Preparing for the Future

A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA
IN THE YEAR 2020

West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study

Edited by
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In 1991, four member countries of the Club du Sahel: Canada, the United States, France and the Netherlands, suggested that a regional study be undertaken of the long-term prospects for West Africa. Several Sahelian countries and several coastal West African countries backed the idea.

To carry out this regional study, the Club du Sahel Secretariat and the CINERGIE group (a project set up under a 1991 agreement between the OECD and the African Development Bank) formed a multi-disciplinary team of African and non-African experts. The European Commission, the World Bank and the African Development Bank provided the funds necessary to finance the study.

The Club du Sahel Secretariat, working in conjunction with the CINERGIE group in Abidjan, directed the group of experts in charge of the study. On several occasions, a Scientific Committee and various advisory groups were organised to help formulate preliminary findings and ideas. The group coordinators were in regular contact with the groups of experts from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in charge of the National Long-Term Perspectives Studies (NLTPS) in African countries.

Undertaking a study of long-term perspectives in West Africa would necessitate taking a step back in order to see far ahead. CINERGIE and the Club du Sahel, not being bound by any short-term policy deadlines, were in a good position to do just that.

However, since long-term developments depend on individual or collective short-term decisions, it is hoped that the study will provide food for thought and, if possible, some guidelines for day-to-day action.

Such was the hope of the countries that commissioned CINERGIE and the Club du Sahel Secretariat to carry out this study.

The purpose of the West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) is to gain a better understanding of the main trends that have dictated change in the region over the past half a century or so, and to reflect upon the direction of change over the next three decades. The aim is to arrive at a set of hypotheses regarding the direction of future change, in order to develop a sketch of the region around the year 2020. The authors have confidence in scientific progress, human ingenuity, the entrepreneurial spirit and the will of West Africa’s people to live and live better. They are aware of the risks the future holds for West Africa. They have sought to sketch a picture that holds promise, despite the difficulties the region will encounter. This picture incorporates a plan, one which will have to be brought to maturity and carried out by Africans. That said, outside agencies wishing to assist should, in fact, be prepared to do so.

A further aim of the study is to show that the West African population has made considerable efforts to adapt to the changes occurring in the region. In all probability, it will continue to do so.
This adaptation has taken place under difficult conditions: traditional civilisations have been poorly adapted to the modern world; political and administrative leadership have been ill prepared to observe and to direct change; human resources have lacked education and training; and capital accumulation and financing capacity levels have been extremely low. Moreover, nation-building was prioritized over regional co-operation. For a certain period the aid to African development efforts was supported by the international context; then the situation destabilized. Foreign aid, though abundant for twenty years, has not managed to pull Africa out of its crisis and has kept the region in a position of dependence. The global economic crisis has undermined Western confidence in the future in general and above all in the future of Africa. Public aid has diminished substantially.

The authors of the study do not underestimate the dangers that such extreme and very rapid changes represent for West Africa. But they are convinced that West Africans have learned a great deal from the opportunities and difficulties of the past thirty years and that, despite the exceptional constraints they will be working under in the coming decades, they will be able to benefit from these lessons. The authors take quite the opposite view to that of a region with no future.

To describe past developments and future prospects, the authors have carried out a more detailed analysis than is usual in long-term studies of the changes that have taken place in the region’s human geography, i.e. in the relationship between its people and their natural environment. The study facilitators asked the research team (which consisted of African and non-African experts from a number of disciplines – statisticians, demographers, economists, geographers, agronomists, urban planners and political scientists) to focus upon human geography as the core discipline to synthesise their findings.

Taken somewhat aback, at first, by such an unfamiliar frame of reference, the experts soon became accustomed to it and agreed that human geography has its advantages and sheds a different light on African realities compared to that of the more common approaches. It is a discipline well suited to describing one of West Africa’s most significant facets: the fact that it is still undergoing important population resettlement. It is also a visual discipline: it produces maps. It tries to grasp the direction of long-term trends. It encourages modesty, showing that unexpected upheavals make prediction hazardous. And it teaches patience.

The human geography perspective entails an interest in large scale, long-term phenomena, and equal weight cannot be attached to the short-term. Detailed attention cannot be given to sectoral trends. The working papers on which this final report is based do not contain detailed analyses of trends in health, environment, industry, etc. Nor do they include any recipe for what should be done tomorrow. At most, they suggest certain priorities as well as a few promising directions to take. That is the particularity and the strength – but also the limitation – of this West African long-term perspectives study. WALTPS is intended to complement the many careful studies carried out by specialists in different disciplines. Its authors have sought to examine...
trends in West Africa, from a long-term viewpoint, and from which encouragement for continued action could be drawn.

The study was directed by Jean-Marie Cour.

Mahamane Brah, Director of the ADB/OECD CINERGIE Unit, Chérif Seye, CINERGIE’s Communications Manager and Jean-Marc Pradelle from the Club du Sahel, co-ordinated the study.

John Igué, Director of the LARES in Cotonou, Benin supported the CINERGIE Unit in co-ordinating the team of experts from West Africa.

Serge Snrech worked in close collaboration with Jean-Marie Cour to manage the members of the team based at the Club du Sahel office in Paris.

This team consisted of Jean-David Naudet, Benoit Ninnin, Michel Arnaud, Mukanda-Bantu Kalasa and Laurent Bossard. Roger Pons and Vincent Leclercq also lent their expertise to the study.

The team benefited from the advice and experience of Anne de Lattre throughout the duration of the study.

Moustapha Dème co-ordinated the Mali case-study, with contributions from Bakari Sanogo, Ousmane Diallo, Sékouba Diarra and Bakary Sacko.

Edmond Kaboré co-ordinated the Burkina Faso case study.

Ibrahim Jibrin co-ordinated the study on social and political change in Nigeria, which was produced by D.J. Abin, B. Ahonsi, J.A. Ariyo, Z.A. Bonat, M. Mamman, A. Momoh, Adebayo Olukoshi, C. Obi and A.C. Onwumerbobi.

J. Ebow Bannerman co-ordinated the Ghana case-study, with contributions from S.D. Addo, Kwassi Adarkwa, A.F. Arye, James Bok Abdan, George Botchie, John S. Nabila, Kwame A. Ninsin and Nii Kwaku Sowa.

Mamadou Diouf co-ordinated the study on the dynamics of social and political change, with contributions from Albert Bourgi, Pierre Henri Chalvidan, Mamadou Diop, Elimane Fall and Pierre Weiss.

A number of meetings were held, at which the WALTPS results were discussed by decision-makers and researchers from Africa, Europe and North America.
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Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed:

- to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
- to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and
- to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996) and Korea (12th December 1996). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).
Overcoming doubt: reconsidering the past and acquiring a vision of the future

Among the consequences of the recession that hit sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s, the most damaging has without a doubt been the loss of confidence in the future which has affected both the ruling class in these countries as well as their development partners. Donors, disappointed and at times misguided, have reacted by launching a growing number of initiatives, not only with the objective of testing new remedies, but also with that of reestablishing the interest and confidence of their constituents. As for African governments, destabilised, discredited and often submerged in aid conditions and advice, they have done their best to manage the situation day by day, relegating the driver’s seat to foreign advisers.

Given such conditions, aid recipients were unlikely to fully accept the spirit as well as the letter of the increasingly complex conditions attached to it. Aid programs were bound to fail, since the countries aided were unable to clearly (and independently of official doctrine) express their own vision. As a result, there has been a tendency towards the spread of “Afro-pessimism”, at the expense of “Afro-realism”.

To break out of this intellectual logjam, some observers and institutions suggested taking a fresh, more objective look at performance in the region over the past thirty years and rediscovering the major long-term trends in West Africa, where the process of population growth and human settlement are not yet completed. If convincing enough, this notion of long-term trends should lend new shape to strategic planning, molded prospectively: a realistic and, as such, positive vision of the future, so lacking today.

It is often suggested that when the international environment is so unpredictable, what African countries need most is greater adaptability, rather than planning and prospective studies. In fact, a prospective approach fulfils the same function for institutions as dreaming does for people. Just as people need to dream as a source of inspiration and aspiration, so too do institutions need to periodically devote time to thinking back over the past and forward to the future. It is during such phases of free intensive reflexion that institutions can distance themselves from the slogans and multitude of confusing messages received each day from the world at large. By looking at a much longer term moving picture, Africans can rediscover their roots and prepare to confront the real world more effectively. That is the basis for this study.
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

From the World Bank’s long-term perspective study to WALTPS

After some early long-term exercises that were interesting in their own right, though not widely circulated, the 1989 World Bank study *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study* marked a milestone towards a wider temporal and spatial scope in thinking on development strategy. After its publication, African governments and bi/multi-lateral donors agreed in Maastricht in 1990 to undertake similar studies on both the national and subregional levels. A support project, entitled African Futures, was set up to this end.

For several reasons, the idea of a subregional perspective study first took concrete form in West Africa. To begin with, several West African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, and sub-regional institutions such as CILSS, already had some experience with prospective studies. Secondly, thanks to the CILSS/Club du Sahel partnership, these countries and their development agency partners had been discussing long-term questions affecting the region as a whole since the late 1970s. Thirdly, as the climate swung back to more favourable conditions, partners of CILSS and the Club du Sahel felt the need to go beyond issues of famine prevention and natural resource management to tackle more structural questions – e.g. the role of the Sahel in West Africa and how to manage the interdependent relationship between the landlocked Sahelian countries and those situated along the coast.

Long-term trends and specific features of West Africa in the face of change

The WALTPS study sets out to reveal the structural changes that have occurred since the 1960s amongst the peoples, as well as within the institutions, of West Africa and to place these changes in perspective against the *long-term trends* affecting these countries over the time span of one century: 1930-2030.

During this period, the total population of the subregion will have multiplied tenfold and its urban population one-hundredfold. These figures alone show the fundamental importance of demographic variables and, more precisely, of settlement dynamics, i.e. the growth and the redistribution of population within each country and across the region. The main aim of the study was to highlight (a) the long-term interactions between these settlement dynamics and economic and social processes and (b) the evolution in the subregion of four interlocking factors: *population, spatial settlement, market dynamics, and social and political change*.

The WALTPS is thus a complement to the World Bank’s long-term perspective study, which paid little attention to the spatial aspects of demographic change or to its impact on economic development.

To arrive at an objective observation of West Africa’s past performance, one must bear in mind those features that are specific to the region. To neglect these factors is to face a greater risk of
development failure and of the spread of doubt and cynicism among experts and public opinion. Here we shall outline the characteristics that most particularly reinforce the need to question the dominant paradigm.

First, because it is the last region in the world to undergo demographic transition, Africa must cope with particularly high rates of population growth. This is occurring alongside intense intra-regional migration movements, the net balance of which gives only a very partial idea of their scale. This mobility, a characteristic of the region throughout its history, was facilitated at first by the fact that Africa had not yet undergone a stage of stabilized rural settlement and that national sentiments were relatively weak. Migration has helped to solve some of the problems raised by population growth, but it has also generated tensions that are difficult to manage. A part of the sustainable development challenge that faces these countries today, and which will continue to face them in the coming period, is to find ways of maintaining a high degree of mobility in an environment far less favourable to such movement.

As has been observed in other parts of the world, one of the chief results of population mobility is urbanization. However, unlike urban America or Asia, West African towns and cities have not enjoyed the benefit of a significant influx of already-urbanized migrants who thus bring with them urban skills and capital. In most of these towns and cities, only very recently founded, it is only a small proportion of the inhabitants whose parents were townspeople and who are thus already familiar with the experience of urban life. Most West African town/city-dwellers still regard themselves as “just passing by”.

A second aspect of this mobility is that population tends to concentrate in a small number of growth centers. This trend is inevitable and, in the broadest terms, beneficial. However, like urbanization itself, it is often denounced as unacceptable and unfair; as a consequence, it often runs counter to official policy, and thus the real dangers of reduced mobility are not properly addressed.

Despite the fast-growing population, many areas are still very isolated and overall population density is still low, making transaction costs higher in Africa than elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, the region must cope with the very low level of physical capital it has inherited from its past. At the start of this century, the region disposed of very little permanent infrastructure to occupy and develop its immense territory, even in rural areas, where farming was not a sedentary activity. In contrast to Asia, the lack of basic capital accumulation meant there was no private capital available for urban development, so that African societies had to place higher levies on current monetary flows. The effects of this lack of inherited capital are still felt today.

At the present stage of demographic transition, and in view of the high internal mobility and weak physical capital, individuals, businesses and institutions give priority, in practice, to employment over productivity. Africa’s towns and villages meet the needs of as many newcomers as possible by creating what is essentially informal economic activity. As soon as the income from an activity can cover more than one family’s essential needs (food, lodging, clothing etc.), it is immediately subdivided to give work to another migrant. Thus extensive growth – marked by low,
static productivity – has been preferred to more intensive production modes. This form of job-sharing partly explains the clear correlation between economic growth and urbanization: The economic boom of the 1970s was reflected in an urban growth rate of over 7 per cent per annum, while in the recession of the past decade this rate has fallen to 4.5 per cent. This is why, in both past and present contexts, increased productivity of labor can only be a minor objective compared to that of providing shelter and basic needs for as many people as possible. Under these conditions, the attempts, during the 1960’s, to graft on modern industries — which only make sense if one is seeking to replace scarce or expensive labor with machines — were in many cases premature.

The international business environment has proved especially aggressive for weak countries, as it imposes constraints that exacerbate problems of demographic transition. In trade, for example, the recent reversal of world food flows has had major consequences. Many developed countries, which were historically net importers of foodstuffs, have become net exporters, seeking outlets for their surplus. African countries are under strong pressure to open their borders to food imports; however, they cannot compete with imports of developed countries and are thus restricted to competing with each other on the relatively narrow exotic produce markets. Similarly, by subsidizing their exports of manufactured goods and dumping scrap and second-hand goods at unbeatable prices, rich countries create highly unfavorable conditions for the development of small businesses as well as for the development of the craft industry.

Instead of mitigating – or compensating for – instability and deteriorating terms of trade, external transfers tend to amplify their impact.

As for the regional market, which might have acted as a buffer against the external onslaught, its development is hampered by the region’s balkanization, by the de facto separation between English- and French-speaking countries, and by the ease with which imports can enter.

Thus, confronted with an invasive and globally unfavourable international environment as well as a dependence on aid, West African countries are far less able than the countries of Asia or America to organize themselves on a regional basis and to thus more easily resist the multitude of initiatives proposed by agencies of development aid. Whereas today’s wealthy countries enjoyed the luxury of facing one by one, gradually, over the span of centuries, issues such as competitiveness, environmental protection, poverty, governance, democratization, regional integration, etc., West Africa is forced to deal with the same issues all at once. Agriculture – including capitalization of land – ought to underpin capital formation, yet not only does this remain a sector of instability, but markets are opened to the world market before being solidified locally. Industry ought to emerge, but production in the crafts industry is still archaic, the labor force overabundant and poorly educated. Modern education is developing rapidly while modern employment is lacking. Industry should be putting as many people to work as possible instead of focusing upon the capital-intensive processes encouraged by global competition.
Lastly, we are not doing justice to the countries of the African continent if we ignore the fact that the States and institutions inherited from the colonial powers are still extremely young. Priority must be given to the assertion of the State, of its land, and of its national identity. The resuscitation – during the first decades of independence – of the essential elements of the colonial-era model for governance and economic planning is a natural tendency of which history has provided plenty examples.

Finding long-term historical trends in today’s apparent chaos

This somewhat different look at transformations that occurred in the West African region between 1960 and 1990 shows that the development efforts of these past decades have not been in vain, as it is often suggested. Analysis of the real economy indicates that West Africa has developed and has settled its growing population without generalized pauperization. Despite the fast pace of this settlement process (reflected, for example, in the fact that the population of the urban informal sector has increased tenfold in thirty years), the standard of living of the various population categories identified in the study has made slight progress. This is an achievement, given the region’s particular characteristics. The redistribution of the population over these past decades has gone hand in hand with a significant accumulation of capital and constitutes a major asset for the future.

Given the perspective generated by these long-term trends, images of the region in 2020 have been sketched, along with plausible hypotheses on the evolution of some exogenous variables, taking into consideration the specific features of a West Africa faced with changes imposed by the international environment. These images have been complemented by medium-term images, illustrating contradictions between the suggested long-term goals and developments and the short-term and medium-term trends and constraints. At any given time, the policy maker’s choice of strategy consists of seeking the best possible compromise between a vision of the long-term, and the constraints of the short and medium term.

The long-term images presented in WALTPS cover changes in the related fields of human settlement patterns, land use and environmental management, transformation of the economy, and social and institutional change. For the various settlement hypotheses (the distribution of people throughout the region) “images” of the national and regional economies appearing to be “compatible” have been produced. These images, which illustrate the interactions between the related fields mentioned above, represent an attempt to provide plausible answers to the following questions:

▲ Where will the some 400 million people that will make up West Africa’s population live a generation from now?

▲ What needs will be expressed by the various categories of population across the region? To what extent can these needs be met, from what incomes, activities and transactions? What should be done to ensure the appropriate changes?
What strategies must be considered, what policies followed and what investments made to support the settlement of new population and generate employment?

What key variables will make it possible for West Africa to benefit from the dynamism of human settlement and what inhibiting factors need to be removed?

The emphasis placed on the process of population dynamics in these long-term images is no accident. If the fashionable concept of sustainable development has any meaning at all, it is that of the realistic and intelligent management of the settlement processes of our planet. This peopling process is now occurring at its maximum speed within West Africa and in one half-century the process will be largely completed. Now is therefore the time to think spatially and regionally. Now is the time to deal with this issue.

In 2025, the fifty or so countries that are now in human settlement transition will have a combined population of four billion, 40% of the world’s total. By 2025, their total urban population is likely to triple, and the total volume of migrants in these countries (i.e. entering and leaving towns) will increase more than tenfold. The basic needs engendered in these countries by changing settlement patterns and gradual integration into the world economy are considerable. Still, however great these “basic needs” may appear, it is preferable to face up to them.

The value of the demo-economic images outlined in WALTPS is that they start from the hypothesis that all future populations of the region will actually find somewhere to live and some purpose for being there. The images call forth a number of questions which the international community as a whole must attempt to answer:

Since one essential condition for sustainable high population growth is mobility (locally, subregionally) of that population, what can advanced countries do to help maintain or restore conditions favourable to mobility within regions in settlement transition? What can advanced countries do to help manage the risks inherent in this migration?

The ratio between living standards in developed countries, whose population has stabilised, and in countries undergoing settlement transition is now over twenty to one at purchasing power parity, much higher than it has ever been in the history of mankind, and continues to grow. What strategy would need to be adopted, particularly in the North, to gradually reduce the anomalies that have accumulated over three generations? How should the rules of the world economy be adapted so that the least advanced countries can find their place once again? What code of good practice should rich and emerging countries adopt to help emerging countries develop and exploit their subregional markets? How can sustainable development policies be put in place that favour human mobility, dynamic exchange between urban and rural areas and truly regional solutions for management of arid lands and river basins?

What imbalances may be expected between savings and investment, exports and imports, in the countries in settlement transition? How can these imbalances be corrected? What innovations compared with past practice will be necessary?
What, in particular, will the future roles be for official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI)? How can the current critical re-examination of ODA be reconciled with the fact that the need for net official transfers (capital, skills, technical assistance) will be growing faster than the economies of rich countries, and that FDI will for many years tend to head for the emerging countries?

Rwanda and Burundi today (see Box I) are stark reminders, not so much of the often-cited ethnic conflict, but of what happens when policymakers lose historical and regional perspective. By limiting the scope of political analysis and of the perception of development problems almost entirely to the national paradigm – considering that these countries have no solid historical foundation and that their markets and economies are much too small – the spatial dimensions of human settlement and its implications for sustainable development and conflict avoidance were lost. Consider that in 1993, Rwanda averaged 292 inhabitants per square kilometer and Burundi 214, compared to 76 in Uganda, 30 in Tanzania and 18 in Zaire. The processes of urbanization and division of labor between agriculture and the other sectors that most other countries of Africa enjoyed since the early sixties was interrupted in Rwanda and Burundi by severe restrictions to population mobility. As a result, ninety percent of the households have had no alternative other than to live on family farms whose average size has shrunk to less than half of one hectare, a size too small to sustain food self sufficiency. While caution should be taken in placing too much importance on “demographic determinism”, recent evaluations of the Rwanda tragedy have emphasized that the only long-term solutions involve regional actions that take into account spatial management of human settlement and land and water resources.

Images of Africa in chaos, tangled in ethnically-driven crises, are so common today that they have become assumptions of convention. However, such images are misleading. A closer and longer term examination of African societies reveals many profound changes, some occurring more rapidly historically than occurred in Europe, North America and now Asia. In fact the crises are more visible in a still photograph than in a moving picture. They coexist side by side with change and innovation in a broader logic of time and space often overlooked in our short-term analyses.
Developments in the Great Lakes region are an example of the need to carefully consider recent history. With hindsight, the development aid and relief structure set up since independence in that region appears to the WALTPS authors to have been ineffective in coping with the structural problems facing those countries as well as incapable of reacting to the current crisis. In particular:

▲ The “paradigm” and conceptual framework that long determined action of donors (and the many NGOs!) were unsuitable: There was no clear understanding of settlement trends and their economic, social, political and environmental implications; there was a strong bias in favour of rural areas and agriculture leading to the support of the family small- and then micro-holding; distrust of the urbanisation process leading to a slower division of labour between agriculture and other sectors; and finally, uncoordinated local action.

▲ Lack of vision, failure to account for the long-term and insufficient understanding of the deep structural changes implied by population growth, settlement changes and opening up to the market economy have led, for too long, to favouring the status quo, hampering internal and external mobility, and thus increasing the risks of explosion;

▲ Insufficient attention was paid to regional realities and requirements which led to aid programs designed within the narrow framework of national borders. What donor programmed its action in Kivu in light of constraints and opportunities provided by the neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi?

▲ The sectoral nature of aid policy and programs led to the underestimation of the importance of infrastructure and administration for this region in settlement transition, the neglect of the spatial consistency of action taken, and to the ignoring of the dynamic relationship between towns and rural areas;

▲ Poor determination of needs resulting from change (notably in regards to human settlement) led to serious underinvestment in infrastructure and local public facilities, particularly in areas of potential immigration. In sparsely urbanised countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, local resources mobilised for local public expenditure are, and will long remain, trivial compared with what is needed. The low level of public expenditure on behalf of the central administration and local authorities seriously hampers the process – so essential to the region – of restructuring settlement patterns. Similarly, potential immigration zones of neighboring countries face territory-management and infrastructure needs that largely surpass the capacities of local savings;

▲ The number of exterior aid organisms (bi- and multi- lateral donors, NGO’s decentralised co-ops, other projects...) is making life progressively more difficult for local authorities: prior to recent events, Rwandan and Burundian officials responsible for exterior cooperation were welcoming over 200 missions per year!

Lack of comprehension of the demo-economic dynamics that are of current reality in the region is certainly an element of significance where recent events are concerned, although other profound causes are also identifiable. Today’s crisis is an occasion to develop new thought processes concerning strategy, policy, prerequisites, and implementation, in order to better manage resettlement and development in the Great Lakes area, one of the most unstable regions on the planet.
The underlying image depicted in this report of long-term perspectives in Africa is of a region whose most restrictive yet dynamic characteristic is the rapid growth and redistribution of its population. This process will continue for some time to come: the region’s population is almost certain to double over the next thirty years. While it accounted for only a minor portion of the planet's population growth up to the beginning of this century, Africa is today home to one additional inhabitant in four. By around 2020, one out of every two newborn babies could be African.

West Africa is not the first region in the world to undergo such rapid population growth. Other examples are America in the nineteenth century and China and the Asian sub-continent in the first half of the twentieth. But population growth in Africa is occurring under rather unusual conditions compared to these other examples:

- Population growth began later than elsewhere, and under even more difficult circumstances: an archaic world was suddenly thrust into contact with modernity and the global market;
- Whereas North America’s immigrant flood included a proportion of urbanised migrants, businessmen and capitalists whose skills and savings helped to build the nation, West Africa’s population growth comes from its own rural population base.
- Unlike India or China, two ancient civilisations that were able to isolate themselves for a while from the rest of the world while accomplishing (in a cruel fashion) their social and demographic transformation, West Africa is entirely open to outside influences.

A further factor is that progress in medicine and information, combined with the developed countries’ capacity to intervene, have reduced mortality rates long before the society was ready to reduce its fertility rates.

A mobile, energetic population

In a situation of rapid population growth, West Africans have endeavoured with great vigour and individualism to improve their living conditions. Their spirit of initiative has taken many different forms. Its main characteristic has been intra-regional mobility, particularly towards towns. In these towns, citizens have invested savings and labour to make their surroundings acceptable. They have created jobs to absorb the
uninterrupted migratory influx. The farmers, for their part, have moved closer to population centres where their products find more reliable outlets than in areas of more scattered settlement. And town dwellers and country folk alike have taken advantage of the lower priced consumer goods available on the world market.

The authors of this study do not deny that the population’s behaviour has created not only positive developments but also major dysfunctions of all kinds – economic, social, ecological, etc. Of course, they think the changes could have taken place differently and that far wiser policies could have been applied. Policy makers would have had to separate intertwined effects, minimise the negative and maximise the positive. Instead, however, African governments concentrated on trying to catch up with the advanced countries – copying exogenous models and amassing private wealth – rather than concentrating on the careful observation and wise guidance of their people. The overseas development agencies failed to grasp the scale and rapid pace of the changes going on in the region, and did not adequately understand what could and could not be done. The authors of this study take not a stance of definitive opinion in regards to the past, but rather one of attempted comprehension.

From the authors’ standpoint, one of the positive aspects of African government policies has been their laissez-faire attitude. With few exceptions, these governments have not sought to prevent migration within the region. Despite the drawbacks, it has in a way been this mobility that has given breathing room to such a rapidly-growing population.

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**Urbanisation: The main element of the settlement pattern structuring process**

The most striking feature of the population movements around the region has been the rapid growth of the towns. This has also been the most influential factor in changing thought processes and behaviour.

West Africa is no longer an essentially rural region, and it will be still less so in the future. Moreover, contrary to one widespread view, urbanisation is not necessarily a harmful trend. While it does tend to destabilise, it also lends to restructuring as well as to movement towards a new equilibrium.

In West Africa, rapid urbanisation has so far taken place undramatically and in a balanced way. The big coastal towns and the capital cities have grown, but so have the smaller towns. Nigeria doubtless represents the likely pattern of urbanisation for its neighbours twenty or thirty years hence: a majority of town dwellers living in a tough world, having to mobilise all their energies to ensure their daily survival, but gradually becoming productive.

