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Figure 1

The Sahel region between 12°N and 20°N
5 WORST DROUGHTS BETWEEN 1970–2007 (WEST SAHEL)

1972
1984
1986
1990

Rebellion of the Tobou tribes and civil war in Chad (1965–1990)
Biafran War (1967–1970)
Border conflict in Western Sahara (1976–1991)
Conflict in the Casamance (1982–2007)
Tensions between agricultural and pastoral communities in Burkina Faso (1986, 1995)
Tuareg rebellion in Mali (1990–1996)


Figure 2
Timeline of events in West Sahel and 10 worst droughts between 1970 – 2007
1 Biafran War 1967–1970

1.1 Timeline

29 July 1966 Rioters in northern Nigeria who want to leave the federation assassinate General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi, Nigeria’s then-president, and kill 200 officers and soldiers from the East. Lieutenant-colonel Yakobo Gowon assumes power in the North, West and Centre-West. The Eastern region stays out of the hostilities and is opposed to the seizure of power by Northerner generals.

September 1966 During a constitutional conference that includes representatives from the East, the Northern delegation submits a contradictory resolution, recommending the creation of a powerful central State and the division of the country into a larger number of provinces.

September–October 1966 New massacres of Igbo people (south-eastern ethnic group) are committed in the North. Some 30,000 Eastern Nigerians are murdered while the violence quickly spreads to the West and Central-West and is sometimes orchestrated by police and military forces. Two million people flee to the East.

January 1967 Military governors sign the Aburi Agreement, which promises greater autonomy for regions to avoid a sudden break-up of the federation. The agreement guarantees that civil servants will be paid until May 1967. It calls for the creation of a supreme military council, with each region having full autonomy to deal with its internal affairs, but the agreement is not respected given the pressures on Gowon. Economic problems pile up in the East and relations with the federal government grow more tense when the latter withholds 12 million pounds in civil servant wages and the East keeps federal income tax revenues owed to Lagos.

February 1967 A partial blockade of the Eastern region is put in place. Start of protests by the Yoruba communities in the south-west and opposition to Gowon in the central-west. The Northern emirs, who hold power, decide to split Nigeria into even more regions.

27 May 1967 The Eastern Nigerian Constituent Assembly declares the region’s autonomy.

28 May 1967 Gowon declares a state of siege. He issues a decree establishing 12 states (Nigeria had previously consisted of only four regions).

30 May 1967 The Eastern state’s parliament votes overwhelmingly in favour of the secession of Biafra (the south-east, with a majority Igbo population). Gowon raises an army of 12,000 men.

26 June 1967 Two fronts are opened, in north-east and north-west Biafra.

From July 1967 onwards Biafran oil extraction operations shut down.

16 September 1967 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) condemns Biafra’s secession.

February 1968 Start of aerial bombardments.

Early 1968 Fall of the town of Bonny (Rivers State, South Nigeria) and loss of control over the terminus for the network of oil pipelines. Some of the population flee the town and swell the ranks of refugees attempting to return to what remains of Biafra. The separatists gradually lose the coastal area but hold on to Port Harcourt.

1 The money the federation owed civil servants should have been paid following the signature of the Aburi Agreement. Instead, the federation used the sudden departure to the south-east of Igbo civil servants in the North as an excuse not to pay its debts to the Eastern regional administration.
16 April 1968 Biafra is officially recognised by Tanzania, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia.

End May 1968 Fall of Port Harcourt, Biafra’s only point of access to the outside world.

November 1968 The federal government regains control and resumes operation of Biafran oil facilities.

End of 1968 – Beginning of 1969 Federal troops gradually occupy the most fertile agricultural regions, Annang, Uyo and Bende.

1969 Fall of the principal cities of Enugu, Aba, Onitsha and Umuahia.

13 January 1970 The Biafran rebellion collapses.

1.2 Explanatory factors

1.2.1 Background
Two major factors explain the process that led to the Biafran War: Conflicts between three ethnic groups similar in demographic size, the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, came to a head. Their discord fanned secessionist flames by invoking the principle of self-determination of peoples. Sizeable communities of elites educated in the European system of the 1950–1960s – the Yorubas and Igbos – lived in majority Hausa towns such as Kano, the scene of past anti-southerner pogroms. In 1953, serious clashes between Igbos and Hausas in Kano caused several thousand casualties on the Igbo side. The publication of population distribution by region and ethnic group following the 1963 census drew attention to the number of Igbos and Yorubas living in the North, sharpening the resentment of Northern Hausa populations. In May 1967 Gowon created 12 states, three in the East, six in the North and two in the West, to loosen the grip of the three ethnic groups. Biafra’s defeat was interpreted at the time as the revenge of minority groups, especially those living in the central belt, who were neither northerners nor southerners and comprised equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. In April 1976, Nigeria was again split up into 19 states, further diluting the impact of the three main ethnic groups’ separatist impulses.

The issue of oil revenue distribution. In 1961, oil fields were discovered in the East. Nigeria became a major African oil-producing country in 1966. Oil resources precipitated the crisis in Biafra by promoting the rise of the East and of the Igbo elite. Once advocates of Nigerian unity, the Igbos now saw the federal government as a tool employed by northerners to politically dominate the south. They dreamed of independence and had an economic base capable of supporting secession. The North-South development chasm widened, with the south becoming more dependent on the supply and distribution of agricultural products.

1.2.2 Triggering factors
The division of the East into three states in 1967 entrenched the split between the Igbos and minority ethnic groups such as the Efiks, Ibibios and Ijos. It gave the minorities an administrative existence and took away a corridor to the sea from Igbo country. Rivers State had the majority of oil resources at the time (57.1% of Nigeria’s total production, versus barely 3% for the Central-East) as well as Port Harcourt, the main port.

1.2.3 Aggravating factors
One cause of Biafra’s failed secessionist attempts was the redrawing of ethnic-administrative boundaries. At the same time, oil companies lent their support to the federal state (except for Shell, which played the secession card). The OAU condemned the secession in September 1967 and all international powers – except for France – lined up on the side of the federal
government. Alliances between states and business networks made it possible to marshal enormous military resources, with the Gowon army swelling from 10,000 to 100,000 men at end-1968. When Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire recognised Biafra’s identity, weapons and equipment were passed via Libreville, with France’s support. **The financial and logistics support provided to the rebellion hardened the blockade.**

When the federal state imposed a blockade and oil production stopped beginning in July 1967, Biafra could not be supplied. Threats of famine emerged when federal troops occupied the most fertile farming regions and the towns of Enugu, Aba, Onitsha and Umuahia were lost. By late 1968, massive influxes of people into an already densely populated Biafra, with rain-washed soil that was relatively infertile, triggered an unprecedented humanitarian disaster.

### 1.3 Human toll

The war affected more civilians than soldiers: one million people according to *Le Monde* (12–01–90). Doctors Without Borders (DWB, 1995) estimates that it caused **2 million deaths, 1.5 million from hunger or malnutrition. The number of refugees is estimated at 7 million** (October 1968).

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### 2 Rebellion of the Toubou tribes and civil war in Chad 1965–1990

#### 2.1 Timeline

**1965** French troops pull out of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET). Rebellion erupts in the Ouaddai region, when Muslim Mobi populations refuse to pay taxes (death toll: 23). Tombalbaye, Chad’s first president, puts an end to BET’s attempts at feudalism and autonomy for sultanates. He puts southerner civil servants in charge of levying taxes.

**22 June 1966** The National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) is created in Sudan, at the instigation of Ibrahim Abatcha.

**1968** Death of Abatcha. FROLINAT operates on two fronts: the south-east, or Ouaddai, Salamat, Guera and Chari province, and BET and Kanem. The Toubou dissident movement
is led by Goukouni Oueddei, the son of a traditional Tibesti chieftain. This military split marks the beginning of the schism within FROLINAT.

28 August 1968 President Tombalbaye calls on French troops to restore order. An expeditionary corps of 2,300 men is sent to Tibesti.

After 1969 The Batha and Salamat regions rebel.

1971 Libya recognises FROLINAT as Chad’s sole representative.

1972 Multiples schisms within FROLINAT. The government now controls just a third of the national territory, home to two-thirds of the population. The Chari River becomes a military demarcation line. In the south, pro-government troops try to prevent FROLINAT’s infiltrations to protect the cotton-growing area.

1973 Libyan troops occupy the Aozou Strip. The Toubou dissident movement led by Goukouni and Hissène Habré’s movement make a final split from Abba Siddick’s FROLINAT.

21 April 1974 A team of ethnologists is taken hostage (Claustre affair).

1975 Commander Galopin is assassinated on a mission for the intelligence services.

13 April 1975 Fall of Tombalbaye. The National Movement for Cultural and Social Revolution (MNRCS, formerly the Chadian Progressive Party) comes to power and starts a cultural revolution that sparks ethnic-religious massacres.

1977 A major offensive in the north to block the campaign to fragment Chad is carried out by General Malloum, now President.

1978 Hissène Habré joins Malloum’s regime and becomes Prime Minister.

June 1978 A new Libyan invasion and Libyan support for the rebellion led by Goukouni. Malloum negotiates a military agreement with France but Goukouni solidifies his positions.

12 February 1979 Rift between the President and his prime minister. Civil war erupts and the Armed Forces of the North (Forces Armées du Nord or FAN) carry out numerous massacres of “southerners”. Clashes take place in Abeche, the capital’s military bastion. The country breaks apart.


July 1979 FAN occupies N’Djamena with the support of the French army and Hissène Habré takes power.


January 1981 The Libyan government announces the merger of Chad and Libya, which is condemned by the OAU. France exerts pressure to restore Chad’s independence.

October 1981 After an attempt to merge Chad and Libya fails, Goukouni demands that Libyan troops withdraw. Mr. Kadhafy recalls his 10,000 men. Habré suspends his military operations at the Sudan-Chad border, then resumes the offensive.

1981–1982 FAN makes inroads into every province in the country.

November 1981 Hissène Habré takes Abeche.

September 1982 Hissène Habré controls nearly all of the country and becomes President in October 1982. He is quickly threatened by Goukouni’s re-gathered troops, supported by Libya.

June 1983 Attack on Abeche. France supplies arms to the Chadian government without intervening militarily. Habré has a number of sources of military support, in particular the U.S.

August 1983 The Libyan army bombards Faya-Largeau. Violence escalates and the conflict turns international.
1984 Disturbances break out in southern Chad ("Codos" rebellion). Bloody repression continues until 1988, with all movement leaders opposing Habré.
1987 Libyan offensive in the north of Chad. Habré retakes the Aozou Strip and is then forced out. He takes 2,000 prisoners in Faya. Defeat of Kadhafy.
1988 Libya recognises Chad’s government.
1990 Idriss Déby again invades Chad and defeats Habré, who is forced to flee to Senegal on 1 December.

2.2 Explanatory factors

2.2.1 Background

**Marginalisation of the Toubou tribes** (See Chapter VIII “Tuareg rebellion in Niger” and IX “Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Ganda Koy Self-Defence Movement”). Toubou dissidence has always existed in Chad. Located in central-eastern Chad – especially in the Manga, Kawar and Djado regions on the border between Libya and Chad – the Toubou and Kanuri area straddles Chad and Nigeria and transcends the national borders inherited from the colonial period. The Toubou rebellion, like that of the Tuaregs, demanded autonomy for the region and hiring priority for local personnel at oil sites.

Rebellion has been a recurrent problem for almost 50 years, especially in BET and eastern Chad. It was a triggering or aggravating factor in some of the country’s civil war cycles. BET’s stubbornness prompted President Tombalbaye to ask for French troops to stay on in the area, which remained under separate administrative governance until 1966. The Toubou people, who are both Nigerian and Chadian, are nomadic herders who claim Tibesti as their own. In the late sixties, the former sultanates of Ouaddai, Kanem and Baguirmi were undergoing a process of refeudalisation and return to autarky, controlled by traditional authorities. Their reversion was a reaction to the arrival in BET of southerner civil servants, who brought corruption with them. The resulting tension led to the creation of FROLINAT, which became the focal point of opposition to Tombalbaye’s central power. The front was nationalist and did not militate for separatism in the beginning. But with the jockeying for position amongst its leaders and their mutual enmity – especially between Hissène Habré and Goukouni – FROLINAT started to splinter in 1972 into a host of rival, ethnically based separatist movements. At that point FROLINAT failed in its attempt to represent all political tendencies in Chad and to bring together Muslim groups.

A huge, fragmented country that excites avarice. Distances in Chad are exponential, hence the extreme isolation of some parts of the national territory such as the BET region and especially Tibesti, protected by mountainsides. Its “geography of fragmentation” explains longstanding tensions and regional attempts at secession, especially in the east and north. Moreover, because Chad is located at the crossroads of the Sahel routes linking both the Maghreb and Mashrek to sub-Saharan Africa, it excited the interest of its neighbours and the U.S. and French governments.

2.2.2 Aggravating factors
Violent splits within rebel movements and civil war. Violence peaked in 1972, when 3,000 deaths were reported as a result of armed clashes. The South was on the brink of civil war and minorities were challenging the domination of the Saras. Goukouni’s People’s Armed Forces allied itself with Kamougué’s FAT (Forces Armées Tchadiennes) troops to counter Hissène Habré’s FAN. However, the schisms within FAT that led to fighting prompted some inhabitants of the town of Moundou to flee. At risk of being stripped of his command post, Kamougué dissolved the opposition parties in Moundou. Despite that the confrontations continued and the town of Bongor in the Mayo-Kebbi region became a centre of resistance to Kamougué. Hissène Habré’s troops gradually occupied the south’s three main towns, Moundou, Sahr and Doba. In Ouaddai in the east, Tombalbaye’s crackdown against FROLINAT triggered a massive emigration of inhabitants to nearby Sudan and Darfur.

Moammar Kadhafy’s attempts at destabilisation. In 1972, Kadhafy created an “Islamic Legion” made up of Ugandan and Central African Republic (CAR) nationals, volunteers from Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal and Sahrawis. Besides supporting his dream of creating a “Saharan Republic” for the greater glory of Islam and defending the claims of the marginalised Tuareg and Toubou tribes, the Legion enabled Kadhafy to pressure regimes whose ideological slant ran counter to his pan-African vision and to expand his political and territorial control. Libyan interventions were major factors in destabilising the Chadian rebellion and indirectly stoked the ethnic rivalries in Chad.

The conflict became more international after Libya’s various incursions and French military interventions in response to the taking hostage of a team of ethnologists. The Claustre affair, as it was called, resulted in the murder of a military advisor, Commander Galopin, sent by the French general staff to negotiate their release. It was an attempt to attract worldwide public notice and force the French government to stop its meddling in Chad and its support of Tombalbaye. In 1979–1980, by virtue of the military agreement hastily signed by Goukouni, France found itself obliged to try to lock in the respective positions of the three separatist forces: FROLINAT, the Toubou rebellion led by Goukouni and the government led by Hissène Habré. In 1980, Goukouni did not hesitate to use aviation, tanks and 3,000 Libyan soldiers to crush the government troops of Hissène Habré. When the Tripoli government announced Chad’s merger with Libya in January 1981, the conflict became even more entrenched and internationalised. A shift occurred in French diplomatic and military policy when F. Mitterrand’s socialist party came to power in May 1981 and forced Libya to back track. By that time at least four of Chad’s direct neighbours were actively involved in the conflict: Libya, Sudan, Cameroon and Nigeria.

The occupation of the Aozou Strip. This is one of the oldest border disputes in the Sahel, opposing Chad and Libya with periodic intervention by France. Oddly, however, it concerns one of the few borders to have been formally recognised by an independent state, Libya, in 1955. The boundary consists of two, perfectly rectilinear lines. Their intersection at the Tropic of Cancer had already been the subject of a dispute in the 1930s between France and Italy. The current lines were challenged by Colonel Kadhafy, who claimed the Aozou Strip. The area was occupied militarily in 1973. The underlying issue of the occupation was oil exploration. The Libyan regime could not challenge the borders officially agreed by the Treaty of Tripoli signed in 1955, but Kadafhy did cite a secret agreement signed with Tombalbaye in 1972, which promised 23 billion francs CFA ($100 million) in exchange for surrendering the Aozou Strip to Libya. The border eventually

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2 The Islamic Legion or Islamic Pan-African Legion comprised up to 5,000 men. It was disbanded in 1989.
reverted to its former outline agreed by the Treaty of Rome, signed between Pierre Laval and Benito Mussolini in 1935.

When Hissène Habré brought the Tibesti rebels to power in 1979, relations between Chad and Libya, his former ally, hardened. Ultimately, Aozou proved not to have rich oil deposits and was nothing more than a rocky strip traversed by nomads who were perfectly comfortable with its lawlessness and porous frontiers. The occupation of this bit of land by Libyan troops violated the principle of the intangibility of frontiers ratified in Article 3 of the OAU charter, signed in 1963. The tensions created by this territorial dispute tipped the country into cycles of crises and status quo until Libya’s final incursion in 1988, followed by its official recognition of the Chadian government.

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3 The border conflict in Western Sahara 1976–1991

3.1 Timeline

1973 The Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro; Frente Polisario, or People’s Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Rio de Oro) is created.

16 October 1975 The International Court of Justice issues an opinion on the application of the principle of self-determination of peoples.

6–9 November 1975 350,000 Moroccans gather peacefully in the Western Sahara as part of the “Green March”.

14 November 1975 The Western Sahara is divided between Morocco and Mauritania.


27 February 1976 The Polisario Front proclaims the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

December 1977–Early 1978 France intervenes (Lamentin operation). A cease-fire is signed between the Polisario Front and Mauritania.

5 August 1979 The Algiers Agreements are signed: Mauritania cedes the Rio de Oro to Morocco. The Polisario Front, entrenched in Algeria, fights Moroccan troops.
1980–1987 A wall stretching about 2,700 km is built to isolate the Polisario Front’s leadership and Saharan refugees (exiled in Tindouf) from the rest of the Sahrawi population.

1982 SADR is admitted into the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

February 1984 Mauritania recognises SADR.

12 November 1984 Morocco pulls out of the OAU following SADR’s admission to the Addis Ababa Summit.

6 September 1991 A new peace plan goes into effect and a referendum on self-determination is planned, under the supervision of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’un référendum au Sahara occidental, or MINURSO). It is scheduled for 1992 (but was ultimately postponed several times).

Between 1996 and 2001 Several countries withdraw their diplomatic recognition of SADR.

June 2003 Baker Plan. After successive post-Houston Agreement (1991) referendum failures, the UN Special Representative reactivates the project. His plan calls for establishing a Western Sahara Authority for five years, but is endorsed only by the Security Council. It is rejected by Morocco, leading to a new failure.

January 2004 228 military observers and soldiers from 31 countries are still part of MINURSO as of this date.

December 2007 The final gathering, called the Gjeijimat rally after a small town in the Western Sahara, takes place. A hundred Polisario leaders return to Morocco.

3.2 Explanatory factors

3.2.1 Background

The Western Sahara is a 266,000 square-kilometre area in north-western Saharan Africa bordered by Morocco on the north, Algeria on the north-east, Mauritania to the east and south and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Considered a non-autonomous territory by the UN, this former Spanish colony still has no definitive legal status more than 30 years after the Spanish pulled out in 1976. The Western Sahara is in the grip of a conflict driven both by some Sahrawis’ fight for independence and the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria for regional hegemony. Elevated to a global issue, the Saharan conflict still impedes construction of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) to this day.

In 1884 Spain established a protectorate in the Western Sahara that was confirmed by the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. It began by establishing trading posts and a military presence, although the borders were not clearly defined until the treaty between France and Spain dating from the turn of the 20th century. Local tribes fought the colonial power with Morocco’s help, but this support stopped when the Kingdom of Morocco became a French protectorate in 1912. The Spanish Sahara was carved out of the territories of Río de Oro and Saguía el-Hamra in 1924. It was administered separately from the lands grouped under the name “Spanish Morocco.”

In 1965, the UN pushed Spain to decolonise the territory and begin discussions with Morocco, in conjunction with the Ifni enclave. However, Algeria was in open conflict
with Morocco concerning the boundary line of their common border and Morocco and Mauritania also held opposing territorial claims to the Western Sahara. As a result, the Western Sahara’s three neighbours were unable to put up a united front against Spain, perpetuating its domination.

Settlement of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict and an agreement between Morocco and Mauritania made it possible to unify the anti-Spanish front, the pro-Moroccan Front for Liberation and Unity (FLU). At the same time, several local groups took up armed resistance with the help of the Moroccan national liberation army, created during the Moroccan people’s struggle against the Spanish-French occupation of their country.

3.2.2 Factors triggering the conflict and sequence of events

In 1975, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice confirmed the existence of historic ties amongst the peoples of the Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania, but concluded they were not of a nature to prevent a referendum on self-determination.

A few days after the ICJ’s opinion, Morocco organised the Green March (6 November 1975) to publicise its desire for Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. This led Spain to sign the Madrid Accords with Morocco and Mauritania on 14 November 1975, to make the division of the territory official. Morocco was given the northern two-thirds and Mauritania the southern one-third; Algeria and the Sahrawis were not consulted during the negotiations. The withdrawal of Spanish troops, decided upon shortly before the death of Franco, took place between 1975 and 1976.

On 27 February 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in Bir Lehlou, the day after the last Spanish soldier left the area. At the same time, the Polisario Front mounted lightning incursions against Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, which it viewed as new occupation forces. The Battle of Amgala between Moroccan and Algerian forces in the Western Sahara in 1976 shows Algeria’s active support of the Polisario Front. Between late 1975 and 1976, thousands of Sahrawis left the Western Sahara for the refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, managed by the Polisario and the Algerian Army.

Morocco became the de facto holder of the remainder of the territory in 1979, after Mauritania’s withdrawal. In the 1980s, Morocco built a defence wall splitting the territory in two, with the eastern quarter henceforth controlled by the Polisario Front. A war of ambushes with the Polisario Front ended in 1991 following a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations; a referendum organised by the United Nations on the area’s final status was postponed several times.

3.2.3 Aggravating factors

The problem of the self-determination referendum and censuses of the Sahrawis. The Western Sahara was claimed both by Morocco – which called it the “Moroccan Sahara” – and by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), founded by the Polisario Front in 1976.

A mined border and forgotten refugee camps. The Western Sahara shares 42 kilometres of border with Algeria, 1,561 kilometres with Mauritania and 443 kilometres with Morocco. Since the 1991 cease-fire, Morocco has controlled and administered about 80% of the territory, while the Polisario Front controls 20% left by Morocco behind a long safety buffer. The areas controlled by Morocco (in the west) and the Polisario are separated by a wall of sand built by the Moroccans. In addition, 300,000 refugees remain in the Algerian border camp of Tindouf, some of them since 1976.

The issue of natural resource control. The Western Sahara is rich in iron, phosphates and fish stocks, but probably also in oil and gas. Several oil companies have been authorised
to explore the territory. These natural resources whet the appetites of the protagonists, preventing the conflict’s final settlement and poisoning relations between Algeria and Morocco. The latter accuses Algeria of supporting the Polisario Front so that it can gain access to the ocean.

**Internationalisation of the conflict.** The Western Sahara has been a major issue in the Morocco-Algeria rivalry for more than 30 years. Throughout the Cold War, the Polisario Front could count on the support of the Eastern Block, especially the USSR and Libya, to counter “Moroccan expansionism” that “seriously endangered” all eastern and southern neighbours, while Morocco could rely on the complicity of Western Europe, the United States, the Persian Gulf monarchies and Israel. By creating a balance of power between the belligerents, this taking of sides prevented a quick resolution of the conflict at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. Diplomatic solutions – notably the holding of a self-determination referendum – have been postponed regularly since 1992.

