SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND INITIATIVES
WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR WEST AFRICA?

Karim Hussein, Donata Gnisci and Julia Wanjiru

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SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND INITIATIVES

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ISSUES PAPER

KARIM HUSSEIN, DONATA GNISCI AND JULIA WANJIRU

DECEMBER 2004
FOREWORD

West Africa is experiencing rapid transformation and population growth. Security and insecurity are hot topics both in relation to these dynamics of change and to the risks violence and instability pose for the process of regional integration, growth and poverty reduction. Much work has been carried out by international specialists and institutions on how to improve security in developing countries. For example, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), United Nations agencies and research institutions have been working for some years developing guidelines for good practice in Security System Reform. Yet, many West African actors do not immediately see the relevance of these models to the problems they face, given the political, societal and cultural specificities of the region and the complex nature of conflict. In SWAC consultations on conflict and stability during 2002–2003, the need to develop a concept and vision of security tailored to West African realities was highlighted by regional partners.

Responding to these requests, this SWAC Issues Paper provides an overview of concepts, approaches, tools and initiatives available to the international community in the field of security. It discusses the notion of human security in light of the rise of an African security regime. It points out a series of key issues and questions for further discussion of how to address security threats in a way that is responsive to West African priorities. The paper is one of the 2004 outputs of the SWAC Secretariat’s work on governance, conflict dynamics, peace and security. It aims to inform SWAC partners, particularly West African actors, on international terminology, norms and practice in this area.

The paper aims to foster informed debate on the relationships between security, governance, conflict and development and around the way in which public, private and civil society actors might develop their own thinking on security and insecurity. It also aims to stimulate discussion on approaches to addressing the security agenda that are relevant to the realities and dynamics of change on the ground. At a practical level, it seeks to dynamise decision-making processes concerning the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as well as the design of strategies and programmes in support of West Africa’s security agenda by international donors and partners.

Finally, we are grateful to Dylan Hendrickson, Senior Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute, King’s College, University of London, UK, for his valuable comments and insights on earlier drafts of the paper.

A wide-ranging consultation of regional actors – individuals, groups and institutions engaged at different levels in dealing with conflict and security in West Africa – is being undertaken around the issues raised by this paper. It is hoped that this process will stimulate thinking and debate both within and outside West Africa on the nature and importance of security, human security and insecurity in the West African context and assist in identifying practical frameworks for action at the regional level. Additional contributions to this debate are warmly invited from West African partners.

Mr. Karim Hussein, Head, Agricultural Transformation and Sustainable Development Unit
Ms. Donata Gnisci, Conflict Analyst, Governance, Conflict Dynamics, Peace and Security Unit

If you would like to contribute your comments, provide analyses or receive further information on this consultation and follow-up, please contact: Ms. Donata Gnisci (e-mail: donata.gnisci@oecd.org).

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1 See the DAC policy paper on “Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice”, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/44/31870339.pdf
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABHS</td>
<td>Advisory Board on Human Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRU</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHS</td>
<td>Commission on Human Security</td>
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<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (DAC Network)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>Child Protection Unit (ECOWAS Secretariat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCD</td>
<td>Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community Monitoring Observer Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Informal grouping of eight major countries in the world: Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States; Italy; France; Canada and – since 1998 - Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFN-SSR</td>
<td>Global Facilitation Network for Security System Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IANS</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assistance on Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCASED Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PSC  Peace and Security Council (AU)
RECAMP Renforcements des Capacités Africaines pour le Maintien de la Paix
SADC Southern African Development Community
SSR  Security System Reform
SWAC Sahel and West Africa Club (OECD)
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
US  United States
WAANSA West African Action Network on Small Arms
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WANEP West African Network for Peacebuilding
WARN West Africa Early Warning Network
WAWA West African Women Association
WILPF Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WIPNET Women in Peacebuilding Network / WANEP
This Issues Paper aims to situate the concepts of security and human security in relation to the West African context. It provides an overview of the main concepts, approaches and initiatives available internationally, in Africa, and particularly in West Africa, with two core objectives:

I. To make available to the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat’s (SWAC Secretariat) regional partners a wide range of information and essential sources on regional and international initiatives and best practice on security issues with a view to facilitating informed consultation and decision-making processes at all levels.

II. To raise strategic questions and identify key challenges to feed into the development of a regional approach to security in West Africa.

Human security is a critical component of the global political and development agenda. Two ideas lie at its heart: firstly, the protection of individuals is a strategic concern for national as well as international security; secondly, security conditions for people’s development are not bound to traditional matters of national defence, law and order, but rather encompass all political, economic and social issues enabling a life free from risk and fear. Despite the consensus on the foundations of this concept, an uncontroversial definition of human security does not currently exist. Since the mid 1990s, the UN Commission for Human Security, the UNDP, the World Bank, the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the national governments of Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, and others have worked to identify its key components. Nonetheless, definitions continue to be broad, emphasising the protection of human beings and local communities from a variety of threats, ranging from individual to collective, and from physical to political, economic, social, or environmental.

The international community has attempted to operationalise such definitions by combining the two agendas “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. This broader concept of security underpins reconstruction processes in countries emerging from violent conflict. For example, in West Africa, national recovery strategies based on reconciliation (at the national and local levels) sit alongside economic revival, institution building, Security System Reform, and the maintenance of peacekeeping forces in the country or zone affected by conflict, to consolidate the peacebuilding process.

Violent conflict is detrimental to human security. Given the interconnectedness and regional dimensions of African conflicts, there is a need for an overarching continental and regional strategy for peace and security. The African continent and the West African region, in particular, have developed their own security frameworks during the last few decades through the OAU (now African Union – AU), ECOWAS and the WAEMU. The recent creation of the AU Peace and Security Council and progress in the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security represent positive steps toward the establishment of an African security framework that is both comprehensive and coherent. However, ‘buy-in’ at the national level, underpinned by external financial and logistical support, remains crucial for them to be successful.

The European Union (EU) has committed substantial support to the new AU peace and security initiative. Some OECD countries are also providing support to develop African-led peacekeeping capacity. Yet capacity building programmes, financed by different bilateral and multilateral donors, need to be better co-ordinated. In addition, efforts are being made to put the issues of widespread proliferation of arms on the African continent and human security on the G8 agenda. The G8 countries could play a more strategic role in controlling arms flows to countries affected by violent conflict and their neighbours.

African-led peace support operations currently seem to be donors’ preferred option for intervention in regional conflicts: not only can regional forces be deployed more rapidly, but they also possess extensive knowledge of the context in which they are called to intervene. West Africa has the most solid experience of regional peacekeeping operations – gained from the ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone starting in the early ‘90s, and more recently in Côte d’Ivoire. It is critical that regional mechanisms
such as ECOWAS work in synergy with the emerging Africa-wide framework for peace and security which needs to be strengthened at the continental level.

Civil society actors can play a vital role in ensuring human security, especially during peacetime, through concrete action and advocacy. Women seem to be highly successful in creating networks to promote peace and security. External support can help foster this role. However, civil society cannot alone provide protection and services to local populations or replace state institutions and functions. For the human security agenda to be successfully promoted there is a need to build appropriate partnerships between state and non-state actors.

Two main issues emerge from this review:

1. The Security System Reform (SSR) policy agenda, which is receiving growing attention within the donor community and developing countries, offers a framework to explore linkages and synergies between the human security and more traditional security agendas from the level of regional organisations, through to state institutions and local communities. Although the concept of human security is gaining international legitimacy, in practice, countries continue to view security through the prism of the State and rely on military instruments to achieve it. Because of its multidimensional nature, it is difficult to operationalise the human security concept and to simultaneously address all aspects of the human security agenda in the short term, especially in conflict contexts. In the long term, however, it will be critical to develop appropriate strategies and approaches to reconcile human and state security goals and objectives. In West Africa, this will mean, for example, fostering thorough discussions on how to adapt the ECOWAS Mechanism and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to respond to human security concerns in ECOWAS member countries and the region as a whole.

2. Regional peace operations carried out in Mano River countries and Côte d'Ivoire have demonstrated that building up momentum to create security regimes, at the continental and regional levels first and then strengthening complementarities between these levels, is essential. Avoiding unclear or overlapping roles, actions, and responsibilities is critical. Co-operation and subsidiarity, rather than competition, will be critical to maximising the use of limited funds and other resources made available by member states and international partners to improve the security and well-being of West African populations. This will also entail open and transparent discussions and exchanges between all concerned actors and stakeholders to define the most appropriate balance between the military and civilian components, and the preventive and responsive dimensions, of the security framework.

These issues are discussed in greater depth in the last part of this paper. This leads to the identification of a number of strategic challenges that need to be debated and addressed in the region in order to take this agenda forward. These are grouped under the following headings:

- Translating the concept of human security into practice,
- Enhancing Security System Reform,
- Laying the foundation for a coherent security regime in Africa,
- Operationalising the role of ECOWAS in stabilisation and peacekeeping efforts,
- Achieving greater self-sufficiency in peacekeeping operations,
- Co-ordinating military assistance regionally,
- Halting the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines.
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Security is no longer only the concern of defence and humanitarian actors. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the security debate has become part of the international development agenda. Traditionally, it had focused on military activities, the control of military hardware, action against armed groups and networks and the reform of state military institutions. Yet increased attention is now being paid to other actors within the “security system” and the softer side of security including governance of security institutions, the links between security and insecurity, access to resources, well-being, poverty, environmental risk and security. Many of these issues have been gradually incorporated into work undertaken during the ‘90s by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

In Africa and particularly West Africa, this critical change has been paralleled by the emergence of regional security frameworks upheld by intergovernmental organisations, whose creation is also advocated by African civil society. What has not yet fully taken place is a broad regional debate on what security and human security mean in the West African context, and what the priorities are, if any, to integrate human security into regional frameworks designed to maintain peace, order and physical security. This Issues Paper aims to contribute to such a debate through an overview of concepts, approaches and initiatives on human security and security held by international, intergovernmental and governmental institutions – in Africa and elsewhere. The roles and action of global and West African civil society are also considered. This work has two specific objectives:

I. To make available to the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat’s (SWAC Secretariat) regional partners a wide range of information and essential sources on regional and international initiatives and best practice on security issues with a view to facilitating informed consultation and decision-making processes at all levels.

II. To raise strategic questions and identify key challenges to feed into the development of a regional approach to security in West Africa.

