This paper analyses the main issues and key recommendations emerging from the informal consultation process on the 1997 DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. Issues and recommendations raised by partners reinforce, elaborate on, and suggest new areas for action by donors and other actors in the field of development co-operation. These have been taken into account in the preliminary draft of the policy note [DCD(2000)15]. This paper, written by Mr. Robert Walker, is submitted to the Task Force for CONSIDERATION at its Meeting on 14-15 December 2000.

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REPORT ON THE INFORMAL REGIONAL CONSULTATION PROCESS ON THE DAC GUIDELINES ON CONFLICT, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper analyses the main issues and key recommendations emerging from the informal consultation process promoted by the Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) to review and update the 1997 DAC Guidelines on CPDC.

The consultation process was based on three informal regional meetings organised in Africa (Addis Ababa, November 1999), Latin America (Cartagena, July 2000) and Asia-Pacific (Bangkok, October 2000). Over 120 participants from 43 partner countries, as well as representatives of donor countries, international organisations and development banks, attended the meetings. Specific reports were produced for each consultation, providing views on the main issues addressed by the Guidelines and other evolving work on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development co-operation carried out within the DAC or other international fora.

The three consultations confirmed the relevance of the DAC Guidelines as a useful roadmap for policy-makers on the role and potential of aid in situations of violent conflict and in conflict-prone countries. The consultations stressed also some regional issues and problems related to the different local contexts within the various regions, thus highlighting specific elements for the DAC review and update of the Guidelines. The report provides also some boxes on regional or country-specific experiences summarising relevant lessons discussed in the consultations.

Key messages from the consultations focused on (i) principles and approaches; (ii) partnerships and actors; and (iii) major themes for reflection and action. Issues and recommendations raised during the consultation process re-enforce, elaborate on and suggest new areas for action by donors and other actors in the field of development co-operation. These have been taken into account in the preliminary draft of the policy note *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* [DCD(2000)15].
I. Introduction

1. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation were adopted in May 1997. The Guidelines deal with issues of concern to donor and partner countries when considering the use of official development assistance in countries involved in, or prone to, violent conflict. Since 1997, the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation has become engaged in further areas of work which were not covered in the Guidelines. These include impact of aid as an incentive/disincentive for peace in conflict situations; aid and security issues, and conflict prevention and development co-operation.

2. The DAC agreed to update the Guidelines by December 2000 to reflect new experience and circumstances. It was recognised that this process must involve review and dialogue with partner country representatives from government and civil society. The Task Force therefore decided to hold three regional consultations in Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific to enable partner countries to share their experience on the relevance and validity of the Guidelines and other work of the Task Force. The Consultation process was also seen as an important opportunity to disseminate the Guidelines to partner country governments and civil society and to facilitate dialogue between DAC Members and partner countries on these issues and in relation to specific conflict situations.

3. In organising the consultations, participants were sought who were broadly representative of the countries in the region and their political, institutional, cultural and gender diversity. Representatives were invited from governments, civil society organisations, academia, expert groups, and aid recipient groups. Participants were also sought from Task Force Members to ensure in-depth dialogue between donor and partner country representatives. For each Consultation, a core group of Members and the DAC secretariat was responsible for organisation. This group identified key issues, based on regional specificities, from the Guidelines and the ongoing work of the Task Force, to be addressed in the Consultation. Members also gathered information on relevant organisations and actors in order to generate a diverse group of participants.

4. The Regional Consultation for Africa\(^1\) took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15-17 November 1999 and was co-hosted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organisation of African Unity (OUA). Fifty participants from over 20 countries attended, representing governments, independent national bodies, civil society organisations, regional organisations and academics. Participants from donor countries, UN agencies, the African Development Bank and the World Bank also attended. Keynote addresses were made by: H.E. Dr. Leonardo Simao, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, and Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Executive Secretary of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA). Working groups and plenary sessions addressed issues under the following themes:

- Foundations for Peacebuilding: Good Governance and Civil Society.
- Conflict Prevention and Mitigation: Development during Conflict.
- Challenges in Bridging Humanitarian Relief and Development.
- The Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations.

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• Regional and Sub-Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.
• Supporting Post-Conflict Recovery: Operational Priorities.
• Women, Children and Youth.

5. **The Regional Consultation for Latin America**\(^2\) took place in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, from 12-14 July 2000, in collaboration with the Spanish Centro Iberoamericano de Formación. Over 20 participants from 11 countries in the region attended. Participants represented governments, civil society organisations, regional organisations, academics and the business community along with representatives of donor countries, UN agencies and the World Bank. Keynote presentations were made by Mr Ruben I. Zamora, President, Instituto para la Democracia (ISAPDE), El Salvador, and Ms. Raquel Zelaya Rosales, Executive Secretary, Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), Guatemala. Working groups and plenary sessions covered the following themes:

- Structural Stability.
- Aid Incentives and Constructive Engagement in Conflict Situations.
- The Role of Development Co-operation in Conflict Prevention.
- Social Participation in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.
- The Role of International Development Co-operation in Peace Processes.
- Demobilisation, Reintegration and the Role of Aid.
- Promoting Justice and Reconciliation through Development Co-operation.
- Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.

6. **The Regional Consultation for the Asia-Pacific**\(^3\) region was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 25-27 October 2000, in co-operation with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). Over 50 participants attended including representatives from civil society from 12 countries in the region, along with representatives from OECD countries, UN agencies, the Asian Development Bank and regional organisations. A keynote address was made by Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka. Working sessions and plenary sessions discussed issues under the following themes:

- Conflict Prevention through Development Assistance: Addressing the Social and Political Dynamics.
- Building Capacity for Donors and Partners to Address Conflict-Related Issues.
- Donor Roles in Regional Co-operation for Management of Refugees and Internally Displaced People.
- Encouraging Justice, Reconciliation and Peace through Development Assistance.

II. **Key Issues and Recommendations from the Consultation Process**

A. **Principles and Approaches**

7. The Consultations reinforced the case for development co-operation actors to play a fuller role in supporting efforts to prevent, resolve and recover from conflicts. A strong theme in each of the consultations was the need for such work to be based on a set of clear principles and to follow emerging

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good practice. In particular, participants stressed the need for donors to better understand and analyse conflict situations and uphold a certain number of basic principles: accountability, transparency and coordination of donor agencies engaged in conflict prevention, good governance and peacebuilding. Donor approaches also need to be based on participatory, long-term and locally owned processes. Although these were not presented as new issues, a number of participants felt that rhetoric had not yet matched reality in ongoing conflict situations.

