Ministerial Lobby Group

PROPOSAL FOR SUPPORT FOR GMAP ACTIVITIES SUBMITTED TO THE ACBF

Ninth GMAP Meeting
Paris, 21-22 June 2001

Michel Leblanc, Tel. 01 45 24 17 98, E-mail: michel.leblanc@oecd.org

JT00109947
## PROPOSAL FOR SUPPORT FOR GMAP ACTIVITIES
### SUBMITTED TO THE ACBF

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. History of the GMAP</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reasoning behind the work programme</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Beneficiaries</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Objectives</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Strategies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1. Short-term strategy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2. Medium-term strategy</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Content</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1. The selected topics</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1. Political aspects of regional integration</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2. Building a competitive, integrated regional economy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.3. Infrastructure development, production and trade catchment areas and management of common infrastructure</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Activities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Budget</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Financing plan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Programme governance and management</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Future of the GMAP</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

The GMAP (Groupe Ministériel d'Animation et de Proposition) is a lobbying group based on the awareness that African policymakers needed to take the initiative to prevent the debate on regional integration from getting bogged down between a concept of institution-led integration neutralised by trivial conflicts of interest among the many intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in West Africa and an excessively interventionist role for aid agencies in strategies for integration, indirectly downplaying regional issues since their priority goes to national approaches in the development cooperation relationship.

The GMAP’s purpose is to put African policymakers back at the centre of decision-making and to build a regional project that will enable West Africa to position itself with respect to the changes caused by globalisation and the radical transformation of African societies. The main objectives of the ministers belonging to the Group are to lead debate on regional issues, arrive at a shared vision in consultation with networks of innovators, and promote significant reforms in development approaches, strategies and policies.

This project submitted to the ACBF is intended to give a structure to the GMAP’s action and the resources appropriate to its ambitions. It focuses on three themes: i) political aspects of regional integration, ii) economic and commercial integration, and iii) infrastructure development, production and trade catchment areas, and the management of common infrastructure. In each field the GMAP has developed a methodology for formulating operational proposals and bringing them to the attention of government leaders.

The decision to seek a special partnership with the ACBF reflects the importance the GMAP ministers place in their strategy on human and institutional capacity-building: no project for integration can be viable or sustainable unless it is part of a local vision constructed by regional stakeholders, translated into strategies, policies and projects implemented by those stakeholders. Moreover, the GMAP hopes that, apart from the financial support essential for its work programme, this cooperation will develop effective synergies with other networks supported by the ACBF strategy in West Africa and other subregions of sub-Saharan Africa.

2. History of the GMAP

At the initiative of the secretariats of the CILSS and the Club du Sahel, a group of ministers holding various portfolios met in Dakar in August 1999 to form the GMAP. Its aim was to strengthen African leadership, compensate for the weakness of dialogue with their international partners, and select those themes for which they were ready to mobilise, with their partners, to undertake practical action. At the Yverdon Conference in Switzerland in September 1999, organised by the Club du Sahel, the Group was extended to other ministers from both Sahelian and coastal countries. It set itself on that occasion three major tasks:

- act as focus and advocate in dialogue with the ministers and Heads of State in the subregion, so that Sahelians can assume a leadership role in initiating actions for reform of development cooperation;
- provide strategic guidelines for priorities in regional cooperation with development partners;
• put the case to development cooperation agencies for African concerns to be considered more fully in the reform of the structures and procedures of development partnership.

On this basis the GMAP prepared a special meeting with the aid agencies, which was held in Bamako in November 2000, during the CILSS Heads of State and Government summit. It submitted three issues for discussion:

• aid reform;
• development cooperation and regional integration;
• a food security strategy paper with a view to poverty reduction in the Sahel.

Until that point, the secretariat work of the GMAP was covered jointly by the CILSS and the Club du Sahel. The Club assumed most of the costs of organising GMAP meetings and preparing papers. The ministers felt that, while retaining an informal system of operation that guaranteed frankness and freedom of action, the Group should have an independent secretariat. This secretariat would be based in West Africa and have the human and financial resources to take on the GMAP work programme independently, so as to strengthen its ability to act and give practical form to the concept of African leadership.

The GMAP also decided to refocus its work programme on a single idea—the regional approach to development—and subordinate other themes to that idea.