3.2.4 Status of the situation since 1991
In 1991 the UN Security Council created MINURSO, whose mission was to enforce the cease-fire, facilitate prisoner-of-war exchanges, help repatriate refugees, identify and register voters and hold the referendum.

From 2003 onwards, certain UN documents referred to Morocco as an “administering authority”, which would give it the right to develop the Western Sahara’s natural resources – to authorise oil concessions, for example. The SADR government also claims authority to administer the territory. In 2002, a legal opinion issued by Hans Corell, UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, stated that the powers and responsibilities of Spain for the territory had been transferred to a temporary tripartite administration. Although the cease-fire has been upheld and the Polisario Front released 300 Moroccan prisoners in November 2003, Morocco and the Sahrawis continue to disagree about who will have voting rights. No solution acceptable to the protagonists has been found to the problem of the return of Tindouf refugees, a critical issue for holding the referendum.

Since 2007, the United States has seemed to favour even more clearly the Kingdom of Morocco’s position. Indeed, the containment of Al Qaeda in Muslim North Africa is a new geopolitical reality that is very likely to further harden the respective positions of the warring parties.

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4 Conflict in the Casamance 1982–2007

4.1 Timeline

1980–1981 School marches and strikes at Ziguinchor to protest against shortcomings in infrastructure and facilities. Popular discontent becomes more organised in a tense social and political climate.

26 December 1982 The strikes continue. A march organised by the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) is dispersed with bloodshed. A priest, Father Diamacoune Senghor, is arrested, an event which sparks off armed rebellion.

From 1984 onwards The Dakar authorities adopt a dual strategy for reining in the impact of the MFDC: a strategy of all-out military effort is coupled with one involving administratively splitting the geographical Casamance into two separate regions to isolate the various armed movements from each other. Sidy Badji establishes the underground movement “Atika” (in Jola “the arrow”), the most radical armed branch of the MFDC.

1989 The International Criminal Court in the Hague rules in favour of Senegal in its border dispute with Guinea-Bissau for the control of Cape Roxo.

July–August 1990 The army and separatists are involved in serious clashes.

31 May 1991 A ceasefire agreement is reached between the Senegalese government and MFDC separatists.

1992 A split occurs in the northern front of the MFDC. Senegalese leaders infiltrate the Movement in an attempt to divide it.

1995 Fresh disturbances erupt. On 6 April, four French tourists disappear in the Casamance.

October 1995 The army launches an offensive in Lower Casamance.

8 January 1996 Organisation of initial peace talks between the separatists and national peace committee representatives.

September 1998 Incidents on the Guinea-Bissau border.

26 December 1999 During the Banjul peace negotiations, another ceasefire agreement is signed by the Senegalese government and the MFDC.

30 November 2000 An initial meeting between the new Wade regime and the MFDC is scheduled for 16 December in Ziguinchor.

24 March 2001 The government and rebels meet to “finalise” the peace agreement signed on 16 March.

30 December 2004 A new ceasefire is signed between Minister of the Interior Ousmane Ngom and Diamacoune Senghor and a relatively calm period begins, disturbed by a few sporadic attacks.

April 2006 Bloody clashes break out between MFDC factions brought about by the leader’s health problems, which encourages power struggles.

17 January 2007 Death of Father Diamacoune Senghor.

May 2007 Persistent rivalry between several MFDC factions which have remained underground, some of them seeking refuge in Gambia.
4.2 Explanatory factors

4.2.1 Context

The colonial and post-colonial inheritance supplemented by geographical factors. The natural region of the Casamance is cut off from the rest of Senegal by the Gambian enclave. Its distinctive ecological and geographical features have made it Senegal’s granary. A former Portuguese colony, it was the last land area to be incorporated administratively within Senegal. The longer time taken to integrate it explains why its links with the rest of the country remain weak. This geographical and political distinctiveness has strengthened the strong cultural identity of Casamance communities.

A State management deficit. The Senegalese nation state has traditionally been based on its groundnut crops and its marabout brotherhoods. The centre of production (the groundnut basin in the Baol region) has received greater support from development policies than the outlying regions of national territory. During the 1980s and 1990s, the political and financial crisis resulting from implementation of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) tended to marginalise the Casamance still further. In addition, policies for geographical and administrative decentralisation introduced from the mid-1990s onwards replaced the previous organisational models. As a result, the central administrative authorities have been somewhat poorly represented in the Casamance, thus increasing its isolation from the remainder of the country and encouraging the growth of pockets of insecurity.

Weak regional economic development. Despite the potential of the area, it has been impossible to make the most of agricultural capability because of the low level of investment and inadequate facilities. The poor state of the roads is not conducive to the free movement of persons and goods and, by cutting off the region still further, exacerbates the frustration of local communities.

The land question. The rich lands in the south have attracted relentless land speculation since the 1970s. Abandoning the arid infertile lands of the central basin, baol-baol, cayor-cayor and saloum-saloum migrants have opened up pioneering fronts in the Upper and Lower Casamance to develop cash crops (especially cotton and groundnuts). This all-out exploitation of land in the Casamance has given rise to resentment and tension among the indigenous peoples who only recognise traditional methods of land allocation. The conflict has been reflected, first of all, in a near-instinctive intolerance of “foreigners”, and more particularly the northerners of Senegalese origin and Guineans. These “foreigners” are accused of having taken over the land, excessively exploited natural resources, overexploited and damaged the environment, and engaged in vote-catching practices and corruption in an administration dominated by northerners. Next, the communities of “southerners” have been subject to discrimination and marginalisation: the shared perceptions of those in the North have conveyed negative and disparaging images of Casamance people. Demands for territorial autonomy have led to an indexing of symbols and common values among them which have furthered the development of a “Jola reality” and a “Casamance identity”.

The fully-fledged movement finally emerged as the continuation of both social and identity-based activism that had been developing throughout the whole of the Casamance since the 1970s.

4.2.2 Events triggering the crisis

In December 1982, a protest march organised by the MFDC was repressed with bloodshed by the security forces. The demonstrators sought to take down the Senegalese flag from the
governor’s palace and instead raise a white flag in a symbolic gesture. This event marked
the beginning of the repression but also the conversion of the separatists to armed struggle.
The longstanding marginalisation of the Jolas in the north (they were of peasant stock and
customarily confined to jobs as seasonal workers, servants or work in the armed forces)
began to appear in the south because of the increasingly difficult economic situation. With
any upward social mobility barred to them, people in the Casamance became aware in the
early 1980s that Senegalese society had largely exhausted its capacity for integration. This
very recent marginalisation in the south was the key factor which triggered the crisis.

4.2.3 Aggravating factors

**Incomptability of beliefs.** After 1990, the crusading zeal of Islam and the marabouts
(essentially adherents of Mouridism) developed in the southern regions, which led to
incomprehension on the part of the Casamance – most notably Jola – communities wishing
to maintain their animist and Christian beliefs. The MFDC took advantage of this trend
and developed a form of propaganda based on the collusion between public authorities
and Islam. It lambasted this proselytism as an attempt to eradicate the “Jola reality” rooted
in charms and initiation to the sacred wood. The Casamance sense of neo-colonisation
was spurred on by the determination of the State to do away with their cultural ties to the
land through regionalisation and the establishment of military barracks and to grant them
no means of expression. In this sense, the Casamance crisis has been just one “aspect of
the social crisis in Senegal which has erupted at its weakest link” (*La crise casamançaise,*
Marut, p. 82.).

**The vulnerability of the State.** At the end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s,
MFDC activities became more radical. This was not unrelated to the fact that the Senegalese
State experienced different crises from which it emerged much weaker (the Senegal/
Mauritanian crisis in 1989 and the severe political crisis at the time of the 1988 presidential
elections; and more recently, since 2006/07, the disillusion of Casamance people with the
regime of Abdoulaye Wade who in 2000 promised to put an end to the Casamance conflict
in 100 days).

**Disension within the MFDC.** Following the political victory of 1991 and signature of
the ceasefire agreements, the MFDC was undermined by internal rifts, as some sought to
pursue the strategy of political negotiation, while others preferred to concentrate more on
armed action. The death of Father Diamacoune Senghor in 2007 reactivated the conflicts
over who should succeed him.

**Military intervention to counter MFDC guerrilla operations.** The establishment
of military quarters and the use of heavy weapons proved to be largely ineffective in
overcoming the MFDC, which was able to take advantage of the natural environment
(mangrove swamps, forests, branches of the river, underground tunnels, etc.) to launch
attacks and then disappear.

**Interventionism on the part of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.** Given its setting, the
Casamance conflict stretched beyond borders and had an influence on neighbouring relations
between the three countries. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, these relations deteriorated in
the border dispute over Cape Roxo with its extensive surrounding offshore oil wells.
However, they became really tense after Guinea-Bissau was accused of acting as a base
for withdrawal and arms supplies for MFDC combatants. The situation was even more
critical in that it was further accused of not having supported Senegal during the conflict
with Mauritania, and also suspected of having facilitated the rapprochement between
MFDC and Mauritanian leaders and obstructed the establishment of the Senegambia Confederation. To prevent the factions of Ansoumana Mané close to the MFDC from coming to power in Bissau, Senegal was obliged to lend its military support to Nino Vieira in 1998. As the Senegalese authorities feared a union of the “3 Bs” (Banjul, Bignona^3 and Bissau), they began to apply economic pressures in the mid-1990s (border closure, indirect blockades on gas or petrol, etc.) so that Gambia would not enter the conflict. After the Jola, Yayah Jammeh, came to power in Banjul in 1994, Gambia was used even more as an area for the strategic withdrawal of combatants, obliging Dakar to invite Gambia to the negotiating table in 2000, and then in 2004.

**The “peace saboteur” phenomenon.** After the “dark years”, between 1991 and 1994, during which organised cooperation initiatives withdrew from the Casamance, the development partners returned to invest in the goal of peace and security. “Peace saboteurs” repeatedly took advantage of opportunities to maintain a situation of endemic insecurity in a general climate of security. The variety of strategies promoted by the central authorities (settlement in 100 days, Council of Elders, reversal of the political wing, etc.) obscured the activities of the parties involved and tended to compromise the search for a lasting peace.

**The question of refugees.** Since the middle of the 1990s, between 10,000 and 70,000 people have been displaced (according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)), in most cases to within communities around their looted villages and sometimes to camps on the borders with Guinea-Bissau and Gambia. With renewed fighting in 2007, the return of the refugees was delayed, while new groups of people sought to take refuge. Mining in the low-lying areas primarily in the south and south-west of Ziguinchor prevented any agricultural activity, thus wiping out the local economy. In most cases, though, civilians fled as a result of village raids organised by armed factions out to seize the rice granaries, cashew nut orchards or other resources to fund their military expenditure. Everyday coexistence among the refugees and the communities taking them in sometimes led to conflict due to the scarce food resources, the increase in essentially needed commodities and the relative lack of schools and health centres.

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^3 Bignona is the administrative headquarters of one of the three départements of Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor, Bignona and Oussouye).
5  Border dispute and the “Christmas War” between Mali and Burkina Faso 1985–86

5.1  Timeline

**Between 1960 and 1974** Minor incidents on the border between Mali and Burkina Faso. Intimidatory manoeuvres organised on both sides. Establishment of joint committees to defuse the tension but efforts to achieve diplomatic settlements make no progress.

**August 1983** Four Burkinan captains come to power led by Thomas Sankara who accepts a diplomatic settlement, referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.

**October 1983** Each of the parties submits its statement to the ICJ which is to deliver its verdict in June 1986.

**August 1985** Drissa Keita, Secretary General of the West African Economic Community (WAEMU), is expelled from its Ouagadougou headquarters after making provocative comments about Burkina Faso and President Sankara.

**December 1985** Organisation of a census in Burkina Faso. As this requires the presence of military staff in the area subject to dispute, it gets under way in a tense atmosphere. Incidents occur between census officials and Mali citizens.

**20 December 1985** At Mali’s request, Burkina Faso withdraws its troops from the disputed areas informing its neighbours that it has done so. The vehement official statements exchanged by both actors exacerbate the tension and contribute to a highly charged situation.

**25 December 1985** Bombardment by Malian armed forces of the towns of Ouahigouya, Nassoumbo and Djibo. The “war of the communiqués” is the pretext for this Malian military operation. Burkinan forces in turn bomb the town of Sikasso before a ceasefire can be reached.

**26 – 29 December 1985** Sustained feverish diplomacy. Three initial ceasefires disregarded by both parties.

**30 December 1985** Signature of a fourth agreement between the warring parties.

**22 December 1986** The ICJ finally delivers its judgement with which both parties say they are satisfied. Burkina Faso receives the northern area known as the “three rivers area” which is strategically important for livestock farming and agriculture in this region of the Sahel. Mali recovers the so-called “four villages” area.

5.2  Details regarding the disputed area

The disputed area consisting of a strip of land 275 kilometres long (some sources say only 160 kilometres) and 30 kilometres broad, is situated in the extreme north-west of Burkina Faso. It stretches from the Malian village of Yoro to the point at which the borders of Mali, Burkina-Faso and Niger intersect. The strip in question, whose exact borders remain unclear due to repeatedly carving up the region at the time of colonisation and then decolonisation, was the original reason for an armed conflict between Burkina Faso and Mali, known as the “Agacher (or ‘Agescher’) Strip War” or “Christmas War”.

22 Security Implications of Climate Change in the Sahel Region © SWAC 2010
5.3 Explanatory factors

5.3.1 Context
The border dispute which had not been settled, despite efforts to reach a diplomatic solution, led to a deterioration in bilateral relations. Contrary to the situation on the border with Niger, the Upper Volta/Mali boundary was never described in a General Regulation by the French colonial administrative authorities. The initially drawn line was based on mapping from the colonial era but was not the subject of a clear demarcation officially established in decrees issued by the colonial governors of that period. A first dispute occurred in the Béli area in 1961. Following conflicts between riverside dwellers, a joint Mali/Burkina Faso committee met in 1968. Both parties disagreed with each other. Mali claimed that the area had always been on the colonial boundaries of Western Sudan, according to a document dating from 1935 which included the disputed villages within the Mopti circle. It considered that, as there were no orders or regulations, the presence of the administrative authority in the area and the existence, at least on a seasonal basis, of closely-knit communities which had settled there for their herds to graze, were sufficient grounds for declaring the disputed strip of land to be Malian. Burkina Faso laid claim to the area of the four villages remaining in the Mopti circle in 1935, because the foregoing document had been repealed by the law of 1947 which re-established the colony of Upper Volta within its former boundaries. Maps available from 1920 did indeed indicate that the four villages at issue belonged to the former Voltaic circle that bordered Ouahigouya.

Growing diplomatic tension fuelled by ideological and geostrategic antagonisms. Diplomatic efforts on the part of Burkina Faso led to a signed agreement on the boundaries and demarcation of 1000 kilometres of undisputed border territory, and the establishment of a major Joint Commission for bilateral cooperation in September 1983. Burkina had been conciliatory towards its neighbour Mali by lifting its veto, in October 1983 at the WAEMU summit, so that Mali could join the West-African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). But the effect of a series of events (heightened tension in Mali with the preparation of a general strike, a visit by Mr Gaddafi to T. Sankara, tension between Drissa Keita and the Burkinan government, etc.) was to make the Sankara regime the bête noire to be eliminated, as it was challenging French interests and destabilising the regime of Moussa Traoré in Mali (rioting due to famine and student unrest, insurrectional atmosphere since 1982).

5.3.2 More random factors
They were mainly climatic. Poor rainfall levels were the sequel to successive periods of drought in the 1970s and the exceptionally severe drought of 1984. This trend, which drove Malian livestock farmers further than they would normally venture towards water points and grazing lands in the north of Burkina, stirred up the conflicts between crop and livestock farmers in the disputed Agacher area.

5.3.3 Events triggering the conflict
This was an event in which tension erupted into conflict over a very short period. However, the first signs of it date from much earlier and the factors that triggered it off are closely linked. They included the census activity which required the presence of Burkinan military staff in the disputed villages of Dionouga, Kouni and Sebba, and which the Malian authorities viewed as a further provocation. Yet the operation was part of a systematically pre-planned ten-year cycle, with the preceding census held in 1975. In February 1985 against a background of acute social tension in Mali, Charles Hernu (then) French
minister of defence paid an official visit to the Malian authorities which resulted in an arms delivery. By stirring up speculation over French attempts to destabilise the Sankara regime, this event played its part in triggering the conflict.

5.3.4 Aggravating factors

Two processes which were the outcome of political manipulation stirred up tension and added an international dimension to the conflict. First, as in the case of Chad and Libya, the border dispute issue was exploited and the military manoeuvres obscured the extreme vulnerability of the Malian regime to grave internal crises. Furthermore, the publicly traded war of words racked up the tension while the media precipitated the conflict by fanning the flames of nationalist sentiment.

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6 Severe tension between crop and livestock farmers in the south-west of Burkina Faso 1986 and 1995

6.1 Timeline

Events in Sidéréadougou

December 1986 After being told that a herd was trampling over his field of crops, a Karaboro farmer kills a Fulani stockbreeder. The young Karaboro goes to the police station and his father is arrested and imprisoned.

The following day The police helped by community auxiliaries attempts to keep order and guarantees the safety of women and children from the different communities.

The day after that During the burial of the Fulani herdsman attended by a large crowd in the field in which the murder had taken place, the police arrives with the Karaboro father and son and delivers a report on crop losses arising from the damage caused by the herd. The Fulani takes this as further provocation and the Karaboro father is beaten by the mob so severely that he dies from his wounds.

One day later The Karaboro farmers meet and decide to go to the police station to free by force the Karaboro’s son still in prison. Army and police units from Banfora and Bobo Dioulasso then arrive at the police station, dissuading them from violent intervention. In response to this, they return home, arm themselves with their rifles and take reprisals on any Fulani they meet in the village. In the end, three are murdered in Sidéréadougou.
and surrounding villages. The damage done in the fields spreads as the Fulani flee and no longer control their herds, which further angers the Karaboro. Two other Fulani are killed in nearby villages.

Events in Mangodara

February 1995 Three Fulani herdsmen are crossing a Karaboro field when the owner tells them to leave his land and aims a weapon at them. Tempers flare. The farmer is disarmed and beaten.

The following day The farmer lodges a complaint and demands a sum of 225,000 CFA francs which he claims to have lost in the brawl. The herdsmen deny the theft and offer to cover the wounded man’s medical expenses.

The evening of the next day Livestock enclosures are attacked, with many animals killed and drovers wounded. Fresh meat is discovered in the homes of the Karaboro farmers. One young farmer is held in police custody. A Fulani is then shot by some Karaboro who go on to storm the street, shooting at any Fulani they met on the way.

On 9 February Seven dead and many wounded are reported, all of them Fulani.

6.2 Explanatory factors

6.2.1 Context

A region involving substantial ethnic interchange with no centralised social form of organisation, in which socio-political regulation has been based primarily on legitimate violence. The Comoé region was inhabited by a great many different peoples (Senufo, Karaboro, Fulani, Lobi, Bambara, etc.) which had experienced no form of centralised political and social organisation prior to the Dyula and French conquests. Reciprocal influences and interaction have occurred between these communities. “This social pattern resulting from a kind of balanced vindictiveness nevertheless works on the assumption that certain invisible material and symbolic limits are rigidly established. Outside areas subject to community protection, soldiers of fortune are liable to severely rebuke and run the risk of death, looting and slavery” (Ouedraogo, 1997).

With lands increasingly in demand, coexistence has been subject to growing conflict for the control of resources. The first to occupy the Banfora plain, the Karaboro were pushed eastwards by their new Dyula neighbours. Driven by their growing population and relative degeneration of the soil, the Karaboro have continued their eastward migration. This migration of indigenous peoples has run into the influx of livestock farmers fleeing the arid areas in the north. Current migratory movements have diverted some communities from regions in the centre, north and west towards the fertile lands of Comoé, and the département of Sidéradougou in particular. Fulani have settled in the region in successive waves of varying size. In the main, these Fulani originally from the Sahel area of Burkina Faso and Mali and/or former settlers in the Bobo region have increasingly moved southward in the search for good grazing land. By contrast, the Mangodara département has only recently become an area for migration. These movements covering short distances are mainly those of Karaboro farmers arriving from the west (Banfora) to escape the deterioration in their living conditions and the barren land of their native areas. The livestock farmers have extended their migration increasingly southwards and competition has inevitably arisen between the two approaches to land occupation (Karaboro/Fulani and crop/livestock farming).
Drought, aridity and soil degeneration caused by human activity. With the drought of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the soil gradually degenerated. The general decrease in soil fertility was also attributable to more intensive farming of the central plateau and the growth of speculative crop farming on more fertile land in the west. Meanwhile, overgrazing shortened the periods in which land was left fallow, thereby inhibiting natural soil replenishment. In addition, the country has annually lost 32,000 hectares of forest cleared either to make use of the land or because trees are felled to provide wood for heating or rare oils for export. Finally, water sources often used for domestic consumption have become polluted by the passing livestock that drink from them. Notwithstanding favourable weather conditions resulting in a good harvest in 1996–97 (with a yield of 2.4 million tons, or an increase of 7.5% compared to the preceding period), this steady

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4 Only 9% of Burkinan farmers used organic fertilisers in 1997.
growth in environmental damage has led to increasingly fierce competition for the control of resources.

**Crisis/transformation/adaptations in Fulani livestock farming.** With generally unfavourable weather patterns causing a deterioration in their living conditions, Fulani herdsmen had been obliged to migrate since the 1940s to make the most of their sole asset, livestock. The successive cycles of drought in the 1970s and 1980s tended to reinforce this trend. This migratory movement mainly reflected the need to redistribute loads as the number of livestock grew and the farmers vacated land after the harvest. Migratory movements took many forms. Sometimes long, they could occur over increasingly greater distances which meant frequent periods spent in foreign countries. Successful treatment of trypanosomiasis further encouraged migration. Transhumance might also occur over shorter distances. Apparent too were processes of partial settlement by herdsmen, as scope for grazing was reduced following growing human occupation of the land (especially around Mangodara). This relative degree of settlement on the part of the Fulani herdsmen provided opportunities for agriculture, so that social and trade relations with other groups appeared increasingly dispensable. Furthermore, the use of drovers who were unrelated to the owners of livestock led to a fairly clear rift between the Fulani and sedentary populations. The routes for transhumance were no longer strictly followed and animals were fattened by illicit means. Where disputes occurred, drovers were no longer responsible for the damage caused by herds. This situation was exacerbated as the former authorities became more compliant and by the fact that no particular chieftaincy administered the Fulani in this area.

**The erosion of traditional regulatory structures among Karaboro farmers.** The basic foundations of Karaboro social existence were gradually undermined by migration and successive moves to new locations, the displacement of long-standing family-based groups and the decreasing size of farm holdings. In the Karaboro community, traditional social relations were unable to adapt to continued existence under the new rules imposed by modern society. Social mobility was at a standstill and the Karaboro were unable to maintain their customary socio-economic environment within the new societal structure. This latent sense of civil war infecting all indigenous peoples in the province seemed attributable to loss of the mystique that surrounded their world and drove them to perpetrate acts of violence, while also apparently reflecting an effort to redefine their social relations with other communities, given that the identity of each had disappeared with the breakdown of their own forms of organisation.

**The growth of monetary social activity.** The corollary of diminishing traditional values was the gradual spread of social competition to accumulate wealth. During the same period, a fresh upsurge in gang crime and vandalism was observed in the area, as a result of the increasing importance attached to economic currency.

