AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS FOR COMMODITY PRICE STABILISATION

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This document is presented to the 52nd Session of the Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets for DISCUSSION under Item 12d) of the draft agenda.

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The scoping paper presented to the Committee in October 2009 on the project covering “Structural Change in Global Agricultural Markets” [TAD/CA/APM/WP(2009)19], Output Area 322 of the 2009-10 PWB, indicated that one factor that may be contributing to increased price volatility particularly for grains was the lower level of global stocks in recent years. This paper, prepared by a consultant, Dr. Christopher Gilbert, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italy, reviews the situation of lower global stocks and discusses the role that stocks play in price determination for storable commodities. The paper also provides a bridge to the 2011-12 PWB on the structural change activity which will focus more on policy responses to price volatility. In this respect, it reviews briefly the history, and lessons to be drawn for international stockholding, of the former international commodity agreements (ICAs) with economic provisions for price stabilisation, discusses some alternative, market-based approaches for coping with price volatility and provides suggestion for further work.

The document is presented for Discussion.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>Instituto Brasiliero do Cafe</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>International Commodity Agreement</td>
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<td>ICCA</td>
<td>International Cocoa Agreement</td>
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<td>ICO</td>
<td>International Coffee Organization</td>
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<td>ICOA</td>
<td>International Coffee Agreement</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INRA</td>
<td>International Natural Rubber Agreement</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Programme for Commodities</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Sugar Agreement</td>
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<td>ITA</td>
<td>International Tin Agreement</td>
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<td>IWA</td>
<td>International Wheat Agreement</td>
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<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS FOR COMMODITY PRICE STABILISATION

Executive summary

1. This report examines the various international commodity agreements (ICAs) with economic provisions (price bands and stockholding or supply control obligations) that were established in the post Second World War period with the declared objective of stabilising international commodity prices. The report asks what, if anything, can be learnt from the ICAs.

2. The answer is largely, but not entirely, negative. While it would be incorrect to claim that international commodity agreements failed, they did not have significant success in reducing the volatility of the prices they set out to stabilise. By restricting exports, they probably did succeed in raising prices but this is not helpful in the context in which the international community wishes to limit grains price variability by preventing future price spikes, or to limit the effects of such spikes.

3. The experience of buffer stock stabilisation does yield some lessons:
   - It is potentially very costly, partly because public storage crowds out private storage.
   - The need to update the stabilisation range in relation to changed market circumstances can result in controversy.
   - Once its inventory is exhausted, a buffer stock agreement has no other means of limiting price rises. Intervention is therefore more effective in limiting price falls than in curtailing the incidence and magnitude of spikes.
   - This asymmetry is exacerbated by the possibility of speculative attack.

4. The report also looks at the relationship between grains stocks and prices. The theoretically implied negative stock-price relationship is apparent in the data but the fit is poor and allows plenty of space for other factors to affect grains prices. It is far from clear that low stocks were more than a contributory factor to the 2007-08 price spike and hence doubtful whether higher stocks would prevent a future spike.

5. Much is made of the fall in grains stock-consumption ratios over the past decade but this fall is largely due an apparent fall in Chinese stocks. It is unclear whether the historical Chinese stock data can be regarded as reliable and to what extent these stocks, if real, would have been available had they been required outside China.

6. For these reasons, the more optimistic claims made for an international grain stockpile should be discounted. If intervention is considered desirable, the commodity agreement experience indicates that the intervention authority should follow the practice of central banks which, when they intervene on foreign
exchange markets, do so without prior announcement and without making their objectives explicit. This could substantially reduce the level of intervention costs.

7. Market-based measures may offer a superior alternative in countering food price volatility. The purchase of out-of-the-money call options allows an importing government to put an (approximate) ceiling on the price it will pay for its grain. The cost of this protection is known in advance and will only be paid if it is lower than the perceived benefit. Whereas public storage discourages private storage, the use of market-based protection will increase private storage.

8. Finally, the report suggests an agenda for future research. This should focus on increasing the transparency of information on grains stocks, investigation of the extent to which different types of public storage impact private storage and examination of the costs and benefits from the use of market-based instruments.
1. Introduction

9. This report examines the various international commodity agreements (ICAs) with economic provisions (price bands and stockholding or supply control obligations) that were established in the post Second World War period with the declared objective of stabilising international commodity prices. The report asks what, if anything, can be learnt from this experience with the ICAs.

10. A contributory factor that has been identified as possibly driving high grain prices since 2007 is the apparently low level of global grains stocks. Section 2 of the report outlines the theory of the role of stocks in price determination for storable commodities (sections 2.1 and 2.2), discusses the downward trend in global public and commercial inventories and food stocks over the most recent decades (section 2.3) and attempts to relate stock levels to prices (section 2.4). Section 3 discusses the history and motivation of the ICAs with economic provisions for the different products (section 3.1), the instruments they employed (sections 3.2 - 3.4), the reasons for their lapse or collapse (section 3.5) and their successes and failures (section 3.6). Section 4 of the report discusses the lessons of the ICAs for concerns relating to the current elevated levels of grains price volatility (section 4.1), the stockholding measures that are currently receiving attention (section 4.2), food security issues (section 4.3) and market-based alternatives to intervention (section 4.4). Section 5 offers brief conclusions.

2. Commodity stocks

11. Commodity prices are variable because short term production and consumption elasticities are low. Production responsiveness is low in agriculture because input decisions are made before new crop prices are known. These decisions depend on expected prices and not price realisations. Price outcomes are seldom so disastrous as to result in the crop being abandoned on the trees or in the ground. Short term demand elasticities are low because the actual commodity price may not be a large component of overall value of the final product (e.g. cocoa in chocolate, coffee beans in soluble coffee powder); and, for subsistence commodities, because there may be few alternative affordable products (e.g. potatoes in nineteenth century Ireland).

12. Changes in commodity prices originate in shocks to demand and supply. It has generally been supposed that price volatility for food crops owes more to supply shocks while volatility for industrially consumed commodities is driven primarily by demand shocks. This judgement reflects low income elasticities of demand for food, implying that food consumption is less variable than the business cycle, and high usage intensity for industrial commodities in construction and investment, resulting in their consumption being more variable than the business cycle. However, because harvest outcomes are not strongly correlated across either continents or commodities, supply shocks are more important in explaining movements in the prices of individual food commodities than in aggregate food price indices where a degree of offsetting takes place (Gilbert, 2010).

2.1 The relationship between price and stocks

13. Low elasticities imply that small shocks to production can have a large price impact. However, the impact of shocks on commodity prices is moderated by stockholding. Low prices, caused either by positive supply shocks, negative demand shocks, or both of these, imply probable positive returns to stockholding. Consumption demand is therefore augmented by stock demand until such point as the expected return from holding stocks is equal to rate of interest on comparably risky investments. The fall in prices is moderated to the extent that excess supply is absorbed in stocks.

14. The same mechanism works for excess demand resulting from negative supply shocks or positive demand shocks. These result in destocking thereby augmenting supply. The catch is that destocking
requires an inventory. Once stockout occurs, price is determined simply by equality of production and consumption demand. The non-negativity constraint on stocks implies that stockholding behaviour will be more effective in moderating downward than upward price movements. This leads to the observation that commodity price cycles will typically exhibit long flat bottoms punctuated by occasional sharp peaks.

15. There have been significant advances in understanding inventory-moderated commodity price cycles. Building on a paper by Williams (1936), Samuelson (1957) illustrated the effects of storage on grain prices. In a pioneering paper, Gustafson (1958), writing in the context of grains, characterized the amount of storage which will take place in a competitive world in which there is no government intervention. The Gustafson storage rule applies in a simple non-dynamic model of agricultural supply and demand with a single state variable - availability, defined as production plus lagged carryover. Deaton and Laroque (1992) obtained essentially the same result as so-called rational expectations equilibrium. Wright and Williams (1991) used numerical methods to approximate this equilibrium in more complicated dynamic models.

16. It is a feature of these models that commodity stocks and the commodity price are jointly determined. It is neither the case that the price is determined by the current carryover nor the reverse. Instead, there is an equilibrium relationship between the price in the current crop year and the planned carryover to the following year. This relationship is inverse – if availability is low, there will be no carryover and the market clearing price will be high while if availability is high, stocks will be carried forward to the next year and the price will be low.

