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**REPORT OF THE INFORMAL WORKSHOP ON “THE INTERNATIONAL AID SYSTEM:
WHAT NEXT?”**

Paris, 4 February 2005

Jointly organised by the OECD Development Centre and the Overseas Development Institute, in collaboration with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) / Development Cooperation Directorate.

OECD Team: Louka T. Katseli, Henri-Bernard Solignac-Lecomte, Felix Zimmermann

ODI Team: Simon Maxwell, Andrew Rogerson, Paolo De Renzio

Contacts:

OECD Development Centre: Henri-Bernard.Solignac-Lecomte@oecd.org;
Felix.Zimmermann@oecd.org

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**REPORT OF THE INFORMAL WORKSHOP ON
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1. Following a request by the Chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the OECD Development Centre, in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute and in consultation with the Development Co-operation Directorate, organised a one-day informal workshop on “The International Aid System: What’s Next?” in Paris on 4 February 2005.¹ The aim was to place the DAC’s work on aid effectiveness into the context of the wider debate on the future of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and to lay the tracks for future work and research. Academics, practitioners and policy makers from donor and recipient countries were invited to contribute short notes ahead of the meeting, and to express themselves in their own capacity, under the Chatham House rule. Although there were some points of divergence, some common ground emerged. The most salient points of this discussion are summarised below, divided into four parts:

- A. The global consensus on aid has yet to deliver
- B. Incentives for change, and constraints
- C. Considerations in moving ahead
- D. What next for the OECD and its partners?

A. The global consensus on aid has yet to deliver

2. Evidence from recipient countries shows that the global consensus on the need for more effective aid and on the means to achieve it – as embodied in the aid effectiveness pyramid – has yet to deliver. Presentations from African and Latin American speakers, which were widely endorsed by Workshop participants, revealed emphatically that the major gaps identified prior to the first High Level Forum in Rome (HLF-I) remain unchanged on the eve of the HLF-II in Paris.

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| <p>The global consensus model</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- the primacy of poverty reduction, broadly defined;- coherent policy stances, especially on trade, supportive of development goals;- good governance principles and an emphasis on building effective institutions;- accountability and participation;- donor alignment on country-owned strategies;- results-based management;- reduced conditionality, enhanced allocation;- increased predictability of aid;- harmonised approaches across autonomous aid agencies;- and a sharp increase in ODA leveraged on all the above. |
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3. In spite of repeated promises, aid volumes are not rising sufficiently to meet the Millennium Development Goals. The 0.7% target remains far away, as does the target for LDCs. Moreover, the bulk of the recent increase in ODA is accounted for by debt relief and security-related activities, and the prospects for a broad international agreement about new and innovative sources of financing for development (IFF, global taxes etc.) remain elusive.

1. See programme and list of participants at the end of this document. Presentations made on that occasion can be downloaded from www.oecd.org/dev/meetings/aidworkshop.

4. Aid remains unpredictable. Donors are reluctant to make multi-year financial commitments upon which recipients could rely in their budgetary planning and Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs). Conditions for aid disbursement are often inconsistently applied and the determination of resource envelopes is regarded by some as slow and non-transparent. Moreover, not based on an objective assessment of needs and performance, aid allocations have resulted in the phenomenon of *donor orphans* and *donor darlings*.

5. In contrast with the high degree of support for harmonisation within the international community, the aid system appears increasingly fragmented. Donor efforts are criticised as being disjointed and weakly coordinated, with diverse disbursement mechanisms and monitoring procedures. On a global level, new bilateral and multilateral initiatives, such as the global funds, seem to be undermining the harmonisation agenda by introducing entirely new systems and modalities.

6. Although some progress has been made, aid is still not being aligned with country-led systems. Projects remain the prevalent modality of aid delivery, despite agreement on the necessity for greater budget support and sector-wide approaches. Aid is delivered as an add-on, frequently channelled through donor-managed parallel structures, rather than being integrated into government priorities and budget cycles. Certain forms of technical assistance are felt to be imposed by donors, rather than being demand-driven and supportive of national capacity-building efforts.

