Publications

Institutions of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations

Challenges Ahead

In series:OECD Fiscal Federalism Studiesview more titles

Published on November 18, 2015

book

Intergovernmental fiscal institutions are the overarching framework for relations across government levels. They comprise the constitutional set up of a country; the division of power between government levels; the prevalence of fiscal rules across government levels; intergovernmental budget frameworks; the role of independent bodies such as fiscal councils in shaping fiscal relations; the inter-ministerial organisation of fiscal decision making; and other framework conditions shaping intergovernmental fiscal relations and fiscal policy. This book brings together academics and practitioners dealing with or being involved in shaping the institutions of intergovernmental fiscal relations. It has an interdisciplinary focus and provides insight from various academic or practitioners’ fields: economists, political scientists, budget management specialists and others.
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword
Executive summary
The role of intergovernmental fiscal institutions: The case of tax sharing
Intergovernmental fiscal relations and fiscal coordination during the crisis
Fiscal constitutions: The fundamental drivers of intergovernmental fiscal policy
Fiscal adjustment, decentralisation and sub-national autonomy
Soft budget constraints: The case of municipal bonds in Italy
Fiscal relations across levels of government and sub-national fiscal rules in Japan
Intergovernmental budget frameworks in Austria
Autonomy and interdependence: The scope and limits of “fend for yourself federalism” in the United States
What makes a local government reform successful? The Finnish experience
Intergovernmental co-ordination of fiscal policy in Switzerland
The budgetary policy framework in Sweden and its implication for intergovernmental fiscal relations
Municipal bailouts in Denmark – and how to avoid them
Multilevel fiscal institutions and mechanisms for reducing tax cheating: The case of Mexico
Contributors
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