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**NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH**

Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters

INEX 4 GUIDE FOR EXERCISE PLAYERS

INEX 4 Exercise on Consequence Management and the Transition to Recovery

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INEX 4 EXERCISE ON CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT AND THE TRANSITION TO RECOVERY:

GUIDE FOR EXERCISE PLAYERS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of this Document

As part of its ongoing series of international exercises, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), through its Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters, has developed the INEX 4 Exercise on Consequence Management and the Transition to Recovery, to be conducted during a period beginning in late 2010.

The purpose of this document is to provide general guidance to the INEX 4 exercise players on their participation in their country's INEX 4 exercise. It should be read in conjunction with the INEX 4: General Information document ([NEA/CRPPH/INEX\(2009\)6](#)), which will be provided to Players via their National Planning Committee.

1.2 Overview of INEX 4

Since 1993, the International Nuclear Emergency Exercise (INEX) series, organised by the NEA has proved successful in testing, investigating and facilitating improvements in emergency management systems nationally and internationally.¹ The last INEX series, the INEX 3 consequence management exercises conducted during 2005-2006, investigated arrangements for responding to widespread radiological contamination of the environment arising from a radiological emergency. NEA, through its Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters (WPNEM) has developed a new exercise, INEX 4, to continue the investigation of longer-term emergency management and address areas of current interest.

INEX 4 will address the consequence management and transition to recovery issues arising from a malicious act involving dispersal of radioactive materials in an urban area. Its overall goal is to allow participating countries, organisations and stakeholders to test, or identify elements for improving their arrangements for such events and to share their experience with other countries after the exercise.

The INEX 4 series of exercises are intended to be conducted as individual national table-top exercises in each participating country. Each national exercise has been organised under the responsibility of a designated National Exercise Organiser and National Planning Committee (NEO/NPC). Exercise play will be issues-based and structured around moderated discussions addressing the identified exercise topic areas.

¹ Further information on the NEA's emergency management programme, including the INEX series, can be found in the NEA website (<http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/wpnem.html>)

The focus of the exercise play and discussions will be on the national arrangements for consequence management and the transition to recovery relevant to the exercise scenario, on the types of decisions and actions to be taken, including international interfaces, and on identifying areas for improvement. The exercise duration and the extent of participation have been determined by each country's NEO/NPC to meet national needs within the overall INEX 4 framework. The outcomes of each national exercise in terms of observations, lessons and issues identified will form the basis of the follow-up INEX 4 International Evaluation Workshop, which is being organised by NEA for late 2011.

1.3 Exercise Scope and Limitations

The INEX 4 exercise series has been designed to be a convenient and efficient means of investigating issues in the intermediate and longer term emergency management of a malicious act involving dispersal of radioactive materials in an urban area. It is comprised of a series of national-level table-top exercises conducted in participating countries. Each country's exercise will involve a practical investigation of the issues in consequence management and the transition to recovery in response to a malicious act leading to radioactive contamination an urban area.

A single common scenario has been developed to allow all participating countries to directly compare their approaches for managing the response to such events. To facilitate overall evaluation and experience exchange, all participating countries have been encouraged to adopt the common objectives and scenario. As a consequence management exercise, the INEX 4 design specifically excludes the early crisis phase, including notification, although issues arising during this phase may need to be addressed. Additionally, while it is acknowledged that there will be an interface in many countries between criminal justice and emergency response elements associated with malicious events, INEX 4 focuses on the later-phase consequence management aspects presented by these scenarios.

The INEX 4 exercise is *neither* a real-time exercise *nor* a free play exercise; it is *neither intended nor designed* to test any international conventions for notification or assistance and should not be used as such. The exercise will not be used to evaluate the performance of any participating country or individual player.

1.4 Expectations on INEX 4 Players

Exercise players include all invited participants from responsible organisations under the national emergency arrangements that are required to respond to the exercise scenario. It is expected that they are officials or other representatives of the principle response organisations within the country, as well as other invited relevant stakeholders. In preparation for the exercise, it is recommended that all exercise players read and be familiar with the contents of this guide, and any other exercise materials provided through the national exercise planning committee.