7. Donors' disbursement conditions remain complicated and inflexible to respond to shocks and changing priorities, with one speaker referring to the phenomenon of the "matrix-master", a donor-side expert who is the sole person to understand the complex web of procedural requirements at country level. In their reluctance to transfer ownership to recipient countries, donors also seem hesitant to decentralise decision-making authority from headquarters to the country level.

8. The consensus model has placed much emphasis on the need to support recipient country ownership of the development process. Yet large capacity gaps remain, with many countries struggling to design poverty reduction policies that are integrated into growth strategies, to involve civil society in this process, to collect adequate data, and to carry out effective monitoring of results. Coordinating a large variety of donors in such an environment appears in many cases to be an insurmountable challenge.

9. Finally, the poverty-focus of aid remains far from certain. In what is frequently an unsupportive institutional environment, poverty-reduction frameworks are not country-owned. On the recipient side, the necessary involvement of local stakeholders remains insufficient, although the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach has created welcome new channels for participation. On the donor side, a predisposition to micromanage policies and impose inappropriate models on recipients still poses major challenges for reform. As a result, country specificities have been disregarded at the expense of one-size-fits-all solutions, and policies essential for poverty reduction – such as private sector development – have been underemphasised. In this context, Workshop participants also mentioned the continuing focus on inputs and process, rather than on poverty-reduction outcomes and results.

B. Incentives for change, and constraints

10. Having identified major gaps in reform, discussions turned to the reasons for which rhetoric was not being translated into action. Contributions pointed to the need to look at incentives for collective action amongst both donors and recipients. This revealed that the "consensus model" stands somewhat less firmly than it ought to, given the unanimity of stakeholder preferences it presumes.

11. The poverty-reduction objectives of development co-operation are compromised by other donor interests, such as security, trade and migration. These interests lie at the heart of two major systemic

problems identified by Workshop participants. Firstly, historical ties or other strategic interests, rather than objective criteria, may determine aid allocations, resulting in the emergence of the abovementioned donor darlings and orphans. Secondly, recipients are still pressured into adopting policies (e.g. privatisation) or accepting modalities (e.g. tied technical assistance) that may not, in all circumstances, be appropriate from the point of view of poverty reduction. Combined, these problems detract from the coherence and predictability of the aid system.

12. Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies are in constant competition for scarce donor resources, both with each other and with other domestic ministries. In making the case for increased funding, they are prone to focus on activities that are more visible to domestic taxpayers, but not necessarily more effective in reducing poverty. Thus, emergency relief will garner greater public support than multi-annual commitment to budget support, and social sectors will attract higher priority than productive sectors. Connected with this are the strong accountability requirements faced by agencies spending public money. These are passed on to recipient countries directly in the form of stricter fiduciary conditions and higher administrative costs, or indirectly through the establishment of parallel and non-aligned structures, as well as through the strong focus on measurable inputs rather than longer-term results.

13. Despite a long series of initiatives, reform of multilateral institutions was widely regarded as a major obstacle to progress. Speakers cited a high degree of overlap and inconsistency between the mandates of the major institutions, particularly within the UN system, but also between the UN agencies, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). In this context, two other constraints were highlighted, with particular reference to the BWIs. Firstly, decision making structures are weighted in favour of creditor countries, either through voting shares or through representation in the major decision-making bodies. Secondly, appointed staff is largely drawn from creditors' finance ministries or central banks, resulting in lower familiarity with development problems faced at country level, and potentially in a lack of coherence with bilateral aid agency activities.

14. In many respects, the development discourse does not recognise that there are a considerable number of recipient countries for which the proposed consensus model may not be appropriate. This largely concerns two major groups of countries. The first is a group of emerging countries that have ensured access to new sources of capital and are thus becoming less dependent on aid, more politically assertive and somewhat less focussed on immediate poverty reduction objectives. These countries may prefer to deal with donors selectively and to limit their number of donor partners.

15. The second is a diverse group of recipient countries which, due to large-scale capacity constraints or unfavourable institutional environments, may not regard harmonisation and alignment as their first priority. It was noted that fragile or conflict-ridden states, particularly those in which downward accountability and adequate participation of important local stakeholders were lacking, are not in a position to take ownership of their development strategies, and that donor approaches may legitimately involve greater use of parallel channels or conditionality in their aid programs.

