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During the financial crisis many governments aided both the financial and non-financial sectors in their countries on an unprecedented scale. These emergency measures have in some cases taken precedence over competition rules. In particular the fact that governments helped some banks but not others has weakened competition in some markets, with “too big to fail” institutions commanding a higher market share than previously. This has
The OECD conducted an online public consultation on draft high-level principles on consumer protection in the field of financial services which came to an end on 31 August 2011.
This report examines the interplay between banking competition and financial stability, taking into account the consequences of the recent global crisis and the policy responses it provoked.
In recent years, India has enjoyed one of the highest growth rates worldwide, weathering the global financial crisis better than many other countries.
This paper examines how the the distributive impact of macroeconomic shocks is shaped by selected institutions. It uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework with heterogeneous agents and an endogenous collateral constraint.
This book presents the key findings resulting from discussions held at a series of best practice roundtables on competition and procurement.
This paper addresses the often neglected question of how macroeconomic risk is shared across and within economies, and identifies reforms that could contribute towards achieving more desirable risk-sharing outcomes.
Two back to back events were organised in Jerusalem on 28-30 June 2011 – a two-day Israel-OECD Conference “Cutting Bureaucracy: Regulation and Services” and a one-day workshop at the technical level on “Improving the Design and Evaluation of Regulation and the use of Regulatory Impact Analysis”.
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What types of policies nations should use to address the threat of global climate change? This document discusses the implications of different market-based policy alternatives and shows that not only competition enforcement and advocacy can make such policies more effective, but that the policies themselves also have effects on competition. An executive summary and an aide-memoire of that discussion as well as an analytical note by
Observership by non-OECD economies in the Committee is actively encouraged based on a strategy which outlines criteria for identifying potential observers and defines their role and participation in the work of the Committee.