Despite this rapid urbanisation, the countryside has not emptied – on the contrary, its population increased by roughly 60 per cent between 1960 and 1990. On the other hand, the towns have helped to restructure rural settlement patterns by encouraging farmers to move closer to markets. In the years to come, urbanisation will continue to have a strong influence on the spatial distribution of the rural population.
Urban growth has slowed since the crisis. West Africans have adapted to the new, harsher circumstances. However, urban growth will start up again, though certainly less rapidly than the rate experienced between 1960 and 1990. This study gives a striking but convincing picture of urbanisation in the year 2020: some thirty cities with populations of a million or more, as opposed to six in 1990; several coastal towns merged into one high-density urban belt; sixty cities (compared to eleven in 1990) of over 500,000 people; about 300 towns of over 100,000 people; and a scattering of some 6,000 urban centres. In the year 2020, within the 500 kilometer stretch between Benin City in Nigeria and Accra, the capital city of Ghana, we are likely to count more than 25 million people, including 5 cities of more than 1 million inhabitants.

Changes on this scale will require huge investments in infrastructure and social services. An enormous effort will have to be made to settle the population and provide it with work. Singularly talented political and administrative leadership will be required, capable of managing imbalances, inequalities and lasting tensions, and able to rally the energies needed to provide urban infrastructures and education for the growing population.

Such changes – practically beyond the scope of our imagination – also necessitate skilful regional negotiations; and if the necessary talent does not come to the fore by inclination, then reason should summon it. This study’s description of the towns in the year 2020 leads to the hypothesis that the national urban networks, which were encouraged to become autonomous after national independence, will merge into sub-regional networks, each centred on a sub-regional metropolis with influence beyond its own borders. This tendency is in line with the movements and behaviour of the population, for whom national borders might just as well not exist.

**Urbanisation and economic growth**

The expansion of the towns and the futuristic urban picture sketched in this study have aroused considerable debate among the experts associated with the study team. While there is general agreement as to the contribution that urbanisation has made to economic growth over the past thirty years, there are unresolved questions regarding the particular characteristics of this growth. The experts agree that existing urban models should change if they are to become more effective.

**Accumulation of urban capital**

The experts agree that, having started with a much weaker urban capital base than other countries around the world, West Africa has made great efforts over the past thirty years. Accumulated urban capital has been estimated at about US$ 300 billion, consisting of public infrastructures, roads, markets and housing. The urban dwellers of West Africa have worked hard to finance the private building stock accumulated since independence – worth an estimated US$ 200 billion, or two-thirds of total urban capital. They have done so largely by
their own means. National accounting statistics greatly underestimate these investments. These figures are worth comparing with the net official aid received by West Africa between 1960 and 1990: US$ 50 billion in real terms.

In view of the prospects for urban growth, these indigenous investments must continue and increase. But in fact, these have slowed down since the crisis, as have foreign official aid investments in the urban sector. Transfers of the resources needed to finance investments with long-term payoffs have declined sharply. If the shortfall in local infrastructure continues, living conditions in urban West Africa will suffer a lasting setback; this in turn will damage the capacity of the trade, industry and service sectors to gradually bring greater solvency to the towns, as well as the capacity of agriculture to grow more prosperous thanks to urban markets.

**Job creation in the towns**

For thirty years, with an unceasing influx of rural residents seeking work and a better life, West African towns have adapted to demand as best they could. Modern foreign firms with stringent requirements for skills, productivity and market outlets and concerned with amortising their investments in a high-risk situation were not able to absorb more than a small portion of migrants. It was in response to the need for large numbers of jobs of different kinds that the informal sector spread like wildfire.

The informal sector was well suited to absorbing an abundant supply of labour with few skills and little education. It obliged its workers to attain a sufficient level of productivity to cover their cash income needs – which were higher in town than they had been in the countryside – but this did not prove to be excessively demanding. The informal sector enabled people to meet their essential needs with the use of simple technologies. In short, its vocation was, and still is, to absorb and employ as many urban newcomers as possible, rather than increase productivity in the sense of output of goods and services per labour unit.

Despite the low productivity of the informal sector, urban productivity has been rising, thanks to increased population and trade densities. The urban environment accounts for an increasing proportion of economic activity and gross regional product – a proportion that increased from 38 per cent in 1960 to 66 per cent in 1990 and would have increased even more had the crisis not greatly affected progress in the West African economy. The urban economy already makes a significant contribution to changes going on in the region.

However, this contribution will have to increase if the towns are to become a driving force for development. And it is on this point that the experts disagree:

▲ Some consider that the present model of the urban economy, which is inegalitarian and excessively rent-focused, could well impede the progress of the towns, encouraging the State – which is very sensitive to the power and pressures of urban dwellers – to seek revenue wherever it can: foreign aid, foreign trade, rural areas, land, even by way of illegal drug trafficking. This hypothesis renders a pessimistic view of West Africa’s future development.

▲ Others consider it unlikely that the towns will grow without increases in production. In their
view, there are encouraging signs suggesting that urban society may, of itself, engender new dynamic processes. These signs are of various kinds but can be united under the heading of “competition”, a new concept for Africa.

At present, these promising signs are as follows:

▲ Civil society is differentiating itself and is organising itself to confront the political power structure. Whereas Africa’s essentially rural societies were hitherto hierarchical but egalitarian, as the struggle between divergent interests grows more fierce and as the need to survive in an ever more crowded world becomes more demanding, political competition becomes an element for change.

▲ Traditional trade with the outside world is now running out of steam, and Africa is forced to take into account global competition. The recent devaluation of the CFA franc indicates that priority is being given – more consistently than to political considerations – to the competitiveness of African exports, to increases in local agricultural and industrial production, to regional trade, and to less expensive social services. Other measures will follow, reviving the economy. These measures may give national products a better chance in regional trade and world markets.

▲ A class of African entrepreneurs is beginning to emerge. It is made up of people whose attitudes – shaped by their education, knowledge and contacts with the outside world – are closer to those of business people in the developed countries. The competitive spirit is one aspect of this.

Despite these changes, growth in the urban economy will, of course, be difficult and slow. The WALTPS team does not believe there will be strong growth in modern manufacturing, trade and services: the financial, legal, economic and political conditions will not favour this and competition with other parts of the world will be too fierce for foreign investment to start flooding into West Africa. The informal sector will remain the main employer: in the year 2020, the majority of town dwellers will still be earning meagre incomes from these low-productivity jobs. However, the informal sector could gradually subdivide with the emergence of small and medium intermediate enterprises run by city-born business people possessing a certain urban culture. In high-density regions, considerable markets will be open to these enterprises. They will doubtless become more attentive to winning these markets than they are at present.

As has already been shown, these changes will not come easily. Fierce competition in economies characterised by shortages can lead to severe social inequalities, that is to say to a combination of progress, harsh social relations and acute tensions. Westerners, imbued as they are with the social sensibilities of the 20th century, find such models unpalatable. Nonetheless, for the optimists amongst the study’s authors, this is for West Africa the urban development model most likely to impose itself over the coming decades.

Farmers in search of markets

Food crop production has responded quite well to the food needs of a rapidly growing and increasingly urbanised population. The authors of this study, combining various methods to compensate for the unreliable nature of the statistics, have estimated that food production
increased by 2 per cent a year between 1960 and 1990. This was not enough of an increase to fully meet demand; the balance has come from commercial imports and abundant food aid (indeed, too abundant). However, food production is lagging only three years behind population growth, while food imports, as expressed in calories, have slightly more than doubled since 1960, from 6 per cent to 14 per cent – still a fairly modest level compared to other parts of the world.

Urban market demand has played a significant role in stimulating food production, as can be seen from the maps showing the spatial distribution of the farming population. Farmers have moved closer to the towns to earn higher and more reliable incomes. Besides moving to new areas, they have begun to increase their productivity and yields and improve production techniques and structures. Admittedly, intensification is so far occurring only locally, and cautiously; it is still rare for all the right conditions to come together for both sustainable agriculture and intensification. The regional market still plays only a minor part in food trade. However, trends in food crop production in Nigeria may be an example of what could happen in other parts of West Africa. The States of the Nigerian Federation now import scarcely any food, meeting an increasing proportion of their requirements from their own output. Population density, highways linking market towns (financed in the days of high oil prices), and an endemic shortage of hard currency since the downturn in the energy market, have all been favourable for domestic food crop production, favourable to a lesser extent for intra-regional food imports and unfavourable for food imports from the world market.

Although food production had a decent record in West Africa, for the last ten years export cropping has proved a disappointment. It is the mediocre performance of export cropping that explains the overall lack of progress in agriculture. World price trends, the inadequacies of government policies and rent-seeking levies have had a major impact on farmer behaviour and on the weakness of African competitiveness. Since export crops will remain a significant source of hard currency in the future, the failings of earlier policies ought to be corrected.

The authors of this study are united in considering that, despite the many, complex problems that have to be resolved, despite the very severe ecological dangers in some regions (especially in the Sahelian zone and along the increasingly densely populated coastal strip), prospects for the development of food cropping in West Africa are not unpromising. Several factors could contribute to turbulent but positive progress:

▲ Farmers will continue to shift towards the most useful farmland, as they have in Nigeria. Over the next thirty years, usable farmland will become virtually saturated throughout the region, forcing farmers to move on from their present extensive farming systems to intensive farming with increased yields.

▲ Farmers will continue to move closer to urban markets. To meet the growing demand of these markets, capitalist farm enterprises will gradually emerge. Where they emerge will be essentially dictated by land availability. A modern form of farming will probably develop, geared to commercial production for the domestic and regional markets.

These developments will take place more easily if governments resist the pressing call of the world
market and if the mobility of the farming population can be maintained. These are conditions which run directly counter to certain conceptions of development concerning Africa. They are also contrary to certain Western interests. Furthermore, the vision this study gives of future patterns in food production, like its vision of the urban economy, is not at all egalitarian: population pressure, the quality of available physical resources and the location of commercial outlets will dictate intensification potential, which will thus vary widely from one area to another; there will be many farmers, including some of the better-off, who will find it hard to make a place for themselves in the changing pattern of agriculture. In the view of the authors of this study, this will be the price of progress in an economy with rapid population growth. It will mean permanent and sometimes acute social tensions. But is the most important aspiration not that there be progress?

A region of settlement transition and of prolonged imbalance

Following the brief introduction to WALTPS above, some remarks and questions are in order.

West Africa, as a region in rapid population settlement transition, will be imbalanced for the foreseeable future. Even if attempts are made to reduce fertility rates, this can only have an effect on population growth in the medium and long-term. The region’s population is virtually certain to double in the next thirty years. Indeed, of all that we know about the region’s future, it is this of which we are the most certain.

If this is recognised and accepted as an imminent reality, then the crucial question is, what steps should be taken to house, feed and employ this new population in acceptable conditions? Two measures appear to be essential: decentralise the State, and organise civil society. Decentralisation will enable individual towns and villages to implement land use planning policies that will have been agreed upon via consultation. The existence of a properly organised civil society will make it possible to discuss the present and the future, to handle predictable conflicts with negotiation, and to plan local financing of the public facilities needed for the new population.

West Africa, as a region in rapid population settlement transition and prolonged imbalance, will be subject to great political, economic, social and environmental tension. Changes will be abrupt, unstable, and varied. How can positive changes best be fostered, and risk and regression reduced? One major source of tension will likely be migration from poor areas to those with more resources and to towns. The WALTPS estimate is migration of some twenty million people. That figure was eight million between 1960 and 1990. What can be done so that migration within and between countries does not become a source of conflict? How large might migration to the outside world become if development does not provide enough employment for a growing population? In this area, as in others, a more aware, better organised civil society can help to manage the trade-offs and negotiations needed to protect migrants from arbitrary treatment and insecurity.

West Africa, as a region in rapid population settlement transition, will need to manage a permanent scarcity of financial, technical, and
human resources. In the next thirty years, the gap will continue to be wide between the supply of and the demand for these resources. There will be strong temptation to adopt illegal solutions.

State resources will remain modest compared with their needs, regardless of the amount by which they attempt to increase taxation. Rural land capital and urban wealth will increase only slowly. States will need to supplement direct and indirect taxes with levies on commercial transactions. However, they will have to avoid their past excesses in this area, or competitiveness in exports and production for domestic and regional markets will be compromised.

How can the resources be found to finance the public facilities for which there is an enormous necessity? Would not one way be, apart from public and private investment, to use new forms of labour-investment to meet the demand for education, public health care and infrastructure maintenance? Should not innovative experiments be tried in mass education, using modern technology now available? In regardsd to the great problem of educating the young, there has been up to now a distressing lack of thought and action.

It is hard to predict what will happen to official development assistance. Past trends show that it is cyclical: abundant in boom years, limited during crises, and greatly eroded by indebtedness. Indebtedness to multilateral bodies is likely to cause some States serious problems in the future. WALTPS suggests that official development assistance should be predictable, grant-based, and targeted to supplement low domestic savings. It argues that official assistance should be extensively devoted to population related investments: economic and urban infrastructure, local facilities, and land-use planning. The authors believe that local people have so far proved their ingenuity, mobility and ability to adjust, and that they will therefore be able to use this new infrastructure to work, produce, and trade. Since aid is at present divided between macro-economic recovery and a plethora of objectives of varying usefulness, and since the proportion devoted to long-term investment has dwindled, the WALTPS proposals would require hard choices and changes that are worth close consideration. Does aid not have too many objectives and functions? Should it not be more focused?

Changes in private external resources are not clear. West Africa could make better use than at present of its basic commodities, but, despite cyclical surges, the long-term trend is not hopeful, except for energy products. Non-traditional exports to world markets will increase only moderately. Loans and foreign direct investment may increase, but there is fierce competition from successful regions in Latin America and Asia. West Africa is likely to suffer from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange, which may not be entirely a bad thing, since it may encourage African enterprise and the expansion of the regional market. How can this enterprise and this expansion be promoted?

The authors of WALTPS are well aware that this is not a good time for discussion of the long-term. The recession in the developed countries is not yet over; adjustment to new circumstances will take a long time. Uncertainty is in the air. Africa has a poor image in the media. However, the specialists who worked on WALTPS are convinced that a clearer vision of the future could give justification and purpose to short-term action. To abandon a continent in population settlement
transition when it is showing signs of dynamism despite its precarious situation would be a serious error, and would involve shutting one’s eyes to the consequences of such a trend.

Finally, a few suggestions for Africans and those countries that want to help Africa. These suggestions are intended to prepare for the future, to inform choice, in the hope that, after due consideration, decisions will not be delayed for too long.

Working Suggestions Based on WALTPS

Negotiation and conflict resolution

It is hoped that WALTPS has provided enough evidence that, of West Africa’s particular features, two will have a determining influence on the future: it will long remain a region in population settlement transition, and will consequently remain a region of imbalance. Over the next thirty years, as during the last, population mobility and changing settlement patterns will be among the essential conditions for progress in development.

Rapid settlement transition, lasting imbalance and massive migration will expose West Africa to the permanent danger of disorder and conflict. Predictable migration into towns and into areas that are resource-rich is likely to exacerbate national and regional tensions, particularly at the social and ethnic levels. These threats are a great danger for countries with weak institutions and where civil society is too poorly organised to attenuate conflicts.

Africans are aware of these problems. They have begun to discuss measures that could be taken to settle conflicts. They are considering the creation of an African intervention force.

The discussion and action needed for West Africa’s long-term development can hardly be dissociated from a discussion of the negotiation and resolution of national and regional conflicts. How can the connection be made? Would not a first step be to examine the WALTPS conclusions at the highest political level in Africa so that policy makers are aware of the opportunities and risks in the future and of the steps that need to be taken to maximise the former and minimise the latter?

Deciding on investment priorities

The study indicates that West Africa’s need for public investment as a result of population growth and settlement will be immense, and that local and foreign resources for this purpose will be insufficient. So, inevitably, choices will have to be made. And they will be cruel choices. They will resemble war-time economics (managing shortages) more than peace-time economics (managing abundance).

Most of the public sector’s economic and social investment requirement will have to be met by Africans themselves. The governments’ tax-raising capacity will not be sufficient. The country studies on long-term development prospects should provide an opportunity to debate ways and means of mobilising civil society to complement government efforts. Sectors with especially urgent needs are mass education (literacy), basic public health and hygiene, natural resource preservation and infrastructure maintenance. Foreign aid can only very partially cover needs in these areas.
In the view of the authors, foreign aid must be guided in the future by a view of West Africa as a region undergoing rapid population growth and resettlement. Aid’s driving force must be the encouragement of greater fluidity in economic relations within the region. This means communications infrastructure investment to facilitate trade as well as population mobility; it means local-purpose investment in the towns – in short, investments with long-term payoffs which local savings cannot cover. As these are long-term, costly investments, the overseas development agencies should seek agreement amongst themselves on investment priorities, on a schedule for implementation, and on criteria for concerted action.

Supporting change in agriculture

Agriculture will continue to play an essential role in West African societies. It will continue for very many years to be one of the region’s main earners of hard currency. West Africa enjoys some considerable advantages in tropical crop production. Agriculture will be the principal means by which regional trade will increase. By the year 2020, it is estimated that roughly half the food imports into West African countries should be from neighbouring countries. Lastly, the capacity of the rural areas to regulate their output of migrants to match the economic health of the towns should be an essential element for the region’s social and political stability.

For agriculture to fulfill these crucial functions, farmers must shift from practices that lead to the depletion of natural resources – which result in progressive saturation and exhaustion of farmland – to practices that assure the renewal of soil fertility. This implies a more intensive form of agriculture, using both more labour and more inputs per hectare.

The capacity for a given area to make this shift to intensive farming depends very much on the quality of its natural resources, the degree to which they are being used and local market incentives (i.e. the existence of remunerative markets). We know in advance that not all areas will be able to intensify at the same time: some areas where opportunities are few or non-existent will find it hard to make up for what they take out of the natural environment. The volume and buoyancy of urban demand will be very important in determining farmers’ investment capacities. However, there is a whole series of measures that could be taken to maximise the number of rural people taking part in this shift to intensification. Particularly:

▲ Local communities should organise themselves around the management of important changes in their production systems: appropriate legal frameworks, especially with regard to land tenure; decentralised agriculture credit structures; concerted land use planning;

▲ Farmers’ should be able to organise themselves and play a part in defining farm policy on a par with traders, processors and consumers of farm products;

▲ The visibility and predictability of agricultural product markets should be increased and the macro-economic policy environment for production should be of favorable nature. In particular, it should curb pressure to import subsidised and low quality products.
Encouraging regional co-operation

This study shows that the decline of traditional exports, combined with the difficulty of breaking into world markets with new export products, the low level of private investment and the inadequacy of official aid, will lead to endemic shortages of hard currency. These shortages will have an unfortunate impact on infrastructure but could have beneficial effects, by slowing down imports.

The shortage of hard currency could also give the regional market a better chance to expand.

African thought processes are ill prepared for giving the regional market free play. Governments, more than people, regard regional competition as a bad thing, just as, until recently, they saw competition within domestic markets as dangerous.

Nor are the development agencies much in favour of regional co-operation, despite what they say. They are not as hostile as one might think to the balkanisation of the region. Some prefer the \textit{de facto} split between English and French-speaking countries, as reflected in transport networks and in the organisation of the markets, to a closer relationship. Regional infrastructure is not developing as fast as the need for it and the existence of different currency zones complicates regional commercial transactions.

West Africans ought themselves to take the initiative of launching a well-informed debate on the advantages and drawbacks of the present situation and on the prospects for regional markets. The aid agencies should support a serious African debate of this kind, based on careful observation of the facts and involving both entrepreneurs and civil servants.

Fostering the development of civil society

The Club du Sahel and the CINERGIE unit took the initiative of setting up a private enterprise network in West Africa because they believed the gradual formation of a network of modernising African businesses to be one of the main ways of increasing urban income and, indirectly, rural income. They also believed that better organisation among entrepreneurs can also influence the attitude and behaviour of the State towards business and help entrepreneurs to take control of their own future development.

Encouraging the success of African entrepreneurs requires, among other things:

- the organisation of enterprise networks, nationally and regionally. Not only could these improve the general business environment, but they could also encourage a better sharing than in the past of technical, management, and commercial experience. Exporters could collectively learn from obstacles and opportunities on world markets. They could take advantage of joint-venture opportunities to sell on regional markets;

- the organisation of financial networks nationally and regionally, to share experiences in such areas as securities markets, venture capital companies, local business banks, etc.

Many other associations could be created by African civil society: national and regional farmer
associations, educational, religious and arts associations, charities and self-help groups to help meet the needs of the community (health care, hygiene, urban clean-ups, etc.)...

Political associations with a grass-roots base also have an increasingly important role to play in gathering information, discussing and encouraging discussion, training officials, and in providing early warning to politicians before conflicts arise.

Civil society in West Africa is already facing challenges, and will face more in the future. It will have to cope with and make up for the State’s shortcomings. Progress so far, improvements yet to be made and possible forms of support could be widely discussed in light of the WALTPS conclusions.

Observation and analysis of the facts
Throughout the duration of the study, the experts tried to gather and analyse as much as possible facts and observations on long-term trends in West Africa. In this way, despite the shortage of available statistics, they have constructed an original database containing demographic, geographical and economic data.

The study shows that the great region-wide transformations that will result from population growth and settlement, urbanisation, new economic trends, relations between town and country and interactions between output and markets will have both positive and negative effects on development. It will be necessary to support the positive trends and minimise the negative.

Since knowledge is a precondition for clear-sighted decisionmaking, we hope the African governments and foreign aid agencies will set about acquiring more reliable means of observing, understanding and anticipating not only these changes, but – as well – the needs of a region undergoing rapid population growth. The WALTPS study provides a foundation upon which this work may be initiated.
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A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

Area Covered by the West Africa Long-Term Perspective Study: The Countries of the Sahel and the Coast of the Gulf of Guinea
CHAPTER 1

West Africa undergoing long-term change

Since independence, West Africa has experienced two different kinds of pressure: exceptional population growth and brutal exposure to world markets (§ 1.1).

It is highly likely that these trends, which have already deeply affected the region, will continue to exert an influence upon the region over the next thirty years, causing further change. Discussion of the long-term future is therefore necessary (§ 1.2).

Despite the magnitude of the challenges that need to be addressed, and thanks to the adaptability of the popular economy, West African societies have managed to provide the necessary goods and services for their peoples, albeit at the expense of more conventional economic growth (§ 1.3).

The most visible manifestation of the capacity of West Africans to adapt to change has been massive migration: southward, towards the coast, and especially towards towns (§ 1.4).

A network of 3,000 towns and cities (§ 1.5) has taken in 66 million new inhabitants and provided them with income and housing (§ 1.6).

Farming has gradually become market oriented (§ 1.7). With only a slight time-lag, it has succeeded in meeting the increasing demand for food. The market for food crops is becoming increasingly important for the rural economy (§ 1.8).

Indeed, much has been learned over the last thirty years. The elites of recently independent States are having to defend their mediocre record at a time when new interest groups are competing for power (§ 1.9).

More generally, systems based on sharing out rents reached an apex and have since fallen, while economic and social competition has emerged as a major influence (§ 1.10).
1.1 Two initial shocks: rapid population growth and brutal exposure to world markets

Since 1960, West Africa has been doubly jolted: internally, its population has grown at a rate rare in human history, and, externally, it has been exposed to a rapidly changing world economy. These simultaneous shocks have forced the region to change substantially and to rely primarily on its own strengths.

Until the late 19th century, the population of sub-Saharan Africa – and West Africa in particular – remained stable, while that of most other continents was expanding. A significant population increase did not occur until the early 20th century. The current population explosion only really took off after World War II, accompanied by improved health care and hygiene (graph 1). Since then, the region’s population growth rates are observed to be close to 3% (2.7% on average between 1960-90). The West African population has grown at a sustained level, rising from 40 million in 1930 to 85 million in 1960 and to 215 million today.

Such growth rates, which have led to a doubling of the population every 25 or 30 years (graph 2), have caused a jolt that few areas in the world have had to contend with. This shock is all the more dramatic because it is accompanied by a profound change in the conditions for economic development.

Sudden exposure to the world economy

West Africa’s exceptional population growth was accompanied by another major change: exposure to the world economy. This began after World War II, and became particularly significant following independence.

The pre-colonial and colonial periods did little to prepare the region for economic competition.
Weak economic development was mainly the result of exploitation of the region’s natural comparative advantage: raw materials or tropical agricultural commodities.

After independence, the new West African states were plunged into the world markets and into a level of economic competition for which they were poorly prepared.

To meet the needs of a growing population, to build modern Nations and to satisfy the new ruling classes who were aspiring to quickly catch up with developed countries, the demands were great. Faced with such demands, West Africa continued to base its economic growth on those natural assets that could be readily exploited: extensive agriculture which was expanding at the expense of natural resources and, in some cases, mineral commodities. Added to this were international transfers, which for some countries became the most important source of revenue.

Under such a variety of social pressures, few investments were made in order to diversify the revenue services of the national economies. Over the last thirty years, these economies have remained heavily dependent on commodity prices and international transfers.

Two shocks that have forced societies to change

These two shocks led to dramatic changes, inducing a rapid and irrevocable breakdown of most of the ancient balances within West African societies. Most of the efforts agreed upon locally over the past 30 years have been in direct or indirect response to these changes.

On the following pages, an attempt is made to gain a better understanding and a sense of the consequences of these efforts, as well as to reflect on the direction of change in the future.
1.2 Major changes will continue with vigor over the next thirty years

The changes that began before independence are far from over. The region’s population will continue to grow and West Africa will find itself increasingly more integrated into world markets. Further imbalances and greater change can already be predicted. For this reason, a discussion of the long-term future is necessary: to outline the main directions of eventual change, as well as to contribute to the debate on development strategies.

Population growth over the next thirty-year period has been charted on the age pyramid shown here (graph 3). With an average fertility rate exceeding six children per woman, every mother of today has, on average, more than three daughters (table 1). They, in turn will be mothers in 2020. Even if there were a sharp fall in fertility rates, a rapid rise in the population could not be prevented because, at least at the start, it would be counterbalanced by a rise in the number of mothers.

In 2020, West Africa will likely have a population of at least 430 million. This forecast, directly a result of the WALTPS study, lies at the lower end of standard projections used by mainstream development organizations. The highest forecast estimates a regional population of some 470 million inhabitants. In either case, West Africa’s total population will have increased tenfold in less than 100 years.

However, the fact that the population will double within a generation should not disguise the absolute necessity of attaining a rapid fall in fertility. In the very long-term (over 50 years), the demographic images diverge considerably. They may make all the difference between a difficult challenge (low hypothesis: a rapid population rise in the short-term but a rapid fall in fertility) and a challenge that would likely prove insurmountable (high hypothesis: a progressive slowing down of fertility).
Although AIDS will not restrict the region’s population growth, there is a risk that by disproportionately affecting young workers it will increase the dependency ratio (number of non-workers for every worker) and make it harder for the working population to cope with society’s needs. On this basis, urgent action obviously needs to be taken.