16. Conflicting incentives can also be observed amongst the many recipient countries for which the Paris agenda may well constitute the appropriate path to follow. Whilst some have progressed well with donor coordination mechanisms – Nicaragua, Tanzania and Mozambique were cited as examples – others appear more willing to put up with donor diversity and requirements as measurable risks and inescapable costs of the aid system. The latter have thus preferred a “wait-and-see” strategy, arguing that the future benefits of reform are uncertain. Some participants noted that such recipient positions form part of a cycle in which the resultant lack of donor trust further hinders progress in the pursuit of ownership, harmonisation and alignment.

C. Considerations in moving ahead

17. Opinions at the Workshop converged to recognise that, whilst remaining inactive was not an option, a uniformly-applied “big bang approach” to improving the development-effectiveness of the international aid system seemed neither feasible nor desirable; the aim was to widen, not restrict, political space for action. Combining an ambitious long-term vision with short, achievable goals along the way would require like-minded groups of partners to advance the agenda in areas where they had a particular interest. This was linked to the call for a “menu” approach, whereby donor and recipients countries could individually or collectively proceed in those areas which most suit their preferences and local conditions. Strict application of the principle of subsidiarity would be required, in order to limit action at global level to those challenges which could not be adequately addressed at country level. This approach was referred to by some participants as “radical incrementalism”.

18. There was widespread agreement that any attempts at reform would have to involve greater recognition of diversity, both between donors and between recipient countries. Moreover, although effective aid was essential, the reform debate ought not to neglect the crucial importance for poverty reduction of other, complementary policies. These points highlighted the need for more information about actors’ preferences, and for an aid system that emphasises flexibility and allows for learning. Coupled with this was the reminder that trust and accountability mechanisms would continue to be important in assuring the fulfilment of commitments, by governments to their citizens on the one hand and by donors to recipient countries on the other. Acknowledging that many of the above arguments are hardly new, workshop discussions turned to those areas which require special and urgent attention at country or international levels.

19. Several participants underlined the necessity for recipient uniqueness to drive development co-operation policy. Current mechanisms distinguishing countries according to their per-capita income were seen as insufficient, whereas performance indicators such as the World Bank’s Country Policy Institutional Assessment (CPIA) were regarded by some as too subjective to allow for fair aid allocation. A more nuanced approach to distinction would allow for gradation rather than graduation, and would include more attention to factors such as a country’s capacity to absorb aid, its ability to raise internal (e.g. taxes) or external resources (e.g. through international capital markets), and its special circumstances (e.g. presence of shocks, or conflicts). Some discussants also underlined the potential of a regional approach to allocation.

20. A more nuanced system of distinguishing between aid recipients would help identify countries for which capacity building may be of more urgent priority than further progress in alignment or budget support. In this context, many participants pointed to the need for greater understanding of the provision of technical assistance and its effect on a country’s capacity. Two other areas requiring attention were the development of stronger recipient policies on external resource management and the support of civil society and private sector participation in country governance systems. With respect to the latter, participants called for the rebalancing of the dialogue framework at country level in order to give greater emphasis to the voice of local development actors.

21. For countries with greater capacities, it was acknowledged that new approaches, including the World Bank’s PRSP, had already led to positive changes at country level, such as the new mechanisms of civil society engagement. Several ideas were posited calling for further progress: more comprehensive country strategies could include policies on productive sectors; total financial envelopes could allow for pooling and donor alignment in accordance with their own preferences; rolling programming could encourage greater flexibility and learning; more outcome-based conditionality could lead to greater trust, if linked to longer-term, contractual commitments.

22. These ideas raised the question of which frameworks might encourage donors to fulfil their commitments towards improved “behaviour”. Whilst there was some disagreement about the degree and combination of competitive and regulatory practices required, there was common ground about the urgent need for better information about donor practices and preferences. Various dialogue mechanisms, such as the NEPAD-OECD Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness, were cited as potentially successful new examples of international information sharing. Of those participants who argued that only increased competition would encourage better donor performance, some welcomed progress in “naming and shaming” through donor ratings systems (e.g. by the Center for Global Development). Others proposed systems of competitive donor bids for alignment with recipient-led initiatives, especially where the latter had greater capacities. Finally, there was some support for the idea of “policy code sharing”, which would encourage donor competition in some areas (or countries), but collaboration in others.

23. Several participants were less convinced about competitive approaches, claiming that only greater regulation of donors, including donor sanctions, could bring about significant change. Accordingly, international systems could be established to arbitrate between donors and recipients in the event of conflict, and to protect overburdened recipients by, for example, excluding donors from a country if their aid contribution is disproportionate to their procedural requirements. In line with this approach, some participants called for a redefinition of ODA, with a view to identifying the precise amount of aid allocated for poverty-reduction purposes rather than other donor interests. Sceptics claimed that such an approach would be unrealistic given the donors’ constraints and diverse incentives.

24. Finally, in a discussion on priorities in establishing supportive global institutions for the aid system, participants appeared to raise more questions than answers. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the issues identified as requiring urgent global attention included: the future of cross-cutting global funds and their relationship to the aid effectiveness agenda; the development of new sources of financing for development generally and global public goods in particular; the future proportions of bilateral and multilateral aid; the restructuring of decision-making and voting within international organisations to allow for greater recipient representation and voice; the possibility of mergers and sunset clauses in order to prevent further fragmentation and duplication of agency activities.

D. What next for the OECD and its partners?

25. By the end of the workshop, there remained uncertainty as to the optimal future shape of the international aid system. Two aspects were nevertheless clear: institutions and incentives within the system are extremely complex, and the factors that affect its relevance and effectiveness from the outside are changing rapidly (e.g. China’s rise as a trade power and new donor). In this context, taking the reform agenda further will require **additional work amongst policy makers**. Some of the issues above already have the DAC as a “home” for further discussion at international level:

(i) “Core HLF” issues – such as *ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results* – are certain to remain subject to continued collective action after the Paris HLF-II, under the auspices of a successor to the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. With reference to paragraph 22 above, it may be useful to open a dialogue on the benefits and costs of differentiated development co-operation strategies, based on more competitive models.

(ii) Similarly, issues related to *capacity* could be addressed by the DAC’s Governance Network (GOVNET). These include the limits of technical assistance, the need to engage national expertise and local institutions, and to create incentives for learning by doing (see paragraphs 6 to 9 above).

(iii) Issues related to *aid allocation* are also on the DAC agenda for the near future.² New work could tackle preferences and differences in capacity of recipient countries, and explore different allocation strategies based on varying degrees and combinations of competitive and regulatory practices.

(iv) The forthcoming review of the PRSP approach should cast new light on how best to integrate the *growth and poverty* agendas, on how to expand ownership and on issues of *conditionality*.

26. In making progress in these policy domains, two further initiatives might be envisaged: (i) the possibility of associating recipient countries more closely with the DAC Peer Review system; (ii) in the event that the HLF-II sees an agreement on a set of indicators, new work would be required to scope, test and set up independent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

27. Furthermore, with respect to *ODA definitions* and *DAC statistics*, several proposals were floated, including: (i) developing a forward-tracking mechanism for future aid flows; (ii) improving the tracking of bilateral contributions through the multilateral system (including multilateral funds), and (iii) refining the definition of ODA itself, in order to reflect the growing role of private flows (e.g. with a view to harmonising the tax treatment of private donations across DAC members).

28. Progress on all these fronts requires supportive policy analysis on several issues, some of which already feature in the ongoing and planned work of the Development Centre and the Overseas Development Institute:

(i) On the core *“HLF issues”*, a first set of questions surfaced regarding the nature of the donor/recipient relationship: (a) what is the scope for expanding partnership / contractual models of aid relationships – e.g. emulating the experience of EU Regional Funds? (b) What is the potential of outcome-based conditionality models for reconciling donor and recipient preferences? (c) What incentives are there for recipient countries to “regulate” donors more firmly and what does evidence tell us about the effects? And on the more specific issues of information and donor ratings: (a) Can we gather more evidence on the patterns of donor fragmentation in selected countries, and their impact on government capacity and aid predictability? (b) Can a baseline be established for total aid transactions costs at country level, against which alignment policies can be benchmarked? (c) What would be the effect of alternative donor “rating” or performance-assessment instruments on donor behaviour and overall effectiveness? Under what conditions could they be used to support mutual accountability?