3. Reasoning behind the work programme

West Africa has undergone radical change in the last ten years. Most countries have undertaken major structural reforms affecting both the organisation of government and mode of governance (democratisation of politics, redistribution of powers between presidency, government and parliament, decentralisation, anti-corruption measures, etc.) and aimed at macro-economic stabilisation through adjustment and liberalisation of the main sectors of production. At the sub-regional level, the countries in the CFA franc zone have embarked on an intensive process of economic integration within WAEMU, with a strategy of convergence of macro-economic and sectoral policies, a multilateral surveillance system and transfers of competence. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken a similar approach, which will lead to the implementation of a second currency zone, with a view to a single currency zone by 2004. Most of the countries in the region are drafting strategic poverty reduction papers to benefit from the HIPC initiative.

There is now a general consensus on the need for regional integration, based both on the history of ethnic groups and the awareness that national territories are too small to implement viable economic development strategies or to manage shared resources. However, governance remains mainly national or sub-national, and most public decisions are taken within a national development perspective. The many inter-governmental organisations, which cover different areas and compartmentalise technical problems according to their specific mandates, do not make it any easier to arrive at a shared, consistent, cross-sectoral regional vision, which could then guide sectoral choices.
International development cooperation also tends to have a national focus. Despite strong support for the objective of integration, the aid agencies have never managed to produce a valid, coordinated strategy on integration. Instead, they have preferred links with individual governments through bilateral agreements.

The key challenge for the GMAP is therefore to generate effective discussion on regional integration, a key pre-requisite for making progress towards achieving integration. This involves political action steered by high-level public figures with a strong commitment to integration. It implies organising discussion between citizens, civil society organisations and public policymakers. It means choosing common issues and enhancing discussion of them by drawing on existing knowledge and by producing cross-sectoral analyses and proposals, as opposed to the usual sectoral approaches.

There are several reasons for changing approach and seeking a new impetus for integration processes:

- As economies and trade become increasingly globalised, only a regional approach to development will enable West Africa to escape marginalisation. This strategic option requires countries to be aware of the sub-region’s collective resources and the advantages that rational, shared development of these resources will bring to all the countries involved.

- Democratisation and good governance have become decisive criteria for full membership of the international community and for engaging the support of citizens and other stakeholders for reforms. Disruptions to these processes in several countries are a major obstacle to the pursuit of integration.

- Political problems such as acute and persistent socio-political crises are now the main brake on economic growth, without which sustainable regional integration is an illusion. There is an urgent need to remove these political obstacles, which hamper day-to-day integration processes and undermine sub-regional dialogue and the status of West Africa in international negotiations.

New issues are emerging in the sub-region with the Millennium African Renaissance Programme and the Omega Plan for Africa, which are promoted in tandem with the African Union. The Omega Plan proposes a new integration model for Africa. The coordination of this model with the foundation of the African Union is a major issue.

These issues have become a concern for all. The lack of a forum to investigate them properly prompted ministers from the region to take the initiative of setting up the GMAP. By developing partnerships and alliances with networks firmly engaged on the path to regional integration, the GMAP initiative aims to promote the collective regional interest in public policymaking.

4. Beneficiaries

The project envisages a number of target groups:

- ministers belonging to the GMAP, and the community of government officials and public policymakers;
the development cooperation and intergovernmental integration organisations active in the region, and their staff, mainly ECOWAS, CILSS and WAEMU;

- networks of private stakeholders, socio-economic organisations and the region-wide networks of local elected officials;
- aid agencies and their staff;
- African media and journalists.

These target groups are seen as crucial elements in the implementation of the project and as its beneficiaries, particularly with respect to capacity-building. Section 5 (below) specifies how they correspond to the GMAP’s objectives.

5. Objectives

The GMAP’s five objectives:

- Create an informal discussion forum, outside diplomatic formalities, where all the important issues related to regional integration can be discussed and investigated, particularly those considered taboo in intergovernmental discussions.

- Develop a collective vision and approach to globalisation and its implications for a regional approach to development.

- Form a pool of persons to lobby and advise national and regional policymakers and aid agencies.

- Assist government leaders to formulate their national and regional decisions on the basis of general and cross-sectoral issues, which frame the management of sectoral issues and which form the "key areas" of a regional development strategy, but which are too broad to be encompassed by sectoral approaches.

- Decompartmentalise North-South decision-making centres and improve the level of information by developing communication and dialogue with organised non-government stakeholders in the region, with a view to providing a better understanding of the complex processes and transformations under way in the region.