17. Empirically, commodity researchers focus on the relationship between the current price and the lagged carryover, that is the carryover (if any) from the previous to the present crop year. This relationship is also inverse, but, unlike that between the price and the current year’s carryover, is also causal (the current price cannot affect last year’s storage decisions). However, the relationship need not be constant since the price depends on availability which is the sum of the lagged carryover plus the current (actual or expected) harvest. This possible non-constancy applies also in more complicated models, such as those in which production depends on expected prices, where the lagged carryover and the current harvest may affect prices with different weights. For these reasons, one should not necessarily expect to find a constant relationship between price and stock levels.

18. This is also true for other reasons. The foregoing discussion has related entirely to so-called speculative stocks. Inventory may also be held as working stocks. The analogy is with the transactions and precautionary demands for money. Such stocks yield their owners, typically processing companies or merchants, a “convenience yield” which is measured by the amount they will pay to have immediate access to the commodity (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). It seems likely that changes in industrial structure and practice, in particular the emergence of just-in-time delivery systems, may have reduced convenience yields and hence diminished this component of stock demand. If this is the case, the same commodity price will be consistent with a lower level of stocks today than was the case, say, a decade ago. In practice, therefore, it makes sense to relate price to stocks relative to a current estimate of “normal stocks”.

19. Grains stocks are also held by governments for food security reasons. Globalisation resulted in increased reliance on trade rather than national stockpiles – see section 4.3. Movements in these governmental stocks can be large and have the potential to obscure the stock-price relationship.

20. Price volatility will also be related to lagged stock levels, but subject to the same qualifications. In the context of a high carryover from previous years, a negative supply shock (a poor harvest) will be met largely by destocking. The price impact will therefore be limited. In the case of a zero or low carryover, the same supply shock would require consumers to reduce consumption. Because demand elasticities are low, the price will need to rise by much more to clear the market. Volatility will therefore be
negatively related to stocks (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010). But because volatility is directionless, both upward (poor harvest) and downward (abnormally good harvest) price movements will be larger when stocks are high than when they are low.

2.2 Public and private stocks

21. Theories relating commodity prices to private stockholding behaviour have important implications for commodity policy. Miranda and Helmberger (1988) have shown how public stockholding, for instance by a buffer stock agency, changes the incentives for the private sector to hold stocks. In particular, the fact that the agency is committed to selling at a specified ceiling price will limit potential price gains and hence reduce the incentive for the private sector to hold inventory. If market conditions are sufficiently weak, the public sector may end up holding the entire market deficit. This was the situation under the sixth International Tin Agreement which collapsed in 1985 – see Anderson and Gilbert (1988). Clearly, floor provisions of this type make buffer stock stabilisation extremely expensive.

22. A stabilisation ceiling price can also be vulnerable to speculative attack (Salant, 1983). If speculators perceive the stocks held by the stabilisation agency as possibly insufficient to maintain the ceiling price min the future, they will compete to buy the entirety of the agency’s remaining stock in order to take advantage of likely capital gains. Recognizing this, Wright and Williams (1991) suggested that, while a stabilisation agency might choose to defend a defined floor price, it should avoid making commitments on the price (or prices) at which it will sell. It will nevertheless remain true that public stockholding will, to a greater or lesser extent, crowd out private stockholding.

23. Speculators may also in principle attack a floor price by selling the commodity short. There is, however, an important asymmetry between a floor (short) and a ceiling (long) attack. Speculators will typically operate on the futures and not the cash market, at least in the first instance, since futures transactions only require the deposit of margin, typically 10% of contract value, while cash transactions require full payment. Futures therefore permit leverage. Futures purchases at or near the stabilisation ceiling will pull cash prices up in line with the rising futures price since the contango (the difference between the futures and the cash price, if positive) must be equal to the carrying charge (interest plus warehousing and depreciation costs) – see Hull (2006). Upward pressure on futures price therefore translates dollar for dollar into the cash price which the authority is required to defend. This does not apply to speculative futures sales at the floor since the backwardation (the difference between the cash and the futures price, if positive) can be indefinitely large. Provided market participants believe that the authority has sufficient finance to defend the floor, it can allow the futures price to fall beneath this level. Furthermore, the authority is in a position to perform a “short squeeze” on the speculators by forcing them either to deliver the commodity at contract expiry or close out at a loss. For these reasons, short speculative attacks rarely occur whereas long attacks are commonplace.

2.3 Trends in international grain stocks

24. In this section, I consider the evolution of stocks of wheat, maize (corn) and rice at the world level. It is necessary to exercise caution in the interpretation of these numbers since much of the stock data is inferred from data on production and consumption. I use data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in preference to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) since the USDA data is available over a longer time period. The FAO data tend to imply higher stocks-consumption ratios but the general trends are the same in the two datasets.

25. Dawe (2009) argues for exclusion of Chinese stocks on the basis that China is largely self-sufficient in all three major grains and that Chinese production and consumption are not impacted by world prices. Furthermore, much of the variability in world grain stocks is the result of accumulation and
disaccumulation on the part of China. I therefore look at stock-consumption ratios both including and excluding China.

26. Figure 1 (see end of paper) shows the world wheat stock-consumption ratio from 1960/61 to 2009/10.\(^1\) The figures move closely together except in the late nineteen nineties when the Chinese accumulated large levels of stocks – 49% of the world total at the end of the 1998-99 crop year. Stock-consumption ratios have declined over the fifty year period considered from around 35% to around 25%. In real terms, the world wheat price has declined in real terms from around $250/ton to around $175/ton (in 2005 values)\(^2\) – see Figure 2. The result is that the simple relationship between wheat stocks and prices has been obscured by increases in agricultural productivity, resulting in lower prices, and improvements in stock and production management resulting in lower inventory requirements.

27. Figures 3 and 4 provide the same information for maize. Stock-consumption ratios have declined even more dramatically in maize than in wheat – from a similar initial value in the early nineteen sixties of around 35% to a current value of near 15%. While this decline was steady for wheat, in the case of maize there was a sharp jump back to the earlier levels in the late nineteen eighties. Again as in wheat, Chinese stocks were very high in the late nineteen nineties, accounting for 64% of world stocks from 1997/98 to 1999/2000. Over the same period, the real maize price has approximately halved from around $200/ton in 2005 values) in the early nineteen sixties to around $125/ton through the nineteen nineties. Even at its recent 2007/08 peak, real maize prices were substantially lower than in the nineteen seventies and eighties.

28. Rice shows a starkly contrasting picture – see Figures 5 and 6. Here, stock-consumption ratios have tended to increase over time, from around 7% in the early nineteen sixties to around 20% now. China accumulated enormous stocks in the late nineteen eighties and early nineteen nineties holding almost 75% of world stocks in 1990/91 and 1991/92. Aggregate non-Chinese stocks have shown much lower variability. The Bangkok spot price is generally taken as in indicator or the world rice price. This halved in real terms from around $600/ton (at 2005 values) in the early nineteen sixties to around $300/ton prior to the 2007-08 spike. Even at its 2008 peak, the rice price was much lower than it had been in the nineteen seventies. (It is important to note, however, that the free market in rice is very much residual and that actual transactions prices may differ markedly from the Bangkok quotations).

29. The general picture is one of trend declines in wheat and maize stock-consumption ratios taking place simultaneously with declines in real grains prices, although rice has seen rising stock-consumption ratios. Overlaying this, there was a very substantial accumulation of grain reserves on the part of China, starting with rice in the late nineteen eighties and following through into wheat and maize in the nineteen nineties followed by disaccumulation in the first five years of the new century. Taking a long period view, the lower stock-consumption ratios in wheat and maize probably result from greater production and organisational efficiency in the food processing industry. The more general decline in stocks in all three grains over the most recent decade, by contract, is the result of Chinese destocking – see Dawe (2009).\(^3\) Part of the argument as to whether world wheat and maize stocks are now too low therefore revolves round

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1. Ratio of closing stocks to consumption on a crop year basis. Source: USDA.