**Ineffective means of State intervention.** The public authorities encouraged settlements in this transit area opening onto the rich fertile lands in the south. The order of the National Council for the Revolution declared that from 1988 all land would become State property (under the agrarian and land reform)\(^5\), overriding any other kind of legitimate entitlement to it, aroused the anger of the indigenous communities (most notably the Karaboro in Sidéradougou) who accused the State of interfering in strictly local affairs involving ancestral land rights. In addition, programmes aimed at increasing the autonomy of various economic operators tended to be instrumental in generating social and spatial

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\(^5\) It is also thought that desertification prompted the State to assume more drastic control over natural resources and establish non-discriminatory mechanisms providing access to the land for ethnic minorities in this area, such as the Fulani and Mossi, etc. The impact of this reform as an aggravating or circumstantial factor in triggering off the crisis is questionable, as it was little more than an abstract notion for many of the region’s inhabitants who remained poorly informed.
segregation. The public authorities were perceived as responsible for the disagreements between farmers and herdsmen, and indeed for creating ethnic tensions. During both conflicts, the Karaboro considered that the Fulani, though guilty from the outset, were not formally disciplined by the State authorities. The Fulani for their part also criticised justice and administration since, notwithstanding the occurrence of violent crimes, no judicial procedure had been established by the court in Bobo-Dioulasso. The Fulani felt that justice was on the side of the farmers and that it censured and condemned their own way of life. Be that as it may, the events of 1986 led to a breakdown in mutual understanding between the main players and representative State bodies (regional department for water and forestry, justice, the security forces, etc.) which became even greater after 1995.

6.2.2 Aggravating factors

Attempts to justify earlier resentment: The violent conflicts of Sidéradougou and Kowéré remained very vivid in the collective memory (with four dead, three Fulani and one Karaboro in December 1986). These events were the basis for divisions and reinforced the desire to eliminate other groups. This resentment was fuelled by ethnic antagonisms, in which the Karaboro customarily viewed the Fulani as masterminding raids on the local population (Zerma raids, kidnapping and the sale of slaves to Mali, etc.). Their hatred was all the more unrelenting for the fact that they felt humiliated by the sense of religious superiority which the Fulani conveyed to them. For the Karaboro, the Fulani were perceived to be the sole instigators of transgression and attacks against the social order. This in turn enhanced the Karaboro sense of their own civility, as they alone (they claimed) complied with the new social standards. The process of alienation and the upsurge of tension provided a favourable setting for playing on the collective memory by focusing attention on the enemy – those who were different.

Circulation of small arms: the number of weapons in circulation steadily increased during this period. They were smuggled into Burkina Faso from Ghana.

The exacerbating role of the media: In contrast to the events of 1986, those of February 1995 were reported by the press. The local conflict suddenly assumed national proportions. This gave rise to public discussions which exacerbated the divisions between the Fulani and Senufos. In this context, the press recounted the opinions of Fulani who spoke of “genocide” in interpreting acts of violence perpetrated by the Karaboro. In particular, it made reference to attacks against an ethnic group as the first signs of an ethnic war similar to those of Burundi or Rwanda (Le Matin, March 1996).

Ineffectual regulatory bodies. Tension between the two communities might have been contained to a greater extent if traditional arbitration mechanisms had functioned more effectively. The “masters of the land” who were linked by cousinhood to the Fulani used with them the forces of “kinship mockery” to defuse situations that were contentious or conducive to conflict. However, with the breakdown in traditional methods of organisation, they were no longer able to perform their function. Other theories stated on the contrary that (1) long-standing mechanisms for overcoming conflicts had been activated to prevent the situation from becoming more acrimonious; (2) by forming what was essentially a self-defence group to replace ineffectual security forces, the “masters of the land” tended to fan conflicts in taking sides with the Karaboro (Hagberg, 1998).

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6 In the view of the Karaboro, the religious conservatism of the Fulani led them to judge non-Muslims as “Kaffirs” unworthy of any interest.
7 Border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over islands in Lake Chad (1987–2004)

7.1 Timeline

1964 Establishment of an intergovernmental agency known as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

Between February 1987 and May 1989 Various skirmishes linked to a border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon near Lake Chad.

17 May 1987 Following the permanent migration of its peoples onto Darak Island, Nigeria decides to raise its flag on Cameroon territory.

Since 1997 Growing scarcity of fishing resources. Fish transported along the now dry river bed.

10 October 2002 The matter is referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

December 2003 Withdrawal of Nigerian troops with no serious incidents.

10–12 February 2004 Eighth session of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission at Abuja. Signature of a Treaty of friendship and non-aggression confirming the withdrawal and the transfer of authority from Nigeria to Cameroon in the Lake Chad area. Cameroon is granted sovereignty over 32 villages. The border is gradually demarcated to lessen the risk of disputes arising from uncertainty about its precise line in this unsettled environment.

7.2 Geographical reference points
The Lake Chad basin lies within a vast Sudanese region of the Sahel covering an area of 2,381,636 km2. Its underground and surface water network stretches from Hoggar and Ténéré, to Tibesti and Ennedi continuing southward towards the north of Cameroon and the north-east of Nigeria, and management of such a cross-border basin requires sound transnational cooperation. Settlement has been highly mixed and varied around the Lake which covers different climatic areas, as reflected in the exploitation of specific natural resources consistent with the environment.
In earliest times, the Lake Chad islands were inhabited solely by the Buduma and Kanuri peoples, who were traditionally cattle rearers and fishermen engaged in activities on their sheltered islands for centuries during the Kanem-Bornu Empire. They formed animist communities which were not influenced by Islam until the beginning of the 20th century. They thus never felt concerned about the line of colonial borders drawn between Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon.

Several islands, including Darak island located 35 km to the east of the border with Nigeria, were reportedly first occupied by Nigerian fishermen who followed the retreating waters of the Lake at the end of the 1980s. Consisting of 21 villages and 14 separate islands, Darak covers an area of 660 km². With a population of around 20,000 in 2006, it is home to several peoples living there together (Hausa, Djoukoun, Margui, Mousgoum, Massa, Ibo, Arab Choa, Kotoko). That said, the Nigerian Hausas form the majority, nearly all of them having settled around the island to fish there.

7.3 Explanatory factors

7.3.1 Context

Drought from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s (1973–82). At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the entire Sahel was hit by a series of droughts. Besides the many deaths they caused, these droughts encouraged the migration of thousands of people towards the islands of the Lake as a “place of refuge”, despite the inter-State borders in existence. Groups of Nigerians began to occupy certain Cameroonian islands that emerged from the waters as Lake Chad shrunk. Not long after that, the Nigerian Borno State administrative authority endorsed this migration, establishing its supremacy over land which, in principle, was part of Cameroon. That said, the effects of these movements involving indigenous and non-indigenous groups should not be exaggerated, given that when the two States argued over their right to some of the Lake Chad islands, peoples of varied background (from Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Chad, the Central African Republic, etc.), lived peacefully together there united by their common exploitation of environmental resources, especially those of fishing.

Acronyms:

- CNS Sovereign National Conference
- FLAA Liberation Front of Air and Azawad
- UPD Union for Democracy
- CVT Tuareg Vigilance Committee
- UFRA Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance
- MNJ Niger Movement for Justice
A growing population combined with lower levels of rainfall. Estimated at around 10 million in 1963, the number of people living around Lake Chad had risen to 30 million by 2006. This demographic pressure on the resources of the Lake coincided with the decrease in rainfall. Meteorologists claim that the amounts of rain recorded in the Lake Chad basin have substantially fallen over time. They dropped from 320 mm a year on average in the Nigerian part in the 1970s to 210 mm in 1996.

The growing scarcity of natural resources and increased competition for their control. Deforestation seems to have been the most damaging human activity. As firewood and charcoal have remained the main energy sources for local residents, the vegetation cover has been daily eroded, thus significantly altering the ecological balance of this fragile ecosystem.

The drop in water level subsequent to lower rainfall meant that land which had long been flooded became available. This led to the appearance of many islands and constant changes in the visibility of the area’s (national) border markers whose siting and observation depended on water levels. The fall in water levels also led to competition for access to and control of this fertile territory. In the Cameroon area of the Lake in the mid-1990s, there were more than 30 villages established by Nigerian immigrants with a total population of over 70,000. It was in this context that the Nigerian groups which were larger and very enterprising continued to occupy the newly available land and islands.
created following the repeated draining of the Lake. After serving as an area for political asylum, it became a refuge for climatic reasons.

**Extensive fishing activity controlled by Nigerian traders** was closely followed by the arrival of Nigerian army and civilian authorities on Darak, thus breaching the inviolability of the borders according to the Cameroon authorities. From then on, the Nigerian army organised the meticulously planned occupation of some 30 islands. Notwithstanding Cameroon protests, Nigerian military and administrative forces have continued to occupy the Darak region because of the very scattered presence of the Cameroon authorities.

### 7.3.2 Aggravating factors

The series of droughts occurring since the 1970s seemingly gave rise to a **fishing crisis** with less flooding of the water holes (yaérés). It was magnified by a massive influx of migrant Malian or Nigerian fishermen with more aggressive fishing techniques. The fall in water levels also followed an increase in irrigated crop cultivation. In this context of increasingly scarce resources, Nigeria defended the interests of its Hausa nationals by taking over the disputed islands. After suffering the loss of their livestock during heavy flooding in 1956, the Buduma now saw the paths of transhumance obliterated by crop growing as water levels subsided.

**Inter-ethnic tensions developed** against the background of a surge in population (in some areas, population density rose from 10 to 60 inhabitants/km²).

**The unevenly matched forces** of Nigeria and its smaller neighbor Cameroon account for the Nigerian takeover. However, the conflict caused by this border dispute was relatively insignificant compared to the one centring on the Bakassi peninsula which caused a diplomatic outcry and extensive troop mobilisation. Obliged to handle the Bakassi affair during the same period, both governments preferred to seek a more peaceful solution to their Darak Island conflict.

### 7.3.3 Persistent lack of security around Lake Chad

**Other border conflicts** for the possession of certain islands between Niger and Nigeria (over so-called Tomba Moto island) and between Nigeria and Chad led to military skirmishes for the takeover of islands such as Tatawa, Hadidé and Kinasserom. In attempting to extend its sovereignty over the disputed territories, each country sought to appropriate as much as possible in terms of land and water resources, as well as all their prospective economic benefits (especially fish).

**There were other conflicts in which the central issue was the control of water resources.** In the 1990s, there was a further conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria over use of the water in Lake Chad by the rural populations in each country. In this particular instance, disagreement centred on how to develop the land with, on the one hand, the people from Cameroon who lived exclusively on fishing, vegetable farming and a few food crops and, on the other, Nigerian communities which were developing irrigation-based agriculture. The digging of huge irrigation channels dried out the Cameroon crops and to some extent the Lake itself. LCBC intervention was unable to resolve the dispute.

**Conflicts between crop and livestock farmers, “permanent” dwellers and “seasonal” migrants.** For decades, the fringes of Lake Chad were a refuge for migrants looking for land to cultivate (“seasonal” workers) or grazing lands for their animals (nomads). These movements were unwelcome to the permanent settlers who feared for their resources. Farmers blamed herdsmen for damage to the rural environment caused by livestock, while the herdsmen complained that there not enough thoroughfares for them. Very often communities formed vigilante groups to protect their exclusive access to resources. The endless conflict every year between crop and livestock farmers has often
turned into pitched battles between communities. Given its scale and regular occurrence, it has constituted one of the main reasons for insecurity in the area.

**Criminality and cross-border gangsterism.** The economic vitality of the region also whetted criminal appetites. The result of this has been straightforward armed robbery capable of developing into outright cross-border criminal activity. As to the proliferation of small arms in the region – the result of 20 years of civil war in Chad and the armed rebellion in neighbouring Niger – was an aggravating factor. In 1997, the LCBC member countries attempted to assemble a multinational force in the hope of curbing this criminality. For months at a time, patrols combed the woods bordering the bed of Lake Chad to fight armed bands that had taken up residence there, although they were unsuccessful at restoring full security.

7.3.5 Comments on reportedly vanishing Lake Chad

Lake Chad is filled mainly by river water, 83% of which comes from the River Chari. Allowing for some time lag, annual variations in the Lake follow the sharp rise in the river level between September and December, with subsequent evaporation lowering the level of the Lake from January to August. Changes in the area of Lake Chad depend on the rainfall and have occurred in three phases. The geographical area of the “little lake” is less than 2500 km² compared to between 20,000 and 25,000 km² for the “big lake”. While the years from 1950 to 1970 corresponded to a “medium-sized lake”, the drought throughout the 1970s ushered in a “little lake” phase. This period also corresponded to the Chadian civil war. In 1972 and 1983, the rainfall deficit was more than 40% and reached 55% in 1984. Even though rainfall was somewhat more abundant in the 1990s, the average isohyets moved 100–150 kilometres to the south. Between 1997 and 2007, many scientists claimed that the falling water levels of Lake Chad were even more marked than previously and that the future of 20 – 30 million people hung in the balance.

Thus a widely held opinion – often conveyed by the media on the basis of controversial scientific research – was that Lake Chad was decreasing in size under the impact of global warming, which made it an ideal source of evidence when considering the latter’s global implications. These findings have been challenged by several researchers working on Lake Chad (CIRAD). They claim that the main factors governing the hydrological dynamics of the Lake up to the present day have been regional rainfall and the Chari. In their view, the Lake has simply been at a settled “little lake” level since the beginning of the 1970s. From the 1980s onwards, the economic difficulties both of the States bordering the Lake and the hydro-agricultural areas using water from it or from its tributaries gave its water resources some respite: the quantities taken remained limited compared to the ambitions nurtured in the previous decade. While these developments may have a significant environmental impact at the local level, or during the periods of lowest water levels in dry years, they have a negligible effect on the hydrological functioning of the basin as a whole. That said, the situation could well change. In the two States (Chad and Nigeria) with the broadest access to the Lake, the increase in oil revenue could reawaken dormant ambitions. “It might thus be very tempting to transfer the waters of the Ubangi towards Chad”. Better knowledge of the climatological and hydrological prospects of the Chad basin should thus also be a means of “preventing the issue of climate change from being exploited in the interests of risky schemes” (Magrin, 2007).

8.1 Timeline

**May 1985** During the height of the drought, nomads seeking food supplies for their encampments are reportedly driven away by the security forces. Clashes end in fatalities on both sides. The incident worsens already tense relations between the regime of General Seyni Kountché and neighbouring Libya.

**In 1989** Widespread arrests of young people suspected of having been trained in the Islamic Legion of Mu'ammar Gaddafi. Fresh attack on Tchin-Tabaradene.

**In 1990** To free the prisoners, the Tuareg “rebels” organise a large-scale attack in the night of 6–7 May and occupy the police station and military arsenal. The Tchin-Tabaradene attack surprises the Niamey authorities who bomb the town. After violent repression by the army, the confrontation claims around 100 victims, most of them civilians.

**June 1990** The struggle becomes more radical. A state of emergency is imposed in the north of the country by the army which bypasses the civilian authorities and, coordinated by Colonel Mamadou Tandja, undertakes mass arrests of Tuaregs suspected of complicity.

**15 May 1991** Establishment of the Timidriya (“brotherhood”) by Nigerien intellectuals.

**19 October 1991** Organisation of the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) and establishment of the Liberation Front of Air and Azawad (FLAA), which is fighting for “integral federalism”.

**20 October 1991** Attack on the administrative post at Ingal in which six guards are killed and three civilians seriously wounded.

**26 August 1992** Murder of a police officer which leads to an army mutiny known as the “événements de la troupe” (“events in the army”). In reprisal, the arrest of 186 Tuaregs is followed by acts of torture after they were suspected of offering the rebels their support.

**September 1992** Common front of the Tuareg communities comprised of 130 customary chiefs unite against the rebellion. Relative ineffectiveness of the temoust concept (the Tuareg “cause”).

**10 January 1993** Attempted murder of Mamadou Tandja in Abala at the height of the presidential campaign; the attack ends with nine dead and around twenty wounded.
27 March 1993 Mahamane Ousmane becomes the new president, beating Colonel Mamadou Tandja who indicated his preference for a military solution. Beginning of negotiations.

April 1993 Each party frees prisoners.

June 1993 Negotiations resume in Paris. They are deadlocked by the excessive demands of the Tuareg rebellion, which calls for the autonomy of two-thirds of national territory.

October 1993 Kidnapping in Tchin-Tabaradene of the deputy sub-prefect and militants of the Union for Democracy (UPD), a Tuareg party often supporting the ideas arising from the rebellion. Establishment of a Tuareg Vigilance Committee (CVT). In reaction, Arab militia are formed and fight the rebellion.

24 September 1994 Negotiations resume.

9 October 1994 A preliminary agreement is signed in Ouagadougou. It provides for a three-month truce and the signature of a permanent agreement within six months.

24 April 1995 Signature in Niamey of the “Permanent Peace Agreement”.

1996 Coup d’état which brings General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara to power.

Late November 1996 Establishment of the Union of Forces of the Armed Resistance (UFRA).

February 2007 Resurgence of the Tuareg rebellion, as the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) considers that there has been a failure to comply with the 1995 agreements.

8.2 Explanatory factors

2.1 Context

Long-standing demands for autonomy. The Tuareg rebellion is an old problem that surfaced on the declaration of independence (indeed President Diori Hamani went so far as to set up a Ministry of Saharan Affairs to resolve it). Feeling that they were marginalised and oppressed by the “black” authorities which bore them an unyielding hatred, the Tuareg community had never been far from dissidence vis-à-vis the State. The enlistment of an entire generation of Tuaregs from Niger in Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion temporarily delayed the outbreak of the rebellion on national territory. However, this period of “initiation” in the Legion meant that Tuareg combatants from Mali, Chad, Algeria or Niger became aware of their common characteristics (including that of belonging to a “martyr” nation) and of their determination to be the torchbearers of Tuareg identity. Thus new patterns of solidarity were formed, while the temoust was given a theoretical underpinning for use as a political weapon. The idea was to unify the nomad confederations in a federal system which first meant engaging in a national struggle to secure autonomous status.

8.2.2 Events triggering the crisis

Because of the highly radical demands of the Tuareg movement (a total of two-thirds of national territory) which spoke out at the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) on 19 October 1991, a national front was mobilised against the Tuareg cause. On the sidelines of the conference, the FLAA was formed and demanded the establishment of an “integral federalism” in reference to a unified Tuareg nation between Azawad and northern Niger. The CNS rejected this demand which belied a secessionist goal, and the FLAA armed struggle began with an attack on an administrative unit at Ingal, in which at least six people died on 20 October 1991.

8.2.3 Aggravating factors

The “events in the army”. This mutiny led to the strengthening of forces for the rebellion which then had difficulty in absorbing the influx of new combatants.
Divisions within rebel movements and internal radicalisation of Tuareg societies.

The constitution of a common Tuareg front was compromised from its inception because of differences separating the various combatant factions and the pro-independence stance of each of the confederations involved in the conflict. Many divisions arose, preventing the movement from mounting a truly effective offensive against the Niamey authorities. Furthermore, the temoust with its political doctrine marked by foreign influences (in particular the Jamahiriya of the Libyan leader) did not really win over the tribal chiefs or manage to federate the Tuareg communities, with the result being that the Tuareg chiefs established a common front against the rebellion in September 1992.

The creation of self-defence organisations opposed to the rebellion. Several movements for counter-rebellion were formed. Exploiting both the conflict between crop and livestock farmers (linked to competition for the control of scarcer resources resulting from aridity and desertification) and the confrontations between Tuareg and Arab communities, they were suspected of either support from or manipulation by the Niger authorities. The Timidriya (with 220,000 members from five of Niger’s seven départements) was the most progressive of these organisations. It advertised itself as the “voice of the unheard” and, in opposition to the “white Tuaregs”, defended the interests of a Tuareg community of “black” origin who were constantly kept out of the peace negotiations and subjected to the exactions of the customary authorities, including national armed forces. Legalistic, it sought to find a solution to the conflicts between farmers and herdsmen and was against tribalism, slavery and attempts to erode national unity. The fearsome Arab militia, on the other hand, which were formed in Tassara after the creation of the CVT in October 1993, militarily harassed the Tuareg rebels. They were brought into being by the transitional government of Amadou Cheiffou which authorised certain supposedly more vulnerable national communities to organise their own self-defence. Through the links maintained with Algerian traders, their action played its part in internationalising the conflict. All these factors led to renewed outbursts of fighting in which civilian communities were often the victims.

Propaganda and media publicity for the Tuareg cause. To offset the relative ineffectiveness of the temoust, some Tuareg movements sought to secure media publicity for the cause by manipulating international public opinion around the theme of the martyred people who could only take refuge in “integral federalism”. Accordingly, the Tchin-Tabaradene massacres were repackaged and publicised by the media as the “genocide of the Tuareg people”. This new media attention, the splitting of the rebellion and the internationalisation of the conflict effectively prevented the various “pockets of dissidence” from finding common ground and was instrumental in turning the conflict into an endless cycle of truces called and truces broken.

8.2.4 Likelihood of a renewed Tuareg crisis in Niger

The signature of the “Permanent Peace Agreement” in April 1995 officially marked an end to Tuareg demands for autonomy in Niger. Nevertheless, the acceptance of constitutional frameworks and democratic “rules of the game” (most notably, decentralisation) did not end the Tuareg crisis. While the Armed Resistance Organisation (ORA) and the Coordination of Armed Resistance (CRA) supported the 27 January 1996 coup d’état, continued State centralism, sluggish implementation of the peace agreements and laws on decentralisation, fostered the renewal of the armed movement in October 1996. North Niger has remained scarred by residual violent crime sustained by the insularity of the Tuareg territories and the fact that they possess too few development schemes, which in turn has caused more criminality. This fresh upsurge in violent crime has occurred against a background of
ethnic antagonism, given that the Niger communities in the “great north” have remained particularly responsive to the glorification of tribalism and of pro-slavery or racist theories as described by the temoust, the Arab militia or the Timidriya. The first war (1991-95) was followed in early 2007 by a war between the Niger authorities and the MNJ which felt that the agreements of 1995 had been violated and that the State was sapped by corruption. As in Mali, several distinctive trends have typified this fresh round of violence and tended to complicate the Tuareg imbroglio still further. They include the proliferation of armed groups and the coordination of action by organisations in Niger, Chad, Algeria and Mali, radical Islam linked to Al Quaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Aqmi, or “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib”), the circulation of small arms, drug and human trafficking, and demands linked to redistribution of the revenue from uranium.

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9.1 Timeline

June 1990 Attack on the Ménaka police station. This is the first indication of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali. The Tchin-Tabaradene massacre of Niger Tuaregs is the underlying reason for this armed revolt, which rapidly spreads to the other side of the border.

11 April 1992 Signature of a “national pact” for which General Amadou Toumani Touré is primarily responsible.

25 February 1994 “Year of the gun”. Murder of Colonel Bilal Saloum. Fratricidal struggle between the Azawad People’s Movement (MPA) and the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad (ARLA).


July 1994 Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta announces the prohibition of self-defence groups during a tour of the North, without opposing Ganda Koy as a cultural movement.

1996 Timbuktu Peace Agreement.

February 2006 Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Fagaga, a former Tuareg rebel combatant who had joined the army, goes underground. He demands measures for the (north-east) Kidal region and for former rebels in the army, following the 1996 Peace Agreement.

May 2006 Several hundred combatants join him in support.

End of May 2006 Capture of two Malian military bases in Kidal, emptied of their weapons and ammunition. The attacks leave five people dead – two rebels, a regular army soldier
and two civilians. In addition, 4500 civilians leave the town of Kidal for fear of reprisals after the arrival of government forces.

**July 2006** Fresh peace agreements.

**September 2007** The peace agreements are once again violated by a faction totally opposed to the signatories of the July 2006 Algiers accords, namely the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), also known as the *fagaguistes* and the *bahanguistes*. A skirmish near Ti-n-Zaouâtene in north-east Mali leaves between five and eight people dead. Around 30 people – civilians as well as army staff – are taken hostage.