(ii) On *capacity building*, new analysis should help refine the needs, preferences and absorptive capacity of recipient countries and develop a set of indicators to reflect them.

(iii) On *aid allocation*, further investigation is needed in (a) the analysis of multiple aid allocation objectives and revealed donor preferences, and (b) alternative policy formulations for allocating aid across countries and donor agencies.

(iv) On *supportive global institutions*: (a) what would be the optimal “division of labour” between bilateral and multilateral institutions, and how should the role of the latter evolve? More generally, what are the scenarios for systemic change between the different components of the aid system? (b) How could recipient countries be engaged in the coordination and/or funding of global public goods?

29. In order to link future policy work and analysis, several proposals were put forward to pursue and develop the informal, substantive *multi-stakeholder dialogue* set in motion by the Development Centre,

2. At its 2005 Senior Level Meeting, the Committee is due to envisage new work based on the conclusions of the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, held in London in January.

ODI and the DAC/DCD with this workshop. These included the facilitation of an on-line consultation, the expansion of the network of participants – especially to include more experts from recipient countries and civil society organisations – , organising a follow-up meeting, or possibly a mix of all of the above. A joint paper by the Development Centre and the DCD suggesting concrete follow-up modalities could be submitted to their respective governing bodies, and be circulated to workshop’s participants.

The International Aid System: What's Next?

An informal workshop co-hosted by the OECD Development Centre and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), in collaboration with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) / Development Cooperation Directorate, with financial support from the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the World Bank.

4 February 2005

(By invitation only)

OECD - Room 7 - 19, rue de Franqueville 75016 Paris

Agenda

Participants have been invited in their personal capacity. The Chatham House rule will apply.³ Each topic will be introduced by one or two keynote speakers (15 minutes each) so as to stimulate a free and informal exchange of ideas. Simultaneous French/English interpretation will be provided.

9:00-9:30	Registration and coffee / tea
9:30-10:00	Welcome and introduction Kiyoo Akasaka, <i>Deputy Secretary-General, OECD</i>

I. From intentions to outcomes: where are the major gaps?

Chair: Michel Reveyrand, Chair, DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness

10:00-11:15	Features and performance of local aid systems Introduction by Oliver Saasa, <i>Professor of International Economic Relations, Zambia</i> and Mauricio Gomez, <i>Vice- Minister of Cooperation and Economic Relations, MFA, Nicaragua</i>
11:15-11:45	Coffee / tea break
11:45-1:00	Gaps and challenges for reform Introduction by Andrew Rogerson, <i>Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute</i>
1:00-2:00	Lunch

II. Implications for policy and institutional reforms

Chair: Richard Manning, Chair, OECD Development Assistance Committee

2:00-3:15	Visions, scenarios and issues for reform Introduction by Keith Bezanson, <i>former Director, Institute for Development Studies</i> and Louka T. Katseli, <i>Director, OECD Development Centre</i>
3:15-3:45	Coffee / tea break
3:45-5:00	How do we get there? Shaping the international agenda Introduction by Simon Maxwell, <i>Director, Overseas Development Institute</i>
5:00-5:30	Conclusions & closure
5:45	Cocktail hosted by the Swedish Ambassador to the OECD <i>(at the Swedish Permanent Delegation to the OECD, 2 rue du Conseiller Colignon, 75016 Paris)</i>

3. "(...) participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed".

The International Aid System: What's Next?

