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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE RELEVANCE OF BUDGETING

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This document has been written by Professor Paul Posner, George Mason University, Shin Kue Ryu and Ann Tkachenko.

For further information, please contact Jon R. BLONDAL at OECD Headquarters Tel. +33 1 45 24 76 59; Fax +33 1 44 30 63 34; Email: jon.blondal@oecd.org

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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE RELEVANCE OF BUDGETING

1. Introduction

- 1.1. Public private partnerships have constituted a growing movement worldwide for at least the past decade. Nations have been seeking private partners to finance, manage and maintain infrastructure serving public purposes in a growing range of areas transportation, hospitals, prisons, schools are among the leading candidates for private partnerships.
- 1.2. A previous OECD paper provided a comprehensive overview of the numerous public management and finance issues raised by this emergent tool of government.¹ The issues addressed included in that report included definitions, trends, criteria for assessing economic viability, budget scoring and accounting treatment, and managerial and regulatory issues.
- 1.3. This document is a supplement to this more comprehensive OECD report. In this report, we examine the budgetary treatment and issues raised by PPPs in more depth. Given the unique budgetary and accounting issues posed by privately financed capital services, the budgetary rules, institutions, and procedures applying to these transactions warrant greater assessment.
- 1.4. In this paper, we will examine the budgetary implications of PPPs. We will examine the following questions
 - 1. What are the issues posed by PPPs for central budget offices?
 - 2. How do such proposals affect near and longer term fiscal targets and priorities?
 - 3. What approaches currently are in practice to budget for these partnerships and what are their implications for public finance,
 - 4. What budgetary strategies and processes should be considered by OECD nations to promote greater consideration of the short and longer term affordability of PPPs on nation's fiscal space and priorities?
- 1.5. The report draws from conversations with budget officials in eight OECD member countrie Australia, United Kingdom, Hungary, Portugal, United States, Korea, France, and Chile. A telephone survey was sent to budget officers as the basis for a telephone conversation with senior budget officials. (Interview questions are attached in Appendix A). In several cases, follow up phone calls and discussions were undertaken with several budget officials in these nations. In addition to these nations, the experiences of other nations both within and outside of OECD were included to highlight emerging budgetary practices and issues. This report is also based on review of many reports and publications by

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk sharing and Value for Money,* [GOV/PGC/SBO(2008)1/REV]. Report presented at the Senior Budget Officials meeting, Winterthur, Switzerland, February 21-22, 2008.

individual nations, as well as by multilateral institutions including the IMF, World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank, European Union and the United Nations.

2. Background on the use of public-private partnerships to finance capital infrastructure services

- 2.1. Nations have increased their reliance on public private partnerships in recent years to finance capital asset acquisition and operations. While private firms have perennially been engaged in specific phases of traditional capital construction and servicing, public private partnerships constitute a different tool to finance and deliver infrastructure and other forms of public capital.
 - 2.1.1. Nations have stepped up their use of PPPs in recent years. PPPs in nations in our review have grown to comprise a portion, although not the majority, of capital budgets. The United Kingdom has had the longest experience, with PPPs currently comprising from 10 to 15% of the capital budget in recent years. France and Korea had similar experiences, with PPPs comprising 20% and 15% of those nations' capital budgets respectively. Among our nations, Portugal reported the highest payments for PPPs representing nearly 28% of the national budget or 9.4% of GDP. Projects in the pipeline could add up to nearly 20% of GDP eventually. In the United States, on the other hand, PPPs are quite limited; the cumulative project costs of such partnerships in the United States that had been funded or completed by October 2006 totaled over \$ 48 billion (in nominal dollars), a small share of the \$ 1.6 trillion in public capital spending on infrastructure by all levels of government during a similar period.
- 2.2. Nations have many reasons for pursuing partnerships with the private sector to deliver goods and services. Much of the impetus is political in nature, arising from constraints on governmental roles and spending, whether it from domestic publics, financial markets or regulatory bodies such as the European Union's deficit and debt limits. Some of the push is opportunistic private provision diffuses blame for raising fees on services and gives the illusion of making public budgets look smaller, at least in the near term.
- 2.3. However, the principal analytical rationale is that the private sector can achieve equal or greater levels of services with lower costs than pure public sector provision. The private sector has incentives to achieve greater efficiencies than public agencies operating alone, thanks to competition that healthy markets provide. In his theory of "creative destruction", Joseph Schumpeter attributes economic growth in free markets to a process where entrepreneurs introduce new technologies, new kinds of products, new methods of production and new means of distribution that make old ones obsolete, forcing existing companies to quickly adapt to a new environment or fail. As will be discussed below, most nations have rigorous procedures to compare the long term value for money prospects of private partnerships with purely public provision prior to authorizing PPPs, and sometimes prior to determining the winning bids on PPP contracts. Since the interest charged to government is inherently lower than private finance, the cost savings for equivalent levels of service must be sufficient to overcome this natural public sector advantage.
- 2.4. The chart below locates the various combinations of public and private roles in the delivery of public services. When acquiring and operating capital assets, government traditionally uses a combination of public finance and some form of private delivery for some aspects of capital services. Typically, governments will contract for the design and construction of a major asset, such as a building or a highway, with highly specific public conditions and oversight. Once the asset is completed, government

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Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Random House, 5th ed. 1976).

often performs operations and maintenance functions with public employees. For instance, the Australian national government only uses private contractors to construct traditional government owned capital.

Public-Private Roles and Tools

Delivery/Finance	Public Finance	Private Finance
Public Delivery	Direct Government	User Fees
Private Delivery	Contract	Vouchers PPPs

- 2.5. Traditional capital infrastructure is financed entirely by government, but is often provided through procurement contracts with private firms. The design and construction of school buildings or prisons, for instance, are often accomplished by government financing contracts with private companies who build the facility to government specifications. The operations and maintenance of capital projects following construction is typically done by government employees, although separate contracts can also be used. This portrait obviously varies among nations. The role of the central government in providing infrastructure in federal systems, such as Germany, Australia or the United States, is often confined to providing public grants to states or localities who are the principal builders and owners of public infrastructure.
- 2.6. When compared to traditional capital infrastructure services provided by government, PPPs are characterized by several important differences.
 - First, the private sector provides up front financing for the costs of building and operating the asset. While the extent of the private role varies as discussed below, the government's role shifts from financing the building and operations of the asset to providing an annualize stream of payments to the private financing partner.
 - Second, the private role in most PPPs goes beyond just the design and construction of the asset to its operation and maintenance. The comprehensive control of asset from cradle to grave provides one of the major incentives motivating private firms to complete asset construction on time within cost estimates. Delays and cost overruns will hamper the ability of the private partner to collect payments from the government or the public for delivering capital services.
 - Third, the private sector bears a significant and appropriate portion of the risk from project operations and management. Private sharing of risks is another critical factor in promoting efficiency gains from private partnerships. The following comprise the many of the most important types of risks that can be present in PPPs, risks which under traditional government owned capital projects are largely borne by government itself:³
 - Construction risk delays and cost overruns;
 - Financial risk increases in financing costs;
 - Availability risk threats to the continuous supply of capital services;
 - Demand risk potential shortfalls in use of the asset by publics;

International Monetary Fund, *Public-Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk* (Washington DC, IMF, 2006), p. 12.

- Force majeure risks from natural or manmade disasters and war.
- 2.7. The earlier OECD report went into depth on the factors involved in striking an optimal balance in sharing risks between public and private partners. As the crucible of efficiency gains over public sector provision, the nature and degree of risks borne by the private sector is a key factor for government officials in determining whether to engage in a PPP and how to price contracts to compensate private parties for increased risk.
- 2.8. Beyond the three defining characteristics discussed above, other design features are deemed to be critical for PPPs to realize their efficiency gains. Competition among bidders is crucial for enabling government to negotiate best value at lowest cost. Competition encourages competing firms to create winning proposals that achieve public value at lowest cost. Competition also can ameliorate principal agency problems by providing greater information to government officials about costs and outputs. The absence of competition, in effect, can lead to the substitution of a government monopoly with a privately owned one, with all the costs and sluggish responsiveness that monopolies tend to bring in their wake.⁴
- 2.9. Closely related is the ability of government to specify all of its major performance goals in the contract. Provisions that cannot be measured often are not met, leading to incomplete contracts which fail to achieve all significant public goals and objectives. While efficiency and output goals are easily specified, quality and equity considerations are notoriously resistant to measurement. The more that these and other difficult-to-measure considerations are important in achieving public objectives, the stronger the case for retaining government ownership and delivery.

