THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENTS, EMPLOYERS AND TRADE UNIONS IN FIGHTING HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT

Report on a joint meeting of management and trade union experts held under the OECD Labour/Management Programme

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Paris 1993
Labour/Management Programme

Experts’ Meeting 1993-6

THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENTS,
EMPLOYERS AND TRADE UNIONS IN FIGHTING HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT

Report on a joint meeting of management and trade union experts
held under the OECD Labour/Management Programme

(Paris, 15-16 March 1993)

Formal relations between the OECD and representatives of trade unions
and of business and industry in Member countries are conducted through two
organisations officially recognised by the OECD Council. These are the Trade
Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) and the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC). In addition to various forms of policy
discussion throughout each year, arrangements provide for meetings at the
technical level, which do not engage the responsibility of the organisations.
Such meetings are held either in the form of ad hoc discussions with the
Secretariat, or under the Labour/Management Programme which, at the beginning
of each year, establishes a series of meetings devoted to specific themes.

After meetings held under the Programme, a rapporteur draws up a report
of the discussion on his own responsibility, for distribution to the social
partners and to the relevant OECD Committees. The opinions expressed in such
reports are those of the rapporteur, except where they are expressly attributed
to individual participants, and do not necessarily reflect the views of other
participants or of the OECD.

Copyright OECD 1993
# Table of Contents

* Foreword............................................................. 4
* Final report on the meeting by Mr. Stephen Bazan ............... 5
* Introduction ........................................................ 5
* Part one - Policies aimed at combating unemployment .......... 5
  I. The current state of unemployment study ....................... 5
  II. Macroeconomic policy stance .................................. 6
  III. Globalisation and international competition ................ 8
  IV. Other measures to reduce unemployment ....................... 9
* Part two - The collective bargaining response ..................... 11
  I. Collective bargaining and macroeconomic policy ............... 11
  II. Collective bargaining, productivity and employment .......... 12
* Conclusion .......................................................... 14
* Annex: List of participants ........................................ 16
Foreword

Under the OECD Labour/Management Programme for 1993, a joint meeting of management and trade union experts on "The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments, Employers and Trade Unions in Fighting High Unemployment" was held in Paris on 15 and 16 March 1993. The meeting was prepared in collaboration with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC).

Below is an overall report of the discussions of the meeting of experts, prepared by Mr. Stephen Bazen who was designated as General Rapporteur for this activity.

A list of the participants in the meeting is given in the Annex.
1. After a short downward trend in the latter half of the 1980s, unemployment has increased again in OECD countries. The defeat of inflation in the 1980s and its containment was widely believed to be the foundation of sustainable economic growth and lower unemployment. This macroeconomic policy stance was combined with a strong emphasis on structural policy reforms and the removal of obstacles to the working of markets, as a means to achieving lower unemployment in the medium term through improvements in the supply side. However it would appear that the policy stance of the control of inflation and structural reform of markets has proved to have been unsuccessful in achieving sustainable growth and permanently lower unemployment. Have the reforms have not gone far enough or is this policy approach inadequate? The review of the causes and possible remedies for unemployment currently being undertaken by the OECD Secretariat will be able to re-examine the adequacy of this policy stance.

2. The present meeting had the aim of providing representatives of the social partners with the opportunity of contributing to the policy framework that the OECD will present as a consequence of its analysis of the unemployment issue. The discussion at the meeting concentrated on (a) the kind of policies that the social partners feel are likely to bring about reductions in unemployment and (b) the role that collective bargaining - and therefore the social partners - can play in bringing about lower unemployment either directly in terms of the kind of bargains struck or indirectly in terms of contributing to the successful implementation of those policies.

3. Given that many issues were raised several times at different stages of the meeting, in this report the topics have organised in the following manner. In the first part, discussions concerning policies aimed at bringing down unemployment are presented while in the second, experts’ views of the collective bargaining responses are presented.
macroeconomic policy stance in terms of the slowdown of potential growth rates. The labour market reaction to external shocks is being analysed in terms of the role of wage determination, labour mobility, education and training policies and the impact of long term unemployment on unemployment.