2. I deflate by the US PPI (all items). The chart therefore measures the wheat price relative to the wholesale prices of all goods using US weights. Although the precise numbers change, the general pattern shown in this and the following figures is unaffected by the choice of deflator. Data source for prices and PPI: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

3. FAO (2004) concluded that “Much of the drawdown in world stocks has been due to a drawdown in China’s cereal inventories”. However, they also caution that is difficult or even impossible to estimate the “true” level of cereal stocks in China in the past, and that apparent changes may have resulted from different estimation procedures or from statistical revisions.
the issue as to whether Chinese stocks were, in the past, available to the world economy to provide a cushion in the event of a negative shock.

2.4 Grains stocks and grains prices

30. In order to see whether, and by how much, grains stocks have impacted grains prices it is necessary to disentangle the long term trend movements in prices and stocks from the shorter term variations about trend. Econometric modelling offers one approach to this problem. An alternative is to use more straightforward statistical trend extraction methods. This is the approach I adopt here with the proviso that results can be sensitive to the trend model adopted and the sample over which the trend is identified. Use of a long sample reduces problems associated with start and end points but makes the assumption of a constant linear trend less plausible. I therefore adopt the approach of fitting smooth trends but which nevertheless permit continuous variation in the slope of the trend – see Koopman et al. (2009).

31. Figure 7 illustrates the resulting relationship for wheat. The horizontal axis measures deviations of the world stock-consumption ratio (i.e. with China included) from its estimated trend, lagged one year. The vertical axis measures the deviation of the wheat price, deflated by the US PPI, from its estimated trend. The correlation, negative as expected, is -0.620. The negative relationship is clear, but is dominated by the four observations from the nineteen seventies price spike (1972/73, 1973/74, 1974/75 and 1975/76). The 2007/08 observation falls in the middle of this group. Nevertheless, the relationship is only modestly strong – stock differences explain less than 40% of price differences. Approximately the same stock deviation as 2007-08 was observed in four other years (1966/67, 1974/75, 1975/76 and 2008/09) but was associated with much lower price deviations from trend. Low stocks appear to provide only a partial explanation of high wheat prices.

32. Figure 8 shows the corresponding relationship for maize. Here the correlation is lower at -0.310. The 2007/08 observation gains falls within the range defined by the nineteen seventies price spike. Although high price periods years are associated with low stocks, there are many years with similarly low starting stocks for which the price is close to (e.g. 1984/85) or below (e.g. 2004/05) its estimated trend. Low stocks therefore appear necessary but not sufficient for high prices.

33. For rice, a superior correlation is obtained by excluding China from the stock-consumption ratio (-0.452 against -0.223) supporting Dawe’s (2009) argument. Figure 9 therefore shows the former relationship. The observations for 2007/08 and 2008/09 are comparable to those for 1974/75 but as in the case of maize, low stocks appear to be necessary but not sufficient for high prices.

34. Summarizing, by considering deviations of both the deflated price and the stock-consumption ratios from their respective trends, it is possible to discern the expected negative relationship between grains stocks and grains prices. Furthermore, the combination of the price and the stock-consumption level in 2007/08 was comparable for each of the three grains to those observed in the nineteen seventies food price spike. Dawe (2009) is therefore incorrect in arguing that “stocks did not have an important effect on the evolution of the world food crisis”. At the same time, low stocks appear to have been necessary but not sufficient for high prices historically, suggesting that stocks provide at best a partial explanation for price movements. Other commentators have emphasized diversion of food commodities into use as biofuel feedstocks (Mitchell, 2008), exchange rate changes (Abbott et al., 2008) and futures market activity (Gilbert, 2010). Any evaluation of a stock-based policy to counter possible future volatility should take these and other additional factors into account.

4 If China is excluded from the stock-consumption ratio, the correlation falls to -0.500.

5 Excluding China, the correlation is almost unchanged at -0.304.
3. **International commodity agreements**

35. The term “international commodity agreement” (henceforth ICA) refers to a treaty-agreement between governments of both producing and consuming countries to regulate the terms of international trade in a specified commodity. There have been six ICAs which have had “economic” (i.e. interventionist) clauses: the International Cocoa Agreements (ICCA), the International Coffee Agreements (ICOA), the International Natural Rubber Agreements (INRA), the International Sugar Agreements (ISA), the International Tin Agreements (ITA), and the International Wheat Agreements (IWA). There is also a large number of “study group” style agreements whose functions are information collection and dissemination, market promotion and, in certain cases, the fostering of research and development. With the ending of international commodity control, where they have survived, the previously active agreements have taken on this form.

3.1 **Genesis and motivation**

36. Primary commodity markets have been subjected to governmental intervention at least as far back as the nineteen thirties. The first IWA was concluded in 1933 as a response to low wheat prices during the Great Depression. At the end of the Second World War, there was a widespread expectation that excess production and low prices might return. The immediate post-war discussion of commodity matters aimed at avoidance of these outcomes. The unratified 1948 Havana Charter, which would have set up the International Trade Organisation as the third pillar of Bretton Woods, included measures aimed at the alleviation of situations of “burdensome surpluses” (Rowe, 1965). For the most part, it was envisaged that this would be accomplished primarily through supply regulation - typically export controls. In the absence of the institutional structures which the Havana Charter aimed to create, interested governments negotiated free-standing agreements of which the 1949 IWA and the 1954 ISA and ITA were the first. Both the ISA and the ITA primarily on supply management - the ISA entirely so, while the ITA also utilized a buffer stock, the initial purpose of which was seen as supporting the price over the period in which export restrictions took effect – see Fox (1974). These two agreements continued an interventionist tradition inherited from interwar colonial administrations. The 1949 IWA followed a different approach based on the concept of a multilateral contract (International Wheat Council, 1993).

37. Wheat is produced and consumed in developed economies. In the immediate postwar period, the major wheat exporters were Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States. Sugar is also produced in developed economies (from beet) as well as in developing countries (from cane). The ICAs negotiated from the nineteen sixties related to tropical export commodities with the result that the exporters were developing countries and consumers were developed economies. This equation coloured future developments.

38. At the time of the negotiation of the first ICOA in 1962, coffee was predominantly a Latin American commodity (Brazil and Colombia were the largest exporters), although production was already expanding in Africa. The Instituto Brasileiro do Café (IBC) was responsible for Brazilian coffee policy and had favoured supply management for many decades, but the Colombians had resisted this, preferring to expand production under unfettered conditions. However, as coffee consolidated in Colombia, the coffee-growing regions came to look for higher prices rather than increased output (Bates, 1997). The ICOA was modelled on the ISA as a pure export control agreement. The United States was, and remains, the single largest coffee consuming nation. The crucial element which allowed the ICOA to come into existence was the willingness of the US government to agree to export controls. This was the period immediately following the socialist revolution in Cuba, and it is often supposed that the US saw the advantage of higher coffee prices for Latin American exporters as outweighing the disadvantages arising...
from a controlled market. Bates (1997) argues that the highly concentrated US coffee roasting industry was more concerned with reliability and security of supply than with price and may have seen acceptance of supply controls as an tolerable price for supply security.

39. Cocoa is largely West African, although there is significant production for export in south-east Asia. (Latin America now produces largely for domestic consumption). Many of the West African cocoa producers are also coffee producers, and West African cocoa had inherited a tradition of state-controlled marketing from the British and French colonial administrations. In this context, it was natural that the cocoa producers would seek an agreement similar to that negotiated in coffee. However the US government declined to join the 1972 ICCA, perhaps seeing West Africa as less important for US interests than Latin America. The ICCA differed from the ICOA in that its primary instrument was the buffer stock, with export controls playing a supplementary role.

40. With the 1964 foundation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ICAs moved into a more highly politicized environment. Existing ICAs came under the auspices of UNCTAD, which also sought, from 1976, to stimulate the negotiation of new agreements as part of the Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) in connection with the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was intended to set up what its proponents viewed as a more equitable system of trading relations between the developed and the developing world. The IPC was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Its most explicit statement is in UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV) which sought the stabilisation of commodity prices around levels which would be “remunerative and just to producers and equitable to consumers” (UNCTAD, 1976). UNCTAD produced a list of ten “core” commodities in which it hoped to see ICAs but developed country governments argued for a commodity-by-commodity approach to negotiations. These negotiations took place in Geneva over the following years.