The Issues Paper will be widely disseminated by the SWAC Secretariat with a view to stimulating debate in the region, informing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the implementation of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In addition, it seeks to foster information sharing to feed into new strategies and programmes developed by international partners in support of West Africa’s security agenda.

The Issues Paper has five main parts:

- First, a number of core concepts and approaches to security issues are briefly reviewed.
- Second, several initiatives undertaken to put such concepts into practice are outlined.
- Third, an initial review of potential implications for West Africa is attempted, placing special emphasis on continent-wide African security mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflict.
- Fourth, an overview of key emerging issues and questions for debate in the region that arise from the review of international concepts and practice is presented.
- Fifth, a detailed annex is provided with a selection of key organisations, institutions, networks and initiatives in this area, as well as lists of web sites and document resources available.

Finally, the distinction between different concepts of security referred to in this paper needs to be highlighted. The security debate revolves around three notions that reflect the agendas of distinct actors in the international system, although the first two can also be mutually supportive. Human security is

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the broadest perspective, one that proposes an alternative way of seeing the stakes for global peace and cooperation, taking people and their experiences as the key point of reference. It has evolved from two parallel trajectories: the first tends to converge with the human development agenda, the other gives priority to physical protection from violence due to conflict and/or crime. Security System Reform is a narrower concept and an approach whose origins stem from three distinct debates within the donor community on: military expenditure, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, and public sector governance. It focuses on how states can best use their means of coercion to achieve wider human development goals within a democratic political system. Thirdly, traditional views of security prioritise defence and military issues with the aim of promoting regime stability domestically and as a means to affirming state positions and interests in the international arena.

I. WHAT CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES ARE AVAILABLE INTERNATIONALLY TO ADDRESS SECURITY ISSUES?

The international community began to place emphasis on security matters in relation to development issues during the early 1990s. A consensus was reached on the need to broaden and deepen the concept of security, taking account of the political context at end of the Cold War. Stronger collaboration also became possible between development, foreign policy and defence institutions within governments, helping to provide a new basis for North/South relations on these issues. The concept of human security that will be examined below was shaped by and emerged from this process. OECD countries (e.g. Norway, Canada, and Japan) and United Nations bodies have contributed to placing human security firmly on the global political and development agenda. The ‘human security’ approach argues that threats and challenges to security transcend national defence, and law and order to encompass all political, economic and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and fear. The focus has shifted from the State to the security of persons; however, these are not mutually exclusive. Security can be thought of as a “public good”, responding to the strategic need to support sustainable human development at the same time as promoting national, regional and global peace and stability. The human security approach has also made it clear that any attempt to address security-related matters needs to be based on consultation and collaboration with different sets of actors which frequently have different interests, e.g. civilian/military; governmental/non-governmental; local/national/regional/international.

Notwithstanding this consensus, it has been difficult for international actors to reach agreement on a single authoritative definition of security that assists the international community in effectively tackling multifarious challenges and threats, including violent conflict, crime, disenfranchisement, economic deprivation, and environmental degradation. As illustrated below, definitions of human security tend to be very broad, often leaving core questions unaddressed, such as:

- **Who** should provide human security and **how** should it be provided?


4 Different arguments have been put forward to explain the inclusion of human security in the “high politics” of international development. A neo-realist account of international relations (IR) has underscored how the values enshrined in this concept can be perceived as serving the foreign policy interests of medium-sized powers on the international stage, which seek to strengthen their influence and position in the international system. On the other hand, a social constructivist perspective of IR has highlighted the role played by global institutions (IOs, NGOs, the media, civil society actors, etc.) in shaping the interests and priorities of states, toward the promotion of humanitarianism, from which “human security” springs. Finally, other accounts have claimed that the explanation rests in a combination of these two perspectives, given the particular historical context of the last two decades. Following this line of logic, the dramatic changes provoked by the events of 11 September 2001 on the international scene are likely to undermine the promotion of the human security agenda putting more emphasis back on traditional security matters. See A. Suhrke, 1999, “Human Security and the Interests of States” in Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 265–276.
In the event that objectives of protecting the State and protecting individuals are incompatible, how should the contradiction be resolved?

How does human security link up to the broader security debate in operational terms?5

Moreover, although numerous initiatives on human security exist in West Africa, notably in Anglophone countries, and have catalysed a regional debate on human security, the concepts being applied still depend to a great extent on donor approaches and security agendas. What is now necessary is a process to adapt these approaches to take on board African interests and realities, assisting Africans themselves to create an appropriate regional and continental security framework.

1.1 Threats to survival, daily life and dignity of human beings

“It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired.”

Obuchi Keizo, former Prime Minister of Japan, 1998

For Obuchi Keizo, human security represents “the keyword to comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats.”6 Amartya Sen develops this concept in more detail, recalling that human security is a fundamental part of broader development processes, integrally connected with securing human capabilities, i.e. “the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. […] A set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another […] to choose from possible livings.” In this context, illiteracy and innumeracy are forms of insecurity in themselves. Illiterate people have more difficulties finding employment and limited capacities to understand and demand their legal rights. Lack of education hinders people’s capacities to make informed decisions concerning their lives.

According to Sen the following distinct elements lie at the core of the human security concept:

• A clear focus on individual human lives (in contrast to state security models)
• An appreciation of the role of society and social arrangements in making human lives more secure in a constructive way
• A reasoned concentration on the downside risks to human lives8
• A choice to focus on the ‘downside’ – emphasising the more basic human rights.

Placing this concept at the heart of international development policy and practice, at the UN Millennium Summit (September 2000), the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan underlined the need for a more human-centred approach to security. Security should be thought of less in terms of defending territory and more in terms of protecting people. In the Millennium Report 2000, the international community is urged to take action to achieve “freedom from want” (the development agenda) and “freedom from fear” (the security agenda). Security as a precondition for lasting peace is considered as fundamental to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the full development of human capacities.

5 See A. Suhrke, 1999, op.cit.
6 Opening remarks at the meeting on “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow” www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html
8 That is, rather than focusing on the overall expansion of effective freedom in general. In contrast to the broader objectives of human development, ‘downside risks’ means a clear focus on immediate threats that menace survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human beings. This requires protection of people from pervasive threats such as conflict, deprivation, extreme poverty, etc.
1.2 The relationship between security and development: the UNDP approach to human security

“Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity”

UNDP, 1994

The UNDP has developed a very broad understanding of human security resting on the idea that security should not focus exclusively on states, territory and military questions as individuals are at the heart of security concerns. The Human Development Report 1994 entitled New Dimensions of Human Security, was probably the first attempt to define such a concept in a holistic way. Security is described in relation to seven dimensions reflecting almost all of the key components of human development. The Report, however, does not address explicitly the difference between “human security” and “human development”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic security</th>
<th>Assured basic income: access to employment and resources.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food security</td>
<td>Physical and economic access to food for all people at all times. Hundreds of millions of people in the world remain hungry either through local unavailability of food or, more often, through lack of entitlements or resources to purchase food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health security</td>
<td>Access to medical treatment and improved health conditions. Poor people in general have less health security and in developing countries, the major causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Living in a healthy physical environment which is spared from desertification, deforestation and other environmental threats that endanger people's survival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal security</td>
<td>Individual security from physical violence. Threats can take several forms, for example: threats from the State, foreign states, other groups of people (ethnic tension), individuals or gangs; threats directed against women or children based on their vulnerability and dependence; threats to self (e.g. suicide, drug use, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community security</td>
<td>Most people derive their security from membership of a social group (family, community, organisation, political grouping, ethnic group, etc.). Tensions often arise between these groups due to competition over limited access to opportunities and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
<td>Living in a society that guarantees basic human rights and freedom of expression.</td>
</tr>
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1.3 ‘Voices of the Poor’: how the poor define security

The World Bank Report Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change (New York, 2000), made a significant contribution to deepening the idea of human security by incorporating the perspectives of the poor in the security and development policy debate. This report was based on extensive fieldwork undertaken across the developing world, with over 60,000 women and men interviewed on their views of the concerns of their daily lives, poverty and insecurity. This study found that physical insecurity consistently ranks as one of the principle concerns of the poor in all regions, but also provided a more nuanced perspective on what ‘security’ means to the poor.

Participatory approaches provide a micro-level perspective on security, which is complementary to macro-level perspectives typical of more traditional approaches; in short, participatory approaches highlight ordinary citizens’ perceptions of well-being and security. This study showed that a top priority for the poor is the need to secure stability, predictability and continuity in their daily lives. The following four dimensions are identified.
Stability of income  
Financial security: a stable and steady income

Predictability of one’s daily life  
Some people are more concerned about predictability than financial security

Protection from crime  
Feeling protected from lack of law and order and increased crime

Psychological security  
Emotional security: a psychological sense of belonging to a social group

1.4 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC): linking security to governance issues

The work undertaken by the UNDP on human security has shaped the approach and terminology adopted by key bilateral donors represented in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. In 2001, the DAC Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation Network (CPDC) defined security in the following terms:

“Security is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and basic necessities of life, and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well being. [...] the security of people and the security of the State are mutually reinforcing.”

Governance issues are central to this approach to security insofar as a wide range of state and non-state institutions play a role, or have a role to play, in protecting people at different levels. Security can be seriously undermined where these security institutions are poorly managed and co-ordinated, or are not responsive to the needs of populations (see 2.2 below).

1.5 Towards a global agenda for human security

The Commission on Human Security (CHS), co-chaired by Sadako Ogata (former UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen, was created in 2001 to follow up on the UN Secretary-General’s Millennium Report. It aimed to develop a concept of human security that might be used as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation and, building on this, to propose a concrete programme of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.

The CHS’s work was divided into two broad areas of research and related consultative processes. The former explored human insecurities linked to conflict and violence; the latter examined the relationships between human security and development. The CHS final report Human Security Now (New York, 2003) states:

“Human security means protecting vital freedoms. It means protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations, building on their strengths and aspirations. It also means creating systems that give people the building blocks of survival, dignity and livelihood. Human security connects different types of freedoms – freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.”

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9 See list of organisations at the end of the document.
11 This area of work addressed in particular the special security needs of populations and the protection of victims, refugees and internally displaced people. It also focused on the interrelations between insecurity and the need to ensure that development activities are maintained alongside conflict resolution initiatives.
Among the recommendations formulated by the Commission, the establishment of an Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) was implemented in autumn 2003. The Board works to disseminate and operationalise CHS recommendations. In particular it envisages developing guidelines for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (see 2.3 below).