### 9.2. Explanatory factors

#### 9.2.1 Structural factors

The size of Tuareg settlements in Mali and Niger fostered the spread of the rebellion. These two countries are home to four-fifths of the Tuareg population (of some 1.5 million) who in Mali have settled mainly in the erg of Azawad.

**Tuareg identity and the Nation State.** The Sahara has never been an impassable barrier between the north and south of Africa, but has always been crossed by the camel-driven caravans of the different Tuareg tribes. Since the start of the 1960s, such traditional differentiation has been superseded by membership of the nation, which in very varied ways has conditioned the daily experience of people living in the five States formed as a result of decolonisation. The effect of the historical antagonism born of conflicts between nomadic and sedentary populations, along with the steady centralisation of the new sovereign States, was to divide and marginalise the Tuaregs. Remaining detached from economic activities and administrative regulations, these nomadic peoples have been negatively regarded due to the belief that they are hard to control. First attempts to launch an armed struggle against their new masters as early as 1961–63 in Niger and Mali were quickly put down. Political and economic decisions were still taken in the south, far from the areas of Tuareg settlement, which has tended to exclude them from power-sharing. Because of the divided Sahara area, it was hard for the traditional Tuareg economy to survive the introduction of tightly controlled borders and the establishment of national authorities (customs, taxation, police), dominated by southern Black African ethnic groups, who obstructed cross-border movements. In addition, Tuareg communities were subjected to a deliberate policy of “nationalising” nomadic peoples and obliging them to settle permanently by any possible means, however coercive. This attitude of ethnic discrimination was more commonly encountered in Mali and above all in Libya and Algeria. In the last two cases, government action or inaction gave rise to frustration and resentment.

**The impact of drought in 1969–74 and 1981–85 and the return of the Islamic legions.** The repression of the 1963 rebellion caused the first migration of Tuareg peoples towards Algeria. The cumulative impact of the 1973–74 drought similarly led to a mass exodus towards the cities of the Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa. The severe drought of the mid-1980s was the main reason for the Tuareg uprising in the 1990s, since this period of aridity led to the wholesale loss of livestock, the sole

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**Acronyms:**

- **MPA** Azawad People’s Movement
- **ARLA** Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad
- **ADC** Democratic Alliance for Change
- **MFUA** Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad
- **ATNM** Tuareg Alliance of Niger and Mali
source of subsistence for these communities. The scant food aid mobilised by the Malian government, and the systematic practice of corruption and misuse of aid, generated widespread frustration among the Tuareg tribes who were once more obliged to head towards exile in Algeria and Libya.

9.2.2 The decisive event

The repressive action against the Tuareg in Niger in 1992 hastened the outbreak of the rebellion in Mali in an atmosphere of acute social and political tension caused by the overthrow of the Moussa Traoré regime (even though the Tuareg rebellion refused to become involved in this social unrest).

9.2.3 Aggravating factors

Fierce disagreement between confederations. Formed from a group of tribes, each confederation was identified by the name of the territory under its control, on which communities led a nomadic existence. Confederations were divided up and even constituted competitive entities. The historical material available has revealed that rivalry has always been a basic element in the relations between groups. Four movements defended the Tuareg cause in Mali [originally integrated within the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA) in 1992]. The armed Tuareg factions were handicapped by the lack of an undisputed charismatic leader. The inhibiting factors of national construction and of internal crises within the rebel movement also prevented the establishment of a unified Tuareg movement. Furthermore, guerrilla operations against government troops hampered any rapid and long-lasting resolution of the conflict by giving rise to successive cycles of static development and renewed aggression.

The appearance of the Ganda Koy (“masters of the land”) movement in May 1994 was one outcome of the struggle led by the Tuareg rebellion. It was a movement for self-defence which denounced the “National Pact” for peace signed in April 1992 and roundly condemned the armed gangsters and racists of the Tuareg rebellion and the waiting game played by the State. For Ganda Koy, the National Pact was not signed with the participation of the sedentary black peoples of the North consisting of Songhai, Bambara, Fulani, Bozo and Tuareg-Bella.

Ganda Koy thus originated in a conflict for the occupation of an area between sedentary “blacks” and “white” nomads, while the rebellion was meting out its harsh demands. It developed “anti-white” racist theories as a reaction to the racist ideas of the temoust. The emergence of this movement during the “year of the gun” coincided with a general weakening of State authority (associated with the period of transition to democracy, the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, and the end of IMF and World Bank financial support to Mali), the result being that the movement secured the discreet complicity of the army, top State officials and the press.

Frustration arising from the lack of representativeness among the signatories and delays in implementing the reforms. It took a long time (under the regime of Alpha Omar Konaré) to implement the peace agreements providing for the recruitment of rebels to public service jobs and the introduction of socio-economic development programmes together with the decentralisation of State resources. Partial compliance with stated commitments bred anger and frustration (the full withdrawal from Algeria of the Mali Tuareg case file did not result in the establishment of mechanisms for monitoring the Algiers peace agreement). Moreover the peace agreements reached with the ARLA excluded the MPA (Azawad People’s Movement) from the negotiations. These various factors account for the resurgence in 2006 of rebel dissidence that stemmed from what was left of the MPA and involved small armed groups engaged in violent criminal action.
Towards the South. A new stage was reached with internationalisation of the conflict when Tuareg action in Mali and Niger was coordinated under the Tuareg Alliance of Niger and Mali (ATNM) and the region assumed strategic significance for the United States and the European Union, both determined to eliminate terrorist groups linked in any way to Aqmi (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib).

9.3 Human consequences and resurgence of the Tuareg rebellion

Equipped with vehicles and plenty of light arms, the Tuareg fronts have since 1990 stepped up operations designed to undermine and harass the symbols and representatives of the central Malian and Nigerien authorities, even though they have rarely mobilised more than some 100 combatants at any one time. Typical of these attacks have been unannounced forays into briefly occupied locations in which only official buildings and strategic “infrastructure” are targeted. However, during 1994, the bloodiest year, around 5000 victims were reported, while the Ganda Koy reaction accounted for between 60 and 300. With the resurgence of the rebellion in 2006, attacks appear to be spreading to southern regions against the army but also private individuals who are subject to raids or hostage-taking. As in Niger, several distinctive trends have heightened the complexity of the Malian imbroglio, among them the proliferation of armed groups, a splitting of the movement, drugs and arms trafficking, human trafficking and radical Islam, etc.

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10.1 Timeline

1989 Setting up of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) which receives 3% of the federal budget, or 13.6 billion naira in 1998.
1997 Royal Dutch/Shell invests USD 32 million in its programme of support to the community and apparently recruits 57% of its workforce from among the Ogoni population.
From October 1998 Fierce protest which quickly develops into a series of sometimes violent and bloody revolts to attract government attention and obtain compensation from the oil companies.
End of 1998 Deployment of several thousand soldiers in the region.
1999 Repressive measures taken by the government and army. Imprisonment and execution of the Ogoni leader and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. Execution of other leading political activists.
1999 Over a dozen oil companies exploit the site.
2001 Shell and other oil companies establish an office to undertake an environmental survey of the Niger delta and assess the overall damage to the environment.
Since 2003 The Joint Task Force (JTF, a policy and army force) is deployed in the delta.
2005–06 Emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which seeks to wage total war against the State.
2006 Nigeria loses its ranking as top African oil producer, according to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2007 Newly elected, President Yar’Adua declares the crisis afflicting the delta to be one of his government’s priorities.

10.2 Explanatory factors

10.2.1 Context

Distribution of oil revenues. Around 90% of Nigerian oil comes from the delta in the South and more particularly from the Rivers Region (cf. Biafra War) inhabited by minority ethnic groups (Itsekiris, Ijaws, Ibibios, Ogonis, Efiks, Kalabarins, Ilajes), for whom coexistence with the Ibos has not always been easy. Paradoxically, this is the least developed region in the country: the deficit in infrastructure and means of communication is very high, as is the unemployment rate, especially among young people. Despite the high revenue that oil resources generate for the federal government, less than 5% of it is actually spent in the oil-producing regions of Nigeria. Thus the Delta area appears to have been long since abandoned by the central authorities, while frustration has given way to cyclical rebellion motivated by political and economic concerns but also the wish to defend the forgotten interests of the “oil boom have-nots”.

Latent irredentist and insurrectional impulses in the South, which had already been articulated during the Biafra War, were for several decades fuelled by mounting frustration.
among the resident communities of the Niger delta. The pollution of the rivers and mangrove swamps on which these people depended for their livelihood reached a critical level, and the accusations of corruption regularly targeting OMPADEC executives made for a highly charged situation in the mid-1990s.

10.2.2 Aggravating factors
Alongside OMPADEC, the State also established the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) to finance infrastructural schemes. A given percentage of the profit from the local sale of refined oil products was paid to the PTF. In contrast to OMPADEC, its role was not to upgrade the Delta region but to develop schemes throughout the entire country. Besides these State initiatives, the oil companies quickly realised that the security of their operations depended on calming the tension between the Federal government, the Ogoni communities and themselves. While Shell or Chevron do indeed appear to have intensified their socio-economic investment in the area, their efforts have still done very little to lower tensions there.

Many factors have since contributed to internationalising the conflict. High-profile tactics used by armed groups in the Delta (such as kidnapping, the occupation of oil-producing sites, efforts to secure media publicity for their action, etc.) are foremost among them. MEND, which first appeared in 2005–06, carried out attacks against pipelines, offshore rigs, and JTF pipeline fitters. MEND has also been involved in operations to hijack shipments of oil for subsequent refining and illegal sale on the regional market (“bunkering”). In addition, ransom-money from hostage-taking has also been used to fund local potentates. The result of this violence in the Niger Delta has been to lower Nigerian oil production by 25% since January 2006, which has led to a wave of brutal repression. When elected in 2007, President Umaru Yar’Adua stated that the delta problem constituted one of the “seven priorities” of his period in office. However, the vagaries attributable to this repressive policy have aroused little sympathy from the international community for a movement whose violent action has tended to “pollute” and discredit its political demands.

10.2.3 Human Toll
Oil well operations, acid fallout from burning, and water pollution have encouraged the spread of epidemics and the development of respiratory diseases or cancers among the Ijaw and Ogoni communities. Since Warri-South Area headquarters moved in November 1996 from Liaw territory to an area controlled by the Itsekiri, there has been a steady upsurge in the conflict between the various Niger delta ethnic groups, resulting in considerable violence. By 2007, MEND “terrorist” activity had caused scores of fatalities. JTF repression organised in retaliation may have driven from the area around 20,000 people fleeing their burnt villages, according to Amnesty International.

10.2.4 Analysis of the Conflict
This conflict is reminiscent of the secessionist demands of Biafra and the Yoruba communities at the end of the 1960s, except that in this case it concerns minorities who fear domination by the Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas arising from regionalisation, the federal system and the negotiations on sharing national energy resources.

It also seems desirable to consider the likelihood of security crises caused by the ecological impact of oil operations and by the health and economic consequences of the imminent rise in water levels in the Gulf of Guinea. Originally too swampy to be fertile, land in the delta has suffered further degeneration in the acid fallout from oil exploitation. With rising water levels in what are already regarded as very humid areas, malaria could
well spread among communities that sometimes lack natural protection, while the fragile ecosystem of mangrove swamps could be destroyed and floods could aggravate damage to already scant infrastructure and facilities.

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11 Influx of repatriated Burkinan citizens following the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and threats of a health and ecological crisis

11.1 Timeline

1989 First real signs of xenophobia and increased border harassment for Burkinan citizens.
1993 Riots and lynching of Ghanaians following a football match lost by Côte d’Ivoire.
1999 Army coup d’état led by General Gueï.
2000–01 Conflicts over land between Burkinans and Kroumen in lower Sassandra (Tabou). Sharp increase in anti-Dyula and anti-Burkinan attacks.
May 2001 A fresh conflict erupts over land between Burkinan citizens and indigenous Guéré in the commune of Blolékin. It results in six dead and the torching of 17 encampments.
October 2001 Firearm attack on the Ouangolodougou customs post. Three customs officers die and three more are seriously wounded. There are reprisals against Burkinans at the height of conflict over land between migrants and indigenous groups. Thousands of Burkinan workers fearing for their life begin to return to their country.
19 September 2002 A new coup d’état takes place in Côte d’Ivoire and degenerates into civil war.

11.2 Factors accounting for the return of Burkinan citizens

2.1 Context
Economic reasons underlying the migration of Burkinan young people. After settling in Côte d’Ivoire sometimes as long as three generations ago, without however possessing Ivorian nationality, Burkinan citizens originally migrated there just on a temporary basis (for seasonal work). Then, the deterioration of social relations in Burkina Faso as reflected in a loss of collective values and a weakening of lineal and family bonds, etc. tended to lengthen the time that they remained emigrants. Life became increasingly expensive and income from agriculture was not enough for a Burkinan to pay, for example, for a typical
wedding ceremony, whereas the economic opportunities offered in Côte d’Ivoire meant that he could hope to do so quite quickly.

**The demographic impact of Burkinan citizens in Côte d’Ivoire.** According to the 1998 census, over 2.2 million Burkinan people had settled in Côte d’Ivoire, or around 15% of the country’s total population. In accounting for 56% of the foreign population, they constituted the country’s foremost foreign community. Growing numbers of Ivorians said that they feared this immigration and were starting to feel a minority in their own country.

**The Ivorian economic crisis.** At the end of the 1990s, the model of stable peace and prosperity which was very largely due to the economically motivated Burkinan immigration, suddenly became an Ivorian illusion with the fall in the price of raw materials. After the death of President Houphouët-Boigny, the economic recession gave rise to a political crisis fuelled by conflicts over the succession.

**Political manipulation in the face of a difficult internal situation.** Playing on the issue of “Ivoirité” and nationalist entrenchment, Baoulé leaders attempted to forestall attempts by minorities – especially the Bété – to seize power, blaming “foreigners” for the threefold national crisis and casting suspicion on Ivorians in the north, Dyulas or Senufos closely associated with their Burkinan and Malian neighbours.

**Rise of xenophobia, attacks on immigrants and massive migration.** Overtly hostile behaviour (with anti-Dyula and anti-Burkinan beatings, murders and attacks) occurred in several regions in the south. It often stemmed from land conflicts between Burkinans and indigenous communities (Kroumen, Guéré, etc.) in areas in which the rate of settlement of the former was around 35-40%. The rapid increase in such incidents led people of Burkinan origin to flee. According to the UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and the National Committee for Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance (CONASUR) in the Burkina Faso Ministry of Social Action, out of 1 million displaced persons on 31 December 2003, 550,000 represented displacement within Côte d’Ivoire, and 450,000 in the countries bordering it, including 360,000 in Burkina Faso.

11.2 Impact of migration on health and the environment

11.2.1 Land-based tension

The main entry points for migrants were the border provinces of Nahouri and Comoé. These people, who often had to flee fighting after losing everything (loss of fields or plantations, theft of rice, cacao or coffee harvests, etc.), originally came mainly from the South-West and the Mossi Plateau. They were thus returning to their home provinces. At first, the local communities warmly welcomed these repatriated groups and let them settle in new areas to farm the land. But with land capacity eventually overstretched, the “repatriates” on the Mossi Plateau and around Bobo turned instead towards Comoé province in which crop farming was not as intensive and which had one of the highest rainfalls in the country (1000 mm/year) and a dense hydrographical network. The départements of Niangoloko, Sidéradougou and Mangodara took in 8000, 6000 and 5000 repatriates respectively, who in those localities, accounted for half of the residents in the villages and radically changed the area’s ethnic structure. There was a threefold expansion in the cultivated surface. The increasing pressure on land heightened the risk of conflict between indigenous and migrant groups in areas already seriously affected by continuing conflict between crop and livestock farmers.
11.3.2 Reappearance of Human African trypanosomiasis (HAT)
By retaining their rest-houses and wild fauna, protected areas in the Comoé region but also the Ivorian forest belt became potential reservoirs for Glossina (tsetse flies). Although HAT was eradicated in Burkina Faso, it is still rife in Côte d’Ivoire. Most returning Burkinans had been living in areas in which the disease was endemic and while the risk of its spreading was very slight before repatriation began, migration into Comoé province led to its reappearance. Lobi country, in which it had been hardest to eradicate, appears to have been particularly badly hit. The economic difficulties experienced by “returnees” further increased the risk. Rather than pay 10 CFA francs for a bowl of water, they chose to dig holes in backwaters during the rainy season, which led to further contact with Glossina.

11.3.3 Environmental threats
With insecurity rife in the north of Côte d’Ivoire, its fauna had disappeared and Dozo hunters and poachers overran the three natural parks in the south of Burkina Faso (Comoé, Léraba and Dida Koulbi), while non-regulated fishing also spread. The arrival of the repatriates hastened the trend as they retreated to the forests, the only remaining areas which offered them any means of survival.

11.3.4 Returnees, refugees and resettlers
The forced return to Burkina Faso of several hundreds of thousands of people was not straightforward. Some of them no longer had any family in a country in which they might be viewed as “foreigners”. From being “external migrants” in Côte d’Ivoire, these individuals acquired the status of repatriates and then “internal migrants” in less than three years. The government drew up a working plan for the socio-economic reintegration of repatriates at a cost of over 17 billion CFA francs but only 567 million CFA francs could be made available in 2002-03. Almost 250,000 “resettlers” or “returnees” made their way back to Côte d’Ivoire, either to resume their occupations after the war ended, or to try and survive there more comfortably than in a country that had become foreign to them.

11.3.5 Inter-ethnic tension
In south-west Burkina Faso, the Mossi have become the majority ethnic group followed by the Dyula and the Dogossés. With the doubling of the rural population in the space of three years and greater ethnic diversity, the indigenous populations – in particular the Dyula and Lobis – have become wary of migrants and resettlers. With their reputed disregard for customary regulations, the Mossi are considered too ‘intrusive’. This imbalance between human beings and living space, accentuated by a steady decline in soil quality, has had the effect of exponentially increasing the area of cultivated land, leading to renewed tension between crop farmers and herdsmen.

References
12 Drought and food crisis in Niger
2004–05

12.1 Timeline

**August 2004** Rains end earlier than expected. France earmarks EUR 1.16 million for action to halt the locust invasion in Niger.

**November–December 2004** Drought and migrating locusts hit northern parts of the Sahel simultaneously. The government in Niger introduces arrangements for managing and preventing the food crisis (with the EU and France in particular). The United Nations Famine Early Warning System declares that Niger requires “urgent attention”, with 3 million people threatened by starvation.

**March 2005** The World Bank, in cooperation with the WFP, the FAO, UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and the UNDP, reschedules its expenditure on the project to eradicate migratory locusts, for USD 4 million. It suggests that the government of Niger reallocate the funds/donation intended for the reform of public expenditure to the purchase of foodstuffs (USD 40 million, including USD 11.7 million in donations).

**May 2005** The prime minister of Niger, Hama Amadou Tandja, appeals for international aid. International media report that 3.5 million Nigeriens are threatened with starvation, 800,000 of them children aged under 5. The FAO issues an appeal for USD 4 million in emergency agricultural support to Niger and the UN issues a similar emergency appeal for USD 16.1 million.

**June 2005** The WFP describes the situation as “very dire”. Only 11% of the financial resources required are received. NGOs in the country condemn the machinations of international agencies and accuse the Niger government of having underestimated the scale of the problem and reacted belatedly. The Niger authorities initiate their fifth operation to sell grain at lower prices.

**July 2005** United Nations bodies issue an appeal for USD 30 million but the various contributions only reach USD 10 million. A campaign for free food distribution is launched with help from the WFP.

**September 2005** Free distribution ended to avoid the risk of destabilising the market and creating tensions over prices.

**August 2005** UNICEF announce that because of the food crisis, the number of children that have had to be treated for malnutrition has more than doubled since August 2004.

**November 2005** The Niger government urges those NGOs still present “to go home” and accuses the WFP of having overestimated the financial requirements for coping with the crisis and asks it to justify the provision of USD 20 million.

12.2 Explanatory factors

**12.2.1 Context**

**Endemic crises.** Niger is a country confronted by a chronically severe food crisis due to what is almost structural malnutrition in some départements and extreme dependence on unpredictable weather. Farmers in Niger are caught in a cycle of great insecurity and vulnerability. Preparation for the 2005–06 crop year was a fitting illustration of this: from the beginning of 2005, farmers had to rely for their own subsistence on seed stocks meant for 2005–06. As regards the 2005 end-of-year harvest, it had to be sold rapidly to repay loans. This pattern of indebtedness and chronic poverty maintains farmers in an
extremely weak position in which food tends to be very scarce. The chronic food crisis re-emerges from June and July onwards with the onset of the difficult interim period lasting 3–6 months.


**Impact of demographic factors on malnutrition.** The population of Niger has doubled in 20 years (1984-2004). It is also the country with the highest reproduction rate in the world (eight children for every woman). Over 15% of children aged under 5 suffer from chronic acute malnutrition.

**Cultural factors linked to gender and the birth rate.** The high birth rate is directly attributable to the many early marriages leading to greater segregation of women and a high illiteracy rate, as well as a strong tendency for births to be closely spaced. In addition, according to cultural beliefs, breast milk is lacking in quality when mothers are pregnant, so they only partially feed their infants on it. Because of closely spaced births, the youngest children in families are more severely affected by the food crisis.

**Cultural factors arising from cultural and dietary customs.** For cultural reasons and in the Maradi area in particular, people have a diet consisting almost entirely of millet deficient in protein. The fact that quantities and varieties do not match real dietary requirements has been a decisive factor in the emergence of this severe food crisis.

**Keener competition for resources.** South Niger constitutes an immense farming area, in which there has been quite strong competition between crop and livestock farmers for access to resources. In reducing the period during which land lies fallow, this pressure has furthered a steady diminution in soil fertility and accounts for the poor harvests and food crises chronically affecting this region.

**The invasion of migratory locusts.** One of the main causes of malnutrition has been the destruction of grazing land by migratory locusts in 2004. The FAO could not find donors to fund a scheme for eradicating them. These insects spread and dragged many regions into crisis by causing a 223,000-ton grain production deficit and an animal feed production deficit of 4,642,000 tons (FAO, 2005) in the 2004-05 crop year.

### 12.2.2 Events triggering the crisis

According to the FAO in June 2005, the climatic factors that triggered off the food crisis were the early end to rainfall in the 2004 rainy season (70% responsible notwithstanding good annual rainfall in 2003-04) and the locust peril (30% responsible). Three thousand villages in southern Niger spread across the northern fringes of nine départements (Tanout, Dakoro, Illéla, Téra, Ouallam, etc.) corresponding to 63 districts were affected by the crisis. The situation in 27 of those villages (especially in the département of Tahoua) was deemed to be extremely critical or critical. This chronic crisis was worsened by a bad crop year in 2004–05, resulting in greater grain and animal feed production deficits.

