ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE TAIPEI

-- 2010 --

This report is submitted by Chinese Taipei to the Competition Committee FOR DISCUSSION at its forthcoming meeting to be held on 19-20 October 2011.
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1. Changes to competition laws and policies, proposed or adopted

1.1 Summary of new legal provisions of competition law and related legislation

1. The Fair Trade Act (hereinafter the “Act”) and its related legislation, the Enforcement Rules to the Fair Trade Act, have not been revised since February 2002.

1.2 Other relevant measures, including amended guidelines

2. With the experience gained from handling past cases and the knowledge learned from foreign competition authorities, the Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter the “FTC”) has revised and issued 9 guidelines and policy statements for particular industries or sectors to build a fair competition environment in response to requests from the public. The FTC:

- Issued “Guidelines on the Handling of Promotional Advertising Cases”;
- Issued “Guidelines for the Handling of Cases Involving Large-scale Enterprises’ Payments to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises”; 
- Issued “Guidelines on the Handling of Comparative Advertising Cases”; 
- Revised “Guidelines on Handling Cases Governed by Article 21 of the Fair Trade Act”; 
- Revised “Guidelines on Handling Cases Governed by Article 20 of the Fair Trade Act”; 
- Revised “Guidelines on Investigations in Multi-level Sales Cases”; 
- Revised “Policy Statements on the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising”; 

1.3 Government proposal for new legislation

3. By taking into consideration the suggestions put forward in the peer review report of the Global Forum on Competition of the OECD in February 2006 and the emergence of various competition concerns due to the trends in globalization and internationalization, the FTC has since drafted a new proposal to revise the Act in 2006. A task force was organized by the Department of Legal Affairs of the FTC to gather together the Commissioners to discuss the new legislation. The proposal containing the new amendments consists of three major aspects that are concerned with the suggestions made by the OECD Competition Committee and encompass some important reforms.

1.3.1 To revise relevant exemptions on concerted actions and to introduce a leniency program

4. Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act prohibits enterprises from partaking in concerted actions, save for specific types of conduct that are beneficial to the economy as a whole and are in the interests of the public at large. Only for certain purposes shall the parties apply to the FTC for approval. The two policy
concerns in the phrase “beneficial to the economy as a whole and in the public interest” are the element of efficiency and industry development.

5. The FTC acknowledges that the types of concerted actions that are beneficial to the economy as a whole and in the interests of the public are numerous. For example, the developing of R&D projects jointly with competitors, intellectual property rights and technologies obtained jointly with competitors could enhance the incentives to create and, more than that, would reduce the costs of innovation. Thus, the FTC is planning to revise the relevant provisions of the Act to relax the exemption restrictions on concerted actions based on the two aforesaid policy concerns, but will do so by referring to the experiences of developed countries. It can be expected that the FTC will continue to adhere to its strict position when carrying out its law enforcement against concerted actions.

6. Due to the difficulties in obtaining substantive evidence of cartels, the FTC has extensively surveyed the designs and the methods of enforcement of such programs in other countries. These findings have served as important references for the FTC to introduce a leniency program that will provide reduction or immunity from fines to cartel members who report to the FTC regarding the illegal organization of the cartel.

7. In accordance with Article 41-1 of the Fair Trade Act draft amendment, the FTC has formulated the “Regulations Governing Implementation of Immunity from or Reduction of Administrative Fines against Cartels (draft).” The major content of the draft regulations includes: applicable targets of leniency policies, application requirements, application methods, requirements for granting immunity and reductions to administrative fines, provision of evidence of illegal conduct, conditional agreement clauses, confidentiality of identity, and other enforcement items. When the Fair Trade Act draft amendment is adopted, the FTC will implement a leniency program.

1.3.2 To employ search power

8. Given the difficulties in obtaining substantive evidence of large-scale international, or technological, or secret anti-competitive practices, it has become increasingly prevalent among competition law authorities to employ search power. With this, most competition authorities can more efficiently investigate and combat anti-trust and cartel cases. The employment of such search power can save on investigative costs, prevent the spread of injury and detect cartels. The FTC also needs to prepare itself to deal with the growing prevalence of “smart” crime.