Enormous investments are required to meet the needs of the region’s growing population

West Africa will need, even more than in the past, to mobilize all its domestic strength and major sources of capital in order to house 430 million people, to create gainful employment for the adult population and to educate more than 200 million children. Although the challenge of meeting these considerable needs is largely predictable, as they are dictated by population trends, the prospects for revenue remain uncertain.

### Fertility rates in West African countries: the origin of rapid population growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fertility Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>7,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>6,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>6,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>4,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>7,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>6,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.R.</td>
<td>6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A changing economic environment

The economies of West Africa were built on agricultural and mineral commodity exports. This system continued to function well up until the end of the 1970s – and even beyond – although commodity markets had entered a new phase. While technological progress in the North made it possible to use fewer raw materials and more substitutes in industrial production, the supply of raw materials from the South continued to increase. An increase which was further compounded by Asian producers entering the market.

From 1970 to 1990, the share of primary products in export earnings fell from 53% to 20% in the developing countries of South and Southeast Asia, from 90% to 68% in those of Latin America, but only from 93% to 89% in sub-Saharan Africa.

Poor prospects for rapid diversification

During the 1970s, the system of industrial subcontracting by locating manufacturing activities in developing countries with abundant cheap labor provided a development model for a number of countries in Asia and South America. Most of these countries have consequently enjoyed remarkable growth rates and improved living standards.

Delocalization continues and tends to occur in free-trade zones. However, the trend is changing and now favors advanced countries (both industrialized or newly industrializing) with a dynamic domestic market and a supply of qualified labor, rather than poor countries with cheap labor. It will therefore be difficult for new poor countries, especially in Africa, to attract international subcontracting opportunities.

While Africa is losing export market share for traditional products and is having great difficulty diversifying its exports, it remains open to imports. With the economic recession, the nature of these imports has changed in an alarming way.

Lower purchasing power has coincided with the arrival on world markets of massive surpluses of subsidized farm products, and all sorts of second-rate or used goods which head for a new life in Africa, virtually destroying any chance for local production.

Further change is inevitable

Up until now, West African economies have been pressed to deal with their population increases and the required restructuring of settlements. These economies have not chosen to or been able to diversify a dwindling economic base so as to secure the financing necessary for their own development. Meanwhile, they remain highly dependent on world markets for a number of their own basic needs and consequently face growing gaps in their balances of trade.

In the past, international transfers (which are stop-gap measures and look uncertain for the future) have filled these gaps. They will increasingly need to be filled by the expansion of the regional economy.

West Africa will have to continue to change rapidly and significantly to adapt both to its population growth and to the growing constraints in the international economic environment.

The region, in fact, is in the middle of a long-term process of change, during the course of which it is undergoing its own specific economic, cultural, social and political modernization. For the hurried
observer, the evolution may seem a long one, and during moments of crises such as the one West Africa is experiencing today, one may wonder if this process of change is on the right path.

In its attempt to determine the future direction of these long-term changes, the WALTPS team has chosen to examine the processes underlying the changes over the past thirty years in West Africa; this is covered in the first section. In the second section the study attempts to project a few likely evolutions on the basis of trends and mechanisms identified in the previous section. A number of issues arise from this study and are presented in the third section of this report. These issues should provide the background for a lively debate not only in West Africa but also in partner countries.

1.3 Economies in which meeting-basic-needs continues to play a dominant role

West African economies remain in the earliest stages in the division of labor that other countries in the world have already experienced. Alongside a modern sector, now in deep recession, much of the economy is still informal and is oriented towards meeting people’s basic needs (food, housing, clothing, transport). A simple world, but one that – paradoxically – statisticians find difficult to comprehend.

West African economies are still at an elementary stage in their development. The region’s infrastructure and technology, as well as its training of civil servants and managers, for the most part date back only to the second World War and remain incomplete.

In 1960, the region was characterized by a large agricultural sector still living in semi-autarchy, a small urban fringe (13% of the population was urban in 1960), the majority of which was made up of managers and employees (wage-earners and civil servants) from the modern sector and a minority from the informal sector.

Over the last thirty years, the modern, informal and agriculture sectors have remained the key elements of the West African social structure.

Efforts by national decision makers and their partners were focused on developing the modern sector, which was considered to be the appropriate means for development. However, over the past thirty years, this sector has stagnated and employs today only 10-15% of the population. Conversely, the principal change occurring in West African societies is the dramatic movement of the agricultural sector’s population to the informal sector, mainly in urban areas, as can be seen clearly in Graph 4. These two sectors make up what we shall refer to later as the “popular economy” and what was referred to by Fernand Braudel as the “domestic” economy.

This popular economy, in contrasts to the modern sector, is a rustic economy geared towards meeting the basic needs of the population. Paradoxically, because of its simplicity, this economy cannot be measured with the instruments specifically designed to deal with the realities of the more formal “modern” sector.

Since the modern sector represents less than 15% of the population, the WALTPS team deemed it
A vision of West Africa in the year 2020: Preparing for the future

The three West African societal sectors
Graph 4
While attention was fixed on the modern and agricultural sectors, the main transformation over these last thirty years has been the rapid development of the informal sector, essentially in the cities. This sector is expected to account for the majority of economic activity in 2020.

necessary to construct an alternative reading of the regional economy based on the analysis of individual behavior. This “demo-economic” reading allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of the popular economy (see Box 1).

A two-tier economy

This demo-economic analysis in fact reveals a two-tier economy:

❚ The “modern” economy grew rapidly until around 1980 and then shrunk at an even faster rate until 1990. Average productivity fell by more than 10% in ten years, while employment remained virtually static for that period. The modern sector – the part of the West African economies most directly linked to the world economy – enjoyed rapid economic growth between 1960 and 1975, a time when the economic climate was favorable. The modern sector was lavished with public spending and was consequently the motor for urbanization. Reciprocally, this sector’s health was heavily dependent on that of the international economic environment.

❚ The popular economy is more deeply rooted in the local environment. This economy was better able to resist the recession and adapted to changing circumstances mainly by regulating the migratory flux between towns and country-side. This economy is an economy of survival dominated by a social function: it primarily seeks to reduce risks and satisfy individual basic needs. Such an economy aids African societies to resist the multiple shocks to which they are exposed. Nonetheless, this economy is not particularly promising in terms of rapid economic growth.

The strong dichotomy between these two economies underlines the extreme weakness of the regional trade economy, which should lie between the two. We shall see later on just how important the development of such an intermediate economy is for the future.
Contrasting assessments of West African economic performance

Analysts are often pessimistic about Africa’s outlook. This can be blamed partly on the fact that their instruments (and in most cases their paradigms) are not designed to, and therefore cannot, measure the great changes currently underway in West African societies.

Urban construction, for example, is mainly informal and poorly measured. Judging from national accounts alone, it would be hard to understand how the 66 million new town-dwellers who have appeared since 1960 actually live! A conservative reevaluation of accumulated housing capital was undertaken, based on the average lodging cost of different social groups and on the actual numbers making up these groups.

This reevaluation doubles the accumulated housing capital. Since investment in housing has been a major component of private investment, this reevaluation means that the “real” investment rate needs to be revised to some 20 – 30% of gross regional product (GRP), a significant amount. Similarly, an analysis of the size and pattern of food expenditures in household budgets (usually 40 – 60% of total expenditure) suggests that the food market is quite different from the one reflected in agricultural statistics.

More generally (and depending on the point of view), two markedly different readings can be made of West Africa’s performance over the last thirty years.

According to macro-economic aggregates, the region’s performance was average during the last thirty years. Taking the aggregates for the decade 1980-1990 only, the region’s performance was very poor, mainly because of the worsening...
international economic environment and the recession in the modern sector. Even if its figures differ, the demo-economic analysis does not contradict the overall results of this analysis.

On the other hand, if the demographic variable is taken into account, it is evident that despite this mediocre economic performance, the region was able to cope with massive growth in its population. This happened without disasters or increased poverty. This in itself is a remarkable achievement. Admittedly, the average per capita value added remained largely static over the whole period and even fell in the last decade, particularly in towns. Yet, urban growth has been productive in the sense that it has involved considerable accumulation of assets, mainly private ones, and has permitted the beginning of the large-scale division of labor. This is the principal outward sign of a subsistence economy becoming a market economy.

1.4 The response of people to changes in their environment has given rise to significant mobility within West Africa

Mobility has played a critical role in the adaptation of West African communities to their changing environment. Stimulated primarily by rapid changes in economic geography, this mobility falls into three categories: from North to South in almost every country, from the interior to the coast, and, most importantly, from rural to urban areas.

At the beginning of the twentieth century in West Africa, colonial rule curtailed large population movements in the region. For this reason, West Africa’s geographic population settlement in 1960 was roughly similar to that of the large settlement areas particular to the region throughout its history. These areas corresponded to those most favorably suited to subsistence cereal farming and to the trans-Saharan trade routes, the region’s main source of wealth in the past. As a result, the Sudanese and Sahelian zones were relatively densely populated. Other settlement zones were developed along the coasts as trade (in gold, slaves and – later – tropical products) got under way.

On the eve of independence, the characteristics of West African settlements corresponded only partially to the overseas-trade catchment areas with which West Africa was to be linked. Certain countries with high potential (such as Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon) were sparsely populated, while some of the least favored zones were densely populated, particularly those in the Sahelian zones.

Independence and the influence of market economies brought about a drastic change in the economic landscape. Rapid development of the export market led to a rapid increase in export earnings and growth in export-producing areas. Above all, the wealth generated by these changes resulted in taxable income for the young States. This income was redistributed mainly to create new administrative networks in the region as well as to develop the industrial sector in the cities. These changes in economic geography set in motion a massive shift in the West African population:

1. from North to South in most countries;
from the interior of the region to the coastal areas;
from the countryside to the towns, often in association with the first two trends.

Sociopolitical factors compounded these basic mechanisms, increasing the attraction of certain countries as migration destinations (there has been an active policy to attract migrant labor to Côte d'Ivoire) and reducing that of others (bankruptcy in Ghana during the 1970’s, repression in Sekou Touré’s Guinea).

In all, the study has identified four large zones in which the settlement patterns have evolved in a fairly homogeneous way over the last thirty years (map 2 and table 2):

Zone 1 comprises the main centers of urban growth in the coastal countries and their immediate hinterland.

Characteristically, the population density in this zone is high (124 inhabitants per sq. km, on average), with 41% of the West African population occupying 8% of the area. The zone’s urban/rural ratio is also high (55% in 1990). This zone has grown the fastest in the last thirty years, with net immigration of 8.3 million, an annual rate of 0.4% (and 0.6% if we discount Nigeria).

Zone 2 comprises the remaining areas near the coast. With 28% of the regional population living on 25% of the area, not only is this zone relatively underpopulated (given its potential), but it is also under-urbanized. In the last thirty years it has been an emigration zone, but one that could become an immigration zone in the future.

Zone 3 corresponds roughly to the dense settlement clusters in the Sahel and includes the most dynamic parts of the Sahelian countries.

With 25% of the region’s population living on 13% of the area, it is more urbanized than zone 2.

Urban and rural population growth in West Africa
Graph 5
Marked differences between countries.
Because this zone faces serious constraints, it also experiences net emigration (-0.3%).

Zone 4 covers the rest of the Sahel. It has the lowest demographic and economic potential and one of the largest rates of emigration (-0.7%).

This four-zone division of West Africa highlights the great attraction of the coastal areas which draw people both from the less dynamic areas of the coastal countries (zone 2) and from the Sahel (zones 3 and 4). Most of the migrants to the coast are concentrated in zone one.

### Distribution of the urban population by zones

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportion of total area (%)</th>
<th>Proportion of total population (%)</th>
<th>Growth rate of total population (%/p.a.)</th>
<th>Share of urban population (%)</th>
<th>Growth rate of urban population (%/p.a.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1960/90</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zone 1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zone 2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zone 3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zone 4</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 Towns have absorbed two-thirds of population growth and will continue to expand

The most striking development of the last thirty years has been the rapid expansion of West African towns: the proportion of town-dwellers rose from only 13% in 1960 to 40% in 1990. Apart from the dramatic growth of a few major cities such as Lagos, urban expansion has been relatively balanced. It has slowed down in the last ten years, but it seems plausible that by 2020 the urbanization ratio will be close to 60%.

Between 1960 and 1990, the number of town-dwellers rose from 12 to 78 million as towns absorbed the equivalent of nearly two-thirds of total population growth.

Urbanization appeared to be driven by both pull and push factors:

Urbanization has been a feature of rich economies such as Nigeria, whose oil boom saw its urbanization level increase from 15% to 49%. Agricultural success in Côte d’Ivoire also resulted in a rapid rise in the urban ratio from 17% to 47%.

Urbanization has equally developed in those countries that have experienced serious ecological crises such as Mauritania (the level rose from 9% to 42%), or those that have fallen prey to serious political problems (Chad’s level rose from 6% to 24%).

Often, both factors affect one country. In Mali, all medium-sized towns have expanded rapidly. But whereas the growth of Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu can be attributed to the two droughts that drove rural populations off their lands, Kita, Koutiala and other cotton-basin towns have clearly grown as a result of cotton earnings and the economic benefits that they engendered.

Emergence of a relatively balanced urban network

It would be wrong to consider urban growth as merely restricted to the expansion of a few major cities. While the urban population increased by a factor of 6.5, the number of cities with populations greater than 100,000 rose from 12 to 90, and the number of towns with over 5,000 inhabitants rose from 600 to 3,000 (map 3). The regional rank/size distribution of towns is relatively normal, whereas the distribution within each country suggests greater importance of each capital city compared to secondary towns. The urban network is beginning to take shape even though large towns (those with more than 500,000 inhabitants) remain dispersed – often at great distance (around 1000 km) – throughout the region.

More than 60% of the population to be town-dwellers in 2020?

Even if recession has resulted in some localized de-urbanization, it is most likely that the urban-rural ratio will continue to increase in the long

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1 The definition of a town varies greatly from one country to another. The WALTPS team opted for any settlement with a population of over 5,000. If the threshold had been set at 20,000, a common practice, the proportion of town-dwellers would have been smaller, but the rate of increase higher.
run. The rate of this growth rather than the growth itself is what remains unknown.

The pace of urbanization will slow down for structural reasons as the size of the rural population reservoir decreases (see Box 2). This decrease will be influenced by the economic health of urban areas. The WALTPS low hypothesis suggests that 53% of the population will be town-dwellers in 2020. If the urban economy recovers (the WALTPS chosen hypothesis), this figure will be about 63% (graph 6).

A network of cities with a population of over one million spread evenly across West Africa

Hypotheses on future urban growth are, obviously, not without consequences for the final structure of the urban network. However, even if the relative importance of major cities and secondary towns may vary slightly, the structure of the urban network will largely reflect the political and economic inheritance of the last thirty years.

The major cities will expand “individually” at their own pace and as a function of their ability to assert themselves regionally and internationally. Because urban growth will slow down, there will be few changes in the rank order. However, following their relative stagnation of recent decades, Accra and Conakry may well expand at an above-average rate; conversely, Dakar and some Nigerian cities are likely to fall in the rank order. Of the 30 largest cities in 1990, most will become cities of over one million. Although the rank/size distribution is fairly flat at the top because of the 19 capital cities in the region, it is likely that Nigeria (as the main polarizing influence in the region) and Lagos (as the heart of the regional urban complex) will continue to have a strong impact on the region. Greater Lagos will probably ultimately have 12 to 15 million inhabitants.

The cities with over 100,000 inhabitants (280, compared with 90 in 1990) should develop into a regular grid across West Africa. This configuration is already mainly in place, and is unlikely to be upset. There are few areas with no towns at all that are susceptible to rapid expansion, except in areas where mineral deposits are being discovered, such as oil in southern Chad and gold in western Mali. Generally speaking, decentralization should increase the role of secondary towns and at the same time accentuate disparities between them as their respective central governments redistribute fewer and fewer resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural slowdown in urbanization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Box 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The peak of urbanization in West Africa is now past. Over the last thirty years, some countries achieved an average annual urban growth rate of more than 8%, but this is unlikely to be repeated. Indeed, urban growth was due to a strong rural to urban migration. Urban growth will no longer be sustained at such an exceptional pace because the proportion of people living in rural areas has considerably diminished.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1960, 13% of the region’s population lived in towns. Under these conditions, if 1% (the average between 1960-1990) of the rural population migrates to the towns, these towns will grow at nearly 10% per year, and rural migrants will make up two-thirds of this new urban population.

However, in a situation like we have today, the urban population is 40% of the total population, and so the same rural emigration rate produces urban growth which is no more than 4.5% per year. In this case, rural migrants make up only one-third of the new urban population.
An ancient urban network: Yoruba cities in Nigeria

Box 3

Although the majority of West African towns are new, an old urban tradition exists in some areas, particularly in Nigeria. The dense urban network of the Yoruba land reflects the strong and ancient organization of this society. As Camille Camara* puts it, “it is indeed in the western state (of Nigeria) where we find the densest urban network in tropical Africa. Traveling a few dozen kilometers in any direction reveals this fact. From south to north, there is first Lagos, the federal capital, the great port on the Bight of Benin (...). At a distance of some 65 km from there is Shagamu; 65 km further on is Ibadan, (...) straight ahead is Oyo and then Ogbomosho (...).

Ogbomosho lies some 50 km from Oyo, which lies at about the same distance from Ibadan. Travelling from west to east, you come across Ile-Ife and Abeokuta, roughly 60 km apart, the same as between Abeokuta and Ibadan, from which Iwo is 40 km, and Ilé 80 km. Then 55 km driving brings you to Ondo, then to Akure and to Owo, each separated by a distance of 55 km or so. In general the towns are 45-90 km apart, most often 45-50 km. This short distance between towns is quite exceptional for tropical Africa.”

Network of cities with more than 50 000 inhabitants in West Africa: Evolution 1960-1990 and projection for 2020
Map 3

Populations in towns
- From 50 000 to 100 000
- From 100 000 to 200 000
- From 200 000 to 500 000
- From 500 000 to 1 million
- From 1 million to 2 million
- From 2 million to 5 million
- From 5 million to 10 million
- More than 10 million

1960: 600 towns, 17 with more than 100 000 inhabitants

1990: 2 500 towns, 90 with more than 100 000 inhabitants

2020: 6 000 towns of which 300 have more than 100 000 inhabitants
The development of small towns will be affected by their relationship with the major cities and, even more importantly, by the population and economic dynamics of neighboring rural areas. Despite their rapid growth in the past, towns in disadvantaged areas are likely to reach a growth ceiling in the future.

Future growth in the urban population (a threefold increase over the next thirty years) will induce, as in the past, considerable demand for public and private investment.

1.6 The economy has adapted to cope with urban growth

The urban economy’s main function has been to respond to the enormous pressure from immigrants: rather than seeking to increase productivity, town-dwellers have shared employment. Likewise, they have spent large sums of money on housing. This accumulation of urban assets represents considerable investment that is several times greater than international transfers.

Although towns experienced dramatic increases in their populations (multiplied by a factor of 6.5 in thirty years), per capita income in the informal sector remained remarkably stable during that period. This paradox is only too apparent.

The informal sector is largely made up of recent immigrants who have maintained strong links with their home communities. Consequently, these immigrants are under great pressure to welcome other people who wish to leave their village. Because of this, any economic growth in towns does not increase per capita income, but rather attracts new people from rural areas, keeping the basic income in the urban informal sector close to the minimum needed for survival.

Because they are determined by basic needs which hardly vary over time, incomes from the informal sector have remained relatively stable. This sector is not regulated by incomes but by changes in the patterns of migration. It is this mechanism that explains the direct correlation between economic growth and urbanization.

The economic boom years of 1960-70 saw a high rate of urbanization, with towns growing at a rate of over 7% a year; on the other hand, the recession of the last ten years has been translated into a sharp slowdown, with the urban growth rate declining to close to the natural rate of increase (+4.5% per year).

Since GDP per capita is relatively stable in each sector, growth is due to the changes in the relative size of the different sectors: in a growth phase, the agricultural sector (which has the lowest incomes) declines in importance while other sectors expand. This is growth by distribution.

The priority is job creation

Although the number of jobs in towns did increase to absorb immigrants, this usually meant a fragmentation of work rather than a division of labor that would encourage complementarity and economic efficiency. The great number of activities in trade and minor services in West African economies provide evidence of this phenomenon. Conversely, except for activities which enjoy natural protection (because the products are perishable – vegetables, poultry, pigs,
bread – or bulky – beer), there has been little development of light manufacturing and processing activities.

**Inadequate management**

More often than not, urbanization (a phenomenon closely associated with the growth of the informal sector) has been badly managed by politicians, who have either ignored or condemned it. Consequently, town planners have taken little account of the specific needs of low-income town-dwellers. Within West African cities, separate worlds co-exist: the formal, planned city, taking up 20% to 40% of the area but housing only 15 to 20% of its population; at the other extreme, temporary and precarious housing, in which lives 15 to 20% of the population; and in between, the majority of town-dwellers live in districts that are mostly informal but better laid out with some urban facilities.

**Considerable private investment**

The rapid expansion of towns has led to a large accumulation of urban real estate assets: public infrastructure (roads, drainage, public services) and, above all, investment in private housing.

The urban assets accumulated in West Africa over the last thirty years barely appear in national accounts. The analytical tools developed by the WALTPS yielded a net estimate of $300 billion (of which two-thirds is investment in private housing and some 20% in non-regulated construction). This amount of financing greatly exceeds the total financial transfers the region received during the last three decades. It is more than two times the present total Gross Regional Product.

Put another way, the urban assets accumulated since 1960 amount to $4,000 per town-dweller.

**1.7 Agriculture has gradually become market-oriented**

Farming has become part of the market economy, thanks to the rapid development of export crops and to the demand of the growing urban food market. Food-crop farming is given a boost when urban demand reaches a sufficient size as is currently the case in Nigeria, some parts of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The rapid modernization of the farming industry, however, concerns only a small proportion of farmers.

In 1960, West Africa’s population was mostly rural (87% of the population) and mainly oriented towards subsistence farming. Between 1960 and 1990, many farmers became connected to the market economy.

Market orientation in agricultural production has been most visible in export crops. West African societies have shown genuine interest in developing this source of wealth. Export production often resulted in well-organized subsectors in which the State intervened directly. For the State as well as the actively participating population, export productions represented a source of revenue which proved to be quite substantial. The development of the export-crop
market often enabled equipment, inputs and technical innovation to be introduced into the rural areas which produced these crops.

The development of the food market also linked farmers to the market economy, although this happened more discreetly (graph 7). Given the importance of home-consumption, this market has long remained a residual one. With 20% of the population living in towns (often the case in the 1960s, and still the case in some Sahelian countries), there is only one potential customer for every four farmers. In addition, not all farmers have access to food markets. Those with the best connections to towns were the first to seize the commercial opportunities. This has created increasing disparity among rural areas. The food policies of States in the region gave priority to cheap food for the towns, which hardly encouraged the development of a domestic food market.

Despite these handicaps, income from the regional food market has always been the largest component of the average agricultural income. As a result of the rapid growth in volume and prices of export crops, the food-crop share of agricultural GDP fell to 56% in 1970. Because of the regular increase in marketed output as a result of this increased demand, the domestic market accounted for 73% of agriculture’s share of GDP in 1990.

Urban markets influence rural settlement patterns and agricultural production

Market opportunities for farm products have had a great impact on rural settlement patterns. The WALTPS has produced a map indicating the influence of markets on rural areas (Box 4 and map 4).

This analysis shows that with the exception of a few agricultural zones where the soil and climate are less suited to farming, rural population density has increased along the same lines as urban markets have developed. The heterogeneity of rural population settlements has increased over the past thirty years as a result of rapid demographic growth in economically promising areas and demographic stagnation (due to massive emigration) in other areas (cf. 1.4).

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**Graph 7**

Market production has risen regularly since 1960, first as export of crops increased and then more so in the form of food crops. The latter consistently represented a larger share of marketed crops during the period 1960-1990 and is likely to contribute increasingly to agricultural income in the future.
The nearer a farmer lives to a town, the greater his or her incentive to produce food (access to information and low transport costs). But at the same time, because of a much higher population density near towns, the constraints to farming are greater. The question that is then posed is, which of these two contradictory forces will eventually prevail? This study indicates that the attraction of the market outweighs the production constraints: the productivity per unit area and per farmer of those farms near urban centers is higher than in those areas further away.

In fact, agriculture in West Africa is still in a transition phase. Some farms are now well integrated into the market and operate as businesses, while for many other farmers, farming remains, first and foremost, a way of life (indeed survival).

Even if markets were to expand considerably, this duality is likely to remain a feature of West African agriculture.

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**Measuring the relationship between rural areas and markets**

Box 4

To measure the intensity of interactions between town and country, we have built an indicator reflecting the intensity of the signal sent out by towns to their hinterlands. This detailed “market attractiveness” indicator takes the following into account:

- the size of the different markets and distances from these markets;
- the uneven cost of carrying goods over a given distance (due to infrastructure, topography, hydrography, etc.);
- conditions affecting the supply of farm surpluses (agro-climatic characteristics, rural population density, etc.);
- competition among the different markets for these surpluses;
- possible “shut-off” effects that restrict “market attractiveness” to a certain level, above which imports become more competitive.

The three maps reproduced here show the value of this indicator in 1960 and 1990. Population projections and an additional set of hypotheses were used to draw the map for 2020 (Ninnin, 1994). The black areas are strongly linked to the market, the grey areas are moderately connected, the white areas only very weakly.

The links between spatial variations in market tensions and in other variables for which spatialized data were available, were then studied. It was then possible to show that:

- rural population density correlates highly with market attractiveness: the more an area is “exposed” to the market, the greater its population density. At the West Africa level, this relationship provides a far better explanation for the sharp variations in rural population density than do agro-ecological criteria, which have a strong impact only where population density is high;
- output per hectare and per rural inhabitant also proves to correlate strongly with market attractiveness. This helps explain some of the major differences in productivity between different areas with the same agro-ecological conditions;
- maps of market attractiveness also provide a visual representation of market catchment areas – all the areas belonging to the same market. The maps here show that, up to now, the main markets have remained separate. They only become strongly connected around the year 2020, by which time half the region’s trade in food and farm products will originate in the region.
1.8 Town and country: real complementarities that should be strengthened

Urban demand plays an influential role in determining the geography of agricultural supply. This supply has been able to meet demand with a time-lag which, after peaking at five years, now stands at three years and apparently is falling. At a time of rapid population growth, urbanization both reduces the pressure on farmland and produces a solvent demand for the farmers who remain. This is the case as long as markets function properly and complementary trade between town and country can develop.