3. Public-private partnerships for capital infrastructure services take various forms across nations

3.1. There are many forms through which public private partnerships take shape. As the OECD report indicated, many variations of partnerships fill the broad space between government provision and full privatization. The private roles for capital asset creation and operations can include all or several of the following: design, build, operate, and maintenance. The private sector can either build a new asset or purchase an existing asset from government. The private firm can own the asset fully or transfer it back to government at a specified time. In all cases, the financing responsibility is shifted in whole or in part to the private sector, whether it is for construction or just for operations and maintenance. Box 1 contains taxonomy of potential permutations of PPPs.

⁴ John Donahue, *The Privatization Decision* (New York, Basic Books, 1989).

OECD, Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk sharing and Value for Money, [GOV/PGC/SBO(2008)1/REV], p. 9.

Box 1. Different types of PPPs

The following indicates the role played by private sector:

Build-own-maintain (BOM)

Build-own-operate (BOO)

Build-develop-operate (BDO)

Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF)

Design-build-operate (DBO)

Buy-build-operate (BBO)

Lease-own-operate (LOO)

Build-operate-transfer (BOT)

Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT)

Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT)

Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT)

Build-transfer-operate (BTO)

- 3.2. The most common form of PPP is the design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF) where the private sector finances, builds and operates the asset for a period of many years, often ranging from 20 to 50 years. Here, the government's financing responsibility shifts from up front payment of asset creation to the purchase of a stream of services that the private partner generates with the asset. In the case of existing assets, the private sector, in effect, agrees to operate, upgrade, and maintain the asset. This buybuild-operate model (BBO) is being implemented by several states in the United States. For instance, the Indiana Turnpike was purchased from the state by a private consortium for \$ 3.8 billion in exchange for a contract to operate, maintain and upgrade the highway for 75 years. ⁶
- 3.3. Another closely related form of public private partnership is the concession. A concession transfers operation of an infrastructure service to a private firm which operates, maintains and finances the asset. Like a PPP, the private partner takes on certain risks specified in the contract, perhaps taking responsibility for a greater share of demand risk than traditional DCMF or other forms of PPPs. Unlike a classic PPP where the government pays the private partner an annual fee, however, the concessionaire pays a fee to the government for the privilege of operating the asset which remains the property of the government. Also, unlike a PPP, the concession receives payment not from government appropriations but typically from user charges levied on the consumers of the asset, e.g. highways. However, governments in many cases subsidize and underwrite the risks of the concessionaire through such mechanisms as guarantees and other forms of contingent subsidies triggered by demand shortfalls.
- 3.4. While not defined as PPPs by most observers, operating and financial leases share some of the features of PPPs as well. Unlike PPPs, the government leases an asset from a private owner, either for a short or longer term. However, leases have similar budget implications. In effect, they enable financing of asset construction and operations with private rather than public resources, thereby circumventing up front funding requirements and other disciplinary constraints in the budget process.
 - 3.4.1. Financial leases are classified as a form of borrowing, since the government bears the risks. International Public Sector Accounting Standards and budget offices in some nations have rules that

US Government Accountability Office, *Highway Public-Private Partnerships: More Rigorous Up-front Analysis Could Better Secure Potential Benefits and Protect the Public Interest* (Washington, D.C., GAO-08-44, 2008).

reclassify operating leases as financial leases based on the substance rather than the form of the transaction. The state of Victoria in Australia, for instance, classified arrangements as financial leases based on share of total asset costs financed by government, the extent of the asset's useful life covered by the lease and the provision for government acquisition at bargain basement prices. In the United States, the Office of Management and Budget has similar rules, and financial leases require the agency to record the budget authority for the lease up front rather than annually as lease payments are made.

- 3.4.2. The United States national audit office, now called the Government Accountability Office (GAO), found that federal agencies often sidestep the up front funding requirements under OMB's financial leasing rules by structuring their leases as short term operating leases. The agency found that such leases had the function of providing for long term space needs, but a much higher cost to the government than government ownership or lease-purchase. To ensure that the underlying costs of competing asset financing options were compared on the same terms, the agency recommended that all tools for financing long term space needs be required to be budgeted for up front in agency budgets. When provided with a level budgetary playing field, the GAO concluded that there would be a greater chance that the most cost effective option to the government would be chosen.⁹
- 3.5. Each of these forms of PPPs has their own unique attributes and consequences. What they have in common is up front financing of asset construction or enhancement with private rather than public resources. However, this is not a free resource. In return, the public sector must either provide annualize payments over a number of years to the private firm or must provide the firm with concessions which permit it to use public resources, such as land, or to charge fees from the public. These annualized costs have budgetary effects but for operating rather than capital budgets. In effect, the costs of capital are converted from up front payment to annualized payments.

4. The Impetus for PPPs: Infrastructure and Capital Budgeting

4.1. Public infrastructure, if well chosen and financed within appropriate fiscal constraints, can play an important role in economic growth. Public investment is important for economic growth, but only as part of a sustainable fiscal framework providing a stable long term macroeconomic platform of longer term growth, savings and sustainable commitments. The IMF provided a good overview of the criteria that should be used in considering public infrastructure spending proposals:

"A proper assessment of the scope for increasing investment spending in any particular country requires a careful analysis of aggregate demands conditions, absorptive capacity, short-term financing constraints and medium-term public debt dynamics as well as tradeoffs with other types of expenditure in that country." ¹⁰

IMF, Public-Private Partnerships, Government Guarantees, and Fiscal Risk (Washington ,D.C., IMF, 2006), p. 22.

⁸ US Office of Management and Budget, *Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget, OMB Circular A-11* (Washington, D.C., OMB, 2007).

Paul L. Posner, *Budget Issues: Budget Scorekeeping for Acquisition of Federal Buildings*, Testimony before the House Government Operations Committee, Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security (Washington, D.C., GAO/T-AIMD-94-189, 1994).

International Monetary Fund, *Public Investment and Fiscal Policy* – *Lessons From the Pilot Country Studies* (Washington DC, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF, April 1, 2005), p. 4.

- 4.2. Government spending on infrastructure can potentially increase the stock of publicly owned capital and may improve the long term productivity of the private sector and, in that sense, it represents an investment in the future productivity of the private sector. However the economic payoff from public spending on infrastructure depends on the usefulness of the investments themselves and the extent to which the spending "crowds out" or reduces the funding available for investment in private capital. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office in the United States concludes that the relative payoff from infrastructure projects tend to be concentrated in the transportation sector and that additional infrastructure spending in other areas is more difficult to justify. Moreover, the agency noted that building new infrastructure is only one option for transportation upgrading the condition of existing assets and employing congestion pricing to rationalize demands are strategies that may be more cost effective. ¹¹
- 4.3. Significant backlogs exist in infrastructure across all nations. A recent World Bank study indicated that for the new EU member states the so-called EU8 major investments will be necessary to upgrade their infrastructure to match the levels in other EU nations. A 2004 study showed that €500 billion would be needed during the next 15 years. Furthermore the environmental investment needs constitute an additional € 47-69 billion. ¹² For the United States, CBO concludes that growing delays in air travel and surface transportation, bottlenecks in transmitting electricity, and inadequate school facilities all suggest that some targeted additional infrastructure spending could be economically justifiable. Federal transportation agencies estimate that an additional \$12 billion in highway funding and \$4 billion in airport funding will be necessary just to maintain current levels of service in the face of expanding populations and congestion. ¹³
- 4.4. In one sense, the presence of backlogs and unmet needs for infrastructure is not unusual. While resources are limited in the public sector, needs are relatively unlimited. Policy domains beyond infrastructure have their own inventories of backlog and unmet needs for government spending and other subsidies, whether it be affordable housing, child care for low income mothers, health care for uninsured or underinsured populations or subsidies for university students. Advocates of spending characterized as "public investment" have asserted a presumptive place in budgetary priorities over pure "consumption' programs, owing to the potential impact of investment in expanding the economy.
- 4.5. The rationale for public-private partnerships is, in no small part, predicated on the alleged bias against capital investment in most cash based budgetary regimes. This central issue makes it important to better understand how political incentives and budgetary regimes interact and what their implications are for both the overall level of public capital investment as well as the choices of capital projects within the overall budget constraint.
 - 4.5.1. Some would argue that capital spending can provide highly visible benefits to political officials to claim credit with their constituents for delivering specific benefits at the expense of the entire nation. Some derisively label capital projects as "pork" and suggest that public officials, if anything, allocate too much infrastructure spending for specific local projects that have little national benefit. In the United