List of participants

Experts (other than OECD)

Amani, Haidari	Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Tanzania
Arsenis, Gerassimos	Athens Institute for Development and Governance, Greece
Ashoff, Guido	German Development Institute (DIE)
Baser, Heather	European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)
Bezanson, Keith	<i>former</i> Director Institute of Development Studies (IDS), UK
Bhattacharya, Amar	World Bank
Buira, Ariel	G24 Secretariat, Mexico
Chataigner, Jean-Marc	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
Chhibber, Ajay	World Bank
Cogneau, Denis	Développement, Institutions et Analyses de Long Terme (DIAL), France
DeBarra, Caoimhe	Trocaire, Ireland
De Renzio, Paolo	Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Eeckhout, Marion	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands
Gomez Lacayo, Mauricio	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nicaragua
Guillaumont, Patrick	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), France
Hall, Christopher	World Bank
Harsmar, Mats	Expert Group on Development Issues (EGDI), Sweden
Hartford, Tim	International Finance Corporation (IFC)
Hartmann, Arntraud	Inwent, Germany
Jacquet, Pierre	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
Johnson, Alison	Debt Relief International
Kabell, Dorte	Consultant, Denmark
Killick, Tony	Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Le Goulven, Katell	International Task Force on Global Public Goods
MacLachlan, Malcolm	Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Martin, Matthew	Debt Relief International, UK
Maxwell, Simon	Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
McGillivray, Mark	World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), Finland
Ohno, Izumi	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan
Osei-Danquah, Kwabena	United Nations Population Fund
Perrin, Emile-Robert	Haut Conseil de la Co-opération Internationale, France
Ramskov Kuhl, Hans Martin	Kabell Consulting, Denmark
Riddell, Roger	Oxford Policy Management, UK
Rogerson, Andrew	Overseas Development Institute (ODI), UK
Saasa, Oliver	Researcher / consultant, Zambia
Sall, Ebrima	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Senegal
Sokona, Youba	Sahara and Sahel Observatory, Tunisia
Sorgho-Moulinier, Odile	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Soto, Marcelo	Institute of Economic Analysis, Spain
Turner, Rachel	Department for International Development, UK
Weiffenbach, Renilde	UN/IFI's Dpt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands

National Delegations and Representations to the OECD

Andersson, Gun-Britt	Ambassador of Sweden
Azukizawa, Eigo	Japanese Delegation
Bagai, Dipa	World Bank
Berthelmer, Pierre	Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie, France
Bocquet, Dominique	DAC Delegate, France

Brunschwig, Sonia	International Monetary Fund
Carner, George	DAC Delegate, US
De Luca, Vincenzo	DAC Delegate, Italy
Doucet, Didier	Ministère des Affaires étrangères, France
Giroux, Pierre	DAC Delegate, Canada
Köseoglu, Cavit	TIKA, Turkey
Matsunaga, Daisuke	DAC Delegate, Japan
Ngo, Brian	World Bank
Sima, Vanessa	Foreign Affairs, Canada
Terakado, Masayo	Japanese Delegation
Verheul, Jeroen	DAC Delegate, The Netherlands

Non OECD Delegations

Lee, Pai-Po	International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), Chinese Taipei
Liu, Junfeng	Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Paris

OECD

Akasaka, Kiyo	Deputy Secretary General
Carey, Richard	Development Co-operation Directorate
Chen, Michael-Xiao-Bao	Development Centre
Corsi, Elena	Development Centre
Drechsler, Denis	Development Centre
Foy, Colm	Development Centre
Hammond, Brian	Development Co-operation Directorate
Hiemenz, Ulrich	Development Centre
Isenman, Paul	Development Co-operation Directorate
Jütting, Johannes	Development Centre
Katseli, Louka	Development Centre
Lauzon, Normand	Sahel & West Africa Club
Manning, Richard	DAC Chairman
Marzo, Federica	Development Centre
McDonnell, Ida	Development Centre
Possémé-Rageau, Gwénola	Sahel & West Africa Club
Puhakka, Meria	Development Centre
Reisen, Helmut	Development Centre
Reveyrand, Michel	DAC Chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness
Roeskau, Michael	Development Co-operation Directorate
Schumacher, Sunhilt	Sahel & West Africa Club
Specker, Herman	Development Co-operation Directorate
Trzeciak-Duval, Alexandra	General Secretariat
Wegner, Lucia	Development Centre

Rapporteurs

Solignac Lecomte, Henri-Bernard	Development Centre
Zimmermann, Felix	Development Centre