1.3.3 To differentiate administrative penalties for various violations

9. The punishment system of the Act is different from others. By not only applying administrative fines as the tool of punishment, the Act combines anti-competition with unfair competition and does not differentiate among the penalties for different types of violations. According to Article 41 of the current Act, an administrative fine ranging from NT$50,000 to NT$25,000,000 (approximately equivalent to US$1,716 to US$857,868 at the exchange rate of $29.142NTD/USD in September 2011) could be imposed upon any violators. However, fines against hard-core conduct are low based on international comparisons.

10. In order to deter violations, the administrative penalties will be imposed depending on the behaviors associated with the violation. In the proposed new legislation, the violation-related behaviors will be categorized into 1. merger, 2. anti-competition, and 3. unfair competition. Thus, the statutory cap for the administrative penalties will be different for different violations.
1.3.4  To reform the structure of the FTC

11. In order to cope with the reform of government organizations, the FTC’s name will be changed from the “Fair Trade Commission, Executive Yuan” to the “Fair Trade Commission.” Due to the growing importance of economic analysis in antitrust cases, the FTC will transform its Statistics Office into the Information and Economic Analysis Office as the designated unit responsible for economic analysis and industry data collection. In October 2010, the FTC established an “Information and Economic Analysis Office Planning Team” to make plans step by step. The implementation plan details the steps to be taken to: continuously build the capability and capacity of economic analysis for internal staff, clarify the role and function of the Office in cases dealing with process, and build partnership models between the Investigation Departments and the Office.

12. Appeals of the FTC’s decisions will be taken directly to the Administrative Court rather than to the Appeal and Petition Committee of the Executive Yuan. Commissioner appointments will be subject to the consent of the legislature. These changes will draw attention to the fact that the application of competition law should to the fullest extent possible be free of political considerations to gain a wider support for competition policy from the general public.

1.3.5  To apply the rule-of-reason standard to RPM

13. Article 18 of the Fair Trade Act deems resale price maintenance to be a conclusively illegal conduct. This prohibition covers only goods. Virtually all articles of the Fair Trade Act encompass both goods and services, but the “resale of goods” in Article 18 refers solely to tangible goods. Extending the interpretation of the current Article to include services has seemed somewhat inappropriate up to now. Nevertheless, to fully achieve the objectives of competition law, the FTC is currently working toward an amendment to include services in Article 18.

14. Currently, the most experienced countries apply the “rule of reason” to resale price maintenance cases and thus the effect on market competition must be examined. By taking into consideration the practices of various competition authorities and the effect of resale price maintenance, the FTC has researched and discussed changing the treatment of resale price maintenance to the rule-of-reason standard. The amended Article 18 of the Fair Trade Act will explicitly state that no enterprise shall engage in maintaining resale prices, except for actions for which the actors have proper justification. The FTC considers using the “rule of reason” as a basis to evaluate whether the actor engaging in resale price maintenance has imposed only a minimal effect on competition and that its conduct could have a positive effect.

2.  Enforcement of competition laws and policies

2.1  Action against anti-competitive practices, including agreements and abuses of dominant market positions

2.1.1  Summary of activities

15. The Act permits the existence of monopolies as long as they do not abuse their market power. Concerted actions are strictly forbidden by the Act. However, while some exceptions are allowed for, these do require the FTC’s prior approval and its decision is based on the public interest. The Act also bans resale price maintenance but requires the FTC to apply the rule-of-reason standard to other types of vertical restraints.

16. In 2010, the FTC processed 1,500 cases, including 1,299 cases received in 2010 and 201 cases carried over from the preceding year. By the end of 2010, 1,338 cases had been closed, and 162 cases were pending. A total of 401 complaint cases applicable to the Act were concluded in 2010 and, of these, 59 concerned anti-competitive practices.
17. Decision rulings on complaints and FTC self-initiated investigations were undertaken in relation to 155 cases in 2010, and only 12 of these fell into the category of anti-competitive practices. The FTC also initiated investigations into 3 anti-competitive cases.