2. Reactions to the presentation were limited due to several of these issues being agenda topics at the meeting. However, concern was expressed about the need to take account of the quality of employment created, and not simply the quantity, by certain policy measures and also the importance of non-wage elements in labour costs in the section on wage determination. In the macroeconomic policy section the suggestion that policy stance had no effect on long term growth paths of economies was rejected, especially by union experts. The impact of financial factors such as asset prices and credit markets was thought to be underplayed in the study, and it was felt that the importance of creating stable economic conditions as a means to maintaining high levels of employment should be stressed. Finally, the role that firms play was thought to be under-emphasised albeit for different reasons. On the one hand it was pointed out by management experts that small and medium-sized firms have played a key role in employment creation in the US and the UK. Union experts on the other hand argued that firms, by closing down certain operations in industrialised countries in order to set up in developing countries with lower labour costs and fewer labour standards, were responsible for part of the unemployment problem in the OECD area.

3. The latest forecasts for unemployment in the OECD envisage no reduction in unemployment for 1993. The next official OECD forecasts will be published in June 1993. The representative from the Economics Department pointed out that there were signs of a pick up in growth in the US and Canada and to a lesser extent in the UK, and the outlook was encouraging. The latter is due, it was argued, to the spill-over effects of growth in North America and the UK and the probability that interest rates in Germany would be lowered during the year. Inflation was now under control and the growth process could begin again. Participants thought that this view was too optimistic.

II. Macroeconomic Policy Stance

1. In the 1980s the goal of low unemployment has been secondary to that of achieving low inflation as governments increasingly saw low inflation as a necessary condition for low unemployment. Several union experts claimed that unemployment was being used as a tool to bear down upon inflation. Policy turned towards bringing down inflation and seeking to reduce unemployment through supply-side reforms. The full employment objective, and along with it Keynesian economics, was discarded by many governments as a dominant influence in policy-making. In the second half of the 1980s, many OECD economies saw unemployment fall from the peaks of the early to mid 1980s only to see it rise again at the beginning of the 1990s - but before it could fall back to the lower rates experienced before 1980.

2. Participants on the union side felt that policy-making in the 1980s has not produced the predicted results. The gains in employment in the late 1980s have been wiped out in the first few years of the 1990s. It was emphasised that macroeconomic policy stance does have an effect on growth in the medium term. High interest rates choke off investment, and thus the productive capacity of
economies, as well as diminishing other interest-sensitive forms of expenditure such as consumer spending and house purchases. High unemployment has come to be regarded as a normal state of affairs. It was further argued that failure to deal with unemployment in a recession can lead to long run stagnation so that there are high costs of not dealing with unemployment soon. In order for unemployment to be brought down substantially, it is thus first necessary for it to have a high priority in policy-making. The current sit-and-wait approach of many governments, waiting for the US economy to pick up and German interest rates to come down, means that the problem is worsening.

3. The rise of unemployment in the early 1990s appears however to have its principal cause in low rates of economic growth and many contributions from the union side in particular emphasised the need for expansionary macroeconomic policies. There were few contributions from the management side on macroeconomic policy although it was pointed out that short term measures aimed at increasing employment can have negative effects in the medium term. There was however wide agreement that any macroeconomic expansion would have to be accompanied by other measures such as active labour market policies in order to bring unemployment down in a substantial way.

4. Participants recognised that the ways in which governments can achieve sufficiently high growth rates however are limited. First of all the debt position of many OECD countries is a matter of concern due to the existence of structural budget deficits (i.e. once the effects of recession have been removed$^F$), so that the scope for fiscal expansion is limited. Furthermore there is concern that financial markets may regard a substantial fiscal expansion as a sign of abandoning the goal of low inflation and this may require higher interest rates with unfavourable effects on investment. The nature of the world has changed since the 1970s and policy-makers have fewer degrees of freedom. The liberalisation of financial markets has added a further constraint to the usual inflation and balance of payments constraints. The failure to maintain appropriate interest rates can lead to flights of capital. It was therefore emphasised that any macroeconomic expansion will therefore need to be co-ordinated between countries in order to overcome these constraints, and the OECD, the G7 group and European Community were argued to provide possible bases on which to build a co-ordinated approach.