The project submitted to the ACBF concerns the whole of the GMAP’s work programme. The objectives in this specific project consequently largely overlap with the GMAP’s general objectives. However, this project is of great importance for building African human and institutional capacities. This cross-cutting objective is contained in most of the GMAP’s strategic objectives and concerns the following target groups:

- ministers who have already recognised the GMAP’s value added in terms of access to strategic information and an opportunity for calm analysis away from day-to-day business. The GMAP’s initiatives have already provided these ministers with a form of self-study which has a direct impact on the rationale of their governmental and administrative operations;
• Heads of State who have had an opportunity of showing their interest in the GMAP, valuing the access to strategic information through non-institutional channels that provide more objective information, key to making strategic decisions. They believe regional strategy must be replaced at the heart of national decisions, and do not fully trust the mechanisms used by the IGOs for presenting issues and preparing decisions. They see the work of the GMAP as one way of improving the presentation of the issues submitted to them and “regaining control” of the options for regional development;

• IGOs and their staff who after some hesitation expressed an interest in this initiative. They now see the GMAP as a lever for reviving debate on crucial aspects of regional integration that no IGO alone has the competence or legitimacy to raise, and invigorating and improving each IGO’s sectoral approach. Moreover, the IGOs are aware that it is inevitable and salutary that they should be restructured and rationalised to advance a consistent project for integration. Consequently they see the GMAP initiative as an opportunity to cope with these changes not grudgingly but as part of a political project undertaken under African leadership and providing a sense of direction for their gradual restructuring. In the short term, they expect the GMAP to help significantly improve the quality of IGO studies, moving from a system where the IGOs mainly submit action plans to national leaders to one aiming primarily at properly presented and prepared strategic decisions, followed only then by technical action plans to implement them;

• regional networks of private stakeholders, socio-professional organisations and local elected officials, with whom the GMAP has cooperated in an atmosphere of trust and dialogue since it was launched. The main networks involved are the WAEN (West Africa Enterprise Network), ROPPA (farmers’ organisations), and the MDP (Municipal Development Programme). They achieve a better understanding of the constraints affecting public decision-making, and public policymakers, in return, learn to give greater consideration to grassroots realities and the expectations of these stakeholders. This cooperation gives rise to a genuine exchange of views between networks and Ministers and improves the quality of the proposals made by the GMAP;

• the development cooperation agencies, who have also been working with the GMAP since it was launched. The importance of international aid in budgetary balances and investment financing means that any significant change involves simultaneous changes to the approaches of both African decision-makers and their development partners. As GMAP activities develop, Africans will gradually assert their strategic options more effectively, and the agencies will respect these options and change their own behaviour in their day-to-day relations with their African partners;

• the media, who are a central element in GMAP strategy. Information on regional issues remains scarce and mainly institutional, and is far removed from the sense of “belonging” to a regional community felt by ordinary Africans. Relations with networks and associations of journalists will make it possible to provide them with facts to refresh their material and gradually bring them to play a more effective part in leading debate in the subregion and comparing different points of view.
6. Strategies

6.1. Short-term strategy

In the immediate term, the GMAP is creating the pre-conditions for pursuing its activities and implementing its methodology. Its work in the last two years has demonstrated the value of this initiative to the various target groups. Starting from that basis, the GMAP has decided to work in a more structural and structured way. To that end, the Group will set up a permanent secretariat assisted by a technical unit, both to be housed at ECOWAS. This choice has two objectives: reduce costs and start to build synergies with the major organisation for political and economic integration that involves all the countries in West Africa.

In political terms, the GMAP intends to remain independent. With respect to the various initiatives for integration within the region (Millennium Programme, Omega Plan) and the IGO agendas, the GMAP intends to position itself as formulating strategic options and practical proposals to influence the content of those initiatives and make them more consistent with each other. To that end, the GMAP places great importance on the formulation of a strategic vision of regional issues that is widely shared by regional stakeholders.

6.2. Medium-term strategy

The medium-term strategy is to strictly implement the methodology adopted by the GMAP.

For each of the three main areas in which the GMAP is interested, the Group will select in due course a series of practical issues, each of which will be dealt with by a similar procedure.