### Decision Rulings by the FTC in 2010 (Unit: Number of cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Anti-competitive Practices</th>
<th>Abuse of Monopoly</th>
<th>Mergers</th>
<th>Concerted Actions</th>
<th>Resale Price Maintenance</th>
<th>Vertical Restraints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of illegal actions may exceed the number of cases involving decision rulings because a case may involve more than one illegal action.

2.1.2 Description of significant cases, including those with international implications

2.1.2.1 Anti-competitive Cases

- **Case 1: Cartels — Industrial paper supply market**

As a result of observing irregular price patterns in the domestic industrial paper market where prices increased a number of times in the recent period, the FTC initiated an ex-officio investigation. The FTC resolved that the three largest domestic industrial paper suppliers, Cheng Loong Corp., Yuen Foong Yu Paper Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Long Chen Paper Co., Ltd., jointly raised industrial paper prices from November 2009 to March 2010 in violation of Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act which prohibits the concerted actions. Administrative fines of NT$ 5 million, NT$ 3 million, and NT$ 2 million were imposed on Cheng Loong Corp., Long Chen Paper Co., Ltd., and Yuen Foong Yu Paper Mfg. Co. Ltd., respectively.

After investigation, it was found that the market share of the three industrial paper suppliers in the base paper supply market of the first-class industrial paper reached 90%. From November 2009 to March 2010, the rising of waste paper prices increased costs and industrial paper prices were consequently adjusted. The three largest domestic suppliers, however, consistently raised the list prices of the industrial paper. Their acts not only exceeded the price increase ranges that reflected the cost price increase of the waste paper, but also deviated from the trend of the internationally competitive price increase range.

In addition, the methods and speed of raising the price, and the price increase ranges on this occasion were all different from those implemented in 2007 (i.e., the business habits of the suppliers were different from those in the past). The FTC compared the proportion of the actual purchasing cost of the waste paper and the business operations of one of the suppliers in this price increase period with those of the rest of the suppliers, the results showed that the cost pressures borne by each of the suppliers and the ratio of the domestic sales to overseas sales of each supplier were obviously different.

However, the suppliers consistently raised the prices at the same time within the same price increase ranges, and none of them could give any reasonable explanation to support such adjustments in their industrial paper prices on this occasion. All three suppliers were deemed to have jointly raised the industrial paper prices through consensus, conspiring for improper joint profits, with the intention being nothing other than avoiding price competition.

During the FTC’s investigation, all three suppliers admitted that they engaged in frequent get-togethers. The association and frequent interaction of businesses in the same industry is generally against the principle of competition and is not commonly seen in other competitive industries. As
a result, it was highly likely that it could be inferred that the said enterprises were exchanging information on pricing or production quantities through private get-togethers. Based on the above-mentioned evidence, the FTC concluded that the three largest industrial paper suppliers were in violation of the prohibited concerted actions set forth in the Fair Trade Act.

- **Case 2: Cartels — Kaohsiung Port outer-port launch transport service market**

Launch operators in Kaohsiung Port met together to reach a meeting of minds over joint operation of a rotating launch schedule for transporting harbor pilots and joint sharing of revenues. This conduct restricted the services offered, affected the market function in the Kaohsiung Port outer-port launch transport service market, and therefore violated Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act prohibiting concerted actions.

Seven operators, including Kaohsiung Port Logistical Services Co., Ltd. (KHS), had acquired the permission to operate outer-port launch services. Enterprises involved in this concerted action case accounted for a total 100 percent market share in the Kaohsiung Port outer-port launch transport service market.

The Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau has not formulated related regulations governing outer-port launch rates, nor does it set launch rate standards any longer. Currently, operators continue to charge for their services with reference to the Transportation Launch Rate Table set in 2002 following the Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau’s consultations with relevant trade associations, shippers and operators. Nevertheless, such rate standards merely serve as reference, leaving room for price competition between the operators and shipping businesses in the market.

Outer-port launch transport operators could either adopt various price or non-price competition strategies based on situations in actual market supply and demand to attract trading counterparts, or seek collaborative partners. However, in view of the high refund rate to attract customers and the ruthless price war practiced by operators, prior to commencing operation in 2009 KHS undertook to reduce price competition among operators, convening meetings among launch operators to discuss the joint dispatch of launches at Kaohsiung Port in order to stabilize the market through collective operation, establish a consolidated dispatch center to facilitate mutual oversight, and prevent operators from soliciting passengers on their own. Furthermore, revenue apportionment was jointly established and operators exceeding a set proportion of revenues were expected to refrain from competing for customers with other operators.