41. Brown (1980) gives an account of the UNCTAD negotiations. Although the rhetoric of the negotiations related to the variability of commodity prices, with buffer stock intervention now the favoured instrument, developed countries remained suspicious that the main intention of the producer country governments related to raising the level rather than reducing the variability of prices. The INRA was the only new agreement to emerge from this long process.

42. The tropical export crops ICAs emerged against a background in which colonial governments had historically regulated commerce and the subsequent UNCTAD push for more widespread agreements took place in a context in which many developing country governments hoped to re-establish political regulation of international markets. In sugar and wheat, the ICSAs were negotiated against a background in which international commerce had been largely on an intergovernmental basis. The initial motivation was the avoidance of excess supply and low prices and, in the case of wheat, food security. Subsequently, developing country governments pushed for “remunerative and just prices”, a phrase widely interpreted by consumer country governments as suggesting above-market prices. Volatility reduction featured more prominently in the rhetoric of negotiation than in actual practice.

3.2 Export controls

43. The principal instruments used by ICAs have been supply management through export controls and buffer stock intervention. The ICOA and ISA both relied entirely on supply management while the INRA only used a buffer stock. The ICCA and ITA employed both instruments. In the first ITAs, the buffer stock was seen as a supplement to export controls but in later ITAs it assumed the major role. In the...
ICCA, the buffer stock was always more important than the export controls. The initial (1933) IWA was based on export controls but these were ineffective and absent from subsequent IWAs. Gilbert (1989) discusses the detailed intervention procedures.

44. Supply management presupposes the ability of government to control either production or exports. In agriculture, production is typically undertaken by a large number of relatively small producers, and the same was also true of most tin production. Governments can attempt to control production through quotas (livestock and dairy products), acreage controls (crops) or dredger capacity (alluvial metals) although yield variability can translate into substantial output variability for crop commodities. For export crops, governments have therefore found it more effective to control exports than production. In the cocoa, coffee and sugar agreements, these controls were often implemented through monopsony-monopoly marketing boards (a feature of many ex-British colonies) or caisses de stabilisation (standard in many ex-French colonies). With exports constrained and little domestic consumption, export controls forced producing countries to accumulate excess production. When ICOA export controls were finally lifted in 1989, producer country inventories were released onto the world market resulting in depressed prices over the following five years (Gilbert, 1996).

45. To that extent, the difference between stabilisation via export controls and via a buffer stock is who holds the stocks and at whose cost. In export control agreements, the incidence of the costs of stabilisation is on producers and producer governments which have the incentive to reduce future production. Instead, with buffer stock stabilisation, producer and producer governments have little incentive to reduce production. This is a major reason why the ICCA and ITA combined export controls with buffer stock intervention.

46. Export controls are better seen as an instrument for raising prices from unsustainably low levels than for stabilizing prices. This is because effective controls can compel reductions in available supply in the face of low prices, but can seldom compel producers to increase supply in the face of high prices. In a surplus situation, producers are collectively better off by collectively reducing exports from the levels which maximize profits on an individualistic basis, even if they be worse off if they were to this unilaterally.

47. Regulation through export controls faced three major problems:

a) Export controls rely on a comprehensive compliance both by actual and potential producers.

b) They may introduce distortions.

c) The potential benefits may be appropriated by or dissipated in rent-seeking activities.

48. With rigid historically-based quota allocations, these negative side-effects tended to increase over time.

49. Compliance is always a problem in any cartel-like arrangement. Each producer benefits from the price rise in resulting from other producers’ supply restrictions, but would benefit himself by maintaining or even increasing his own production level (since price is now above marginal cost). Every producer therefore has an incentive to renege but is aware that obvious violations of the agreement will encourage others to follow. Because these agreements did not include any mechanism for redistributing profits between members, low cost producers, who might be inclined to expand even at low price levels, were often the least committed to controls. Because agreements only included countries who were significant producers at the time the agreements were negotiated, potential producers and producers who were too small to be included in the scheme, were unrestricted. Supply restrictions therefore tend to encourage both production by non-members and non-compliance by members. This was a serious problem in tin where Brazil, a non-member of the ITA, found it profitable to substantially expand production under the umbrella
of ITC export controls. By contrast, high cost African coffee producers expanded market share at Brazil’s expense under the umbrella of the ICOA. With the ending of ICOA controls, the Brazilian market share in coffee has returned to its pre-ICOA level.

50. The allocation of export quotas has the potential to distort both the production structure of the industry, since low cost member producers are unable to expand at the expense of high cost producers, and also the consumption structure, if more than one grade of the commodity is produced. Grade distortion was a major problem in the ICOAs, where consumer preferences moved during the eighties towards high quality mild arabica coffees at the expense of robustas and unwashed arabicas. The ICOA’s historic quota allocations generated a significant premium for mild arabicas, while at the same time the agreement allowed production in excess of quota of these premium coffees to be sold at substantial discounts in non-member consuming countries, largely in Eastern Europe and south-east Asia - see Bohman and Jarvis (1990). This caused resentment in importing member countries.

51. As primary prices generally declined in real terms during the nineteen eighties, the price raising features of the export control agreements became more apparent than previously, but at the same time, growing evidence that, at least in the case of coffee, quota allocations in many instances generated rent-seeking, casts doubt on whether the coffee growers themselves were always beneficiaries of these prices. The extent and effects of rent seeking behaviour of this form in the Indonesian coffee sector has been well documented by Bohman et al. (1993). The result of such activities is that the coffee producers came to see little direct benefit to themselves from the control agreement. The extent to which the benefits from higher prices are diverted to others or simply dissipated in wasteful activities is difficult to gauge.

52. Rent seeking and the distortion of markets are problems of market efficiency. The extent of inefficiency introduced by resort to export controls increases the longer they are in effect. Increasingly, therefore, the international community came to see attempts to formalize export control arrangements into long term agreements as misguided.

3.3 Buffer stock stabilisation

53. Buffer stock stabilisation rests on an implicit premise that private sector storage is inadequate. This may be a valid assumption in the absence of efficient futures markets since individual risk aversion will in general result in investments (here investment in storage) requiring inappropriately large risk premia (Arrow and Lind, 1970). However, futures markets allow separation of the speculative and storage decisions with the result that hedged stockholding becomes near riskless and so should be unaffected by individual risk aversion. In that case, it is invalid to claim that high volatility justifies public sector storage. All three commodities (cocoa, natural rubber and tin) for which there have been active buffer stock agreements were traded on futures markets. There is therefore no strong theoretical case for public sector storage.

54. At the practical level, buffer stock stabilisation faced three major problems:

a) The long run price level about which stabilisation should take place may change over time, requiring updating of the stabilisation range.

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8 It remains the case that if futures markets are biased predictors of future cash prices, commodity storage may reflect incorrect incentives but at least in the case of agricultural crops, risk should be idiosyncratic and hence diversifiable which should result in unbiased futures prices. The empirical evidence is consistent with futures prices being near unbiased.
b) Even if the stabilisation range is appropriately defined, the intervention authority may lack the resources to keep the price within the range.

c) Once the buffer stock is exhausted, the intervention authority lacks instruments for dealing with any further price rise.

55. The long run sustainable price may change over time because of changes in production costs, or of consumer tastes. Problems associated with updating of price support ranges became central in the three buffer stock ICAs. In the two decades to 1973, buoyant real prices in conjunction with low inflation in the developed countries implied that periodic upward revision of ranges was required. This seldom proved controversial since, with actual prices generally above the stabilisation range, consumer country governments did not see range revisions as likely to raise realized prices. By contrast, over the two decades from 1975, falling real prices and (after 1981) low inflation, prices tended to be at the bottom of the price range in buffer stock agreements. The ITA contained no mechanism for revision of the price support range, and this range also suffered from an implicit dollar link. The lack of updating procedures was an important factor in the collapse of the ITA (Anderson and Gilbert, 1988).