5. There was a good deal of agreement on the need for a co-ordinated macroeconomic expansion to be accompanied by other measures. Participants on both sides pointed to the need for governments to provide and increase provisions for training in order to avoid skill shortages and to aid the reininsertion of unemployed into work once employment starts to rise. Some union experts felt that even growth rates in excess of 3% per annum would be insufficient to bring down unemployment substantially and that work-sharing of some form would need to be implemented. The existence of large numbers of long-term unemployed may also require more than economic growth for their numbers to be reduced.

6. It was pointed out by one management expert that the success of a growth-induced approach in reducing unemployment was undermined by the variations in the size of the labour force. In some countries where employment had risen, unemployment had continued to rise due to an increase in the size of the labour force. Also once employment starts to rise, the "encouraged worker effect" operates whereby a certain number of those previously inactive are induced back into the labour force by the increase in the availability of work.
7. A further constraint applicable in certain countries, although ignored by the US and UK in policy-making in the 1980s, is the external constraint. If growth were to pick up, unemployment reduction in these countries may have to be limited due to the requirement of financing a current account deficit with capital flows - which entails a higher rate of interest and a credible non-devaluationary stance. Certain key economies such as the USA, France and the United Kingdom may well be balance-of-payments constrained and a slowdown in growth in these economies will have spill-over effects on others.

8. Given the limited room for manoeuvre on a unilateral basis, it was emphasised that expansionary macroeconomic policy would need to be internationally co-ordinated. The alternative, as in the current situation, where governments are reluctant to embark on expansionary fiscal policies and appear to be waiting for some external stimulus was criticised particularly by the union side. There is a growing consensus - one reflected in the contributions made by the participants at the meeting - that an internationally co-ordinated expansionary macroeconomic policy is a necessary condition for unemployment-reducing growth rates to be attained. Whether such growth rates are sustainable depends on how quickly constraints appear and whether these can be overcome.

III. Globalisation and International Competition

1. Experts on both sides pointed to the globalisation of production and the competition emanating from developing countries with very low labour costs as reasons for unemployment and that an alternative non-macroeconomic approach would be necessary. In view of the differences in labour costs, many companies were competing either through the adoption of technology enabling productivity to be enhanced or through relocating certain operations in countries with low labour costs. The adoption of labour-saving technology and relocation decisions have both involved laying off workers in industrialised countries. The management and union responses to dealing with this form of unemployment were very different.

2. In the face of such international competition firms seek maximum flexibility in order to adapt to an ever-changing market situation. Competition from low wage producers obliges firms in industrialised countries to seek to control unit labour costs through productivity increases, technological change, the reform of traditional working arrangements and in some cases attempting force down wages. Management experts pointed out the need for highly flexible working arrangements, the development of small and medium sized firms specialising in services that can be contracted out by larger firms, the decentralisation of collective bargaining and the removal of obstacles to hiring and firing of workers. The role of governments in this process was argued to be the provision of active labour market policies such as training and re-training programmes in order to facilitate the adoption of new technologies and to minimise the duration of unemployment experienced by workers made redundant.

3. In contrast, it was pointed by union experts that it is difficult for firms to compete with countries where labour standards hardly exist and where
wages are very low. Attempting to compete with low labour cost countries on the basis lowering wages was doomed to failure and the downgrading of labour standards was felt to be an inappropriate means of competing with countries with little worker protection. It was emphasised that dialogue between the social partners is necessary in order to find solutions in terms of retraining and the adaptation of work arrangements following the implementation of new technologies.

4. There were clear differences in the type of strategy that the two sides thought appropriate. Management experts argued that traditional work forms should be abandoned and rigidities removed so that firms in industrialised countries could compete with low cost-low labour standard producers. Collective bargaining would need to be as decentralised as possible, that workers would have to accept ongoing changes in working arrangements and that wages would have to be more flexible. It was pointed out that in New Zealand no attempt was being made to compete with low cost developing countries, but that the regulation of working conditions had been minimised in order to enable firms to compete where possible on the basis of productivity improvements and containment of unit labour costs.