Although the region was not very dependent on trade with the outside world in the 1960s, food imports boomed between 1970 and 1980 before slowing sharply in the last decade due to the recession and structural adjustment. Admittedly, the level of imports is high compared to the available foreign exchange, but this level is by no means “excessive”, except in the case of a few countries, both Sahelian and coastal (see graph 10). Imports measured in calories rose from 6% to 14% of total consumption between 1961 and 1990, peaking around 20% in the early 1980s.

Population growth does not necessarily lead to food dependency

The caloric deficit can in fact be explained by a time-lag between regional food supply and demand, which is growing at nearly 3% per year. The reasons for this time-lag are different urban feeding habits, rapid urban growth and the harshness of external competition.

In 1980, at the height of the food crisis, regional food supply lagged five years behind regional demand: the amount produced in 1980 was equal to the amount consumed in 1975. Rapid urbanization and the ease of importing largely explains this lag in production. But, it is interesting to note that by 1993 the gap between supply and demand was reduced to three years, with regional food production in 1993 equal to the regional consumption requirements of 1990 (graph 8).

This is, therefore, a process of “catching up” that indicates that West African farmers are capable of increasing production faster than the rate of population growth, provided that climatic, institutional and economic conditions are suitable.

Côte d’Ivoire is a remarkable example: farmers there can now meet domestic caloric demand with a small surplus, even though over the last thirty years the total population has more than tripled and the urban population has increased by a factor of ten.

Market development: a condition for intensive farming

Analysis of the period 1960-90 indicates that, in West Africa as elsewhere, urbanization, which is the most basic form of large-scale division of labor between producers and consumers, is a necessary condition for income growth in rural areas and for intensive farming.

However, this condition is not sufficient in itself unless the following requirements are satisfied:
Town-dwellers are not eating more imported food

Box 5

Food Consumption patterns vary according to the place of residence. Urbanization obviously has an effect on food dependency. In West Africa, wheat and rice make up 13% of basic rural food consumption (cereals and starches) and 50% of urban food consumption (FAO). But contrary to popular belief, people are not eating more imported food. If urban and rural households are analyzed separately, per capita food imports in 1990 were comparable to 1960 figures for both groups.

Senegal, quite fairly cited as having developed a taste for imported food, imported 370 calories per person per day in 1960-65. A quarter of a century later, in 1985-89, the figure was 390, although the urban ratio had risen in the meantime, from 29% to 39%. Even if Senegal’s food dependency is excessive, it has not been made significantly worse by urbanization.

A desire for a more varied diet, which regional farming could satisfy

The study on food consumption in Abidjan over a 25 year period (Resquier-Desjardins, 1989) reveals a relative increase in the quantity of roots and starches, a reduction in cereals, particularly bread (!), and only a slight increase in rice. The only sign of a taste for imported food is a large increase in the consumption of meat (latest data from 1985), most of which is imported.

Rising living standards usually translate into a desire for a more diversified diet rather than a diet with a higher import content (J. Egg, J. Coste, 1991), as seen in the trend in cassava consumption in Sahelian countries. This behavior can easily be reversed during recessions, as shown by the return to root staples in Nigeria (A.S. Afouda, B.G. Soulé, 1992) and Cameroon (F. Roubaud, 1994).

Urban demand is sufficiently strong;

• links between market-towns and production areas function properly;

• the macro-economic environment and trade policies are favorable.

In recent years, rural households have been increasingly diversifying their activities away from farming. For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the non-farm share of rural household income is estimated to be along the order of 25-30%. In a sample of Sahelian countries in West Africa, the figure is about 40% of total income (Reardon 1992).

Therefore, although farming is generally the main activity, rural households are increasingly open to other sources of income.

In this context in which activities and investments are constantly changing, farming can only progress significantly if it is competitive vis-à-vis other economic activities. This is particularly true for the adoption of technical innovations, which often require additional investment of labor or capital. If these innovations are cost-effective, they are quickly adopted and sometimes financed by non-farm income, as has been observed in the Kano area (Mortimore 1994). The increase in land disputes near towns is clear evidence that private interests are being mobilized where commercial farming is possible.
Evolution of regional production average and imports and total availability

Graph 8
The gap between supply and demand is subsiding after peaking in 1981.

Supply of urban goods and services: the weak link in rural-urban relations

Box 6
Rural products are sold in towns in exchange for urban goods and services. The export of these from urban to rural areas is similar in volume to total exports of these countries to the rest of the world. But trade flows between town and country are generally unbalanced against the rural areas which receive less than they supply.

For example, towns in Ghana “import” goods and services from rural areas that equal 15% of GDP, while the rural areas import only the equivalent of 11% of GDP from towns. A certain degree of imbalance is inevitable and to be expected in the trade and financial relations between town and country for those countries undergoing urbanization. The cities in several countries such as Guinea, Ghana and Cameroon do not always supply their hinterland with accessible and appropriate goods and services or attractive opportunities for investment in urban land and construction.

If (rural) farm supply is to adjust to (urban) demand, it is essential that the quality and availability of urban goods and services for rural areas be adequate. If non-farm goods and services become unavailable or harder to obtain (because of rationing, disorganized markets, deteriorating infrastructure etc.), then one can expect marketed farm supply to adjust downwards. The current recession hitting private and public urban productive sectors is likely to exacerbate farmers’ tendency to seek refuge in self-sufficiency.
1.9 From the birth of the State to the rise of pluralism

The State has changed a great deal over the last thirty years. Directly descended from the colonial system, the State, after independence, had a monopoly over economic and political life and made serious mistakes in trying to enforce this dual contract in the interests of its societies. Today the State is, without a doubt, at a turning point in its history; the financial recession has limited its means and ambitions, new actors are emerging and decentralization is the order of the day.

At the start of the colonial period, African countries, unlike the Asian ones, had not acquired much experience in the management of people and space. Nor were Africans accustomed to thinking in terms of national communities. The colonial period brought about an important change by establishing national areas and introducing purposeful management.

The colonial powers made great use of traditional authorities: in the French colonies, the traditional chiefs became auxiliaries of the government, while in the British colonies, indirect rule allowed them more autonomy. Yet everywhere, the traditional authorities were gradually left out of the management of the new countries. The carving up of the colonial territories was not consistent with ethnic considerations but rather with the defense of the strategic and commercial interests of the colonial rulers. The colonial powers produced the multi-ethnic territories that would become Nation-States. This creation marginalized the traditional authorities, unable to rule in these multi-ethnic territories, while the colonial powers neglected to train alternative national elites.

Therefore, the demand for independence did not come from the traditional chiefs but from the class of colonial auxiliaries and urban workers. Even if the latter two groups were opposed to colonial power, they were in fact closer to the colonial mentality and the States that they created. These interest-groups were eventually to demand power and then assume it upon independence.

The double contract of independence was restricted to a small segment of the population

For two or three years, independence gave the illusion of bringing about radical change. The State was perceived as the ideal entrepreneur, bringing general progress and social justice. But as early as 1962 or 1963, the illusion had dissipated. The

Young graduates: the active unemployed!

Box 7

Over the years, surveys have shown an increasing number of young graduates who declare themselves to be unemployed, while these same surveys show that more than half of them actually work. It is symptomatic that those working claim that they are unemployed. This would seem to suggest an intense frustration and dissatisfaction on their behalf; even after several years of informal work, these young graduates continue to consider employment in the modern sector as the only real kind of work. The period of unemployment can be long; possibly surpassing two years as is the case in Benin for example.

personalization of power was affirmed in virtually every country by coups d’état, the introduction of one-party rule, or simply the monopoly of power by autocrats.

At Independence, the new African elite proposed to its citizens a double contract: a social contract for rapid material development and a national contract declaring the Nation-State as the new dominant form of collective solidarity.

Even in the early years, the social contract was seen for what it was: a pact that concerned only the “modern sector”, that is to say mainly urban dwellers (wage-earners, educated elite etc.). Peasants were considered to be a homogeneous, unenlightened mass, the essence of the Nation that needed guidance by the elite, most of whose income they provided. The urban informal sector, still rudimentary in the small towns during the years of independence (only 13% of the population lived in towns at that time), was seen as a transitional phenomenon. It was generally considered that the small craftsman, bearing the stigma of underdevelopment, would automatically disappear following industrial development. This “modern” bias in West Africa was a striking feature of what followed during the next thirty years.

The recession of the 1980s exposed the shallow roots of the State.

As long as resources were abundant, this system enjoyed a certain consensus. The State taxed producers who still made enough profits to keep them producing and everyone got something from the system. But, as public finances gradually dried up due to a fall in the world price of raw materials and the exhaustion of their capacity to borrow, the State was less able to display largesse and the consensus was shaken.

The number of geographic areas in which the State no longer exercised a strong presence began to multiply. This situation arose because of the State’s increasing inability to meet its administrative responsibilities and the process began very early in physically distant or informal parts of the economy. Gradually, governments became totally cut off from society and only governed the modern sector.

The collapse of external resources in the 1980s accelerated the shrinking of the State’s clientele.
to the point of endangering its base of support: the modern sector. Salaries were not paid for months, staff were put on short-term contracts or made redundant, enterprises were privatized, the stricter provisions of labor law were abolished and graduates were no longer guaranteed a job. All this only served to increase the number of dissatisfied people and the result was to encourage the change over of political power among parties. The opposition parties that gained power have not been able to effect a necessary break with the past. Up until now, they have not been able to establish a social nor a national contract. On the contrary, they came to power denouncing the former government’s inability to respect the contract founded at the time of independence. Gradually the new leaders are being caught in a trap of their own making: even if they want to open up the dialogue with the people, they are subject to the same forces that led to the demise of their predecessors and which actually put them into power – the discontented segments of modern society, beginning with the student population.

Can the crisis of the post-colonial State give rise to a new African political system?

Two factors suggest that current changes will ultimately go beyond mere changeovers in political power and go so far as to modify the very rationale of the system: competition is developing amongst the elites and civil society is beginning to play a greater role.

Today the administrative elites, born in the wake of independence, are challenged by new competitors: the traditional middle classes (particularly the traders of colonial times), organized groups in the private sector (such as the small Baol-Baol traders in Dakar) and religious movements such as the Islamic brotherhood... These historic elites had been obscured by the all-encompassing power of the State; today, they are making a comeback due to liberalization, which is giving them a new economic base and new functions. The competition between various elites could be fierce and the outcome will be crucial in determining the direction societies take. In effect, it will not be simply a transfer of power within an established system. Behind the competition for power, important choices regarding the kind of society that is desired are having to be made, and this at a time when governments are having to redefine their role.

As the population expands, as economic and social affairs gradually become more complex, and as the grip of the State on these changes weakens, so private initiatives have become more structured, cohesive and widespread. Although States have not yet recognized this by changing their institutions, private initiative is now a major element of West African political life. Decentralization, the development of farmer’s unions, and the organization of the private sector (and even the informal sector) are growing realities that States are having to acknowledge in redefining and justifying their role.

In any event, whether the State reforms itself, is replaced by other forms of governance, or even becomes more radical, the age of the post-colonial State does seem to be coming to a close before our eyes. A new, specifically African type of political system is about to see the light of day.
1.10 The emergence of competition

The past thirty years have witnessed the rise and fall of regimes that have been based on State intervention in the management of the economic and social environment. These regimes came to power thanks to favorable economic conditions and the weak structure of national societies. Economic globalization, the doubling of the population and economic and social development, have rendered these regimes obsolete. Competition has become an integral part of most sectors of society — something that society was hardly prepared for. Yet, if competition is accepted as a major engine of change, it could play a central role in West Africa’s future.

In 1960, the countries of West Africa had virtually no industrial fabric, no entrepreneurs, no politicians, no local managers. They were inspired by the hope, shared by many international observers, that they could quickly catch up with the developed countries, a hope that was supported by the rapid growth of the 1950s. Inspired by the pattern set by the developed countries, they adopted active strategies to speed up the modernization of their societies. These strategies were based on segmenting society into social sectors or groups, each one distinct yet complementing the others.

Economies were organized around public distribution

The economy was divided into sectors, the roles of which were supposed to be coordinated: the modern sector, which was comprised mostly of monopolies, had the task of modernizing the country and supplying the domestic market; the agricultural and mineral export sectors were to exploit their natural comparative advantage and provide the economy with foreign exchange that was mostly absorbed by the modern sector. The rest of the agricultural sector was meant to ensure national self-sufficiency. Finally, the informal sector was supposed to do the rest: that is to say, very little in theory (as the State was charged to do everything) but much in practice.

The snags in this set-up were numerous. The modern sector never managed to function in an autonomous way; it always relied upon the foreign-exchange earning sectors. The theoretical complementarity was not developed, economic activities continued to be led by the commodity export sector (complemented in certain cases by capital transfers), and competition, which was limited to the traditional sectors outside the State’s control, was rare and restricted.

This economic system was accompanied by a value system which was also compartmentalized: rural culture was revered, while a cosmopolitan, modern, urban model was held up to represent the future. Any other social pattern was seen as transitional and deliberately ignored. The result was a society built on two social classes, intended to be solid and indivisible: peasants and the modern elite.

Political rhetoric urged the pooling of efforts in all areas and condemned any expression of private interests as divisive. Competition was thus excluded from society. Economic and social competition was perceived as wasteful and
harmful. The economy was dependent on the State, based on exploiting natural advantages and dominated by monopolies (or oligopolies). It maintained, indeed even strengthened, its rent-seeking character already established during the previous colonial period. In politics, the one-party rule system existed alone. Democracy was presented as a waste of effort, a luxury that was incompatible with mobilizing the forces a country needs to develop.

Despite some success stories, this model has now reached its limits

It is all too easy today to call the integration model a failure because it is ill-suited to the current situation. However, it did coincide with growth in the regional economy for a number of decades. It contributed to modernizing society, improving health and education standards, transforming territories and integrating the 70 million new town-dwellers without major incident. Social integration had real success for two decades: it educated and integrated cohorts of young people from all backgrounds in a consistent framework with shared common values.

However, West African societies and their leaders did not see that internal and external circumstances were changing. The integration model gradually became obsolete as competition was excluded from it. West African societies and their leaders were forced into preparing for a different kind of reality. The international environment and domestic social change made competition an increasingly important influence on economic and social activities.

For some, West Africa is not competitive: it would be more accurate to say that, until recently, West Africa was not even in competition.

External competition for scarce resources has increased internal competition

In the 1970s, West African economies came under fierce attack for the first time. Asian countries began competing on the tropical commodity markets. Later, in the early 1980s, competition on domestic markets was exacerbated by external factors – the success of Asian countries, world surpluses – and internal ones – booming trade, divergent economic and monetary changes and massive smuggling.

Competition, encouraged by adjustment policies, gradually became more important for these economies. Public intervention declined and the modern sector shrank. Meanwhile, national and international competition overtook traditional sectors, especially the food sector. The informal sector, whose growth had been throttled by urban recession, faced more internal competition. Medium-sized enterprises are emerging from this competition in a number of different sectors such as health care, education, transport, construction and public works, and trade, but rarely as yet in manufacturing. The State, discredited by the collapse of parastatal companies and short of resources, is noticeably losing its control over society.

In the social domain, competition broke up the integrating and unifying characteristics of the earlier model. The urban melting-pot has not given
rise to a cosmopolitan consensus among ethnic groups, but rather has increased competition among them.

The emergence of competition has been a violent shock for West African economies and societies, not only because it was unpredicted, unwanted and uncontrolled by the government and economic agents, but because it occurred during particularly unfavorable circumstances: falling commodity prices and declining net transfers.

The State saw its control of society dwindle at a time when it was having to pursue dialogue with an increasing number of interest groups. Deeply destabilized, the State has hardly been able to manage this period of turbulence.

Competition brings about economic changes and social tensions

A general trend in West Africa points towards the diversification of economic activities and social patterns: the appearance of an intermediate sector and a private-sector middle class, the emergence of local communities, greater social inequalities, and a denser regional economy. This diversity will inevitably increase the economic opportunities as well as the number of individuals lined up to seize them. The process of change is thus only just beginning within the West African societies who are experiencing this competition, and as such must be considered as one of the major transformations that will influence this region’s future.

The current recession must not hide the fact that these societies are beginning to adapt to new challenges. This is noticeable in the economy: in the food sector, which has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, and in the private sector, which is slowly diversifying and becoming more professional. Rapid change has also occurred in political and social affairs since the beginning of the 1990s.

But this adaptation will only be successful if internal and external competition (including regional) are identified and accepted (possibly even organized) as driving forces for economic and social progress in West Africa. This will require a clear break with the old models, a break that leaders have not yet fully made.

The development of pluralism in radio broadcasting in Mali

Box 8

Mali is undoubtedly one of the most advanced African countries in matters of pluralism in radio broadcasting. In 1987, an Italian NGO managed to set up a non-profit rural radio station, Kayes Rural Radio, completely independent of the government’s activities. This was the first breach of the State radio monopoly in Mali, a de facto monopoly with no basis in law.

In September 1991, Radio Bamakan, a non-profit urban radio station with no broadcasting license, put out its first broadcasts from Bamako. In October 1991, Radio Liberté, the first commercial radio, also began broadcasting from Bamako. In December 1991, the Council of Ministers adopted the draft law on private FM sound radio broadcasting (...). In June 1992, the 1-kW transmitter of Radio Kayire, another non-profit station in Bamako, began broadcasting. Between mid-1992 and the first months of 1993, six new radio stations were set up in different parts of the country. Pluralistic broadcasting in Mali was under way...

CHAPTER 2

A frame of reference for the future

Two complementary approaches were adopted for WALTPS’ prospective analysis:

The objective of the first approach is to produce a vision of the future one generation hence. By definition, this vision distances itself from economic cycles – indeed this is one of its main advantages. The vision is expressed as a long-term image of the distribution of people and their activities. This image is an attempt to sketch an answer to the questions raised at the outset of the study: where and how will 430 million West Africans live in 2020? The image we sketch here is based upon (1) a series of “projections” which have been arrived at via the mechanisms identified in the 1960-1990 retrospective study, and (2) on various sets of somewhat freely-suggested hypotheses (§ 2.1).

The countries along the Gulf of Guinea, around Nigeria, will remain the economic heart of the region. Changes in this sub-region will mainly depend upon the speed of Nigeria’s recovery, which itself will be a function of its ability to settle internal political tensions (§ 2.2).

The Atlantic countries will have the choice between trading more with the outside world and greater involvement in the regional market which, in the short-term, will be more difficult (§ 2.3).

Finally, in order to secure a sustainable future, the large landlocked countries will have to rely on the export – almost exclusively intra-regional – of their labor and farm products (§ 2.4).

The second approach explores a number of medium-term images and examines the conditions and implications associated therein. By nature, this second approach takes into account – to a much greater degree – current constraints: it is intended to be realistic, even if some of the images sketched assume a number of deliberate policy decisions.

The current situation and trends (as opposed to the long-term image) suggest three possible scenarios for the ten years ahead: (1) the continuation of current trends, greater rent-seeking and, for most countries, lasting recession; (2) the development of economic poles, according to liberal conventional strategies for growth, and the simultaneous marginalization of poorer zones, which could have a destabilizing impact on the region; or 3) the strengthening of regional dynamics, which is the preferred scenario over the long-term, but is premised on a rupture with the past, which could thus eventually induce a certain degree of tension in the short-term (§ 2.5).
2.1 A long-term image

The long-term image proposed by the WALTPS team is based on the hypothesis of a medium-term revival of urban economies, and on a gradual assimilation of West African economies to the “normal” behavior observed in the rest of the world. Although regional trade is likely to expand rapidly, international trade will continue to dominate, and the need to import for domestic consumption will compete with investment. The image suggests that the recession may come to an end during the next ten years and that substantial growth may well be possible once again.

Based on the foreseeable changes in settlement patterns and in the economies of West Africa, and based on the responses to these changes highlighted in the retrospective study, the WALTPS team has outlined a vision of the region for the year 2020.

Major changes in West African societies between 1990 and 2020

- West Africa’s urban population will grow at an average annual rate of 4.2% between 1990 and 2020, compared with a rate of 6.3% between 1960 and 1990. This will result in a total urban population 3.5 times greater than at present as well as in an increase in the average level of urbanization from 40% to 63%. The total rural population will increase by 40%, at a rate of 1.0% a year. Migration within the region will remain strong.

- The number of wage-earners in the modern sector will increase at a slower rate than the urban population; the proportion of the population in the non-farming sector employed in the modern sector therefore will continue to decline, from one-third today to one-quarter in 2020.

- This implies growth of some 5% a year for the informal sector, which will thus absorb over 50% of the total population increase. The informal sector will become more differentiated: the first generation of micro-entrepreneurs from the countryside will be gradually replaced by a second generation of “intermediate developers” born in the towns (like most town-dwellers by then), with a minimum of capital and an “urban culture”. This “intermediate sector” will gradually become the source of home-grown development in manufacturing and services.

- Continued urban growth will stimulate growth in food-crop production, which will be increasingly oriented to the market and characterized by revenue increases that will be used for investment. This phenomenon, which will clearly affect areas with more than 50%, urban dwellers will concern only a limited number of farmers. Nonetheless, it is a trend that will be evident – to differing degrees – throughout much of the region.

- Social inequalities will increase. In rural areas, a small number of dynamic farmers will produce a great proportion of the surpluses for the regional market. These entrepreneurs will organize themselves to defend their economic interests and become increasingly involved in managing decentralized villages and small towns. Urban society’s present dichotomy – that is, its division into two significant sectors: the modern and the informal – will be washed away by the appearance of a class of entrepreneurs from the latter. A social
continuum with a wide range of diversified activities and incomes will emerge.

The main outline of the economic image

In light of past experiences, these hypotheses are indeed plausible, even if they are deliberately optimistic. They were used to produce a long-term projection (2020). Added to these were a set of complementary hypotheses on changes in international trade. WALTPS assumes growth of 3% a year for farm exports and 4% for oil and other energy exports. Other exports will increase in line with population growth in the urban-modern sector. It is assumed that by 2020 the region will have a “normal” trading behavior.

This economic projection of West Africa was built on the social accounting matrix for 1990, chosen as the base year (§1.4).

- Gross regional product (GRP) will quadruple, from $130 to $510 billion (average growth rate: 4.6%, one point higher than in 1960-90). Per capita GRP will be a little under $1,200 in 2020, an increase of 75% since 1990, or an average increase of 1.9% per year.

- The agricultural sector will produce 14% of GRP and will account for 40% of the total population. The agricultural value added will grow at an overall average rate of 3.2%: 3.1% for products for the domestic market, 2.6% for products exported to the world market and 8.2% for products for the regional market. The regional market will absorb 6% of total agricultural output. Average agricultural productivity per farmer will increase by 85% compared with 1990, and average marketed output will increase 2.4 times.

- Some 25 million farmers (15% of the total) will produce enough for 40% of the region’s consumers (100 million people). Their productivity will reach five times the self-sufficiency level, while the

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**Evolution of income in the various sectors of West African societies**

**Graph 9**

GDP per capita remains stable throughout the entire period in each sector, while the relative importance of each sector changes. Only when intersectorial population redistribution is complete can faster growth be expected in each sector. Note the pattern of urban GNP per capita, which reflects the increasing size of the informal sector in towns.
average productivity of the other 150 million farmers will differ little from the present regional average – which is at two times the self-sufficiency level.

The informal sector will evolve into an intermediate (between the informal and the modern) sector, and will absorb 60% of the total population increase. In 2020, it will employ 44% of the total population and produce 23% of GRP. Average productivity in this sector, part of which will become the intermediate sector, is $600, and the ratio of informal sector productivity to agricultural productivity will fall to 1.5, and be even less in the most urbanized countries, where the rate of migration to towns will decline sharply.

The non-farm modern sector will account for 15% of total population and, as in 1990, 63% of GRP.

Towns will produce 82% of GRP, compared with 66% in 1990. Per capita GRP will increase by 40% in both rural and urban areas, with the urban to rural ratio of productivity remaining virtually constant at 3.3. Urban per capita GRP in 2020 will be equal to that attained in 1980, the highest ever for the region.

Economic growth will be faster in Nigeria (per capita average 2.1%) than in the rest of the region (1.6%). This is due to its exceptional resource base and its economic structure.

According to this image, intra-regional and overseas trade will achieve a ratio of openness (imports plus exports over GRP) of 39%, close to the 1990 figure. But the region’s openness to the rest of the world will fall from 36% in 1990 to 30% in 2020. The difference is explained by intra-regional trade, which will make up 22% of these countries’ total imports, compared with 9% in 1990. The imported share of countries’ food demand will increase from 11% in 1990 to 15% in 2020, but intra-regional trade will account for nearly half of these imports, compared with only 14% in 1990. For this to happen, average growth in intra-regional food trade will need to be around 9% a year for thirty years. But even allowing for this possibility, intra-regional trade will still only provide 7% of the region’s food supply. Nigeria, which has an overall trade surplus with the rest of the region, will be a net food importer.

Medium-term image for 2005

In the second phase, an intermediate image for 2005 was sketched. This allowed two stages to be distinguished in the next thirty years: the end of the recession (1990-2005) and a sustained period of growth (from 2005 onwards).

According to this image, the average growth rate of GRP over the period 1990-2005 will be lower than for the rest of the period (on the order of 4.1% a year) but higher than that for the total population. Nigeria will achieve a GDP growth rate of 5.0% after the severe recession of 1980-90, while the rest of the region will grow at 3.8%. The continued, albeit slower, division of labor between urban and rural areas will contribute to the development of domestic and regional markets. Intra-regional trade will begin to take off, but at a modest level (only twice that of 1990).

The profound changes in settlement patterns and economies that began with independence will be at an advanced stage, the 1980-90 recession will
have been overcome, and faster growth will now
begin on a healthier footing. The long-range image
described above can be reached by 2020 if the
average regional growth rate is 5%. The regional
economy’s accelerated growth will still depend
to some extent on transfers and trade with the
rest of the world, but it will be increasingly aided
by greater intra-regional trade, which will grow
at 10% a year between 2005 and 2020.

2.2 The countries of the Gulf
of Guinea around Nigeria: the
heart of the regional
economy

The group of countries along the Gulf of
Guinea from Abidjan to Yaoundé constitute
a narrow strip of economic activity along
the coast which accounts for over 80% of
regional GRP. This strip is the essence of
the regional market and represents the
greatest potential for regional trade. At its
center lies Nigeria, which alone produces
50% of West African GRP and possesses
enough mineral wealth to ensure its long-
term prosperity. Nigeria is truly the heart of
the regional economy. Nonetheless, there
remain internal political tensions which
must be overcome.

Nigeria is indisputably a giant in West Africa, and
on a number of different scores. In 1990 it had
(1) half of West Africa’s population, massive oil
and natural gas reserves, (2) an urban population
that accounted for 49% of its total population
(above the regional average), (3) 80% of the
region’s university level graduates, and (4) a
dense, high-quality infrastructure. It is one of the
few African countries that “counts”, in its own
right, on the international scene. It is often
compared to South Africa in regard to its role as
a regional pole of development, and has been a
net contributor to the financial markets for more
than 20 years.