56. If, on the other hand, the stabilisation range adjusts so rapidly that it simply tracks the market price, the agreement will not stabilize prices to any useful extent. Specifically, if an agreement stabilisation range is revised down to a sufficiently large extent in relation to weak market conditions, producing countries will cease to perceive any interest in the so-called stabilisation exercise. The INRA included provisions for periodic revision of the support range in relation to a moving average of past price. These revisions proved unpopular with producing governments since with weak prices, downward revision implied a fall in actual prices. Disputes over downward revision of the price support ranges were important in the eventual abandonment of intervention in the second INRA (Gilbert, 2007).

57. The second problem is that buffer stock stabilisation can be expensive. This is obvious if "stabilisation" is around a price in excess of the long run market clearing level, but would also be true in a "neutral" scheme in which the correct long run price level had been identified, supposing this to be possible. Theoretical models suggest that commodity price cycles should exhibit long flat bottoms punctuated by occasional sharp peaks – see section 2.1. Buffer stock stabilisation will consequently be an expensive instrument for dealing with low prices since stocks will need to be held over a long period. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that public sector storage displaces private stocks – see section 2.2. Townsend (1977) has shown that any neutral price-fixing scheme will eventually exhaust available resources. It is clear that the less finance an intervention authority has available, the earlier this likely exhaustion date. Lack of finance severely handicapped the ICCA and was a major cause of the collapse of the ITA.

58. Buffer stock was also ineffective at the peaks, which arise from stockouts – the third problem indicated above. Once the stock was exhausted, the authority was powerful to do anything except campaign for an upward revision of the support range.

59. In practice, the updating and finance difficulties tended to become entangled. Because of long investment lead times, metals and tree crop commodities can experience acute excess or (as presently) under-capacity for sufficiently long periods of time as to make buffer stock stabilisation about the supposed long run price infeasible. This factor was important for both the ICCA, as the result of severe excess capacity during the nineteen eighties, and in the ITA, where exhaustion of Malaysian alluvial deposits had resulted in a sustained period of under-capacity in the seventies. The ITA broke down because the agreement was inadequately financed, was attempting to stabilize at too high a level and was carrying the entire world surplus. The ICCAs were both poorly financed and committed to stabilizing the price at too high a level.
3.4 Multilateral contracting

60. The 1949 IWA was based on multilateral contracting. IWA exporting members guaranteed assured supplies of wheat subject to a maximum price while importing countries guaranteed purchases subject to a minimum price. These provisions were maintained in the 1953, 1956, 1959 and 1962 IWAs. These arrangements worked well so long as prices did not fall significantly beneath the IWA floor or exceed the ceiling but were difficult to sustain in more turbulent times. Contractual floor and ceiling prices were absent from IWAs after 1971 (International Wheat Council, 1993).

61. The IWA multilateral contracts were contracts between governments. This was natural at a time in which international trade in wheat was dominated by intergovernmental transactions and in which the prices paid to farmers in wheat exporting countries were set or heavily influenced by national farm support policies. The concept ceases to be workable in a world in which commerce is in the hands of private companies and where WTO regulations prohibit export subsidies. Even if it were judged desirable, the IWA concept of multilateral contracting would no longer be feasible.

62. Multilateral contracts are a form of forward contracting. The IWAs extended for three years, so the IWA multilateral contracts may be regarded as a set of one, two and three year forward contracts, for unspecified quantities implicitly related to past transactions, capped at predetermined floor and ceiling prices. These prices are negotiated to be fair to exporting and importing countries at the start of the agreement so at that time they have zero value to either side, i.e. neither exporters nor importers are financially better off as the result of the contracts. However, as market conditions change during the course of the agreement, the contracts have positive equity for one side and negative for the other – if prices rise, importers gain from the price ceiling at the expense of exporters while if they fall, exporters gain from the floor at the expense of importers. Once the losses from adherence to the negotiated ceiling prices become substantial, there is pressure from farmers to renegotiate or renege, as in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (also based on multilateral contracting) in 1973. If the losses from sticking to the negotiated floor prices become substantial, consumers and importing governments seek renegotiation, as the 1967 IWA a year after its negotiation.

63. Multilateral contracting can work well so long as price volatility remains low but lacks enforcement mechanisms and hence credibility when volatility becomes high. It is ill-adapted to a world in which commerce takes place between private companies.

3.5 Decline of the ICA movement

64. Through the latter half of the nineteen seventies and into the eighties saw the commodities debate becoming increasingly politicized. Many developed country governments viewed price stabilisation as a costly diversion of funds from more pressing development objectives. Some suspected that a number of commodity exporting countries wished to substitute an inefficient socialist-style “planned” commodity economy which would result in an unfavourable shift in the terms of trade against the developed countries. Industry groups saw the continuing UNCTAD negotiations as driven by political rather than commercial concerns. Consequently, the ICA movement went into reverse.

- The ISAs had never managed to overcome the problems caused by the USA’s 1962 decision to deny access to Cuba, then the largest sugar-exporting country, to the US market, and by the substantial growth in sugar production in the European Union. The fourth ISA terminated in 1984 and was replaced by an agreement which did not contain market intervention clauses (Gilbert, 1987).
• The IWAs failed to achieve mechanisms for updating contractual price floors and ceilings in the face of market turbulence which commenced in 1968 and became acute in the nineteen seventies. Implicit in this was the absence of incentives in the agreements to ensure continued adherence to the agreements in altered market circumstances.

• The ICCA allowed the possibility of market intervention through unspecified production management measures, but no longer through the buffer stock. However, the ICCAs never had either the finance or the country coverage to be able to have more than a small effect of the cocoa market (Gilbert 1987, 1996).

• The ITA broke down spectacularly on United Nations Day (24 October) 1985 as the result of attempting to defend an unrealistic floor price with insufficient finance the – see Anderson and Gilbert (1988).

• The ICOA effectively abandoned supply management ambitions on (US) Independence Day (4 July) 1989. In the post-Cold War period, the USA no longer saw a need to provide surreptitious financial support for its Latin American coffee-producing allies, and Brazil, now the second largest coffee consumer as well as the largest producer, had mixed motives.

• This INRA staggered on until 1999, a year prior to the formal ending of the third INRA, when first Malaysia and then Sri Lanka and Thailand gave notice of withdrawal from the agreement. These actions were in part motivated by the perception that, because of adjustment of the price bands, the INRA offered too little stabilisation. This effectively terminated the agreement and hence also the ICA movement.

65. There is no single reason for the breakdown or lapse of the commodity agreements. The cocoa and sugar agreements lapsed because they were ineffective. The tin agreement collapsed because it was attempting to hold the price at too high a level with too little finance to do this. This was the single case which corresponds to the widespread view that ICAs attempt to stand Canute-like against the incoming market tide, but it is important also to recall that the ITA was effective for the first twenty-five years of its existence. More interesting are the cases of coffee and natural rubber where the agreements lapsed rather than collapsed. In rubber, this was because producing country governments saw little benefit from continued price smoothing, while in coffee the agreements lost support from consumers and to some extent also from producers (Gilbert, 1996).

66. These changes in support took place in the context in which the markets for tropical export commodities were being liberalized and in which domestic stabilisation agencies – marketing boards and caisses de stabilisation – were being dismantled or forced to accept reduced powers – see Akiyama et al. (2001). The private sector was becoming more important and government involvement in agriculture was diminishing. Governments had both less power than previously to control supplies, and also a diminished willingness to do so. Increasingly, the ICAs appeared anachronistic and international meetings, in which diplomats deployed non-commercial arguments about price and export levels, seemed irrelevant to the need to compete in free and competitive markets.

3.6 ICA effectiveness

67. The extent to which ICAs have (a) raised and (b) stabilized prices remains controversial. Evaluations have typically relied on counterfactual simulation of econometric models, for example Smith and Schink (1976) on tin, and Palm and Vogelvang (1981) on coffee. Exercises of this sort are subject to qualification with regard to the extent that the models employed in the simulations adequately reflect market behaviour. These worries are underlined by the fact that production, stockholding and export
decisions will adapt to the policies followed by the stabilisation authority (Miranda and Helmberger, 1988). This is difficult to model.