The KHS and six other operators met together to discuss and jointly determine a rotating transportation schedule and joint revenue distribution, according to which operators would transport harbor pilots and divide revenues as apportioned in a revenue sharing arrangement. This compelled operators autonomously soliciting passengers to allocate their revenues to other operators, while operators less aggressive about soliciting customers received profits from their competitors. Simply by running shifts on a rotating basis launch operators would be less willing to make efforts to attract customers through favorable price or non-price conditions and the customers’ freedom to determine with whom to transact would be diminished.

The FTC made a decision that such a concerted action eliminated the willingness of the seven operators to attract customers through various competitive strategies, and that given the lack of other competitors in the market, the mechanism for adjusting market supply and demand was prevented from working. Accordingly, the concerted action sufficiently affected the supply and demand functions of the Kaohsiung Port outer-port launch transport service market and therefore violated Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act. Pursuant to Article 41 of the same Act, the FTC issued a cease-and-desist order to seven operators and imposed administrative fines amounting to a total of NT$ 5 million.
Case 3: Restrictive Business Practices

In October 2008, Mei-Hua Multimedia Technology Co. filed a complaint with the FTC alleging the possibility of limiting trading counterparts’ business activity improperly by MDS Multimedia Corp. (hereinafter MDS) and Zui Ing Co. (hereinafter Zui Ing), which required that their distributors not participate in any marketing activities for the karaoke products of other companies and otherwise terminated their contracts with MDS and Zui Ing. The FTC hence initiated an investigation.

Based on the FTC’s investigation, it was found that the market shares of MDS and Zui Ing in the MIDI Karaoke product market were respectively 37% and 50%, totalling over 80%, which constitutes a considerable degree of market power in such a market. In addition, the two companies MDS and Zui Ing had a long-term cooperation relationship in the karaoke product business and they were affiliated enterprises with vertical an integration relationship.

In September 2008, both companies announced at meetings with their distributors that they would terminate their contracts with distributors if distributors simultaneously served as an agent, broker, or distributor for MIDI karaoke products of other brands. This announcement was also released to their distributors in writing and was contained in contracts MDS and Zui Ing signed with their regional subcontractors. It is the FTC’s opinion that such exclusive dealing conduct of MDS and Zui Ing could restrict their competitors from expanding or obtaining sales channels, and therefore result in the effects of market foreclosure and weaken “inter-brand competition” as well as cause substantive damage to market competition.

The FTC also discovered that MDS and Zui Ing entered into a contract with regional subcontractors where regional subcontractors were required to charge users a sublet price for MIDI products that was not lower than the rates agreed in the contracts, otherwise MDS and Zui Ing would terminate the contracts. In fact, when signing the contract each regional subcontractor issued a check to MDS and Zui Ing as a deposit in accordance with the agreed rental price in the contract. The actual amount of sales was then deducted from the deposit. In other words, each regional subcontractor was already assuming the risk regardless of whether the subcontracted sets of products were rented out.

The FTC concluded that MDS and Zui Ing prohibited regional subcontractors from engaging in rental price competition and deprived the regional subcontractors of the freedom to determine the rental prices based on their own business environments and competitive strategies. Such conduct could easily lead the rental prices among all distributors to be a single price and decrease the “intra-brand competition” of similar products in different marketing channels. MDS and Zui Ing had been limiting their trading counterparts’ business activity improperly by means of the requirements of business engagement in violation of Article 19(vi) of the Fair Trade Act. The FTC ordered MDS and Zui Ing to cease such an unlawful act immediately and imposed administrative fines of NT$1000,000 and NT$700,000 on MDS and Zui Ing, respectively.