In order to obtain full benefit from the exercise, all players are expected to be prepared to discuss their allocated roles and responsibilities as defined in their national emergency arrangements. They will be expected to know the response capabilities of the organisation they represent, including relevant resources and linkages to other organisations, be appropriately trained and be familiar with their arrangements for radiological-nuclear emergencies. As an issues-driven exercise, all exercise players should be prepared to discuss issues relevant to their roles and responsibilities in the context of the INEX 4 scenario.

Exercise players are expected to attend any pre-exercise training sessions or briefings, according to availability. During the exercise, players must keep their actions within the defined scope of the exercise. Any additional direction, including details regarding the exercise objectives, scenario and rules will be provided to players as pre-exercise training or as part of the introductory remarks to the exercise.

2 INEX 4 EXERCISE CONCEPT

2.1 INEX 4 Objectives and Topical Areas

The main goals of INEX 4 are to allow participating countries to *i*) test or identify elements for improving their arrangements for consequence management and transition to recovery in response to a malicious event involving dispersion of radioactive materials in an urban area (affecting people, critical infrastructure, environment, economics, etc), and *ii*) exchange experiences with other countries that have conducted an INEX 4 exercise. To meet these goals, the following common **key objectives** have been set:

- Test and investigate the adequacy of national arrangements (including national coordination and communication), and where appropriate international arrangements, for consequence management and the transition to recovery;
- Review and share information on approaches to consequence management and the transition to recovery, in order to identify good practice and to allow review and improvement of national and international arrangements; and
- Identify key areas and approaches to international coordination and communication in order to provide a basis for improvements in international emergency management systems.

It is recognised that the scope of response to an urban-based malicious event may be broad. However, in order to present a manageable exercise from the perspective of planning and conduct, the following specific **topical areas** have been elaborated:

1. Decision-making on protection strategies for consequence management and the transition to recovery, including issues in:
 - optimisation (technical, economic and social factors);
 - implementation and termination of countermeasures ;
 - communication and coordination between countries and international organisations, including:
 - communication arrangements (capability, willingness and practical ability to exchange information);
 - understanding of the emergency situation;
 - recommendations for protective actions;
 - communication of recommendations for protective actions;
2. Public health, including issues in information and communication;
3. Monitoring and assessment, including capability assessment;
4. Safety and security of populations and infrastructure, including
 - population control (police command and control);
 - population management;
5. Planning for recovery, including:
 - clean-up and waste management;
 - stakeholder involvement.

These 5 topics, which will be evaluated from both a national and international perspective, form the basis of the exercise focus areas and post-exercise evaluation questionnaire.

2.1 INEX 4 Exercise Scenario

To meet the identified exercise goals and objectives, INEX 4 has been developed around a single generic scenario based on a contamination footprint arising from a malicious event involving a radiological dispersion device in an urban area. The basic design characteristics for the scenario include:

- A single radiological dispersion device (RDD) as the initiating event;
- A clearly defined contamination footprint with early phase countermeasures that have been taken. Fixed elements include: source term; size of footprint (within a generic cityscape); early actions taken; and a series of driving inputs and questions;
- It is assumed that aspects dealing with security and forensics have been completed, and are therefore not explicitly addressed in the common framework².

The start of exercise play within the INEX 4 framework occurs at a time clearly identified as being after the crisis/early phase has ended. All events prior to the exercise start, including any actions implemented or terminated, will be part of the exercise scenario. It is therefore important for players to accept that the exercise will start at a point after which an emergency response would have already started, and to play the exercise as if they had already been involved in, or knowledgeable of, the early phase response. While issues related to the initial crisis management will inevitably be discussed during the exercise, crisis phase play is considered out of scope of the exercise. Players should not replay or revisit the initiating scenario.

In planning the exercise, due consideration has been given to the exercise start conditions. In general, the exercise start represents a period of a few days after the initiating event and the start of the response, and specifically, it is assumed that the following conditions apply:

- The national emergency response arrangements are operational and the crisis phase terminated;
- The release of radioactive materials has ceased;
- The deposition of radioactive materials has occurred;
- The contamination of the environment has been roughly characterised;
- Any urgent (life-saving) countermeasures have been implemented and are no longer under consideration;
- All immediate public health issues have been addressed;
- Other countermeasures implemented during early phase may still be in place (such as evacuation, food bans, agricultural countermeasures, etc.);
- Security and forensics aspects have been completed;
- Further countermeasures will be anticipated as part of the INEX 4 exercise play.