68. Table 1 reports the results of a cruder evaluation procedure for the five ICA commodities for which developing countries are the most important exporters. The table gives the annual price averages for cocoa, coffee, natural rubber, sugar and tin over the nine years following cessation of intervention. In each case, prices are measured relative to the IMF Commodity Price Index (non-fuel commodities), with the ratio normalized to 100 in the twelve month period prior intervention ceased or was abandoned. The indices in Table 1 should therefore be seen as indices relative to the general level of non-energy commodity prices. Except in the case of natural rubber, the ending of intervention was associated over the following two years with prices around 30%-40% lower than in the final year of control. Despite subsequent recovery in coffee and sugar, on average prices remained 30% lower over the next three years, and much of this difference persisted over the following five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cocoa</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Natural Rubber</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
<th>Tin</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>110.9</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>101.6</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 5-9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>115.3</td>
<td>189.6</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>107.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69. Taken at face value, the figures in Table 1 suggest that ICAs raised commodity prices by a substantial amount. However, prices may have fallen for three other reasons:

a) Release of stocks either held by the buffer stock (tin) or by producers subject to export controls (coffee) will have depressed prices relative to their ICA levels.

b) ICAs may have lapsed or failed in the face of likely increases in supply. In coffee, the advent of Vietnam as a major exporter in the early nineteen nineties depressed prices after the ending of ICOA controls. It seems very unlikely that the rigid ICOA quota system would have been able to cope with the arrival of a major new exporter. Exporting members may have been aware of this possibility.

c) Other market developments may have resulted in prices being higher or lower than under ICA interventions.

70. Nevertheless, averaging over all five ICA commodities, it is evident that post-intervention prices were around 30% lower than might otherwise have been expected for two years and around 10% lower for a further two years. This provides some evidence that the ICAs did raise prices.

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9 Table 1 updates Table 2 of Gilbert (2007). Except for natural rubber, where an extended window is now available, differences relate to revisions in the IMF non-fuel commodity price index used as deflator. Data sources: IMF, *International Financial Statistics* except coffee, International Coffee Organization.
71. Did the ICAs also stabilize prices? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that commodity prices should be less variable when supply is plentiful – see Williams and Wright (1991), Deaton and Laroque (1992) and Brunetti and Gilbert (1995) – and the end of controls tended increased availability through release of the buffer stock, or, in the case of export control agreements, by allowing exporting countries to sell accumulated inventory. Looking at the three year period immediately following the lapse or collapse of controls in relation to the three year period immediately preceding this, the coefficient of variation of monthly coffee prices fell from 23.6% to 10.7%, while the coefficients of variation for cocoa and tin rose from 6.9% to 14.3% and from 8.3% to 14.3% respectively. Coffee moved from a regime of high but volatile prices to one of stable depressed prices while the rise in the coefficients of variation for cocoa and tin is attributable to lower average prices – the price standard deviations are almost identical before and after the end of stabilisation. Rubber price volatility reflected changes in market tightness – prices became less volatile in the weak market conditions at the time of the ending of the agreement but volatility has subsequently increased dramatically as the markets for all industrially-consumed raw materials have become very tight.

72. It is true of both export control and buffer stock agreements that they were more effective in defending floor than ceiling prices. In an export control agreement, it was always economically possible to limit exports although, as in OPEC, disagreement on the allocation of quotas may make this politically difficult. Quota allocation in the ICOA was very rigid and enforcement was undertaken by importing member countries who only accepted coffee certificated by the International Coffee Organization (ICO). When markets became tight, however, the ICO could do little more than exhort members to expand exports implicitly beyond commercially attractive levels. Similarly, in a buffer stock agreement, the buffer stock authority can buy the commodity so long as its funds are sufficient to do so, while it can only sell what it has previously bought. Both types of intervention are therefore effective in preventing price falls than rises. But this is exactly the same as the situation private stockholding in the absence of intervention – see section 2.1.

73. Even if ICAs did generate benefits to exporting countries we should ask, who were the beneficiaries within the countries? There is some evidence, particularly from the coffee agreements, that benefits were diverted to elites (Bohman et al., 1996). Export controls always create rents, partly because export quotas can be allocated to friends or political allies, and also because the administration of controls generates employment and therefore a vested interest in the continuation of controls. One reason Brazil lost interest in coffee market control was the perception that the major beneficiary was the controlling IBC bureaucracy (Gilbert, 1996).

Evaluation of the overall “success” of the ICAs is problematic on account of the confusion over their objectives. The rhetoric of the agreements, at least over the final decades of the century, stressed reduction in price variability, but here the effects appear to have been at best marginal. By contrast, producer governments have always seen ICAs as a means of raising prices, or at least of avoiding low prices, and on this criterion, the agreements – in particular the ICOA and the ITA – do appear to have enjoyed some success.

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10 Perhaps more than this - the eventual bankruptcy of the International Tin Organization arose because, essentially by means of the creative use of what would not be called off-balance sheet accounting, its market exposure greatly exceeded the resources it owned to purchase tin. See Anderson and Gilbert (1988).
3.7 Summary

74. The motivation of the early post-War commodity agreements was the avoidance of excess supply and the associated low prices. Food security was an additional concern in the IWA. These agreements operated largely through supply management, principally export controls, although the IWA was built around multilateral contracting. The second round of agreements, which related to tropical export crop commodities, was justified in terms of price stabilisation but was largely motivated by the wish on the exporters to obtain higher prices. There was a significant shift of emphasis in these agreements towards buffer stock stabilisation which had been seen in the earlier ITA as an adjunct to supply management.

75. Both export controls and multilateral contracting presuppose a substantial intergovernmental role in international commodity commerce. This was true of wheat in the initial postwar decades and was true of developing commodity exporters prior to the substantial market liberalisation which took place on the nineteen eighties. Both developed and developing country governments have now retreated from this level of involvement in commodity commerce and neither type of arrangement would now be practical. Furthermore, they are doubtfully WTO-compatible. Export controls had other negative impacts – they protected high cost producers from competition for lower cost competitors, they introduced distortions in the qualities (grades) available to the market and they induced significant rent-seeking behaviour. These negative impacts tended to cumulate with the duration of intervention.

76. Both export control and buffer stock agreements faced acute problems in updating their stabilisation ranges over time. In the nineteen sixties and seventies, inflation required that floor and ceiling prices be periodically raised. In the nineteen eighties, altered market circumstances put downward pressure on the entire primary sector requiring stabilisation objectives to be lowered. These changes were politically difficult and were a major factor behind the ending of intervention.

77. Buffer stock intervention was expensive, both because public storage crowds out private storage and because stabilisation reduces the incentives for producers to expand or contract production. The costs of buffer stock stabilisation could be reduced by periodic and formulaic revision of the stabilisation range, on the basis for example of a moving average of past prices. This was the practice in the INRA. Nevertheless, it failed to diminish the extent of political controversy and limited the perceived usefulness of the agreement.

78. A review of the historical experience suggests that international commodity agreements were successful in raising prices but had very little success in reducing priced variability. Part of the reason for this lack of success is that they lacked effective instruments for dealing with price spikes – countries cannot be forced to export beyond what is profitable and a buffer stock can only sell what it has previously bought.

79. The ITA was the only commodity agreement to collapse. Perhaps others would also have collapsed if intervention had continued. In these other agreements, intervention lapsed. It is incorrect, both as a matter of logic and history, to argue that commodity price stabilisation in infeasible and is bound to break down. Instead, governments either lacked the will to continue to stabilize, or concluded that the benefits were too small or that the costs were too large to justify intervention.

4. Policy observations

80. The prices of grains and other food commodities increased dramatically in 2007-08. Subsequently, in 2009, prices fell back although, except for wheat, not to their pre-spike levels – see Figure
10 which charts the world prices of the four principal grains, maize (corn), wheat, rice and soybeans. The summer of 2010 witnessed catastrophic weather conditions in much of the northern hemisphere resulting in renewed upward pressure on the wheat price which nevertheless remains well below its 2008 peak.