1.6 African governmental and intergovernmental concepts of human security

Under colonial rule, African states and their security establishments were organised and administered according to European models. These formal models largely remained in place following independence, though in many cases more informal administrative and security structures developed in parallel to the official structures. In the 1960s the OAU confirmed state sovereignty within borders as defined under the colonial rule.

Most attempts to develop new and innovative security paradigms specifically relevant to African contexts are relatively recent. Contemporary African thinking on security is manifestly influenced by the UNDP Human Development Report and the experience of National Poverty Reduction Programmes, which prescribe that security institutions have a role to play in poverty reduction. However, as a recent OECD/DAC survey of Security System Reform notes, there are antecedents of the concept of human security to be found in African philosophies and discourses (e.g. those of Nkrumah and Senghor in West Africa) that argue for the primacy of basic human needs. By and large, there is consensus across Africa that security should be people-centred; security means, first and foremost, people’s safety. This idea is reflected in the 1991 OAU Kampala document – Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa:

“Security embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be constructed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights.”

In practice, however, the majority of African governments have continued to consider security issues in terms of protecting the State, its institutions and frontiers, regime stability and military defence. This partly explains why, except perhaps in the case of South Africa, the concept of human security in its current form has come to be considered as donor-driven. Despite this perception, the OECD/DAC survey indicates that human security represents an “ideal” or ultimate goal to which African populations aspire. However, African populations consider that it is the State’s primary duty to act to provide basic protection of life and property. Nonetheless, in many contexts, violence and/or political disorder continue to be widespread, adding to the lack of confidence in the State’s capacity to create the conditions for human security to be achieved.


II. WHAT INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO PUT HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES INTO PRACTICE?

A comprehensive and integrated response to security and development challenges is indispensable to enhance sustainable peace globally. This requires the involvement and concerted action of all members of the international community, whether they be states, UN system bodies, regional organisations, international financial institutions, NGOs or other civil society actors. Considering the creation of a human security regime, it is important to note that several norms, principles, institutions and practices are already in place, for example, those that permit assistance and protection of victims of war and natural disaster. However, these elements are not all at the same stage of development nor can they enable us to tackle all facets of human security. A selection of international initiatives relevant to supporting human security in West Africa is presented below.

2.1 Global initiative on human security: people’s protection and empowerment

For the CHS, two broad strategies are essential for human security. These are based on the notions of:

- **Protection**: which requires concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically shield people from any form of violence or threat of violence.

- **Empowerment**: which enables people to develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making processes that affect their lives.

With regard to conflict, protection and empowerment should target the most vulnerable individuals and communities. These are classified into three categories: (i) people living in areas affected by violent conflict; (ii) people on the move; (iii) people living in areas emerging from conflict (see Box 1 below).

Promoting human security entails taking **preventive measures** to reduce vulnerability and minimise risks; otherwise taking **remedial action** where prevention fails. The CHS has identified a list of priorities requiring immediate action:

- Protect people in violent conflict.
- Protect people from arms proliferation.
- Support human security of people on the move.
- Establish human security transition funds for post-conflict situations.
- Encourage fair trade and markets for the benefit of the extreme poor.
- Provide minimum living standards everywhere.
- Accord high priority to universal access to basic health care.
- Develop an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights.
- Empower all people via universal basic education, through much stronger global and national efforts.
- Clarify the need for a global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to hold multiple identities and affiliations.

Based on the observation that different actors have become involved in addressing human security issues worldwide, the CHS has proposed more integrated and comprehensive policies and strategies and a **global initiative to place human security at the top of local, national, regional and global agendas**. Such an initiative would aim to mainstream human security in the work of security institutions at all levels. It identifies the following set of objectives and related tools to achieve them:
• Prevent conflict, promote human rights and development: establish early warning mechanisms; sanctions; fact-finding and diplomatic missions; preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations; more emphasis on education, poverty eradication and equity; basic economic security; raising living standards and health security; strengthening of civil society capacities.

• Protect and empower individuals and communities: build a protective infrastructure against critical and pervasive threats e.g. police systems, environmental regulations, health care networks, education systems, safety nets (e.g. food/cash for work, social protection), vaccination programmes, etc.

• Deepen democratic principles and practices: foster a democratic political order, buttressed by physical safety and economic growth, which helps to protect and empower people. It is therefore necessary to build strong institutions, guarantee the rule of law and foster citizenship practices.

• Promote a human security culture and framework: raise awareness on human security issues in society; disseminate information on existing initiatives and networks to foster a more integrated approach.

Box 1: Ways to enhance the security of people affected by violent conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall: fight against poverty; attack the root causes of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Work towards the achievement of the UN MDGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Control arms flows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Halt the arms trade with countries in conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Criminalise violation of the UN Security Council embargoes on arms (publication of arms traffickers’ names)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Make sure that weapons are properly destroyed and not recycled to serve in other conflict settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support anti-personnel mine clearance programmes through the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improve the protection of refugees and other involuntary migrants:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Separate refugees from combatants (to avoid recruitment of new combatants in refugee camps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide adapted assistance to countries hosting refugee populations (mediate between host and refugee populations at the local level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhance child protection in conflict zones:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban the recruitment and use of child soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide psychological assistance to child soldiers and facilitate their reintegration in society in contexts emerging from conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure respect of human rights:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Protect minorities; fight against ethnic discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exercise more international pressure on authoritarian regimes to stop violation of human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deepen democracy:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support transitional governments to prepare free and fair elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Promote a culture of open, tolerant and pluralistic society that accepts cultural diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthen civil society capacities and the participation of civil society organisations in decision-making, e.g. grass-roots organisations, producer organisations, networks, associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen state capacities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fight against corruption (foster transparency and accountability of state institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide security across the national territory (implement locally-owned Security System Reforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construct viable and functioning democratic institutions and public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Guarantee basic services to all citizens (foster decentralisation, local authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Translate written laws into practice (set up law enforcement structures)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 The Security System Reform (SSR) agenda: linking security, development and governance issues

SSR stems from peacebuilding activities which aim to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, consolidate peace following war, and facilitate post-war reconstruction with a view to avoiding renewed conflict. SSR is a component of the human security agenda. Within this wider agenda, SSR concentrates on challenges states face by using means of coercion in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and supportive of human development goals. It highlights the need for approaches able to reconcile states’ security interests with those of populations.

The SSR agenda covers three inter-related policy challenges facing all states:

- First, developing the institutional frameworks that states require to handle development and security policy as integrated areas of public action;
- Second, strengthening the governance of various actors and institutions that are responsible for formulating, managing, implementing and monitoring security policy;
- Third, building professional security forces capable of carrying out their operational tasks and accountable to the civil authorities.

Security System Reform requires dealing with a wide range of actors (see Box 2 below) and defining their roles, responsibilities and actions in a way that is compatible with the establishment of sound democratic governance principles, transparency and the rule of law. In practice, however, its implementation has been very state-focused so far.

**Box 2: Types of actors in the security system**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmerie; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, military and civilian intelligence and security services; coast guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units such as civil defence forces, national guards, militia, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security management and oversight bodies: executive institutions of national government; national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; traditional authorities and local authorities; financial management bodies (ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and CSOs e.g. civilian review boards, public complaints commissions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-statutory security forces: (with whom international actors seldom interact openly) liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private armies and bodyguard units; private security companies; political party militias.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operationalising the SSR concept and translating it into effective policies, strategies, programmes and approaches pose many challenges. Since the late 1990s, the DAC has supported efforts to develop a common definition and a common approach to donor activities in this domain with the intention of enhancing the coherence of donor policies and those of their counterparts in OECD governments, including defence establishments. Building on this initial work, the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC Network) recently conducted a global survey of SSR, including both a donor and a regional component, which culminated in a new policy paper and statement on SSR endorsed by Member countries.

16 *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice.*
The DAC has developed a core set of “guiding principles”, discussed in its policy paper, which encapsulate the critical challenges and norms involved in SSR work and are designed to foster dialogue on how security-related assistance should be provided. These principles highlight the importance of local ownership of the reform process and the need for SSR to be based upon a broad assessment of security needs of concerned people and the State.

SSR inevitably requires a long-term engagement to produce meaningful outcomes. Development agencies, therefore, need to remain engaged well beyond the set-up phase. This is particularly the case for countries implementing post-war reconstruction and nation-building processes. Donors must work closely with their national counterparts to ensure that SSR commitments are financially viable over time so as to inspire confidence in the reform process. On the whole, the timeframe of donor interventions, the types of assistance they provide, and the nature of the partnerships with local actors and institutions dealing with the reforms are critical choices donors need to make in collaboration with their national counterparts. The political will and commitment of those engaged with the reforms, however, are sine qua non conditions for reforms to be successful. A thorough debate is needed at the national level on what the security priorities are and how best to pursue them domestically in the long run.

**Box 3: Types of initiatives undertaken in the framework of SSR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil monitoring of the security sector:</strong></td>
<td>Civil oversight mechanisms, early warning systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military reform:</strong></td>
<td>Structural reforms to improve governance of armed forces, education on the role of armed forces in a democratic society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police and judicial reform:</strong></td>
<td>To enhance legal protection of citizens (human rights training for police officers, transitional justice, law enforcement structures, advice and support for crime prevention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community policing:</strong></td>
<td>To enhance contact between police officers and citizens (political and policy dialogue to improve civil society security force relations, confidence building activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace support operations:</strong></td>
<td>DDR programmes, fight against transnational crime and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training for private security providers:</strong></td>
<td>To ensure common standards and respect for the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional initiatives:</strong></td>
<td>Further develop regional security mechanisms and regional security bodies, defence treaties, peacemaking initiatives, regional peace networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media campaigns:</strong></td>
<td>To raise public awareness (civilian capacity building, peace education)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been two main drivers of the SSR agenda in West Africa:

(i) The democratisation process across the region over the last fifteen years, and

(ii) The peacebuilding efforts in Mano River countries emerging from conflict and Côte d’Ivoire.

The creation of the ECOWAS Mechanism as a regional framework for collective security, military cooperation, conflict management, peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (see 3.3 below) could also help to set norms for the regional security system in the future, but as yet it has limited influence on the way SSR is implemented at the national level.