### 12.2.3 Aggravating factors

**The silence of the international community and imperfections in humanitarian relief arrangements.** When the food crisis was officially announced in November 2004, everything was blamed on the drought caused by poor rainfall and on the locust peril. With the support of the WFP, the Niger government issued an emergency appeal for 78,000 tons of food aid in December but was immediately met with the “deafening” silence of the international community (Olivier de Sardan, 2007). In July 2005, BBC pictures revealing the extent of the human catastrophe were shown worldwide and finally forced the world to react. Among the reasons given by international organisations for their inadequate
Responsiveness was the unusually long time for aid to be disbursed. This destabilisation in the structure of international aid was also exacerbated by increasingly hardening relations between the international organisations and the Niger government. In September and then November 2005, the government halted free distributions, and condemned media coverage of the crisis stating “that there is no famine in Niger but a food crisis”. It also stated that “there have been no deaths” directly attributable to the crisis and that, while infant mortality in Niger was structurally high, it fell when warning systems were activated enabling children to be cared for in nutrition centres. All these announcements prompted polite embarrassment on the part of international observers. At the same time, the government violently attacked the WFP, accused of having overestimated financial requirements, and urged it to justify the release of USD 20 million. In December, tempers cooled after what was regarded as a misunderstanding and the government apologised officially to the organisation. In investigating the causes of the famine, Olivier de Sardan showed that the food crisis was brought about jointly by the international organisations, NGOs and the Niger government and that the process had fuelled the crisis surrounding the chronic erosion of State responsibilities. By accumulating a financial windfall and coordinating humanitarian operations without however systematically involving the State authorities, the international organisations weakened the latter vis-à-vis large sectors of Niger’s population. This crisis has finally shed light on the malfunctioning of aid and necessitated an in-depth reform of the global aid system, which is increasingly dependent on its media coverage.

Poor harvests recorded for the 2004-05 agricultural year drove heads of households to migrate to find work, which indirectly led women and children to become more isolated and vulnerable throughout the crisis. This tore apart the system of production. The sale of ploughing implements and livestock, as well as the mortgaging of land, led to a long-term decline in the capital of rural communities coupled with a process in which farmers fell into debt. This great economic vulnerability and its repercussions for child nutrition worsened the health situation, with the appearance of medical complications among children given their malnutrition (malaria, diarrhoea, blood in the stool, pneumonia, etc.).

Speculative agriculture and soil degeneration. Major agricultural development schemes guided former production systems towards speculative high-output agriculture (maize, cotton). This sometimes involved irrigation and included the use of biotechnology and agricultural inputs, which contributed to further soil impoverishment, the scarcity of water resources, and the breakdown of small family-based holdings and the social fabric. The danger of such a crisis recurring increased when schemes for irrigated crop-growing were introduced with effect from 2006 in each of Niger’s eight regions. Affecting an annual 2000 hectares, these large-scale schemes which consume great quantities of water are likely to hasten further still the drying up of water channels and ground water, and to result in a process whereby soil aridity is intensified outside the irrigated area.

Unavailability of food and no monetary access to it. Because of poor harvests during the 2004-05 crop year in Nigeria and the fall in world grain stocks (rice, millet and sorghum), Nigerians sought food supplies in Niger, which generated inflation and meant that the local population in Niger had no access to grain whatever. The situation was made worse still by measures introduced in neighbouring countries to withhold their national output. In July 2005, Mali and Burkina Faso closed their borders on this occasion to prevent their local produce from being sold on the market in Niger. This protectionist measure which ran totally counter to regional regulations on the free movement of goods, severely limited the supply of grain on southern Niger markets. Finally, speculation in grain crop prices led to distorted market prices for food commodities and grain in particular. With effect from May 2005, the price of a bag of millet rose from 10,000 to 40,000 CFA francs,
corresponding to four goats bartered for a bag of millet instead of one goat in normal times. The country was also affected by a resultant increase in the price of rice.

References

Civil war between Ethiopia and its province Eritrea (1961 – 1991)

First civil war in Sudan (1963 – 1972)

Famine and fall of the Haile Selassie regime (1972 – 1974)

Afar rebellion (1972 – 2005)


Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977 – 1978)

Ogaden war (1982 – 1985)

Famine in Ethiopia (1983 – 1985)


Second civil war in Sudan (1983 – 2005)

Resurgence of the Somali rebellion (1987 – 2007)


Darfur war (2003 – 2006)


Figure 5
Timeline of events East Sahel and 10 worst droughts between 1960 – 2007


1963  Anyanya calls for the creation of a separate state for the first time.
1964  Armed rebellion begins. Military repression and hundreds of villages burned. Radicalisation of opinion in the South. Despite the presence of 18,000 loyalist troops, the conflict continues to drag on.
Late 1960s A brutal crackdown results in the imprisonment of 30,000 southerners and forces many thousands more into exile. The conflict starts to look like a war of extermination.
1967  Following the Six Day War, Sudan breaks off diplomatic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom.
1969  Unrest amongst groups of young northerner officers quartered in garrisons in the south. 25 May 1969 A coup brings Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry to power. Shortly afterward soldiers from the southern rebellion movement assume power. The Sudanese government and the USSR step up their collaboration.
1969-1971 A long period of negotiation between the two leaders, Nimeiry and Lagu.
July 1971  Assassination of many Communist militants accused of organising a plot against Nimeiry. The USSR, which was arming the Sudanese army, withdraws its support. February 1972 Signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The South is granted autonomy and southern elites are guaranteed a return to positions previously held in the state apparatus.
25 July 1972  Sudan restores diplomatic relations with the United States.

13.2 Timeline – civil war 1983–2005

September 1983  Nimeiry’s decision to apply Sharia law across Sudan stirs strong opposition in the South. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is created, under the command of John Garang de Mabior. Rebel movements resurface in the South and attack government forces.
1984  A drought ravages the entire country and threatens the lives of 4–5 million people.
March and April 1985  A popular insurrection and a coup ends the Nimeiry regime. A Transitional Military Council is created, presided by General Swar el Dahab. A proposed cease-fire is rejected by Garang, who accuses the new head of state of wanting to place the South under the authority of a mini military council. Hostilities resume. The Sudanese government establishes closer ties with Libya, effectively ending Tripoli’s logistical and military support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM, the political arm of the SPLA).
1986  The war begins again after several failed attempts to bring Garang into the government. Though famine grips the South, humanitarian organisations are unable to get food aid through. The SPLA takes a harder line. In August, a Sudan Airways airplane is shot down by the SPLA.
1989  A coup brings General Omar al-Bashir to power. Repression intensifies in the South, while the central government stokes inter-ethnic rivalries to divide and weaken the southern movement.
**October 1990** The former head of the armed forces and two generals defect and join Garang’s troops. More than 400,000 people are forced out of southern Sudan into Ethiopia.

**January 1991** Garang forms a government in exile. After Mengistu’s fall in Ethiopia, the SPLA loses a portion of its bases there. Divisions within the movement lead to the emergence of a pro-independence current that weakens the SPLA/SPLM. The bombings and acts of violence committed by the government army in the South intensify.

1992 Hundreds of people in local communities are executed in Juba.

1993 The government organises its biggest military offensive since 1982. Thousands of civilians are killed and thousands more flee. Violent combats take place between dissident SPLA factions.

1995–1997 The SPLA wins crucial battles. Negotiations resume under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The conflict attracts increasing attention on the international stage. Under pressure from the international community, Al Bashir is forced to agree to return to the negotiating table.

2002 Negotiations start to produce results. Machakos Protocol. A transition process based on two principles, self-determination and separation of religion and the state, is set up.

**October 2003** Signature of a cease-fire agreement under the aegis of the United States. The Sudanese government accuses the SPLA and Eritrean regime of supporting the rebellion in Darfur. Peace negotiations slow down.


31 July 2005 John Garang dies in a helicopter accident a few weeks after being sworn in as the Republic of Sudan’s first Vice President.

### 13.3 Explanatory factors, first civil war

#### 13.3.1 Background

Physical markers separating the North and South. Some scientists [Lavergne] deny the existence of a North-South divide. Passage between the two takes place along a broad strip of savannah-steppe land marked by vigorous socio-economic exchanges among the peoples living there. In their view this suffices to prove that the Muslim North versus Christian, animist South dichotomy is an ideological construct invented by the protagonists. Other researchers counter with the argument that Sudan is located in the heart of the overlap between the Mashriq and sub-Saharan Africa and combines two ethnically, economically and geographically distinct worlds. The dividing line is the 10th parallel in the world’s largest wetland, the Sudd, which means barrier or obstacle in Arabic. So a natural border exists at the confluence of the Bahr al Arab, Bahr al Ghazal and Bahr al Jebel rivers, consisting of a papyrus forest with shifting boundaries (which was not crossed by British explorers until 1840). This vegetation barrier explains why the South is diverse and was long sheltered from any outside influence. The North, in contrast, is more homogenous, with nomadic groups from Arabia having gradually assimilated with the native populations starting from the 7th century onwards. The notion of belonging to an ethnic group virtually disappeared there, while Islam and the Arabic language cemented bonds among peoples whose distinctive, identifying features faded over time. Seating political power at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles provided an opportunity
for growth, trade and territorial unification based on the slave trade. Lastly, the Mahdi state (1885–1899) proposed a political unification plan for the North so elaborate that it was considered exceptionally dangerous by the British colonial power, which, after conquering the Mahdi regime, began developing Sudan to counterbalance Egypt’s designs.

Resistance to a political and economic elite. The South’s economic development was stifled by the slave trade, which led to massive depopulation, economic stagnation, compartmentalised production systems and a tendency of southern communities to keep to themselves. Furthermore, under British colonial rule the South was neglected despite its potential because it was too far from the country’s vital centre and the sea. Few cash crops were planted there and the installation of a northern, Arabic-speaking administration bred resentment in southerners.

A separate colonisation process (1921–1947).
Placed under British colonial administration, southern Sudan had its own system and was kept separate from the North. In 1922, the South literally closed itself off by expelling native southerners. Later, during the period between independence in 1955 and 1963, the South served as headquarters for armed opposition movements against the central government in Khartoum.

From 1955 to 1963, the transfer of colonial administrative services to a northern elite gave the latter an opportunity to put in place systems based on financial gain and corruption. Rejection of predatory, artificial institutions was the initial spark for the discontent that gradually degenerated into armed struggle.

13.3.3 Aggravating factors

A forgotten war. In contrast to the extensive media coverage ‘enjoyed’ by the Biafran War, the conflict in southern Sudan remains a ‘forgotten war’. The international community’s failure to put pressure on the Sudanese government before 1997 was a contributory factor in the outbreaks of violence which ultimately mired the region in conflict.

Wrong type of strategy adopted to counter guerrilla warfare. Anyanya, a South Sudanese separatist rebel group, mounted repeated harassment operations before retreating to the brush or outposts in other countries. Despite the enormous resources provided to government troops, the war became bogged down with no clear advantage gained from battles. By 1971, the conflict had already swallowed up a fifth of the national budget without really weakening Anyanya. This first war’s progress and political fallout

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show that attempts to use military force in the South destabilised the different military regimes in Khartoum and exposed them to frequently successful coup attempts.

Establishment of a “Dinkacracpy” and schisms within the rebel movement. Small Equatorian groups were the first to foment rebellion through Anyanya. Overall, South Sudan is extremely diverse. It has over 250 ethnic groups8, the largest of which is the Dinka (2 million), and no common language9. Then, from 1972 to 1983, a Dinkacracy emerged which spurred small Equatorian ethnic groups to demand anew the South’s division, in contradiction with the Addis Ababa Agreement. The protracted nature of the rebellion, the clashes between ‘intellectuals’ and fighters, and Dinka domination led to in-fighting among southern ethnic groups, which clashed over the leadership of the movement, and conflicts between farmers and herders for control of pastureland. In addition, Anyanya’s raids on hundreds of villages brought disagreements among rebel organisations to a head.

13.4 Explanatory factors, second civil war

13.4.1 Background

A northern attempt to neo-colonise the South. Due to the aridification of the fertile steppe caused by the mechanisation of farming, the North coveted the lushly irrigated, fertile land of southern Sudan. The South also contains major oil deposits. Under the promptings, in all likelihood, of foreign investors, especially major agro-food and Islamic financial firms, the North attempted to colonise the South economically, to weaken it and generate revenue from the use of its resources. A former slave reservoir, the South became a pool of cheap labour and raw materials for processing in northern factories, even while the region remained poor in infrastructure and underdeveloped, power stayed in the hands of Northerners and ‘Somtherner’ culture continued to be held in contempt.

Failure to respect the South’s autonomy and a refusal to share oil revenues. The main principles of the Addis Ababa Agreement – recognition of the South’s autonomy and the equitable sharing of oil revenues – were ultimately not respected, prompting renewed fighting.

The issue of jihad and Sharia: This was nothing more than a pretext for the government to justify a full-blown colonial enterprise. The declaration of Sharia law was simply a theological tool for economic conquest.

Excavation of the Jonglei canal. The digging (1980–1983) of a 285-kilometre-long canal to circumvent the wetland meanders and thus prevent the evaporation of four billion cubic meters a year of water sparked fierce opposition from southerners, especially in Nuer communities. The project was supposed to support the irrigation of grazing lands, manage surplus water after the rainy season, stop the seasonal fluctuations of Nile river waters and allow the South to play a more active role in the country’s economic life. However, the Nuer herders’ way of life was governed by the Nile River’s flood cycle. The Nuer ethnic group spearheaded a resistance, mainly to preserve its way of life based on overly fragile, unstable balances (notably the cultivation of flood-recession crops).

13.4.3 Greater randomness in climate and non-climate variables

A period of drought, steppe aridification and famines. Besides determining the North’s attempt to economically colonise the South, these events indirectly accelerated the

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8 South Sudanese ethnicities fall into three ethno-linguistic groups: Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Bant
9 In addition, in 1972 Christianity — accounting to for only 10% of the South’s population — was not a strong enough cultural identifier to unify the southerner movement.
crisis and aggravated the toll exacted on the populations. In 1984, a catastrophic drought affecting 4 to 5 million people ravaged the country, both North and South. Aridification and desert creep set the stage for the political manipulation and armed mobilisation of militia recruited from the Baggara (or Misseriya) people, pushed out by the dryness of the steppe and of their northern rangelands. By carrying out systematic raids, these militia utterly destroyed the Dinka communities of Bahr el-Ghazal, claiming more than 300,000 victims between 1986 and 1989. The reappearance of El Niño in 1997-1998 also caused serious destruction in the eastern coastal region and a few deaths. Most importantly, however, it revived the spectre of famine in southern Sudan.

13.4.4 Aggravating factors

**Divisions in the SPLA.** Although Garang consistently sought a solution that would give the South autonomy while keeping Sudan intact, other movements (notably the Nuer10) favoured the South’s independence. In addition to this division, the natural environment combined with the way the slave trade affected the population distribution and organisation have seriously fragmented the peoples of South Sudan. Difficult communications and extremely scattered and isolated populations partly explain why the rebellion ceased to make progress after an initial phase of military success. Building a unified separatist movement was therefore challenging. Adding politically unorganised, disunited local peasant uprisings and “apolitical combatants” to the mix further weakened the separatist movement. In 1996, a turf war broke out in the South Sudan Independence Army (SSIA) headed by Rick Machar Teny-Dhurgon. The SSIA split into two rival factions that faced off in the centre of Upper Nile State. The Khartoum government was especially adept at exploiting these internecine conflicts in its fight against the SPLA. In January 1996, for example, a dissident SPLA movement, the GANTRY movement (*Gogrial Nyamlell Tonj Rumbek Yrol*), defected to the other side and operated in northern Bahr el-Ghazal as a government militia. The Khartoum regime manipulated other southern militia, specifically the tribes which had suffered in the past from Dinka domination: the Fertit in Bahr el-Ghazal, the Mundari in Equatoria and the Anuak in the Upper Nile.

**Manipulation of the conflict in the North:** The North-South dichotomy that engendered the inter-ethnic conflict between Muslim northerners and Christian and animist southerners is primarily an ideological construct (Lavergne, 1999). Indeed, ways of life, languages and even religious practices are also quite diverse in the North. The actors involved were extensively manipulated, with disastrous results for the civilian populations. In actuality, the peoples of the North and South are interdependent. This can be seen by the fact that, after being recruited as government militia, the Baggara11 preferred to make peace with southerners after the Dinka refused to give them access to wells and grasslands in retaliation for their raids.

**Internationalisation of the conflict.** The support of first the USSR and then the United States for the Sudanese government, of the Mengistu regime and Eritrean government for the SPLA and of the Tigray regime for Al Bashir’s government after 1991, as well as Libya’s intervention alongside the SPLA and later in support of Al-Dahab, continually altered power relationships and allowed the deployment of substantial military forces, of which civilian populations were the chief victims. The Sudanese government in its border conflict with Eritrea concerning the lowlands and the port of Massawa wielded an

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10 In 1991 the Nuer devastated Dinka lands between Bor and Kongor, killing thousands, stealing cattle and burning down villages. These massacres caused the food shortage suffered by the Nuer people. Indeed, the Nuer are pure herdsmen, who depend on the Dinka for their grain supplies. Yet their own troops devastated Dinka fields.

11 They were northern militia (the “Murahilin”) recruited from the youth of the Arabic-speaking, Islamised cattle-herding tribes of the steppe, the “Baggara.” Their raids devastated the countryside, killing over 300,000 people between 1986 and 1989.
aggressive brand of Muslim proselytism in the mid-1990s. It destabilised the government in power and forced Asmara to close its borders and delay the return of refugees (500,000 between the fall of Mengistu and 1996).

13.5 Human toll

13.5.1 Figures
The Sudan conflict is one of the world’s longest civil wars, displacing a record number of people.

1955–1972 500,000 of Sudan’s 12 million people (1962) killed, or 4.2% of the total population [according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 1994].

1972 Sudan’s foreign affairs minister estimates the number of exiles at 250,000. However, the figure of one million refugees was also cited by the French newspaper *Le Monde*. The flow of refugees and displaced persons probably represented half of southern Sudan’s population.

1983–1990 500,000 deaths out of 22.4 million people in Sudan, or 2.2% of the total population (according to Al Hazali, 1993).

1983–1993 260,000 deaths, or 1.1% of Sudan’s total population (UNDP, 1994).

1988–1990 250,000 deaths, or 1% of the country’s total population [Doctors Without Borders (DWB), 1995].

In 1996 hundreds of thousands of people took refuge in camps in neighbouring countries.

2005 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the number of southerners likely to return to Sudan from neighbouring countries at 500,000. The UNHCR cites 100,000 assisted returns plus 150,000 “spontaneous” returns since 2005.

13.5.2 Insecurity in refugee camps
The figure of almost 800,000 refugees in Sudan in 2002 does not count undeclared refugees, who were considered clandestine exiles. The huge influx of people made it difficult for camps to ensure the integrity, that is, the neutrality and protection, of the area within their confines. The camps became training grounds for defeated armies and a hideout for arms traffickers. They were also tightly monitored at all times by exiled religious and ethnic authorities and sometimes suffered the violent incursions of armies from the refugees’ native countries. A political inability to find a place for them in society at large kept the refugees quarantined. Women in particular were victims of rape and violence. Despite calls for the return of southern refugees settled in the North in 2006–2007, regular government forces and especially the pro-government Misseriya militia blocked their homecoming, maintaining a climate of insecurity on the roads back, especially in South Kordofan and the oil states of Unity and Upper Nile. Likewise, on the border with Uganda in the Kaju Kaji region, refugees urged to return to their native districts with the UNHCR’s support were unable to stay long enough for the census. Their permanent resettlement was prevented by the growing insecurity caused by the deadly raids by armed bands of Acholis marginalised both in Uganda and South Sudan and loosely affiliated with the Lord Revolution Army (LRA).

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12  565,000 settled in urban areas and 132,000 located in the camps in north-western Sudan.
13.5.3 Issues surrounding displaced/refugee populations and the question of deterritorialisation

The populations displaced by the conflict in Southern Sudan are estimated to amount to 3.7 to 4.3 million, of which 1.8 million have gathered in the outskirts of Khartoum (a quarter of southerners have now settled in the Sudanese capital). This incessant displacement, particularly towards the North, has resulted in a mixing of communities that has Arabised the groups concentrated in Khartoum’s suburbs. Moreover, ties maintained with Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees have helped detribalise displaced communities while at the same time cutting off all contact between them and their native land, complicating efforts to resettle refugees in the south. The arrival of half of potential returnees and a substantial number of displaced persons in localities where all resources have been completely exhausted steps up pressure on resources still available, especially humanitarian ones, sparking local conflicts.

Alongside displaced Sudanese, the country is sheltering some of the world’s largest groups of refugees. Khartoum was home to 40,000 Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in 1994. Of the 132,000 people housed in refugee camps in the South, most (121,012 people) are partisans of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was defeated by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). Others are outcast supporters of the Ethiopian ruling class who supported Mengistu Haile Mariam before 1991. In 2003, 904,020 refugees and displaced persons lived in Sudan, especially northern Sudan. After Mengistu’s fall, Sudan, UNHCR and Ethiopia worked together to plan the refugees’ return. Cutting off weekly food deliveries and water supplies are methods commonly used to force displaced populations to return to their country. In March 2001 they prompted a hunger strike by hundreds of Ethiopian refugees protesting the UNHCR’s methods.

13.6 Outlooks

The issue of oil revenue sharing. The CPA signed in 2005 calls for distributing half of the revenues from oil well operations to southern Sudan, which should ensure its relative economic viability since roughly 500,000 barrels are extracted each day. This income whetted the appetites of Khartoum and the SPLM at a time when North-South borders had not yet been clearly delineated.

The boundary line between the North and South (2,000 km) remains a thorny problem. By the end of 2007 the ad-hoc commission had still not managed to agree on the validity of the maps and resulting division. Moreover, oil fields operated by Chinese-Sudanese and Malaysian consortiums are found on both sides of the border, in two regions, Abyei and Mount Nouba, that are still directly controlled by Sudan’s president on the south side.

Other issues, such as the referendum on the self-determination of South Sudan in 2011, could reignite communitarian tensions and conflicts concerning access, control and redistribution of resources. Conflicts have already been revived by the census initiated in late 2007, which is a condition of the 2005 peace agreements. Indeed, the censuses are supposed to provide a basis for determining how to share oil revenues and prepare the 2009 legislative elections and South Sudan’s referendum on self-determination in 2011. The delimiting of administrative boundaries – determining whether regional entities belong to the Karthoum or Juba government – has spurred a number of sometimes murderous clashes. These may be seen as ethnic conflicts inasmuch as the desire to ensure ethnic uniformity within sectors incites ethnic cleansing (see the Murle ethnic group, sworn
enemies of the Dinka, who control the SPLM [Lavergne, 2007; Rosière, 2006]). **Collusion between the Darfur conflict and pacification in Southern Sudan** (see Darfur War fact sheet).

**References**


**Glossary:**

**Anyanya (or Anya Nya):** Armed branch of the resistance movement in Southern Sudan. The word means deadly snake venom in the Madi language. Anyanya rose from the ashes of a previous resistance movement, Anyanya I, that sprang up in 1955. It consisted mainly of Nuer, Lotuko, Madi, Bari, Acholi, Zande and Dinka groups fighting the Khartoum government. The movement disbanded when the Addis Ababa protocol was signed in 1972. It resurfaced among Nuer dissidents, who took up arms again in 1978. After 1983, a competition for leadership broke out between Anyanya and the SPLA, which led to Anyanya’s defeat. Some of its members joined the SPLA, while others joined the ranks of pro-government militias. The movement still exists today under the acronym SANU, or Sudan African National Union.

**John Garang de Mabior:** Born in 1945, he joined the Anya-Nya of Joseph Lagu in 1970. Enrolled in the Sudanese army after the Addis Ababa Agreement, he became the chief architect of the SPLA and SPLM from 1983 on. Inflexible concerning the goal of an autonomous southern Sudan, he had to deal with strong internal dissonance in his movement starting in 1991. In 2005 he negotiated the CPA, which restored peace to the region. In early July of that year, he was sworn in as Sudan’s Vice President, but died three weeks later in a helicopter accident after an official visit to the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni.