81. These developments have resulted in a widespread view that the combination of rapid economic growth in much of Asia with more variable weather conditions, perhaps in part caused by global warming, will result in higher and more variable food prices over at least the next decade. They have also provoked renewed interest in the possibility of international intervention to reduce or offset this anticipated volatility.

4.1 Lessons from the commodity agreements

82. The International Commodity Agreement (ICA) experience over the second half of the twentieth century is generally perceived as having been negative. The account in section 3 of this paper indicates that this judgement is too simple. Except in a single case (tin), intervention lapsed rather than collapsed. Furthermore, it is necessary to ask what the actual objectives of each agreement were and whether they enjoyed the support and resources to achieve these objectives. Developing country exporters came to look at the ICAs as instruments for raising more than for stabilizing prices. The evidence suggests that the agreements may have been successful in this regard. By contrast, importing country governments laid emphasis on the potential volatility reductions that the ICAs were expected to deliver. These expectations were largely disappointed. The success or failure of the ICAs therefore depends to a large extent on the perceived intervention objectives.

83. The principal current concern in relation to the grains markets is volatility reduction and, in particular, the avoidance of further grains price spikes. Wheat remains the most important grain. Many wheat exporting countries are rich and few are very poor. By contrast, many of the poorest countries are grains importers. There is thus no suggestion that intervention should aim to raise wheat prices and there may be some hope that intervention might reduce the average level of prices over time. Food security issues have resurfaced.

84. Given these concerns, much of the post-1945 commodity agreement history is irrelevant. Limitation of exports will tend to raise rather than lower prices and does nothing to reduce either the incidence or magnitude of price spikes or to enhance food security. This leaves only the buffer stock features of the three agreements which used this instrument (cocoa, natural rubber and tin) as potentially informative for the current debate.

85. The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 highlighted four problems with buffer stock agreements;

a) They are potentially very costly, in part because public storage crowds out private storage – see Sections 2.2 and 3.3.

b) There is a need to update the stabilisation range in relation to changed market circumstances. This can result in controversy. Formulaic updating, on the basis for example of a moving average of past prices, reduces the potential for stabilisation and hence the value of the intervention, but does offset the costs of intervention – see Section 3.3.

c) Given sufficient finance, a buffer stock authority can maintain a price above the agreed floor. However, the buffer stock can only sell what it has previously bought so once its stock is exhausted the authority has no further means of defending the ceiling. The consequence is that

buffer stock agreements tend to more effective in limiting price falls than in curtailing the incidence and magnitude of spikes – see Section 3.6.

d) This feature is exacerbated by the possibility of speculative attack. Although attacks can take place either on a floor or a ceiling price, the problem is more serious at the ceiling – see Section 2.2.

86. In practice, there is little evidence that buffer stock stabilisation did result in any significant reduction in price volatility.

87. The substantive lessons from the ICA experience, where relevant to current circumstances, are therefore predominantly negative, informative about what should be avoided and not what should be done. However, this does not imply that valid policy options are unavailable.

4.2 An international grains stockpile?

88. A number of commentators have proposed creation of an international grains stockpile. Most recently, Fan (2010) has argued that, as part of the five prong IFPRI programme, “the establishment of a global, coordinated physical grain reserve, which could be managed by the WFP”.

89. There are two sets of arguments against this proposal – the first theoretical and the second practical. At a theoretical level, the proposal presupposes that private storage is inadequate. I discussed that argument in Section 3.3 and argued that there is no general argument that, at the world level, private storage is inadequate. (Occasional price spikes would not themselves constitute such an argument since it may simply be too costly to eliminate them). Furthermore, even if it were thought that world grains stocks are too low there are strong arguments for preferring policies would stimulate additional private storage against those which emphasize public storage and which are likely to discourage private storage.

90. Section 2.4 argued that although it is possible to discern the expected stock-price relationship, this relationship is weak for grains. This is consistent with claims that many other factors have driven recent grains price movements. Even if grains stocks had been higher at the time of these spikes, these other factors would have been unaffected and the effects of increased storage on the price spikes might have been minor. It may therefore be wise to discount the more optimistic claims made for an international grain stockpile which presuppose a much tighter stock-price relationship than that which is actually observed. These conclusions are similar to those reached by Wright (2009).12

91. At a practical level, the commodity agreement experience makes it doubtful that public storage would reduce the incidence or magnitude of price spikes. Buffer stock stabilisation was costly and did not notably reduce price volatility for those commodities where it was employed. In particular, once the buffer stock is exhausted, it can do nothing to prevent further price rises. This, and the asymmetric risk of speculative attack at the price support ceiling, suggests that any intervention should forbear from committing to a pre-defined price ceiling. Instead, the intervention authority should follow the practice of many central banks which, when they intervene on foreign exchange markets, do so without prior announcement and without making their objectives explicit. This could substantially reduce the level of intervention costs by finessing both the updating and speculative attack problems.

92. Von Braun and Torero (2009) have advocated a virtual food reserve which would complement a smaller physical reserve. The virtual reserve, which would be backed up by a financial fund, would be used to “calm” markets under speculative situations, i.e. it would be used to countervail speculative pressure. The proposal supposes both that the fund managers know better than the market and that they can prevail

12 Wright does suggest a small emergency reserve to respond quickly to national or regional emergencies which could help speed up responses of international organizations in relief situations.
against it. A useful analogy here is with those central banks which intervene in currency markets. The 1985 Plaza Agreement, which reveresed the rise of the US dollar, shows that in certain circumstances well-planned interventions can be successful. Despite this, the profitability of many hedge funds comes from betting against central bank foreign exchange market interventions and the same would likely be true if a virtual grains reserve were to be established.

4.3 Food security

93. Food security is not a problem in the major developed market economies despite some political comments to the contrary. No developed economy experienced problems in obtaining the food its citizens required in 2007-08 and there does not appear to be any likelihood of food security problems in the future. This is obviously the case for the Australia, Canada and the USA which are food exporters. The European Union (EU) is closer to being in food balance but is integrated into the North American as well as the Eastern European grains markets. Contrast the situation of grains with energy where it is easy to envisage political conflict which closes the Straits of Hormuz drastically limiting petroleum availability.

94. The issue is less clear for many food importing developing countries. The question which they face is whether to rely on trade or stocks to combat food price volatility. Timmer (1986) argued for a move away from national food security stocks towards production based on comparative advantage and food security via trade and this view was reflected in the policy advice offered by the multinational development agencies.

95. The response of rice exporting countries to export controls in 2007-08 and the similar response of Russia in wheat in 2010 have persuaded many developing country governments that trade fails to deliver on food security in precisely those circumstances that it is required – see Christiaensen (2009). Export restrictions generate a familiar Prisoners’ Dilemma: both grain exporters and importers are better off if in the long run if exporters forbear from restricting exports but the governments of exporting countries are unable to commit not to resort to such controls if they are expedient in the short term. The consequence is a “bad” equilibrium in which importing countries run national food security stockpiles and aim for food self-sufficiency despite the high costs involved and exporting countries are unable to fully exploit their comparative advantage and their farmers are unable to profit from periods of high world prices.13

96. Even given a favourable international regulatory environment, reliance on trade may be problematic for countries which are poorly integrated into the world or regional economies. This will apply particularly to landlocked countries where transport costs can drive a substantial wedge between export and import parity prices. These are also countries in which the arguments of section 4.2 against public storage lose some validity

- Futures markets, which would allow the separation of the storage and speculation decisions, will be absent.
- Food prices will be too important for governments to plausibly commit to not to intervene. The knowledge that such intervention is likely will discourage the private sector form undertaking sufficient storage thereby providing justification for the eventual public intervention – see Dana and Gilbert (2008).
- Low cost food may be one of the few instruments easily available to governments to target the welfare of the poorest households.

13 Fan (2010) argues that “governments should be encouraged to eliminate existing export bans and refrain from imposing new ones”.

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97. National food security stockpiles therefore remain a viable policy option for poorly integrated developing economies.