Extensive Security Sector Reforms have taken place on the African continent, as the global survey commissioned by the DAC highlights, but they also differ greatly in relation to their rational, scope, objectives and pace. They do not constitute SSR according to the criteria and approach set by the DAC. Interestingly, situations emerging from conflict, such as Sierra Leone, appear to be the most appropriate environments in which SSR can be conducted effectively, despite the immense challenges posed by the legacies of violent conflict and its effects on the political, institutional and socio-economic situation.

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2.3 Initiatives led by governments and other international networks

A number of donor countries have taken action to support the human security agenda.

- The **Japanese government** has identified human security as one of the key objectives of its foreign policy. To this end, it has organised three sessions of the International Symposium on Human Security and launched the UN Trust Fund for Human Security in support of other related UN initiatives. Japan has also established a bilateral Grassroots Human Security Grants.18

- The **Canadian government** has committed itself to stimulate the debate on human security and developed policies to respond to the world’s new security threats.19

- The **United Kingdom’s** Department for International Development (DFID) has developed a SSR policy and actively supports the African Human Security Initiative,20 a network of seven African NGOs that aim to assess the performance of African governments in respect of human security issues. Moreover, the United Kingdom has adopted a cross-departmental strategy on SSR which is endorsed by the Ministry of Defence, DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).21

- The **Human Security Network**22 is a group of thirteen countries that facilitates dialogue at the ministerial level on questions pertaining to human security. The Network publishes the Human Security Network Bulletin in collaboration with the Harvard Human Security Programme.23 Since 1999, the Network has organised a Ministerial meeting on an annual basis that aims to bring international attention to emerging security issues. In 2004, this meeting will be held in Bamako (Mali), the only African member state of the Network.24 The priority themes identified by the Malian Chair are: children in armed conflict, small arms and light weapons, and gender in peacekeeping operations.25 The Bamako meeting will provide a key opportunity to draw international attention to security threats in Africa.

2.4 Civil society: a critical partner for the State to enhance human security

The ultimate responsibility to ensure people’s physical protection and security is held by state institutions; nonetheless, the role of non-state actors is increasingly recognised. The CHS has recommended that more resources are invested in civil society, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), “reaffirming the role of individuals, corporations, foundations and faith-based organisations in transferring resources to communities and people in need.” Concerning the African continent, the Kampala document, stated that “civil society organisations must be fully involved in shaping the security framework in Africa.”26

Non-state actors contribute to a great extent to increasing or reducing human security. Private security forces (e.g. political party militias, private body-guard units, community organisations), for instance can, to a certain degree, support human security, protecting civilians from internal armed conflicts. However, they are more often responsible for undermining it – where they take part in the fighting.

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24 South Africa takes part as an observer. The other members of the network are: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia and Thailand.
26 A. Sesay stresses that “one aspect of security must be a society’s ability to exercise control over its destiny”, D. Henk, *African Views and Outside Actors*, [www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds/occassional/paper1/views.html](http://www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds/occassional/paper1/views.html).
By and large, local actors (including decentralised authorities) are more aware than any other actors of the different risks and threats to human security in a given context. As such, they represent reliable and consistent sources of information at the field level for existing early warning systems. On a more general level, the analytical work produced by international and African research institutes dealing with conflict management and peacebuilding contribute to shaping international peacekeeping efforts. For example, in West Africa, the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) has linked up distinct initiatives and established a WARN Program (West Africa Early Warning Network) that is setting the stage for a civil society-based early warning and response network in West Africa. WANEP also plays a key early warning role for ECOWAS.

NGOs have often proved to be extremely effective in advocating for the security of populations who are victims of conflict and delivering goods and services to affected areas. Examples from Mano River countries (see Box 4 below), Côte d'Ivoire, the Senegal River Valley, etc. demonstrate that local communities are often the first to provide basic assistance to involuntary migrants before even international humanitarian agencies deploy their emergency programmes. The involvement of civil society organisations in reconciliation and reconstruction is key to laying the basis for long term human security through, for instance, peace education programmes, activities targeted to war affected children, etc. However, their action is frequently limited due to poor security conditions and difficulties in accessing isolated areas.

Emphasising the specific contribution civil society can make to promote human security should not lead to minimising the importance of the State, whose functions and responsibility to protect populations within its borders and empower them to participate fully in society cannot be wielded by any other internal or external actors. Appropriate partnerships between state institutions and non-state actors are therefore essential to successfully support the human security agenda in West Africa. Security System Reform constitutes one opportunity through which this partnership can be developed.

**Box 4: Women’s roles in conflict, peace building and human security**

Women are usually less directly involved in armed groups or armies. However, they play roles in feeding and providing support to combatants and are among the primary victims of violent conflict. They are also highly affected by the socio-economic consequences of violence. As they tend to remain the key providers for the family in wartime, these consequences impact on other family members. In refugee camps, women and their children make up the majority of the population.

Women’s roles at all stages of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes are increasingly recognised. Women are key actors enabling the reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced persons in society in the aftermath of conflict. The specific roles and functions they have in society allow them deeper understanding and knowledge of the communities, the complex factors underlining the conflict, the existing coping strategies and possible solutions. The ‘Mano River Women’s Peace Network’ (MARWOPNET), for example, created by women groups from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea in 2000, was crucial to the peace and recovery processes in these countries. Among other activities, the Network provided training in conflict resolution and negotiation techniques to local media and members of NGOs. They also visited refugee camps to advocate for special needs of involuntary migrants, and met with rebels.

ECOWAS has acknowledged the importance of women in development, by establishing the ‘West African Women Association’ (WAWA) at the ECOWAS Summit in Conakry in May 1983. This Forum represents an opportunity to further advocate gender issues in ECOWAS peacebuilding operations. Other existing networks, agencies and initiatives related to women’s roles for peace and human security include:

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27 www.wanep.org.
28 Other examples include African Security Dialogue and Research (www.africansecurity.org), based in Accra, Ghana, and the Centre for Democracy and Development (www.cdd.org.uk), based in Lagos and London, both of whom carry out extensive research on security issues in the region and are part of a growing network of security analysts and practitioners that are working closely with governments to shape state security policies.
The Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) is part of WANEP and aims to support women’s groups in peacebuilding.\(^{30}\) When WIPNET was established in 2001 it regrouped only 14 organisations. Today more than 400 women’s groups and associations are affiliated to this initiative.

UNIFEM also works towards mainstreaming different approaches to foster women’s participation in peacebuilding operations. It created a ‘Women, Peace & Security’ web portal\(^ {31}\) with country profiles, information on the impacts of conflict on women, and their responses.

Finally, ‘Peace Women’\(^ {32}\) is a platform with information on women, peace and security issues and peacebuilding initiatives in armed conflict zones.

III. SELECTED INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA AND WEST AFRICA

Given the regional dimensions of violent conflict on the continent, African decision-makers have worked towards establishing an Africa-wide security regime which addresses conflict, peace and security issues and is mainly supported by OECD Member countries. The following sections review the evolution of African peacekeeping frameworks, in particular the AU Peace and Security Council and ECOWAS regional security mechanisms. These initiatives focus mainly on the second strand of the human security agenda (i.e. protection against violence and physical insecurity) involving concrete, timely action in response to specific events. The first strand, which is linked to more long-term structural changes, is currently addressed through measures addressing the circulation of light weapons, the use of anti-personnel landmines and child soldiers.

3.1 The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa

The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), held in Kampala in 1991, represented one of the first opportunities to discuss security issues at the continental level. The results of the meeting were summarised in the Kampala document\(^ {33}\) that recommended to the African Heads of State and Government a series of principles and policy measures for mediation, conciliation and arbitration, peacekeeping, confidence-building, non-aggressive pacts, lowering of military expenditures and the creation of an African Elders Council for Peace. It also pledged that comprehensive and integrated development strategies should be developed that encompass security, stability, development and co-operation issues.

It was not until 2000, however, that the OAU adopted the CSSDCA Declaration at the Lomé Summit.\(^ {34}\) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government recognised that “the security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole.” The Assembly also agreed to establish by 2005 a framework for codifying into national laws and legislation the concept of human security as enshrined in the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, in order to rebuild confidence and establish collaborative security frameworks at national, regional and continental levels. A full set of core principles, commitments and performance indicators were developed to assess progress towards these objectives.

\(^{30}\) [http://www.wanep.org/women_in_peace.htm](http://www.wanep.org/women_in_peace.htm)

\(^{31}\) [www.womenwarpeace.org](http://www.womenwarpeace.org)

\(^{32}\) [www.peacewomen.org](http://www.peacewomen.org) is a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) UN, New York.


The interconnectedness of African conflicts clarifies the need for regional security frameworks and the creation of an African security community. A number of initiatives and institutions addressing peace and security in some way have emerged over time, e.g. the CSSDCA; the OAU Conflict Management Centre and Peace Fund; the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism; regional intergovernmental organisations dealing with security issues at the sub-regional level, etc. To date, however, it is difficult to consider them as forming one comprehensive and articulated ‘security system’, let alone a unique ‘security community’ because of lack of co-ordination, weak institutions and limited capacities, etc.

3.2 The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The African Union has established a Peace and Security Council which has a mandate to maintain peace and security on the continent. The PSC, composed of 15 members, has similar functions to those of the UN Security Council. However, the veto vote is not contemplated nor can any country sit on the Council on a permanent basis. Among other competencies, the PSC can:

- **Make decisions**: to intervene militarily in serious circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (supranational authority);
- **Impose sanctions**: in situations where an unconstitutional change of government has taken place in a member state;
- **Adopt appropriate measures**: where the independence and sovereignty of a member state is threatened by armed groups, among other acts of aggression.


The establishment of an overall Africa-wide strategic and operational framework for peace and security is consistent with the trend towards less direct involvement by the international community in ending African conflicts. As sketched out in the table below, arguments are increasingly being made for regional versus international intervention. This, however, would not mean the complete disengagement of external partners, as external assistance is often crucial. In this respect, the permanent members of the Security Council have agreed on the need for greater support for African peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts. Furthermore, as Kofi Annan has stated, regional rapid deployment forces are crucial to UN peacekeeping.

