ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN SWEDEN

-- 2005 --

This report is submitted by the Swedish Delegation to the Competition Committee FOR DISCUSSION at its forthcoming meeting to be held on 8 and 9 June 2006.
1. Changes to competition laws and policies, proposed or adopted

1.1 Summary of new legal provisions of competition law and related legislation

1.1.1 Unannounced visits under the Competition Act

1. The Competition Authority’s powers in unannounced visits have been further specified. The Competition Authority has been given the express authority to conduct inspections of residences and other spaces disposed by board members and employees of the company being investigated on infringements of the prohibition rules in the Competition Act or Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.

1.1.2 Damages under the Competition Act

2. As of 1 August 2005, the number of those entitled to damages has been expanded by the prior limitation “another company or contractual party” being stricken from the Competition Act. It is now also possible to apply the damage regulations to infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, i.e. the EU competition rules. At the same time the period of limitation for the right to damages was also extended from five to ten years.

1.1.3 Act on Insight into Certain Financial Ties

3. The Act on Insight into Certain Financial Ties etc., called the Transparency Act, came into effect on 1 August 2005. The EU Transparency Directive has been incorporated into Swedish law through this act.

4. The directive’s aim is to ensure the European Commission’s right to insight into the financial ties between public institutions (the state, the municipalities and the county councils) and publicly owned businesses as well as the financial activities of certain companies. The objective is that the Commission should have the possibility of ensuring that companies do not receive state support or other benefits that conflict with the competition rules.

5. The Transparency Directive primarily affects publicly owned companies, but can also affect private companies that have been granted a legal monopoly or public support, for example. Neither the directive nor the law entails any prohibition on various measures, just an obligation to keep some accounting in order to make authoritative insight possible. The intention is to make it clear how public funds have been transferred to the companies and how they have been used.

6. The Competition Authority has oversight to see that the law is observed and shall collect accounting material requested by the Commission. To be able to implement the new accounting and reporting requirements, the Authority can decide on obligations aimed at the company. A fine can be attached to such an obligation.

1.2 Other relevant measures, including new guidelines

1.2.1 Leniency rules

7. During the year the Competition Authority has pursued a review of its Guidelines specifying how it interprets the leniency rules of the Competition Act. A new set of Guidelines on this topic came into effect in March 2006.
1.3 Government proposals for new legislation

1.3.1 Revision of the Competition Act – supplemental directive

8. In June, the Government made a decision to give a supplemental directive to the Commission on a Revision of the Competition Act (2004:19). Besides previous tasks, the investigator shall also examine the criminalisation proposals made in the report Competition Crime – a legislative model (2004:131). The report has been under consideration and many of the official consultation statements were strongly critical of the proposal on criminalisation.

9. The investigator shall now present the Commission’s view of the matter based on a general efficiency perspective and with regard to the official consultation statements submitted. The investigator shall also propose new regulations on who may appeal certain Competition Authority decisions.

10. The investigative period has been extended and the commission’s results will be reported in whole no later than 1 November 2006.

2. Enforcement of competition laws and policies

2.1 Action against anticompetitive practices, including agreements and abuses of dominant positions

a) Summary of activities of:

- The Swedish Competition Authority

Tip-offs and complaints from companies and private persons

11. Oral and written tip-offs and complaints are often the basis of our work in tracking down and taking action against serious infringements of competition legislation. In 2005 the Competition Authority received a total of just over 750 tips and complaints. The number was somewhat lower than the year before.

12. Most of the tips and complaints concern retailing. Many companies complain of being afflicted by supply refusal for various reasons. But retailers that turn to the Competition Authority in such matters seldom have concrete evidence.

13. Telecommunications is also an area that many complain about. Above all it is common that consumers complain that they cannot receive broadband services or that it is difficult or impossible to switch suppliers.

14. One of the most common areas of complaint comes from companies that consider that public actors acted in a way so that competition on the market was distorted.

15. The following table shows the number of new cases registered during 2005 under the Competition Act - mergers, agreements and complaints - and the number of decisions taken during the same period. The total number of cases pending at the end of 2005 amounted to 59.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mergers</th>
<th>Anti-competitive co-operation(^1)</th>
<th>Abuse of a dominant position(^2)</th>
<th>Other cases (inquiries, etc.)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. An important task assigned to the Competition Authority is its consultative role on existing and proposed public regulations. A total of 163 formal opinions were submitted to governmental and public authorities.