8. **Understanding and analysing conflict:** Participants underscored the need for donors to better understand conflicts affecting states in the three regions. This requires recognition that conflict is not a uniform concept. Donors need to understand the different types and nature of conflict. Participants, in Latin America in particular, noted that the concern should not be conflict per se in dynamic societies but the tendency towards increased violence mainly directed at civilian populations. Increased efforts are needed to recognise and support local efforts to address social conflicts before they are transformed into violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: Early warning and risk indicators in Latin America</th>
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<tr>
<td>In the Latin America Consultation, the importance of identifying risk factors to help anticipate the occurrence of violent conflict was stressed. Such risk factors include:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The loss of political space for opposition, civil society and media to engage in public discourse.</td>
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<td>• Social, economic and political exclusion from mainstream development.</td>
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<td>• Impoverishment and rapid decline of livelihood opportunities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Insecurity and increase in perceived threats.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Distorted distributional effects of development, and rising inequalities that exclude entire groups from enjoying civil rights and basic services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Violation of human rights, increasing impunity and weakening of the rule of law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Migratory flows, both internal and external, for economic and political reasons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Donors should, therefore, continue efforts to integrate a conflict prevention lens into all humanitarian and development work in conflict prone countries, and aim to minimise negative impacts of external assistance and maximise positive peacebuilding impacts. Donors need to share such best practices and tools with each other and local partners.

10. **Accountability:** Donors should be accountable to beneficiaries in conflict affected situations in relation to the outcomes of the programmes they support. They should be accountable for the degree of benefits to intended beneficiaries and for any negative impacts on stability, such as failures induced by reforms they have encouraged. Provision of external assistance should be within the timeframe initially indicated to avoid negative consequences and avoid suspicions being directed at partner country governments and officials.

11. **Transparency:** Participants noted that donors need to be more transparent about their work in conflict situations but recognised dilemmas in this respect. In some conflicts, public transparency on approaches to peacebuilding involves risks for both donors and partners. However, this does not preclude donor responsibility to be transparent with their partners. Approaches will need to be tailored to particular conflicts. Joint donor, state and civil society monitoring and evaluation teams were suggested as one potential means of enhancing transparency and accountability.
12. **Local ownership:** Donor support to peacebuilding initiatives should be based on dialogue with a broad range of local state and civil society actors. The emphasis must be on funding local initiatives rooted in relevant social and cultural contexts. Sometimes there is a danger that external support can undermine or transform such initiatives. For example, concern was raised over the fact that significant international presence in peace processes leads to a drain of competent staff from civil society institutions to better paid positions in international organisations.

> “Aid can nurture political peace commitments, but not replace them.”
> (Latin America Consultation)

13. **Co-ordination and coherence:** Coherence, co-ordination and consistency of approaches were stressed as key issues which participants from the three regions wished to see better reflected in external support. Improved, shared analysis of conflict situations is needed among donors as a precursor to developing better co-ordinated and joint approaches to conflict situations. However, the problem was perceived as more fundamental than simply lack of co-ordination mechanisms. Competing donor influences, which themselves can be a source of political instability and unrest, are common in conflict situations. Donors are perceived to apply inconsistent or ‘double’ standards to similar situations of conflict in different countries. For example, a strong donor focus on human rights abuses may be applied in one state and not in another. It was noted that this inconsistency undermines the credibility of development co-operation objectives in relation to peacebuilding. In addition, in relation to individual conflict situations, donor countries’ approaches through development co-operation often lack coherence with their diplomatic of military approaches. It was noted that while development co-operation can support peacebuilding, in most situations it cannot on its own have an impact on the root causes of conflict. It is therefore essential to improve coherence between development and the different foreign policy instruments that directly or indirectly influence the propensity for conflict. Real political commitment is needed if donors are to support peacebuilding. Effectiveness of development assistance provided will largely depend on this.

> "Social cohesion is the degree to which horizontal, cross-cutting ties that bond different groups intersect with vertical ties that link civil society and the government. Social cohesion is important because it helps to decrease hostilities and violence within communities while improving understanding and mutual assistance for vulnerable groups." (Latin America Consultation)

14. It was noted that good governance interventions have often focussed mainly on capacity building, training and skills transfer. But the prevention of conflict in divided societies involves keeping cross sections of communities engaged in dialogue. Participants suggested the donor community less easily understands the process side of the equation.

15. **Good governance:** Participants noted that peaceful and stable societies are more likely where accountable state institutions are in place which allow participation of all sections of the population. Development co-operation should support development of governance systems which reduce risks of conflict. Donor approaches to governance need to be better informed by understanding of what governance frameworks are likely to reduce or exacerbate conflict in particular societies. This requires engagement with a range of actors beyond the state. Donors should support development of state policies of social inclusion which are based on principles of equality and non-discrimination (specifically addressing gender-based discrimination). They should also support the building of links between state and civil society based on the concept of a social contract between state and society.
16. **Longer term approaches**: It was also noted that effective engagement on conflict issues requires a longer term commitment from donors to partner countries. Donors need to intervene at both micro and macro levels over the long term, and co-ordinate intervention at both levels. This should include entering into longer term co-operation agreements. Provision should be made for sustaining programme support through times of political change in donor countries to ensure stability and predictability in implementation. Such support to conflict affected countries should be linked to, and depend on, sustained progress towards political and social objectives. More unearmarked and flexible funding should be provided to support efforts of government departments and organisations with proven responsibility and effectiveness.

> **“Mending war torn societies takes time, and donors should have a more realistic time perspective.” (Latin America Consultation)**

17. **Neutrality and impartiality**: The degree of adherence to principles of neutrality and impartiality by development co-operation actors in conflict situations needs to be clarified. It was noted that the approach of government donor organisations is, in practice, frequently informed by political concerns. However, humanitarian assistance should be impartial in seeking to assist those with genuine needs. In situations of internal oppression and conflict, it is less a question of whether humanitarian assistance should be provided but how best it can be provided, in a way which minimises potential negative effects. It is important to ensure that humanitarian assistance is not driven by partisan or narrowly defined political concerns. Therefore, assistance to states in conflict needs to be based on careful analysis to clarify the consequences and impact of aid and ensure that civilians are not ‘punished’ for the circumstances of conflict over which they have no control. Sanctions, and other similar means, as an instrument to influence the course or prevention of conflict, should be clearly targeted against those responsible (for example, at individual bank accounts and visas).