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35 At the “97th Ordinary Session at Ambassadorial Level of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January, 30th 2004. The PSC will be formally established in late 2004. First elections for the PSC were held in March 2004 on the basis of equal rights, equal regional representation and the principle of rotation of representatives.

36 The 53 member states of the African Union agreed in February 2004 to create a joint standing military force that could intervene to prevent civil wars or genocide. This force is to be constituted from troops from key AU member countries and will operate under the African Union Peace and Security Council. The force was billed by one African President as a collective answer to threats, whether internal or external, anywhere in the continent. The standby force will consist of 15,000 soldiers, divided into five regional brigades by 2005, expanding to a continental force by 2010. The standby force will build on existing regional capacities, in particular from Kenya, South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. It remains to be seen how this will be implemented in relation to West Africa. For further background, see V. Kent, M. Malan, 2003, *The African Standby Force. Progress and Prospects*, African Security Review Vol. 12, No. 3.

The success of Africa’s new Peace and Security Council in fulfilling its mission will ultimately depend on the availability of political will and funds, not only through external support but above all via the engagement of all African member countries. To date, African states have backed military co-operation primarily through existing regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC. At the present time, it remains unclear how the AU Peace and Security Council will interact with existing regional mechanisms and specifically with ECOWAS’. Subsidiary structures that strengthen complementarities and avoid duplication between the diverse peace and security regimes at the national, regional and international levels need to be further developed in order to effectively fit existing regional structures into a coherent AU peace and security framework.

### 3.3 The evolving security role of ECOWAS in West Africa

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) founded in 1975, includes 15 member states. The original mandate of ECOWAS focused on regional co-operation and economic integration as ways to avoid Africa’s marginalisation and enhance economic stability and development. ECOWAS members were well aware that such goals could only be attained in an environment of peace and stability. Thus, two protocols on defence issues were signed shortly after the creation of the Community to complement its economic mission, i.e. the ‘Protocol on Non-Aggression’ (1978) and the ‘Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence’ (1981).

38 The evolving relationships between AU Peace and Security Council and regional peace and security mechanisms makes donor choices on the allocation of resources more difficult. The EU, for instance has recently pledged 250 million Euros to support AU peacebuilding capacities, assuming that the AU will redistribute some of the money to regional peace and security mechanisms.


40 ECOWAS member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, The Gambia, Togo, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
Unlike the non-intervention clauses of the UN and OAU charters, ECOWAS is compelled to intervene in armed conflict within one of its member states if the conflict is likely to endanger peace and security in the entire Community. Following this principle, West Africa was the first in the continent to establish a regional military peacekeeping intervention (i.e. Liberia, in 1990). In the absence of a response from the international community to massive violations of human rights in Liberia at the end of 1989, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in the country and successfully supervised the presidential elections in July 1997. In August 1997, the ECOMOG mandate was extended to Sierra Leone to reinstate the democratically elected government into power, following the May military coup, and to restore peace and security.

The ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone is often used as evidence that African states are capable of joining their efforts to solve common problems without resorting to external partners. However, its shortcomings are often evoked to inform the design and implementation of future peacekeeping initiatives. The decision to deploy ECOMOG troops was strongly supported by Nigeria against the views of, mainly, Francophone countries. This has shed doubts on the legitimacy and neutrality of the intervention. In addition, the high record of abuses against civilian populations committed by ECOMOG troops and ECOMOG’s failure to protect some of the most vulnerable people in certain conflict settings have nuanced the generally positive assessment of its performance in the two countries. In spite of this, ECOMOG has gained both local and international recognition. In 1998, ECOWAS’ Foreign Ministers recommended that ECOMOG formally become responsible for peacekeeping operations in the region. ECOWAS subsequently enhanced its capacities and slowly transformed ECOMOG from a series of ad hoc initiatives to a more permanent structure for sustained military co-operation.

The lessons learned from intervention in Liberia (1990–97), Sierra Leone (1997–2000) and Guinea-Bissau (1999) have shaped the creation of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. Prior to this ECOWAS agreement, Francophone countries had signed a Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD) in 1971 to foster security within the WAEMU zone. This was integrated into the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention in 1999 to create a single regional security system and institutionalise structures and processes ensuring consultation and collective action for the whole of West Africa. In 2001, ECOWAS member countries also signed the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which complements the Mechanism addressing the root causes of conflict, instability and insecurity. This Protocol remains in the very early stages of implementation.

The Mechanism goes beyond the earlier protocols to the extent that it foresees that ECOMOG should intervene in internal conflicts threatening to trigger a humanitarian disaster or posing a security threat to the region and situations that result from the overthrow or threat to a democratically elected government. The Authority of Heads of State and Government is the highest decision-making body of the Mechanism. ECOWAS’ Executive Secretary can initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiations and reconciliation actions to effectively prevent and manage conflict in the region. In addition, the Mechanism comprises five distinct bodies:

- **Mediation and Security Council**. It accounts for 10 members elected for a period of 2 years. It can authorise all forms of intervention such as the decision to deploy political and military missions (a two-thirds majority is required in this cases), inform the UN and AU of its decisions, provide and review mandates and terms of reference for forces, and appoint force commanders.

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41 Chapter 4, Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/13ProtMutualDefAss.pdf

42 A. Sesay, 1999, ECOMOG and sub-regional security in West Africa, Conflict Trends, No. 2.

43 ECOMOG, created at the Banjul Summit in May 1990, is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea and air components, composed of troop contributions from ECOWAS member states. For more information on the evolution of ECOMOG see M. Khobe, 2000, The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, ISS, Monograph No. 44.

44 See www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/12ProtDemocGood.pdf.
• **Defence and Security Commission.** It is composed of military technocrats, and advises the Mediation and Security Council. It examines all technical, administrative and logistical issues related to peacekeeping operations.

• **Council of Elders.** It comprises 32 members appointed by the Executive Secretariat on an *ad hoc* basis to engage in preventive diplomacy and “use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators”.

• **Early Warning Observation System.** It encompasses the Observation and Monitoring Centre with headquarters in Abuja and offices in Cotonou, Banjul, Monrovia and Ouagadougou covering four Observation and Monitoring Zones. It aims to collect and transmit data to the ECOWAS Secretariat on conflict risks and potential disputes in all of West Africa.

• **ECOMOG.** It constitutes the Community’s intervention force, composed of standby multi-purpose modules from member states, ready for immediate deployment. According to Article 22 of the Mechanism’s protocol, ECOMOG can be responsible for the following missions: observation and monitoring; peacekeeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention; enforcement of sanctions, including embargoes; preventive deployment; peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilisation; and policing activities, including the control of fraud and organised crime. To help ECOMOG troops fulfill their missions, three training schools have been established in the region: the Peacekeeping School (Côte d’Ivoire); the International Training Centre (Ghana); and the National War College (Nigeria). These are to provide tactical, operational and strategic training to standby units. It is foreseen that it would become compulsory for each member state to have standby units to be regularly inspected by the Defence and Security Commission.

Despite undeniable progress, logistical and financial constraints to peacekeeping missions continue to be significant. First of all, ECOMOG is confronted by the same difficulties as any other multinational army: language differences, different training standards, lack of common standards for equipment, arms and ammunition, etc. Secondly, there are constraints specific to ECOWAS’ situation: poor integration of different troops; excessive control by home governments; understaffing; etc. The experience of the three ECOMOG missions has demonstrated the importance of securing financing support before embarking on an intervention. To date, ECOWAS has been heavily dependent on funding from outside. Moreover, without the commitment of a lead nation such as Nigeria, ECOMOG cannot form a meaningful force on its own.

To better guarantee the availability and sustainable management of funds for peace and security activities, ECOWAS is working with its partners towards the creation of a regional **Peace Fund** similar to the AU Peace Fund. Such a fund will enable ECOWAS to finance a full range of activities regrouped according to three “windows”: conflict prevention and capacity building; conflict management and peacekeeping; and reconstruction (both political and humanitarian aspects).

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45 Financial costs of regional intervention are covered for the first three months by the troop-contributing countries; then ECOWAS takes over. However, without the financial support from outside, ECOWAS does not possess the resources necessary to undertake large scale missions on its own. The OAU pledged US$ 300,000 for intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the EU contributed €2million and many other donor countries provided funds e.g. the US: US$ 250,000; Canada: US$ 300,000; and Japan: US$ 100,000.

46 In Liberia, Nigeria paid 90% of the costs (over US$ 1.2 billion). France entirely financed the ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau.

47 The African Development Bank has taken the lead for the establishment of this Fund whose creation is provided for by Article 36 of the Mechanism Protocol. The AfDB has allocated US$ 15 million to the Fund through the Peace and Development Programme on activities (mainly capacity building) under the first and third windows. Other international donors already supporting or having committed themselves to support the ECOWAS Peace Fund are: Canada: US$ 900,000; Denmark: US$ 1.17 million; and Japan: US$ 70,000. In April 2004, ECOWAS and the AfDB jointly organised a meeting in Tunis to present the Fund and other related initiatives to the donor community and mobilise further resources and support.
Box 5: ECOWAS initiatives to halt the proliferation of small arms and light weapons

Some eight million firearms circulate in West Africa, according to International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Exportation, Importation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons was agreed upon in 1998 with the aim of reducing human suffering and stopping the circulation of arms that fuel regional conflict systems. The Moratorium constitutes the main platform for supporting regional efforts to control small arms. The initial three-year Moratorium was extended until November 2004.

The implementation at the national level is however compounded by: weaknesses of national security institutions; the lack of political will in some member states to effectively engage in the action required by the Moratorium; and limited co-operation among member states. It is widely recognised that the ECOWAS Secretariat cannot enforce the Moratorium alone. The circulation of small arms and light weapons in war-torn countries does not only undermine the security of civilians, threatened by attacks by bandits, criminals, etc. but also increases the risk of spreading local conflict to the region. Weapons are easily transferred from one conflict zone to the next and sometimes even recycled after disarmament operations, as it appeared to be the case in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. At the Abuja conference in March 2004, ECOWAS Heads of States confirmed that the illicit spread of small arms is a major source of instability in the region and acknowledged the need for a concerted regional approach to halting their proliferation. To this end, ECOWAS committed to establish a Small Arms Unit to work in close collaboration with the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). The West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) also works towards preventing the proliferation of small arms.