Congressional Budget Office, *Issues and Options in Infrastructure Investment* (Washington, D.C., CBO, May, 2008).

Nina Budina, Hana Polackova Brixi, and Timothy Irwin, *Public-Private Partnerships in the New EU Member States* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2007), p. 2.

¹³ Congressional Budget Office, *Issues and Options in Infrastructure Investment* (Washington, D.C., CBO, May, 2008).

States, for instance, earmarking of capital projects has grown exponentially in the past 20 years, as Congressmen reach to dedicate specific projects in their districts to enhance their election prospects.¹⁴ More broadly, public officials face a political asymmetry in the interest group system which one political scientist calls "clientele politics". In short, groups that benefit from narrowly defined projects, such as certain capital projects, have greater intensity about claiming these specific benefits than the broader diffuse public that has to pay for the benefits. Thus, capital projects that concentrate benefits on narrow constituencies while spreading costs more broadly often constitute as winning political formula.¹⁵

- 4.5.2. Others argue that capital spending is disadvantaged in cash based systems because funds for construction must be provided up front in the years that design and construction take place. The uneven, lumpy nature of capital spending makes it difficult to plan for such items in hard pressed budgets. 16 As the modern entitlement state has grown, mandatory items for pension and health care often come to crowd out discretionary resources such as capital, particularly in recent years when fiscal pressures to reduce deficits and achieve surpluses have become ascendant. Some argue for a separate capital budget freed of the constraints and tradeoffs with operating programs, in recognition of the importance that public investment plays for future growth. Robert Eisner, for instance, has long argued for borrowing for capital given the rates of return that such programs provide the nation at large. ¹⁷ Nations such as the United Kingdom adopted this as part of their fiscal policy, explicitly providing for deficit financing of the capital portion of spending. Nations that have switched to accrual point to the potential to smooth out spikes in capital funding as a distinct advantage of their approach.
- In most budgets, nations budget for capital on a unified basis. This means that capital and operating accounts are allocated under the overall budget constraint in the same process. This has important macroeconomic and allocational advantages. Nations ensure that their total budgets capture all significant outlays from the government in a given year affecting the near and medium term economy, an important barometer for national economic policy. Nations can also assure themselves that all claims compete against one another against the ceiling of limited resources. Agencies are encouraged to assess tradeoffs between capital and labor costs, and explore alternatives for achieving public policy goals from a range of capital and non-capital strategies.
- 4.7. Some nations have provided for a separate capital budget process. In some cases, this involves only separate displays or pulls outs of capital accounts whose funding is determined through a unified process. In other cases, it may entail a separate budget cycle with its own separate budget constraint and targets. In some nations, such as the United Kingdom, capital budgets have a different fiscal decision rule than the rest of the budget. In the case of the UK, the capital portion of the budget is intentionally targeted to be in deficit in order to encourage greater building of infrastructure. Under the "golden rule", the budget as a whole must be balanced over the business cycle, with capital deficits being offset by balances in other accounts in expansionary phases. In the UK, moreover, departments have separate budgets for resources (operating costs) and capital for new investments.

One estimate from the Congressional Research Service shows a growth of earmarked transportation projects in Congressional appropriations from 140 in 1994 to 2094 in 2005, or 5% of total Transportation appropriations in that year. Congressional Research Service, Earmarks in Appropriations Act: A Memorandum, January 26, 2006.

James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, (New York, Basic Books, 1980).

A. Premchand, "Capital Budgets: Theory and Practice" in Anwar Shah, Budgeting and Budgetary Institutions (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007), 92.

Robert Eisner, "Debunking the Conventional Wisdom in Economic Policy", in Albert C. Hyde, Government Budgeting: Theory, Process, Politics (Pacific Grove, Ca: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1992), 312-322.

- 4.8. The accounting treatment is also relevant to both the macro and allocation objectives of budgeting. Nations in cash based systems generally require capital projects to be funded up front for traditional government provided capital projects, since the cash flows for design and construction occur in the first several years of the project. This has the advantage of ensuring that public decision makers have to recognize the full construction costs of assets up front at the time when the irrevocable commitment to begin the project is made. Alternatives, such as borrowing and depreciation, stretch out the budgetary recognition over time to reflect the longer term benefits and actual consumption of the asset. These alternatives fail, however, to force decision makers to consider the full costs at the time they are, in effect, taking credit for the full benefits of the projects. This potential mismatch of benefits and costs may lower incentives to carefully deliberate and compare specific capital projects, as well as alternatives to achieving their goals through non-capital means such as congestion pricing.
- 4.9. In addition to cash, some nations budget for the total commitment that is encumbered by programs in the budget. This may be similar to cash outlays for salaries and expense accounts and social services, but it can be very different in timing for capital projects. In the United States, budgets are prepared on both a cash and budget authority basis. Budget authority is appropriated by the Congress to provide agencies with the formal legal authority to commit the government to actually expend cash. For capital projects, OMB requires the budget authority to generally consist of the full costs of building the asset, even though the cash for design and construction may spend out over several fiscal years. This up front commitment is similar to the capital budget accounts in the United Kingdom and to the new French system which requires Parliamentary approval for commitments that involve future payment.
- 4.10. The several nations with accrual budgeting use a different accounting for capital projects. In these nations, the costs of capital are not budgeted for up front, but rather paid for over time through a depreciation charge to reflect the consumed cost of that asset in each year. While some assets, such as national "crown assets" are excluded from this regime, agency owned capital is largely budgeted for on an incremental, annualized basis. New Zealand is the only nation that awards funding for depreciation, providing agencies with a funding source to acquire new capital assets. In the UK, the budget uses cash based or near cash based accounts which differ from resource accounts prepared according to GAAP.
- 4.11. Accrual based systems can smooth out capital funding and overcome the spikes associated with cash based budgets. The requirement to assemble sufficient authority or cash in cash based systems becomes challenging and can this may discourage governments from undertaking important capital projects. However, absent other controls, accrual based approaches do not provide the discipline of up front funding. As a result, the government becomes committed to new projects without being forced to budget for the full costs of those commitments. While accrual based nations do have separate approval processes for projects exceeding certain thresholds, nonetheless at the agency level these projects do not have to compete on a full cost basis against other priorities for limited funds. Those nations that enable agencies to use depreciation as the source for new capital funding have experienced measurement and allocation problems; depreciation is not easily calculated for certain assets and government can lose control and flexibility to reallocate to agencies with greater relative needs. ¹⁸
- 4.12. Nations with cash based budgets have developed various strategies designed to overcome or mitigate the spiking problems that are said to discourage public infrastructure budgeting. Some of the

¹⁸ US Government Accountability Office, Budget Issues: Accrual Budgeting Useful in Certain Areas But Does Not Provide Sufficient Information to Report on Our Nation's Long-term Fiscal Challenge (Washington, D.C., GAO-08-206, December, 2007).

strategies are internal to the government itself. In some cases, funds have been used to accumulate resources over several years from components within or across agencies to enable larger projects to be undertaken. In other cases, incremental budgeting occurs, where agencies build projects in discrete stages designed to reduce the marginal impact on budgets in any one year.