**Joseph Lagu:** The undisputed leader of Anyanya during the first civil war in southern Sudan, Joseph Lagu was born in 1931, near Juba. He became an officer in the Sudanese army in 1960 but then defected in 1963 and joined the resistance. During the same period, he founded Anya Nya and its political branch, the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and assumed total control of the resistance beginning in 1968. He signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted autonomy to Southern Sudan in 1972. He was elected President of the High Executive Council of the Southern Sudanese Autonomous Regional Assembly in 1978, and then became the second Vice President of the Republic of Sudan in 1982, until the fall of the Nimeiry government in 1985.

**Nimeiry (Gaafar Muhammad):** After military studies taking him from Khartoum to Cairo, he assumed the role of spokesman for young Sudanese officers and orchestrated a military coup in May 1969 which brought him to the highest office in 1971. He ended
17 years of civil war by granting autonomy to South Sudan through the Addis Ababa Agreement. In the early 1980s the single party of which he was the undisputed leader turned markedly authoritarian, violent and unpopular. When his regime attempted to impose Sharia law on the entire country in 1983, the Addis Ababa protocol was violated and war broke out again. In 1985, the government fell after a coup led by his defence minister, General Mohammed Ahmed Suar-El-Dahab.


#### 14.1 Timeline

1973 Severe drought, especially in Wollo province.
27 February 1974 The navy mutinies in Massawa, Eritrea.
June 1974 The Derg (‘council’ in Ge’ez) is created by army officers of the mutiny.
21 March 1975 The monarchy is abolished.
1975 Armed opposition is organised in Tigray, called the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
31 April 1976 The Derg announce their political programme.
1976 A succession of regionalist armed insurrections in the provinces.
July 1977 Second Ogaden War.
5 July 1982 Start of the third Ogaden War.
Spring 1983 Effective TPLF and ELF guerrilla operations repeatedly defeat government troop offensives.
1984 Famine and humanitarian disaster strike the entire country. The Mengistu regime’s agrarian reforms – collectivisation, forced displacement and “villagisation” – are discredited.
1988 The TPLF liberates most of Northern Tigray and its forces advance towards Addis Ababa in August.
1991 Fall of the Red Negus.
14.2 Explanatory factors

14.2.1 Background

The empire’s fall: Peripheral regions reject the feudal system. A legacy of the Kingdom of Choa, the imperial government created a feudal system based on the myth of the dynasty’s descendence from King Solomon and the idea of a ‘Greater Ethiopia’. As a result, the dynasty traditionally acted as godparent to the other Solomonic dynasties in the Semitic and Christian highlands, such as the Goggam and Tigray (or Tigré, Tigrai). Moreover, alliances forged with native Amhara and Oromo populations to weaken rival dynasties fostered a new caste of provincial notables. This suzerain caste, numbering nearly two million individuals in the 1960s, lived from government service (tax collection) and revenues from land concessions right up until the agrarian reform of 1975. This caste created resentment among dynasties that had been removed from power and southern ethnic groups which were opposed to the centralised state basing its power on the seizure and transfer of their resources to the North. In 1973, a famine wracked Wollo province, killing 40,000 to 80,000 people, mainly Afar herders and Oromo farmers weakened by the wholesale confiscation of their lands by affluent classes and Emperor Haile Selassie’s government. This famine episode would have a major role to play in undermining the legitimacy of the regime in place. ‘Regionalist’ opposition movements. (See Tigray opposition, Eritrean rebellion against Ethiopia and Ogaden Wars).

14.2.2 Triggering events

For the Empire’s fall: The severe drought and famine that followed it led directly to the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie. Ethiopia’s first famines date back to the 13th century, then occurred one after another during the 15th–17th centuries until the great famine of 1888. Five major food crises were recorded in the 20th century: the famines in Tigray (1958), Way Lasta (1966) and Wollo (1973) and during the events of 1984–1985 and 2001–2003. So the fall of the Negus can be viewed as a reaction to the severe, endemic food shortage that roiled the country. Discontent in the army. However, it was chiefly the mutiny of the Ethiopian navy in Massawa, Eritrea that brought down Haile Selassie. The regime’s collapse began in the most sensitive part of the Empire, Eritrea, where the magnitude of the rebellion weakened the government. The country’s only organised force, the army, followed the lead of the mutinous non-commissioned officers and soldiers and met with only slight opposition after a revolutionary military committee, the Derg, took power.

For the fall of the Red Negus: Ethiopian society was shaken to its core by the army’s mutiny and the reforms implemented beginning in 1988 to achieve ‘democratisation’. The creation of political parties, the adoption of a new Constitution and the granting of free speech rights show that, in their bid to stamp out the older society, the revolutionaries weakened the foundation of their own power by stirring up all kinds of ethnic consciousness and identities.

14.2.3 Aggravating factors

For the fall of the Mengistu regime: Upheavals caused by the collectivist reforms. The 1974 revolution proclaimed the equality of all cultures and nationalities in Ethiopia (76 distinct, equal nationalities. 21 April 1976 Derg political programme). While keeping the same administrative districts as under the kingdom, the new regime returned the land and administration to peasant associations until the 1979 collectivisation, wrongly dubbed the “green revolution”. The second leg of government reforms was a ‘villagisation’ policy, intended as a response both to the famine and the security situation. In early 1985 farmers
were forced to leave their homes and settle in villages built from scratch near water sources, schools and medical facilities, to facilitate access to those services. However, many rural residents preferred to take refuge in camps or leave the country rather than accept forced re-housing. The government’s frequent inability to provide the expected services made the policy even more unpopular. Thus, instead of boosting agricultural productivity, the programme caused a decline in food production. It was suspended in 1986.

The Red Terror episode. In 1976, insurrections broke out across the country. The head of state Mengistu Haile Mariam cracked down through a campaign of repression dubbed the ‘Red Terror’ (1977 – 1978). Students and young people suspected of being members or sympathisers of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party were systematically executed. The regime also instituted a forced displacement policy that uprooted most of the farmers in the North and relocated them in the South and East of the country. Between 1985 and 1986, nearly 600,000 people were displaced from their villages and farms under this policy, most of them forced out by soldiers. Many farmers opted to flee rather than be resettled. Several human rights organisations reported that the forced displacements resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Mengistu regime officials also instigated the assassinations of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Orthodox patriarch Abuna Tefelows and 60 dignitaries of the Empire. They are further accused of being behind the execution and disappearance of some 100,000 Ethiopians between 1977 and 1978. Others sources estimate that about 500,000 people were killed during the Red Terror.

The accentuation of centrifugal trends and radicalisation of the “separatist” movements. In the eyes of the Godjam, Begemdir, Wollo and Tigray populations, the Derg policy was an Arab-Muslim plot. Other provinces saw the Derg as a prolongation of Amhara domination. Forced to fight on every front, the Derg instigated a massive return centralisation.

14.3 Comments

The arms race on the Ethiopian side provides a measure of the brutality of the armed conflicts. The former regime’s military budget in 1991 was 20 times greater than the 1974 budget. In 17 years, military spending grew to USD 8 billion. The army recruited 1.1 million people during those 17 years and the government purchased 370 planes, 1,700 tanks, 1,600 armoured vehicles and 4,000 pieces of artillery. After it was all over, the regime acknowledged 300,000 deaths before the final offensive of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Other sources put the toll at more than 500,000 dead as a result of regular army actions alone. The EPRDF also counts one million losses on the insurgent side, a large portion of which were civilians.

Bibliography:
15 Civil war between Ethiopia and its province Eritrea 1961–1991

15.1 Timeline

1952 Eritrea is incorporated into the Ethiopian federal system by decision of the United Nations.
1962 Eritrea is annexed to Ethiopia, triggering an armed revolt.
1969 Crisis within the ELF. Split and creation of the EPLF.
1970 Second major Ethiopian offensive against the EPLF. Eritrea is divided militarily into five regions. Civil war between ELF and EPLF partisans.
1974 Fall of the Negus. The war between Eritrean factions continues. The Eritrean separatist rebellion controls the countryside, ceding only the towns to the Ethiopian army.
1974–1975 Truce during the initial phases of the Ethiopian revolution.
August 1974 The Derg send a chief of staff to negotiate. He is executed in late 1974, hardening the Derg’s attitude towards the separatists.
June 1976 The first Red March is organised.
February 1977 A new chief of staff who was supposed to negotiate with the Eritrean rebels is executed by the regime after being accused of wanting to topple his former Derg colleagues.
July 1977 The second Red March is organised.
1978 A massive airlift is organised between Ethiopia and Moscow to support Mengistu’s troops. Eritrean forces make a strategic withdrawal to the southern province of the Sahel.
March 1984 The EPLF becomes the only movement in place in the liberated areas. It manages to annihilate a quarter of Ethiopia’s air force at the Asmara base. The two sides keep fighting and reject the idea of negotiating or calling a truce despite the famine ravaging the entire country.
1987 The Parliament of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia grants Eritrea, Tigray, Dire Dawa and Ogaden the status of autonomous regions, with an assembly and executive branch. This proposed administrative reform splits Eritrea into the “Christian” high plateaus and “Muslim” lowlands.
1988 The EPLF and TPLF form an alliance.
1990 The EPRDF is created.
1991 The EPLF has genuinely gained the upper hand and appears the only viable international discussion partner. Addis Ababa is taken and Mengistu flees. Meles Zenawi, leader of the TPLF and then the EPRDF, acts as president of a transitional government. Eritrea gains de facto independence in the new Ethiopian federation.

15.2 Explanatory factors

15.2.1 Background

Historical divergences between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea is a former Italian colony (1936–1941). In 1941, British soldiers managed to oust the Italian troops. The British invested substantial capital in transport and infrastructure to make Eritrea the staging ground for military operations in the Middle East, but economic development ended abruptly in 1944. The four major powers were undecided at the time whether to grant Eritrea its independence, annex it to Ethiopia or divide it between Sudan and
Ethiopia. Given the major powers’ divergent opinions, Eritrea remained under British administration until 1952 by decision of the UN. Italian colonial influence and British investments transformed Eritreans, making them more open to the outside world and more westernised than Ethiopians, who remained under feudal rule. During the 1950s, Eritrea’s economy went into a slump. Amhara civil servants replaced Eritreans and Eritrea was officially annexed to Ethiopia in 1962. Higher unemployment freed up males, who joined the ranks of the rebellion, the ELF, en masse. Because of its openness to the outside world, Eritrea forced Ethiopia to question its feudal system.

Physical factors contributing to Eritrea’s isolation and autonomisation in relation to the central state. The Ethiopia-Eritrea region consists of a series of high plateaus and lowlands with a mountainous massif at its centre drained by 12 rivers supplying water to the surrounding areas, thereby physically compartmentalising the highlands in a way that makes travel between Ethiopia's western and eastern provinces difficult. These geographical factors combine to create a strong sense of distinctiveness among Eritrean people and a very weak level of Ethiopian central government administration.

15.2.2 Triggering event
Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea in 1962 triggered the armed rebellion.

15.2.3 Aggravating factors
Eritrea’s division and rebel factions a factor in prolonging the conflict. Eritrea has no geographical or ethnic unity because of its highlands versus lowlands split. This contrast is matched by linguistic, religious and social divides, which put enormous constraints on the rebellion. The north-western areas (lowlands populated by Muslim nomads) were easier to liberate, while establishing the front in the mountainous areas populated by farming and urbanised communities was more of a challenge. The religious divide also cropped up when the “Unionist” party (supported and encouraged by Ethiopia) linked to the Copt hierarchy of the Eritrean high plateau was created. Religious divisions made their impact felt on the Eritrean front, which showed signs of weakness. In 1969 a crisis broke out in the ELF, which had splintered after the more socialist-oriented EPLF was created. The 1969–1970 crisis erupted against a backdrop of intense repression, during which Ethiopian offensives ended in a number of bombardments that isolated the islands of rebellion from one another. Moreover, the ethnic and religious differences were exacerbated by Eritrea’s division into five military regions, which split combatants by ethnic and religious affiliation, and destabilised and weakened the ELF. Meanwhile, the EPLF did not settle for occupying territory militarily. It pursued economic, military, administrative and agrarian reforms as well and encouraged literacy and the adoption of a sedentary lifestyle by nomads. For all that, the EPLF was diplomatically isolated and only officially recognised by Syria and South Yemen. Most Arab countries opted to support the older, more conservative ELF (the Beni Hamer that comprised it were strongly influenced by the Mahdi state. Many were Ascarì, or Italian colonial troop auxiliaries (another factor in Eritrea’s fragmentation and the battle among armed factions). The EPLF represented a new faction in the separatist movement that was gaining ground and controlled a portion of the high plateaus, the north and the east while the ELF held on to the coastal strip and the south. This split and the infighting among factions cost the Eritrean rebellion some of its credibility. The civil war between the two
fronts dragged on until the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the advent of Ethiopia’s revolution in 1974. At that time the Eritrean separatist rebellion controlled the countryside, ceding only the towns to the Ethiopian army. The ELF, prey to serious dissensions within its ranks, lost ground to the EPLF during this time.

After a truce, the battle resumed against Mengistu’s collectivist, Marxist regime. Attacked on all fronts, the Derg attempted to negotiate with the rebel movements, but the assassination of its emissaries radicalised the regime’s position. Indeed, the Derg feared setting off a chain reaction if they appeared weak vis-à-vis the Eritrean separatists. The regime dusted off the old imperial arguments about the “Amharic synthesis” of peoples and presented itself as the empire’s heir. Eritrea’s strategic importance also increased with the reopening of the Suez Canal and Djibouti’s independence in 1977. Meanwhile, the EPLF capitalised on the disarray caused by the Ethiopian revolution to escalate the fight. The departure of 4,000 Americans from the Kagnew base and 9,000 Italians from Eritrea led to a sudden rise in unemployment among Eritreans, who joined the resistance forces in droves. At the same time Addis Ababa’s new leaders decided to close down the schools so they could send schoolchildren and older students out to teach rural residents to read and write, prompting a massive influx of people to swell the ranks of the ELF and EPLF, leading to 6,000 new, educated recruits. The two fronts managed to retake the ports of Assab and Massawa. Morale in the Ethiopian army hit a new low with the loss of U.S. financial and logistical support in December 1974. The government organised two “Red Marches” in 1976 and 1977 by promising land to thousands of Ethiopian rural volunteers. But the poorly organised marches flopped totally (the roads being blocked, the Derg eventually flew in 10,000 peasants to Asmara). The Ethiopians reinstated a disastrous military situation with the support of the Soviets, who had once favoured Eritrea’s independence, a new paradox in the two major blocs’ jockeying for position in Africa. An air bridge between Moscow and Ethiopia was operated during 1978. The fronts decided to make a strategic withdrawal to the southern province of Sahel and the conflict then became mired in a war of position that appeared to have no political or military solution. The 1984 famine that struck 12 of 14 provinces did not stop the regime from pursuing its war effort, rejecting any idea of a truce. The EPLF became the only movement in place in the liberated areas and in May 1984, it managed to destroy a quarter of Ethiopia’s air force at the Asmara base. 1988 sealed the alliance between the EPLF and TPLF, which racked up one military success after another. The EPRDF was formed in 1990 and Meles Zenawi took Addis Ababa in the spring of 1991.

15.3 Human toll

Between 1974 and 1989 546,000 deaths were reported, or 1.4% of the 1993 Ethiopian population, according to the National Defence General Secretariat (SGDN).

Since Mengistu’s fall and the EPLF’s assumption of power through the EPRDF, between 300,000 and 500,000 Eritreans have moved to Sudan and 422,000 are refugees, or 12% of Eritrea’s population according to M. Lavergne.

References:
16 Humanitarian disaster associated with the famine in Ethiopia 1983–1985

16.1 Timeline

**February 1982** Ethiopian troops, 100,000 strong, launch an offensive against guerrilla positions in northern Eritrea. The offensive was a military failure, with more than 30,000 men killed on the Ethiopian side.

**1983** The first drought of the 1983–85 successive droughts.

**June 1984** Drought and famine grip large portions of the country’s north.

**October 1984** The country is about 535,000 tonnes short of the grain it needs to feed its population. Mengistu appeals to the international community.

**November 1984** The figure tops 1.2 million tonnes.

**March 1985** The Derg gain political control of the supply organisation. Management of it is turned over to the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) so that the food aid can be distributed selectively. The EPLF, TPLF and Ethiopian army continue their fighting and reject any idea of a truce to spare civilian populations.

**April 1985** The abrupt evacuation of 57,000 refugees from the Ibnet camp (Gondar) ends badly. A scandal breaks out over diversions of humanitarian aid by the Mengistu regime.

**December 1985** Doctors Without Borders (DWB) is expelled after accusing the Ethiopian regime of diverting a portion of the food aid and of rounding up and forcibly moving people (in particular near the Sekota centre in Wollo).

**10 April 1986** The Mengistu regime puts an end to “villagisation” and population displacement. The two policies affected nearly 3 million Ethiopian

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**Figure 6**

1984 Drought: anomaly of summer precipitation

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Source: UK Met Office Hadley Centre, 2010
16.2 Explanatory factors

16.2.1 Background

**Collapse of the Ethiopian economy.** Following the Revolution and the so-called “Red Terror” period and despite major structural reforms introduced under land, land collectivisation and food security policies, the state farm economy collapsed. State farms employed seasonal workers almost exclusively, including at least 500,000 farmers in the North. With the outbreak of the famine they lost most of their income, helping to discredit the agricultural policies introduced by the Derg. The famine was also aggravated by the regime’s agrarian policies and reforms, which fanned the flames of tensions surrounding resource access and control.

**Grain wholesaling made illegal.** While state farms were collapsing and grain stocks were not being replenished as a result of poor harvests caused by the drought, the government declared grain wholesaling illegal. This had the effect of slashing the number of merchants from 30,000 to 5,000 in 10 years of revolution. Grain trade was disrupted just as people were clamouring for emergency food assistance.

16.2.2 Triggering events


16.2.3 Aggravating factors

**A state overwhelmed by events.** In mid-1984 a new drought and a major famine began to grip a large portion of Ethiopia’s north. At least four conflicts were also being fought against armed regionalist movements – in Tigray, Eritrea, Ogaden and Oromo lands – rendering the country’s economy was incapable of responding to the crisis.

**Warring parties that persisted in their military operations.** Attacked and weakened by the TPLF, ELF, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), the Mengistu regime had built up one of the biggest armies in sub-Saharan Africa thanks to a military agreement with the USSR and heavy military spending. Despite harbingers of an unprecedented famine in the country, the Ethiopian state continued its armed operations in combat zones hit by very severe shortages (Eritrea, Tigray), preventing transportation of supplies from getting through. Rebel movements matched government intransigence with their own inflexibility, rejecting calls for a truce to aid populations. Although the famine was caused by lack of rainfall, its magnitude is the result of military operations, which never stopped despite the humanitarian disaster. Two distinct famines can be identified, the most severe of which occurred in the country’s north, the site of the fiercest battles against the TPLF and EPLF. The situation worsened when Mengistu created a no-go area 10 kilometres wide along the border with Sudan, after evacuating all foreigners despite protests by the Red Cross and governments, including the United States and USSR. After declaring a state of emergency, Mengistu decided that all Ethiopians had to pay one-twelfth of their wages or one-tenth of their income to the Derg, to do their part to support the war effort.
**Forced displacements.** The official purpose of forced displacements, which were distinct from the policy of “villagisation”, was to thin out certain drought-stricken regions and transfer the population to better irrigated locations such as Bale, to respond to climate crises and spare people from hunger. In reality, they aimed to empty the rural areas held by the rebellion under the guise of countering overpopulation and the threat of epidemics. But forced displacements to areas unfit for human habitation and too far from water sources aggravated the famine and killed at least 100,000 people through malnutrition and exhaustion. By calling for the relocation of 33 million people, or 70% of the total rural population, they also caused de facto deterritorialisation, the destruction of family production systems, the indebtedness of peasant farmers and over-consumption of wood, which in turn aggravated the process of desertification in the country’s northern fringes.

**Manipulation of food aid for political and military ends.** In the Wollo and Tigray provinces, the famine was at the centre of a struggle between rival political forces whose primary focus was the control of populations. The state aimed to broaden its hold over the “mulish” rural populations now made vulnerable by the climate and food crisis. The armed opposition fronts wanted to shield their popular base from the government’s attempts to control them, safeguard their organisational authority and curb the effects of the famine by arranging to move people to Sudan. In the regions under TPLF control, the Ethiopian government sought to achieve with the “food weapon” what it had been unable to impose by military means. The goal was to drive affected populations toward the towns and cities controlled by the Ethiopian army [Makelé (Tigray), Korem, Maychew, Kobbo (Wollo)], an end partially achieved through political control of the relief supplies organisation in March 1985. Some of the food aid was allocated for the forced displacement of 20,000 families and their resettlement in the south and south-west on 300,000 hectares of land, despite protests by the NGOs, which condemned the raids, forced departures [57,000 people from the IbiNet camp (Gondar)] and manipulation of public opinion (the government diverted some of the food aid and opposed opening up corridors to allow humanitarian aid through on the grounds that its enemies were rebels and bandits). Thus, an excess of apolitism and non-interference distorted the true missions of humanitarian organisations.

16.3 Human toll

The toll of the 1983–1985 famine was 500,000 to one million deaths depending on whether deaths from malnutrition are added to those caused by forced displacements. More than 7 million people went hungry. The main provinces affected were the central-northern highlands and eastern lowlands of Wollo, Tigray, Begemder and Semyen, and overall 12 out of Ethiopia’s 14 provinces. All told, between December 1984 and July 1985, 510,000 families out of the 1.2 million people the government had planned to displace – most of them from the three regions cited above – were forced to leave and resettled in areas west of Addis Ababa, close to Nekempt, Jima, Bure and Bedele. By some estimates, this relocation caused 100,000 casualties.

References

17.1 Timeline

1960 Somalia gains independence and immediately lays claim to territories inhabited by Somali ethnic clans in Ethiopia. First Ogaden war.

21 December 1969 Siad Barre seizes power of Somalia in a coup d’État and enters into an alliance with the USSR.

July 1977 Launch of the offensive known as the second Ogaden war. WSLF troops, backed by Somalia, penetrate into the Hararghe.

September 1977 The USSR refuses to recognise Somali claims on Ethiopian Ogaden. Somalia pulls out of its military agreements with the USSR.

February–May 1978 Thanks to support from the USSR, Ethiopia successfully wins the second Ogaden war.

1981 Somalia suffers a military defeat in Harraghe province (areas crossed by Somali Ogaden tribes. Ethiopia re-establishes a presence.

5 July 1982 Ethiopian forces support armed elements hostile to the government in Mogadishu and advance across the border into Somalia, thereby precipitating the third Ogaden war.

1984 The Derg takes power in Ethiopia. Attack by the WSLF near to Dire Dawa on the Addis-Djibouti railway line.

1987 Civil war breaks out in Somalia.

1991 Fall of Mengistu. Fall of the government of Siad Barre, which helps the WSLF, renamed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), regain support.

February 2006 the Islamic Courts Union takes control in Somalia. December 2006 Ethiopia intervenes militarily in Somalia (20,000 men)

17.2 Explanatory factors

17.2.1 Background

Pressure from outlying Muslim populations. The heart of Christian Ethiopia started to come under particular pressure from surrounding Muslims areas from the 16th century onwards. During the Empire’s period of expansion (19th century), Menelik II managed to gain control over the Ogaden highlands lying to the East of the Rift valley which descend down to the Somali steppes and the lower-lying tropical areas in the South inhabited by a pagan people, the Oromo. This brought a number of largely Muslim populations into the empire. Present-day Ethiopia has preserved this legacy by including the vast expanses of the Ogaden inhabited by Somalis.