Details on the exercise initiating scenario are provided in Annex 1.

² This does not preclude countries, if they so desire, from more closely examining these aspects under their own initiative and in a manner consistent with the framework.

2.2 INEX 4 Exercise Format

To meet the stated objectives in the most efficient manner, INEX 4 has been designed as a moderated issues-driven table-top exercise in which the Players from the various relevant organisations and other invited stakeholders are gathered in a common location, arranged, for example, by organisation or response function. An Exercise Moderator will provide the overall control to the exercise and facilitate the discussions based on the scenario evolutions and exercise injects. The moderated discussion format will allow participants to investigate in-depth their arrangements for dealing with the exercise scenario as it develops over time, without the resource constraints associated with a realistic and protracted decision-making timeline. As an “issues-driven” exercise, the emphasis of exercise play is on discussion, problem solving and issue identification rather than rapid decision-making. Players will be challenged to discuss and review their plans for consequence management and the transition to recovery in response to the scenario and topic areas.

The exercise will begin with a narrative description of a scenario from the Exercise Moderator. Players will receive narrative and technical information about the event, the response actions that have taken place as part of the scenario and the priorities established at the end of the crisis phase. As the exercise progresses, the Moderator will provide Players with updated information (such as narrative descriptions, situation reports, maps, etc) related to the evolution of the emergency situation and associated issues and questions corresponding to each topic area. This material will facilitate detailed discussion on response arrangements and identify good practices or gaps to be addressed in post-exercise follow-up.

Players will be expected to discuss their arrangements or possible approaches to manage the evolving situation. Discussions will typically focus on:

- response roles and actions;
- procedures, interfaces and communications amongst organisations (national and international);
- consideration of appropriate actions to address the technical and social problems presented (human health, critical infrastructure, environment, economics, etc);
- identification of local, national and international issues that arise, including decisions and actions with international implications;
- termination of countermeasures;
- issues relevant to long-term recovery;
- potential improvements; and
- other topics within the exercise scope.

In responding to the scenario, the exercise Players may assume the use of equipment and resources compatible with the arrangements that exist in their country, including bi- and multi-lateral agreements. Outcomes and issues brought forward are recorded by Evaluators/Recorders for future action. Exercise outcomes and issues will be recorded for further analyses and for inclusion in the INEX 4 Exercise Evaluation Questionnaire. Individual performance will not be assessed.

At the exercise conclusion, the Moderator will indicate the termination of exercise play to all Participants and outline the next steps with respect to the exercise outcomes and evaluation. This will normally include an immediate post-exercise debriefing between Evaluators/Recorders and the Players to record any additional information and general impressions, and a final wrap-up.

2.3 Exercise Duration

The duration of the individual INEX 4 exercises may differ between participating countries, depending on considerations and/or objectives specific to each participating country. It is suggested that

most will probably span 1-2 working days. The duration of the specific national exercise will be communicated to players by the National Planning Committee.

2.4 Exercise Artificiality and Simulation

By definition, an exercise is a simulation of a postulated event. In the case of INEX 4, Players will be briefed by the Moderators to expect and be prepared to accept some exercise artificialities, such as data, information or limitations on play that are introduced to help ensure that Players are not unduly hindered in their play by the absence of a person, organisation or information that they would ordinarily expect to be available.

Given the artificiality that is introduced by starting an exercise part way through the “response”, the Moderator will provide an appropriate briefing at the beginning of the exercise on the early phase and the key issues addressed in the scenario. This will help to frame the subsequent exercise play, and allow players to familiarise themselves with the other players and organisations that would have already come together during the crisis phase. Another instance of artificiality is possible simulation of any non-participating organisations. In order to accomplish the exercise objectives in the time and space available and with limited participation, Moderators may be required to simulate input from non-participating organisation, as appropriate to the exercise format and the issues being addressed.

For INEX 4, any required external communications will be defined by national objectives. Unless specifically included in the exercise design, Exercise Players may assume that external national and international communications will be simulated.