In conclusion, ECOWAS has considerably improved its responsiveness to conflict and has become the key player enhancing peace and security in West Africa, as proven by the ongoing mission in Côte d’Ivoire (see box 6 below). The Secretariat has progressively taken more important initiatives to tackle security challenges faced by West African populations and obtained consistent international support to build its capacities in this area. The focus of ECOWAS initiatives on security has progressively begun to address dimensions of human security beyond physical violence, as demonstrated, for instance, by the creation of Child Protection Unit (CPU) within the Secretariat.

The role of ECOWAS as a guarantor of peace and security in West Africa, beyond peacekeeping and conflict management and resolution, could be developed further if ECOWAS were involved in providing a regional framework for DDR programmes implemented at the national level.

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48 International Action Network on Small Arms: http://www.iansa.org/about.htm.
50 Technical assistance to support the implementation of the Moratorium under the auspices of the UNDP.
51 Established in May 2002 in Accra (Ghana) the WAANSA is a network of more than 50 organisations from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Togo.
52 K. Annan, 2004, Security Council calls for regional approach in West Africa to address such cross-border issues as child soldiers, mercenaries, small arms, SC/8037, 4933rd meeting.
53 The CPU is responsible for monitoring child status in conflict settings, promoting preventive mechanisms, and supporting child rehabilitation and reintegration in post-conflict societies. Child protection in armed conflict remains a sensitive problem in Africa. According to the International Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, more than 120,000 children under the age of 18 are forced to fight in African conflicts.
Box 6: UNOCI peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire

Following the UN resolution No. 1528 of 27th February 2004, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) took over the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) on April, 4th 2004 for an initial period of 12 months, under the commander of Senegalese Major-General Abdoulaye Fall.

Acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNOCI is mandated to undertake activities in the following areas:

- Monitoring ceasefires and movements of armed groups
- Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation and resettlement
- Protecting UN personnel, institutions and civilians
- Supporting humanitarian assistance efforts
- Supporting the implementation of the peace process
- Assisting in the field of human rights
- Providing information to the public
- Restoring law and order.

ECOWAS forces (1,400 personnel from Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger and Senegal) were integrated into the UN peacekeeping mission UNOCI (6,000 personnel) whereas the French contingent (4,000 personnel) remained under French command. The integration of ECOWAS troops into UNOCI is expected to contribute to enhancing regional peacekeeping capacities. The choice of an African commander at the head of the UNOCI mission also supports the principle of African ownership.

As it usually takes about three months to fully deploy UN troops, collaboration with regional forces will be critical to initiate the operation on the ground without delay. However, in practice the effective deployment of ECOWAS forces was postponed for a few months due to insufficient financial resources. The ECOWAS Secretary-General claimed that ECOWAS member states would be unable to keep their troops in Côte d’Ivoire at their own expense, given their precarious financial situation. The UN estimated that the UN mission to Côte d’Ivoire would cost some US$ 303 million for a period of 6 months. This sum compares with the overall AU Peace Fund Budget for the year 2003 amounting to US$ 48 million.

3.4 External support to Africa’s peacekeeping capacities

3.4.1 Capacity building programmes

External partners have shown their commitment to African peacekeeping efforts through financing almost two thirds of the AU Peace Fund 2003 budget, i.e. US$ 30 million out of US$ 48 million. As noted, despite high profile external interventions in recent years in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, donors tend to emphasise African responsibility for regional security and aim to assist them through capacity building instead of intervening directly on the continent. In this context, several programmes and initiatives are planned or have already been undertaken, for example:

- Similar training schemes are provided by the French programme Renforcements des Capacités Africaines pour le Maintien de la Paix – RECAMP.
- The UK Africa Conflict Prevention Pool does not deliver this training itself but funds training initiatives through third parties. Training would be provided through British Military Training Assistance Teams (BMATTs) based in the region.
- In the framework of the Canada-West Africa Peace and Security Initiative, Canada supplies ECOWAS with 40.5 million Canadian dollars for security and peace issues.

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55 UN News Centre, 26th February 2004.
• The ECOWAS Scholarship Fund is intended to finance specific training programmes for West African military and civilian personnel.

• The International Peace Academy helps ECOWAS operationalise the Mechanism.

There is a strong need to co-ordinate these different capacity building programmes at the regional level if they are to have a lasting impact on African military and civilian security structures.

3.4.2 The African Peace Fund supported by the EU

As Africa’s major trading partner and largest provider of official development assistance, the EU welcomed the initiative to create a continental framework for peace and security. At the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting held in Dublin, on 1 April 2004, the EU pledged 250 million Euros from the 9th European Development Fund to institute the African Peace Facility. Based on the principle of African ownership, the African Peace Facility’s aim is to support capacity building in designing, planning and implementing peace and peacekeeping operations run by the African Union and/or regional organisations. It will not be used to finance EU peacekeeping operations in Africa. The African Union is indicated as the core decision-making body with regards to peacekeeping operations under the Peace Facility.

The first operation to be supported by the African Peace Fund is the AU observer mission to Darfur (Sudan) agreed upon in June 2004 for a period of twelve months. This will be a major test for the implementation and effectiveness of the emerging African security framework.

3.4.3 Increased commitment of the G8

In the G8 Africa Action Plan, conflict prevention and resolution were defined as “top priority”. Concretely, the G8 countries committed their support in the following areas:

• DDR programmes and Africa-owned peacekeeping mechanisms to end major armed conflicts on the continent

• Technical and financial assistance to enable African countries and regional organisations to be more effective in conflict prevention and resolution by 2010 (e.g. through training African military forces, better co-ordination, etc.)

• In collaboration with African countries and the UN system, regulate activities of arms brokers and traffickers and eliminate flows of illicit weapons to and within Africa

• Eliminate and remove anti-personnel mines

• Work with African governments, civil society and other actors to address the links between armed conflict and the exploitation of natural resources

• Peacebuilding support to societies emerging from or seeking to prevent violent conflict

• Enhance African capacities to protect and assist war-affected populations.

Considering that the G8 countries account for nearly 90% of the world’s arms exports, there is a growing demand for the G8 to play a positive global security role. The G8 has increasingly responded to international pressure by placing African development and security issues on its agenda. At the G8 Summit in Cologne in 1999 important steps were taken towards debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (the Enhanced HIPC Initiative). Having been accused of being closed to the developing world, the G8 meeting opened its doors to some African leaders in 2003. The five NEPAD initiators (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) were guests at the G8 Summit in Evian which was to design an action plan for Africa. At this Summit in 2003, G8 leaders pledged support for the establishment of the African Standby Force. Moreover, the UK Prime Minister has declared that Africa will be a priority during the UK’s presidencies of the G8 and the EU in 2005.  

IV. ISSUES RAISED AND KEY QUESTIONS FOR THE REGION

This document has provided an initial review of approaches and strategies from different types of actors to enhance security, with a special focus on African and West African contexts. It is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis, but to provide information to help different actors participate in an informed way in a West African debate on security and insecurity in the regional context. Building on this, we have drawn out below a first set of issues and questions with a view to stimulating debate on a comprehensive framework to address human security in West Africa. This is a starting point – further priorities, issues and questions will emerge through consultation.

To begin, we would like to underline two intertwined elements that have emerged from this review.

Firstly, there is a need to find ways to integrate the regional human security agenda and traditional security agendas at all levels. The field experience in implementing SSR in countries emerging from conflict (e.g. in Sierra Leone) represents an opportunity to learn lessons in this regard. However, when assessing SSR capacity to serve the human security agenda, one should consider that, hitherto, reforms have tended to be a top-down and short-term exercise, often lacking in impact and visibility on the ground. Two questions arise:

- How do security system reforms help West African countries analyse, understand and debate their own security problems?
- Are they conducive to the development of suitable measures to address security threats and challenges in a way that enhances sustainability and ownership?

Pragmatically, this would imply prioritising actions and objectives over the short-, the medium- and long-term, taking account of the different realities on the ground and diverse interests of actors. In West Africa, this approach could contribute to a regional debate that will influence the shape of the ECOWAS Mechanism and the implementation of its Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance so that these respond more directly to human security concerns in ECOWAS member countries and the region as a whole.

Related to the item above, it is important to use the momentum to create continental and regional security frameworks in order to enhance complementarity in the roles of African institutions such as the African Union and ECOWAS so to more clearly define roles and avoid duplication of actions, and responsibilities. Facilitating co-operation and subsidiarity rather than competition between different security structures will enable them to maximise the value-added of external funds and other resources made available by member states and international partners. Improving the security and well-being of West African populations will equally demand open discussions to define the most appropriate balance between the military and civilian components, the preventive and responsive dimensions of the security framework at national and regional levels.

4.1 Translate the concept of human security into practice

Although the key elements of ‘human security’ are broadly recognised internationally, in practice, the way in which security issues are handled continues to be primarily state-oriented, from which three observations arise. First, this accounts for the need for further conceptual clarification of human security, notably vis-à-vis the human development agenda. Second, the incoherence between the multidimensional nature of the concept – which may lead to conflicting short-, medium- and long-term objectives – and types of approaches and tools available to address human security threats and challenges in reality makes it difficult to create a holistic regime out of the existing norms, principles, institutions and practices. Third, in developing countries and namely in African countries, the security objectives of the State and populations often seem to be at odds.
Besides the conceptual and practical constraints to operationalising the human security agenda, the implications of the “war on terror” on the current global political context and on geopolitics affecting West Africa are also worth noting. The fight against terrorism has dominated the global agenda of OECD countries since late 2001. Donor development co-operation and security policies have begun to re-emphasise the physical and military aspects of security and incorporate an “anti-terror dimension” which also affects the targeting of aid. This situation raises two kinds of challenges for human security in West Africa. On the one hand, this could result in reduced interest in making progress towards addressing “human security” in West Africa. On the other hand, a few countries, namely in the Sahel region, could be critical allies in the global war against terrorism due to their geographical location and other socio-political characteristics. Some benefit from enhanced military training and assistance support. However, given the limited overall aid budget, this is likely to diminish resources available in no-targeted area. The regional consequences of this trend in terms of conflict prevention and promotion of human security need to be carefully monitored over time.