Like other West African countries, Nigeria has
developed grand industrial projects, a number of
which have failed. Because of its oil earnings, it
has probably spent more on such projects than
other countries have. The result is high-quality
infrastructure (a far denser road and highway
network than anywhere else in the region), but
few viable industries. Naudet (1993) quotes
sources claiming that the country’s industrial
capacity utilization rate is between 20% and 25%.

Despite the failure of modern industry, however,
small manufacturing industries are springing up,
especially in the densely populated areas of the
Igbo lands: spare parts, textiles, pharmaceuticals,
etc. This may be the start of the intermediate
sector, the “bottom-up” industrialization so
eagerly awaited throughout the region
(see Box p. 53).

In fact, Nigeria has almost everything it needs to
make it one of the first African countries to
achieve economic take-off on its own. The only
issue weighing heavily on the horizon is the
governance, or even governability, of the country.
This will certainly be the decisive issue for the
future of Nigeria and for the future of West Africa
as a whole.

The international community and Nigeria’s
neighbors can only stand back and attempt to
predict the country’s internal changes, for it would be difficult and risky to exercise any influence from the outside on the political changes that are currently underway.

Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon: dynamic economies whose development depends on trends in the Nigerian market

Three other West African countries with relatively large economies (where GDP is greater than 7% of the regional total) are also located on the Gulf of Guinea: Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. Together with Nigeria they account for 78% of GRP. They have few mineral resources and have based their economies primarily on agricultural commodity exports (although Cameroon has had a mixed agriculture-industry strategy). Though export earnings have been lower than Nigeria’s, less has been wasted on poor investment. As a consequence, the wealth generated has been enough to cope successfully with the internal tensions of societies in transition. When commodity prices fell – and with them the State’s ability to redistribute export earnings – inherent weaknesses in these societies became apparent, and regionalism and other tensions have grown rapidly.
The strategies these countries adopt will be influenced by trends in commodity prices and by opportunities to diversify their economies. Diversification will heavily depend upon what happens in Nigeria. Pending economic recovery after the current recession, the Federation will certainly become a major customer for these countries, given that its market is so large and so near. But if Nigeria enters a prolonged period of stagnation or deep recession, it will be harder for these countries to diversify. They will have no other option but to rely on the world market for trade.

### Economic data for the countries of the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990 DATA</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>URBAN RATIO</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILLIONS (% OF REGION)</td>
<td>(% OF REGION)</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COTE D'IVOIRE</strong></td>
<td>11.4 (6%)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GHANA</strong></td>
<td>14.5 (7 %)</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOGO</strong></td>
<td>3.5 (2 %)</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BENIN</strong></td>
<td>4.5 (2 %)</td>
<td>37 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NIGERIA</strong></td>
<td>9.5 (48 %)</td>
<td>49 %</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAMEROON</strong></td>
<td>11.5 (6 %)</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>138.9 (71 %)</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>81 %</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Benin and Togo eager for regional trade

Compared with their neighbors, Benin and Togo are small countries with small populations concentrated along the coast. They have played a number of roles in the course of their history, acting as: transport corridors for farm exports in colonial times (Igué, 1993); a free-trade zone (Togo); a or warehouse-state (Benin). The small size of these countries limits their perspectives for endogenous development (because their domestic markets are so small) and reduces major infrastructure and territorial management problems. Their most noteworthy characteristic, compared with large countries, is their flexibility and ability to adapt. The health of these small countries’ economies will depend on making the most of this flexibility as well as on their regional environment.

Should regional trade take off, Benin and Togo could act as intermediaries for the four larger countries in the Gulf of Guinea that will be trading the most. Otherwise they will be obliged to find other economic activities linked directly to the world market, an activity which will prove much harder for them.

2.3 The Atlantic countries: overseas trade or closer links to the region?

The countries along the Atlantic coast are quite autonomous relative to the regional market, and are much more oriented towards the world market – especially Europe. Over the last thirty years, these countries have stagnated economically, with the Senegalese economy losing steam and the Guinean economy plunging into a lasting crisis. There are real opportunities for economic recovery, even though the integration of this area into the regional economy is currently far from certain.
Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Cape Verde: the challenge of urban employment

The Sahelian countries on the Atlantic coast are small in terms of usable area (Mauritania is mostly desert). They are much more active in international trade than the rest of the region, especially with more distant countries. They receive on average more aid than any other group of countries (more even than the landlocked Sahelian countries, which are poorer), for a mediocre economic performance. Their agricultural potential is limited (small in Mauritania, Cape Verde and Gambia; moderate – but seriously degraded – in Senegal). They are slightly more urbanized than the regional average and should in theory become more so in the absence of rural employment opportunities.

Economic growth in these countries has occurred largely due to overseas links both during the colonial period, when Dakar was the capital of French West Africa, and since then, with extensive aid and high levels of international emigration. This sub-region has a mediocre farm potential and will probably never be able to support a large rural population. Even if towns become intrinsically less attractive, there is a strong possibility that migration from the countryside will continue as a result of the rural areas becoming increasingly more saturated.

The major difficulty, therefore, will be creating enough urban employment. The relative proximity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990 Data</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Urban Ratio</th>
<th>GDP (% of Region)</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita US$</th>
<th>AID Per Capita US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mauritania</strong></td>
<td>2.0 (1%)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senegal</strong></td>
<td>7.3 (4%)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gambia</strong></td>
<td>0.9 (0%)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cape-Verde</strong></td>
<td>0.3 (0%)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guinea Bissau</strong></td>
<td>1.0 (0%)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guinea</strong></td>
<td>5.3 (3%)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sierra Leone</strong></td>
<td>3.7 (2%)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia</strong></td>
<td>2.6 (1%)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>23.1 (12%)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

The coastal Sahelian countries import a relatively high proportion of their food

Graph 10
A model was constructed to correlate food imports with structural features (population, per capita GDP, urban ratio). The graph here shows the ratio of actual imports over the expected imports. All of the West African countries, except the coastal Sahelian countries, import relatively less than expected.

of the European market may be a springboard for countries that are situated far away from the heart of the West African market.

This subregion depends heavily on its ability to diversify its sources of income, on finding destinations for its migrants, and on international transfers. Its agriculture is poor, and it is even less able than other sub-regions to cope with long-term population growth. All of this make it probably one of the most fragile regions in West Africa, with little room to maneuver on the development path.

Box 11
Guinea’s “wasted years”

Guinea possesses one-third of the world’s known reserves of bauxite, as well as major deposits of gold, diamonds and off-shore oil, and considerable agricultural potential. However, developing this potential was long handicapped by the economic policies of the Sékou Touré years, 1958-84. Farmers in Guinea were faced with state-run production systems, fixed prices, a state monopoly in input supply and marketing, and an overvalued currency. They gradually lost all incentive to produce export crops, though originally these had been highly profitable. Banana exports fell from 100,000 tons to almost nothing, and coffee exports shrank by more than 80%. Pineapple production, 25,000 tons in the early 1960s, was cut in half by 1970, with similar trends for cocoa and groundnuts.

By the early 1970s, since diamond mining had stopped, Guinea’s foreign trade was totally dependent on exports of bauxite and alumina trihydrate. Given the high volatility of world bauxite prices, a latent foreign exchange crisis erupted. Despite reduced food imports, farmers marketed less of their output; the increased incentive to produce was more than outweighed by poor roads and a lack of goods to buy. Economic recession, combined with political repression, drove people out of the country in huge numbers. The last ten years have not been enough for Guinea to return to the path of development. And yet, in the days before independence, its future looked brighter than that of Côte d’Ivoire!
Forest countries of the Atlantic coast: serious uncertainties, despite real economic potential

These countries have had three decades of successive, serious political crises, from Sékou Touré’s dictatorship in Guinea to war in Liberia, not to mention countless coups d’état. These crises have been sufficiently destructive to impede economic growth and population movement (except, perhaps, in Sierra Leone). Despite the sub-region’s large mineral wealth and great agricultural potential, it has remained poor; its per capita GDP is higher only than the landlocked Sahelian countries and its urban growth has been slow, with an urbanization rate below 30% in each country.

Because of their abundant natural resources, these countries have real potential. However, poor governance, which can only be improved at a gradual pace, might prevent them from making proper use of these resources in the foreseeable future.

Over the long-term, these countries may develop in any number of ways. They may gradually link up, via Côte d’Ivoire, with the heart of the regional economy. Alternatively, they may join the coastal Sahelian countries and turn increasingly to overseas trade. Or they may turn in on themselves and perpetuate the succession of past crises.

The role of Guinea will probably be decisive, but it is still too soon to judge what shape its recovery will take.

2.4 The large landlocked countries: limited room to maneuver and an unavoidable regional future

The large landlocked countries of the Sahel suffer from a number of handicaps: in addition to being landlocked, they are vast and sparsely populated territories, suffering from major environmental problems. These countries should deliberately encourage migration and continue to play their traditional role of exporting labor to the rest of West Africa. They should also support the agricultural and the food sectors in which they have certain comparative advantages.

The large landlocked countries are located for the most part within the Sahel region. These countries are characterized by a highly variable climate to which they are all the more sensitive since their populations remain essentially rural. The urbanization ratio for this sub-region is only 22%. These are the most deprived countries in the region. They have a per capita GDP of half the regional average.

These countries have a long history of massive emigration. Their future will continue to depend upon the capacity of coastal and other more distant countries to absorb these migrants. In addition, they are obliged to seek a balance between two changing parameters which are beyond their control:

- On the one hand, there are climatic and...
environmental changes which determine the ability of these largely subsistence farming communities to feed and employ their population.

On the other hand, there is a fluctuating demand for migrant labor in the coastal countries which, if it is sufficiently large, will drain off the surplus population and generate sizable remittances to be transferred to the poorest areas.

Development could be relatively balanced if both parameters (agriculture and migration) evolve positively. Conversely, if both decline, then it is more than likely that these Sahelian countries will fall into a recession.

Between these exogenously determined parameters, the room for maneuver for these Sahelian societies is slight: it will depend upon the urban economies and the buoyancy of the cotton-growing areas, which are the only ones safe from drought. In any case, farming will continue to play a crucial role in these countries in terms of production and as a means of temporarily retaining the population surplus.

These landlocked countries suffer from one more handicap: their size. Except for Burkina Faso, they are large (in terms of area) and heterogeneous. This makes it difficult to equip them with infrastructure and to govern them. A delicate balance must be struck between the provinces of the south and those of the north. The southern provinces, rich thanks to their export earnings, must at all cost export to the region’s coastal

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Box 12

“The remittances resulting from out-migration have long been an important source of income for food security and investment. Economic recovery in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the opportunity to return to rapid growth in Nigeria, make it likely that there will be a greater demand for labor in both countries. However, as Malian migrants integrate into their new countries, there may well be a gradual decline in the remittances they send home.

In the long-term, job creation in Mali should therefore be a priority. There is a limit, however, to the number of employees in the national labor market that the mining sector can absorb. Compared to the coastal countries, industrialization faces structural handicaps.

The main sustainable alternative is the development of the food sector, based on exploiting those products in which Mali has a comparative advantage. These are livestock, cereals, fruit and vegetables, which have remained competitive despite the overvaluation of the CFA franc. Exports of these products to the other countries in the region provided nearly two-thirds of export earnings in 1990. Since devaluation, their competitiveness has improved.

Over time, the main challenge will be to export less in the raw state and more processed products with higher value-added. The markets exist: cereal-bran-based animal feed, for which demand in Senegal and Mauritania is estimated at some 100,000 tons a year, of which only half is supplied; maize-based poultry feed; meat rather than livestock exports, etc. But first the obstacles to farm development must be removed and conditions created to maintain competitiveness.”

Mali case study synthesis, 1994. M. Dème. WALTPS.
### Economic data for the large landlocked countries

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990 DATA</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>URBAN RATIO</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
<th>GDP PER CAPITA</th>
<th>AID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MILLIONS (%)</td>
<td>(%) OF REGION</td>
<td>(%) OF REGION</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>8.2 (4 %)</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>8.7 (4 %)</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7.7 (4 %)</td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5.5 (3 %)</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. Afr. Rep.</td>
<td>2.4 (1 %)</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>1 %</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138.9 (17 %)</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>81 %</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

markets. These provinces are in direct competition with the northern zones of these coastal countries. To compete effectively, they will have to mobilize all their resources, so as to ensure the necessary increases in productivity. The northern provinces of the north are usually more densely populated and house the groups that were once dominant. These provinces are not particularly aware of the challenges involved and yet claim a greater distribution of the national wealth.

The difficulties in managing these diverse interests are likely to lead to increased separatist sentiments in the near future in the north (as is already the case in several Sahelian countries), but also eventually in the south.

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Box 13

In light of the country’s current crisis, the medium-term challenges for the Niger economy appear clearly. Can the State accumulate enough revenues to maintain essential functions such as health, education and control of the territory? And can its production system – primarily the remnants of (1) the modern manufacturing sector and (2) most of the craft sector (which employs many people) – even hope to survive?

These issues depend heavily on the development of trade with Nigeria. Trade will continue regardless of the two countries’ official policies, and state strategies will be supported or evaded depending on whether they are favorable or hostile. The recent structural adjustment program introduced in Niamey, which ignores the economic influence of Nigeria, provides little hope that the authorities might integrate the essential role of their huge southern neighbor into the management of Niger. CFA devaluation and the new Nigerian exchange controls have not altered the basic cause of regional monetary distortions, where a convertible currency (the CFA franc) and an unconvertible one (the Naira) coexist side by side. It may be feared that even more Nigerian products than in the past will enter the Niger market. They may replace products imported from world markets, which are now too expensive. Only Niger’s agro-pastoral products, such as livestock and cowpeas, may increase their market share in Nigeria.

A Niger whose future excludes Nigeria and the rest of the CFA region is hardly imaginable. The seriousness of Niger’s problems should prompt its authorities to prepare and accelerate the process of integration rather than wait for it, especially with Nigeria. This could be done by far greater bilateral cooperation in joint projects and, above all, trade policy.

It is not unrealistic to hope that the two states could quickly begin negotiations to open up the Federation’s market to Niger’s agro-pastoral products. What would Nigeria get out of it? Its small neighbor, given its close social links with the north of Nigeria, would maintain a “minimal State”, without which there could be political instability. Possible political contagion would thus be avoided.

2.5 An image of the next ten years

The next decade is largely conditioned by the dynamics already underway; it is with this time-horizon in mind that the actions to be taken today and associated ones in the future need to be determined. The three images sketched below for the year 2020 are meant to be thought-provoking. These images do not cover the entire range of possibilities, nor are they mutually exclusive.

Analysis of the major mechanisms underlying change in West Africa and of the predictable developments in the international environment, indicates three possible paths in the medium-term (ten years). Table 6 summarizes these images.

The continuation of past trends, or the “dead end” perspective of overseas trade without diversification

The first scenario extrapolates from past trends. Overseas trade continues to predominate and West African societies are organized to maximize earnings from it. Major cities expand rapidly as export earnings are diverted into the consumption of cheap imports. Governments share this trading mentality.

Nigeria, which possesses the most abundant natural resources in the region, greatly increases its leverage within the region. As traditional export earnings dry up in some countries, illicit and more profitable trade (in drugs and forgeries for example) could gradually develop.

In this scenario, the coastal zones develop the most rapidly, while the hinterlands produce no exports and are neglected. The Sahelian countries in particular could well enter a difficult phase.

In order to limit risks to the developed world (emigration, drugs, pollution and ecological disasters), aid agencies restrict themselves to a limited development management role and provide humanitarian support for the worst-hit areas. This *laissez-faire* scenario runs the serious risk of social, political and economic breakdown (weakened and corrupt States, rapidly growing inequality and social unrest). This scenario would also entail a crash-course in self-reliance for African countries as they learn to live off expedients rather than aid, as well as to cope with insecurity. This is an untrammeled free-market scenario.

A strategy of orthodox growth: free enterprise and good governance, which proves successful for well-placed countries

The second image is a scenario of orthodox free-market development, based on the rational exploitation of comparative advantage, and on the gradual formation of new competitive sectors outside the primary commodity sector. Output expands, but only slowly in unprotected sectors, despite an active monetary policy. Private investment (domestic and foreign) gradually reappears as the business climate improves.

The emergence of growth poles depends not only on making best use of potential but also on a process of profound structural change: separation of market and State, reform of the State and
improved governance. These are the characteristics that distinguish Image 2 from Image 1. This orthodox approach enables the countries that embrace it to receive the ongoing support of the international community. This support is used to maintain an acceptable level of activity in towns while competitiveness improves. The quality of services, particularly that of social services, improves as a consequence of reform of the State.

However, some countries are unable, because of political reasons or the lack of natural resources, to enter this take-off phase of growth, and continue to stagnate, exerting great migratory pressure on the dynamic poles. These countries are tempted by the opportunistic route and threaten the self-discipline of the poles by importing cheap, second-rate products into the regional markets.

Regional integration as a prerequisite for sustainable growth

Image 3 is ambitious: the creation of a wide regional entity for rather modest ends: an economic learning period for small and medium-sized agricultural and handicrafts enterprises, who are learning to compete in a regional market managed collectively by member countries.

The duality of this development is on the surface contradictory. The first effect of setting up a regional market would be the reduction of major trade flows, either because some sectors would be protected or because opportunistic border-trade would be gradually reduced. Intra-regional trade is likely to decline at first as local output gradually expands. The first development objective is thus at the local rather than the regional level.

The same holds true for migration. Although regional integration seems to be an open invitation to extensive migration, local development opportunities are likely to keep people where they are.

This inward-oriented scenario underscores the importance of geographical distance, since long-distance trade is, either directly or indirectly, linked to international trade.

Although Image 3 is one of deliberate, radical reform, there is little chance of a noticeable rise in living standards in the near future. As economic rents diminish and protectionism generates price increases, the trend is initially, in fact, towards recession. Local production will only develop over the long run, and initially at low levels of productivity. The regional market will be “won” at first with very simple products, which will replace more attractive imported goods.

Medium-sized companies and the opportunities to export consumer products will first appear within and among the economic pole countries in West Africa. A period of adjustment will be necessary. Corrective mechanisms aimed at removing any existing handicaps should also encourage investment in the peripheral areas, further encouraging regional competition.

This “modest” scenario is the only one which suggests a truly regional pattern of growth, and which seeks to avoid excessive tensions within the region that could become violent.
### Summary of scenarios

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scenario 1: Extraversion and rent-seeking</th>
<th>Scenario 2: Orthodox liberal growth in the poles</th>
<th>Scenario 3: Regional integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth strategies</td>
<td>Excessive seeking of international rents, including illicit ones</td>
<td>Orthodox liberal growth strategy in the centers of attraction, and stagnation in areas exterior to these</td>
<td>Priority given to the integration of the regional market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and social change</td>
<td>Private trading mentality, even within the State</td>
<td>Separation and co-operation between market and the state</td>
<td>State and political progress, developing regional solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monetary situation</td>
<td>Maximising the opportunities provided by separate currencies</td>
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<td>Strategy of the international community</td>
<td>Resignation and laissez-faire; security, and a minimum level of humanitarian activities</td>
<td>Keynesian adjustment and increased conditionality</td>
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OECD/Club du Sahel
CHAPTER 3

Current challenges

West African society is experiencing, much later than the rest of the world, the basic changes that will lead it to its own economic and political modernity. This reshaping of society is occurring at great speed, and at a time when the international environment is not particularly favorable. It is a process which induces imbalances and tensions whose excesses and unintended effects need to be limited, while not permitting that the momentum of change be slowed.

Flexibility and adaptability in West African societies need to be encouraged to meet this challenge, and there are many ways of doing just this. WALTPS underlines the importance of reflecting upon long-term development strategies, while at the same time taking immediate action.

The study underlines the need to concentrate a major effort on education and training, which are factors of development and of social integration (§ 3.1).

The study also stresses the need to develop analytical tools (especially macro-economic ones) that take into account individuals and geographic diversity (§ 3.2).

With regard to economic policies, priority must be given to (1) the creation of an environment conducive to the development of a more competitive urban economy and (2) the encouragement of more autonomous management of urban areas, as well as (3) the encouragement of rural businesses (§ 3.3 and 3.4).

Land management and decentralization are further essential aspects of the responsibility which civil society owes to its environment (§ 3.5 and 3.6).

In addition, migratory freedom as well as the development of the regional market for goods and services are two essential elements which lead to (1) the encouragement to learn about competition, (2) a compensation for the probable lack of foreign currency, and – as such – (3) optimization of growth (§ 3.7 and 3.8).

Finally, the study underlines the necessity for the States and their partners to seriously reflect upon the necessity to mobilize substantial financial resources of which the West African region will be in serious need over the next few decades (§ 3.9 and 3.10).
3.1 Educating young people and integrating them into society

The African education system lags far behind the systems of other developing countries. The situation is growing worse as people in much of West Africa lose faith in the state school system. With nearly 50% of the population under the age of 15, education should receive much more attention. Education develops economic performance, integrates young people and transmits new values. The rehabilitation of the school system is therefore a major task of utmost urgency, but one that will be particularly hard to achieve.

The absence of collective references (or too many, which amounts to almost the same thing) in West African societies is evidence of ineffective attempts towards integration over the last thirty years. In this context, education is at the top of the list of the integration attempts that have failed. Education is supposed to convey collective values, and is thereby an element of national integration. It is also supposed to convey knowledge, and is thereby the capacity for innovation and progress. In the last thirty years, neither of these objectives has been fulfilled.

The results are disappointing: primary school enrollment is 72% for West Africa as a whole and has apparently fallen, since 1980, in 7 of the region’s 19 countries. Secondary school enrollment varies from 7% to 38% depending on the country, but exceeds 20% in only five of them. Students in tertiary education numbered only 406,000 in the whole region in 1990, two-thirds of whom were in Nigeria.

In a region characterized by very low average age, the inadequacy of education is a very serious threat to long-term development, weakening national cohesion and the ability of production systems to develop at a rate that is consistent with population growth and international competition. West African education suffers from many ills, generally more evident in French-speaking than in English-speaking countries:

- high unit costs, even at the primary level: from 0.05 of per capita GDP per primary pupil in Ghana to 0.25 in Mali; from 2.5 of per capita GDP per secondary pupil in Ghana to 11 times in Burkina Faso. On average, education costs amount to 3-4% of GNP and are roughly equal to 20% of national budgets.

- uneven allocation of resources, with tertiary education favored over basic learning and technical training. In Burkina Faso, 30% of the education budget is allocated to grants to students abroad;

- virtually non-existent operating budgets, with the bulk of current expenditure allocated to teachers’ salaries.

Aid has not compensated for this bias, rather the reverse. Although education accounts for 5-6% of total aid, of that amount only 5% was allocated to primary education while 40% was allocated to tertiary education.

Education should be a high priority in the future. This will be very expensive: R. Pons estimates that it would require 7-8% of annual gross regional
product and two and a half million teachers, two-thirds of them in primary schools, to achieve even modest objectives, *inter alia*, a lower illiteracy rate, an increase in primary enrollment from 60 to 80%, an increase in secondary enrollment from 15 to 30% and stable levels in tertiary education.

Preparing West Africans for socioeconomic change

Such an effort is only possible if the role of education in society changes radically. Education has long been viewed, especially in the French speaking countries, as the best means to gain access to the modern sector, but no more than that. It is not surprising, therefore, that the current recession in the modern sector is leading to a fall in state school enrollment. This would also explain why the main opponents of the State are students who had hoped to become part of the system and are instead seeing the door slam in their faces. The renewal of the education system in West Africa and its long-term success will depend on the ability to provide a broad and basic education program that meets the community’s expectations. It is all the more difficult given that education must also prepare students for university-level studies. Meeting this demand is imperative if West Africa is to have the scientific and technical manpower necessary to meet the challenges of the future.

Only when primary education is successfully decentralized, when its beneficiaries are more in control of the services offered, will West Africa

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[Graph 11: Gross enrollment ratio (GER) in primary education in African countries]

The GER measures the proportion of children attending school irrespective of their age. Seven countries were in regression for the period 1980-1990: Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Mali.

Enrollment represents the ratio of the number of children attending school to the total number of children in that corresponding age group.

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2 Enrollment represents the ratio of the number of children attending school to the total number of children in that corresponding age group.
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

be able to satisfy the educational needs of the region on a large scale.

**Better circulation of information and knowledge within society**

The domain of knowledge extends beyond the education system. It concerns learning, the exchange of ideas and experiences (within and outside the region) and information. Needs in this area are enormous. Progress in this domain, both within and outside the region, will require significant investments in communication infrastructure. The current stock of communication and knowledge-sharing tools – telephones, computers, databases, technical publications, research budgets – gives an idea of the size of the task. West Africa lags further behind in this area than it does in its economic performance.

The percentage of those within the modern and emerging intermediate sectors currently making use of modern means of communication is relatively small. This suggests that there is little hope of these sectors actually financing this expensive communication infrastructure, despite the fact that this is a key element affecting their ability to compete. It is in this area that foreign donors could contribute – an area in which they are significantly advanced.

### 3.2 Producing and circulating information more appropriate to West African issues

West African societies are still at the stage in which individual, daily survival accounts for a large part of human activity and of the economy. If policy-makers are to support these societies as they change, they must have regular information on the behavior, numbers and movements of social groups. Existing statistical systems cannot provide them with this information.

Population censuses need to be revised with a view to simplifying and increasing the frequency at which they are carried out. Better coverage of economic and geographical topics, in general, should be systematically improved.
Demographic censuses – less unwieldy, more frequent

This is certainly the case for population censuses. The present frequency of censuses (every 15 years on average) is unsuited to countries with rapidly shifting populations. The aim should be to carry out a survey every 5 years, even if this means simplifying every other census, i.e. targeting a few variables that are particularly sensitive.

The processing, presentation and publication of census results should be adapted to policy-makers’ needs:

* provisional results should be published more quickly, preferably as computer files;
* census maps should always be published, preferably as files that can be directly used on Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

The results should be checked, both nationally and regionally, by:

* systematically checking the consistency of national results within the region (to avoid for example, double counting of migrants, which is at present common);
* checking for consistency in the distribution of population by type of activity (farming, non-farming) and by size of town or village;
* standardizing procedures for counting the urban population and various aggregates and ratios.

A regional inter-governmental organization could be given the task, together with the specialized institutions of the United Nations, of monitoring, critically analyzing, archiving and publishing demographic databases for West African countries. The WALTPS provisional database could be a starting-point.

Better knowledge of the grassroots economy with budget-consumption surveys

With consumption data for various social groups, WALTPS used a demo-economic accounting framework and a method to produce accounts of the “real” economy that reflect the way people actually live. Although there is no question of substituting these “demo-economic” accounts for the standard national accounts, this approach could be used to check the consistency and plausibility of official statistics, production statistics, and consumption data on all non-
tradable goods and services, which are poorly measured by official accounts.