2.2 Mergers and acquisitions

2.2.1 Statistics on the number, size and type of mergers notified and/or controlled under competition laws

18. Mergers involving parties reaching a certain sales volume or a particular level of market share must give notification to and obtain no objection from the FTC. The FTC makes its decision based on whether the benefits to the economy as a whole will exceed the anti-competitive effects of the proposal.
Notifications for Mergers  
(Unit: Number of cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases under Processing Carried Over from 2009</th>
<th>Received in 2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Results of Processing Mergers not Prohibited</th>
<th>Mergers Prohibited</th>
<th>Termination of Review</th>
<th>Cases Pending at Year-end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Statistics on Enterprise Mergers  
(Unit: Number of cases)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cases not Prohibited</th>
<th>Type of Merger (Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Fair Trade Act)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Subparagraph 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: More than one type of merger may be applicable to some cases. Therefore, the total number of cases under different types of mergers exceeds the total number of approved cases.

2.2.2 Summary of significant cases

- **Case 1: Pre-merger Filing Obligation — Holiday Entertainment Co. & Cashbox Partyworld Co.**

  Cashbox Partyworld Co. (Cashbox) operated jointly with Holiday Entertainment Co. (Holiday) on a regular basis; in addition, Cashbox, through its control of the boards of directors and supervisors as well as executive officers, had direct or indirect control of the business operations or the appointment or discharge of personnel of Holiday, thereby meeting the merger criteria as defined in Subparagraphs 4 and 5, Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Fair Trade Act. In this case, Cashbox failed to notify the FTC before implementing the merger with Holiday Entertainment Co. in violation of Article 11 of the Fair Trade Act. The FTC imposed administrative fines of NT$300,000 and NT$1,500,000 on Cashbox Partyworld Co. and Holiday Entertainment Co., respectively.

  In fact, Cashbox had previously applied for merger approval in other earlier cases, and the FTC in its decision on the case dated July 4, 2003 required undertakings from them and did not prohibit the merger. However, the merging parties did not finish the merger by the date originally scheduled after the FTC made the aforesaid decision. In addition, in 2006, Holiday planned again to merge with Cashbox and filed a merger notification with the FTC. As the merging parties’ market share and the situation of the relevant market had already changed, and the overall economic benefits of such a merger would not outweigh the disadvantages resulting from the competition restraint caused by the merger, therefore, in 2007 the FTC decided to prohibit the merger in accordance with Article 12(1) of the Fair Trade Act.

  After that, a number of complaints were sent to the FTC alleging that Cashbox and Holiday had continued to proceed with a merger without applying for approval. After investigation, the FTC found that Cashbox and Holiday, through their co-investment companies Qian Yu Co., Ltd. and Qian Sheng Technology Co., Ltd., jointly operated their customer service center and audiovisual computer system. Furthermore, Cashbox contractually operated Holiday’s karaoke business on Linsen North Road through the unlawful merger.

  By 2007, Cashbox executives were appointing many high-level positions within Holiday. In total, three of the five directors and two of the three supervisors in Holiday were directly or indirectly selected by Cashbox. Moreover, Cashbox-appointed director Lee Hau-yin was also the CEO of
Holiday. Cashbox had direct or indirect control of the business operations and the appointment or discharge of personnel of Holiday.

Cashbox and Holiday failed to notify the FTC and therefore violated Article 11 of the Fair Trade Act. According to Articles 13 and 40 of the Fair Trade Act, the FTC ordered Cashbox and Holiday to cease unlawful activities and ordered Cashbox to remove certain persons from their positions in Holiday until there was no substantial control in Holiday, besides imposing administrative fines of NT$500,000 and NT$1,500,000 on Cashbox and Holiday, respectively.

3. **The role of competition authorities in the formulation and implementation of other policies, e.g., regulatory reform, trade and industrial policies**

19. In its first amendment in 1999, the new provision of the Act required that the Act should not be applied to acts performed in accordance with other laws only if such other laws do not conflict with the legislative purpose of the Act. This amendment thereby affirms that the spirit and contents of the Act be the core of economic policy.

20. The FTC has completed a comprehensive review of all relevant laws and regulations since 2001 to minimize potential conflicts among laws, to advocate free and fair competition, and to ensure the presence of a healthy operating environment in which all businesses are able to compete fairly. As a result, the FTC will continue to be aware of developments in various markets, perform reviews of other laws to determine whether they are in compliance with the Act and consult with relevant industry competent authorities to prevent related laws and regulations from impeding competition.