Against this background, working together towards reconciling the expectations of populations and the goals of states concerning security emerges as a priority for all stakeholders. In West Africa, opportunities exist to pursue this objective in situations emerging from conflict. For instance, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, particularly the disaffected youth, are integral parts of state security and human security agendas. The young have been heavily involved, directly or indirectly, in violent conflict. The lack of economic opportunities and alternative perspectives may persuade them to join the fighting where they would then be reluctant to abandon this lifestyle, let alone their arms, in the aftermath of a conflict. In the reconstruction and reconciliation process, it is essential to place DDR issues in the broader context of the youth challenges in West Africa. The importance of this issue cannot be underplayed, given that more than 45% of the regional population is under 15 years of age and an even higher proportion is under 20 years of age.

Key questions:

- Whose responsibility is it to guarantee human security in the West Africa region? What are the specific roles of states, non-state and regional actors?
- How should human security be protected and enhanced? How can regional development policies and frameworks developed by regional organisations more effectively address human security concerns (e.g. regional poverty reduction strategies, ECOWAS and the WAEMU agriculture policies, etc.)?
- How can greater consideration of human security concerns be fostered in national strategy and policy formulation processes? Are there lessons to be learned from the implementation of DDR programmes in West Africa that might be useful in this regard?
- What kinds of initiatives are best suited to implementing the human security agenda in West Africa both in countries at peace and those emerging from conflict? In the event that the objectives to protect the State as well as individuals seem incompatible, how can this type of contradiction be resolved?
- How does human security link up to the broader security debate in operational terms?
- What are the consequences of the global war on terror for the operationalisation of the human security agenda in West Africa? How can West Africa work with its partners to address the challenges raised?


58 According to World Bank Development Indicators for 2002. In fact, the proportion of 10 to 20 year olds in the total population of West Africa is around 23% (according to the US census Bureau). In 2003, this is equivalent to 65 million people.
4.2 Enhance Security System Reform

While changing political, economic and security circumstances have obliged many West African governments to consider some degree of reform in their security institutions, these are often piecemeal and narrowly-focused. Instances of SSR have been largely limited to countries that are emerging from conflict, such as Sierra Leone which was conducted under donor guidance. There are few ‘comprehensive’ SSR programmes in the OECD/DAC sense of the term and even the SSR terminology has yet to become fully familiar to policy makers in the region.\(^5^9\)

Reluctance towards Security System Reform is particularly strong in countries at peace because SSR affects the core of state institutions and modifies power relations between policy-makers, communities and interest groups. On the other hand, scepticism towards SSR is also motivated by the absence of sufficient resources and capacities to cope with the trade-off between the pursuit of a long-term goal, e.g. improving transparency and accountability of the overall security system, and the immediate need to strengthen its operational effectiveness. Few countries can afford to engage in developing effective, sustainable solutions to interrelated security and development challenges if they continue to grapple with political, social and economic instability and insecurity.

Poorly trained and undisciplined security forces can be an important element of the security problems faced by any given country. However, SSR is not limited to military issues, but also encompasses the whole national decision-making process, the role of the armed forces within this process and civil-military relations in general.\(^6^0\)

Approaches to SSR are not usually regional. In some contexts where conflicts are inter-linked and have strong regional often cross-border dimensions, conceiving of SSR on a regional perspective might be justified.

Key questions:

- What incentives can be developed to encourage Security System Reform during peace time? Is there room for the Peer Review Mechanism established by NEPAD to support this process of reform?

- How can the SSR concept be better adapted to the local context and local ownership of reform processes be strengthened? How can the relationship between state institutions and non-state actors be enhanced during this process?

- In countries emerging from conflict, how can we make sure that SSR, peacebuilding and socioeconomic reconstruction strategies are coherently framed and implemented in a manner supportive of human security objectives?

- Is there a role for ECOWAS to play in identifying basic principles of SSR that suit the West African context, guiding the definition of security policies and strategies at the national level?

4.3 Lay the foundation for a coherent security regime in Africa

The relationship between the ECOWAS Mechanism and the AU Peace and Security Council, and their respective positions vis-à-vis the UN Peace and Security Council, requires further examination. These institutions can be complementary if their respective mandates, responsibilities and capacities are clearly identified. Up to now, this has not always been the case. For instance, a formal arrangement between the OAU and ECOWAS did not exist. The problem remains in the process of establishing the African Union.

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\(^5^9\) E. Hutchful and K. Fayemi, “Security System Reform in Africa”, \textit{op.cit.}

\(^6^0\) R. Williams, 2000, “Security Sector Reform and the Origin of a Concept”, \textit{Monograph} No. 44, ISS, Pretoria.
As roles and missions of different African peace and security frameworks are currently in the making, it is difficult to institutionalise their relations and collaboration at this stage. However, if a solid, comprehensive and coherent security regime is to be created for the whole continent it is important for African regional organisations to reflect on the framework for their inter-relationships and an appropriate allocation of responsibilities.

**Key questions:**

- What are the potential areas of complementarity and duplication between ECOWAS and the African Union with regard to peace and security? What priority steps need to be taken to formalise cooperation in this field?
- What roles can international donors financing both organisations play to facilitate African strategic thinking on the establishment of a coherent and consistent African security regime, while ensuring African ownership of the whole process?
- How can African civil society be involved in the process of creating an overall security framework that takes account of human security concerns?

### 4.4 Operationalise the role of ECOWAS in stabilisation and peacekeeping efforts

ECOWAS has taken the lead in maintaining security in West Africa. ECOMOG has now had more than ten years experience of peacekeeping in the region’s hotspots, while ECOWAS has developed a very ambitious security agenda at the political and institutional level in a fairly short period of time. However, because the majority of ECOWAS member countries are classified among the least developed countries, the Community faces major resource constraints to fulfilling its security mission. Besides, ECOWAS is confronted with severe institutional challenges. Enhanced regional co-operation, a strong vision and political commitment by member states, and partnership with civil society are essential to operationalise ECOWAS’ security agenda through the implementation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and the Protocol for Democracy and Good Governance.

**Key questions:**

- How can ECOWAS ensure sustained availability of funds for the implementation of the Mechanism without excessive dependence on external support?
- What could be the criteria for creating a system of transferring resources from ECOWAS member states to the Mechanism which is both equitable and sustainable?
- What initial lessons can be learned from the creation of the ECOWAS Peace Fund? How can this inform further initiatives for human security in West Africa?
- Beyond Security System Reform and military intervention, what more could ECOWAS do to foster the wider components of human security among diverse actors in West Africa (adapting regional policies, sponsoring multi-stakeholder forums, etc.)?

### 4.5 Achieve greater self-sufficiency in peacekeeping operations

Humanitarian and peacekeeping operations often depend on the involvement and leadership of former colonial powers, as was the case in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. African countries and regional organisations lack the military capacity to sustain their own missions. The establishment of an African Standby Force is intended to enhance African peacekeeping capacities, although this will continue to depend on external funding, at least in the short term. Given strong financial constraints, African decision-
makers will need to identify ways to maximise their capacity to intervene when necessary and define the nature and scope of interventions within the context of the limited resources available to them.

Key questions:

- What are the appropriate scope and limitations for the permanent African Standby Force? In what ways are permanent peacekeeping forces preferable to ad-hoc arrangements in the West African context?
- Which strategies will better enhance human security in Africa: disarmament of African societies, SSR, enhanced military capacities or activities to support human development and capacity?

4.6 Co-ordinate military assistance regionally

Military assistance continues to be channelled bilaterally despite the crucial role regional organisations could play in this field. Further co-ordination among donor initiatives to strengthen military and peacekeeping capacities in West Africa through regional organisations is necessary. In particular, assistance is required to build capacities in relation to logistical and financial aspects of peacekeeping operations, and not only to train troops, as frequently happens, for these programmes to better respond to local needs and demands.

Key questions:

- What are the opportunities and constraints for ECOWAS to negotiate military assistance on behalf of its member states with major West African partners?
- What can be learned from similar experiences, if any, elsewhere?

4.7 Halt the proliferation of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines

Small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines are widely available in West Africa, with small arms and light weapons being particularly cheap and accessible. Some experts suggest that human security initiatives should focus on large-scale disarmament across Africa rather than on military capacity building programmes. Arms trade with states in conflict and/or at risk of conflict and rebel factions represents a threat to human security. Measures to monitor the illegal arms trade (with ex-Soviet bloc countries and other war torn countries) with a view to halting this type of trade already exist for West Africa i.e. the ECOWAS Moratorium, whereas legal arm trade is still poorly limited and scrutinised. The G8 countries can contribute a great deal to developing a framework for effectively addressing this issue. Finally, while anti-personnel mines may not be as widespread in West Africa as in some other regions, they remain a veritable threat to the lives of thousands of people and could become more of a problem in the future. To ensure the danger posed by mines is limited over time, action could be taken by ECOWAS in collaboration with national governments to ensure the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty.

Key questions:

- What specific arrangements are required to control arms circulation in cross-border areas in the context of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Moratorium? How can networking and information sharing be enhanced to serve this purpose?
- What measures do the international community, and in particular the G8 countries, need to take to ensure transparency and democratic control over the legal arms trade?

ANNEX 1: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER SOURCES – BY THEME

The African security regime: key documents


1993: Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution/OAU Conflict Management Centre: www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No10/DeConing.html


Security in Africa – general


The West African security regime – key documents

1971: UEMOA Non-Aggression and Defence Assistance Agreement (ANAD)


Security and peacekeeping in West Africa


**Human security – general**


Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 2001, *Relación entre Derechos Humanos y Seguridad Humana, documento de trabajo*, San José.


Bibliography on human security: www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/bibliography.pdf
Comparison of definitions: www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/comparison_definitions.pdf
Definitions of human security: www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/list_definitions.pdf
Harvard Programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research.
First edition in early 2005; modelled on the UNDP Human Development Report, the Human Security Report will map the incidence, intensity, causes and consequences of global violence and policy responses.
Published three times a year by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
Report highlights progress towards the achievement of the MDGs.
Human security and civil society


Selected reference on G8 and human security


J. Kirton, 1997, The Growing Demand for a G7 Global Security Role in the 1990s, G7 Research Group, University of Toronto, Toronto.


Human security in the foreign and development policies of bilateral donors

Canada, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001, Freedom from Fear, Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security, Ottawa.


Security System Reform – general


GTZ, 2000, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries, Division 43.


Small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines


Children in armed conflict, armed groups and DDR


Annex 2: Organisations, Institutions and Networks Working on Security Issues

Commission on Human Security: www.humansecurity-chs.org
The Commission on Human Security was launched in January 2001 in order to achieve the following objectives: promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security and its underlying imperatives; develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security.