Rejection of the Ethiopian regime’s centralising system (cf. fall of Haile Selassie, red revolution, conflict between Ethiopia and its province of Eritrea). In 1987, the administrative

Acronyms:
WSLF— Western Somalia Liberation Front
ONLF—Ogaden National Liberation Front
OLF—Oromo Liberation Front
and agrarian reforms introduced under the Mengistu regime led to the separation of the Somali territories of Dire Dawa and the Ogaden. Divided between administrative districts, an increasing number of conflicts began to break out as a result of land and border disputes between different Somali communities.

17.2.2 Explanatory variables

Constantly shifting alliances. As in all the separatist and nationalist crises since the 1970s in Ethiopia, many countries influenced the course of military operations during the Ogaden wars. Soviet backing for Somalia in 1969 switched to Marxist Ethiopia when the Barre government broke off its military agreements with the USSR after the latter failed to support Somali claims on territories to the East of Ethiopian Ogaden. Other protagonists such as Cuba also intervened during the 1977–1978 conflict.

Somalia, a troublesome neighbour. Ethiopia shares a 1,600 km long border with Somalia. The permeability of this border and the mix of ethnic identities explain why this border area has long served as a hinterland and refuge for the Ethiopian Somali separatist movement. This permeability was exacerbated by the implosion of Somalia following the fall of President Barre and the rise to power of the Islamic Courts in 1991. The particularly close links between members of the ONLF and neighbouring Somali populations lent an ethnic and radical religious dimension to the combat led by the ONLF, which is paying the price of the international fight against “Arab-Muslim terrorism” following the fall of the Islamic Courts in 2006. Invoking security and the right of self-defence as a motive, Ethiopia intervened directly in the domestic affairs of Somalia, supported the formation of a Transitional Federal Government in 2004 and sent 20,000 men in February 2006 to fight against the Somali Islamist Courts.

Fear of radical Islam. Some Ethiopians living along the border currently fear that religious radicalism may spill over the border from Somalia into Ethiopia. Sporadic and occasionally violent tensions have recently broken out in different parts of Ethiopia between orthodox Christians and Muslims, who until recently had been known for their peaceful co-existence and mutual respect.

Persistent tensions and rising radicalism. Alongside the armed regionalist movements such as the OLF and ONLF, small Islamist groups such as al-Ittehat are taking advantage of the permanent political instability in Somalia to organise terrorist actions. Al-Ittehat has created real centres of unrest in certain parts of the Ogaden and claimed responsibility for several attacks in August 1996 and April 1997 in the Ethiopian capital, notably against the Minister of Transport, Abdul Majid Hussein.

A new wave of terrorism and crackdown in the Ogaden. In April 2007, the ONLF launched an attack against the Abola oilfields which left 74 dead. This triggered a crackdown which was followed, on 28 May 2007, by a grenade attack by the ONLF on ceremonies being held in Jijiga and Degehabur. The explosions and ensuing panic left 17 dead and dozens injured, including the President of the Somali region. Most of the victims killed in these two simultaneous attacks were civilians.

References:
18 Tigrayan rebellion against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia

18.1 Timeline

**February 1975** Creation of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawi. The EPLF instigated the creation of the TPLF, which was modelled on the EPLF and set up to protect its southern flank.

**Spring 1983** Offensives launched by the Ethiopian army successfully clear the main roads to the South, but the determination of the Tigrayans, aided by the Eritreans and the highly eroded topography of the southern plateau, make guerilla actions highly effective.

**1985** Relations between the TPLF and the EPLF deteriorate, although this does not prevent the two movements from co-ordinating their fight against Mengistu.

**8 March 1986** The TPLF is accused of murdering two NGO workers from World Vision.

**31 December 1986** Italians from the Beles (Gojjam) project are kidnapped by the TPLF near to Gondar. They are released in Sudan in January 1987.

**1988** The TPLF liberates most of northern Tigray and in August its forces advance on Addis Ababa.

**1988–1989** Operations using Amhara and Oromo as proxies against the Tigrayans start to bear fruit.

**Early 1991** The TPLF retain control solely over the Tigray. Signing of an agreement between the TPLF and various movements [ONLF, Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO)] to create the EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) with the backing of the United States.

**May 1991** Fall of the Red Negus.

**22 July 1991** The EPRDF takes power and Meles Senawi is elected interim President.

**End of 1994** Adoption of the new Ethiopian constitution establishing a Federal State which recognises ethnic diversity and the right of different nationalities to self-determination.

18.2 Explanatory factors

18.2.1 Background

**Long-standing rivalries.** When the emperor Menelik extended his empire to the west, and particularly to the east and south, he relied upon the backing of the Amhara people. This Christian ethnic group was part of the ancient bastion of Christianity which since the 4th century had survived in north-east Africa despite the Muslim advance from the 7th century onwards. Until the 19th century, the Tigrayans located in the Tigray region north of the Amhara region were the heart of this bastion, which in the 16th century was swamped by Muslims from the east. However, these two Christian ethnic groups, both speaking a Semitic language, were traditionally rivals. The Amhara populations served as auxiliaries for the central State. The marginalisation of the Tigrayan ethnic group and its long-standing rivalry with the Amhara were responsible for the inter-ethnic violence

Acronyms:
- **TPLF**—Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front
- **EPLF**—Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
- **ONLF**—Ogaden National Liberation Front
- **OPDO**—Oromo People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
- **EPRDF**—Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
which broke out during the Tigrayan rebellion. **Rejection of the feudal system and the centralising authority** (cf. fall of the Negus).

### 18.2.2 Triggering events

**Rejection of the feudal system and the centralising authority** (cf. Red Revolution, conflict between Ethiopia and its province of Eritrea).

**Mengistu reforms and the agricultural crisis.** While the tensions created by the agrarian reform, the forced displacements resulting from “villagisation” and the severe drought in 1982-1984 were not the direct cause of the rebellion, the combination of these factors led to a reversal in the TPFL’s relative position of strength vis-à-vis the Mengistu regime. The TPLF found itself in a position where it could regularly sever road links between the capital and ports of Asab and Massawa and where it could advance into the Wollo and Gondar while still maintaining control over the whole of the Tigray.

### 18.2.3 Aggravating factors

The Haile Selassie regime followed by that of Mengistu provided a basis for the alliance between the TPLF and the EPLF, until dissenting voices started to emerge and reappeared in 1998 during the struggle against the new regime in Addis Ababa in which the Tigrayans (EPRDP) and the EPLF played a leading role.

**Playing the nationalist card.** Mengistu, particularly from 1988 onwards when he was on the point of losing both Eritrea and Tigray, tried to set popular opinion against the northern Fronts by rekindling the long-standing animosity of the Amhara and Oromo towards the Tigrayans.

### References


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19 Afar rebellion against the EPLF and the TPLF and resurgence of tensions 1972–2005

19.1 Timeline

1972 The Uguguma (meaning “revolution” in Afar) rebellion breaks out. The rebellion is a result of a split within the EPLF aimed at defending the population of Dankalia against the violent actions of this Front. As soon as the conflict starts between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Afar are against the secession of the province of Eritrea.

Towards 1977 Young Afar fighters organise resistance against murderous incursions by certain elements of the TPLF.

1977 Djibouti gains independence. The Afar share control of this small strategic State in the Horn of Africa with the Issa.

1979 The young Afar fighters refuse to allow the TPLF to use the road from Berahle to go to Bada to fight the EPLF. Tigrayan forces retaliate and kill around twenty Afar. This incident marks a turning point in the escalation of the conflict (known as the “battle of Tuesday”). TPLF fighters step up their military campaigns to impose the Front’s authority in the north of the Afar region and a growing number of Afar join armed groups to resist these operations.

1981 In response to the TPLF, other fighters join forces and lend new momentum to the Uguguma with the aim of defending Afar territory and populations against attacks or foreign incursions. In the Tigray region, where large Afar communities are established, the Uguguma successfully withstands attempts by the TPLF to establish a stranglehold.

1986–1987 The Uguguma incorporates other fighting forces, such as those from Bori in Eritrea which had also opposed forced recruitment by the EPLF.

From 1989–1990 onwards: The TPLF, contemplating rule over the whole of Ethiopia, is wary of the Afar Front and avoids confrontation with the Uguguma.

July 1991 The de facto independence of Eritrea (officially gained in 2000) marks the split in Afar territory and the separation of the territories on the Red Sea from Ethiopia by the victorious Eritreans (the autonomous region of Assab is lost by the Afar at this time). The Afar Fronts unite to form the Afar Revolutionary Unity Front (ARDUF). Start of the total armed uprising (against Ethiopia, Eritrea, but also disagreements with the Issa communities, etc.).

From 1993 onwards The Ethiopian and Eritrean armies join forces to fight the UDRAF, which continues to expand its theatre of operations into southern Afar.

1995 Djibouti hands over Muhaydin Mafatah, the historical head of the Uguguma, to the Ethiopian regime, which contributes to the collapse of the movement. The Ethiopian government obtains a ceasefire agreement by force. End of the armed uprising.

1997–1998 Djibouti and Ethiopia join forces against the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and the Uguguma. In 1997, the Ethiopian authorities hand over the leaders of the FRUD to the Djibouti regime.

February 2005 The Uguguma agrees to lay down its arms and convert itself into a political party known as the Afar National Revolutionary Democratic Front (ANRDF).

June 2006 Massive fraud leads to the failure of the political representativeness of the Afar parties.
19.2 Explanatory factors

19.2.1 Background

**Afar identify and the United Nations.** Afar communities live in the very heart of the Horn of Africa, apart from Somalia, in what is known as the Afar triangle. Since the respective declarations of independence, and subsequently in 1977 and 1991, they have been divided between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The Afar populations have been particularly marginalised and their demands call for a fairer distribution of resources and administrative posts in the Djiboutian and Ethiopian States, as well as the reunification of Afar lands on the Red Sea with those in the Ethiopian Afar heartland (the Afar movement is not a separatist movement, but seeks unification of the Afar nation). It is an indigenous resistance movement which continued to develop its pan-Ethiopian objectives to seek reunification of the Red Sea coast, after the EPLF and the TPLF had taken control of Asmara and Addis Ababa respectively. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea consider the Afar movements to be a threat to the stability of their States. In Eritrea, the Afar are demanding the return of the Red Sea coastal areas, without which Eritrea would lose its raison d’être. In Ethiopia, the Afar remain a highly marginalised community despite their relative autonomy within the federal system. As a result, they have systematically opposed all regimes that have come to power in Ethiopia.

Challenge of managing resources against a background of dwindling resources due to desertification and environmental degradation. Successive periods of drought have led to a scarcity of pasture land and reduced the livestock holdings of Afar populations, for whom livestock is both their main source of income and their sole basic foodstuff. The construction of dams to retain water and the development of intensive agriculture in State farms has led to the confiscation of the best Afar land and made it difficult for them to provide water and grazing land to livestock which are becoming increasingly sensitive to parasites and are dying en masse. Afar lands are becoming less fertile as a result of mechanisation and shorter fallow periods. The growing scarcity of natural resources and fierce competition for control of these resources (water, pastureland, salt mines, access to the sea and control of strategic roads) is bringing Afar into conflict with all the surrounding communities (Oromo from Wello, Argoba, Karrayou, Somali, Tigray, Issa, Amhara, etc.) These tensions are sometimes accompanied by inter-ethnic conflicts.
Livelihood dynamics of the Afar rebellion

Figure 7
Livelihood dynamics of the Afar rebellion
19.2.2 Triggering events
The upheavals that wracked the entire Horn of Africa between 1987 and 1991 (fall of Mengistu and rise to power of the TPFL, Eritrean independence, fall of Barre in Somalia, etc.) created divisions in the Afar territorial continuum and prompted the Uguguma to launch an offensive on all fronts.

19.2.3 Aggravating factors and comments on the resilience of the Afar phenomenon
Colonisation of Afar territory and economic activities. The arrival of private Tigrayan colonists on the fertile lands in the Awash valley and the land taken for intensive farming from the most fertile Afar pasturelands put pressure on resources and sparked conflicts of interest, sometimes accompanied by ethnic tensions. The growing scarcity of pasture land and the overgrazing of areas still available led to gradual desertification, aggravated by successive periods of drought. The Awash valley was degraded through the pursuit of a policy of intensive farming, which used river water for both pasture lands and cattle. The project to grow sugarcane over an area of 200,000 hectares and vast market gardening schemes aimed at producing flowers for export took a heavy toll on Afar livestock herders, accelerating drought and famine. The industrial mining of salt (at Afdra and As’Ale) took work away from Afar who had made a living from such activities for centuries, depriving them of income and work. The intrusion of other communities on this activity, which had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the Afar, fanned inter-ethnic tensions.

Feeling that they had been economically destroyed and then culturally annihilated, hundreds of Afar joined the resistance, despite the cease-fire signed in 1995. Afar communities were forced to move and entered into conflict with other communities, such as Issa livestock herders who vied with them for access to the fertile areas bordering the Awash.

Internationalisation of the conflict. Since 2000, the Afar people have been divided between three countries, which have often joined forces to stamp out the rebellion even though they dispute their common borders (as in the case of Djibouti and Eritrea in 1996). From a political standpoint, the real autonomy of the Afar region has not been respected by the Tigrayan powers in place in Addis Ababa. In view of its geostrategic importance, the region had always been controlled from an economic and military standpoint. However, former Afar members of the Mengistu militia managed to lend military support to their relatives and friends in Djibouti in 1990–1991. From 1997–1998 onwards, Djibouti and Ethiopia joined forces to fight the Afar rebellion, and after the 1998–2000 war Djibouti and Ethiopia co-ordinated their actions against the rebellion. Over the past few years Afar territory has been eroded both by States and by neighbouring ethnic groups backed by the States. For example, the Issa, armed and funded by Djibouti, leave the Afar livestock herders in a state of permanent insecurity in the south-east of the region, whereas Oromo trained by Eritreans carry out murderous incursions in the north-west of the region under the blind eye of the Ethiopian army. The Afar rebellion, which is more of an indigenous defence movement than a classical liberation movement, is starting to see small, radicalised and violent groups appear. They engage in kidnapping and use Eritrea as their hinterland.

References:
20 Rebellion and secession in the Oromo movement in Ethiopia 1974–2002

20.1 Timeline

1974 Creation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).
After 1978 The OLF becomes particularly active in the Sudan, organising refugees who had fled due to widespread conscription.
1982–1983 Military actions start in the Wollega. The number of OLF fighters is estimated to amount to merely a few hundred men.
1986 Creation of the Islamic Liberation Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO).
1988 An OLF camp in Yabos is attacked by the SPLA.
September–November 1988 The SPLA successfully destroys much of infrastructure of the Oromo organisation.
Early 1990 Creation of the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), which is part of the EPRDF.
1990 The OLF consists of 10,000 fighters.
End of February 1991 The position of Mengistu Haile Maryam has considerably deteriorated. Negotiations with the EPLF come to a dead end in Washington and the offensive launched by the EPLF, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) present in the west of the country, the TPLF and its satellite organisations in the EPRDF alliance achieve a series of military successes.
Up to June 1991 The OLF provides logistical support to the EPLF and TPLF in the Wollega.
28 May 1991 EPRDF fighters reach Addis Ababa a few days after the flight of President Mengistu to Zimbabwe. The OLF is given four Ministries in the new government.
June 1992 Preparations for regional elections. The OLF puts pressure on the EPRDF by threatening the latter to mobilise mass numbers of troops (through forced recruitment campaigns) and to garrison them in military camps.
23 June 1992 The OLF relinquishes its Ministries in protest against the conditions in which the regional elections took place.
July 1992 onwards The EPRDF imprisons almost 17,000 members of the OLF (civilians and fighters) in camps, in view of the climate of hostility and the stalled negotiations, despite skilled Eritrean mediation, between the two organisations.
End of 1994 To dispel rumours and silence the Oromo opposition, Zenawi partially demobilises the army into which many Tigrayans had been recruited.
2002–2003 Massacres and human rights violations committed by the OLF (and Nuers from southern Sudan) in the Gambella region.

20.2 Foreword

Menelik’s conquests resulted in the annexation of the Ogaden highlands and lower, tropical lands to the South, which are hotter and wetter. These new territories were mainly inhabited by Muslims and, in the very South, pagans whom the Amhara have long referred to as Gallas (a pejorative term) and whom are now described as Oromo. As a result of the movement of Oromo peoples to the north in the 16th century, another vast
The Oromo population emerged in the Choa with sharp differences between the Islamicised East and the “Amharised” and Christianised West. Today, the Oromo are 60% Muslim and 30% orthodox Christian and, although they speak a shared Kushitic language, it is difficult to speak in terms of cultural identity because they are scattered across a vast territory.

Many Oromo are part of the Ethiopian State machinery and currently account for around 40% of the population. Not all Oromo have had the same destiny, however. To the East and the North, the Oromo from Choa are the auxiliary forces accompanying the Amhara colonisation. To the South they consist of groups of serfs who are exploited by the dignitaries in power.

The Oromo are the largest ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, alongside the Amhara and the Tigrayans. With their demographic weight, they can lay claim to the largest territory in Ethiopia as well as the country’s two largest cities (which they did in the 1992 regional elections), Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The security crises involving Oromo movements can be divided into 5 phases: (1) alliance with other regionalist movements against the Mengistu regime (1974–1990); (2) a transitional phase marked by the emergence of factions within the EPRDF (1990–1992); (3) opposition between the OLF and the EPRDF (1993–1997); (4) a return of Oromo movements during the War between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998–2000); (5) renewed conflict since the early 2000s.

### 20.3 Explanatory factors

#### 20.3.1 General regionalist claims

**Centralising drives by various regimes since Menelik and the vassalisation of the Oromo.** Ancient migrations and conquests accelerated the fragmentation of the peoples in the south-west into a tapestry of compact units. Numerous marriages between indigenous peoples and Amhara-Tigrayans helped to strip the Oromo of their nationhood and territories. In the South, they were reduced to a state of servitude if not slavery, while in the North they can be seen to be more like vassals serving the Amhara administration. In both cases, apart from some income distributed to the government’s auxiliaries, the Oromo community felt itself to be marginalised and dispossessed despite being in the majority. Wars, forced displacements and land expropriations also helped to fuel their hatred for the central authority.

#### 20.3.2 Common opposition to the Mengistu regime, dissension between rebellions

After sporadic local uprisings in the mid-1970s, the new regime’s agrarian reform first met with much sympathy. However, the continued pursuit of a policy of paying low prices to producers to ensure cheap food for the cities began to cause anger among Oromo farmers. It was above all the authoritarian reinstallation of populations on Oromo territories without prior consultation with local authorities followed by the policy of “villagisation”, forced conscription, political repression and the deferred effect of the Ogaden war in 1877–1978.
which stoked opposition from the Oromo and encouraged their nationalistic aspirations. This crisis also rekindled old antagonisms between Oromo, Tigrayans and Eritreans. In 1983–1985, while the situation had stabilised in Eritrea and in the southern lowlands, a new front opened in the Tigray and threatened the south-east of Oromia. Nationalist movements attempted to hold meetings to co-ordinate their struggle both politically and militarily, but their views were too divergent to contemplate an agreement. It was when the regime fell apart (1988–1990) that regionalist armed movements joined forces to provide logistical and military support. In January 1990, the EPLF sent freed Oromo prisoners, via Sudan, to reinforce the OLF, which took Asossa to the West. The liberation fronts then set off to attack Wallo and Gojjam after the North was left unprotected, accusing Israel (which had re-established relations with Ethiopia) of training the army and calling for help from Arab countries.

20.3.3 Collusion in the Ethiopian (Tigray, Oromo, Eritrea) and southern Sudanese conflicts
In 1990–1991, the OLF attacked camps containing 400,000 southern Sudanese refugees in the Gambella and Itang area and expelled their occupants. This event demonstrated the collusion of Ethiopian autonomy movements in Sudanese affairs. The OLF had traditionally used Eritrea as its hinterland, but also maintained contacts with loyalist Sudanese forces in combating the SPLA in Sudan. This proved, as in many other cases in the Horn of Africa, that governments had successfully used armed movements as a means of both destabilising a domestic enemy and combating the policy of a neighbouring country to influence and support separatist movements. The attack on Gambella also showed how populations and refugees located in the border areas of a country in conflict were the victims of a cycle of attacks and reprisals (cf. the cycles of violence between Anuyaks and Nuers around Gambella in 1989, 1992 and 2003 in particular). Since its creation in 1983, the SPLA started to operate in the Ethiopian region of Gambella and established a base at Assossa from which southern Sudanese insurgents launched military actions in the Blue Nile region to where many Ethiopian refugees, notably Oromo, had fled. The SPLA attacked an OLF camp in Yabus for the first time in 1988 and in September–November 1989, destroying much of the infrastructure of the Oromo organisation. This cycle of violence fanned the hatred of the Oromo and resulted in reprisals against southern Sudanese refugees.

20.3.4 Radicalisation of the opposition and construction of federalism after 1991
The ‘forgotten’ peoples of democratic federalism. The period of 1990–1991 marked the union between opposition forces through the alliance between the TPLA and the OLF which created the EPRDF. However, the Ethiopian government rapidly embarked on a demobilisation of the old army that was as radical as it was swift. Around 350,000 men found themselves with no resources practically from one day to the next, and some of them turned to rural banditry. In response to nationalist propaganda, Oromo farmers resumed their protest movements which had already flared up between 1974 and 1976 before subsequently coming to a halt in response to repression by the central government. Massacres of Amhara were committed over disputes relating to land rather than ethnicity or religion, after the new policy aimed at liberalising agriculture led to the confiscation of land belonging to Oromo communities by the new Tigrayan governing class. The break between the OLF and the federal government was due less to ideological differences (particularly between the OLF and the EPRDF over the concept of nationalism) than to exclusion from decision-making forums and income from power. The composition of the armed forces, the appointment of local administrators and control over decision-making mechanisms at the level of government were the main points of contention at this level.
Control over Oromo territory and emancipation of the people: the breaking points with the EPRDF. The OLF accused the EPRDF of seeking to undermine its authority over Oromia (approximately 40% of the districts in the country) and of taking over the real reins of power at the expense of government and the Parliament. Fatal armed confrontations broke out in Bale, Sidamo and Haraghe. Major breakdowns in the State apparatus emerged as a result of the hostility of many Amhara senior officials with regard to the new regime, while the political marginalisation of the Oromo people continue to increase.

Regional elections of June 1992, a turning point. These extremely crucial elections (since they were supposed to enshrine federalism as the new political system in Ethiopia) resulted in the voluntary exclusion of the OLF from the political debate in order to resume the armed struggle, hardened opposition along ethnic lines and drove the various Oromo organisations even further away from the path to unity. Since the government had first been formed, Addis Ababa's hold over the country remained total and only minimal powers were given to regional authorities. The OLF saw this as an attempt to introduce a policy of hegemony in favour of Tigrayans. Yet the Oromo organisations made compromises in October 1991 when discussing the new regional entities which were due to provide a framework for the elections. The separatist reaction appeared in June and resulted in a number of postponements. Tensions were high in some regions due to ideological conflicts. The highly radical vision of the OLF led to protests by (non-Amhara) groups which turned into violent conflicts, as in Dire Dawa between 1991 and 1992. While the Organisation of the entire Amhara people rejected the ethnic regionalisation implemented from June 1992 onwards, the OLF demanded the secession of Oromia and, after boycotting the elections, chose to pursue armed conflict with other Oromo organisations.