**Decisions**

17. Over the year the Competition Authority made 472 decisions under the Competition Act, including cases which were closed without any full-scale investigation, and Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The industries which have been primarily affected by the decisions of the Competition Authority are other services, trade, the engineering industry, construction and transport.

18. The Competition Authority made decisions on two commitments in 2005. The Competition Authority did not decide on any obligations during the year.

**Mergers**

19. The Competition Authority made 86 decisions regarding mergers, two of which were made after special investigations had been conducted.

20. Of the 86 decisions, two regarded write-offs after recalls from the parties and one of the cases was not brought up for review because the transaction did not constitute a concentration that required reporting under the Competition Act. 81 cases were left without action within 25 working days.

21. The Competition Authority also handled some cases concerning the Swedish market where the acquisition parties requested the concentration to be reviewed by the European Commission instead of several national authorities. In all cases the Competition Authority has approved such a referral.

**The Authority’s application of EU Competition Rules**

22. The Competition Authority co-operates with other European competition authorities within the European Competition Network (ECN). When we apply Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty in a case, we inform the ECN in an early phase in the investigation. We also inform the Commission before we make decisions under these Articles. During 2005 the Competition Authority turned over such information to the Commission in six cases.

\(^1\) These figures include complaints in which no full scale investigation was carried out

\(^2\) Complaints of which a minor part led to a decision to open a full scale investigation
23. In one case the Competition Authority supported a request for referral to the European Commission of a merger reported to a national competition authority for review. The concentration had not been notified to the Competition Authority.

- Courts

**Summons applications**

24. During 2005 the Competition Authority initiated legal proceedings in two matters in the Stockholm City Court.

**b) Description of significant cases, including those with international implications**

**The Market Court**

25. During 2005 the Market Court ruled on five cases under the Competition Act in which the Competition Authority was involved. We present four of them here.

Petrol

26. In February the Market Court issued judgement in the petrol case. The companies Norsk Hydro, OK-Q8, Preem, Shell and Statoil were sentenced to pay a total of SEK 112 million in administrative fines. At the same time the Market Court upheld the Stockholm City Court’s judgement that the companies should receive compensation from public funds for their court costs.

27. In April 2003 the Stockholm City Court sentenced the companies to pay SEK 52 million in administrative fines for having violated the prohibition on anti-competitive co-operation. In consideration of the Competition Authority not being fully successful in the case, the court decided that the state should pay a certain part of the companies’ court costs. Both the Competition Authority and the companies appealed the Stockholm City Court’s judgement to the Market Court.

28. In its appeal the Competition Authority called for the companies to pay a total of SEK 405 million in administrative fines and that the state should not need to pay any court costs. The Competition Authority limited its claim to a discount reorganisation in November 1999, a lowering of discounts, maximum discounts for ten different customer categories, coordinated action towards large customers and an agreement on an armistice (to not compete by giving the customers higher discounts until the discount reorganisation was complete). The Competition Authority no longer claimed that the companies had also coordinated the changes in the post price before and after the discount reorganisation.

29. Except for the armistice, the Competition Authority won full support in the Market Court for the companies having violated the Competition Act’s prohibition on anti-competitive co-operation to the extent that the Competition Authority had claimed. The Market Court found that the infringements were relatively serious.

Heating, Water and Sanitation

30. In February the Market Court ruled in a matter concerning an appealed obligation aimed at the trade association VVS-Inställötorna by the Competition Authority. The Market Court sanctioned the Competition Authority’s decision of March 2004 that the trade association may not offer certain price lists for heating, water and sanitation to companies on the market. A fine of SEK 5 million was attached to the decision.
31. The Market Court deemed that the trade association’s actions constituted horizontal co-operation on prices, which is a serious restriction on competition. The Market Court found that the procedure entailed an infringement of the Competition Act’s prohibition on anti-competitive co-operation and that the Competition Authority had reason for its obligation order.

SF Bio and Sandrew Metronome

32. In January 2005 the Competition Authority made a motion that the Stockholm City Court prohibit SF Bio from buying Sandrew Metronome Sverige. After SF Bio announced that the transfer agreement with Sandrews had expired, the Competition Authority withdrew its motion and moved that the case be dismissed. Sandrew Metronome had instead entered an agreement with another buyer.