5. In contrast, it was argued by union experts that firms in industrialised countries would do better to move into high value-added, high quality products that require a trained workforce and where labour standards do not have to be eroded in order to be competitive. Indeed it was argued that in order to effect the kinds of changes that would permit industrialised countries to compete in an increasingly competitive international environment collective bargaining and dialogue were essential. One union expert pointed to the centralised approach that applies in Belgium where a competitiveness law requires government and the social partners to determine wage increases in a manner that maintains Belgian competitiveness, and where the social partners are consulted on policy matters. More generally it was argued by the union side that in principle the competitive gains permitted by the high quality-high labour standards approach are without limit while the alternative of low wage competition and the dilution of labour standards, is limited by the level of development reached by industrialised countries.

IV. Other measures to reduce unemployment

1. Apart from unemployment due to the role of globalisation there was also some concern expressed as to whether economic growth would be sufficient to bring down unemployment quickly enough. Both sides pointed to the need for other, non-macroeconomic policies. In the 1980s and early 1990s many governments have already adopted policies that concentrate on continuing the process of removing obstacles to the operation of markets and special measures either aimed at reducing unemployment or making sure that high risk groups are helped. At the meeting four main measures were discussed.

2. Certain trade union experts argued that work-sharing would have to be central to any strategy aimed at reducing unemployment. Various forms of reducing working time were described including reductions in the working week, fewer weeks of work per year and possibly fewer years of work per lifetime. Firms would need to reorganise their work arrangements and individuals would have to accept the notion that the quantity of work they could do and therefore their earning power is limited. Different propositions over how workers may be
compensated for giving up the ability to choose how much labour they supply have been made, with implications for public finances and firms’ costs. Proponents of reductions in working time argue that the alternative is the inequitable fashion in which unemployment allocates the available work.

3. Management experts were largely critical of reductions in working time as a policy measure. It was argued that companies would be able to provide reductions in working time arrangements where this was suitable, but that any steps in this direction would have to come from the "bottom up". In particular it was claimed that the experience of France and Australia in reducing standard hours from forty to thirty nine and thirty eight respectively caused unit labour costs to rise and employment to fall.

4. A reduction of non-wage labour costs was also raised as a way of enabling firms to take on more workers. One such proposal is a reduction in firms’ social security contributions which amounts to a general employment subsidy in that current employees are subsidised as well as those taken on. This kind of measure affects location decisions and the example was given of waterfront companies closing down in Australia and moving to New Zealand due among other things to a 20% cost advantage in terms of non-wage labour costs. One argument against this type of measure levelled by a union expert is that social security contributions are a major form of state finance in European countries and that if they are reduced in a blanket way, alternative forms of finance will need to found.

5. One reason why a pick up in economic growth may not bring unemployment down sufficiently is labour shortage due to inadequate supplies of employees with particular skills or because of geographical immobility. Training and in particular re-training have a key role to play in relaxing skills constraints and training policies have been widely implemented in OECD countries. There was full agreement among participants on the key role that training has to play in enabling unemployment to brought down over the medium term. By enhancing individuals' productivities and preventing labour market bottlenecks due to skill shortages, training reduces that unemployment which is due to labour market mismatch and prevents the build-up of inflationary pressures.

6. Furthermore in the face of increased international competition and the speed at which technological change takes place, both union and management experts emphasised the critical role that within-firm training has to play in the successful use of new technologies and in the enhancement of productivity. It was also pointed out that retraining was essential in enabling workers displaced by the adoption of technology in adapting to other occupations. One management expert claimed that workers may have to undergo an average of three career changes during their working lives.

7. Finally the way in which the unemployed are treated by the State is also thought to influence the level of unemployment through the length of time someone remains unemployed. The replacement ratio - the level of income while unemployed relative to the level of income when in employment - is hypothesised to influence the search behaviour of the unemployed and in particular extend the duration of unemployment. The evidence on the size of such effects at a time of high unemployment is mixed. Recently the administration of unemployment compensation systems has been proposed as an important determinant of unemployment. There was concern expressed by one management expert that while
current demand conditions mean that unemployment will not be influenced by modifying the system, there was a danger that benefit payments would come to be regarded as a "pension" due to benefit dependence especially among younger workers. Benefit dependence could occur with serious implications for the economy in the medium term by limiting the extent to which unemployment could be brought down.