21. In 2010, the FTC organized and participated in seminars and consultation meetings with other government authorities related to competition issues, as summarized in the following:

- Organized relevant meetings at which the FTC consulted with the Agriculture and Food Agency, Council of Agriculture to understand the industrial background, the supply and demand and price fluctuations of a number of agricultural products and also discuss issues related to the operation of the market mechanism which is likely to be obstructed. The efforts made in focusing on competition issues concerned how the Fair Trade Act and Agricultural Products Market Transaction Act apply to the agricultural product marketing practices, as well as how to jointly investigate and handle concerted actions, so as to increase efficiency in the operation of the agricultural products market.

- Organized a meeting entitled “The Fresh Milk Market and the Fair Trade Act” to exchange views with the Council of Agriculture, Consumer Protection Commission, Dairy Association and the major suppliers in the fresh milk market and to advise the milk processing enterprises against engaging in illegal conduct, such as concerted actions or resale price maintenance practices;

- Participated in the “Fourth Review on the Floating Petroleum Price Mechanism” meeting held by the Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs and expressed the FTC’s views on the issue of how the Floating Petroleum Price Mechanism could involve the Fair Trade Act.

- Organized a seminar entitled “Competition Issues Related to the Land Transport Industry” at which the FTC exchanged views with the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Directorate General of Highways, Chinese Taipei Railways Administration, Motor Transport Association and related enterprises, and advised the related enterprises and associations against engaging in concerted price-raising.

- Participated in the “Cross-border Matchmaking Administration Review Committee” meeting to exchange views with the Ministry of Interior and other regulatory authorities, concerning the resolution of cross-border matchmaking cases.
4. Resources of competition authorities

4.1 Resources overall

4.1.1 Annual budget

- NT$ 349.019 million in 2010 (approximately equivalent to U.S.$ 11.98 million in September 2011).

4.1.2 Number of employees

22. There were 220 employees at the end of the year 2010, including all staff in the operations and administrative departments and nine full-time Commissioners. The operations departments include the First Department, Second Department, Third Department, Department of Planning and the Department of Legal Affairs. Over 90% of employees have bachelor degrees with majors in different subjects at the university level.

23. In terms of the educational background percentages, 25%, 19%, 7%, 4% and 45% of the employees majored in law, economics, business administration, accounting, and other related fields (including information management, statistics, and public administration), respectively.

24. As a result, the structure of the human resources of the FTC is as follows:

- Economists: 42
- Lawyers: 56
- Other professionals & support staff: 122
- All staff combined: 220

4.2 Human resources (person-years) applied to:

4.2.1 Enforcement against anti-competitive practices and merger review

25. Apart from the Third Department, which is responsible for unfair competition practices, such as false and misleading advertisements, counterfeiting and multi-level sales cases, the First and the Second Departments of the FTC handle all kinds of anti-competitive cases, including the misuse of dominant market positions, merger reviews, cartels and various vertical restraints.

26. The First Department is responsible for cases related to the services and agricultural sectors, and the Second Department is responsible for cases related to the manufacturing sectors. There are 28 staff members in the First Department and 30 in the Second Department.

4.2.2 Advocacy efforts

27. In 2010, 9 of the 27 staff members in the Department of Planning of the FTC were primarily charged with public outreach programs. However, since most of the outreach programs for competition advocacy were case-oriented, almost every department staff member played an active role in outreach activities.

4.3 Period covered by the above information

- January through December 2010.
5. **Summaries of or references to new reports and studies on competition policy issues**

28. The FTC has studied and published reports on competition policy issues in 2010 with the following titles. None of them are available in English.

   - A Study on Competition Regulations in Digital Convergence Related Industries.
   - A Study on the Fair Trade Act Governing Advertisements in the Real Estate Industry and Related Cases.
   - A Study on Reviewing the Strategy and Effectiveness of Competition Advocacy from the View of Performance.
   - A Study on an Analysis of Current International Trends in the Leniency Program.

29. The FTC has also conducted outsourced research, and has published the following research reports in 2010. None of them are available in English.

   - Research on Merger Remedies.
   - Research on Regulations of the Energy Industry under the Fair Trade Act in Developed Countries.