33. SF Bio made a motion with the Stockholm City Court that the Competition Authority should compensate the company for its costs in the case.

34. The court wrote off the case and awarded SF Bio the right to compensation for its court costs. The Competition Authority appealed the decision to the Market Court and moved that SF Bio’s claim to compensation be rejected. The Market Court awarded SF Bio the right to compensation for its court costs including those in the Market Court.

35. According to the Market Court the parties’ information about an ongoing procurement process with a set closing date in combination with the offer of respite for legal financial reasons entailed certain leeway which meant that the Competition Authority should have been able to delay submission of the summons application.

Insurance agents

36. In 2004 the Competition Authority examined if the Swedish Insurance Foundation’s recommendation to the insurance companies to convert to so-called net premiums was in line with the competition rules.

37. The recommendation meant that the insurance companies would only invoice for the insurance premium and that the insurance agents would themselves invoice the subscribers for consultation. The Competition Authority considered that the recommendation to some extent infringed on the members’ freedom to decide over their own actions. But because the limitation was not obvious, the Insurance Foundation was given negative clearance. The decision was announced before modernisation of the EU competition rules came into effect. Companies can no longer be given negative clearance.

38. The Insurance Foundation appealed the Competition Authority’s decision to the Market Court, which in its decision in June 2005 shared our judgement. The Market Court confirmed that the procedure could affect trade between the EU member states, but that the assessment of the competition limitation was in line with Articles 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty.

The Stockholm City Court

39. The Stockholm City Court issued a judgement in one Competition Act case during 2005. The court also issued decisions in two cases concerning the issue of a fine being attached to a commitment. In December the oral preparation was begun in the asphalt case, the largest cartel case in Sweden to date.

Ventilation
40. In March the Stockholm City Court issued judgement in the case between the Competition Authority and the companies YIT Building Systems and Keyvent. The case concerned three procurements of ventilation contracts and according to the Competition Authority, the two companies had entered agreements that were in conflict with the competition rules.

41. The court considered that the two companies had entered anti-competitive agreements in two of the three procurements. In the third case, the companies’ collaboration was a permitted fusion in the form of a consortium according to the court.

42. The court deemed that YIT fulfilled the requirements set by the Competition Act for a company to receive leniency, i.e. avoid paying any administrative fine (remission of fines). The Stockholm City Court therefore rejected the Competition Authority’s motion against the company.

Electrical outlets and switches

43. In November the Stockholm City Court ordered Schneider Electric Sverige to follow a commitment previously approved by the Competition Authority on penalty of a fine of SEK 3 million.

44. The Competition Authority was of the opinion that the dominant company, which sells electrical outlets and switches, had made use of loyalty creating discount and bonus systems in connection with sales to wholesalers. This may conflict with the Competition Act or the EC Treaty’s regulation on abuse of a dominant position.

45. When the company was informed of the Competition Authority’s investigation they committed to change their agreements with the wholesalers concerned. The Competition Authority decided to accept the commitment and submitted a motion with the Stockholm City Court to attach a fine of SEK 3 million to it, which also happened. In its judgement the court confirmed that the formal prerequisites for the commitment were fulfilled, that the commitment lay within the scope of the Competition Act and that the commitment was sufficiently specific.

The Competition Authority

46. To show what we have done during the year to combat serious restrictions on competition we present here a selection of our cases.

Anti-competitive co-operation

47. During 2005 the Stockholm City Court and the Market Court issued verdicts in several cases in which we were involved. (See previous pages).

Laundries

48. In October the Competition Authority made unannounced visits of companies in the laundry business. We suspected that the companies were involved in illegal co-operation to influence procurements on the market for laundry services. (The investigation was concluded in February 2006).

Industrial chemicals

49. In March we made unannounced visits at a number of companies on the market for the distribution of industrial chemicals. Similar visits were also made at companies in Denmark and Norway. We suspected that the companies were involved in illegal co-operation to jointly raise prices and divide the market amongst themselves.
50. In June we dismissed the case because the continued investigation did not show that any infringements of the competition rules had been committed.