PART TWO - THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RESPONSE

I. Collective bargaining and macroeconomic policy

1. While not the sole source of inflationary pressure, the manner in which wages are determined can lead to inflation being re-kindled or perpetuated through wages following prices in an upward spiral. Insider-outsider models of collective bargaining describe how insiders – those already in employment – negotiate wage increases that do not always take into account the existence of the unemployed or ‘outsiders’ so that as demand expands, wages rise leaving employment largely unchanged. It is also worth noting that a similar situation can arise for different reasons. Firms’ desire to recruit, retain and motivate their workforces may give rise to the payment of ‘efficiency wages’ whereby the wage may remain high in spite of the presence of high unemployment. On the other hand in some countries concession-bargaining at the enterprise level has taken place whereby lower wage increases are agreed to in return for increased job security.

2. In the past, incomes policies have been adopted in order to bear down on the wage-price spiral but seemingly only temporarily, with a process of catching-up taking place after the policy ended. Different forms of wage moderation mechanisms have been proposed such as tax-based incomes policies, the co-ordination of collective bargaining and the more widespread use of profit-sharing. Reactions however mainly centred on the desirability and feasibility of having centralised collective bargaining.

3. It was felt by union experts that centralisation and co-ordination of pay bargaining could, in principle, enable inflation to be brought down more quickly than in less centralised systems (although as shown in the original Calmfors and Driffill studyF)


F extreme decentralisation can also achieve this result). There are constraints on the extent to which centralisation can be achieved. In particular bargaining systems have evolved over time and correspond to particular social and economic structures. Participants – from both union and management sides – pointed out that it is difficult to implement a centralised system in countries where bargaining is decentralised and obtain the apparent benefits of shorter-lived periods of inflation and lower unemployment. At the same time, given the size of the unemployment problem, several union experts argued that in spite of the distortions entailed it is better to co-ordinate collective bargaining where possible in order to contain inflationary pressures that may arise with a pick up in growth rates.

4. On the management side a move towards centralised bargaining was pointed out to go against the trend of the decentralisation and fragmentation of bargaining that has been taking place in many OECD countries. Furthermore it was claimed that centralisation and co-ordination could only be successful for
short periods in view of the distortions entailed. Centralised bargaining does not take into account the heterogeneity of firms within a sector or of industries within a country and that wages were better determined in a decentralised manner. There was little discussion of incomes policies and profit-sharing.

5. It was pointed out by union experts that in countries such as the UK where inflation was re-kindled in the late 1980s, wage pressure mainly came from firms independently bidding up wages by seeking to attract, retain and motivate employees. Labour shortages and efficiency wage considerations as well as possible insider power all contributed to inflationary wage increases and obliged governments to tighten macroeconomic policy in order to bear down on inflation. Thus the reform and decentralisation of collective bargaining systems cannot guarantee that inflationary pressure may arise from the wage determination process. On the management side it was agreed that inflationary pressure could originate from elsewhere, but collective bargaining over wages perpetuates inflationary pressure once initiated.

II. Collective bargaining, productivity and employment

1. Over and above the role of collective bargaining in the macroeconomic context and the inflation process, the meeting also addressed the way in which collective agreements had been adapted in order to take into account employment issues. Participants were asked to submit examples of collective agreements in which employment was explicitly taken into account. These examples were provided at the request of the taskforce for use in the preparation of a chapter of the unemployment study, but were also cited in discussion at the meeting.

2. The most explicit form is where wage increases are moderated or foregone or wages even cut in return for employment guarantees. So-called concession bargaining has been used notably in the United States although its use had not been widespread elsewhere. The use of two-tier wage structures - with lower wage rates payable to newly recruited workers - which was prominent in the US until 1980 since when their use has declined.

3. In the relatively fewer cases outside the US according to the contributions made at the meeting it appears that concession bargaining mainly takes the form of wage freezes (and therefore real pay cuts) and occurs generally when economic conditions are difficult. Union experts from the UK pointed to recent cases in which wage concessions were made in order to avert redundancies, such as an agreement in local government where externally imposed financial constraints would have led to redundancies and employees agreed to a wage cut. One management expert pointed out that wage cuts were rare in the UK, but wage freezes or delays in settlement were common (occurring in up to a third of firms) but employment guarantees were rarely offered by management.