The Advisory Board on Human Security is an independent body composed of eight members. It was established to carry forward the recommendations of the Commission on Human Security and advise the UN Secretary-General on the UN Trust Fund for Human Security.

The UN Trust Fund for Human Security was launched in March 1999 by the Japanese government. Budget: 170 million US dollars for three years. Aim: translate the concept of human security into concrete activities by supporting projects implemented by UN agencies that address various threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity.

SecuripaxForum – UNESCO: www.unesco.org/securipax/
UNESCO has created a website dedicated to peace and human security issues (electronic forum, publications, and a peace institute database with more than 600 hundred resources).

DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC Network): www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34567_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
The DAC, created in 1961, allows consultation among bilateral donors on how to make national resources available for assisting developing countries and for expanding and improving the flow of long-term funds and other development assistance to them. Over time, the DAC has established a series of working parties, task forces and networks whose mandates reflect the main orientations of the Committee: financial aspects of development assistance; development assistance and the environment; statistics; aid evaluation; gender equality; good governance and capacity building; conflict, peace and development; and harmonisation of donor practices. In particular, the CPDC Network is an international forum where conflict and peace building experts from bilateral and multilateral development co-operation agencies meet to define common approaches in support of peace.

Human Security Network: www.humansecuritynetwork.org
The Human Security Network is a group of thirteen countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of Foreign Ministers, maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security. The Network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand and South Africa as an observer. The Network’s work is promoted and supported by the Human Security Network Bulletin that is regularly published in collaboration with Harvard’s Human Security Programme. Since 1999 the Network organises once a year a Ministerial meeting that aims to bring international attention to new and emerging security issues.

Helsinki Process: www.helsinkiprocess.fi/Track3/
The Helsinki Process on Globalisation and Democracy is a joint initiative of the Finnish and Tanzanian governments aiming to foster partnerships between civil society, business and states on three main topics (tracks): global problem solving, financing development, and human security. The Human security track focuses on special needs and concerns of individuals and communities at risk.
**African Human Security Initiative:** [www.africanreview.org](http://www.africanreview.org)
The Human Security Initiative is a DFID sponsored one-year project for a core network of seven established African NGOs to embark upon a process of benchmarking the performance of key African governments in respect of human security issues, measured against the commitments taken at the level at OAU/AU Heads of State meetings.

The Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects provides financial assistance to NGOs, hospitals, primary schools and other non-profit associations, to help implement their development projects.

**West African Action Network on Small Arms:** [www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm](http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm)
Established in May 2002 in Ghana, WAANSA is a network of more than 50 organisations from Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Togo working to prevent the proliferation of small arms in the region.
**ANNEX 3: CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES**

**US African Crisis Response Initiative:** [www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fs_acri_980327.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fs_acri_980327.html)

ACRI provides equipment and training to 10,000/12,000 African soldiers in well-prepared companies and battalions, commanded by trained African officers and capable of deployed operations with consistent doctrine and procedures, using interoperable communications.

**African Contingency Operations Assistance (ACOTA):**
[www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html](http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html)

ACOTA builds upon the African Crisis Response Initiative by reinforcing training packages, including peace-enforcement training. (Budget: 15 million US dollars).

**Renforcements des Capacités Africaines pour le Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP):**
[www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/actualites/recamp.htm](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/actualites/recamp.htm)

In collaboration with the UN and the AU, this French-sponsored programme provides initial training, advanced training and equipment to African states to help them acquire military capabilities to run peacekeeping operations across Africa. (Budget: 30 million euros in 2000).

**Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana:** [www.kaiptc.org/kaiptc](http://www.kaiptc.org/kaiptc)

Launched in January 2004 to develop West Africa peacekeeping capacities in the context of the ECOWAS Mechanism’s implementation, the Centre has the following objectives: provide mission-oriented training, at the operational level, in peace operations for selected participants prior to deployment into areas of operation in West Africa; provide the operational focus that will link the basic tactical peace operations training provided in Mali (under French sponsorship) with the high level strategic training provided at the War College in Nigeria; improve the ability of participants to operate in multinational environments and to co-operate with contingents from other countries; keep participants abreast of the nature and complexities of contemporary inter- and intra-state conflicts; conduct research into the various facets of peace operations.
## ANNEX 4: WEB RESOURCES

### International research institutes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institute</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Democracy and Development</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cdd.org.uk">www.cdd.org.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hdcentre.org/?aid=22">www.hdcentre.org/?aid=22</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College London</td>
<td><a href="http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk">http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Centre for Security Studies</td>
<td><a href="http://www.marshallcenter.org/">www.marshallcenter.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Training and Research Centre on Human Rights and Democracy</td>
<td><a href="http://www.etc-graz.at/human-security">www.etc-graz.at/human-security</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform</td>
<td><a href="http://www.gfn-ssr.org">www.gfn-ssr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Programme on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/human_security.htm">www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/human_security.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Human Security</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/index.html">www.fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Peace Academy</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ipacademy.org">www.ipacademy.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
<td><a href="http://www.prio.no">www.prio.no</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Institute</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sipri.se">www.sipri.se</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### African networks and institutes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institute</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa’s Commission on Human and People’s Rights</td>
<td><a href="http://www.achpr.org">www.achpr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
<td><a href="http://www.accord.org.za">www.accord.org.za</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Strategic and Peace Research Group, Nigeria</td>
<td><a href="http://www.afstrag.org">www.afstrag.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td><a href="http://www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds/">www.uz.ac.zw/units/cds/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa</td>
<td><a href="http://www.isc.ac.za">www.isc.ac.za</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African Regional Poverty Network</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sarpn.org.za">www.sarpn.org.za</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Peace</td>
<td><a href="http://www.trainingforpeace.org">www.trainingforpeace.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Network for Peacebuilding, Ghana</td>
<td><a href="http://www.wanep.org">www.wanep.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Specific aspects of human security: protection of involuntary migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
<td><a href="http://www.archq.org">www.archq.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global IDP Project</td>
<td><a href="http://www.idpproject.org">www.idpproject.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td><a href="http://www.icrc.org">www.icrc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td><a href="http://www.iom.int">www.iom.int</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td><a href="http://www.intrescom.org">www.intrescom.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nrc.no/engindex.htm">www.nrc.no/engindex.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA Internal Displacement Unit</td>
<td><a href="http://www.reliefweb.int/idp">www.reliefweb.int/idp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Refugee Study Centre</td>
<td><a href="http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk">www.rsc.ox.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex Centre for Migration Research</td>
<td><a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration">www.sussex.ac.uk/migration</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Refugee Council</td>
<td><a href="http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk">www.refugeecouncil.org.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td><a href="http://www.unhcr.ch">www.unhcr.ch</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Committee for Refugees</td>
<td><a href="http://www.refugees.org">www.refugees.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African Refugees and IDPs Network</td>
<td><a href="http://www.waripnet.org">www.waripnet.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Commission for Refugees and Children</td>
<td><a href="http://www.womenscommission.org">www.womenscommission.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Specific aspects of human security: small arms, light weapons, anti-personnel mines, and DDR

Africa Peace Forum – Small Arms  
Arm Control Association  
Arm Sales Monitoring Project  
Campaign for a Global Arms Trade Treaty  
Canadian International Demining Corps  
Danish Demining Group  
DDR Resource Centre  
EU and Humanitarian Demining  
Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining  
Handicap International  
International Alert  
International Campaign to Ban Landmines  
Landmine Action  
Landmine Monitor Report  
OCHA Humanitarian Mine Action  
People against Landmines  
Safer World  
Small Arms Survey  
Survey Action Center  
UN Department of Disarmament Affairs  
UN Institute for Disarmament Research  
UN International Action Network on Small Arms  
UN Mine Action Service  
UN Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament in Africa  
UNDP Mine Action Programme  
UNDP Small Arms and Demobilization Services  
US Humanitarian Demining Training Center  
WHO Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention

Specific aspects of human security: child soldiers and civilians in armed conflict

Child Soldiers Discussion Forum  
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers  
HRW Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers  
Italian Campaign against Use of Child Soldiers  
SOS Children Villages  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict  
Stop All’Uso dei Bambini Soldato  
UNICEF – Children in war  
OCHA

African organisations/organisations working in Africa

African Development Bank  
Arab Maghreb Union  
African Union  
Community of Sahel-Saharan States  
Economic Community of West African States  
New Partnership for Africa’s Development  
Southern African Development Community  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
West Africa Economic and Monetary Union

www.amaniafrika.org/small_arms.shtml  
www.armscontrol.org  
www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/index.html  
www.controlarms.org  
www.cidc.ws  
www.danishdemininggroup.org  
www.undp.org/erd/ddr  
www.eudem.vub.ac.be  
www.gichd.ch  
www.handicap-international.org  
www.international-alert.org  
www.icbl.org  
www.landmineaction.org  
www.icbl.org/lm/2003  
www.reliefweb.int/ocha.ol/civilians/landmines.html  
www.mgm.org  
www.saferworld.co.uk  
www.smallarmssurvey.org  
www.sac-na.org/sac_overview.html  
www.disarmament2.un.org  
www.unidir.ch  
www.iansa.org  
www.mineaction.org  
www.unrec.org  
www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/undp.htm  
www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/index.htm  
www.wood.army.mil/hd tc  
www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/en  
www.childsoldiers.org  
www.child-soldiers.org/  
www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/index.htm  
www.coopi.org/it/bambinisieraleone.asp  
www.sos-childrensvillages.org  
www.bambinisoldato.it/  
www.unicef.org/protection/index_armedconflict.html  
www.reliefweb.int/ocha.ol/civilians/  
www.afdb.org  
www.maghrebarabe.org  
www.african-union.org  
http://www.uneca.org/cen-sad/  
www.ecowas.int  
www.nepad.org  
www.sadc.int  
www.uneca.org  
www.uemoa.int
### ANNEX 5: INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND INITIATIVES TO PROTECT HUMAN SECURITY—TIMELINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty/Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Refugee Convention of the OAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Convention on Mercenarism of the OAU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Guideline Principles on International Displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution on Illicit Arms Flow to and from Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Protocol on trafficking in persons, on the smuggling of migrants and on firearms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Bamako Declaration on the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation, and Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>