*Abuse of a dominant position*

**Teliasonera**

51. According to the Competition Authority Teliasonera abused its dominant position by selectively applying more beneficial conditions to the private customers that cancelled their landline telephone subscription with the company and changed to a competitor. These sales methods obstruct competition on the landline telephone market, which treats the consumers unfairly on the long term.

52. In our summons application to the Stockholm City Court in October we demanded that Teliasonera pay SEK 44 million in administrative fine for the infringement that took place during 2003 and 2004.

**Contracts on the wallpaper market were changed**

53. After complaints from a retailer, the Competition Authority investigated if a company applied a selective retailer system for its collection of wallpaper, which entailed a limitation in the number of retailers.

54. We deemed that the contracts could conflict with the competition rules and informed the companies of this. The company then agreed to change their contracts so that they, according to the Competition Authority, are no longer in conflict with the competition rules. The changes mean that the same terms will apply to everyone that wishes to be a retailer. This in turn means that the availability to the end customers, primarily professional painters, increases.

55. The Competition Authority also turned to the Stockholm City Court to attach a fine of SEK 1 million to the commitment in case the company should break its commitment.

**Procurements of maintenance contracts**

56. The Competition Authority has investigated procurements of railway maintenance contracts. In all four procurements (which were held on the same occasion), the contract went to state-owned Banverket’s own production department Banverket Produktion. The Competition Authority investigated if price-cutting could have occurred in the bidding.

57. The investigation consisted of a review of the tenders, prior agreements on the stretches of railway concerned, tender documentation and other documentation, and contacts with Banverket. The investigation was concluded because nothing surfaced that indicated an infringement had taken place.

### 2.2 Mergers and acquisitions

58. During 2005 one case on concentrations has been submitted to an in-depth investigation or contained commitments.

**Special investigation – vegetable oils**

59. In August the Competition Authority initiated a special investigation into a concentration case on the vegetable oil market. After closer investigation of the matter, we decided to leave the concentration without action.
60. The concentration was also reviewed by the competition authorities in Germany, Poland and Norway. They also decided to leave the acquisition without action.

3. **The role of competition authorities in the formulation and implementation of other policies, e.g. regulatory reform, trade and industrial policies**

61. The Competition Authority shall contribute to effective competition in both private and public activities. We do so by proposing changes in rules and other measures to remove obstacles to effective competition.

62. We normally present our proposals to improve competition in reports to the Government. The proposals can also be submitted in official consultation statements to the Government or to authorities that want to know what we think of a particular report or an amendment to legislation. During 2005 the Competition Authority made 163 such consultation statements.

*Exclude cartel members from public procurement*

63. In a communication to the Government in May the Competition Authority proposed measures to make it easier for authorities and municipalities to exclude companies that have participated in a cartel from public procurement. The initiative is a part of the Competition Authority’s efforts to deal with serious infringements of the competition rules that cartel collaboration entails. Under the proposal, public principals would be able to request an affirmation from those submitting tenders that the company, or any company in the group, has not been convicted of serious infringements of the competition rules. This could be done in a non-bureaucratic and simple way that does not otherwise complicate the procurement proceedings.

*Co-operation with PTS on electronic communication*

64. Within the framework of its application of the Act on Electronic Communication, the National Post and Telecom Agency (PTS) shall request written statements by the Competition Authority before the agency makes final decisions in certain issues. During 2005 the Competition Authority submitted one such statement.

3.1 **Reports**

65. In our reports we analyse how various markets function, and submit proposals for improvement. In most cases the reports are made on our own initiative or by order of the Government.

66. During 2005 we surveyed the conditions of the general payment systems in Sweden and shed light on whether access to infrastructure in the payment systems can constitute an obstruction to the small actors on the market and thus obstruct development towards increased competition. The report on this Government commission will be presented no later than 31 January 2006.

67. During the year we presented reports on Government commissions in:

- competition in Sweden 2005; and in

- reports on the retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages.

We have also published a report in co-operation with the Nordic competition authorities.
The following is a presentation of the reports’ contents.

**Competition in Sweden 2005**

68. In the letter of instructions for 2005 the Competition Authority was charged with presenting a report that would provide a broad overview of competition in Sweden. Areas of significance to the consumers were particularly important to analyse.

69. In the report Competition in Sweden 2005, we describe how competition has developed in some ten industries and identify competitive barriers.