> **“Withholding aid until there is total peace is not a working strategy for peace.” (Africa Consultation)**

18. **Common principles for engagement to states in crisis**: It was suggested that donors engaging in ‘failed’ states or states in crisis need to co-ordinate closely and ensure their approaches are based on a common set of principles. This can include developing a ‘strategic framework’ approach – as developed for example in Afghanistan. In particular, donors should:

- Link humanitarian and development strategies with diplomatic initiatives.
- Strive for a spectrum of engagement and of responses that emphasise the inter-dependence of state and civil society.
• Respect the need for flexibility in aid responses as a consequence of the dynamic and changing nature of conflict.
• Be aware of the limitations of donor responses and of the risk factors involved in providing assistance to communities in conflict, both for the provider and for the recipients.
• Be aware that the primary criteria for determining activities and programmes for assistance in conflict situations should be benefits to the civilian population and ensure consideration of their views and opinions in this respect.
• Ensure approaches are gender-sensitive and are based on the principle of equality between men and women.

"We should not ignore that between prevention and rehabilitation there is the plight of countries in a situation of "neither total peace nor total war". Hence a large space is left unaddressed - that of countries struggling not to fall back into war and which have not yet crossed the bridge towards rehabilitation. In these countries, development assistance could make a significant difference." (Africa Consultation)

B. Partnerships and Actors

19. The Consultations highlighted the need for donors to establish and invest in effective partnerships with both states and civil society organisations for conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well as other actors such as regional and sub-regional organisations and business. There was discussion of the considerations that should shape these relations and the dilemmas involved for donors in developing them. Participants also pointed out areas for donor capacity building for better understanding and analysis of conflict situations.

a) Partnership with states and capacity building

20. Effective efforts to prevent or resolve conflict must involve governments of the states affected. Where appropriate, donors should support and work with government to build the capacity of state institutions to respond appropriately to conflict. Participants noted however that this interaction between donor and state is more problematic where the state is corrupt or oppressive, or in ‘failed’ states. Donors face a dilemma between engaging with, and potentially de facto supporting, such a regime or disengaging and potentially losing opportunities for positive influence. Participants noted that provision of humanitarian or development assistance can de facto support or legitimate a regime through:

• Diversion of aid resources away from intended beneficiaries.
• Fungibility of assistance provided.
• Provision of a ‘moral’ legitimacy by being seen to support the regime.

21. However, complete withdrawal of donor assistance and disengagement may have negative impacts. It could:

• Further encourage state actions contravening human rights standards.
• Send wrong signals of external indifference.
• Lead to state collapse.
• Deny humanitarian assistance to affected populations.
Box 2: Conflict and the ‘crisis of the state’ in Asia

The Asia-Pacific Consultation discussed in detail the nature of the relation between state and society in states affected by conflict in Asia. A ‘crisis of legitimacy’ among a number of states in the region was referred to – characterized by an oppressive and predatory role of the state in relation to society, state inability to fulfil its core functions, and state involvement in internal conflict. It was suggested that donor attempts to address conflict in the region must address head on the issue of state role in relation to conflict. New means of engaging are required by donors.

22. There was a predominant view from the three consultations that attempts at constructive engagement should be pursued by donors over disengagement or negative conditionality. Negative conditionality is often limited in its success in influencing warring parties. Where conditionality is applied, donors should be transparent on the criteria being used. Where aid is suspended or withdrawn, detrimental consequences to civilian populations should be analysed and minimised. In particular, it is important to continue efforts to ensure compliance with humanitarian principles, including access to those in humanitarian need and preserving the civilian nature of refugee and internally displaced people (IDP) camps. In addition, the relationship between poverty – especially poverty of women – and recruitment of children by armed groups should be factored into decisions on suspension of assistance.

Supporting state capacity

23. Each Consultation highlighted the importance of legitimate and accountable state institutions for reducing risks of conflict, resolving conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. Donors have a key role to play in supporting development of appropriate governance structures. There is also a need for targeted support to enhance capacity of state institutions to manage conflict peacefully.

“The In Africa, political, economic and social reforms are taking place in a short period of time, producing significant numbers who feel they have been detrimentally affected. These rapid reforms are not allowing institutions and societies to adjust in a gradual way, thus contributing to instability and insecurity. The donor community needs to strengthen the credibility and transparency of its support to the process of political reforms.” (Africa Consultation)

24. **Building state capacity to manage conflict:** Donors should also support targeted initiatives to build state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict. This can include support to a range of state functions and activities:

- Training of government staff on peacebuilding approaches (including increased exposure to peace processes in other countries).
- Strengthening state capacity to implement joint conflict management initiatives with civil society and customary organisations.
- Strengthening justice systems.
- Improving capacity to analyse and respond to local level conflicts.
- Strengthening human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms.
25. Participants noted that engaging with states in these areas is a sensitive and complex task. Supporting capacity building for governments which lack legitimacy and which are not accountable is beset with potential pitfalls. There is a need to avoid consolidating an autocratic form of government which may increase risks of instability. Below are some key orientations for donors engaging in such state capacity building approaches.

- State institutions and regimes are not monolithic. Opportunities should be sorted to identify and influence potential change agents and structures.
- Development co-operation should be aimed at supporting effective functioning, viability and legitimacy of state institutions rather than specific governments in power.
- Local governments in the region often interpret national policies on peace in a particular way. There may be more opportunities for working with and supporting peacebuilding capacity of local level state authorities. However, this requires analysis and co-ordination among donors about who works where.
- A long-term view of engagement is needed based on a careful analysis of conflict and state role/interests in relation to it. Donor support should be provided in phases with close and continued monitoring. Support also needs to be linked to more consistent lobbying work by donor countries.
- Views of local society should be included in such an approach. Where possible state capacity building should be combined with support to capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs) to monitor the state’s role and hold it accountable. Enhancing participation in political discourse of marginalised ethnic, regional or political groups is key. State functions can also become more responsive to civil society by strengthening and improving access to an Ombudsman system.
- Donors must recognise that these approaches will involve genuine dilemmas and issues should be addressed on a case by case basis.