Given their importance in national economic accounts, the current state of knowledge of household budgets is quite unsatisfactory. Budget-consumption surveys are ill-suited to the real socioeconomic situation of West African countries and permanent survey programs are generally too sophisticated and too expensive for the results obtained.

There again, budget-consumption surveys should be designed to be of direct use to officials dealing with national accounts, which is not currently the case. In order to achieve this, surveys must provide regular and reliable answers to simple questions, such as major items of expenditure (food, housing, clothes, transport), taxes and transfers, the distribution of income and expenditure. They must allow for quite different population groups: urban and rural, modern and informal as well as geographical variations.

Finally, the income distributions revealed by conventional budget-consumption surveys are only partial. They provide no information about households with a high standard of living, (i.e. with 5-10 times average income), foreigners and local elites. It is essential to understand the behavior of these households in terms of income and expenditure, for two reasons: (1) because of the specific structure and size of their income (investments, transfers, levies) and expenditures, and (2) because of the particular ways in which these households adapt to changes in the economic cycle.

To supplement the results of budget-consumption surveys, appropriate methods should be devised for investigating and cross-checking specific groups.

Monitoring the local and urban economy

Although currently a number of West African countries are engaged in decentralization, the quality of information concerning the local economy is inadequate for good management. While data on the macro-economic sectors is subject to caution, the distribution of such data within the region is completely unknown. Very few urban or rural authorities possess even approximate information about the economic and financial flows that affect them. Few of them even possess updated maps of their areas.

Responsive management of urban development requires information systems on demographic, economic and social variables, as well as spatialized planning tools that are more factual and explicit than what is now available. The spatialized economic database and maps produced for WALTPS could be the starting-point for producing monitoring tools for the local economy. These tools would make it possible for urban officials not only to respond better to the needs and potential of the local economy, but also to assess more accurately the actual tax-paying ability of their local citizens, as well as those rural households and businesses that benefit from urban services.

Making economic information more readily accessible

In addition to the necessary changes in the type of information collected, the distribution of this information, as well as the appropriate tools of interpretation for daily management, policy design and development needs must be improved. In
CURRENT CHALLENGES

3.3 Supporting economic and management change in the cities

Until now, West African towns have achieved prosperity and growth mainly by circulating external wealth: the taxation of commodity export earnings and foreign aid flows. Rapid urbanization, the collapse of commodity prices, and the emergence of competition have pushed this system to its limits. The future of urban economies lies in the increased mobilization of their own resources. This challenge must be taken up if West Africa is to meet the consequences of what will probably amount to a trebling of its urban population.

Economic expansion in towns (and the growth of urban employment) is at the heart of long-term development in West Africa.

Growth and diversification of urban activities are necessary conditions for combating poverty and maintaining social cohesion. They also provide the basis for the division of labor, and thus for the eventual modernization of the economy.

Box 15

Public expenditure and development funds as well

Public expenditure and development projects should not escape scrutiny. They should be accurately recorded. Spatial references are obviously necessary for ex post project evaluations and discussion of policies on de-concentration, decentralization, spatial distribution of public expenditure, mobilization of local resources... in other words, land management.

More reliable information on the geography of development projects would make it easier to understand just how success depends upon the choice of site, upon features of the local environment, upon spatial consistency between various projects and upon local support measures. Ex ante and ex post cost-benefit analysis of projects should include the structural changes resulting from the projects concerning the local economy: for example, the impact of project expenditures at the local and national level, the use of the income produced, in addition to the secondary effects on the local economy and on its trade patterns with the rest of the country.

general, West Africa needs to decentralize knowledge and information networks.

This requires that education systems – at the primary level and at the technical and professional training levels – be strengthened, so that information can be used to full capacity. It would then follow that regional centers of training and multi-disciplinary research be developed and revitalized.

But above all, information must not simply serve a few macro-economic policy-makers, however enlightened they might be; in the future, it must give every citizen the possibility to grasp not only the changes that are occurring but also the issues of the future, thus rendering possible the adoption of a realistic strategy.

Growth in urban production is both indispensable and possible

In the past, the urban economy managed to house and employ an increasing proportion of the population, but was heavily dependent on external income in order to do so. This was to the detriment of more directly productive investment. The development of international competition over the last ten years has cruelly revealed the serious lack of competitiveness of most urban activities.
In the future, conditions for urban development will be very different; commodity prices will probably not rise, while the saturation of natural resources and the necessity to invest more in renewing agricultural fertility will push back the margins of production; the capacity of the rural population to finance urban development is expected, in any event, to grow at a slower rate than the urban population.

In cities, economic competition will increase as a result of growing demand (strongly linked to population growth) and as a result of an increasing proportion of the population wishing to join the private commercial sector (as other sources of employment, especially the public sector, show signs of running out of steam). Such fierce competition will limit extensive growth (which corresponded more to the pioneer phase of booming urban markets) in many sectors and regions. In the absence of any alternative, the economy’s response to growing competition will likely be an improvement in productivity.

Supporting the development of a new kind of firm

In the past decade, small and medium-sized businesses have developed in competition with, or as replacements for, activities in the modern sector. This trend is often obscured by the many basic-needs businesses still dominant in the informal sector. The trend is particularly evident in construction, services (transport, health care, education, information, etc.), wholesaling (cereals, imports, transit) and processing (bakeries, flour-mills, timber, tailoring, etc.). However, the development of these firms in activities that are exposed to foreign competition is rare, although some exceptions can be cited in Southeast Nigeria and in Ghana. These businesses have few official links with the State, even if their activity is sometimes connected with the private strategies of government officials (import and re-export). They are the embryo of what might be called an intermediate sector.

Encouraging the development of this intermediate sector and, above all, its expansion into unprotected activities or even exports, is vital to West Africa’s future.

The expansion of the intermediate sector will feed off the encounter between the modern and the informal, either within the family (as the children of informal entrepreneurs receive a modern education) or by migration (as emigrants return home to invest). Intermediate businesses will take their initial capital, entrepreneurial experience and management methods from the informal sector. However, they will not operate outside the official economy, and they will take advantage of modern education and use more capital-intensive production technology than informal micro-enterprises. They will make a clearer distinction between the finances of the business and those of the household. They will differ from the present modern sector by being smaller, by having private and domestic capital, by using management methods that follow less strictly Western models (for
example, accounting procedures and labor laws) and by having limited relations with the State.

A certain number of actions aimed at supporting expansion, are possible. Among them, and what undoubtedly is a priority, is professional information – at both the regional and national level – on prices, markets and technology. It would also be appropriate to give these new entrepreneurs the freedom and the voice necessary to reinforce their professional organizations and their lobbying status with regard to judicial and fiscal reform. Finally, reforming the banking system in a way so as to provide incentives to entrepreneurs is a challenge that should not be neglected.

Forecasting and supporting the physical development of towns

Up until now, the physical development of West African towns has – and this is unfortunate – been taken along two separate paths: a small part of the town, usually less than a quarter, has been planned to meet official standards similar to those in developed countries. Unable to conform to such standards, the rest of the town has developed on its own, with links to urban services being established a posteriori.

The long-term image indicates that the urban population is likely to triple, with most of the increase occurring in the informal sector. At the same time, the standard of living in towns will remain close to what it is today. It may therefore be assumed that the standards of use of space and of urban services will remain stable.

If consumption of urban area per capita stays at around 100 sq. m per new urban dweller, nearly two million hectares will be built up in the next thirty years, and will be mainly occupied by low-income households. This is the reality that must be acknowledged in infrastructure and urban development policies. These policies must be used to orchestrate urban development, rather than attempt to standardize a posteriori (and at great expense) districts that have developed unplanned.

The size of the task is such that it should be entrusted to the private sector. The State should provide the major infrastructure, set standards that are simple and cheap enough to encompass the scale of (and if necessary propose financial systems to mobilize savings for) this challenge.

A new social contract in towns and cities?

While construction of new urban infrastructure is a major problem for the future, maintenance of these growing towns and cities is one of even greater magnitude.

As argued above, wealth-creation in towns – via the recovery of the modern sector and the gradual maturation of informal businesses – is a necessary condition for a recovery in urban growth.

Another condition for urban development lies in the improved allocation of this urban wealth that is generated by the national and local authorities. West African towns currently provide 66% of GRP, and this share could exceed 80% by 2020. Given their share of national wealth, as well as the accu-
mulation of urban assets, town residents have as yet contributed very little to public revenue, the key to infrastructure investment. The budgets of local authorities are derisory compared with the economic value of towns or of urban assets.

This poor use of urban income for maintenance of towns might have been acceptable when the urban population was small and the State had plenty to spend on the public sector, largely in towns. Today this is not the case, and a number of West African towns and cities are in an advanced state of dilapidation.

One of the major issues for the future is how to best mobilize local resources. Simple propositions, adapted to the majority of the population in the informal sector, are needed. The most relevant measures are probably those related to land or property taxes. Since many low-income households will find it difficult to help pay for town maintenance, those who cannot afford it should be encouraged to contribute in kind to community work (street surfacing, drainage ditch clearing, etc.).

More generally, public expenditure should be directed, where possible, towards labor-intensive projects in African towns, such as the “AGETIP” projects currently underway in a number of countries. The modest earnings generated by these activities are spent mainly on essential goods, which in turn stimulate the local economy.

3.4 Promoting intensive agriculture while protecting the environment

Having significantly increased the area of land cultivated, farmers now must increase the productivity of that land. Population pressure, quality of natural resources and accessibility to markets have come together to create a potential for intensification” which varies greatly from one area to another. However, market opportunities will be too limited to allow all farmers to become entrepreneurs.

Urban demand per farmer is increasing at a rate of 3-5% a year, and satisfying this demand is, in itself, a major challenge for agriculture. It under-scores the need for increases in productivity similar to those achieved during the “green revolution” in Asia. Agricultural production must also play an essential role in supplying foreign exchange to the West African economies.

West African agriculture faces a double challenge. First, higher population densities in rural areas are forcing technical change: since land is beginning to be saturated, production can no longer be increased by extending former systems; in addition, the market’s growing influence is changing the type of crops that are produced as well as the very way this production is rationalized. These two mechanisms have been observed and
As long as natural resources are available, development is mainly extensive. Production is increased by extending the area under cultivation, to the detriment of the natural resource base.

- When a zone is poorly connected to the market, average area per rural inhabitant remains fairly stable, at a level that is adequate for home-consumption and for the production of a small surplus. Little investment is made to renew resources.

- When the market strongly influences areas that are still sparsely populated (such as the pioneer areas for export crops), the strong economic incentives and resources made available to farmers lead to the creation of larger farms with greater productivity of labor. These farms, some of which are openly commercial, depend – essentially – upon the consumption of the freely available “natural” capital. This is the case in the majority of the cotton growing areas as well as in the coffee and cocoa growing areas.

In areas where farmland is saturated, there are different types of situations:

- Where there is a centralized market (typically an urban market), it is usually surrounded by successive rings of intensive farming that go far beyond the more noticeable peri-urban gardens. In this way, intensive farming in the Kano Close Settled Zone (an area where farmland has been saturated for some decades) meets the needs of a rural population of over 300 inhabitants per sq. km and also produces enough surplus for the urban consumers in nearby towns, including Kano’s population of over 1 million.

- Where the market is more diffuse (in areas where product prices are independent of distance, like in the cases of cotton or cocoa), the attraction of the central market no longer compensates for the problems of land saturation. Confronted with land scarcity, some farmers stay where they are and begin to intensify, while others migrate to “virgin” land to continue farming in the old, extractive way. It is due to this kind of migration that pioneer fronts advance in both savanna and forest zones.

- Densely populated areas without markets (mainly in the Sahelian countries, with one or two such areas in the northern reaches of the coastal countries) may engage in labor-intensive farming with few inputs (see Box). In these areas, other
activities are generally taken on, either at home or via migration. Investment in farming is often limited, and is aimed primarily at meeting home-consumption needs.

The need to intensify leads to greater inequality in rural areas

Land is farmed more intensively (higher output per unit area) when it is absolutely necessary to do so (because farmland is saturated) and when it is more profitable than non-farm activities (where there is a market providing a return on capital and labor, or when the supply of non-farm work dries up).

Market conditions are very unevenly distributed throughout West Africa. Not every area can produce export crops (for reasons of climate or location), and the domestic market, though expanding, is still limited (an average of 0.6 consumers per farmer).

Not every area, therefore, can finance the
investment needed for sustainable commercial farming. At a time when markets are being liberalized, the farms nearest to the market as well as those with highly profitable structures are likely to take over most of the food market as it develops.

The development of agricultural entrepreneurship must be encouraged, even if an increase in social disparities results. The means to do so are the same as those needed for urban entrepreneurs. They are based on the encouragement of professional organizations, the development of information networks, and the creation of an environment conducive to development.

Think of rural transformation along with urban development

Meanwhile, other farmers will gradually be forced to choose between leaving farming altogether or farming in a more labor-intensive manner, although only poor returns for that labor will be obtained.

This choice for farmers will ultimately depend upon the health of the urban economy. If it recovers, it will create both a sustained demand for food – increasing the number of farms that can live off that demand – and will create job alternatives for those whose life in the villages would be too precarious. In this case it is possible to imagine a dynamic balance between town and country. If on the other hand the urban economy remains stuck in recession, the standard of living in rural areas will fall (as land becomes increasingly saturated and as the lack of investment lowers farm labor productivity) except in those areas closest to the markets.

3.5 Land management: supporting change and managing inequalities in West Africa

WALTPS reveals the importance of a better understanding of the relationship between people and the ecological, economic and social areas in which they live and work. It emphasizes a number of specific policy areas for which appropriate land management strategies must be developed.

“Land management means introducing rationality into areas formerly ruled by natural determinism or uncoordinated individual intentions” (Igué 1993). Land management is a major component of regional management policy, the spatial translation of a political idea. In the allocation of infrastructure and public services, it seeks to reconcile two complementary objectives: maximizing the economic efficiency of the territory, and ensuring its social and political cohesion.

The concentration of economic activity and the management of regional inequalities

The natural process whereby population and economic activities tend to concentrate themselves in certain specific areas is beneficial in terms of the cost-effectiveness of equipment and services and promotes the competitiveness of businesses. Such a process can also play a role in the reduction of per capita income differences between rich and poorer areas, since migration from poor to rich zones tends to equalize
differences. One outcome of the geographic concentration of economic activities is the emergence of large urban areas composed of a network of towns and a closely integrated rural hinterland. The largest of these areas in West Africa is around Lagos. This area will ultimately have a population comparable to the U.S. east coast, with five cities of over one million inhabitants and a total of more than 60 million inhabitants along a strip of land 600 km long, running east to west between Benin City and Accra. Some areas in the region are thus subject to special pressure. This is the case, for example, along parts of the coastal strip, where one-third of GRP is produced on 6% of the region’s land. It is also the case of the “national peripheries”: active border areas where there is dynamic private initiative and intense trade.

This concentration of people and activity, which is consistent with natural market trends, cannot be left to the law of the market alone. The areas in question which are undergoing rapid, profound change must be managed. Hence the importance of land management policies. The coastal areas, for example, with their high potential for economic growth, also contain fragile, threatened ecosystems. The long-term management of these coastal areas should be one of the high priority objectives of regional land management.

The vast areas far from the urban zones also raise particular problems because of their sparse population density, weak economic activity, their lack of significant local resources, and the limited impact of policies in the absence of incentives for change. The reality of contrasting trends in urban and more isolated rural areas brings to the forefront the challenge of coping with inequality, as well as that of allocating public expenditure.

Coping with inequality should undoubtedly allow a “natural” response to be asserted by the population: increased mobility and the encouragement of the private transfers which are usually associated with these migrations. The per capita distribution of public expenditure in various areas could also be kept within an acceptable range by partially redistributing both national and local public

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**Major challenges for developing the great Sahelian rivers**

**Box 17**

One of the necessary conditions for intensive farming is the mobilization of natural resources, including the development of river basins.

The two great Sahelian rivers, the Senegal and the Niger, are good examples of the need for regional co-operation to mobilize natural resources. Although these two rivers play a decisive role in the Sahel, they have their source in the Fouta Djallon, in Guinea, a country where desertification is the least of problems.

Maintaining the Fouta Djallon mountains that regulate the flow of these rivers is essential to the lives of millions of Sahelians. This will depend upon the good intentions of a country whose interests, in all evidence, lie elsewhere.

This is an example of the type of collaboration necessary between the different States in West Africa. It is precisely in areas like these that foreign donors can provide support, and in the process ensure that everyone’s objectives in land management are reconciled.
Restructuring West African urban networks

Although the birth of West African nations (and the increasing number of states within the Nigerian Federation) has contributed to the balkanization of the region, it has also encouraged regional land management by favoring the emergence of national urban networks. These networks, centered around political or economic capital cities, are groups of towns which first functioned as administrative units, before expanding beyond that role. The influence of some major towns now extends beyond national borders and numerous urban networks are integrating with each other at the sub-regional level, particularly around Dakar, Abidjan and Lagos. The top level of the region’s urban framework now consists of about ten large cities (one every 800-1000km).

Ultimately, the density of this top urban level will increase to a spacing of 100 to 500 km between cities, with a hundred or so urban centers serving 2 to 5 million people, each handling a gross product in the order of $2 to 10 billion. The pattern of urban centers with regional functions will be the foundation for decentralization. This regional network will also provide the pattern for transport and communications networks.

Development of communication infrastructure

By 2020, intra-regional trade is likely to have increased tenfold (compared with a fourfold increase in trade with the rest of the world). The greater density of the urban network and greater trade between town and country will also boost the demand for medium-range transport. Apart from maintaining and rehabilitating the existing road system, the long-term challenge is to increase its density, in order to cope with inter- and intra-regional trade (as on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, where the infrastructure is practically non-existent).

A picture of how the road system might develop in West Africa is provided by the present road system in Nigeria. WALTPS shows that the density of the Nigerian road network, which is apparently four times higher than elsewhere, is in fact comparable, given the density and structure of settlement patterns in this country. The only exceptional feature in Nigeria is the extent of the road system in the zone situated between the coastal areas and the Sahelian zone, which is the least populated area in Nigeria. This can be explained both by the authorities’ concern to maintain strong links between the northern and southern zones and by the availability of oil resources. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the latter mechanism will only reduce inequality if the State manages to maintain direct control of a large part of national resources, which does not seem to be the current trend.
revenues, which has allowed for long-term investment. The opening up of this area has resulted in fierce competition for access to land.

Faster development in the northern zones of coastal countries

The general image of settlement patterns in 2020 suggests that population density will gradually increase in the hinterland of the coastal areas (called zone 2, see 1.4). Until now, zone 2 has been the least urbanized, experiencing net out-migration between 1960 and 1990. This trend will be reversed, the level of urbanization will increase. This zone’s share of the region’s urban population will increase from 25% to 28% and its share of the region’s rural population will increase from 39% to 42% (excluding Nigeria). This movement of population into the hinterland of the most dynamic coastal areas is essential for land management in West Africa and has many implications. The development of zone 2, where river-blindness has been eradicated, may be useful to absorb the surplus population from the Sahel, as well as to locate market-oriented farms to serve the coastal cities. It may also act as a link between the coastal and Sahelian settlement areas.

More generally, the shift from subsistence to market-oriented farming occurs at different speeds and in different ways, depending on the distance from the market and on the use of land. The current phase of extensive farming spreading outward from market areas is being replaced by more intensive farming and by more capital-intensive specialized farms, which depend more on the availability of land than on their proximity to the market. This trend will probably create even greater inequalities in productivity within rural areas. Land management policies will need to adapt to this increasing differentiation – in farm structure, specifically, and in the rural economy, in general.

3.6 From local to regional: different scales of management

Most of the necessary changes for the future will be made by the people of West Africa themselves, in response to the constraints and opportunities of their immediate environment. So that all these individual efforts do not produce a cacophony, they need to be coordinated and focused. This will require a series of interconnected levels of development management.

Decentralization: from the “local” to the “lands”

The local level is the level at which there remains a strong sense of identity. It is at this level that essential public services should be provided and everyday institutional problems managed. Decentralization policies are, in many countries, moving in just that direction, and so is the local class of entrepreneurs that is only just emerging and whose players are eager to become involved in the management of their immediate environment.

The intermediate level (which John Igué calls “lands”, and correspond roughly to administrative regions) brings together more varied areas: generally, a large city, a scattering of smaller towns
and their rural hinterland. These “lands” are usually areas with a high degree of socio-cultural cohesion. This is the level at which one may hope to mobilize real “communities” towards a common future. This is the preferred level for managing the basic infrastructure and the complementarities between town and country.

Decentralization down to the local collective level should remove part of the burden of tax collection and of public service management from the central authority. This is why, despite some resistance, decentralization appears to have a strong future. On the other hand, the intermediate level is seen as too directly competitive with the construction of the Nation-State, especially in ethnically diverse countries where central authority is still shaky. This level is rarely used as a basis for land management: regions have been perceived as administrative levels rather than as intermediate areas for planning. It will probably take a substantial amount of time for communities to organize themselves at this level.

Remaining part of the local to regional nexus

The predominance of the Nation-State in elaborating and effectively implementing land management strategy should not hide the fact that the majority of West African countries remain highly inter-dependent and are each very small in terms of population and GDP. None of these countries can ignore what is happening in neighboring States, or hope to develop in a sustainable manner alone. Settlement patterns occur at the regional level, markets are sub-regional, river basins and transport corridors cross national borders, and the CFA countries have a single currency. Land management and decentralization strategies, which are necessarily implemented nationally, should be designed with regional imperatives in mind. The States, who are decentralizing nationally, should gradually learn to operate as decentralized levels of the sub-regional units that disappeared at independence, and that should be rebuilt on new foundations. The principle of subsidiarity in the division of tasks between central administrations and local councils should also be applied to States and aid agencies, in regards to their dealings in the sub-region.

To say that decentralization strategies must be implemented nationally but with regional imperatives in mind does not mean that decentralization should follow a standard pattern; rather it should take account of local characteristics. It should be designed to facilitate the necessary redistribution of resources, as well as the regional mobility of people, technologies, capital, goods and services. It should make regional integration easier, not harder. During times of crisis, however, there is a real risk that decentralization will impede mobility (witness the movement towards indigenization in Nigeria), that it will reduce transfers via the State, and that it will lead to a policy of each locality for itself. These are the dangers that must be averted.

Decentralization: an ongoing process

The process of decentralization must be flexible. It must adapt to evolving settlement patterns and to social changes. Consequently, the boundaries of decentralized authorities should not be seen as fixed, but as ones that remain open to change to
**Rethinking the shape of the West African State**

**Box 18**

Although macro-economic studies of West African countries abound, and although socio-political studies are well developed, John Igué suggests that “the territorial analysis of States is far less advanced. A few geographical studies allude to the question, usually in terms of regionalization or town-country relations. This lack is all the more regrettable since Africa’s colonial heritage has left it the most balkanized continent on earth, with many countries where the exercise of power, and therefore the question of the State, raises many problems.”

States size is a characteristic of primary significance. Sahelian states are too large, too sparsely populated and too hard to manage; some coastal states are too small and do not have a critical population mass... But above all, “the greatest territorial handicap of the colonial successor States is the questionable legitimacy of their borders, leading to conflict and even war”.

“The problem of territoriality is primarily expressed as the need to strengthen the State’s borders, and then to create a sound national community. There is also the problem of a dynamic cultural space, i.e. a moral reference, without which the State is unlikely to operate properly. Often the emergence of a true national community held together by the same cultural references is hampered by ethnic diversity and tribal issues, carefully exploited by some to gain power and patronage. The various colonial powers have already faced these problems.”

West African people continue to define themselves largely with respect to territorial boundaries that are not those of the nation-state: the hierarchical network of markets, which covers every corner of the territory, or particularly dynamic border areas.

Igué points out that West African States have been unable to create new reference territories, or even use the existing ones: “nowhere has any balance of territories been achieved. Regionalization is not working. The States use administrative frameworks, not for land management, but merely for infrastructure operations, most of which have less to do with the efficient use of space than with satisfying the ambitions of the men in power”.

**Recently created states:**

political map of West Africa around 1886

Map 8

One hundred years ago, almost no West African state had its current territory. Colonial powers were still vying with African kingdoms for control over land. Not until 20 years later was the region totally occupied and carved up.
the fullest possible extent. How can the notion of the urban district – entity with set boundaries – be reconciled with the notion of the urban agglomeration, of which the surface area doubles every ten years, which exerts important influence upon its rural hinterland, and which might even become “linked” to another region or even to a neighboring country?

Likewise, the authorities at the head of the decentralized units (rural communities, urban districts and urban regions), like the national authorities above them, are answerable not only to their households but also to the businesses that ensure their prosperity. The rural hinterland of towns is to some extent part of their business area, analogous to “industrial estates” on the outskirts of towns. Urban managers are concerned by what happens in their rural hinterland, which often comes under other authorities. This overlapping of the “urban” and the “rural” in the process of local development must be taken into account when discussing the issue of changing relations and shared competence between decentralized units and the local representatives of the national administration (préfets, governors). How can decentralization, which accentuates the geographical division of autonomous units, not undermine the relationships and the trade between these units? This discussion could lead to a redefinition of the function of an administration, which – by way of land management – could assume greater responsibility for the proper running of urban-rural systems.

3.7 Freedom of movement for people and goods will assist adjustment to future change

Mobility has been an essential means for the people of West Africa to adapt to the changes in their environment. Ease of movement within the region has certainly prevented an escalation of tensions and conflicts. At a time when that ease of movement is being restricted because of recession and the perceived need to protect ethnic identities, WALTPS argues that movement must be preserved.

However West African economies develop, whatever the mechanisms for redistributing wealth within them, great inequalities within the region will persist, both socially and geographically.

Mobility helps adaptation and reduces inequality

If one accepts that competition is fierce and that social inequality is greater when resources are scarce, it follows that intra-regional mobility helps to reduce these inequalities (among and within countries) by ensuring a better fit between people and resources. Since migrants move from low-productivity areas to areas where they are more productive, mobility has been an essential means of increasing average income.
This is true on condition that economic distortions do not artificially attract people to places where there is nothing to produce. This is the reproach that many authors make of towns that are heavily supplied with public spending and which attract a greater number of people than the jobs they can supply.

Gradual saturation of easily mobilized resources, even in the most advantageous urban and rural areas, along with the increasing number of people living in these areas who would like to capitalize on these resources, will prove to be structural obstacles to mobility. There will certainly still be great differences in potential between “rich” and “poor” areas. However, settling into the “rich” areas will become increasingly more competitive and much more expensive for the migrant. This structural slowdown will probably encourage the trend, already observed, towards social differentiation among peasants within areas of out-migration and among members of the informal sector within areas of in-migration.