3 EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

3.1 Roles and Responsibilities

The NEO/NPC has identified the organisations, agencies and stakeholders in their country that should play in the national INEX 4 tabletop exercise. The roles and responsibilities of these are elaborated below:

Exercise Players include all invited participants from responsible organisations under the national emergency arrangements that are required to respond to the exercise scenario, as well as other invited relevant stakeholders. All Players will be expected to follow their established procedures or be prepared to discuss their reactions to exercise events as they develop or are presented. These actions should be consistent with what they would be expected to do under normal routine or emergency responsibilities.

Exercise Moderators are designated individual(s) within the exercise venue with the responsibility for ensuring that the exercise play and discussions progress smoothly according to the exercise framework, and that Exercise Players are provided with all necessary technical materials and driving inputs according to the exercise timeline. Moderators have an essential role in ensuring the exercise remains focussed, that issues are brought forth, discussed, and recorded, and that all opportunities are taken to achieve the exercise objectives within the exercise duration.

Exercise Evaluators/Recorders are the designated individual(s) within the exercise venue with the responsibility for ensuring that exercise outcomes in relation to exercise objectives and topics are

effectively recorded to support the completion of the INEX 4 Exercise Evaluation Questionnaire and any other national exercise reporting. The Evaluators/Recorders may need to question Players about particular aspects of the exercise play and discussion, to ensure accurate recording of the results and any issues raised during the exercise. Evaluators/Recorders will *not* evaluate the performance of individual Players.

3.2 Player Orientation, Training and Supporting Documents

In addition to this document, NEO/NPCs may make other pre-exercise documentation available as part of the Player Orientation and Training. Countries participating in INEX 4 are responsible for training their own Players, Moderators, and Evaluators/Recorders. Exercise Players will be notified of any training or information sessions through their NEO/NPC.

4 BASIC EXERCISE RULES

The NEO/NPC will prepare and distribute all Exercise Rules to all Players, Moderators, Evaluators and Recorders. The following basic exercise rules are provided for illustrative purposes:

- Exercise Players must use the relevant emergency response procedures in support of their national arrangements in order to deal with issues that arise during the exercise. If a required procedure does not exist, or “ad-hoc” procedures are proposed, this will be documented by the Evaluators/Recorders;
- Players should use the technical data and information provided by Moderator as well as actual organisational data and information. If a Player makes any assumptions or estimates as part of the play, the Evaluators/Recorders should be made aware and record the details;
- To ensure that communications cannot be misinterpreted, any written communications used in the exercise must be prefaced with "EXERCISE INEX 4 EXERCISE" and concluded with "EXERCISE-EXERCISE". This also applies to any external communications during the exercise.

The National Planning Committee will ensure that any other locally developed national exercise rules are circulated to Exercise Players in advance of the INEX 4 exercise conduct.

5 EVALUATION AND REPORTING

INEX 4 is a "no fault" exercise. Neither participating countries nor individuals will have their performance assessed.

The fundamental reason for conducting a national INEX 4 exercise is to test or investigate national response arrangements or approaches, identify relevant issues and facilitate improvements nationally and internationally. In order to provide a basis for improvements, it is important that the experience and

outcomes of the national INEX 4 exercises be documented and shared to the extent possible. The INEX 4 evaluation will be based on national outcomes using a common evaluation questionnaire distributed as part of the generic technical materials, and an international evaluation workshop held after exercise completion. The questionnaires and overall evaluation focus on identifying good practices, common issues and areas for further investigation, etc. Following the exercise, the Moderator Team and other relevant personnel will complete the evaluation questionnaire for submission to the NEA, as well as any specific exercise report for internal use within the country. The information recorded by Evaluators/Recorders during the exercise will provide the basis for these reports.

The outcomes of each national exercise in terms of observations, lessons and issues identified in the evaluation questionnaires will form the basis of the follow-up INEX 4 International Evaluation Workshop, which is being organised by NEA for 2011 after completion of all national exercises in participating countries. The objective of the workshop is to allow participants to exchange and analyse experience from the national exercises, identify good practices as well as cross-cutting issues or gaps impacting multiple states, and formulate key needs that would benefit from international co-operation. All countries having conducted an INEX 4 exercise, in addition to other interested countries and international organisations, will be invited to participate in the workshop.