- 4.13. Notwithstanding the particular budgetary concepts and systems used for capital projects, nations that wish to increase the level of public infrastructure have heretofore had a limited, and politically painful, set of options. They can
 - Raise taxes
 - Levy or increase user fees
 - Cut spending elsewhere in the budget
 - Borrowing
 - Reduce or manage demand

5. Assessment of the implications of PPPs for resource allocation

5.1. Given these difficult options, private financing has become more alluring as an option for public officials to fund increased infrastructure services. Public private partnerships have obvious economic and political advantages. In this section, we review the budgetary implications of PPPs to date, bringing in various other dimensions that have a bearing on the budgetary costs and consequences of these projects. We will first review the efficiency record – those PPPs that achieve greater efficiency and cost savings than comparable publicly financed projects may ultimately provide greater fiscal space and flexibility, as government is able to reduce the costs of building and delivering capital services. Conversely, if PPPs increase costs, then budgets are more encumbered than otherwise. We will then review the aggregate fiscal impact - even if individual projects achieve greater value for money relative to conventional public capital – what we will call "relative affordability" – it is possible that the budgetary treatment of PPPs may prompt governments to fund more projects than it can afford under intertemporal budget constraints – what we will call "absolute affordability."

The Efficiency Imperative

- 5.2. PPPs have clear potential to promote greater efficiency and possible cost savings by involving the private sector. To achieve value for money in comparison to traditional capital, private efficiency must be sufficient to overcome the extra financing costs of using private interest rates and transaction costs. Assuming effective competition, risk sharing and contract metrics, a PPP might motivate private partner to reduce life-cycle costs through higher construction standards, more frequent maintenance, or investments in cost-saving technology. Efficiencies also could result if a private entity charged prices that were more closely aligned with costs, thereby reducing inefficient demands for services.
- 5.3. The comprehensive nature of contracts which include construction as well as operation and maintenance can have several salutary effects. First, this can ensure a level of funding for maintenance over the long life of PPP contracts, thereby providing for improved infrastructure operations and repair when compared to traditional public provision where maintenance is often the first item to be cut in budget austerity periods. Moreover, the bundling of capital construction and operations and maintenance provides important incentives to private firms to complete construction earlier and with higher quality since this will bring the asset into service more quickly, thereby earning annual income through either fees or government payments.

- 5.4. PPPs, in fact, have shown some early gains in construction timeliness and costs. National Audit office reports for the United Kingdom that PPPs are delivered on time and on budget more often than traditional arrangements. Traditional infrastructure is on time and on budget 30% of the time, while PPP projects are on time and on budget over 75%. ¹⁹ Michael Pollit concludes that PPPs deliver on time and on budget a higher percentage of time. While public agencies could do this too, they needed PPPs to stimulate and innovate. ²⁰ Beyond this, some studies have shown that PPPs were less costly in the United Kingdom for prisons and roads. The National Audit Office estimated that a sample of projects studied in the 1990's experienced cost savings of 10%, attributable to risk transfers from public to private firms. ²¹
- 5.5. In the aggregate, cost savings are achieved through PPPs only if their efficiencies outweigh the higher financing costs and transaction costs that private financing and partnerships inevitably bring. Real cost savings can also be realized if PPPs enable public officials to impose user charges by shifting potential blame from themselves to the private firms now responsible for managing the asset. Indeed, Portugal was able to achieve additional fees for road projects once it became apparent that annual shadow toll payments were insufficient to finance the costs of the private partner under their transportation PPP. ²²
- 5.6. Yet, it is unclear whether value for money has actually been achieved. While promising evaluations discussed above suggest that project management of the construction phase is more efficient, it remains to be seen whether these projects will ultimately deliver greater value for money than conventional government provision and financing. OECD nations have only become invested in PPPs over the past ten years; the UK, a forerunner, began significant activity under the PFI formulation only in the mid-1990's. Given the long term nature of contracts, it remains to be seen whether these projects will ultimately deliver greater benefits at lower costs. In a recent comprehensive review of international experiences, Hodge concludes that the efficacy of PPPs is still subject to debate; insufficient research has been undertaken to date. ²³
- 5.7. Some studies suggest that the long term costs may be higher than traditional government provision, when transaction costs and higher private financing charges are accounted for. Transaction costs can be higher than traditional procurement one study suggests that bidding costs represent 3% of project total costs. Moreover, public bodies are often required to compensate costs incurred by reserve bidders to promote competition. Advisory costs can also be significant, amounting to over 5% of proceed soar National Air Traffic Service.²⁴ Shaoul's work provides evidence of flawed value for money appraisals,

¹⁹ Graeme A. Hodgee and Carstan Greve, "Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review", Public Administration Review 67:3 (May/June, 2007), p 549.

Michael Pollitt, "learning from the UK Private Finance Initiative Experience, in Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve, The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships: Learning From International Experience (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005).

Graeme A. Hodgee and Carstan Greve, "Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review", Public Administration Review 67:3 (May/June, 2007).

Rui S. Monteiro, "PPP and Fiscal Risks: Experiences from Portugal", paper presented at International Seminar on Strengthening Public Investment and Managing Fiscal Risks from Public-Private Partnerships, Budapest, Hungary, March 7-8, 2007.

Graeme A. Hodgee and Carstan Greve, "Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review", Public Administration Review 67:3 (May/June, 2007), p 552.

Frederic Marty, "The Economics of PPP's: Affordability, Value for Money and Risk Sharing" presentation at OECD Seminar on Public-Private Partnerships, Winterthur, Switzerland, February 21-22, 2008.

with arbitrary risk transfer allocations that tip the balance in favor of PPPs but that are not sustainable in real world policy making.²⁵ Case studies of PPPs in Canada suggest that governments have found it difficult to reduce either their total costs or their budgetary risks by transferring revenue risks to private partners.²⁶ Even where cost savings are achieved, the private sector will have an incentive to realize higher private sector returns in the first instance rather than lower public sector costs.

- 5.8. Classic public management problems complicate the implementation of PPPs and undercut the tool's ability to deliver on its efficiency premises. Agencies that deliver services directly with their own employees have certain accountability advantages: transactions are internalized within hierarchies that are more cohesive and responsive to central leadership.²⁷ Obvious challenges are presented when the government must use independent actors it does not fully control to achieve its goals, especially since, as Don Kettl has noted, transferring who does the work does not relieve government of responsibility for the performance.²⁸ Private partners have independent bases of political power and goals and interests that may conflict with those of government agencies. Fundamentally, public-private relationships are consequently best characterized as bargaining relationships in which both partners have independent sources of leverage over the other. Classic problems include: ²⁹
 - Goal conflict The differing priorities and accountability chains of private and public actors can compromise efficiency and distort the goals themselves, manifesting in excess profit taking and failure to achieve public objectives
 - Principal agency problems Principal-agent theory tells us that agents enjoy influence by virtue of their inside knowledge about their own behaviors and motivations.³⁰ Thus, when shortfalls are experienced or costs increase above targets, it is difficult for the government to challenge the private partner due to the latter's control of information about their costs and program operations.
 - Limited competition These information asymmetries can be offset by competition which provides principals greater information from multiple agents competing for contract. However, for many PPPs, competition is limited, partly owing to the large amounts of private capital that

Shaoul, J. (2005). "The Private Finance Initiative or the Public Funding of Private Profit?" in G. Hodge, G. and C. Greve (Eds.), The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships: Learning from International Experience. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 190-206.

Aiden Vining and Anthony Boardman, "Public-Private Partnerships in Canada", Working Paper 2006-04 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, December, 2006).