20.3.5 Opposition and splits within the movement
The ideological conflicts cannot be explained solely by geography. However, there were a particularly large number of supporters of an independent Oromia in the East. Likewise, religious differences were not focused on political conflicts between loyalism, autonomy or secession. The numerous displacements of populations caused by wars, famines and structural reforms fanned conflicts not only between ethnic groups but also within Oromo communities. Behind the unanimity of certain references, a rivalry opposed organisations marked by the weight of external influences and the fragile construction of a national identity. Splits started to emerge in the Oromo movement by as early as 1986 with the creation of the FIDO. The FIDO was set up after a split in the OLF dating back to 1978 and adopted this name in order to benefit from support from Islamic internationalism, which does not mean to say that it was an Islamic organisation. This split between the “Khartoum” branch and the “eastern branch” can be attributed to the impressive sociological diversity of the Oromo, due to the influence of the nearest States or struggles for power. The Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO) was a movement affiliated to the EPRDF which was created in 1990. It was mostly made up of former prisoners of war captured by the TPLF. It was loyal to the government in power. Taking advantage of strong support from the EPRDF and the legitimist sentiment of rural cadres, this organisation was able to gain a foothold in the Wollega, Ilubabo and cities in Oromia. Largely sharing the views of the EPRDF with regard to the Oromo question, it attempted, with varying degrees of success, to block rising support for the OLF in the countryside, sometimes deliberately seeking confrontation. Since 2005–2006, a process of reconciliation has been started. The OPDO sees this as a way of consolidating certain political and military successes and avoiding further isolation because of its alliance with a government that is fiercely contested by the Oromo.
20.4 Resurgences

The stand-off between the mostly nationalist Oromo movements and the EPRDF did not turn to the advantage of the former which had been militarily marginalised by the disarming of a large percentage of their fighters and which had lost some of the support they enjoyed from the fringe groups in the population won over by nationalism.

The Oromo communities are also experiencing a certain revival of political Islam, probably influenced by neighbouring Somalis. This trend is driven in particular by support from Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. While the difference between Christian and Muslim Oromo has not actually led to any real confrontations, the interventionism of certain neighbouring States could have adverse consequences, particularly if attempts at mediation fail and confrontation with the central government again takes a violent turn.

Tensions between Oromo and Somali communities also fuel fears of increased violence and could spark off new conflicts in southern Ethiopia where arms are freely available, particularly since the American intervention in Somalia with the “restore hope” operation.

Lastly, the general dynamics within Oromo communities is one of conflict born of a mix of social conflict, economic aspirations and the issue of territorial status. The quasi-monopoly on the management of the country held by the Tigrayans, who, like the Amhara, are seen by the Oromo as the descendants of Abyssinian colonists, remains a source of tension.

References:
21 Suri violence and revolution in Ethiopia

21.1 Background

The Suri or Surma from the Baale group are an agro-pastoral group with a political organisation comparable to that of better known peoples such as the Dinka or Masai. They originate from the region of lower Omo to the north of Lake Turkana, even though their language would seem to suggest a Nilotic origin. Numbering around 25,000 people in the early 1980s and then only 19,633 in 1994, they live in the border region in south-west Ethiopia between Ethiopia and Sudan. Their social structure is characterised by a rejection of sedentary agriculture, the primacy given to a pastoral economy, a strong warrior ethic and very little degree of integration into State structures due to the remoteness of the area.

Ritualised and domesticated violence is part of the political strategy of this people due to competition over the control of natural resources with surrounding ethnic groups. Fraternal control exercised through organisation into age cohorts has for many years allowed the Suri to contain the violence of young people. These practices could take the form of self-defence, armed attacks, theft, raids, killings, although according to a certain set of rules (including the payment of compensation to the families of victims, for example).

Over the ten-year period between 1986 and 1996 the violence intensified, although there was no clear development over time or series of key events. The Suri crisis (shift from ritualised and domesticated violence to the outbreak of uncontrolled violence resulting in unmanageable social upheavals which transformed the society from within) should be viewed through the prism of three key factors:

- external factors (action by the State, regional wars, the development and access to new technologies)
- particular climate conditions
- the food situation

21.2 Explanatory factors

21.2.1 External factors

The fall-out from the civil war in southern Sudan, structural reforms undertaken by Marxist Ethiopia (“villagisation” and ethnic-regionalistic conflicts in Tigray, Eritrea, the Ogaden and in Afar territory led to the forced displacement of populations and exacerbated tensions over the control of resources. Under Mengistu, the regime unsuccessfully sent senior officials from the central administration into Suri territory to inculcate revolutionary values in the Suri and impose forced conscription on them, which led to resentment and mistrust. In particular, the Suri entered into conflict with the Dizi, a neighbouring farming people. Despite long-standing relations between the two peoples that had lasted for two centuries, the Suri took over territories which the Dizi previously used for grazing, hunting or bee-keeping. A ritual alliance known as the “rain pact” allowed the Suri, in the event of drought, food shortages or sickness among their livestock, to make use of Dizi land was therefore broken. Lastly, a long-standing dispute put them in opposition with the Nyangatom. These pastoral neighbours were previously dominated by the Suri. With the arrival of automatic weaponry in the area, the relationship was reversed. The Suri were attacked and driven out of their territories, in particular those where their ancestors were buried and where ceremonies to celebrate coming of age were celebrated. In addition to
their economic losses (water holes, pastures), the Suri also lost the places dedicated to the memory of the Suri people, resulting in a brutal change in the references for their ethnic identity.

This violence was facilitated and driven by the effects of regional conflicts. The trafficking of small arms became endemic. The SPLA increased its attacks on ethnic minorities on the Ethiopian border. Thinking more in terms of territory than in terms of belonging to a given nation, the Suri found it hard to accept fixed national borders, which became areas of great tension with systematic incursions by armed groups from Sudan and the forced manipulation of Ethiopian regionalist movements against the SPLA (notably the Oromo). Alongside these conflicts, Kenyan expansionism, drove the Turkana further north into the centre of Ethiopia and obliged the Suri in turn to migrate to the north, which brought them into conflict with neighbouring ethnic groups over land control. The Federal State, tried to reduce Suri identity and unsuccessfully attempted to merge it into the planned national identity. Between 1992 and 1994, the State sought to mitigate the Suri threat to local security by pacifying this people and by negotiating peace agreements. The regime took Suri people hostage and launched a major offensive in October 1993. Several hundred young Suri were killed after carrying out several violent attacks, notably on the Dizi (raids on their villages).

21.2.2 Unfavourable climatic conditions and deterioration of the food situation leading to pressure on resources

Serious environmental problems such as drought, disease and famine emerged, particularly between 1984 and 1993. In killing off their livestock, as a result of tse-tse fly or bovine diseases, these problems forced the Suri people, in order to survive, to turn to agriculture, an activity considered by the herders to be unworthy of a warrior. Likewise, in the early 1970s the Tirma and Chai lost their herds, decimated by an anthrax epidemic, and were obliged to beg food from the Dizi and Suri and then themselves started to grow sorghum. It was for these reasons, that the Suri, in the early 2000s, were the victims of murderous raids by the Toposa, a tribe from the Karamojong family. Relations with the Tirma remained very tense, the Suri having seen the Tirmas take over a large part of their territory since the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, the Suri crossed over the border into Sudan and attempted to establish themselves among the Tirma. Lastly, the kidnapping by the Tirma of two girls from Nyerege sparked off an armed conflict that is still on-going today.

References

22 Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
1998–2000

22.1 Timeline
1991 Victory of the alliance between the two fronts (EPLF and TPLF) ends the rule of Mengistu and hands power to Meles Zenawi in Addis Ababa. De facto independence of Eritrea.
1992 Annexation by Eritrea of the border territories claimed by Asmara.
1994 Proclamation of Eritrean independence.
May 1998 Border dispute around the Badme area sparks tensions between the two States.
12 June 1998 Assassination of 4 Eritrean soldiers along the border. Broadcast statement by President Zenawi announcing that Ethiopia could “expel anyone if he did not like the colour of their eyes”.
Until February 1999 mounting tension and arms race. The protagonists amass troops along the border (450,000 men on the Ethiopian side and 350,000 men on the Eritrean side).
February 2001 installation of the United Nations Missions for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) whose mission is to establish a security cordon between the two armies along the border.

22.2 Explanatory factors

22.2.1 Background
Worsening relations between the EPLF and the EPRDF. Although the TPLF was created by the EPLF and the two fronts were united in their fight against the Mengistu regime, disagreements between the two nonetheless started to appear from 1985 onwards against a background of the fight for Eritrean self-determination. From 1991 onwards, a certain degree of complicity emerged between the EPLF and the EPRDF in power in Addis Ababa, as illustrated by the use of the Ethiopian currency in Eritrea and the use of the port of Assab by Ethiopia. This complicity also extended to military operations and made it possible for the Afar to be contained and the fight taken to the Oromo and Somali Islamic fronts. Ethiopia and Eritrea even thought, at one point, of joining in a federation. However, in 1992, the annexation by Eritrea of the Badme border area paved the way for conflict between the EPLF and the EPRDF.

The border dispute. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia arose from a border conflict, although this was by no means of minor interest. It primarily served as a pretext for destabilising a country which, in the eyes of many Ethiopians, should remain within Ethiopian territory.
22.2.2 Triggering events

An incident in which 4 Eritrean soldiers were killed on the border led to an arms race and the mobilisation of military troops along the border. This was in connection with the border dispute between the two countries over the small town of Badme which had been running since 1991.

At the same time, on 12 June 1998, after a broadcast statement by President Zenawi who announced that Ethiopia could “expel anyone if he did not like the colour of their eyes”, a cycle of ideological one-upmanship rocked the two countries and eventually led to the mass expulsion of Eritrean and Ethiopian populations who had been living in the two respective countries (there were some 130,000 Ethiopians living in Eritrea).

22.2.3 Aggravating factors

Rising xenophobia and harnessing of nationalistic sentiments. It was by expressing anti-Eritrean sentiments that the Tigrayan leaders started to gain acceptance as genuine Ethiopians and were able to stabilise the situation in Ethiopia. The violence and xenophobia were first expressed in myths and legends, in which urban Eritreans were depicted as being extremely wealthy. Public opprobrium was initially aimed at this category of Eritreans, who were expelled and expropriated. The deportation campaign subsequently degenerated into a campaign of informing against the Eritrean populations in Ethiopia. This war, which broke out over a minor territorial claim, can therefore be blamed on the desire of the two heads of State to mobilise their respective populations by playing the nationalist card in order to snuff out any domestic opposition. Zenawi became hugely popular, lending support to the power exerted by the President and the Tigrayan community.

Traffic of small arms. Private weapons dealers supplied arms sold freely on the markets and obtained from neighbouring conflicts and the dismantling of Soviet weapons stocks.

Reappearance of the El Niño phenomenon. The conflict between the two States coincided with the reappearance of the El Niño phenomenon in 1997-1998 which increased water temperatures in the Pacific, thereby modifying rainfall patterns and resulting in flooding (particularly in the Horn of Africa) and cycles of drought in western and southern Africa. In November 1997, severe flooding in Ethiopia (which led to the deaths of 300 people) completely destroyed cereal and pod vegetable crops. Hundreds of thousands of homeless people were exposed to major risks of food shortages [at least 5 million people throughout the Horn of Africa according to the World Food Program (WFP)]. This threat was compounded by a risk of drought in early 1998 coinciding with an essential period for crop ripening, which led to major livestock losses from an estimated total of 25 million heads of cattle throughout southern Africa.

22.2.4 Problem with Eritrean refugees and crisis scenarios

The refugee camps on the Sudanese border were subjected to frequent attacks and UN officials eventually admitted that for security reasons camps should be set up at least 50 kilometres from the border. Due to the war and the severing of strategic road corridors, the food aid normally trucked in from the port of Mombasa was halted and airlifts began. The refugees expressed their dissatisfaction with humanitarian organisations. In June 2000, a “rations strike” was organised in the camps to protest against the poor quality of foodstuffs. The BBC was informed and passed on the information, which led to the boycott spreading to all camps in east Africa; in March 2000, voluntary workers (as a general rule

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13 Two previous droughts reported in 1982–1983 and 1992–1992 had reduced food production in southern Africa by a half, thereby putting the lives of 20 million people at risk due to lack of water and food.
refugees cannot be paid a salary) went on strike for ten or so days to support their demand that salaries be matched to those paid to other employees of international organisations. They eventually managed to secure a 20% increase in their allowances.

The return of the first wave of Eritrean refugees (cf. Beni Hamer and the ELF) was a thorn in the side of Eritrean political life and relations between Sudan and Eritrea, and led to crisis “peaks” as these populations gradually set off back to their home country. Around 223,000 Eritreans were living in Sudan, of whom 92,000 were still living in refugee camps in 2001. These were mostly refugees from the 1998–2000 war, although among them were 27,000 former ELF supporters who refused to leave Sudan out of fear of reprisals. They were nonetheless “asked” to leave the camps and the UNHCR ceased to distribute food aid and water, which led to at least 8,000 refugees going on hunger strike. The original plan in 2001 was that 160,000 refugees should be repatriated over a two-year period and that the programme would end in 2004. Between July 2000 and 2003, 103,000 Eritreans returned home, according to the UNHCR.

Alongside this crisis in the international system for managing refugees, which was linked to efforts to seize power at the national level, the re-settling of returning refugees inevitably led to clashes with indigenous populations. Most of those who returned did not go back to their original region but to the regions of Gash and Guluj on the border with Sudan. This development proved the strength of the economic and ethnic-religious links that these “returning” refugees had forged with their Sudanese neighbours and the psychological scars left by the conflict (they did not want to move too far away from the border so that they could flee any future troubles). These returns also created local instability by putting even more pressure on the natural resources of a country racked by periods of severe drought. Having forged an original and complex society during the years spent in camps, the refugees aroused the fears of their direct neighbours. Attacks from Sudan in 2002 and 2003 prompted fears that the “returnees” were colluding with foreign armed groups. However, and above all, the return of the Beni Hamer gave rise to fears of a new cycle of political instability based on repression and power struggles. In addition, the “returnees” had been influenced by the Sudanese Sharia law and by the Muslim refugees. Indeed many of them had been recruited into the Eritrean fundamentalist movement exiled in Khartoum, the Jihad. In April 2003, a bomb attack claimed by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad was carried out to the east of the city of Om Hajer.

References

14 In March 2003, the UN announced that two thirds of the Eritrean population was facing a food crisis caused by, firstly, a prolonged drought and, secondly, the massive displacements of population (“displaced persons” and “returnees”) as a result of the 1998–2000 war. Grain production in 2002 fell by 20% as a result of the drought (FAO, 2003).
23 Darfur war 2003–2006

23.1 Timeline

1980 and 1990 Numerous conflicts between Masalit and Arab herders.
February 2003 The Darfur crisis breaks out on a large scale.
April 2004 First cease-fire agreement under the aegis of the African Union in N’Djamena.
October 2004 The African Union dispatches a mission to Sudan with the backing of the European Union and the United States.
Early 2006 New round of negotiations. Pro-government militias, Janjaweed and other rebel groups refuse to participate in the peace negotiations and continue to attack civilians and block the work of humanitarian organisations.
October 2006 Aerial bombardment of government forces and ground combat against the rebels. Increase in the number of displaced people.
End of 2006 The mandate of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) expires, while the Sudanese government continues to refuse deployment of a new UN mission with greater resources.
End of November 2006 The European Union brings a resolution condemning the atrocities committed in Darfur before the UN Commission charged with humanitarian issues.
Mid-December 2006 Two aid workers from the Save the Children NGO are assassinated in southern Darfur

23.2 Explanatory factors

23.2.1 Background
Historical construction of an identify in Darfur. From as early as the 7th century, successive waves of nomadic Arab tribesmen invaded the Sudan from the Arabian peninsula. The Arabs assimilated with the sedentary peoples living along the Nile fairly easily, but had greater difficulty with the ethnic groups in the centre (Nuba, accounting for 6% of the population) and those living in the mountainous regions, notably those in the West and far West of the country (Fur). The Fur accounted for around 13% of the population in the 16th century and were exposed to Islamic influence at a later date and kept their language. During the various periods of unification and organisation of Sudanese territories (notably the “Black Sultanate”, the Sennar Funj and the Madhist State from 1895 to 1899) solely the Sultanate of Darfur remained outside the orbit of these States.

The population of Darfur received practically no benefits from the wealth generated by these trading contacts. Darfur experienced a long period of prosperity by becoming a staging point and a point of arrival and departure, for caravans on a trans-Saharan corridor which, for centuries, linked the lower Nile valley and Black Africa to

Acronyms:
SLA—Sudanese Liberation Army
MJE—Movement for Justice and Equality
AMIS—African Union Mission in Sudan
the Lake Chad and Congo basins. The sultanates allowed the establishment of a central power, based on the levying of taxes, the slave trade and the pursuit of caravan trade by social elites. During the Pax Britannica, but above all in the 19th century and on the eve of independence, Darfur was perceived as an isolated region far away from the decision-making centres. It appeared to be resistant to change, which explains why the Sudanese State provided little in the form of investment in the economy of the area.

**Inter-ethnic tensions and support from Khartoum for Arab livestock herders.** From 1960–70 onwards, disputes between neighbouring tribes started to become more frequent and farmers, to avoid the incursions of herdsmen, set fire to the pasture land surrounding their villages using a scorched earth tactic. The revolt of the Masalit and their participation in the rebellion by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) can also be traced back to the conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s when their villages were pillaged and sacked by their Arab neighbours, with the tacit support of the authorities. The history of the 1990s was one of a long series of massacres and conflicts over livestock and land between the Masalit and Arab tribes which had moved into their region, such as the Beni Hussein or different sections of the Rizeigat. The crisis broke out when the SLA and the MJE (Movement for Justice and Equality) rebel movements attacked government forces in February 2003. The two main rebel groups accused the government in Khartoum of supporting Arab livestock herders in disputes with African farmers. The regime and the Janjaweed militias then launched major military campaigns against the sedentary communities, notably the Fur.

23.2.2  **Aggravating factors**

**Desertification, anthropic actions and conflicts of control of land.** According to some scientists, Darfur is currently subject to a general process of desertification which has been increasing since the early 1970s. The anthropic causes of this desertification, on the other hand, have been established more clearly. Darfur is a patchwork of populations. Continuing population growth is putting increasing pressure on the land. When the Pax Britannica was established from 1916 onwards, the Fur migrated down from the highest and most remote parts of the Jebel Marra to the surrounding plateaus, which were easier to cultivate and more productive. As a result, in less than a century the population shot up to 3.1 million inhabitants in 1983 and then to 6 million today. This new population was employed on the Gezira cotton farm – during seasonal migrations – to provide income for households. This farm eventually failed in the 1970s, and its investors abandoned cotton cultivation with the result that there was no longer any employment for the labour force in Darfur. The farmers returned to their lands, which led to an increase in the surface area under cultivation. This pressure, which was often far in excess of traditional rainfall limits, also shortened the fallow periods which are essential for the regeneration of soils. Given the wide variations in rainfall from one year to another and from one area to another, farmers increased the number of scattered fields and developed crops in the bottoms and banks of wadis. This extension was to the disadvantage of nomadic livestock herders, who were thereby deprived of their pasture land and routes through cropland and access to water from wadis. To combat desertification and the deterioration in their living conditions, the herdsmen let their herds increase in size, thereby exerting growing pressure on pasture land and water resources. The result has been the emergence of islands of desertification. The herdsmen have also laid waste to natural resources and in particular the forests in southern Darfur. This devastation can be interpreted as a desire to change the environment, to remove barriers to pastoral activity, to symbolically erase
the memory of sedentary farmers attached to these forest from which they derived a major part of their resources.

Desertification has also resulted in behavioural changes which in turn have upset tribal balances: groups such as the Zaghawa which were formerly semi-nomadic became fully nomadic and are now more mobile, whereas farming communities developed their own sedentary or semi-nomadic herds. As a result, the former entered into competition with the neighbouring camel-herding nomads, and the latter with livestock herders using the land on the edge of their villages. The ethnic map of Darfur has therefore considerably changed over time, and recent events are simply the continuation on a larger scale, and according to a planned process, of displacements and changes in ways of living and living spaces. These movements have reshaped the map of alliances and divisions, such as those between the Zaghawa and the Fur who are the driving forces for the uprising against the policy of Khartoum and the racism of Arabising herders.

NGOs overtaken by events, a humanitarian system in crisis confronted with a genocidal enterprise backed by the Sudanese government. The AMIS with 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers and observers in the field was incapable of covering a region the size of France. The African Union received only 26 million dollars in 2005–2006, whereas its deployment and operation cost at least 200 million dollars. The armed conflict and attacks prevented the NGOs from helping the displaced populations, while the refugee camps were highly unsafe and subject to repeated attacks. Observers noted an increase in sexual attacks. In the Kalma camp near to Nyala in southern Darfur, there were an estimated 200 rapes in a period of only five weeks in 2006. The Sudanese armed forces and pro-government militias committed atrocities and acts of destruction (murders, rapes, destruction of houses and wells) and the Sudanese government orchestrated ethnic cleansing. The Sudanese State did everything in its power to manipulate local interest groups and hold out the false hope of regional autonomy. It first abolished local governments in 1970 before then establishing regional autonomy, with no resources, in 1983 and adopted the cause of the “Arabs” against the “non-Arabs”, that is to say the nomads against the sedentary farmers under the current Islamist regime. While the tensions were not of a strictly ethnic nature, the Sudanese State played the hand of tribalism and Islam to defend the interests of the State apparatus.

**Extension of the conflict to Chad.** Due to its proximity to Sudan, and the fact that Idriss Déby came from the same ethnic group as that opposed by government troops, the entire region around Abeche was attacked by pro-government militias. The Sudanese government pursued a policy of destabilisation in a zone containing a high concentration of refugee camps and the field offices of humanitarian organisations. The population of Abeche, which in 1960 consisted of 20,000 inhabitants, rose to over 100,000 in 2005, not counting the 200,000 refugees housed in twelve camps since 2003.

**The issues at stake in regional elections and the distribution of national resources.** In Darfur, the organisation of administration and political divisions such as local elections were major factors which helped precipitate the split between Arab clans and ethnic groups of African origin, including the Fur. The newly converted Arab herdsmen, who lost ground in many local elections due to the lack of a sufficiently large demographic base, found in forced displacements of population and raids since the 2003 war a means of winning seats in the Regional Assembly. At the national level, the Fur and more generally the inhabitants of Darfur – 8 million people, the most densely populated region in Sudan – were marginalised in the new political power-sharing system coordinated by the SPLM and the Khartoum government. Census operations ahead of the regional elections in 2008 added further fuel to tensions between a peripheral region demanding a better distribution of national assets, to the distinct displeasure of the former rebels in
the South who had in a certain manner become partners with the North on the basis of an agreement biased in their favour. They therefore had no desire to reopen the debate over the regional distribution of wealth and power which would include other marginal regions. The results of the census in Darfur with over 2 million displaced persons and 250,000 refugees in Chad were used to justify the forced displacement of populations, if not their replacement with other populations, including Chadian Arabs since 2005. In the absence of any written document certifying the time people had lived in the area, their civil status or land deeds, the census became a weapon in the service of an already advanced process of domestic colonisation. Like the southerners, the Darfur rebels demanded the return of displaced populations and refugees to their home villages before any census operation was carried out. The interest shown by Arab banks with overflowing coffers in investing in agriculture in Sudan further increased this risk of seizure and irreversible transfer of traditional customary ownership to narrow, exclusive private ownership based on land deeds.

23.3 Human toll

It is estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 people lost their lives between 2003 and 2006. The conflict is said to have resulted in the displacement of 3.6 million refugees (Africa Renewal, July 2006), including 1.9 million living in insanitary camps. Three million people are dependent on food aid and 250,000 people have fled over the border to seek refuge in neighbouring Chad. Between January 2005 and October 2006, the number of people, mainly women and children, requiring emergency aid is estimated to have amounted to 2.3 million, including 1.65 million displaced persons.

References: