Spain (2011), DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations

 

www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews/spain
 

 

 

Overall framework for development co-operation


Narrowing the scope of Spanish co-operation 

Key findings:

The IIIrd Master Plan – Spain’s development policy for 2009 to 2012 – has allowed Spain to promote development co-operation to the level of a key foreign policy pillar. However, the breadth of Spain’s programme – the high number of partner countries, themes and cross-cutting issues – is overly ambitious, causing Spain’s aid to be spread too thinly.

Recommendation:

To increase its development impact, Spain should ensure its IVth Master Plan (2013-2016):

  • Focuses on fewer countries, themes, and cross-cutting issues, and clearly prioritises among them. 
  • Develops clear criteria for selecting partner countries, with particular regard to the aim of reducing poverty.

 

Spain has a well-established institutional structure with the necessary autonomy to implement its policy on development co-operation. The key institution for Spanish co-operation is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation (MAEC), with its State Secretariat for International Co-operation and its Directorate General for Development Policy Planning and Evaluation (DGPOLDE). The share of ODA the ministry manages has been growing rapidly, from 19% of Spain’s total ODA in 2004 to 50% in 2009. AECID, the Spanish Agency for International Development Co-operation, overseen by the State Secretariat for International Co-operation, implements a significant and growing part of the ministry’s aid programmes. Spain has also created a new funding structure – the Fund for the Promotion of Development (FONPRODE) – to protect development co-operation from being co-opted by other interests. However, this fund covers only co-operation implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation (paras 3-6, 84).

 

Although Spain intends to focus its co-operation, and has reduced the number of partner countries from 56 to 50 over the past review period, its programme remains dispersed. To concentrate its bilateral co-operation further, Spain needs to set clear criteria for retaining partner countries. Considering that 65% of its gross bilateral ODA is spent in middle income countries, Spain needs to ensure it focuses consistently on the poorest populations in those countries. Spain should also be clear on how it intends to prioritise among its 10 principles, 12 sectors, and 4 areas of special attention in allocating financial and human resources. (paras 8-12).

 

Developing a policy for working with civil society

Key findings:

Spain has made progress in interacting with multilateral partners and the private sector more strategically. However, it lacks a similar framework for working with NGOs, thus missing an opportunity to capitalise on the potential and resources they offer.

Recommendation:

To use the full potential of the government’s relationship with Spanish NGOs, Spain should:

  • Lay out a clear policy outlining what it wants to achieve with, and through, development NGOs.
  • Further refine its funding instruments to ensure that ODA to and through NGOs is allocated strategically and ensures results.

 

The Spanish government has opened its policy consultations to a wide range of stakeholders, giving many of them a voice in influencing the design of the IIIrd Master Plan. It has also become more strategic in working with multilateral agencies, including through Strategic Partnership Frameworks (see Section 3), and with the private sector through a Strategy for Economic Growth and Promotion of the Business Sector that describes the private sector’s development role (i) as partners in the policy dialogue on development; (ii) as contractors in implementing development co-operation projects; and (iii) as key players in advancing development beyond ODA (paras 18-20, 24-25).

 

Although the Ministry has strengthened its relationship with Spanish civil society, and a significant portion of its co-operation is channelled through NGOs, Spain still needs an explicit policy framework for collaboration with civil society, as structured and predictable as the recent strategy for the private sector. In developing this framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation could build on the dialogue it has established with Spanish NGOs in recent years, including policy consultations. The government should define to what extent, and for what purpose, it wants to work with Spanish, international and partner country NGOs. These roles might include: (i) strengthening civil society in partner countries; (ii) implementing projects or programmes; (iii) commenting on government policies, and iv) strengthening civil society’s watchdog function (paras. 21-23; 107-110).
Improving accountability: preparing for tougher economic times

 

Improving accountability: preparing for tougher economic times

Key findings:

While Spain still benefits from high public support for development co-operation, continued high levels of support cannot be presumed. Spain’s development education and communication strategies are not clear, up to date, and actionable enough to sustain support and AECID does not have adequate capacity to promote guidance for development communication efforts.

Recommendation:

To maintain strong public support for aid and development, the government should:

  • Create an up-to-date actionable plan for development education and communication.
  • Increase the agency’s specialist capacity in development communication.

 

So far, Spain’s development co-operation has been able to rely on strong public support and a commitment to global solidarity with the poor. However, there is a risk of losing public backing in the current economic crisis. A 2010 survey by Fundación Carolina indicates that although public support for development co-operation is still high, it fell from 84% in 2005 to 67% in 2010, while opponents of development co-operation are gaining ground (18%, up from 6% in 2005).


Without public support, Spain’s target of giving 0.7% of its gross national income as ODA will be difficult to achieve. Spain’s increase of the ODA share spent on development education (from 1.2% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2009) was a step in the right direction. Autonomous communities and local entities together finance and carry out nearly four-fifths of this work, and therefore play a crucial role. Civil society is also an important pillar of the broad-based public support for development co-operation. But to promote and facilitate its communication efforts, and those of other development players, Spanish co-operation needs up-to-date, actionable strategies or plans for development education and communication. Raising awareness and fostering a culture of global solidarity are priorities in the current Master Plan. However, the ministry’s 2007 strategy on development education is too broad and outdated, and provides little guidance to staff. Its latest communication plan also dates from 2007. The agency would benefit from having more staff specialised in development communication and education (paras 28-29).


Promoting development beyond aid

Key findings:

Over the last four years, Spain’s efforts to live up to its strong legal commitment to policy coherence for development have focused largely on setting up new institutions. However, Spain has insufficient capacity for analysis and monitoring of policy coherence issues. Information is not used effectively and systematically between the existing bodies and towards development stakeholders in a way that would allow monitoring, analysis and accountability to inform and influence policy decisions.

Recommendation:

To monitor policy coherence development efforts in a way that informs and influences policy,  Spain should:

  • Strengthen its capacity to analyse policies for coherence, and ensure that information about policy coherence analysis and decisions flows freely and effectively between existing bodies.

 

Spain is one of a handful of donors that have written their commitment to policy coherence for development into their legal framework. Spain’s IIIrd Master Plan commits all of Spain’s public policies to contribute to the eradication of poverty and sustainable human development. To do so, Spain has created several new bodies to ensure that all Spanish policies are coherent with its development mission: i) The Delegated Committee on International Development: to arbitrate among policies at cabinet level, and ii) a network of focal points for policy coherence: this cross-ministry network, which is currently being set up, will be facilitated by an inter-ministerial committee and led by a dedicated policy coherence unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation (paras 34, 38).

 

However, monitoring policies for coherence with development objectives is made difficult by the fact that the relationship between the new instruments is unclear, and information flows are not used effectively and systematically at all levels. For example, more information about decisions should trickle down from the Delegated Committee to co-ordinating and monitoring bodies. Spain could also draw on non-government actors like NGOs who make their own reporting and analyses on policy coherence. Once it is operational, the network of focal points should also provide information. Spain should then ensure there is sufficient capacity to analyse and monitor the development impact of policies and consolidate available information to influence policy decisions. (paras 3-39, 41-44).


Aid volume and allocation

 

Concentrating official development assistance

Key findings:

During much of the period under review, Spain continued to increase its ODA significantly, though the global economic crisis led to cuts in volume reported in 2009 and 2010. However, Spain spreads its financial resources for development co-operation too thinly among its partner countries, compromising impact on the ground.

Recommendation: 

Using the pause in ODA growth and becoming more selective in how it allocates its aid could help Spain to improve the quality and effectiveness of its cooperation. To this end, Spain should:

  • Narrow the geographic focus of its development aid to allow greater concentration of resources on fewer partner countries.


Spain made significant efforts to reach the international target of giving 0.7% of its gross national income (GNI) as ODA. It doubled its aid as a percentage of GNI from 0.23% in 2003 to 0.46% in 2009. The global economic crisis led Spain to cut ODA in 2009 and 2010 - cuts as severe as those made to the overall public administration. The ODA/GNI share fell to 0.43% in 2010, short of the target of a 0.56%Spain set for itself in its Master Plan, as well as of the 0.51% target expected of it within the EU. Even so, with ODA at USD 5.95 billion in 2010, Spain ranks 7th among DAC donors in terms of volume, one place higher than in the 2007 review (paras. 51-53).


To use this pause in ODA growth constructively, and to improve the quality of its co-operation, Spain has defined nine ambitious spending targets for geographical, sector, and thematic allocations. These include allocating more of its bilateral ODA to least developed and other low income countries, and concentrating 85% of its geographically distributable ODA in 37 priority partner countries. However, Spain’s aid remains fragmented, and Spain is among the DAC members which least concentrate their aid. Spain should exercise flexibility in meeting its spending targets, in order to respond to partner country needs, and overall, make new efforts to reduce the number of its partner countries (paras. 54-55, 59, 62-63).


Conducting a strategic dialogue with decentralised actors 

Key findings: 

Almost one-fifth of Spanish ODA is delivered by sub-national development actors. However, information about this part of Spain’s co-operation is not always available to other parts of the Spanish co-operation system. This may render Spanish aid less transparent, less cohesive, and hamper partner governments’ ability to plan and co-ordinate aid.

Recommendation:

To increase transparency and cohesion, especially at country level, Spain should:

  • Ensure that all Spanish development actors, including sub-national ones, share information on their activities in the framework of cooperation at country level, and that partner country government at central and local levels are fully informed. 


Of all the DAC members, Spain has the highest share of ODA coming from sub-national actors – 19% of its total net bilateral ODA is financed by Spain’s 17 autonomous communities and local entities. Although this share has decreased from 26% in 2005, it remains significant. This decentralised co-operation – most of which is channelled through NGOs – is an asset in supporting partner countries at local level; it also serves to maintain public support for development co-operation. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation has strengthened the dialogue between the national and sub-national entities on development co-operation, and parliament adopted a new legal framework in 2010 that lays the foundations for closer links in designing development policy. However, partner countries and the Spanish co-operation offices need to be informed of these efforts, so they can improve planning and implementation. This will ensure that Spain’s co-operation is transparent, cohesive and has the greatest possible impact (paras 26-27, 57-58).


Ensuring that Spain’s multilateral contributions are strategic

Key findings:

Spain’s new approach to working with multilateral agencies is selective and concentrates allocations in fewer organisations. However, this work could be more strategic and better informed.

Recommendation:

To strengthen its strategic involvement with multilateral agencies and ensure it maximises the impact of Spanish multilateral aid, Spain should:

  • Use systematically the lessons from performance assessments and feedback from its field offices to guide its support to multilateral agencies.


Spain’s core contributions to multilateral organisations have almost doubled since 2005, and in 2009 Spain was the 7th largest DAC contributor to multilateral agencies’ core budgets. Both the IInd and IIIrd Master Plans outline Spain’s resolve to “engage in active, selective, and effective multilateralism”. Having backed up its rapidly growing multilateral contributions with a strategy in 2009, Spain is concluding Strategic Partnership Frameworks with eight multilateral agencies, through which it channels 51% of its ODA – both core and non-core contributions. According to its current Master Plan, Spain intends to concentrate its multilateral ODA even further, eventually spending 80% of multilateral contributions on only 10 international organisations by 2012. By 2009 it had reached 76%. Spain’s efforts for more strategic allocations and selective partnerships with multilateral organisations are welcome and should be pursued. (paras. 20, 64-68). 


Spain does not yet systematically use its multilateral assessments and lessons to define its own policies and help multilateral agencies improve their work. Spain should ensure that its representatives on the boards of multilateral agencies receive and use the feedback and insights into the strengths and weaknesses of multilateral agencies provided by Spanish field offices. This information can be a constructive source to influence decision making at executive board levels in these organisations in order to improve their effectiveness, efficiency and impact (para. 19-20).


Organisation and management

 

Creating clear links between Spanish co-ordinating bodies

Key findings:

Spain has improved consultation with Spanish development actors at headquarters and in the field. However, its five co-ordinating bodies at headquarters are not well inter-connected or working in a way that will effectively inform technical, policy and strategic decision-making across government.

Recommendation:

To use the full potential of all Spanish development actors and ensure co-ordination, Spain should:

  • Review how its co-ordinating bodies add value to development co-operation, and ensure that they work in a complementary way so that the outcomes of discussions inform technical, policy and strategic decision-making across government.


Spanish development co-operation has a particularly complex institutional structure. Not only is aid allocated by 14 ministries within the general state administration, but sub-national development actors also play a significant role, adding further complexity to the picture. This multitude of actors and delivery channels requires close co-ordination and synergy to reduce dispersion of efforts and resources, and increase cohesion and impact (para. 85).


Spain’s new Country Partnership Framework agreements help to improve policy co-ordination among Spanish actors in the field.  At headquarters Spain has five bodies that co-ordinate, consult and advise on development co-operation. Two co-ordinate ministries (the Delegated Committee on International Development, and the Inter-ministerial Committee for Development Co-operation), two co-ordinate national and decentralised actors (the Sector Conference on Development, and the Inter-territorial Commission for Development Co-operation), and one is an advisory body comprising public and private sector entities and NGOs (the Development Co-operation Council). It is not clear how these bodies should work together to strengthen the strategic planning and delivery of Spanish co-operation. It is critical that the communication among these bodies is transparent and that the outcomes of their discussions are used effectively to inform technical, policy and strategic decision making across government. (paras. 86-88).


Taking the step from evaluation to learning

Key findings:

Spanish development co-operation aims to re-orient its planning, monitoring and evaluation according to the goal of “managing for development results”. However, this effort has so far been hindered by  mixed quality indicators against which the impact of Spain’s official development assistance can be monitored, as well as mechanisms to ensure it learns from its evaluations.

Recommendations:

To demonstrate results and promote a learning culture:

  • DGPOLDE and AECID should roll out their tools for managing for development results in all country offices, and train staff to define targets and indicators that make it possible to monitor the impact of development assistance interventions.
  • Spanish co-operation should use the information on results that it gains from its evaluations to influence policy, programming and institutional learning, and to inform the public.

 

The current Master Plan puts managing for development results at the forefront of efforts. It lays out how Spain aims to do this in three areas: planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Spain has begun to roll out this new approach by developing training and guidance. In orienting its evaluation systems towards measuring results, its commitment to building an evaluation and learning culture will be an advantage. Spain has an evaluation policy and a dedicated, independent division for evaluation within the Directorate General.. Evaluation now plays an important role in the new strategic frameworks with partner countries and multilateral agencies. The development agency has seen the number of evaluations increase four-fold between 2007 and 2009, mostly owed to a requirement for NGOs funded by AECID, and above a certain threshold, to evaluate their projects (paras 130-131).


However, Spain could become more strategic about what it evaluates, and how it learns from the results of evaluations. This requires using the outcomes of evaluations to influence policy, programming and institutional learning, and to inform the public. It also entails having the right indicators to measure results in the first place. Although field offices now have to define the results they want to reach from the outset in their new programming framework, a recent internal AECID self-evaluation found that little had been achieved so far in laying the foundations for monitoring and evaluating whether these results were indeed being achieved. Instead, monitoring still tended to give more weight to how money was spent, as the agency lacked the right indicators to measure results and impact. Spain will need to define from the outset how strategic evaluations can inform future programming, plan them accordingly and help field offices define the right indicators, while continuing to conduct operational evaluations for learning and accountability purposes (paras. 96-97).


Defining a human resource policy that emphasises staff mobility and performance

Key findings:

Spain’s human resource policy does not allow for sufficient staff mobility between headquarters and the field, nor does it have a performance management system. These two areas are crucial for sustaining institutional competence and capitalising on available human resources effectively.

Recommendations:

In an economic context where “doing more with less” will become the norm, Spain needs clear criteria and policies to support decisions on how to deploy resources most effectively and efficiently. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation and AECID should:

  • Develop a human resource policy and a medium-term plan for staff mobility and rotation.
  • Introduce an individual performance management system linked to organisational objectives and results.


Spanish co-operation has significantly strengthened its human resource base since the last peer review. AECID’s large-scale recruitment of a professional cadre of 93 programme managers and 120 project managers has made it possible to engage closely in the field with partner countries. However, the ministry and AECID continue to suffer from insufficient staff mobility between the field and headquarters. This is a missed opportunity to capitalise on staff knowledge both at headquarters and in the field, and to enhance Spain’s ability to attract and retain high quality development experts. As Spain expects a high turnover of staff in key positions in field offices in the coming years, it needs a medium-term plan for staff mobility and rotation to facilitate those changes and safeguard institutional competence. Within the ministry, managers should be guided by (i) the aim of making it easier for staff to move within the organisation; and (ii) managing and developing careers. These aspects should also be reinforced in AECID’s next management contract (2011-2014). Furthermore, AECID should consider giving greater employment continuity and responsibility to locally-recruited partner country nationals working on substantive issues (paras 83, 102-103).


A second pillar of Spain’s human resource policies should be the introduction of a performance management system. Although the Basic Statute of Public Employees (2007) makes performance assessment compulsory for every administration in Spain, there is currently no such system for public servants in the Ministry according to the OECD’s 2011 publication Governance at a Glance nor is there one in its development agency. The Spanish administration should accelerate its efforts to implement such a system, which is needed to enable managers to engage with staff on their career development, including mobility, and encourage individual ownership and personal accountability, thereby supporting a business environment that focuses on results, outcomes and impact (para. 103).

 

Improving the impact of development co-operation


Using aid effectiveness tools at country level

Key findings:

Spain has made progress in designing strategies and planning frameworks that will help to make its aid more effective. Putting these new tools into practice at all levels is necessary to translate intentions into actions.

Recommendation:

To make Spain’s co-operation more effective, Spain should:

  • Ensure that field offices and all Ministries that spend ODA understand and use the new planning methodology and tools.


Spain has made remarkable progress in making its aid more effective, going far beyond the recommendations of the 2007 peer review. Not only has it made the international aid effectiveness agenda a beacon of its development policy, but it has also thoroughly re-thought and re-designed its programming process to put these principles into practice. Spain’s policy changes since 2009 and an Aid Effectiveness Action Plan endorsed in January 2011 have paved the way for significant progress in its operations. Its new planning methodology, based on country partnership frameworks and oriented towards results (see section on evaluation to learning), bodes well for greater ownership of programmes by partner countries. It has made programme and sector based approaches the main co-operation modality in many country offices. While the right tools are in place, it is important that they are used by all the ministries that spend ODA (not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation) and rolled out to field offices with the necessary authority to make decisions. (paras 111-114).


Untying aid

Key findings:

While Spain  is making progress in untying its aid overall, it is among the poorest DAC performers when it comes to untying its co-operation with least developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDC highly-indebted poor countries (required by the DAC Recommendation of 2001/8).

Recommendation:

To get better value for money from its official development assistance:

  • Spain should follow its schedule for untying the remainder of its tied aid at all levels of its administration.

 

Spain has made good progress in untying its aid – overall, it untied 75% of its aid to developing countries in 2009, getting close to the DAC average of 79%. However, it needs to make sure it follows its schedule to fully untie the remaining portion of ODA. Spain untied only 77% of its aid to LDCs and non-LDC highly-indebted poor countries in 2009, compared to the DAC average of 94%. Spain’s schedule foresees that efforts by AECID, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, of Trade, Industry and Tourism, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance will untie all ODA by 2015. Untying Spanish aid fully will not only require an effort from the central administration, but also from autonomous communities and municipalities, which continue to tie a large number of small aid amounts to services provided by Spanish entities (paras 124-125).

 

Sharing knowledge on capacity development in middle-income countries

Key findings:

Despite having no dedicated strategy, Spain has gained valuable experience in developing capacity in middle-income countries, which receive a large part of its ODA. Capacity development can help consolidate development gains – a subject of interest to an increasing number of donors.

Recommendation:

To build on Spain’s engagement in middle-income countries, Spain should:

  • Make capacity building a goal in its country partnership frameworks, and collect and share Spanish lessons and experience with capacity development, especially in middle-income countries.

 

Despite having no strategy to guide it, Spain engages in developing local capacity. Spain’s support to developing capacity in partner countries focuses mostly on technical assistance, but this is delivered in ways that allow Spain to build not only individual but also institutional capacity. With its significant engagement in middle-income countries, where Spain directs 65% of its gross bilateral ODA, it has gained expertise in building capacity in contexts where inequality persists. Spain should make capacity building an explicit goal in its country partnership frameworks and sector strategies. We encourage Spain to collect the knowledge accumulated in its field offices, share it with other donors, and use the lessons it draws in future planning. In this effort, it should also capitalise on the knowledge of its field offices on triangular co-operation (Box 1; paras.118 120).

 

Triangular co-operation: Spain's potential to become a bridge-builder

Spain has gained a reputation as a bridge-builder between middle-income countries and least developed countries in Latin America. Spain’s current Master Plan makes a strong commitment to triangular co-operation as a tool that Spain aims to use in priority partner countries where it wants to consolidate development gains. One of the aims is to provide capacity building and to change the nature of its co-operation as partner countries “graduate” from developing country status. Spain has worked with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Mexico to provide assistance in third countries such as Haiti or Paraguay. One of the challenges Spain continues to point out is how to monitor and evaluate triangular co-operation jointly.

 

Towards better humanitarian donorship

 

Consolidating good progress in humanitarian programming

Key findings:

Spain has made solid, and sometimes ground-breaking, progress as it reinvents and refines its significant humanitarian assistance programme. Further efficiency gains could be made in the area of partnerships; and cross-government co-ordination mechanisms, accountability, and learning could be strengthened.

Recommendation:

To consolidate its considerable progress in humanitarian programming, Spain should:

  • Reduce the administrative burden on NGO partners, and introduce common funding and performance monitoring criteria for all NGO and multilateral partners
  • Seek appropriate international training and/or accreditation for all actors within the Spanish response system.

 

Spain now has a bold, strategic and flexible humanitarian programme, guided by a comprehensive humanitarian strategy, under the Spanish development co-operation Master Plan. AECID has also adopted innovative approaches to supporting recovery – focusing on strengthening partner responses and front-loading development assistance - however, it is too soon to see results. Disaster risk reduction is not yet an overarching priority, but AECID’s Humanitarian Office is supporting some useful programming in this area (paras 135-139).

 

Spain is clearly committed to working in a strategic and open manner with partners, providing flexible, and often multi-annual, funding that is focused on delivering results; and promoting mutual accountability. Partners consider Spain an active and responsive donor who values their inputs. However, some areas for improvement remain, particularly in the areas of predictability, beneficiary participation and NGO administrative burden (paras 141-142).


Spain was the 6th largest humanitarian donor of all DAC members in 2009 (up from 9th place in 2007), and it has used its new status as a major player to encourage better donor co-ordination and support triangular co-operation. AECID has developed clear criteria for carving up its humanitarian budget, with a focus on vulnerability and responding in priority sectors. However, this highly developed set of response criteria requires adequate evidence from partners – evidence that is proving hard to obtain (paras 145-146).
AECID has clearly made enormous progress towards good humanitarian donorship, and is now working to build capacity in the autonomous regions (responsible for 8.9% of humanitarian aid in 2009), but this remains a strategic challenge in Spain’s decentralised environment. Spain is encouraged to seek further training and international accreditation for all Spanish response actors, including civil protection (paras 149-150).


Spain recognises the need to move towards a formal learning culture, and to shift its monitoring focus towards analysing programmatic impact. This is complicated, however, as Spain has a very hands-on humanitarian business model, requiring staff skilled in analysis and field decision making – skills that only a handful of AECID staff currently possess (paras 151-153).

 

 

Good practice: Spain is a leader in rapid response

The 2007 peer review recommended that Spain review the effectiveness of its rapid response interventions, and AECID has subsequently taken giant steps in this area, emerging with a flexible portfolio of innovative and effective rapid response tools. These range from joint Spanish/World Food Programme logistics depots to pre-positioned funds with NGO partners, wide flexibility to reallocate budgets (including development funds), direct delivery of in-kind aid, surge deployment, and support from Spanish civil protection, military and police. Co-ordination takes place in rapidly called and regularly repeated emergency meetings involving all partners, including NGOs, aimed at developing one coherent Spanish response strategy (paras 147-148).

 

Developing a systematic approach to risk

Key findings:

Spain must take care to manage its exposure to risk if it is to retain the necessary flexibility to continue with its unique, innovative, and effective hands-on delivery model.

Recommendation:

To reduce overall exposure to negative outcomes in complex humanitarian environments, Spain should:

  • Develop a systematic approach to the assessment, communication and management of programmatic risk.

 

Political and public support for humanitarian programming is currently high in Spain, as the peer review team found in discussions with parliament and presidential advisors. However, lessons from many other donors warn that a change in political orientation often brings additional scrutiny of the humanitarian effort – it takes just one media scandal to reverse public opinion and anger lawmakers. Spain would be wise to build a systematic approach to assessing, communicating and managing programmatic risk into its humanitarian strategy to protect its enviable and flexible humanitarian space (para. 140).

 

Related Documents

 

Peer reviews in development co-operation

Spain (2007), DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations

 

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