^{27.} Christopher K. Lehman, "The Forgotten Fundamental: Successes and Excesses of Direct Government" in Lester Salamon, ed., Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1989), 53-92.

Donald Kettl, Performance and Accountability (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, 1989).

Paul L. Posner, "Accountability Challenges of Third Party Governance" in Lester Salamon, ed., The Tools of Government (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002)

Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency" in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: the Structure of Business (Boston, Ma.: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), pp. 37-54.

must be assembled to finance infrastructure projects. PPPs in the United Kingdom have an average of only three bidders per contract.³¹

- Rent seeking Government contracts can draw opportunistic private firms that seek to gain excessive profits and incomes, which can undermine the efficiency goals of PPPs.
- Moral hazard The more a project embodies a public good, the less the government will be able to let it fail, regardless of formal allocations of risks in contracts. In particular, when demand shortfalls occur, government has stepped in to bail out projects that have become financially unviable for the private partner. This undermines efficiency in several ways: (1) governments lose leverage since private partners know that government will provide a safety net under projects; (2) private partners' can shirk their responsibilities and avoid making tough decisions in the interests of efficiency, safe in the knowledge that government will not let them or the project fail.
- Interdependency Both actors become dependent on the other to achieve their goals. While this can be productive, it can also make government wary of imposing sanctions or other forms of discipline related to contractors' performance, fearful of the impacts that this would have on contractors' ability to deliver services to clients.
- 5.9. There is reason to believe that PPPs outperform traditional government financed capital in the construction phase, but that these advantages may not be sustained in the operational phase. ³² Once the contract has been issued, the government loses leverage. Once the contract is underway, competitors fade away, leaving the government to work with a single contractor.
- 5.10. The traditional advantages enjoyed by contractors become accentuated with long term contracts under PPPs. Contracts that are short term can be reviewed, changed and renewed, but long term contracts increase the stakes and fortifies the position of the contractor which gains expertise and monopolies over production and resources. The long time periods make it difficult for government to write detailed specifications and conditions, leaving important issues to be resolved in subsequent negotiations during the long implementation phase. Bloomfield observes that long term contracts erode competition as governments become more dependent on the contractors' expertise and familiarity. It is inherently difficult to keep contractors in a state of "healthy insecurity" fostered by a robust and competitive marketplace over long periods of time. Contractors often have an incentive to underestimate their costs in original contracts, leading to large overruns as the project evolves. Chilean officials indicate that contract changes for concessions resulted in payments that were 35% higher than original estimates.
- 5.11. Since PPPs cost effectiveness rests in no small part on the transfer of risk, it is important to note that, regardless of the formal terms of the contract, government faces asymmetrical risks owing to their abiding interest in continuing with the provision of the capital service. Government is often left with disproportionate share of the demand risk but it is difficult to anticipate this at the outset of the contract, leaving the government with uncompensated costs. In effect, government faces uncertainty beyond risk uncertainty that is difficult to price in PPP contracts or book as liabilities or even contingent liabilities on the balance sheet. For instance, Portugal's initial contract for suburban rail service Fertagus contract –

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Public-Private Partnerships: In Pursuit of Risk sharing and Value for Money, p. 48.*

Andrea Renda and Lorna Schrefler, *Public-Private Partnerships: National Experiences in the European Union*, report to the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, European Parliament, February, 2006.

transferred risk to private provider but provided for government to assume risk if traffic was lower. When this materialized, the contract was renegotiated with the government in a weaker bargaining position.

- 5.12. When a project is too big or important for government to let fail, a fundamental market discipline which causes private firms to be more efficient the prospects of market failure may not longer be influential. If government is perceived to stand behind the venture, then the project is really public, rather than private and a moral hazard could be induced as the private firm realizes its faces no liability from demand failures. It has been said that public private partnerships have the effect of privatizing profits while socializing losses.
- 5.13. This is not to say that private partners don't also face risks as well indeed it appears that many PPPs successfully transfer risks for construction and availability. However, private firms can anticipate these risks and adjust their price during contract negotiations. Moreover, the private firm's risks, while greater than traditional procurement, need to be compared with other forms of investment. Some analysts suggest that the alliance with government provides rent seeking opportunities, as the guaranteed payment stream strengthens the market position of private partners in dealing with banks and other investors.
- 5.14. In effect, the boundaries between public and private become blurred. As government becomes more reliant on the private partner to deliver essential public services, the relationship becomes more of a collaborative one of mutual dependence than a competitive or arms length relationship that one finds in traditional procurement. The private firms become dependent on a steady payment stream and business opportunity while government becomes dependent on the firm as a monopolistic service provider. While both parties can gain, each also loses some of the value that makes them unique and valuable partners. Government loses control over the production of public value, surrendering a portion of control to the private firm that has different interests than government agencies. Private firms lose their competitive edge, as they no longer have to face the discipline of the market. At some point, the private firm becomes functionally similar to a government agency, particularly if it is "too big to fail".

The Fiscal Imperative


5.15. The differential budget treatment of PPPs compared with traditional public financing also explains their growth as a public infrastructure tool. As we will discuss further below, the private financing of up front capital investment reduces often means that PPPs do not encumber near term budgets in the same way that traditional publicly funded capital projects do. As a result, they can enable government to fund more infrastructure projects earlier than under traditional public capital investment processes within existing deficit or fiscal constraints. One consulting company report summarized the opportunistic case well:

"Because individual projects become more affordable, the public sector can afford to procure a greater number of projects in the aggregate, financed over a realistic long-term period."³³

5.16. PPPs carry important political benefits for hard pressed public officials under pressure to reduce spending to meet fiscal targets. Fiscal pressures were a prime consideration in using PPPs in some of the 8 nations we contacted. Budget officials in Hungary, for instance, said that bringing the deficit under the 3% target is critical since its entry into EU in 2003. When compared to traditional government capital investment, PPPs are a strategy to undertake capital projects with minimal impact on the deficit.

Price WaterhouseCoopers, Delivering the PPP Promise: A review of PPP issues and activity, 2007.

- 5.17. The argument above that PPPs do not have immediate budgetary consequences is a political and perceptual point, but not a substantive one. By assigning financing to the private sector, initial costs do not appear in budgets at the outset of projects. As a result, projects can appear to be far cheaper than they are. In reality, they shift the costs from the capital portion of budgets to the annual operating budgets for years to come. This shift appears to free up near term fiscal space, but at the expense of long term fiscal space. In a triumph of form over substance, PPPs succeed politically through budgetary alchemy costs don't disappear, rather they become less immediately obvious through stretching and amortization.
- 5.18. Once choices are made to appear less costly than they really are, the prospects increase for distortion of priorities and higher long term spending within national budgets. Fiscal and allocation risks and distortions occur when there is a mismatch between benefits and costs for projects. In the case of PPPs, benefits can be claimed in the near term while costs can be spread beyond the immediate political horizon. This creates greater potential for several budgetary consequences
 - Higher levels of capital can be funded than can be afforded given current and long term budget constraints.
 - Costs can be shifted to future budgets, placing greater encumbrances on future generations of taxpayers and public officials.
 - Lower value projects can be selected due to the lack of up front budgetary recognition of full costs.
- 5.19. The decisions to begin pfi's today serve to encumber future budgets for years to come with required annual payments. As a result, government's ability to adapt to emerging priorities or fund competing needs is correspondingly constrained. In effect, these mandatory payments further reduce the ability of governments to use spending cuts or shifts as instruments of countercyclical economic policy.
- 5.20. The long term shift of costs is clearly shown in the United Kingdom. Thanks to the transparent budgetary information from the UK, it is possible to illustrate the long term impacts of current PPP commitments (called pfi's in the UK system). The following chart shows the annual payments due for all pfi projects entered into in recent years. For each pfi project, a series of annual payments, known as the unitary charge, encumbers future budgets for over 20 years into the future. The chart shows that payments begin to subside in about 15 years, but this assumes that no further pfi projects will be initiated when, in fact, the government is continuing to use this tool going forward. UK Treasury officials indicate that annual pfi charges for larger local governments have grown to encumber 25% of operating budgets going forward.