4. One union expert pointed out that in the experience of Canada and the US in the automobile industry shed doubt on whether wage concessions actually saved jobs. In Canada wage concessions were rejected and it is not clear that employment fell relative to employment in the US where concessions were agreed to. Furthermore it argued that concessions in the United States went hand in hand with de-unionisation. More generally it was pointed out by certain union
experts that pressure for wage cuts came normally from the employer side in difficult economic conditions and that in the long run there was no benefit to firms by imposing wage freezes or cuts who as a consequence lose the trust and goodwill of their workforces. In addition such wage concessions occurred usually when companies were in difficult financial circumstances and in many cases ended up closing down anyway, so that many union experts viewed concession bargaining with some suspicion.

5. The issue of productivity was in general regarded as being more relevant for collective bargaining than wage concessions. Enhanced productivity growth can contribute the lowering of the unemployment barrier needed to prevent an acceleration of inflation. Collective bargaining, either implicitly or explicitly, has increasingly turned to issues related to productivity growth. This shows up in increased emphasis on deals concerning changes in work patterns and the introduction of new technology. Such agreements involve the relaxation of certain restrictive work practices in exchange for higher pay (so-called productivity bargaining), employment guarantees in exchange for co-operation in introducing new technology (so-called technology agreements) and up-skilling or training agreements to increase the future employability of those adversely affected by technological change.

6. There was wide though not unanimous agreement that technological change would continue to take place at rapid pace and that this required flexibility in work practices and a workforce capable of adapting to the development of new and different tasks. It was argued particularly by management experts that traditional collective bargaining models would have to be reformed and become highly decentralised. While employment guarantees are not often provided, co-operation over the implementation and use of new technology was thought necessary. Management experts argued that security of employment would be enhanced by the improved competitiveness brought about by the superior technology.

7. In contrast it was pointed out particularly by union experts that technology agreements serve to reassure a workforce in the face of change by providing a set of rules which are to be followed. Even if employment is to be reduced, a technology agreement enables the process of change to occur with fewer social costs, with redundancy terms and retraining programmes being agreed upon. It was argued that strong trade unions are necessary for the effective implementation of change in the vast majority of sectors. Co-operation over the implementation of technology requires reassurance and job security.

8. Productivity bargaining and technology agreements however do not necessarily lead to lower inflation. Either productivity gains can be passed on in terms of lower prices or they can be translated into higher wages or some combination of the two. This depends on how the social partners collectively decide to allocate the productivity gains. According to participants on both sides, productivity agreements were in general linked to pay and not employment. Thus productivity increases fed through mainly into wage increases rather than leading only to price reductions and therefore to improved competitiveness. The appropriateness of measures of productivity was questioned and the role of productivity measurement for pay determination.

9. Redundancy agreements involved generally the payment of severance pay in excess of statutory minima. Some participants argued that lump sums permit a person made redundant to be more mobile geographically and occupationally by
contribute to the costs of adjusting. In some cases redundancy pay is used to
set up small businesses. However the main role of redundancy agreements
according to one trade union expert was to attach a cost to making workers
redundant in order to encourage firms to keep workers in employment if at all
possible.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The views expressed at the meeting brought out major differences
concerning the role of collective bargaining in dealing with unemployment. The
management side saw the decentralisation of collective bargaining as a
necessary development. Some management experts went as far as to argue for de-
unionisation and employee-employer bargaining on a one for one basis. While not
opposing a growth-led strategy in order to reduce unemployment, management
experts laid greatest emphasis on adapting to a world of fierce international
competition, the attractiveness of low cost countries and technological change.
The policy response sought was the removal of impediments to firms’ hiring and
firing of workers, the need for workers to accept change and be prepared to be
highly flexible, and for the State to provide the appropriate education and
basic training.

2. Union experts on the other hand saw the main means of reducing
unemployment as an internationally co-ordinated macroeconomic expansion
accompanied by measures, such as improvements in training, to prevent
constraints arising before economic growth can bring unemployment in a
substantial manner. In certain cases even a growth-led approach was felt to be
inadequate and that reductions in working time would be necessary. The union
side also expressed reservations on the desirability and feasibility of
attempting to compete with low cost countries by eroding labour standards.
Rather than seeking to dilute the role of collective bargaining, it was argued
that change could be achieved more successfully through agreement. Rather than
attempting to compete on the basis of labour standards, it was emphasised that
the future of industrialised economies lay in the development of high quality –
high value-added – technologically-advanced products. This strategy it was
argued requires co-operation and agreement and therefore would need to be based
on high labour standards.
ANNEX