70. The review in the report shows that competition has generally improved in the industries reviewed – at least seen over the long term. An important part of the explanation of the improved competition is that new foreign actors have entered the Swedish market, which has squeezed prices, increased choice and improved quality for the benefit of consumers. In other words, competition in Sweden is being affected by new consumption patterns and increased international competition. New markets have arisen in stride with altered travel habits and the widespread use of the Internet. Private import of goods and increased imports from countries like China and India as well as from new EU member states of Eastern Europe have also contributed to improved competition on the Swedish market.

71. Despite competition having improved, several barriers to competition remain. In the report we provide some 20 conclusions and assessments as a foundation for measures to improve competition. The following are a few of them:

- Revise the regulations for the state monopolies on medication, alcohol and gaming.
- Provide the supervisory authority the right to have serious infringements of the procurement regulations tried by the courts and change the regulations to facilitate the participation of small players in public procurement.
- The municipalities tend to favour the large domestic building companies when they allocate land for construction. If smaller or foreign-based building companies were granted a larger share of the land, competition would be stimulated and there would be a downward pressure on construction prices.
- Joint ownership of hydraulic and atomic energy facilities between the country’s largest competing energy groups should be restricted.
- More frequent measurements of electricity consumption would strengthen the consumers’ position on the market.
- Make it easier for consumers to switch banks and insurance companies.
- Appoint a commission to analyse developments within the healthcare sector from a consumer perspective.

**Reporting on the retail monopoly for alcoholic beverages**

72. In connection with Sweden becoming a member of the EU in 1995, the Competition Authority was charged with ensuring that the Swedish retail monopoly for the sale of alcoholic beverages functions in a non-discriminatory manner so that products from all countries have the same opportunity of reaching
Swedish consumers. We make a report to the European Commission twice annually on the retail monopoly’s way of working.

73. In the year’s first report, we presented the preliminary investigation that formed the basis of bribery and corruption charges against three suppliers and several store managers within Systembolaget. We also reported of the measures Systembolaget has taken against corruption.

74. In the year’s second report, we presented the verdicts in the Stockholm City Court on the bribery and corruption charges. The court’s judgement agreed with the Competition Authority’s previous conclusion, i.e. that bribery and corruption may have affected the retail monopoly’s non-discriminatory way of working. At the same time we confirmed that Systembolaget has taken powerful steps against the problems of corruption in the company and against the suppliers.

Nordic Food Markets – a taste for competition

75. The Nordic competition authorities have jointly prepared a report on competition in non-durable retailing in Scandinavia. The report shows that the low-price stores’ market shares are increasing in the Nordic countries, that the chains’ own brands are taking increasingly more space in the store, and that cross border trade in non-durable goods is strongly increasing. But the share of stores with strongly pronounced low-price profiles (so-called “hard discounters”) is still small in Sweden in contrast to most of the other countries in the EU.

76. Overall competition has become tougher to some extent, but it still needs to become even better.

77. This is the fourth joint Nordic report – the previous reports dealt with the civil aviation (2002), electricity (2003) and telecom (2004) markets.

3.2 Official consultation statements

78. By making statements on proposals in reports and other documents, we can participate at an early stage and influence the preparation of proposals and future decisions.

79. A selection of the 163 official consultation statements that we submitted during 2005 is presented here. We have also participated in a number of oral inquiries.

Deregulation good for the consumers

80. The Competition Authority submitted a statement on the report Liberalisation, regulations and markets (SOU 2005:4) to the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. The Competition Authority pointed out that studies of regulatory reforms have shown that they contribute to increased economic efficiency and better-functioning markets, which is of benefit to the consumers. The deregulation of prior monopolies implemented in Sweden has essentially been positive, and a return to prior monopoly markets is neither possible nor desired. At the same time, high standards are set on the rules of play and active regulatory authorities when markets, such as the electricity and telecom markets, are opened to competition.
81. The Competition Authority’s views on some of the Regulatory Commission’s proposals:

- The Competition Authority shares the opinion that increased transmission connections for electricity between Sweden and other countries are needed.

- Sweden should as soon as possible decide on and prepare legislation on regulations for opening the passenger traffic market to competition in accordance with the Railway Commission’s proposal and the intentions of the so-called EU railway package.

- The Competition Authority supports the proposal that a general competition neutrality policy should be introduced to the overall ownership policy for national companies and agencies conducting business.