The issues are approached in four stages:

- Analysis and comprehension of complex situations and their interaction;
- Forward thinking and comparison of viewpoints, organised at working groups, meetings of the group of ministers, regional conferences and workshops;
- Formulation of operational proposals;
- Communication and advocacy.

7. Content

7.1. The selected topics

The members of the GMAP are interested in three main areas:

- Political aspects of regional integration;
- Building a competitive, integrated regional economy;
- Infrastructure development, production and trade catchment areas, management of common infrastructure.
7.1.1. Political aspects of regional integration

The main focuses of regional integration in West Africa tend to be socio-political problems, economic and trade issues and currency zones. There is also the issue of communications infrastructure. However, political aspects are one of the main obstacles to the effective implementation of commitments made by governments and to the transposition into national policy of decisions taken at subregional level. The need to encourage and control human activity, particularly in border areas, is causing an increase in informal obstacles to trade. It therefore appears difficult to progress on economic and sectoral issues without first tackling several major political issues:

- Managing identity crises. Integration can make it easier for sub-areas and networks of people to express themselves and be taken into account, but can also be perceived as a threat to nation-states and some social and ethnic groups. Can countries develop a common approach to these issues? How can the issue of regulatory institutions and, more generally, convergence of reform of modes of governance be approached?

- Population mobility and refugees. Under the principles of free movement of people and right of establishment throughout the West African area, people displaced by conflict are no longer necessarily considered as refugees, but as regional citizens: this poses problems of access to resources and control of trafficking and political activities. Owing to the fragility of governments and regimes, obstacles to population movement tend to be increasing in an attempt to control activities within national territories.

- Divergences in democratisation processes. Political dialogue in the subregion is significantly weakened by particular types of political regime. This inevitably affects regional discussions and decisions. There is also the problem of convergence of institutional reform (particularly decentralisation) and of the impact on management and regulation of regional public goods and shared resources.

7.1.2. Building a competitive, integrated regional economy

All the countries in the subregion now consider inclusion in the international economy as the main engine of their development. They are involved in multiple negotiations, at regional level (within the framework of ECOWAS and WAEMU) and at international level (within the framework of the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement with the European Union, environment conventions, etc.). These negotiations, which all take place in an identical international context, are conducted separately (overlapping negotiation frameworks) and do not allow countries to negotiate on the basis of a regional vision of their development strategies, even though a regional approach is the only way to resolve most of the questions at the heart of these negotiations. These include:

- What are the costs of integration and non-integration in West Africa? How can the gains and losses generated by integration processes be assessed?

- Under what conditions should the region become involved in free-trade areas, such as the Regional Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union (ECOWAS area or WAEMU area?) and the free-trade agreement with the United States? How can the impact on
key productive sectors, balances of payments and government budgets be assessed? Can export growth match import growth or are there specific risks for some sectors if they are opened too quickly to what may be unfair international competition?

- How should changing labour, environmental and health standards be integrated into the adaptation of export sectors (given that these standards are gradually becoming a much bigger constraint than conventional customs duties)? How can small firms be promoted and how can the region take advantage of the relocation of industrial activities from the North to countries where production costs are lower? What common approaches does this imply in terms of political stability, investment security, tax policy and training?

When examining different trade integration scenarios, it is important to look at the "neighbouring-area integration" occurring in ECOWAS border areas. The terms and conditions of monetary integration also merit further discussion. It would also be appropriate to focus more explicitly on actual dynamics of stakeholders, and to take industries’ mode of operation and level of competitiveness into account in negotiations on opening the region’s trade to international markets.

7.1.3. Infrastructure development, production and trade catchment areas and management of common infrastructure

Infrastructure development has been a central component in the construction of nation-states. The economic crisis has considerably slowed investment in infrastructure. At the same time, transnational production and trade catchment areas have developed. These catchment areas, which concentrate a growing share of the population, pose new challenges and can be seen as opportunities and factors of support for integration processes. There are several questions that need to be answered. These include:

- What type of infrastructure development should be promoted, given that existing approaches are industry-based and are not an effective response to cross-sectoral development needs? This raises the particular issue of promoting development centres (urban centres, industrial centres, agricultural production catchment areas) and interconnection within and between them.

- What common communications infrastructure should be promoted and what forms of management can guarantee sustainable, shared use? Should co-management between public sector and private operators be promoted and, if so, in what form?