6 REFERENCES

INEX 4: General Information, [NEA/CRPPH/INEX\(2009\)6](#)

INEX 4: Guidance for National Planning Committees, [NEA/CRPPH/INEX\(2009\)7](#)

INEX 4: Guide for Exercise Players, [NEA/CRPPH/INEX\(2009\)8](#)

INEX 4: Exercise Evaluation Questionnaire, [NEA/CRPPH/INEX\(2009\)9](#)

7 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

National Exercise Organiser	The individual or organisation who "owns" the exercise and has overall responsibility for ensuring efficient exercise delivery and that all participating organisations are involved from the beginning of the exercise development process.
National Planning Committee	The collective group of representatives from responsible organisations (see Exercise Planning Representative), chaired by the National Exercise Organiser, with the overall responsibility for delivering the national tabletop or workshop exercise.
Exercise Planning Representative	The individual(s) nominated within each participant organisation with the responsibility for co-ordinating the preparation and delivery of the materials required for the INEX 4 exercise.

Exercise Player	A participant in the exercise that is required to respond to the exercise scenario in accordance with their emergency response arrangements, procedures and training.
Exercise Moderator	The individual or individuals with responsibility for maintaining the efficient conduct of a national INEX 4 exercise. The Exercise Moderator is responsible for ensuring that the exercise play and discussions progress smoothly according to the exercise framework, and that Exercise Players are provided with all necessary technical materials and driving inputs according to the exercise timeline.
Exercise Evaluator/Recorder	The individual(s) with the responsibility for ensuring that exercise activities in support of exercise objectives are effectively recorded to support the completion of the INEX 4 Exercise Evaluation Questionnaire and any other exercise reporting.

ANNEX 1

INEX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO

[Note for National Planning Teams: This generic scenario should be updated to reflect the specific scenario for the national INEX 4 exercise.]

As the start point for the INEX 4 exercises is assumed to be after the early crisis phase response has ended, the exercise scenario is provided to players in advance so that they can familiarise themselves with its details.

Scenario Narrative

Back Story

Note: Discussions about security / law enforcement are NOT part of the common INEX 4 exercise objectives; however, the following back story is presented below in order to provide additional context should a country wish to expand the scope of their play. This information will not be included in the INEX 4 Exercise Evaluation Questionnaire.

Two weeks before the attack, a medical irradiation facility reports a burglary at their facility to the appropriate officials. During non-business hours, an individual or group of individuals broke into the facility and stole three (3) relatively small irradiation sources totalling approximately 3.5 Terabecquerels (TBq). Other, larger irradiation sources were left untouched. There is no physical evidence at the scene that leads to any suspects, however, the nature of the burglary does indicate that the facility was specifically targeted and the thieves knew what they were stealing. Local officials contact the national officials to report the theft of the hazardous material. National officials launch an investigation but are unable to identify any suspects. There is no other intelligence or information that leads officials to believe there is either a radiological threat or an imminent threat of a terrorist attack.

Immediate Response

A large explosion is heard in the downtown area of a city during the morning rush hour. The emergency reporting system is quickly overwhelmed with callers reporting injuries in the area and significant localized damage. First responders (fire, police, and emergency medical services) secure the area and begin to treat the wounded. Initial reports are that a vehicle-borne improved explosive device (VBIED) detonated in the middle of a busy intersection. A number of individuals are injured in the area with many more having left the area. One dead body is found in the remains of the driver's seat of the VBIED. First responder personnel with radiation pagers notice that their pagers are detecting the presence of radiation and request the local Hazardous Materials (HazMat) Team to respond. HazMat personnel respond and identify the isotope as Cesium-137. Based on this information and the scope of the incident, local first responders request assistance from nearby communities and national radiation experts.

Initial Response

Emergency Centres are activated at all levels of government. Responding agencies' Public Affairs representatives form a Joint Public Information Centre (JP IC). The local hospitals in the area receive a large influx of patients who claim to have been in the area when the explosion occurred. Command is established at the scene to include local law enforcement, the local incident management team, national law enforcement and the radiological competent authority.