- The Competition Authority shares the commission’s assessment that the consumers’ position on the deregulated markets should be strengthened.

*Criminalisation of cartel crime can be counterproductive*

82. The Competition Authority submitted statements to the Government Offices on the report Competition Crime – a legislative model (SOU 2004:131). Cartels are a kind of financial crime that is very damaging to consumers and society. It is therefore important that there are effective means to combat and intervene against them. A criminalisation of cartels would indeed signal that society does not tolerate them. But at the same time it could reduce the Competition Authority’s possibility of gathering information on cartel collaboration and thereby decrease our potential of effectively intervening against cartels.

83. Additionally, there is a risk that Swedish participation in the co-operation within the EU will be made more difficult.

84. There is a risk that the persons who have information on illegal cartels would opt not to inform the Competition Authority if they risk prison time themselves. Moreover, parallel investigations lead to decreased efficiency. The proposal on a criminalisation of infringements of the Competition Act can thereby be counterproductive. The Competition Authority rejects the proposal of criminalisation.

*Consumer policy*

85. The Competition Authority submitted a statement to the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries on the department memorandum Future Consumer Policy – a basis for a new consumer policy strategy 2006 (Ds 2004:51). We consider there to be a need of acquiring more legal judgements that strengthen and clarify the consumers’ position. This should be done through a reinforcement of resources and mandates for the Consumer Ombudsman.

*No to price regulation*

86. In a statement to the Ministry of Finance, the Competition Authority points out that strengthened consumer influence on the financial market would be good, but rejects the memorandum’s proposal to regulate the maximum interest that may be levied for consumer credit. The Competition Authority points out that price regulation is a very large encroachment on the freedom of allowing companies to set their own terms towards customers.
The municipalities and deregulated waste management

87. The Competition Authority submitted a statement to the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning concerning the memorandum The Municipalities’ Role in Waste Management. The proposal for scrapping the municipalities’ ability to create a monopoly on the market for the handling of hazardous waste is supported by the Competition Authority. But we reject the proposal to make exemptions from the Local Government Act to allow municipal companies to transport or take care of waste other than household waste outside of the municipality’s geographic area. The proposal is in danger of distorting competition between municipal and private actors to the disadvantage of society and consumers.

More effective protection is needed for district heating customers

88. The Competition Authority submitted a statement to the Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning on the District Heating Commission’s reports Reasonable pricing of district heating (SOU 2004:136) and District heating and energy heating in the future (SOU 2005:33). The Competition Authority rejects the commission’s proposals on measures to strengthen the consumers’ position on the district heating market. In the Competition Authority’s opinion, the proposed changes would not entail fully sufficient protection for the consumers. The proposals are not an effective alternative to price regulation on a market that in practice constitutes a monopoly market. To find an effective method of protecting consumers from unreasonable district heating prices, the commission should also have examined other forms of regulation more closely.

4. Resources of competition authorities

4.1 Resources overall

a) Annual budget: SEK 85 million (equivalent to USD 11.5 million in January 2006)

b) Number of employees (person-years):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economists:</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers:</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>Other professionals:</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support staff:</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All staff combined:</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Human resources (person-years) applied to

a) Enforcement against anticompetitive practices: 63

b) Merger review and enforcement: 11

c) Advocacy efforts: 34
4.3 **Period covered by the above information: 2005**

5. **Summaries of or references to new reports and studies on competition policy issues**

*Available in English from the Swedish Competition Authority*

The Swedish Competition Authority. Functions and Organisation (April 2004)

Annual Report 2005 of the Swedish Competition Authority

Monopoly markets in transition – a summary of the report 2004:3

Telecompetition – Towards a single Nordic market for telecommunication services? Report from the Nordic competition authorities 2004

The Pros and Cons of Antitrust in Deregulated Markets Swedish Competition Authority 2004

Business as usual? Clearer Demarcation between Authorities and Markets – a summary of the report 2004:4


The Pros and Cons of Price Discrimination Swedish Competition Authority 2005

Nordic Food Markets – a taste for competition Report from the Nordic competition authorities 2005

Competition in Sweden 2005 – a summary of the report 2005:1

Terms of Access to Payment Systems – The Different Positions of Small and Large Banks - a summary of the report 2006:1

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