- 5.21. Notably, the growth of these annual pfi payments corresponds with the growing fiscal pressures faced by the UK, along with other advanced nations, as a result of the retirement of the baby boom generation. Not only will spending on pensions and health care be higher, but economic growth will slow due to slower growth of the workforce. Notwithstanding these other fiscal trends, these annual pfi unitary charges constitute mandatory payments that must be allocated each year pursuant to the long term contracts supporting each pfi. While government can attempt to renegotiate as technology or fiscal constraints change, the private partner would have to agree to this change.
- 5.22. Importantly, budgetary distortions can occur **even** when the investment is well chosen and represents value for money. There are limits in any budget to funding even effective projects and programs. At some point, capital spending crowds out other types of spending and long term budget constraints can be undermined as well.
 - 5.22.1. Most OECD nations have focused considerable analytic attention to comparing PPPs with traditional government owned capital prior to authorizing new PPP projects. This focus on what we call here "relative affordability" is commendable and represents real progress. However, nations also need to focus on what we call "absolute affordability", i.e. the point at which even projects surviving value for money tradeoffs exceed some budget constraint. Affordability criteria are not as well institutionalized as are value for money comparisons. One study of the authorization of the PPP for financing the London Underground found that affordability was not formally considered, leaving the project with a more than £500 million gap.³⁴
- 5.23 PPPs may also carry allocation risks. By sidestepping the up front allocation of budgetary resources, they may enable lower value projects to gain funding. When the full costs of irrevocable decisions committing public resources do not have to be budgeted for out of scarce resources at the front

Jean Shaoul, "A Financial Appraisal of the London Underground Public-Private Partnership" *Public Money and Management* 22:2 (April, 2002).

end of projects, chances increase for the funding of lower priority projects that would not survive in a more constrained and disciplined process. In Portugal, while traditional government capital projects must compete against a resource constraint, this is not the case for PPPs, opening the door for funding lower value projects. Officials in the United Kingdom also report that low value projects can be supported when PPPs are off the balance sheet and therefore not formally considered in the capital budget on an up front basis.

5.24 Hungary's experience illustrates how budgeting for PPPs can lead to low funding of capital projects that have lower value. In 2003, the Ministry of Education obtained a government license allowing schools throughout the country to obtain funds to build university housing. Under the PPP framework, universities were automatically eligible to claim approval and funding. A pilot project at the University of Debrecen was followed by 11 similar PPP schemes in other universities. As a result, substantially more housing was built than needed; some of them are now being used for unrelated purposes.

6. Budgeting processes and practices for PPPs

- The foregoing suggests that PPPs are not only challenging managerially but lend themselves to budget control and accountability problems. Budget formulation and accounting processes play critical roles in determining the impact that PPPs will in fact have on fiscal policy, resource allocation and public management. In this section, we will examine the specific nature of budgetary processes applicable to PPPs, drawing from the eight case studies reviewed in this study. In this section, we will assess the following specific questions: (1) whether PPPs are on or off budget; (2) how PPP costs are booked in the budget when they are included in the budget; (3) whether and how PPPs are included in longer term expenditure frameworks; (4) whether specific limits apply to PPP outlays or commitments; (5) legislative oversight and review for PPPs and (6) whether and how guarantees and other subsidies provided for PPPs are recorded in budget totals and documents. In assessing budgetary controls, we will, where possible, compare the processes used for PPPs with those applicable to traditional government owned capital assets.
- 6.2. The implications of PPPs for the budget are pervasive, if not obvious. The specific public sector costs that have a bearing on current and future budgets include:
 - Annual payments for the life of PPP projects
 - Capital contributions to establish PPPs
 - Revenue losses from foregoing user fees
 - Contingent liabilities such as guarantees
 - Tax expenditures such as accelerated depreciation taken for private investment
- 6.3. The first question is whether the PPP costs are recognized in the budget at all. Unified budget principles call for all significant government financial commitments to be included in a comprehensive budget. Such documents are not only useful for fiscal policy, but ensure that transactions involving government resources all benefit from common guidance and controls. If the PPP is off budget, then none of the budgetary controls that can promote fiscal discipline and accountability for PPP decisions are applicable. Moreover, government officials will be tempted to disproportionately rely on those techniques even if they are more costly. The treatment of PPPs in financial accounting statements often plays a major role in determining whether the transactions will be recorded in the budget. If PPPs are defined as private rather than public assets, they are not accounted for on the government's balance sheet or counted as part of the public debt.

- 6.3.1. Accounting standards vary across nations, and there are no internationally recognized accounting and reporting standards in place for PPPs. Nations in the European Union are guided by Eurostat guidance which governs the statistical data on government expenditures that member nations must report for purposes of compliance with EU fiscal guidance. This guidance provides for PPP projects to be classified as nongovernmental if the private partner bears the construction risk and either availability or demand risk a characteristic that most projects can easily meet. This 2004 ruling has given rise to concerns that PPPs would be disproportionately classified as nongovernmental, enabling government to more easily comply with EU's deficit and debt strictures. However, nations can and do go beyond this guidance in adopting their own accounting definitions and guidance that govern the treatment of PPPs for internal budgetary and policymaking deliberations.
- 6.3.2. Budgets need not reflect or mirror accounting standards and definitions. After all, many budgets are cash based even though their financial accounting statements are prepared pursuant to accrual based standards. However, for PPPs, accounting standards play a formative role in determining budgetary treatment. In the United Kingdom, PPPs that are off balance sheet are not included in the capital budget and thus not part of budgetary totals recording capital investment. However, annual unitary payments provided to PPPs are on budget, regardless of the project's status as on or off the balance sheet. Most UK projects are off balance sheet if the London Underground is excluded, leaving just 13% of PPPs on the balance sheet, representing 46% of the total value. Experience varies by department; 100% of health care PPPs are off balance sheet, as are 36 of the 47 Defence Department projects. Most PPPs in Hungary are also recorded as off budget, leaving only the annual payments for projects in the budget.
- 6.3.3. The budgetary inclusion of concession varies among nations. In France, concessions are not defined as PPPs and are considered private assets since all risks are formally transferred to the private partner. Portugal does include their concession PPPs as part of the balance sheet, owing to the government subsidies for these projects. However, the commercial-status government agencies are exempted from budgetary controls and information presented on PPPs in the budget. This includes projects sponsored by the highway department, which is no longer a government agency, but a privatized governmental body funded by user payments.

Frederic Marty, "United Kingdom: Accounting for PPP's", presentation at the OECD seminar on Public-Private Partnerships, Winterthur, Switzerland, February 21-22, 2008.

Box 3. Eurostat's decision on the accounting treatment of PPPs and emergence of a dual PPP investment record system in France

Eurostat 2004 regulation mandates that assets involved in a PPP should be classified as non-government assets and recorded off balance sheet for government, if the private partner bears the construction risk AND the private partner bears at least one of either availability or demand risk. In all other cases, assets are classified as government assets.

France records all investments in contracts before project implementation starts. Yet, not all risks are estimated at the time of contract preparation, which makes it impossible to determine whether a project will be off/on government balance sheet. As a result, French government prepares two budgetary documents:

- 1. External documentation presented to Eurostat. These documents do not include PPPs that don't meet Eurostat's risk transfer requirements
- 2. Internal documentation that includes all PPPs into a balance sheet, whether both risks are transferred to a private party or not. The balance sheet determination for internal purposes is based on which party has control of the project. Given the difficulties and uncertainties of allocating risk, the government decided that the presumption should be given to recording PPPs on the balance sheet.

As a result, visibility of PPP investments is higher in internal budgetary documents rather than those presented to Eurostat.

- 6.4. Budgeting for all financial commitments up front is often viewed as an essential discipline in ensuring that decision makers have incentives to fully consider all known costs—at the time that irrevocable commitments of government resources are made. Most nations in our case studies, however, do not require agencies to budget for the full up costs of PPPs up front at the time that the commitment of the government is entered in to. Hungary, Portugal, Korea, for instance, only budget for PPPs once the annual charge is payable. This gives rise to a perception that PPPs are zero-cost projects. The annual charges are only recognized and paid over time rather than up front. Moreover, the annual charges are reflected in budgets only several years after the project is authorized and construction has been completed. Thus, the budget reflects the costs of PPPs on a much-delayed basis, far after the fundamental decision to commit the nation has been made.
 - 6.4.1. The budgetary recognition of private engagements differs from traditional governmental capital projects. Since most nations budget on a cash basis, agency budgets must reflect the estimated cash needed up front to finance design and construction costs, concentrated in the first or second year of funded projects. Accordingly, there is greater up front recognition for traditional government capital than for PPPs However, unlike PPPs, there is no comprehensive accounting for the life cycle costs including both design, construction, operations and maintenance over the life cycle of the asset. Rather, budgets for operations and maintenance are developed on an annual basis during the entire life of the project.
 - 6.4.2. Another important long term difference between PPPs and traditional capital involves the nature of the annual payments supporting capital projects. For traditional capital projects, the existence of the asset implies some government obligation to budget for operations and maintenance, but the actual levels of support are decided on a discretionary basis each year. However, for PPPs, the annual payment comprises a mandatory cost in the budget for every year of the project's life, reflecting a combined charge amortizing capital financing, operations and maintenance costs. As noted above, the long term contracts dictate the length of time that annual budgets will be encumbered with this annual payment mandate. In Hungary, for instance, PPPs for motorways are contracted for 20-35 years and airports are 75 years.

- 6.4.3. Two nations in our case studies the UK and France do recognize the upfront costs of PPPs in capital and investment budgeting at the time that decisions are made. In the UK, for projects on the balance sheet, agencies must budget for the full costs of the capital portion up front as part of separate capital budget accounts. Similar to traditional capital, this PPP cost must be traded off with other capital budget proposals and budgeted under the agency's fixed budgetary allotment for capital under the separate Departmental Expenditure Limits for capital spending. The PPP proposals are reviewed as part of the three year spending review done for each agency as part of the budget process.
- 6.4.4. France budgets for PPPs in two ways once for the gross investment costs covering the duration of the contract, the other for gross upkeep payments. Thus, there is some recognition of the costs of commitment up front when projects are commenced. However, this presented a problem because French law prohibited deferred payments from commitments, necessitating a change in statute to accommodate the delayed annual payments for PPPs.
- 6.4.5. The budgetary treatment for PPPs in some nations is still evolving. In the United States, budgetary recognition of private engagements varies and is done on a piecemeal basis, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Budget Office. Disagreement between the two budget agencies OMB and CBO exists over the proper scoring of public-private partnerships for military housing. OMB guidelines enabled the Defense Department to use housing provided by private partners without recording large budgetary obligations up front. The CBO urged OMB to score the partnerships as government owned investments since the government will eventually be responsible for the housing.
- 6.4.6. The form of budgetary recognition makes a difference for the quality of deliberation on proposed projects. Officials from several nations said that there is more scrutiny of appropriations for traditional government owned capital for two reasons. First, capital costs are budgeted for up front and second, they must compete with other projects for a limited pool of funding. Since PPPs are not funded up front and are not recorded for several years, the budget itself does not prompt a similar level of debate. However, recognizing the longer term financial issues, a number of nations have initiated scrutiny outside the formal budget process through analytical reviews of value for money for PPP projects. In fact, in some nations such as Portugal and the United Kingdom, officials indicate that PPPs get greater scrutiny through these analytical processes than traditional government owned capital. Portugal has decided to extend the same review process and criteria for PPPs to all government owned capital.
- 6.5. In addition to budgetary payments, some nations provide more indirect forms of subsidies for PPPs and concession. Guarantees and other forms of payment are often triggered when projects fall below certain financial thresholds, constituting a contingent liability. In most nations, budget and accounting rules do not require appropriations for these contingent claims. France and Korea, for instance, have guarantees but they are not recorded or recognized until they are triggered. Australia does not reflect contingent liabilities in budget totals but rather in a statement of risk accompanying the budget. The United States, which has very few PPPs, is among the few nations that do budget for the costs of guarantees up front in the budget. The credit subsidy records the net present value of costs to the government over the life of the guarantee based on interest subsidies and projected defaults. Chile has an intemporal budget constraint that limits the guarantees and subsidies for concessions, as discussed in Box 4.

Congressional Budget Office, *The Budgetary Treatment of Leases and Public/Private Ventures.*, paper, February, 2003.

Box 4. Concession risk guarantees in Chile

Chile has developed sophisticated analytical methodologies for the valuation of guarantees provided in the context of concessions. The government guarantees under the PPP contracts are centered in protecting the concession firms from demand and exchange rate risks. Starting in 2002, the demand guarantees are provided at a cost.

The IMG is the major guarantee offered to cover demand risk. The government compensates concessionaire if the revenues from the tolls are less than projected minimum. In exchange for the guarantee, the concessionaire shares 50% of the revenues that exceed the projected revenues. Starting in 2003, a premium is charged for the provision of the guarantee. The guarantees which are triggered are paid in the budget year following that in which they were triggered. The deferred payment together with only a partial compensation of the difference with respect to the total projected revenues limit moral hazard and problems of adverse selection, as well as government's exposure to risk and the fiscal cost of triggered guarantees.

The aggregate net present value of the guarantees for PPPs for 2006-30 is 0.15% of GDP. Chile established an Intertemporal Budget Restriction (RPI) to limit the total amount of subsidies and guarantees, measured on a net present value basis. While this ceiling is not formally in the budget and does not flow to the bottom line, it is presented in a supplemental analysis of contingent liabilities and is enforced by the budget office.

- 6.6. Some nations have imposed budgetary limits on annual PPP spending, partly to compensate for the lack of up front budget recognition and controls. Hungary has limit of 3% for PPPs as a share of government revenues, while Korea has a limit of 2% of spending. While not having specific PPP ceilings, nations like the UK that budget for the upfront costs of PPPs have inherent limits since the PPP projects must be allocated from a limited pool of funds provided to agencies for capital projects.
- 6.7. Effective scrutiny and review of PPP proposals calls for a perspective that goes beyond the annual budget to encompass the life cycle of proposed projects. However, most nations traditionally devote weaker scrutiny to non-cash items and long term obligations compared to immediate outlays. ³⁷ Having said this, nations are moving in the right direction by providing more information and perspectives on longer term PPP trajectories as well as longer term budgetary outlooks.
 - 6.7.1. Most nations include annualized PPP costs in their medium term frameworks which typically extend from three to five years. In nations like Korea and Hungary, this provides some longer term assessment of cash payments for PPPs, but this falls far short of capturing the full costs. Some nations go beyond this to do longer term analyses of full PPPs costs over the life of the project, which appear as supplements to the regular budget. The United Kingdom, for instance, provides data on the year by year costs of annual payments for all PPPs in a chapter in the budget. These long term schedules are included as part of their initial assessment of value for money for each project. Since 2003, Portugal has prepared a memo to the budget director providing the long term costs for all PPPs, a memo that is appended to the budget document.
 - 6.7.2. The growing movement in OECD nations to examine the longer term projections for current budgetary policy is also helpful. The United States, United Kingdom and other nations have developed models to simulate budget outcomes over as much as 50 to 75 years.³⁸ While these long term projections do not incorporate or highlight the long term trajectories of PPPs, they do provide an overall perspective on the fiscal space that will be available over the many years that PPP payments come home to roost in

Nina Budina, Hana Polackova Brixi, and Timothy Irwin, *Public-Private Partnerships in the New EU Member States* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2007), p. 14.

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Pal Ulla, "Assessing Fiscal Risks Through Long-Term Budget Projections", report prepared for OECD Senior Budget Officials meeting (Paris: October, 2006).

budgets. For most OECD nations, the long term outlook is worrisome and shows that budgets will increasing be preoccupied with paying for the elderly and their doctors, with less fiscal space available to finance capital, either future or payments from the past.

- 6.8. The degree of legislative and public oversight over PPPs appears to be less extensive than for traditional government owned capital. In most nations, the annual appropriations process will not disclose the presence of new PPPs since there is no up front budget authority required to start these projects. For traditional capital, the legislature must appropriate the up front funding necessary to begin design and construction. Among our eight nations, Hungary required any major capital project above certain threshold, whether it be traditional capital or PPPs, to gain legislative approval. However, many major nations with extensive PPP activity do not obtain legislative approval prior to approving projects. Korea, the UK and Chile all have decided not to require legislative review and approval. Some officials indicated a concern that legislative review might invite pork barreling to enter into decisions.
- 6.9. While the budget process is critical, other components of policy making and management also play a vital role in ensuring that PPP projects deliver public value within budget constraints: ³⁹
 - 1. Investment planning Determination of which projects are suitable for PPPs and whether such projects satisfy both value for money and affordability criteria through use of public sector comparators. For instance, the IMF suggests that PPPs are better suited to economic infrastructure than social infrastructure due to the greater return of sound economic projects for business and the higher potential to charge users for infrastructure services.
 - 2. Legal and institutional framework Such issues as clear definitions for PPPs, competition and contract management, specific metrics linking contracts with outputs and outcomes, oversight and review units to provide consistency and expert assistance to agencies, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of central budget and line agencies for project review, approval and monitoring. "Gateway processes" are instituted by nations to provide a strong role for the Ministry of Finance in project selection and approval.

See Bernardin Akitoby, Richard Hemming and Gerd Schwartz, *Public Investment and Public-Private Partnerships*, (Washington, D.C., IMF, Economic Issues No. 40, 2007).

Box 4. The Gateway Process

Nations such as Portugal have relied in recent years on a gateway system that includes review and appraisal processes addressing efficiency and fiscal risks of PPPs. Specific roles are provided for the line agencies and the Finance Ministry, which must sign off on projects at each step of the process. The following is a representation of this process based on the experience of Portugal¹

Phase 1: Planning, design and preparation of tender

- --Project Team prepares value for money analysis and tender document
- --PPP Unit reviews the analysis
- --Budget Department evaluates affordability of project
- --Finance Minister approves or rejects project

Phase 2: Bidding and negotiation

- -- Tender Board assesses bids and selects preferred bidder
- --PPP unit assess draft contract
- --Finance Minister approves or rejects the contract

Phase 3: Construction and operation

- -- PPP unit monitors implementation by project manager
- --Budget Department monitors budgetary flows on regular basis
- --All actors involved in renegotiation of contract if necessary
- --Finance Minister must approve any contract renegotiation
- 6.9.1. Many nations with weak budgetary controls nonetheless sustain separate analytic reviews focused on PPP projects. Some of these elements can compensate for weak budgetary controls. For instance, most of the eight nations we examined have dedicated PPP units, in central budget offices, line agencies or both, to review PPP assessments, provide technical assistance and guidance and to oversee implementation of PPP projects. Units in Portugal are constituted as an independent board, while France has established a special task force to review PPPs. The UK Treasury has a 12 person PPP unit. These units can help ensure that PPPs are selected and designed to be consistent with overall budget constraints facing the government. For instance, they oversee the crucial value for money assessments, where PPPs are compared with public sector comparators prior to project approval.
- 6.9.2. As a result, these review processes do provide transparency about PPP proposals, at least inside the government. Some officials suggested that there is actually a greater degree of review of PPPs than for traditional government capital projects. Portugal extended its analytic reviews for PPPs adopted in 2003 to all proposed capital projects, partly out of concern that special PPP analytic procedures might bias decisions against PPPs.

7. Conclusions

- 7.1. The use of private financing and delivery for public services has advantages. Private efficiencies can deliver real benefits that might overcome higher financing and transaction charges. The risk sharing and bundling of all phases of capital services may very well promote incentives to achieve improved outputs with lower costs.
- 7.2. However, these promises rest on heroic assumptions and ideal conditions that are too often missing in many cases. Deep markets are often not available to provide the level of competition necessary to motivate private innovation and efficiency. Clear demarcation and sharing of risks is often

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overturned in practice, as public officials face asymmetrical risks that are often impossible to measure and delineate for the long time frames involved with PPP contracts. Fundamentally, public and private partners have differing interests and, while these differences can lead to a healthy marriage between the partners, they must also be acknowledged as a source of uncertainty and entropy that can complicate and, perhaps, erode the attainment of public goals and values.

- 7.3. Some policy domains and nations may be better candidates than others— economic infrastructure that can deliver greater productivity for private firms offers better prospects for aligning public and private interests in constructive partnerships. However, the more a service takes on the character of a pure public good, the less private incentives will be congruent with public interest, leading to greater public disappointment with the results. The long term financial impacts of PPPs may be better absorbed in nations with good long term growth prospects, while nations with slowing economies and large long term commitments are advised to be far more cautious.
- 7.4. Public-private partnerships, while promising performance breakthroughs, create significant uncertainties and risks for governments. The lack of up front budget scoring lowers the level of deliberation for these projects and invites decisions to be taken based on opportunistic exploitation of budget rules rather than evaluations of longer term risks and rewards. The risks and uncertainties intensify over the long term, as projects face new challenges and as budgets become more encumbered with financial commitments. Accordingly, nations should be wary of using private capital to finance infrastructure and capital assets.
- 7.5. Nations have sought to compensate for the weakness of budgetary controls with impressive analytic initiatives and information that go beyond anything done for conventional public capital projects. And with good reason, given the higher stakes, greater uncertainty and longer term commitments that public-private partnerships entail.
- 7.6. However, stronger budgetary processes and controls are necessary to provide greater assurance that PPPs are being funded for the right reasons. Given limited fiscal resources both now and over the longer term, nations need to ensure that those projects selected represent the most cost effective and affordable approach to financing infrastructure and that this particular strategy is compared with other competing needs across the entire budget using similar budgetary concepts and scoring.
- 7.7. The following elements constitute a strategy for strengthening budgetary review and deliberation for PPPs:
 - Establishing up front funding in the budget for the total commitment entailed for PPP projects should be institutionalized in the budget formulation process. This would help ensure that decision makers face the full cost consequences of their decisions.
 - The funding for PPPs should compete with other claims in agency budgets for inherently limited resources. The full funding of commitments up front from scarce resources provides the best assurance that decision makers will deliberate about the relative value of PPP projects compared with other programs and priorities.
 - There should be a presumption that all PPPs should be fully recorded in the budget, even if projects are deemed to be off the financial balance sheet based on relative risks.
 - Nations should strengthen the process for analyzing PPP proposals by providing for explicit criteria assessing affordability to accompany existing value for money reviews.

- Affordability can be operationalized by establishing limits on the total level of PPP commitments undertaken in a given year. Limits can be measured based on total net present value of long term costs and/or total annual payments for approved projects.
- Guarantees and other subsidies for PPPs, and for other purposes, should be estimated at the time that commitments are authorized. Consideration should be given to using accrual based approaches to measure guarantees, such as credit subsidy concept used in the United States and New Zealand. Limits on total guarantees should also be explored.
- Nations should consider establish or strengthen longer term budget frameworks for many reasons, including providing a more informed basis for considering the long term affordability of PPP projects. Modeling long term fiscal outlooks is the first step. Following this, nations should consider develop their near and medium term fiscal targets with the longer term outlook in mind.
- Nations should also work to provide greater disclosures on future payment obligations for PPPs in budget documents. The extensive information published in the budget documents of the UK and the new budget memos prepared by Portugal provide two excellent examples of transparency supporting PPP decision making.