Command establishes the following initial priorities for the response:


- Safety and welfare of responders and public;
- Validate extent of radiological contamination;
- Crime scene and evidence preservation;
- Restoration of government;
- Restore critical infrastructure;
- Minimise further impact of the environment;
- Minimise economic impact of the region;
- Maintain public confidence;
- Maintain communications with other countries, appropriate international organisations;
- *National Planning Teams may add additional priorities.*

Based on those priorities, the following incident response objectives are developed:

- Continue to provide for the safety and welfare of the responders and public;
- Continue monitoring and sampling activities to valid the extent of contamination and determine appropriate actions;
- Continue to monitor and treat the population for radiological health effects;
- Continue to provide shelter for the evacuated population;
- Continue evidence collection and investigation;
- Maintain a secure perimeter around the crime scene and evacuated area;
- Maintain civil order in and around the affected area;
- Maintain quarantine and embargo of potentially contaminated consumer products and identify criteria for exceptions;
- Evaluate and assess the impact on wildlife and domestic animals and recommend appropriate actions;
- Ensure proper decontamination for the responders and properly dispose of contaminated material;
- Establish and maintain effective traffic control measures around the impact area;
- Evaluate and develop criteria for re-entry to contaminated areas;
- Assess the impact to, and plan to restore, critical infrastructure;
- Assess the impact to, and plan to restore, the local economy;
- Continue an aggressive media and outreach program in coordination with the JPIC;
- Maintain an aggressive outreach to affected entities and stakeholders;
- Communication and coordination with international community;
- *National Planning Teams may add additional objectives.*

To organise the response, the Operations Section Chief creates the following structure (*Note: This is a sample organisation. National Planning Teams may alter this to fit their system*):

Operations Organisation



The Monitoring & Sampling Branch, responsible for identifying the extent of environmental radiological contamination, identifies the following critical infrastructure for priority monitoring:

- Hospitals in and around the evacuated/shelter in place area;
- Fire Department Headquarters;
- Fire Station (Local station);
- Police Department Headquarters;
- Police Station (Local Precinct);
- City Public Works Department;
- Public Health Department;
- Railroad at random locations;
- Nearby Expressway/Highway at random locations;
- Bus Terminal;
- City Offices;
- Social Services Offices;
- *National Planning Teams may add additional locations for priority monitoring.*

Follow-on Response

Days after the detonation, the mandatory evacuation area includes a number of people, businesses and government offices. Shelters have been set up to house evacuees. The main shelter, in the affected city, is at capacity and sheltering a number of people, while another shelter in a neighbouring city is sheltering a smaller number of people and has additional capacity. Each shelter has a Community Reception Centre (CRC), operated by the Ministry of Health, to medically screen potentially injured people.

A large number of people were at work in the downtown area at the time of the detonation. Those people have been evacuated and cannot return to their offices. Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems in these buildings have potentially let in contamination and particulate debris.

The main City Water Pump Station, drawing its water from the river in the contaminated area, shut down within 2 hours of the detonation but the level of contamination is unknown.

A number of hotels in the mandatory evacuation area have been shut down. All of the guests and employees have been relocated to nearby hotels, straining the local hotel availability.

Much of the critical infrastructure in the area is closed pending determination of the level of contamination and evaluation of the impacts to the building facilities.

Ground Truth Information

a) WEATHER

Weather information at the time of the detonation	
Description	Amount
Wind Speed	10 km/h
Temperature	24 C
Visibility	Partly cloudy; no precipitation

b) RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE INFORMATION

The RDD is constructed in a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The adversary used a common sport utility vehicle (SUV). The radioactive source contained 3.7 TBq of Cs-137.

Local Information

Description	Chosen Value
Location of the detonation	<i>To be defined by the National Planning Team</i>
Season and general weather conditions for the follow-on response and transition to recovery	
Number of individuals injured in the initial explosion	
Number of individuals in the downtown area at the time of the explosion	
Number of hospitals in the area	
Number of individuals reporting to each hospital in the area	
Number of people in the evacuation zone at the beginning of the "follow-on response"	
Number of businesses in the evacuation zone at the beginning of the "follow-on response"	
Number and location of shelters set up at the beginning of the "follow-on response"	
Number of people each shelter is housing	
Number of hotels closed	
Number of guests relocated	