**Box 19**

Variations in national population growth rates have been the result of cross-border migration rather than of changes in fertility and mortality rates. Over the period 1960 to 1990, annual growth rates have ranged from 1.6% in Cape Verde to 4.4% in Côte d’Ivoire, for an average natural regional growth rate of 2.7% per year. Counting only net flows, it is estimated that 11% of the West African population (less Nigeria) are living outside their country of birth. Côte d’Ivoire is by far the main destination for immigrants, with a cumulative net inflow of 3.2 million, or an average rate of immigration of 1.2% per year, one of the highest immigration rates in the world. Next come Cameroon, Senegal and Nigeria, with net inflows of one or two million. The country with the highest percentage outflow (-1.4%) is Cape Verde. Countries of emigration are all the landlocked Sahelian ones, plus a few others that are richer but that have suffered political instability or economic mismanagement.

Cross-border migration is only one aspect of the population shift in West Africa. It is estimated that 30-40% of West Africans live within their country – but outside their district or village – of origin, reflecting a large degree of mobility within each country.

Migration across and within borders is closely linked to economic opportunity. The immigration areas contained 31% of the region’s population in 1960 and produced 48% of gross regional product on 30% of the area; in 1990, the figures were 51% of population and 66% of GRP. Population density in these immigration areas is now 2.4 times that of the emigration areas and the average product per inhabitant is 80% higher than in emigration areas.

**Projected settlement patterns in 2020 and cross-border migration**

A number of macro-economic, geopolitical and social factors will have an impact on the distribution of a total population of 430 million in West Africa. The mid-range forecast of settlement patterns in 2020 assumes relative freedom of movement for people within West Africa. This will involve continued migration from the interior to the coast. The main countries of immigration will be Cameroon (+0.6% per year), Côte d’Ivoire (+0.5%), Ghana, the Central African Republic and Liberia (+0.3%). Emigration will mainly come from Cape Verde and Niger (-1.1%), Mali and Mauritania (-0.8%), Burkina Faso and Chad (-0.6%). Over the period 1990-2020 as a whole, net migration between these two groups of countries will be roughly twenty million, compared with eight million in 1960-90.
Maintaining free movement in West Africa

The role of the public sector with regards to the issue of mobility is threefold:

- since mobility generally reflects a rational adaptive behavior on the part of the migrant, authorities should reduce obstacles to mobility;
- however, they should also reduce the artificial attraction of “short-term” opportunities, to prevent a migration rush, particularly during times of economic recession, climatic difficulties, etc.
- public policy should include “social” measures for the most disadvantaged people who are unable to migrate. The problem with adopting such measures is to find a socially acceptable level which will not hold back potential migrants. There is a risk that if they do not migrate now, it will prove even more difficult for them to do so in the future.

In the past, West Africa has actually been a zone of free movement; the richest areas have attracted many migrants from the poorest ones. With the notable exception of Côte d’Ivoire, most governments have attempted to impede mobility, either by making life difficult for the new arrivals (the absence of urban planning was supposed to discourage the rural exodus!), or by developing economic and social activities in areas of out-migration.

As recession in the cities and saturation of the last

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**Net migrations for West African countries**

Graph 13

virgin lands gradually reduce mobility, policy makers in the States and in the aid agencies should rethink their allocation of resources. The need now is not to cope with the effects of a migration rush, but to encourage the resurgence of migration.

Free movement and interdependence should obviously be high national priorities. However, in the interest of efficiency, these phenomena should also unfold across areas that are larger and more diversified than those often defined simply by national borders. The ECOWAS declaration on the free movement of people and goods throughout West Africa has not been fully implemented and should be a top priority.

3.8 The regional market: the advantages of proximity and rapid growth

WALTPS shows that while people have moved in great numbers within West Africa, trade has been limited within the region and is more oriented towards the world market. Existing intra-regional trade has been based on policy distortions rather than on local economic competition. The regional market is growing fast because the population is growing. The market consists largely of basic goods with a steady demand. It is an ideal place to learn the fundamentals of economic competition. Particular attention should be paid to winning back the regional market.

The domestic and regional market in West Africa is growing, and will continue to grow at a sustained rate, as a simple result of the forecasted population increase (from 193 to 430 million consumers in 30 years) and of the division of labor between town and country (from 78 to over 250 million urban consumers). The regional market consists of fairly rudimentary goods and services. Of household expenditure, for example, 40-60% is spent on food, and much of the rest is spent on clothes and housing. Most of these products could, in theory, be easily provided by local craftsmen and manufacturers.

Under-developed trade within the region; abnormally high levels of trade with the outside world

Intra-regional trade in the past has mainly been encouraged by artificial economic opportunities (differences in monetary policies between CFA-zone countries and the other countries in the region; different trade policies) and by the existence of ethnically based cross-border trading networks which have been able to take advantage of them. Intra-regional trade resulting from differences in real comparative advantage has remained minimal. In the long-term, regardless of how the Franc Zone evolves, such distortions are unlikely to continue. Intra-regional trade should be developed more in terms of the comparative advantages attained – or eventually attainable – in each country.

In the course of the WALTPS study, an analysis was undertaken – using global data from different time periods – of the relationships between countries’ demo-economic characteristics (size, population and GDP) and their degree of openness to foreign trade. A significant correlation, relatively stable over time, was found amongst these parameters. The model was then
applied to each country in West Africa separately and to the region as a whole. The results show that, individually, these countries are roughly as open to trade as the model would predict. However, when considering the region as a whole, the results show that it is quite exceptionally open to international trade. West African countries engage more in distant trade (mainly with their ex-colonial powers) than in intra-regional trade. Moreover, this observation is consistent with the weakness in the economy’s intermediate sector (see 1.3). If West Africa were to trade according to the world norm, intra-regional trade would be four or five times greater than it is today.

Admittedly, the trade figures do not take into account what have been the most significant elements of intra-regional exchange in the past: human migration and the flow of revenues sent back to the migrants’ region of origin. Migration and intra-regional trade are two means of regulating inequalities within West Africa. In the case of migration, it is the worker who has to be displaced, whereas in the case of intra-regional trade, the worker remains at home and sends abroad his or her value added. However, the analysis does show that there is a great potential for trade in goods and services within the region which should receive greater attention, especially given the risk that human mobility might be reduced.

A complement to overseas trade, with a high growth potential

The degree of openness that would result was calculated for each country and for the region as a whole. If the hypothesis holds true, the region will supply 22% of these countries’ total imports, meaning a degree of openness to the region (imports plus exports over GRP) of 9%, compared with 30% towards the rest of the world. The 1990 figures were 3% and 36%. This implies a growth rate for intra-regional trade of some 8% per year.

This is an optimistic forecast, since the division of the region into 19 countries probably makes it more prone to overseas trade. Nonetheless, intra-regional trade has healthy prospects for development, even if it is not a panacea; even if this record growth rate is sustained, intra-regional trade will only provide a minor contribution to total commercial flows by the year 2020. There are, however, significant differences between sectors. When the model is applied to farm production alone, it suggests a major role for intra-regional trade by 2020 (46% of total agricultural imports will come from other West African countries).

It thus becomes clear that West Africa must adopt a diversified strategy, and may do so by:

1. taking advantage of the potential for intra-regional trade – trade which is large in volume and, given the proximity of West African countries to one another, is particularly accessible. Apart from the strengthening of its economic value, benefits of notable significance also stand to be gained where regional cohesion is concerned: more links among countries (today, to a large extent, labor flows one way and remittances the other); reduced dependence upon the world market, giving greater resilience to the
Indonesia and West Africa: openness to trade does not necessarily lead to rapid growth

Box 20

Indonesia and West Africa had much in common during the period 1970-1990. They had a similar population size, and, at mid-period, a similar standard of living (per capita GDP at purchasing power parity). Furthermore, they exported similar amounts of oil. And while history has divided West Africa into many countries, geography has divided Indonesia into many islands.

The difference between them is that Indonesia is a dynamic Asian country and West Africa has not enjoyed such rapid growth. Is this because of Indonesia’s better export performance? The table below compares the ratio of exports to GDP calculated in international dollars at purchasing power parity.

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<td>WA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>149</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita at PPP (intern. $)</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil exports (billion $)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total exports (billion $)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil exports/GDP PPP (%)</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total exports/GDP PPP (%)</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
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Source: Penn World Tables.

Using GDP at PPP (preferable when comparing countries with widely varying currencies), West Africa appears to be much more open to exports than Indonesia, even for non-oil exports in 1990. Despite this, Indonesia’s standard of living is 2.5 times higher. This is noteworthy, since Indonesia’s overall economic performance has been much better. This success was driven, above all, by a rapidly growing domestic market, a market which has remained extremely weak in West Africa.

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- regional economy; and a re-focusing upon production zones and upon traditional trade routes;
- improving competitiveness on the world market, both for traditional export commodities and for new more “urban” niche markets, since the region will continue to need a considerable amount of imports from the rest of the world (roughly three-quarters of the volume of the region’s external trade by 2020). Competitiveness must be maintained if the region is not to drop out of the world economy;
- increasing capital in-flows, which have gradually declined in recent years, and which have shifted – from direct, foreign, private investments and loans – to grants.
3.9 Limiting the magnitude and effects of foreign exchange shortages

A number of tasks need to be financed during West Africa’s transformation phase: the education of its people and the building of production systems, towns, and infrastructure. To meet these needs, businesses have raised considerable resources, but these are still heavily dependent on the global economic cycle. The collapse of West African countries’ purchasing power at the international level has created shortages on the regional market. Will this shortage lead to a fall in the quality and quantity of products consumed, or will it stimulate local production?

West African economies have remained highly dependent upon overseas trade and their relations with the international community. They have failed to manage the commodity boom with enough foresight to increase their competitiveness and to diversify their exports. Earnings were needed for other purposes of no negligible importance (maintaining cohesion between social groups via the redistribution of wealth, financing infrastructure, supporting the apparatus of the Nation-State...).

At a time when the needs of West Africa’s new population is growing, its market share in almost all exports is declining. Furthermore, limits to extensive agriculture (the cost of renewing soil fertility as well as the fall in prices on world commodity markets) are progressively diminishing the profits of export agriculture.

Mineral commodities are another matter. They depend almost entirely upon world prices, especially in the case of oil. Unless prices suddenly collapse, Nigeria will have large, sustainable revenues with which to increase its influence in the region.

Financing development with exports will be difficult

Overall, it is highly unlikely that traditional sources of foreign exchange (commodity exports and capital transfers) will keep pace with all needs. Furthermore, prospects for diversifying exports destined for the world market – particularly via urban production – are hardly encouraging in the short-term.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the delocalization of manufacturing to cheap-labor countries did offer the possibility for a new international division of labor, thus enabling the industrialization of a number of third world countries. This strategy now seems to be threatened by technological innovation and by policy changes made by multinational corporations. Consequently, delocalization may only offer a few short-term opportunities in West Africa, except possibly in Nigeria (because of its size and its exceptional natural resource base).

Though the process will be long, diversifying exports by improving the competitiveness of West African businesses is a more probable way of diversifying the region’s sources of income. Prerequisites for promoting industrial competitiveness are improved human resources, a wide diffusion of economic and industrial skills, the development of financial markets, an improved business climate, the emergence of a new generation
of entrepreneurs, the transformation of the “contract” between the public and private sectors, etc.

Under these circumstances, foreign exchange shortages pose a real threat to the potential for a smoothly-run economy and for stable institutions. Finding alternative sources of revenue becomes tempting, such as engaging in the export of illegal substances, beginning with drugs. This danger is beginning to become a reality in a number of West African countries (see Box 21).

Responding to the shortage by making the best use of economic and human potential

While the long-term development of West Africa will require structural transfers (§ 3.10), it will especially require the mobilization of the region’s strengths to the fullest possible extent.

Extreme dependency upon the volatile global environment has compromised current development processes in the region. At a time when few local businesses were able to meet urban demand, the decline in purchasing power on world markets attracted cheap, poor-quality imports, which prevented the necessary emergence of a regional market. No local producer can compete with secondhand shoes imported by the ton, with cheap frozen cuts of meat imported from the European market, or with the second-rate products that can only be sold in Africa. But there are limits to this fall in the quality of consumer goods. The devaluation in Abidjan led the middle classes to purchase cheaper products. The poor, on the other hand, who already consumed the cheapest sources of protein (imported frozen fish), were forced to reduce the absolute volume of their consumption (Akindes, 1994).

In Nigeria, consumers’ “international” purchasing power has dropped virtually to zero, due to the collapse of the Naira. Meanwhile, domestic agricultural supply has been stimulated, and the development of local manufacturing has shown

### Drugs – Africa's latest commodity?

Box 21

“As sub-Saharan Africa becomes dotted with illegal plantations, the pattern of drug traffic is changing. The cohorts of “mules”, “ants” and other poorly organized couriers which used to import drugs from Asia and Latin America for re-export to Europe are giving way to new, more structured organizations to handle local production. The traffic is becoming more professional.

Across the region, the heroin trade produces the greatest flows of illegally earned money. These huge sums are reinvested in production, turning trading points into areas for processing and consuming drugs.

At the heart of the trade lies the most populous country in Africa, Nigeria... Nigerians are near the top in the world cocaine trade... (In the United States), according to experts, Nigerian heroin represents 25% of the market and up to 50% in the Washington and Baltimore areas."

*Drugs, the new world disorder, Observatoire géopolitique des drogues, 1993, pages 203-7.*
Manufacturing boom in Southeast Nigeria

Box 22

“On account of the investments made in new production lines such as for the manufacture of spare parts based on the imitation of far eastern technology, the business sector did not suffer a great lull in its activities. Indeed, with the demand for cheap spare parts rising alongside the prohibitive costs of imported parts during the period of the devaluation of the Naira, demand for products from the Aba-Nweni spare parts factories grew tremendously, resulting in a production and distribution boom. With national and regional distribution networks already in place, factory output was easily distributed and the returns were good both for the producers and for the traders. This encouraged more local manufacturing of parts and in time many of the companies began to move beyond the production of parts for vehicles to the production of parts for industrial machinery. Many factories, unable to replace fixed assets or to afford the costs of imported spare parts, turned to the Aba-Nweni industrial axis for their needs... The growth of local spare parts production is perhaps the most important element of the revival in industrial activity in the Aba-Nweni industrial axis, but also worthy of note is the emergence of textile production and design as well as the growth of food product processing as well as pharmaceutical production. Like the production of spare parts, these other lines of production are backed by strong marketing networks, made up mainly of traders of eastern origin, in the country and in the rest of Africa.”

Nigerian experts believe this boom is related to changing settlement patterns: “The strong entrepreneurial spirit that has characterized Igbo commercial and industrial networks in eastern Nigeria as well as outside the country is related to the challenges of coping with high population pressure on limited land.”

They are equally associated with migration and “generational” effects: “Not only did the Igbo and Ibidio Unions collect a portion of the incomes of their members in the urban areas to finance community development projects in their home villages, the success of sons (and more recently daughters) away from home soon came to be measured by their ability to return home, set up economic ventures back home, and recruit kinsmen from home for positions in their urban-based businesses. Such a mutual aid network would seem to have encouraged the expansion of the population in the south east who are able to amass wealth abroad, which, on the basis of past experiences, was then pooled for the establishment of capital intensive spare-parts industries.”

The emergence of this type of manufacturing seems to have had a synergistic effect on trade and on industrial activities: “From Lagos to Kano, Makurdi to Aba, they (businessmen from the East) developed massive networks for the distribution of second hand goods, which they delivered to households much more cheaply than the factory-new equivalents, whether locally produced or imported. The trade in second-hand goods has thus become a major new source of accumulation that has contributed to the business boom in the East, as well as other cities in the country such as Lagos.”

(A.O.Olakoshi, B.Ahonsi, Nigeria case study, WALTPS).

that with the right capital, skills and market, rapid development is possible. The consequences of the collapse of the Nigerian currency on that country’s and on the region’s economy, however, have been disastrous. A better mechanism must be devised to protect the region from global markdowns.
3.10 Defining a new relationship with the international community

Although domestic savings are being invested on a greater scale than suggested by official statistics, and even if West Africa maintains its market share on international commodity markets and manages to develop the potential of the regional market, the resources available will be insufficient to meet its needs. It will simply not be possible to do all that is necessary. Net transfers from the rest of the world will be necessary for the foreseeable future, but they will have to be administered in such a way so as to avoid the negative effects of the past decades. The first condition for the cost-effectiveness of transfers is the programming of public investments on the basis of development priorities, itself a product of a long-term vision of development.

West Africa is a region undergoing a structural transformation. One of the consequences of this radical change is the region’s enormous need for financial resources. Over the last thirty years, the countries of West Africa had the task of educating their populations, developing competitive production systems, financing urbanization and building their nations. As we have seen, the results have been mixed: considerable urban assets have been accumulated, economic activity has developed well in some sectors and poorly in others, and education has stagnated.

The extent of change in West Africa will inevitably lead to economic deficits

Although it is possible to dispute the priorities adopted by West Africans and the policies that guided them, it cannot be denied that these populations have, financially, made significant efforts (more so than is recorded in national accounts, because it is mostly informal). Although there was substantial waste, and despite the fact that more private funds could have been raised, the size of the total task clearly exceeded the financial capacities of the region.

In fact, demographic transition has always historically been a phase of tension. In many cases, these tensions have been resolved by expansion (war, colonization, or migration), or by domestic crisis (civil war, famine). As it is one of the last regions of the world to go through such a demographic transition, West Africa is experiencing different constraints. On the one hand, migration outside Africa and internal reorganization are being impeded (inflexible borders, immigration restrictions). On the other, famine and war are restricted by humanitarian interference.

Since Africa, and West Africa in particular, does not have recourse to the “traditional” methods for coping with transition, it has had to draw upon its own resources. This explains the importance of exports in the economy and the importance of internal migration to adjust settlement patterns. Likewise, West Africa has made a huge appeal to
the international community to fill, at least in part, the structural deficits resulting from the transition.

**International aid has not been adapted to African circumstances**

The nature, volume and timing of the resources supplied by the international community have varied greatly over time. It can honestly be said that they have not been adapted to the conditions of the African continent.

- These transfers have been very volatile and have been associated much more with the availability of liquidity in world markets than with the real needs or absorption capacity of African countries. Transfers boomed in the 1970s, as oil money was being recycled, and then slumped in the early 1980s. For the coastal countries, these transfers temporarily became net outflows.

- Private flows have been weak. Remitted earnings have always been greater than the sums invested privately during the last twenty five years. And in recent years, this investment has even seriously dwindled.

- Multilateral donors have been playing an increasingly larger role in cash flows but have not really succeeded in taking the appropriate measures on the African continent. This has consequently led to increasing debt, the largest sums being owed to multilaterals.

Since 1970, Sahelian countries, particularly those along the coast, have benefited more favorably than the rest of the region from international aid. These transfers have compensated for a growing structural trade deficit. The forest countries received major transfers resulting in serious debt during the 1970s. These transfers became negative in the 1980s and are only just recovering. Nigeria is a special case, with negative transfers for the entire period from 1970 to 1990.

In all, the net consolidated transfers to West Africa were about $50 billion from 1970 to 1992, or only 3-4% of GRP accumulated over that period. Many of these transfers were loans and have led to massive debt, which is being rescheduled for many countries and is thus on the increase. Even more alarming, the proportion of multilateral debt is now more than 50% for 5 of the region’s countries. Since such debt cannot in theory be written-off, a number of countries are heading for bankruptcy. The whole issue of African debt will have to be re-examined.

**The need for long-term financial planning**

It has been stressed several times that West Africa’s development depends on long-term phenomena – settlement patterns, education, skills and redistribution of power. An image of mediocre prospects for exports raises the specter of a considerable delay, if not a complete halt, in the maturation of these long-term phenomena, which themselves depend partly on the international economy and outside resources. It would be foolhardy to suppose that loans established on a strict, short- or medium-term basis
could compensate for poor export performance on world markets by providing the necessary financial flows.

The commitment of foreign resources, largely in the form of non-repayable grants, will determine the time it will take for general development and diversification of production systems to occur in the region.

This is certainly true for West African countries with few exportable raw materials. But rising deficits in the more fortunate countries must be avoided; these countries are already heavily indebted and are important as safety valves for the poorest countries. The idea of restoring the balance of payments in the short- or medium-term has already been abandoned de facto, as evidenced in the Sahelian countries, as well as in Ghana, who have all been experiencing structural adjustment for ten years now. This change of position now needs to be thought out and managed properly, as it is not exempt from danger. As far as the donors are concerned, this means:

- committing themselves to what might be called long-term partnerships, in which lasting deficits are accepted with no expectation of immediate results, provided the development process appears to be progressing;
- reducing their interventionism, especially in the political and social realms. The growing involvement of donors in defining the objectives of national policies results in these objectives not being met and aid then becomes an end rather than a means. In the future aid could be devoted to more neutral or indirect activities and thus influence social and economic change in a limited way. Aid would “set the scene” for development by supporting land management, improving the circulation and use of knowledge and actively supporting education, communication and information.

![Graph 14: Level of debt as a percentage of GDP and proportion of debt-interest owed to multilateral institutions: double source of a potential crisis](image-url)
CONCLUSION

David Naudet

A study of long term perspectives for West Africa: not a common subject within the realm of scenario/strategy discussions. Its audience is vast, including West African States, regional bodies, donor agencies, the research community, civil society and the general public. No one particular institution was expected to use WALTPS as a basis for its future strategy. These conclusions are purely consultative and open to discussion by all.

The WALTPS exercise represented the common desire – the institutional dream, as alluded to by J.M. Cour in the introduction of this presentation – to clear a free space where close scrutiny might be imposed (1) upon the implicit vision of the evolutions and of the long term perspectives which are themselves the result of a succession of short terms, and (2) upon the insistence for permanent action.

WALTPS was an exceptional experience for all who took part in it and, hopefully, for some of its users too. It represented an opportunity to look at things from a number of unusual angles – long-term, regional, spatial, demo-economic – and an even rarer opportunity to take the time to understand issues before acting upon them.

But at the same time, these approaches were also challenged. How can you address all the regional players at once? How can anything come of results that no institution was competent to back? How can you succeed – by force of analysis alone – in generating interest within, and influence upon, the very players coping with the day-to-day reality of development in West Africa? There was a real risk of transforming this very non-traditional approach into a tool of fantasy, of turning the chance to think into a missed opportunity.

WALTPS was not intended to be just a study. From the design phase forward, it was intended to generate a process of joint reflection involving a large number of those concerned with regional development. It would be a debating chamber within which various interpretations of West Africa’s “present history” could be compared. The aim was not so much to present a complete analysis of regional prospects but rather to attempt to achieve glimpses of the paradigms behind the visions of the West African players.

WALTPS, thus, was not just a study, as summarized in the major part of this book, but also a process of communication and debate – the topic of this conclusion.
Following on from WALTPS

The WALTPS team chose to discuss the study with its future users from the outset. Intermediate meetings were held in various places throughout the study period, either on particular topics or on the general direction of the research. The study was also monitored by a Scientific Committee, which met twice. The methodological principle of successive rounds, beginning with overall analyses which gradually became more complex, often led to disagreements at these meetings. Although it is more interesting to debate a “thesis” rather than a conceptual framework, the discussion of preliminary analyses, however comprehensive, is a hazardous enterprise. In retrospect, the debates along the way seem to have been crucial to the direction the study took as well as to its acceptability by the major players.

The most active communication phase took place after the study was completed. This phase was much more extensive than usual and merits a brief description. First, there was the publication of the WALTPS papers. To date some 11,000 papers have been circulated, of which 7,500 were summary papers. (This number is many more than for other Club du Sahel publications, whose “distribution” is usually less than one thousand.)

Second, a large number of presentations and debates on the WALTPS findings were held in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Senegal) with regional institutions (CILSS), aid agencies (all the major agencies involved) and in academic forums. These meetings were devoted specifically to West Africa’s long-term prospects and were supplemented by many contributions (various seminars on a range of topics) within as well as from outside the region. The public was extremely varied: senior policymakers, national and international officials, development workers, academics, entrepreneurs, and representatives of civil society.

Finally, the WALTPS team aimed at achieving a wider public debate. A large number of stories appeared in the media, especially in West Africa, where the Cinergie unit ran a journalists’ network. This book was part of the process of opening up the debate.

The aim of this communication process is not to repeat the WALTPS findings, but rather to open the debate, promoting discussion of the topics dealt with in the study and encouraging further use of the findings and of the tools developed during the study. Most of the meetings held revolved around not only the presentations of WALTPS but also around the views (on particular topics or in general) of other players. In these cases, discussion centered on the contribution each experience could make to a general understanding of change in West African societies. The background material for these meetings was usually specifically designed and was not exclusive to study papers. The same principle covered circulation. The material sent out was not only reports, but also a range of brochures, maps and databases intended to be of use in various activities. The WALTPS process was aimed at inviting thought, rather than simply at transmitting facts.

This active communication phase was at first
organized by the authors of this study, Cinergie, CILSS and the Club du Sahel. But the proportions it assumed can only be explained by the second wave of requests for documents, materials, meetings, lectures, and even of initiatives, which came spontaneously from all sides. A purely centralized communication strategy soon runs into the ground unless it awakens real interest.

The initial mailing list for the WALTPS summary report was for 700 copies, but now over ten times as many have been sent out.

We have made a point of stressing the extent of this communication phase at the risk of appearing complacent or self-satisfied. However, it is essential to realize that the preceding chapters are an important part of – but do not represent the entire – process WALTPS is intended to be. To put it in the terms of economists, these analyses were designed as intermediate goods rather than as final consumer products.

However, a number of sometimes harsh criticisms were also made. These are worth examination, not in the interest of rebuttal or of having the last word, but rather in the interest of further investigating which criticisms we feel are the most justified and significant and, also, quite simply, because anyone reading the rest of the book is likely to share some of them.

Certain criticisms concerned matters not dealt with in WALTPS. Major topics such as education, healthcare, the environment and gender issues were not given the importance that they deserve – considering their pertinence to the region’s future. This is quite true but could hardly be avoided. The study took up a particular viewpoint, with the intention of being both synthetic and analytical. It could not claim to deal with every topic of importance. It was only intended to be a further contribution to the existing debates.

The WALTPS analyses also provoked a number of critical questions, which are worth examining briefly. Three main reactions cover the bulk of these debates: disagreement with the standard vision of settlement, urbanization and migration; lack of understanding of an overly “optimistic” interpretation of risks and imbalances; and concern in regards to the non-prescriptive nature of the study.

The WALTPS team’s suggested vision of settlement patterns: is it valid?

A valuable debate followed the study findings on

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3 WALTPS has been used, for example, as the basis for teaching materials in national languages and graphs to inform and encourage dialogue with local communities in West Africa.
settlement patterns in West Africa and their impact on economic, social and political change. Our interpretation of these phenomena, seen as exaggeratedly positive by some critics, provoked a number of disagreements, some of them hostile. This is true for settlement patterns in general, but particularly for urbanization.