"Donors tend to focus on the economic dimensions of structural stability without proper reference to its social and governance elements. In this regard, economic policy, particularly as implemented by the International Financial Institutions (IFI) with donor compliance, often works at cross-purposes with the actions to meet the social obligations found in peace accords. Concrete examples are programmes to improve education and basic social services that are often cut by IFI programmes." (Latin America Consultation)

b) Partnership with civil society and supporting local capacities

26. Donors need to develop partnerships with civil society organisations (CSOs) if they are to effectively engage in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Participants suggested key principles which should guide donor partnerships with CSOs.

27. Before intervening, donors need to make a careful assessment, in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, of the wider context of conflict and the role of civil society actors in relation to it. In some cases, donors have failed to be properly informed of ongoing initiatives before starting conflict related programmes. Donors need to look beyond civil society actors ‘approved’ by the state to those who represent ‘voiceless’ sectors.

28. Donors providing support to CSOs must also exercise care to avoid the appearance of control by external powers, which would reduce credibility of CSOs in national dialogues, and possibly increase political instability rather than encourage democratisation. Related to this, a reliance on local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acting only as ‘sub-contractors’ of external donors should be avoided in favour of support to bodies which genuinely represent specific sectors of society. Such organisations should be supported to develop their capacity. In addition, donor relations with civil society should go beyond funding only NGOs to include interaction with genuine community level activities and ‘citizen
peacemakers’. However, donors need to keep in perspective what civil society organisations can and cannot do. Donor support to civil society has to be placed in a broader context and strategy of co-ordinated attempts to address the conflict, for example, also using diplomatic instruments more effectively to influence the political will of states in conflict.

**Supporting local capacities**

29. In all three Consultations, participants discussed the need to support local capacities and initiatives for peacebuilding and seek the most effective means for support. It was noted that donors should broaden their support to include diverse groups and interests such as religious bodies, professional associations, women’s groups, and academia.

30. **Sharing local experiences and best practice:** As a part of conflict analysis, donors should support experience sharing and lesson learning between local practitioners both within and between regions. For example, participants from Burma/Myanmar noted that they could benefit from interaction with practitioners from East Timor. Participants in the Africa consultation noted that they would value more exposure to peacebuilding approaches in the Balkans and in Central America.

31. **Regional and sub-regional civil society networks:** Donors should support formation of regional and sub-regional networks of civil society institutions engaged in peacebuilding and support activities that stimulate mutual learning in transforming conflicts.

32. **Supporting involvement of marginalised and indigenous groups:** Further efforts are required to engage the marginalised and weakest segments of society in peacebuilding. These groups should have broader access to independent information and better opportunities to voice their concerns and interests. Donors should support civil society organisations representing such communities. This should be accompanied by training, for example on negotiating skills, to enable active participation in peace processes and monitoring. In Latin America, the issue of indigenous people was highlighted. In some countries these groups constitute a majority of the population, and they have elaborated their own specific forms of cultural and social reaction to violent conflict, affirming strategies of ‘active neutrality’ in some areas that are grounded in local traditions. The potential role of diaspora communities in mitigating conflict – and in certain circumstances exacerbating it – was also recognised along with the need to consider their contribution to supporting peace initiatives.

33. **Customary peacebuilding institutions:** Participants noted that donors should give particular consideration to understanding, and if appropriate, supporting indigenous and customary peacebuilding institutions. Opportunities should also be sought to identify potential ‘connectors’; i.e. issues that are critical to society and which provide a focus to promote the building of linkages among different groups.

34. **Media initiatives:** Another key area for donor civil society support is strengthening capacity of affected populations to access media which provides objective and reliable information. This should include support for media – especially radio – that operates in local languages, especially during peace processes. It is imperative that donor support builds on rather than replaces existing media. Such support can include funding for making videos and buying air time; developing capacities to use alternative media, especially internet; monitoring media’s complicity in polarising communities and spreading hatred; and sensitising media practitioners to covering conflicts.

“The emphasis on efficiency of aid must not undermine the need to support locally initiated, often fragile processes of peace and reconciliation.” (Latin America Consultation)
35. **Women’s organisations:** The capacity of women to transcend narrow political initiatives was noted as a characteristic that should be developed and encouraged by the donor community [refer to section d].

c) **Building donor capacity**

36. Donor capacity to analyse conflict dynamics and causes needs to be improved in order to design programmes better targeted at conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Donors need to engage with a wide spread of local actors and conflict stakeholders in conducting such analyses and in programme appraisal and design. Attempts to discuss and diagnose causes of conflict can themselves, in certain circumstances, contribute towards a basis for dialogue.

37. Development programmes themselves can sometimes unintentionally exacerbate conflict dynamics. Participants agreed that there is a need to better understand and foresee conflict impacts of development programmes in divided societies. Approaches can include:

- Profiling the socio-economic realities of ethnic and especially minority communities to inform poverty reduction programmes.
- Ensuring that developmental programmes assess differential impacts on ethnic and minority groups.
- Promoting multiculturalism and pluralism by rewarding projects and partners that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement.

38. This should include conflict awareness training for staff of donor agencies and development of models, tools, and best practices including Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). However, it should be recognised that:

- Such tools do not represent a ‘magic bullet’, as reaching definitive agreed analyses of root causes is difficult, and attempts to search for a single objective truth on which to base peacebuilding programmes are unlikely to be fruitful.
- Original causes and grievances do not necessarily remain the ‘root causes’: they are replaced or transformed as conflict evolves. For example, ‘victims’ may themselves become perpetrators of abuses over the course of a conflict resulting in new long lasting grievances among other sections of the population.
- PCIA and similar frameworks need to consider the social and political dynamics of conflict and include a focus on the specific impact of conflict on women.
- A tension exists between the need for donors ‘to study more yet act faster’ in response to conflict situations.

**Box 3: Donor capacity to understand and respond to conflict in the Pacific**

In the Asia-Pacific Consultation, it was noted that recent waves of violence in the South Pacific, rather than one-off aberrations to democratic processes, reflect embedded and deep-seated conflicts in societies. These developments in the region have exposed a lack of institutional capacity and instruments available to donor governments for the understanding, management and settlement of such deep-rooted conflicts. It was suggested that while donor countries have developed economic and diplomatic links across this region, they have been unable to respond to serious political and social conflict and effectively engage in peace-building efforts.
d) Supporting the role of women in peacebuilding

39. Participants noted that gender aspects of peacebuilding were not covered in detail in the Guidelines. Donors should consider carefully the role that women play in building peace between and within communities that are involved in conflict. Donor policies and programmes on conflict should be sensitive to the needs of women in two ways. Firstly, they should extend support to women’s organisations, especially those with a focus on the situation of women in conflict situations, and encourage the formation of women’s coalitions and alliances for peacebuilding across regions and sub-regions. Secondly, they should support initiatives to strengthen the position of women within mixed and mainstream organisations working, for example, on human rights, relief and rehabilitation and peacebuilding. All processes of peacebuilding and peacemaking should incorporate women as decision-makers at every level, as well as consider women’s concerns at every stage of the process.