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Management Experts

Freiherr • Head, Economic Department•••GERMANY
von WEITERSHAUSEN • Confederation of German Employers’
Ottheinrich• Associations••

HUXTER•• Industrial Relations and Personnel•AUSTRALIA
Richard•• Manager
•• Chamber of Commerce and Industry
•• of South Australia••

TRITREMMEL• Federation of Austrian •••AUSTRIA
Dr. Wolfgang• Industrialists, Haus der Industrie•

van HOLM• Directeur du Département des••BELGIUM
Jan•• Relations et Conditions de Travail
•• Fédération des Entreprises de
•• Belgique••••

MORKEBERG• Chief Analyst••••DENMARK
Henrik•• Department of Labour Market and
• Training Policy
•• Danish Employers’ Confederation•

GOMEZ ALBO• Director, Departmento de Asuntos••SPAIN
Dr. Pablo• Laborales
•• Confederation Empresarial
•• Independiente de Madrid••

SEMRAU•• Assistant Vice-President and••UNITED STATES
Michael J. • Director, International Human
• Resources
•• The Coca-Cola Company••

SULLIVAN• Vice-President, Labour Relations•• " "
Stewart•• Pfizer Inc. ••

CASTRÉN•• Departement of Economic Policy••FINLAND
Pekka•• Confederation of Finnish
• Industry and Employers••

de SAINT-GERMAIN Chef de Service à la Direction ••FRANCE•
Mme Anne-Geneviève Emploi, Conseil National du Patronat
• Français (CNPF)
DURANTE • Head of Department • ITALY
Giancarlo • Servizio Syndicale •

FERRARA • Head, International Department •
Giancarlo • Assicredito

CAMERANA • Deputy Chairman of the Board •
Carlo • Magneti Marelli

MAGNUSSEN • Director, Economics Department • NORWAY
Olav • Confederation of Norwegian

MARTIN • Chief Executive • NEW ZEALAND
Steve • New Zealand Employers’ Federation Inc.

RHODES • Senior Adviser Algemene Werkgevers • NETHERLANDS
Dr. Ing. A.A. • Verenging AWV

GILBERT • Director of Employment Affairs • UNITED KINGDOM
Robert • Confederation of British

JERNECK • Swedish Employers’ Confederation • SWEDEN
Mrs. Ingrid

Observer

KOYA • Président Directeur Général • JAPAN
Satoshi • NTT France SA

Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC)

PATTEN • Director
Marc •

BATE • Director
Steven •

FRISVOLD • Manager
Paal •

Trade Union Experts

GOERGENS • Economic Department • GERMANY
Hartmut • German Confederation of

Trade Unions (DGB) •
THONSTAD•  Economist•••• NORWAY
Knut•  Norwegian Confederation of
••  Trade Unions (LO-Norway)••

BERNARDO•  Département Technique•••• PORTUGAL
Mme Ana Paula•  Union Générale des Travailleurs (UGT-P)

IRVIN•  Head of Research and Education•• UNITED KINGDOM
Joe•  Transport and General Workers’
••  Union (TUC)•••

BÄCKSTRÖM•  Senior Economist•••• SWEDEN•
Anders•  Swedish Confederation of Trade
••  Unions (LO-Sweden)••

SPANT•  Chief Economist•••  "
Roland•  Swedish Confederation of
•  Professional Employees (TCO)•

FODEN•  Research Department••
David•  European Trade Union Institute (ETUI)•

PURSEY•  Head of Economic and Social Policy
Stephen•  Department
••  International Confederation of Free
•  Trade Unions (ICFTU)

MACSHANE•  Press Officer•••
Denis•  International Metalworkers’
••  Federation (IMF)•••

BRETT•  General Secretary
Bill•  Institute of Professional Managers
•  and Specialists (IPMS/PSI)

Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC)

EVANS•  General Secretary
John•

McCLELLAND•  Assistant to the General Secretary
Stephen•

BOTSCHE•  Assistant to the General Secretary
Andreas•

RAPPORTEUR

Dr. BAZEN•  Maître de Conférence••• UNITED KINGDOM
Stephen•  Université de Bordeaux I
•  (France)••••