A positive vision of the town and of urbanization

The rise of towns benefited the country, because they afforded a ready market for its produce, because merchants bought land in the country and improved it, and because order and good government were introduced. 

*Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776.*

The debate on the role of the town and urbanization in the West African development process rapidly led to dilemmas, some of which are all too familiar. Is farm growth the cause or effect of urbanization in the case of “sustainable development”? Should we stress the source of the initial accumulation of development or the conditions that make this accumulation possible? What should drive West African development: farming? or urban activities? The answers to these questions are not of purely academic consequence, for within each a hierarchy of investment priorities is inherent. However, we are not far from the problem of the chicken and the egg.

The theological debate on the history of development between the supporters of rural development and those of urbanization, which WALTPS could hardly avoid, raises issues of great academic interest. However, such issues have far less practical relevance, first, because both sides can find eminent researchers to support their point of view and, second, because the research always involves examples from outside West Africa. It makes more sense to concentrate on the widely familiar middle ground of the economic and social continuity between town and country. The reciprocal importance of urban and peri-urban farming and of non-farm activities in rural areas is often masked by academic divisions. Links between town and country, which are also reciprocal, lie at the very heart of changes occurring in both rural areas and cities.

Behind these diverging analyses is the issue of a paradigm of values. The debate revealed the highly negative image of African towns held by many players, both West Africans and others. Cities, in general the major ones, are often seen implicitly or explicitly as unmanageable, predatory, corrupting and devoid of positive stimulus for a country’s social, economic and political change.

This vision is particularly strong in West Africa, where it is the favorite theme of local films and literature. Little seems to have changed since Joseph Ki Zerbo, one of the greatest historians of Africa, denounced in 1978 “the city left behind by colonization and made still more hideous under de-colonization by its monstrous growth”. At a time when urban population is about to overtake the rural in West Africa, there is a clear need for a more positive and more realistic understanding of urban phenomenon.

Settlement patterns that are accepted and worked with

Both the hawk and the man eat chicken, but the more hawks the fewer chickens, while the more men the more chickens.

*Henry George, Progress and Poverty, 1879.*

The debate on the effects of population growth, which goes back to Classical times, and which is more controversial than the debate revolving around development authority between town and country, has provided no definitive answers, even for a particular region. The speed at which settlement patterns (population growth and migration) are evolving in West Africa clearly presents a risk. It is desirable and essential therefore that these changes be managed properly. This purpose is widely supported (but admittedly less widely implemented) both within and outside the region. The apparent drop in both birth and migration rates is a promising sign.

But to view settlement changes only in these terms would represent a refusal to understand the present, thus compromising the future. These demographic changes are among the prime factors of political, social, economic and technical change. Only 30 years ago (less than two generations), West Africa consisted largely of small, mainly rural communities who held loose internal ties as well as a certain degree of complementarity with neighboring communities. Decision-making was arbitrary and consensus made possible by omnipresent social and family relations. Today, populations are numerous, diversified and concentrated. They are connected to a web of markets and integrated into common frameworks and institutions in contact with the world outside. This massive change is bound to continue in the two generations to come.

It is essential to understand this change in order to accept and work with it. The map of West African towns in 2020 has often caused reactions of denial – “it’s not possible” – that are more instinctive than reasoned. As a reasoned hypothesis, reality may well refute this map; nonetheless, it is of fundamental importance to accept it. Only then can we face the challenge of working alongside these changes, pursuing *not* some predefined objective, but rather paths that twist and turn according to opportunities and constraints.

Where are the risks and imbalances that threaten West Africa?

Another series of criticisms regularly leveled at WALTPS is that it underestimates the risks of crises that threaten the region. This analysis is allegedly not objective, but rather biased towards optimism or determinism, thus reducing the study’s usefulness, since the point of looking into the future is precisely to foresee and avoid crisis. The risks most often mentioned are the rejection of migrants, the inability to feed towns, social explosion in towns, massive poverty in the biggest cities, environmental collapse, political fundamentalism, and the criminalization of the State. These possibilities do indeed threaten the region, so this criticism must be considered. However, does the sum of these risks define a future? At the very least, they must be considered within a long term, regional context.
The region’s development forms a trajectory, not chaos

When we have turned an experience or a certain chaos into a story, we have transformed it, made sense of it, transmuted the experience, domesticated the chaos.


WALTPS sought to show that the transformation of West Africa is not a mere sum of events and crises and rather that it is part of a comprehensible trajectory that has a direction and is thus predictable. The forces of transformation affecting the region – settlement, international contacts, the emergence of competition – may explain the crises, may even cause them, but they still provide a long-term direction to the movement the region is making.

The movement of West African societies can be grasped if you stand back and look at it from the standpoint of unity to diversity, and vis-à-vis the organization of civil society from the standpoint of self-consumption and complementary trade to competitive trade and the introduction of the market; from the use of arbitrary decisions to the use of rules as well as the introduction of the rule of law; from decisions made by restricted consensus to decisions made by collective choice and the introduction of democratic institutions; from the ubiquity of traditional social relations to anonymity and the birth of the contract. From the long-term perspective, it can hardly be doubted that West African societies, with a few exceptions, are moving along this path. This realization must be added to any perception of crisis and risk.

Development is a form of imbalance

One of the great debates in the history of embryology was between proponents of “pre-formation” and “epigenesis”. The first group erroneously believed that the development of an embryo was a process of enlarging what was already there. The proponents of epigenesis believed that development of the embryo was a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of tissue from an initially undifferentiated entity. It was they who were on the right track. A city is not a living being, nonetheless I think there is an apt analogy to be made: people who think of cities simply as towns that have kept growing larger are believers in a “pre-formation” theory of city growth, an enlargement of what is essentially already there; I am arguing, rather, an “epigenesis” theory of cities: the idea that a city grows by a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of its economy.


The perceptions of short and long-term imbalances contradict each other. For a constant structure in the short-term, imbalances must be either absorbed by the players or lead to a breakdown of some sort. In West Africa, where imbalances are to be found of every type – financial, economic, ecological, social, etc. – the habit of short-term thinking makes it almost impossible to forecast the future. A number of processes are unsustainable, and the only adequate term for what lies ahead would seem to be “catastrophe”.

In the long-term and over a wider area, however, imbalances are at the heart of the process of transformation of structures. Discontinuities and
breakdowns no longer look like single definitive events. The state of the West African region must be perceived as one of lasting imbalance. The transformations occurring here are part of a process of epigenesis, not of balanced growth. Of course these processes are by their nature deep-seated and thus somewhat unpredictable. They are nonetheless the result of imbalances and must be integrated into any understanding of regional change.

This contradiction between perspectives is nothing new. In 1947, Pierre Gourou, one of the most renowned specialists on tropical zones, predicted that the number of human beings living in these areas had reached the limits of the potential food supply. Since then there have regularly been similar predictions, based on extrapolating unsustainable technical or ecological processes. And yet, per capita food imports to West Africa are about $15 a year at present. Similar results can be found in many other fields. Migration and urban growth have always been denounced as the first signs of social catastrophe. The region has been partly spared and the crises that have occurred have not halted the major changes. In the short-term, land tenure, torn between a number of different systems, still seems likely to lead to conflict. But over the long-term, the introduction of a property market appears to be a clear trend.

The major imbalance is that caused by increased and more diversified demand. The stress placed upon the impact of this demand in the study has been a recurring source of misunderstanding; it has been criticized as too deterministic or too mechanistic. But once again, to ignore the motor of demand would be to refuse to understand the region’s long-term future. In the late 1960s, a perspective study was carried out on Mali in 1985. Today’s reality reveals the predictions of this work – published in 1972 – to have been over-optimistic. How could it have been otherwise? The great droughts of the Sahel were then only a distant memory and the environment was not yet a concern. The authors could not imagine that for 20 years the economy of Mali would be governed by policies that were – to say the least – inefficient, and this at the expense of farming and rural areas. The study in question did not foresee what many people would now call the ecological crisis and economic failure of Mali from 1970 to 1985. And yet, not everything was wrong. Projected millet and sorghum production for 1985 was 1.33 million tons; the actual figure was 1.365 million.

What’s the point of a non-prescriptive study?

The WALTPS findings are obviously not exempt of implications for action, and some are laid out quite explicitly. But they do not set up a full-

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5 Les pays tropicaux, PUF, 1947.
6 Some 10 per cent of total food consumption, which is thus 90 per cent local or regional.
7 In 1927, for example, Maurice Bourgine, lieutenant-governor of Côte d’Ivoire, expressed his concern at the rising number of vagabonds in the “major centers” (?) of his territory: “The local administration attempts to clear the major centers by expelling vagabonds and the unemployed so they will return to their villages.... Here, as in Europe, countryfolk are attracted by the mirage of towns.” From Marc Le Pape, “Urban Attraction, 65 years’ Observation in Abidjan”, Cahiers des Sciences Humaines, vol. 29, 1993.
fledged strategy for a better future, or a body of recommendations for policymakers, which is the essential output of other perspective studies. This deliberate omission upset some people. First, because policymakers did not know how to place the study and use it easily. Second, because it came to seem that common-sense was neglected: why spend so much time and money and not come up with recommendations to make the future better?

**WALTPS says nothing about structural adjustment policies**

A friend of mine who combines a professional interest in Africa with a hobby of collecting antique maps has written a fascinating paper on what he calls “the evolution of ignorance” about Africa. The paper describes how European maps of the African continent evolved from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. You might have supposed that the process would have been more or less linear: as European knowledge of the continent advanced, the maps would have shown both increasing accuracy and increasing level of details. But that’s not what happened. In the fifteenth century, maps of Africa were, of course, quite inaccurate in regards to distances, coast-lines and so on. They did however contain quite a lot of information about the interior...

Over time, the art of map-making and the quality of information used to make maps got steadily better. The coastline of Africa was first explored, then plotted with growing accuracy, and by the eighteenth century that coastline was shown in a manner essentially indistinguishable from that of modern maps. On the other hand, the interior emptied out... It should be obvious what happened: the improvement in the art of map-making raised the standard for what was considered valid data... And so the crowded (albeit at times inaccurate) continental interior of the old maps became “darkest Africa”, an empty space.


The debate concerning change in West Africa has largely polarized around economic policy and structural adjustment. WALTPS says little about this, which worries a number of potential users. The study’s analyses are neither for nor against, nor even outside, structural adjustment. Movement towards a society of international openness and competition is indeed stressed, and it is precisely the purpose of structural adjustment to achieve this transition. WALTPS is intended to provide a supplement, based on human geography, to approaches that focus on economic policy. It aims to give an imprecise picture of the region’s “interior” to add to the precise map of the “coastline” provided by macro-economic analysis.

Development is a skein. For years people have tried to find which thread to pull that would bring the whole skein with it. In the short-term, it may be that the economic policy thread is the one to pull. In the longer term, economic policy becomes partly endogenous and it is then the systemic nature of development that assumes greater importance. We have to try to seize the whole skein at once if we don’t want to end up with a single thread dangling from our fingers.

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CONCLUSION

A study for understanding rather than for action

Many people work at developing solutions that do not relate directly to the problems faced by those on the ground. Consultants and management gurus gain media success this way, rather than by the value of their analysis of problems or of the practical results they have guided. Fashion plays a determining part in their success. First you find an attractive solution and then you look for a problem it can be applied to.


The point has been made that WALTPS was aimed at all the players in West Africa and not at any particular executive body. It does not therefore seek to produce a plan of action. Can one hope that its users will themselves, according to their position and experience, draw the consequences of this novel understanding of change in the region? This is not of course a comfortable task but it may be beneficial, especially since the region’s policymakers are already faced with a plethora of recommendations.

To use a nautical image, WALTPS intends to be a map of currents. It gives some idea of the currents that are the forces of transformation, and, wherever possible, measures them. It does not claim to set a course or even give a faithful picture of the reefs. But it is essential for navigation, if only to avoid sailing completely against the current.

The effect of WALTPS?

It is too soon to evaluate any impact of the study. Without doubt this exercise would be more credible if done by outsiders. But it can be reported that interest in perspective studies continues. CILSS has decided to undertake a major study on the Sahel’s future, Sahel 21, which will use the WALTPS analyses but will seek more to reflect local people’s view of the future rather than that of a group of experts. At the same time, a group of donors has asked the Club du Sahel to analyze aid to the Sahel past, present and future, under the title Co-operation 21. WALTPS has been discussed in the region with people involved or interested in a process of national perspective study, within the NLTPS program (National Long-term Perspective Studies).

It cannot yet be said whether the study’s analyses have affected the views of particular players. Some ideas do seem to be getting through: the interdependence of coastal and landlocked countries, the need for closer co-operation between English and French-speaking countries, the importance of mobility and the settlement of new population. The monopoly of the Afro-pessimistic vision seems to have been broken. Of course, this is more due to the recent satisfactory results of a few African countries and the (relative?) success of CFA devaluation than to any

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10 This program is supported by the UNDP ‘African Futures’ project, and helps to develop national perspective exercises throughout Africa.
study. However, if WALTPS analyses can make a modest contribution to these changes of attitude towards West Africa, they will have done their job.

In 1968, Gunnar Myrdal published *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*. He described his view of the situation in India: growing overpopulation, massive poverty, profound social inequality, general corruption, the difficulty of undertaking reforms which were often emptied of meaning by the elites, the impossibility of land reform, trade and aid policies in the North that were unsuitable if not harmful. Myrdal was alerting world opinion to the drama that was looming, particularly concerning the food sector. Earlier, in 1965, Esther Boserup had published *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth*. After an analysis of settlement patterns and agricultural change she wrote: “Future historians will probably describe the decades after 1950 as an agricultural revolution in India”.

History was to prove Esther Boserup right, rather than Gunnar Myrdal. But Myrdal’s warning was nonetheless as useful for action as the understanding of long-term trends developed by Boserup. Both visions were useful and they complemented one another.
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gathered with the help of Laurent Bossard

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DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

PRESENTATION OF WORKING PAPERS

Summary report of the WALTPS study SAH/D(94)439


Working paper no. 1 SAH/D(93)415


This paper is a commentary on the demographic database set up for WALTPS: a population explosion unprecedented in history, rapid but fairly balanced urbanization, very varied rural settlement patterns, huge migrations, etc. It includes extracts from the database for the 19 countries studied (totals, urban and rural population 1930-2020, growth rates, internal migration, etc.) and comparative regional tables.

Working paper no. 2 SAH/D(93)410


In the absence of reliable basic statistics, national accounts in West Africa give an incomplete and distorted picture of reality. This paper proposes a complementary picture, just as incomplete and distorted, using a demo-economic accounting framework. After summarizing the construction and scope of social accounting matrices (SAMs), the author proposes an overall audit of the demo-economic performance of West Africa from 1960 to 1990. This analysis reveals encouraging features which may lead to faster sustainable economic growth. They are massive, largely private, capital formation, the emergence of significant domestic and regional markets linked to urbanization, and a structural reduction in the rate of population movement which should make it easier to manage. Conversely, West Africa is subject to serious liabilities such as indebtedness, marginal share of world markets, aid fatigue, and unmotivated elites. The author uses these positive and negative features to suggest a possible picture of West Africa in 2020.

Working paper no. 3 SAH/D(93)411


This paper assumes that existing features will play a major part in shaping the ten years ahead. They are: a flourishing informal sector, a collapsing modern sector, extensive growth without increased productivity, an economy turned towards the outside world, trade and rent-seeking. The total result, however, is overall economic growth that has kept pace with population growth and coped with new settlement patterns. The author describes long-term trends in the world economy and West Africa, and then proposes three ten-year scenarios. An extrapolation scenario, based on overseas trade and economic rents, in which Nigeria expands, and the international community withdraws, in importance in the regional economy. A “multipolar” scenario, in which the countries of highest potential adopt long-term structural adjustment with the very conditional aid of the international community. And, breaking with existing trends, a regional integration scenario, based on economic and monetary integration and aiming for the development of production and trade within West Africa.
Working paper no. 4 SAH/D(93)433


Advances in quantitative geography over the last decade mean that the spatial dimension of the economy can now be examined, especially in rural areas. This paper presents the “market attractiveness” approach devised for WALTPS. Market attractiveness can be defined as the attraction that urban and international markets need to exert on production areas to satisfy their demand. It provides a composite indicator of the impact of various markets, their distance, transport costs, the supply of marketable surpluses, market competition for those surpluses, and competition from imports. This empirical relationship is strengthened by comparing market attractiveness with spatialized data on farm production and settlement patterns. Apart from revealing the specific features of production areas, the study proposes a measurement of the spatial structuring of farming by markets, and defines how this measurement can be used to produce a long-term image. Market attractiveness also provides an approximate explanation of the wide disparities in road density from one area to another.

Working paper no. 5 SAH/D(93)421


How have the nations defined by colonial division developed land use management? This paper reviews the institutional framework of land-use planning policies and evaluates the achievements (communications, education, health care, farming, industry, etc.) of West African countries. With few exceptions it reveals the inconsistency of these policies, which were often poorly framed, deprived of resources, and based on unsuitable areas of land. This unsuitability of territory for policy explains why spontaneous forms of development have arisen, such as networks of markets and border areas. Land-use planning needs to be re-thought; the authors suggest a few ways forward, such as defining policies on the basis of regions that are coherent ecologically and culturally, and quite different from the administrative units which exist for the convenience of government rather than to encourage development.

Working paper no. 6 SAH/D(93)434


WALTPS has shown the value of regarding West Africa as a region in settlement transition where the greatest part of internal investment over the last thirty years has gone towards coping with new population. What is the state of external financial aid to an area of the world generally seen by the international community as a “basket-case”? This paper attempts to answer this question, with a consolidated analysis of all external aid and a study of development aid which is “one transfer among others, but unlike the others”. In Part One, Jean-Marie Cour provides a retrospective quantitative analysis of transfers, establishes the link between shifting settlement patterns and West Africa’s financing requirements and puts forward some ideas for new methods of financing. In Part Two, David Naudet analyzes the role, methods and impact of aid, and suggests that aid should be designed for the long-term, focussing on land use planning and the circulation of knowledge. Both parts stress the need to adapt the international financial flows for West Africa to the region’s internal processes, of which the most important is the shift in settlement patterns.

Working paper no. 7 SAH/D(93)432


Of all the challenges posed by West Africa’s population explosion, education is without doubt one of the greatest. This paper brings together the most recent quantitative data and analyses to show the size of the problems the region is facing now and in the future: 24 million children attending primary school in 1990 (60 per cent of the age group) and more than 50 million to educate in the year 2000. The growth in school attendance over the last decade has been slow or even negative at primary and secondary level, especially in technical education and apprenticeships. However, higher education, reserved for the urban elite, saw considerable and sustained growth up to the end of the 1980s. Not only, therefore, is there a lack of money and staff, but the strategy of allocating resources is out of phase with the needs of the majority, especially disadvantaged urban youth.
**Working paper no. 8 SAH/D(93)412**


This paper describes West African urbanization which, from 1960 to 1980, occurred at three times the highest rate achieved in Europe during the Industrial Revolution. This speed of change explains settlement patterns and land use, and the importance of the informal sector, the preferred “reception area” for new migrants. The city also determines a special social structuring in which “closeness to the authorities” is the main road to individual and collective wealth. The paper deals with meeting basic needs, management of urban land, economic activity and social change in terms of how they have developed and adapted to the economic crisis of the 1980s.

**Working paper no. 9 SAH/D(93)444**

**Evolutions socio-politiques en Afrique de l'ouest: synthèse des réflexions menées dans le cadre de WALTPS.**


Part I describes the development of authority and the State in West African societies from the pre-colonial period to the present day. Part II outlines the social and political issues for the future, in the light of the conclusions of the WALTPS demo-economic analysis: the emergence of new classes of rural and urban entrepreneurs, the development of the local economy and decentralization, the role of the State, social issues involved in urbanization and so on.

**Working paper no. 10 SAH/D(93)417**


As in so many other areas, knowledge of the extent of the AIDS epidemic in Africa is limited. What, however, is known for sure, is that, unlike the rest of the world, the mode of transmission in Africa is limited. What, however, is known for sure, is that, unlike the rest of the world, the mode of transmission in Africa is mostly heterosexual. Its demographic impact will therefore be greater than elsewhere.

**Working paper no. 11 SAH/D(93)406**


This paper compares international and West African databases to assess the real economy in West Africa. The results of this analysis are then re-examined according to two deliberately contrasting and controversial demo-economic viewpoints: the *predatory city*, bloated, distorting the natural regulation of relations with the countryside, generating food dependence and unemployment; and the *structuring city*, which for all its imbalances creates solvent demand and structures its hinterland.

**Working paper no. 12 SAH/D(93)414**


From 1930 to 2030 the population of West Africa will have increased tenfold and the urban population one-hundredfold. The agricultural performance of West Africa over the last thirty years is examined against the background of this enormous population shift. Overall, regional food balances have admittedly deteriorated, as production lags some three years behind demand. But, contrary to widespread opinion, urban eating habits have not become more Western, and West Africa is second only to the rest of SSA as the region in the world with the lowest per capita food imports. However, poorly recorded intra-regional trade appears to be below expected levels by world standards. The model of farm growth led by domestic demand has not worked well. The problem is analyzed under four main topics: the impact of urban demand on farming, what cities offer the countryside in return for food, more intensive farming, and the macro-economic environment.

**Working paper no. 13 SAH/D(93)405**


The paper constructs and analyzes an econometric model explaining world foreign trade behavior as a function of countries’ structural features. In particular it: 1) examines the links between a country’s size or population and its openness to foreign trade, and 2) defines theoretical or potential levels for trade between countries, to be used for
forecasts or to estimate a region’s trade with the rest of the world when combined or divided into countries. West Africa is analyzed as an example of openness in a region. The analysis shows that West Africa as a whole does not appear to be a special case for exports or imports, given its size, wealth and domestic prices.

Working paper no. 14 SAH/D(93)407


Available in French only.

The West African population is strangely absent from economic models which ignore the influence of demography. Supply models assume, often rightly, that the labor supply is unlimited, separating economy from demography. This paper examines ways of integrating population growth and settlement patterns into economic demand models. It starts from the idea that population distribution affects economic behavior. Its hypothesis is that the main cause and effect of population movements is to regulate income variations throughout society. They therefore regulate internal and external shocks to the economy, by increasing or diminishing their effects.

CONTRIBUTING DOCUMENTS, NOTES AND NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

Summary Report At The End Of The First Round Of Study. SAH/D(93)402.

Summary Of The Conclusions Of The First Phase And Summary Report Of The Meeting On The Findings Of The First Phase.SAH/CR(93)80.


Senegal


Nigeria


Ghana


Mali


*Burkina Faso*

**MAIN REFERENCE DOCUMENTS**

**A – DEMOGRAPHY / URBANISATION / RURAL-URBAN RELATIONS**

HILL, H. et PALLONI, A. *Demographic Responses to Economic Shocks: The Case of Latin America*.
A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE


B – ECONOMY / DEVELOPMENT / ECONOMIC ACTIVITY SECTORS


ANNEX 1


A VISION OF WEST AFRICA IN THE YEAR 2020: PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE


C – COOPERATION / REGIONAL INTEGRATION


D – HISTORY AND SOCIETY

### Annex 2

**Basic Statistics**

**Population data**

*Past evolution and population projections for West African countries: classified according to population size in 1990*

Table 1

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(1) CILSS member countries: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad.

(2) West Africa excluding Nigeria

Source: WALTPS OCDE/Club du Sahel

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Source: WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel
Available Migratory Flow Data

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| Total immigration | | 64   | 87   | 0   | 52   | 0   | 12  | 27  | 0   | 0    | 0   | 545 | 61  | 86  | 46  | 23  | 1424 | 0  | 178  | |

Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Origins-Destinations of migrants 15 years of age or more, 1988-1992 (x 1000)

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Source: CILSS/CERPOD. Migrations et Urbanisation en Afrique de l’Ouest, résultats préliminaires, juillet 1995
Socio-economic data

General data
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Source: World Tables World Bank
### Gross domestic product 1980-85-90

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Source: World Tables World Bank
### Value added: agriculture

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*Source: World Tables World Bank*
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Source: World Tables/World Bank
### Value added: services

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*Source: World Tables World Bank*
Data recalculated for present study

Gross regional product and value added by sector, real economy. West Africa (19 countries) (value in $ bn)


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Source: WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel
A Vision of West Africa in the Year 2020: Preparing for the Future

Gross regional product and value added by sector, real economy. West Africa 18 countries (excluding Nigeria) (value in $ bn)
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Source: WALTPS, OCDE/Club du Sahel
### Gross regional product and value added by sector, real economy, Nigeria (value in $ bn)


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<td>Agricultural value added, exports to regional market</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>12,7</td>
<td>6,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural value added, exports to rest of world</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4,1</td>
<td>-9,4</td>
<td>2,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Agri. value added</td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,8</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal non-farm value added</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern non-farm value added</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>5,4</td>
<td>-0,4</td>
<td>4,7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total non-farm value added</td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>215</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0,4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,0</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional product import-export pre-tax</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>4,8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross Regional Product</td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>253</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,4</strong></td>
<td><strong>0,1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,8</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural GRP</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>2,1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban GRP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>-0,1</td>
<td>5,4</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productivity (US$ per capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern non-farm productivity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel*
Gross regional product and value added by sector, real economy. West Africa: population, agricultural, non-agricultural, informal and modern (population in millions).

Table 6.D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural pop</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non agricultural pop</td>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal non agr pop</td>
<td>PNP1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern non agr pop</td>
<td>PNP2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>87</td>
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</table>

Population ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non agr pop/agr pop</td>
<td>PNP/PP</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of urbanization</td>
<td>U/P</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal non agr pop/ non agr pop</td>
<td>PNP1/PNP</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel
ANNEX 3

ADDITIONAL MAPS AND GRAPHS

Urban population growth: Africa compared to world dynamics

Source: United Nation Population Division and WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel

West Africa: Total urban and rural population, 1930-2020

Source: WALTPS, OECD/Club du Sahel
Rural population density in West Africa

Density less than 10 inhab. per km²

Density of between 10 and 25 inhab. per Km²

Density of between 25 and 50 inhab. per Km²

Density of between 50 and 100 inhab. per Km²

Density over 100 inhab. per km²
Towns and road networks

Population in towns
- from 50 000 to 100 000
- from 100 000 to 200 000
- from 200 000 to 500 000
- from 500 000 to 1 million
- from 1 million to 2 million
- from 2 million to 5 million
- from 5 million to 10 million
- more than 10 million

Tar-lined roads

1960

1990

2020
The relationship between rural areas and agricultural markets
The 60 largest West African cities, ranked according to demographic size in 1990, from Lagos (4.3 million inhabitants) to Tamalé (170 000 inhabitants)