40. It was observed that donor focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding should be based on the understanding that women’s initiatives for peace and conflict resolution are often collective and collaborative in nature. They are also often more focused on the principle of community action, across ethnic, linguistic, religious and other divides since their principal objectives are meeting the practical needs of the household and community and maintaining security and livelihoods. At the same time, women’s experiences of building co-existence within and among communities during conflict should provide a resource base for the post-conflict phase and reconciliation.

41. Participants noted that ways in which patriarchal systems can use coercion to engineer consent in society need to be questioned and understood if there is a commitment to creating more participatory frameworks of governance. In the same way, issues of sovereignty and security need to be addressed from the perspective of frameworks that guarantee the dignity of every person in a society. Donors should be aware of the need for alternative models of conflict resolution and alternative discourses on issues of justice and reconciliation. In such alternative models and conceptions, women’s actions and practices have much to offer as models of peace and security at all levels, including the household.

e) Partnership shifts in a war economy: business and peacebuilding

42. The Asia-Pacific Consultation considered in detail the role of business in conflict affected countries, and the issue emerged during the other Consultations. It was noted that businesses can play a role both in exacerbating conflict and in contributing to building conditions for peace. Conflict implies costs for businesses and it is therefore in the interest of most businesses to avoid actions which may exacerbate it and rather to support efforts which prevent or resolve it. However, companies can sometimes benefit from conflict and the weakened institutional context in which it takes place, for example, greater profits can derive from ineffective taxation systems, lack of competition, use of bribes etc.

“Working with women’s organisations in conflict situations and inserting gender-sensitivity into mainstream organisations should be seen as critical areas for donor activity.” (Asia-Pacific Consultation)
Box 4: War economies in Latin America

In the Latin America consultation, it was noted that the control over territory for cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs was particularly problematic in the region. Conflicts are transformed and sustained by such illegal economic activities. In Colombia, for example, a system of organised crime, with global reach, based on drug production and trafficking was recognised as a complicating factor in negotiating political peace.

43. Building business-donor partnerships is a new and challenging area for development co-operation. Expanding work on promoting corporate social responsibility should include addressing conflict issues. A number of key areas for donor involvement were highlighted.

44. **Awareness raising:** Further work is needed to raise awareness and stimulate debate of conflict prevention issues among the business community. This can include developing norms, elements of which may exist in current codes of conduct. In particular, focus is needed on reinforcing international norms to strengthen accountability in privatisation of security. There is also a need to consider the potential of consulting with companies in analysing conflict and social impact. Better understanding is needed of the war economies which sustain conflicts.

45. **Creation of spaces for dialogue:** Creation of spaces for dialogue should be supported by donors, for example fora for industry, government, NGOs and other actors to agree on common principles of engagement in conflict environments and means of involving the private sector in peacebuilding processes.

46. **Capacity building:** Government capacities to define or enforce national legal frameworks should be supported, in line with international laws/norms, in order to ensure accountability of large corporations, in particular in the extractive industries. Donors should consider special claims of indigenous peoples relating to ancestral land rights and control over investment projects in their areas. Donors should also explore scope for support to partnership programmes of government, NGOs and business that reduce risks of conflict, for example through development of clear laws and local regulations, community grant making initiatives, and creation of local employment.

47. **Creation of an enabling environment:** Opportunities for development co-operation to foster and promote private sector development in post-conflict situations should be explored. For example, supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises in the informal sector in order to create more opportunities for employment and other local spin-offs, which would reduce risks of disaffected groups, such ex-combatants, engaging in violence. Donors should investigate opportunities to support local co-operation and bridge building, for example through agricultural co-operatives and small entrepreneurial activities.

f) **Regional linkages and approaches**

48. Regional approaches to conflict were discussed in all three Consultations and are covered here as part of many of the issues addressed. The potential for making these more effective, including through donor support, was highlighted.

49. **Response of sub-regional bodies to conflict:** The role of sub-regional bodies in resolving and preventing conflicts should be promoted and supported. This should include further developing regional and sub-regional capacities for early warning. A clear understanding of the criteria for predictable regional
response is required, in particular in relation to cross border security issues and illegal economies which fuel conflict.

50. **Regional approaches to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs):** The scale of the problem of forced migration within and across borders in all three regions, and the value of regional mechanisms and efforts to tackle this issue, was highlighted. Linkage needs to be made in this respect between refugees and IDPs and other regional issues such as human and drug trafficking, indentured labour and cross border natural resource management. Donors should support transnational or regional exchanges on these issues. Capacities for technical training and research at the regional level should also be strengthened. However, external assistance on refugee and IDP issues needs to be placed within a holistic approach to conflict resolution and prevention. Development co-operation also needs to better address other factors which lie behind population flows. These include land dispossession and environmental change. The particular vulnerable position of women both to displacement and when displaced needs to be recognised and reflected in donor programming.

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**Box 5: Constraints to regional approaches in Asia**

Participants in the Asia-Pacific Consultation, in discussing the need for more effective regional approaches to forced migration, noted that current mechanisms face serious constraints due to political sensitivities and by differing capacities for engagement by member states. The non-interference principle of ASEAN limits the effectiveness of regional mechanisms in dealing with root causes of refugee and IDP flows. Root causes were identified as governance issues and the crisis of legitimacy of the states in question. It was noted that ‘sovereignty with responsibility’ needs to be emphasised by ASEAN Members. Clear statements, standards and norms comprising the responsibilities of sovereignty and a system of accountability must be agreed at various regional levels.

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**C. Major Themes for Reflection and Action**

**g) Sustaining peace processes**

51. The Consultations underlined the fact that peace processes in each of the regions were inevitably complex and beset by numerous difficulties and obstacles before peace agreements are actually reached. Donors can only have a significant positive impact if they are prepared to co-ordinate with each other and engage for the long haul. Participants raised a number of key issues for donors in facilitating peace agreements and supporting peace processes:

52. **Managing expectations:** The greatest challenge in a peace process can come once the peace accord has been signed and is excepted to yield concrete outcomes. Donors should avoid unwittingly giving rise to unrealistic expectations. This can generate a risk that those who perceive themselves as losers in a peace process become its spoilers, either by breaking the peace or through other forms of violence such as criminal activities.