- In which sectors could regional infrastructure reduce costs for each of the countries involved and enhance regional awareness and regional networks: healthcare, education (universities and other tertiary institutions), transport (ports, railways, etc.) and energy (gas pipeline project, interconnection of electricity grids, etc.)?

- How can infrastructure be financed? Is combined financing from governments, aid agencies and private investors a viable option?
8. Activities

For the selected themes, the methodology will be implemented by the following activities:

- **Phase 1: Producing a summary paper comprising:**
  - a status report on the issue and a strategic presentation of knowledge available (based on thorough analysis of the literature and consultation of main resource centres);
  - prospects for the future;
  - the positions of subregional stakeholders and views expressed (based on interviews and analysis of position papers);
  - an analysis of the positions of the aid agencies and the international community;
  - a clear presentation of the issues and ideas to be submitted for discussion by ministers;
  - requirements for specific studies and analyses to translate the ideas into operational proposals.

- **Phase 2: Ministers meet to examine the summary paper**

At this stage, discussion within the GMAP will **validate the presentation of the issues and select the ideas** to be used to produce operational proposals. The selection will be based on the likelihood of achieving concrete results within the timetable of regional and international negotiations involving West African countries and any meetings the GMAP may arrange.

- **Phase 3: further research**

This stage involves doing any specific small-scale studies required to inform and refine the investigation, and **producing short memoranda** summarising the analyses and operational proposals contained in them.

- **Phase 4: owning and popularising the issue**

No presentation of an issue is likely to be translated into concrete decisions by Heads of State unless it meets the expectations of networks or institutions whose strategy takes into account the regional perspective. In the early phases the GMAP will already have made contacts with the organisations and resource people concerned by the issue, and at this stage the rule will be to formalise one or more partnerships. These more structured partnerships will:
  - jointly organise a regional workshop or forum to discuss the GMAP’s ideas with stakeholders and test the operational proposals;
  - jointly publish summaries of analyses and proposals to be circulated by partner networks.
The technical unit will be heavily involved in preparing these meetings and producing the documents.

At this stage short press kits will be produced for journalists. This is the phase that is key to the GMAP’s strategy of lobbying and advocacy.

- **Phase 5: Ministers meet to discuss operational proposals**

The Ministers meet to choose which operational proposals will actually be endorsed by the GMAP and submitted for decisions by Heads of State and government.

- **Phase 6: Decisions about operational proposals**

This follows on naturally from the previous phases. At this point various types of issue will be treated differently. Some give rise to practical decisions (such as the choice of the economic zone to negotiate a regional partnership agreement with the European Union), while others are designed more to improve the standard of information available to decision-makers (such as the problems that greater border security poses for the free movement of people and goods).

For the practical issues, the GMAP will adopt a twofold strategy:

- influence the agendas of the governing bodies of the main IGOs;
- mobilise Heads of State, their advisors and governments for specific initiatives.

For the information issues, GMAP analyses need to be circulated as widely as possible.

**9. Budget**

The overall budget for the project amounts to $2,992,000 for the full four years of the project.

This sum is broken down as follows:
### 10. Financing plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>US dollars</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBF</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club du Sahel</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct contributions from bi- and multilateral donors</td>
<td>642,000</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local contributions</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,992,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11. Programme governance and management

The project will be managed by a steering committee comprising GMAP ministers and representatives of the aid agencies who have contributed to financing the work programme.

ECOWAS will open two specific accounts, one in convertible currency and the other in local currency. The ministerial coordination committee is the steering committee for the ACBF project and is responsible for managing funds. The secretary general of the GMAP is preparing a
prospective half-yearly budget, which will be submitted to the ministerial coordination committee for adoption, so that the funds can be released for the operation and conduct of activities for the corresponding period. The secretary general is also in charge of the day-to-day management of funds and must report on income and expenditure to the chair and members of the GMAP.

Financial management is subject to an annual external audit.

12. Future of the GMAP

The founding members of the GMAP chose to build the initiative on a small group of ministers known for their commitment to integration and willing to engage in informal forward thinking.

Gradually the Group will be extended to consolidate its achievements and strengthen its ability to influence regional decision-making. However, it is perfectly possible that the GMAP may ultimately become a wider network of policymakers, if new habits of dealing with regional issues develop within the subregion. This change would be made easier if the institutional environment were clarified and ECOWAS fully assumed in its day-to-day strategy the issues put forward by the GMAP.