4.4 A market approach to grains price volatility

98. The market approach to grains price volatility involves setting up structures and institutions which allow governments and supply chain intermediaries to cope with price volatility instead of attempting to reduce or eliminate this volatility. This approach has been discussed in Dana et al. (2006), Sarris et al. (2006), Dana and Gilbert (2008) and Sarris et al. (2010). The principal instruments used are futures and options contracts or “over the counter” (OTC) instruments by means of which providers (usually international banks) intermediate the exchange instruments to the governments or entities concerned. These instruments have typically been discussed in relation to protection of commodity exporters against price falls but turn out to be even better suited to the protection of commodity importers against price spikes.

99. Consider a government which wishes to protect itself against a possible grains price spike. By buying futures contracts in the appropriate grain, the government locks in the grain purchase price. It will typically not take delivery on this purchase and will close out at the time it, or the national importing companies or agencies, purchase spot grain. On average, this hedge should neither lose nor make money and there will be a modest reduction in the variability of grain purchase prices. The major advantage to the hedger is that the purchase is known more or less accurately at the time the hedge is initiated.

100. In practice, credit and money laundering concerns are likely to imply that developing country governments and intermediaries will be required to hedge by purchase of call options rather than futures. The call option has the effect of putting an approximate ceiling price on the contracted quantities. A ceiling price is attractive if the intention is to hedge against a price spike in which case the “strike” (i.e. contractual ceiling) price can be significantly above the price at the time of contracting, i.e. “out-of-the-money”. Intermediaries in developed economies might also choose to follow the same call-based strategy.

101. A major advantage of the call strategy is that it has a market price. The cost of protection is therefore known (and will typically also be paid) in advance. Purchasers can decide on the level and duration of protection that they require or can decide that the cost is too high and they prefer to remain unprotected. In developed economies, the cost of staple grains is no longer a major component of household budgets and the resulting diversification implies that self-insurance is likely to be the preferred outcome. Many developing economies may value protection. Others may regard it as inappropriate or too costly, either because their food import prices are not closely correlated with world prices (the problem of “basis risk”) or because the funds required could be better spent on other projects. The result will be that protection is confined to those for whom it has the greatest value. This should imply that it is significantly less costly than the establishment of an international grain reserve which will offer a uniform (but low) degree of protection to all grains consumers.

102. The cost of call-based protection for a single government or intermediary can easily be ascertained by contacting potential providers. If large numbers of governments or intermediaries, or even one large government, were to seek this protection, the costs would be more conjectural and could possibly rise. Detailed study would therefore be required if the scheme were to be introduced as a general panacea.

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14 The hedge is only approximate because of “basis risk”, i.e. the fact that the country’s import prices will be less than perfectly correlated with the exchange price. As basis risk increases, the usefulness of the hedge decline – see Dana and Gilbert (2008).
against food price spikes. Nevertheless, to the extent that this form of hedging does impact prices, it should also stimulate additional storage since storage companies would form natural hedge counterparties.\footnote{The storage company would write the call contract. The delta of the call measures its futures equivalent – see, for example, Hull (2006). The storage company would hedge its option position by purchasing the physical in proportion to this delta. Because the delta is continuously changing, this would be costly for a single call but feasible and attractive for a portfolio of calls.}

103. In landlocked countries, transport costs from the nearest port or railhead can be substantial and can also be highly variable – see section 4.3. Ideally, the contract should also lock in the transport price – see Dana and Gilbert (2008). Such countries will need to evaluate whether they are better protected by national food security stocks or through call-based protection. There is no clear 	extit{a priori} answer to this question.

104. Market-based protection against grains price spikes is feasible for many countries and is likely to be affordable for at least some. The fact that not all governments will wish to purchase this form of protection is probably an advantage since it will ensure funds are not wasted. Unlike public storage, it will encourage additional private storage. These ideas deserve further and wider discussion.

\textit{4.5 Agenda for future research}

105. The focus for future research should be on public grain stocks. The following issues appear salient:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] It is widely held that grain stock levels have fallen sharply over the past decade. It was noted in section 2.3 that this fall is largely due to an apparent fall in Chinese stocks but that caution is required in interpretation of those figures. It would be very helpful if agencies could work with the Chinese government to increase transparency on grains stock levels and to establish with greater certainty what stock levels were over the past decade.
  \item[b)] Both economic theory and historical experience suggest that public stockholding crowds out private stockholding. This issue has received relatively little attention empirically. Is this effect large or small and does it vary according to the purpose and location of the stocks. It seems possible, for example, that emergency relief stocks may have little or no price impact while intervention stocks may have a large impact since the former will never be available to regular market participants. It is possible that the same is also true, perhaps to a lesser extent, of stocks held in developing countries and away from major international markets.
  \item[c)] Additional research would be valuable on the potential cost and uptake of the market instruments discussed in section 4.4. Will these be feasible for all major grains or just for wheat and maize? In southern and eastern Africa, white maize is the principal staple. Can this be hedged on the regional South African (SAFEX) market, or should the Chicago yellow market be used, and, in that case, do white and yellow maize prices move sufficiently closely to make the instruments cost-effective? North African and Middle Eastern countries are wheat importers. Do their prices move sufficiently closely with North American prices to make protection via Chicago calls effective, or should they hedge on the Paris market which although historically less liquid than Chicago, has becoming increasingly important as the EU has moved away from direct support of prices?
\end{itemize}

106. It is the contention of this report that answers to these questions would lead to a more informed debate on international grains policy and that this is a prerequisite for improvements in policy.
5. Conclusions

107. The conclusions of this report are largely, but not completely, negative. While it would be incorrect to claim that international commodity agreements failed, they did not have significant success in reducing the volatility of the prices they set out to stabilize. By restricting exports, they probably did succeed in raising prices but this is not helpful in the current context in which the international community wishes to limit grains price variability, or at least limits its effects.

108. The focus of much recent discussion has been on the need for higher levels of grains stocks. Stocks have fallen over time but this may simply reflect lower commercial inventory requirements. In any case, much of the fall in stocks over the past decade is the result of an apparent decline in poorly documented Chinese stocks from what were previously very high levels. The expected negative stock-price relationship is apparent in the data but stocks leave much of the variation in prices unexplained. It seems likely therefore that low stocks were only one of several factors which were responsible for the 2007-08 price spike. It follows that higher levels of stocks would not guarantee the absence of future spikes.

109. Many commentators have reverted to public sector storage as a possible response to apparently inadequate private storage. This is despite the fact that there are no clear theoretical arguments that private storage is in aggregate too low at the world level, although this may be the case in many developing countries. Further, public storage crowds out private storage so the mere inception of a public storage programme increases the problem that it was designed to solve. Public storage is therefore costly, and possibly very costly. Finally, it is unlikely to be very effective in countering price spikes since the storage authority can only sell what it has previously bought. The knowledge that it cannot counter price spikes will leave it vulnerable to speculative attack. The history of buffer stock storage in the international commodity movements bear out these views.

110. Market-based measures may offer a superior alternative in countering food price volatility. The purchase of out-of-the-money call options allows an importing government to put an (approximate) ceiling on the price it will pay for its grain. The cost of this protection is known in advance and will only be paid if it is lower than the perceived benefit. It is likely that use of market-based protection will increase private storage.

111. Finally, the report suggests an agenda for future research. This should focus on increasing the transparency of information on grains stocks, investigation of the extent to which different types of public storage impact private storage and examination of the costs and benefits from the use of market-based instruments.
REFERENCES

Abbott, P.C., C. Hurt and W.E. Tyner (2008), *What’s Driving Food Prices?*, Oak Brook (IL), Farm Foundation.


FIGURES

Figure 1. Wheat stock-consumption ratio
Figure 2. Wheat price deflated by US PPI

Figure 3. Maize stock-consumption ratio
Figure 4. Maize price deflated by US PPI

Figure 5. Rice stock-consumption ratio

- World
- World excluding China
Figure 6. Rice price deflated by US PPI

Figure 7. Deflated wheat prices and stock-consumption ratio, 1961/62 - 2009/10
Figure 8. Deflated maize prices and stock-consumption ratio, 1961/62 - 2009/10

Figure 9. Deflated rice prices and stock-consumption ratio, 1961/62 - 2009/10
Figure 10. International grains prices, 2005-10

- Maize
- Wheat
- Rice
- Soybeans