53. **Taking risks:** Donors need to be prepared to commit resources despite the possibility that such support may only yield tangible results in the long term or not at all. This requires donors to be less risk averse in engaging in situations of conflict or fragile peace.
Box 6: Elements of successful peace processes in Latin America

Key elements for a successful peace process were suggested:
- Support for confidence building measures among the different parties.
- Sustained and committed support to the process by the international community in all areas (diplomatic, political, technical and financial).
- Addressing the high expectations raised by peace agreements.
- Early warning of sensitive issues before they give rise to renewed conflicts.

54. **Monitoring implementation**: Donors should support credible verification systems. These are important for peace processes as confidence-building measures for parties to enter agreements and remain engaged over the long term.

> "Donors are working with a short-term perspective on processes that may take a generation. Building capacities and then withdrawing because the donor does not feel enough progress is being made may be more destructive than not having become involved in the first place. It creates unsustainable capacities that may collapse when the donor leaves." (Latin America Consultation)

55. **Engagement of civil society**: Building capacity of CSOs to enable them to meaningfully participate in formal peace processes and power structures is key (including through support for training and leadership development). At the same time, donors need to bring influence to bear on states and warring parties engaged in peace processes, to accept a structured role for CSOs. Such assistance needs to be sensitive to special interest groups such as women and children and disarmed young militants. In addition, it is important to recognise that communities have the capacity to initiate peacebuilding activities at the height of conflict, before formal peace processes are initiated. Donors should be aware of such initiatives and support them where appropriate.

> “There is a need to transform formal space in peace processes to allow informal groups to sit at the negotiating table. Non democratic peace accords brokered with the exclusion of civil society have been weak on issues of justice and reconciliation, crucial for the sustainability of peace processes.” (Asia-Pacific Consultation)

56. **‘Gendering’ peace processes**: Donors should recognise and reinforce women’s skills in managing survival and negotiating peace at the local and informal level. They should support their transition from the informal grassroots level to formal politics.

**h) Post-conflict peacebuilding**

57. A clear message from all three consultations was that reaching a peace agreement is only one step in the process of resolving conflict. Post-conflict peacebuilding should be seen as an ongoing and long-term task - peace processes do not have a clear end. Although this rhetoric may have been accepted by
development co-operation actors, participants felt strongly that the practice is still starkly different. General
issues raised in connection with post-conflict approaches are detailed here. The following two sections
describe in more detail discussion on two key issues relating to post-conflict situations: demobilisation and
reintegration and justice and reconciliation.

58. **Avoiding overburdening state structures**: Donors should avoid the risk of overburdening fragile
and emerging state structures. This requires better co-ordination and less conditionality. The fiscal
sustainability of the state, through reforms aimed at increasing government revenues is a priority. An early
warning sign of impeding unrest lies in the inability of public institutions to pay the civil service and meet
public service responsibilities.

59. **Broadening post-conflict support**: Often in a post-conflict situation, donors concentrate only on
issues of demobilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of physical infrastructure. There is due to a
frequent misunderstanding that peace comes when conflict ends. Participants noted that the reality is that
new conflicts will emerge. Structural changes needed to address the root causes of the original conflict
(such as lack of political participation) are often never addressed in a comprehensive manner. It was
suggested that donors are no longer interested, since the conflict and crisis is perceived to have ‘gone
away’. In addition, immediate economic priorities need to be addressed. Rising unemployment, for
example, poses risks to fragile peace processes. Failing to meet the aspirations of younger generations may
increase the risks of violence, including through recruitment to armed groups.

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“The concept of ‘structural stability’ in the Guidelines needs articulation, both globally and in
relation to particular country settings. It should be considered a dynamic concept that embraces
both state and civil society in a process of democratic transformation.”
(Latin America Consultation)
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60. **Sustaining support**: A peace agreement is only one step in a peacebuilding process, it is not an
end or goal of such a process. Post-conflict peacebuilding efforts need to continue if peace is to be
sustained and peace agreements respected. A tendency for civil society to be marginalised in donor support
to post-conflict peacebuilding was observed in both the Asia-Pacific and Latin America Consultations. It
was noted this has been a negative factor constraining recovery towards democracy and reconciliation.

61. Donors tend to focus their support more on the state - away from civil society - after the peace is
deemed won. But donor support to civil society peacebuilding initiatives should continue after peace
processes are perceived to have ended.

62. **Recovering misappropriated funds**: Greater co-operation is needed between countries to recover
misappropriated funds from the leadership of former governments when new and legitimate governments
are formed. These funds are vital to nation building, development and consolidation of peacebuilding.

i) **Demobilisation and reintegration**

63. Participants in the Africa and Latin America Consultations noted the importance of successful
processes of demobilisation and reintegration in post-conflict peacebuilding. A number of issues were
highlighted as important for informing donor support to such programmes.

64. **Negotiating reintegration**: The peace process must build enough confidence and trust between
all actors to enable former combatants to enter the reintegration process. Former combatants must believe
in security guarantees if they are to demobilise and disarm. Reintegration should be a specific component
of negotiations and be included explicitly in agreements to establish a common understanding and degree of trust.

65. **Support to reintegration within broader development programmes**: Successful reintegration of former combatants requires that local communities not only accept and support reintegration programmes but also participate in their design and implementation. Programmes must be linked to broader development programmes benefiting local communities to avoid the risk of ex-combatants facing discrimination or resentment from local communities. A focus on broader economic development is also key because successful reintegration requires economic opportunities for ex-combatants beyond time limited reintegration programmes. Experience from Guatemala, for example, suggests that lack of employment and income generating opportunities increases risks of ex-combatants engaging in criminal activities and migrating to other areas. Political will of donors and the state to provide long-term support is therefore key.

66. **Ensuring national ownership**: International funding for reintegration processes is important but national ownership is essential if they are to be sustained. The state should therefore have a prime role from the beginning.

67. **Timing for reintegration**: Donors need to ensure a realistic and flexible timetable in supporting reintegration processes. A long-term approach allows for a process of gradual reintegration. Withdrawing donor support after the immediate objectives of demobilisation are met risks leaving ex-combatants with no support services. This can lead to frustration among ex-combatants and risks of destabilising the peace process. Experience in Central America demonstrates that needs of ex-combatants also change over time. Donors need to be able to adapt their support and retain flexibility to such changing circumstances. In addition, experience in countries such as Guatemala suggests that donor funding for reintegration needs to be better co-ordinated.

