Observership by non-OECD economies in the Committee is actively encouraged based on a strategy which outlines criteria for identifying potential observers and defines their role and participation in the work of the Committee.
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Tradeable emission permits are considered an efficient instrument for achieving a given emission target at lowest possible economic cost. Tradeable permit schemes, also called cap and trade schemes, have become major pollution control instruments. They have been implemented at a national level and, as in the European Union, at supra-national level. The main idea behind emission permits is to create a system of property rights for
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This report on Competition Law, Policy and Enforcement was prepared in the OECD Competition Committee as part of the process of Chile’s accession to OECD membership. The Committee was requested to examine the core competition features and to provide OECD Council with a formal opinion on the willingness and ability of Chile to assume the obligations of OECD membership. In doing so, the Competition Committee assessed the degree of
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Esta revisión de la aplicación de la ley y la política de competencia enChile es parte de una serie de revisiones de las políticas nacionalesemprendidas por el Comité de Competencia de la OCDE. Se redactó comoparte del proceso de adhesión de Chile a la OCDE. Después de completar sus procedimientos internos, Chile se convirtió en miembro de la OCDE, el 7 de mayo de 2010.
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This document discusses the impact on competition of State Aids and Subsidies are applied by governments as well as the ways to improve the assessment of their impact. It includes a Keynote Speech by the EU Competition Commissioner as well as submissions from Argentina, Croatia, Egypt, the European Union, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, India, Jordan, Lithuania, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, the
Efficient provision of transport infrastructure is critical to economic growth. The long asset lives of much transport infrastructure indicates governance through regulation, rather than through contract or public ownership. This can ensure predictability in long-term relationships whilst preserving some flexibility to deal with changes in external circumstances.
The transparency created by a fully independent regulator is invaluable for ensuring sufficient investment is forthcoming, while maintaining reasonable conditions for user access. Discussion at the Roundtable focussed on how to achieve effective independent regulation and how to reconcile independence with the legitimate control of policy by the executive part of government.
Independent regulation is not seen as a universal default governance arrangement. Much of the discussion focused on when to regulate and when to rely on competition, even if imperfect, to drive efficiency. The discussions underscored that there are opportunities to improve performance significantly in the aviation, rail and road sectors, by learning from successful experience in improving governance structures in a range of countries.
In recent years, the financial sector has been extensively debated at OECD Competition meetings, thereby bringing together a variety of influential actors such as senior competition officials, market regulators, academics and representatives of the business community. Competition Issues in the Financial Sector 2011 presents the key findings from these discussions into a cohesive narrative. It also includes the executive summaries of
Trade can be impeded by inefficient transport infrastructure, border procedures or information flows. Better logistics services reduce trade costs for businesses and improve the competitiveness of a country's exports, according to this study. (OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 108)
What goes into sound regulation? What are the tools, strategies and processes that will result in regulatory policy that truly contributes to economic growth and society’s well-being?
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Standard setting yields substantial benefits to consumers and often promotes competition to benefit consumers. Nonetheless, at times, standard setting can give rise to potential consumer harms. By bringing together different players in an industry, the standard setting process provides an opportunity for collusion, deception and strategy about which regulators must be vigilant and proactive. The discussion held found that a standard