**j) Justice and reconciliation**

68. Each Consultation stressed how important it is to address reconciliation and justice within peace processes and in post-conflict peacebuilding. Development co-operation has a key role in supporting effective processes of reconciliation and justice in the longer term after peace agreements are reached.

69. Justice requires recognition of victims’ suffering, the identification of atrocities and human rights violations, and the ability to bring to justice those who are individually and institutionally responsible for such crimes. However, striking a balance between full justice and collective reconciliation is a key dilemma. Tension can develop between the need for victims of gross human rights abuses to see perpetrators brought to justice and the need for different sides to reconcile. The relation between justice and reconciliation is complex and should be recognised as more than an ‘either or’ issue. Participants pointed out that these terms are also culturally interpreted in different ways across regions.

70. The following considerations for donors supporting processes of reconciliation and justice were highlighted:

71. **Reconciliation and healing**: Dealing with the trauma of those affected by long periods of violent conflict should be given greater attention in reconciliation efforts. Credible institutions which deal with the healing aspect of reconciliation processes need technical and financial support. Priority must be given to recognising the legitimacy and dignity of the victims of human rights abuses and those who have suffered during violent conflict. Victims and their history of the conflict need to have a voice in a reconciled society.
72. **International justice:** The creation of the International Criminal Court may be an advance in creating international mechanisms for dealing with violent crimes and human rights abuses that occur during times of internal conflict. In particular, this may be the case when the balance of power within a country does not allow bringing to justice of persons responsible for past violations. It was suggested that a focus on exemplary cases tried in international courts could be the basis of learning for society as a whole.

> "The processes of reconciliation and democratisation are implicitly linked."
> (Latin America Consultation)

73. **Timing of reconciliation:** All actors need to consider carefully at what stage and with what minimum requirements reconciliation should begin. The presence of peace agreements and agreements on power sharing are commonly viewed as the minimum conditions for effective reconciliation. It is also important, however, where possible, to begin a process of reconciliation before conflict has ended. The process has to be set in motion while the conflict is raging. ‘Victims’ of conflict should not be looked upon merely as victims but also as stakeholders who can play an active role in the reconciliation processes. This is part of the empowering process that will lead to reconciliation and social cohesion.

74. **Supporting reconciliation as part of broader governance and development programmes:** Reconciliation is closely linked to evolution of participatory and accountable governance institutions. Participants noted that the proper functioning of such institutions, backed by respect for the rule of law and respect by the state for the role of civil society, is key for a climate in which justice and reconciliation can take place. Donor support to governance and democratisation should include and promote elements of reconciliation.

75. **Reconciliation and displaced persons:** Particular attention should be paid to supporting dialogue and understanding between returning displaced persons and local communities who have remained during conflict. Both will have faced different experiences and reintegration of displaced persons can be facilitated through internationally supported return and reintegration programmes.

76. **Supporting customary mechanisms and approaches:** Donors should recognise that there is no universal method for reconciliation. Potential methods range from legal to community based mechanisms. Donors need to support processes that are culturally appropriate and relevant, including by supporting local approaches. In many countries in each of the regions, there are traditional systems for justice and reconciliation. However, they may have been undermined and devalued by expansion of formal legal systems. Donors need to understand traditional systems, support them where appropriate, and influence the state to give them legal recognition. At the same time, customary approaches should not be seen as a panacea. They may exclude some groups, for example women, from full participation.
Box 7: Customary reconciliation and justice in the Asia-Pacific Region

Participants in the Asia-Pacific Consultation noted how in Indonesia many communities still recognise customary conflict management mechanisms. This can involve warring parties coming together to publicly recognise the fact there is conflict and grievances which need to be resolved. This can contribute to a process of creating a sense of justice. In Ambon, Indonesia, indigenous and settler communities have initiated such mechanisms.

77. **Building donor capacities**: Donors must allocate sufficient resources and recognise that there are long-term savings to be made by investing material and human resources in reconciliation. It was noted that currently most donors are constrained in understanding conflict and reconciliation at local level by their own insufficient human resources. Donors should also take a co-ordinated and cohesive approach in their support to reconciliation processes. Donors need to take a long-term approach because reconciliation is not achieved at any one point. It is an on-going process both at the micro and macro level.

78. **Supporting locally owned processes**: Donor support to reconciliation and justice processes must be based upon careful and proper consultation with local communities to get their views on what is credible and legitimate. Collaborative processes (involving communities, government, civil society, donors) to deal with issues of justice & reconciliation are needed. Donors should support communication and dissemination of the contents of peace agreements and reconciliation to wider populations. There is also a need to support communities in ‘learning from each other’ about reconciliation.

79. **Supporting amnesties and ‘truth and reconciliation commissions’**: Amnesty arrangements need to be informed by international human rights standards and donors need to consider carefully the extent to which this is achieved before supporting such processes. A general amnesty, if gross abuses of human rights are not punished, can create impunity for crimes committed during the conflict and leave the structures that committed the violations intact. This can create resentment in society leading to conflict and mistrust in the longer term. The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or Committees provide an opportunity to deal with feelings of injustice on the part of victims and their families about atrocities committed either by the state or other groups. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions should not be seen as an alternative to punishing those guilty of such crimes – they can exist in addition to and complement other legal processes. Donors can play a role by supporting truth commission processes, promoting the implementation of their recommendations and backing reforms to judicial and security instructions.

k) **Promoting human rights in conflict**

80. Participants in the Consultations noted that conflicts in each of their regions have come to impact principally on civilian populations. More effective measures are needed to prevent human rights abuses during conflict. This itself can serve to reduce and prevent further conflict through addressing grievances which are often at the root cause of violent uprising against the state.

81. **Dissemination of humanitarian law**: Dissemination of international humanitarian law and related human rights norms should be expanded with creative measures of promoting compliance. All armed groups should have access to training in international law, including related traditional value systems, in order to reduce the brutality of conflict and increase accountability of all warring parties. Donors should support initiatives to build humanitarian space. This can include: ‘days of tranquility’, ‘zones of peace’, and temporary cease-fires.
Box 8 : Reducing participation in violence and armed groups in Africa

It was noted during the Africa Consultation that the factors, which make it more likely that people will be recruited into armed groups, should be better addressed. These include efforts to:

- Prevent the forced recruitment into military activity of people in internally displaced and refugee camps.
- Address poverty driven ‘pull factors’ for children to engage in military activity and support female headed households in protecting their children from recruitment into such activities.
- Support primary and other educational activities as an incentive to resist involvement in violent conflict.

82. **Capacity building for human rights promotion:** Donor programmes in conflict situations should have a strong human rights focus. This can include:

- Strengthening human rights monitoring.
- Training in legal rights and state obligations in relation to international conventions.
- Increasing exposure to resource persons from within the region who have experience of working in similar situations.
- Bolstering the capacity of state-sponsored independent institutions like National and State Human Rights Commissions.

83. **Regional human rights approaches:** Participants stressed the value of regional and sub-regional approaches to promoting human rights in countries affected by conflict. In this respect the role of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights was noted as a mechanism through which human rights can be protected and promoted. It plays a valuable role as a neutral regional legal forum providing balanced solutions to concrete cases of human rights violations which may be too politically contentious for national systems.

84. **Understanding and addressing impact of conflict on women:** Gender-based violence is a major source of insecurity for women in all three of the regions. Violence women experience in conflict situations undermines their role and position in the household, and in the community. Human rights violations against women in conflict include rape, harassment, beating, arbitrary arrest and various forms of sexual slavery and servitude. Women affected by conflict are also frequently displaced, deprived of their livelihoods, and must bear the prime responsibility for production as well as for the old, the sick, and children. However, the extent of gender violence in conflict situations, perpetrated by all parties, is often ignored. Donors should support making databases and statistical material gender-specific.

85. There needs to be special focus on addressing the needs of women who have been victims of violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict. There should be an emphasis on dealing with sexual and physical violence and abuse, as well as the psychological and emotional trauma affecting women and children in long periods of insecurity as witnesses to extreme violence and victims themselves. The
problems faced by widows and single women, and abandoned women also require special attention. All actors in conflict prevention must be aware that in a heavily militarised society, the general level of violence against women, including domestic violence, increases. There should be special programmes designed to deal with all aspects of violence against women, not only those particularly linked to the conflict.

1) Security and development

86. Addressing security issues was viewed as an integral part of supporting development and improved governance. The Latin America Consultation focused in particular on demobilisation and reintegration aspects of the security debate [see section B, b)]. The Asia-Pacific Consultation discussed governance aspects of enhanced human security. The Africa Consultation considered the problem of small arms proliferation. Key areas for donor focus include:

87. **Improving governance for human security**: Security at community level can only be achieved when state institutions are in place which can support peaceful resolution of conflict and where economic opportunities are widely shared. It was noted that donors have a role to play in supporting governance and development approaches that better guarantee human security. However, they also have a responsibility to ensure that their own development, foreign and defence policies are coherent, for example when considering support to armed forces in developing countries.

> “Lack of transparency in the security sectors of a large number of Asian countries increases threat perceptions and reduces potential for civilian oversight. Nearly half of the Asian countries do not even participate in the UN Register for Arms.” (Asia-Pacific Consultation)

88. **Proliferation of small arms, regional approaches**: Donors should support measures to reduce the production, export, redistribution and recycling of small arms, ammunition and light weapons. They should also support efforts to stop the legal and illicit flow and provide incentives for decommissioning of such arms. The number of small arms and light weapons outside formal control of the state was noted as a serious challenge to peace and security in all three regions. The example of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms was noted.

### Box 9: Priorities for reforming security sectors in Asia

The Asia-Pacific consultation suggested the following prioritisation for reforming security sectors would be necessary in most developing countries in the region:

- Intelligence institutions and their internal and external role defined and reformed.
- Administrative reforms to ensure good governance.
- Capacity building for political institutions’ and civil society organisations’ oversight of security sector reforms.
- Military sector re-defined and re-oriented toward national defence.
89. **Security sector reform:** It was noted that attempts to reform the role of security sectors can only be successful in the context of broader moves towards participatory and accountable governance. An immediate requirement was noted to be improved transparency of the security sector. In addition, strengthened civilian control over the security sector is a key component of security sector reforms. This includes civilian control over covert intelligence institutions. Participants noted that a key first task in any reform of the security sector is to gain a degree of consensus on its distinct role and function in relation to society and the state.

**Box 10: Peacebuilding in Guatemala**

The Latin America Consultation discussed lessons from the Guatemalan peace process on the conditions needed for peacebuilding to occur:

- **A spirit of tolerance and respect** for social, political and cultural diversity.
- **The legitimacy of the State:** Social actors should accept the precepts that the State and its institutions are legitimate. That is, if the State follows principles of good governance, including transparency in its actions.
- **State reforms:** The state must demonstrate a willingness to undergo structural and functional reforms. The concentration and centralisation of power has been the main source of corruption effectively limiting the possibilities for civil society to participate in the definition of public policy. The state must also generate a continuous process of decentralisation and redistribution, expressed in public spending patterns among the most vulnerable social sectors of society.
- **Citizen participation:** The State must, therefore, accept the principle of a greater role for civil participation in the definition, execution, monitoring and evaluation of public policies. In addition, public policies should be expressed through laws and institutions which, taking into account the needs and interests of the most vulnerable sectors in society, will make possible the prevention and resolution of conflicts.
- **Shared responsibility in the resolution and prevention of conflict:** The creation of permanent tables of negotiation through which initiatives related to preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding can be generated.
- **Support from international co-operation:** Peacebuilding in a context such as Guatemala requires the constant support of international co-operation, which should focus on strengthening civil society to participate in political processes and verify the compliance of all actors with the peace agreements.

90. ‘**New’ security issues:** The Asia-Pacific Consultation identified transnational crime and transnational terrorism as severe challenges to peace and security. The energy requirements for human development also pose serious challenges to peace and security in the coming decades. In addition, environmental security was noted as a critical task for the security sector and a key area where development assistance could make a notable contribution.

**III. Conclusion**

91. The Consultation process aimed at enabling partner countries to input into the process of updating the Guidelines; disseminating them to partner country governments and civil society; and facilitating dialogue between DAC Members and partner countries on these issues. Issues and recommendations raised during the consultations reinforce, elaborate on, and suggest new areas for action by donors and other actors in the field of development co-operation. These have been taken into account in the preliminary draft of the policy note *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* [DCD(2000)15].