

2018 facilitative dialogue: Identifying options for outputs and outcomes and key questions for modalities

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Foreword

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List of acronyms

APA	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CCXG	Climate Change Expert Group
COP	Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
CTU	Clarity, transparency and understanding
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IEA	International Energy Agency
FD2018	2018 Facilitative Dialogue
GCAA	Global Climate Action Agenda
GST	Global Stocktake
MOI	Means of Implementation
NPS	Non-Party Stakeholders
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SB	Subsidiary Body
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SED	Structured Expert Dialogue
SR1.5	Special IPCC report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways
TEM	Technical Expert Meetings
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1. Context and overview

1. The mandate of the 2018 facilitative dialogue (FD2018) is laid out in paragraph 20 of the Paris Decision (1/CP.21). This mandate covers two main objectives: i.) to take stock of collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal as specified in Article 4.1¹ of the Paris Agreement and ii.) to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) pursuant to Article 4.8² of the Agreement. As directed by paragraph 16 of Decision 1/CP.22, the Presidencies of COP22 and COP23 (Morocco and Fiji) have been engaging in informal consultations with Parties to inform the organisation of the facilitative dialogue. These consultations are expected to inform decision-making on many possible elements of the dialogue including the inputs to, and modalities of the FD2018 as well as on any outputs or outcomes.

2. The FD2018's mandate does not explicitly call for outputs or outcomes.³ However, identifying what, if any, outputs and outcomes are desirable from the FD2018 could help the international community clarify expectations for the facilitative dialogue.

3. In addition, agreeing on possible outputs and outcomes from the FD2018 can help identify the inputs needed for the FD2018. Decisions on appropriate inputs, as well as the desired outputs and outcomes of the dialogue can help influence decisions on the modalities of the dialogue. Box 1 explains the terms "outputs", "outcomes" and "modalities" in the context of this paper.

4. Previous analysis (Ellis and Vaidyula, 2017_[1]) has explored possible inputs and information needs for the FD2018. The objective of this paper is to facilitate further discussion on whether outputs and outcomes of the FD2018 need to be proposed or agreed *ex ante*, and if so, what type of outputs and outcomes would best serve the interests of the FD2018. This paper also identifies key questions that could guide decision-making on what modalities would be appropriate for the FD2018; however, identification of options for specific modalities of FD2018 is out of the scope of this paper.

5. Section 2 of this paper explores the possible format and content of different outputs and their associated implications. Section 3 identifies the links between outputs

¹ Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement states that Parties “aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter [...] to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

² Article 4.8 states that in “communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 [...]”.

³ In contrast to the mandate of the FD2018, that for the global stocktake (GST) refers to “outcomes”. The global stocktake established in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement will also assess collective progress towards (i.a.) the long-term mitigation goal. During negotiations on the global stocktake, some countries have indicated that they see a significant difference between “outputs” and “outcomes” (UNFCCC, 2016_[14]).

and possible outcomes of the dialogue. Section 4 identifies some key questions related to modalities of the FD2018.

Box 1. Defining outputs, outcomes and modalities

This paper refers to “outputs” as the direct results of FD2018 discussions. This could include, for example, a summary of technical discussions or a list of Parties’ best mitigation practices (technical outputs) as well as a political declaration or a draft COP decision text (political outputs). “Outcomes” are used in this paper to refer to the short or medium-term effects of the information produced and work carried out within the FD2018, including those triggered by specific outputs. For example, a statement issued by the Chair(s) of the FD2018 that recognises a gap between the current emission trajectory and that consistent with limiting the average temperature rise to [X] could be an output. Outcomes could include better awareness by Parties of possible responses, or a strengthening of their domestic strategies.

Modalities refer to the ways in which the FD2018 can be organised. Decisions on modalities could be related to the format of the dialogue, whether and how many phases could be organised, the timing and duration of the dialogue, linkages with other non-Party stakeholder⁴ (NPS) work and other processes outside the Convention etc. The term dialogue is being used as an overarching term to encompass all events and processes that may be held under the aegis of the FD2018. When discussing individual components of the dialogue, the word discussions or workstreams are used.

2. Outputs

6. The FD2018 has been characterised by some (e.g. (Charles, 2017^[2]), (Mace, 2017^[3]) and (CCXG September 2017 Global Forum, 2017^[4])) as an opportunity to answer the questions: “where are we now?”, “where do we want to be?”, “how do we get there?” and “how do we encourage and inspire action?” (see Box 2). This section explores different possible outputs of the FD2018, which could address one or more of these questions.

⁴ Non-Party Stakeholders refer to all actors that are not Parties to the UNFCCC, except for bodies established under the Convention. For example the World Bank, city of Paris, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), OECD are examples of NPS but the Adaptation Committee is not.

Box 2. Possible themes for the FD2018 discussions: where we are now, where we need to be, how do we get there and how do we encourage and inspire action

During the discussions on the FD2018 at the CCXG March 2017 and September 2017 Global Forums on the Environment and Climate Change (see e.g. (Charles, 2017_[2]), (Mace, 2017_[3]) and (CCXG September 2017 Global Forum, 2017_[4]), four main questions were identified that could influence the type of information needed for the dialogue as well as its outcomes:

- Where are we now?
- Where do we want to be and by when?
- How do we get there?
- How do we encourage and inspire action?

“Where are we now” refers to the current state of progress of collective efforts towards the long-term goal; “where do we want to be and by when” refers to the future state of progress with respect to some time frame that would be in line with the long-term goal; and “how do we get there” refers to bridging the gap in climate action between the current state and a future state. “How do we encourage and inspire action” refers to framing discussions and identifying possible solutions that take into consideration the motivations of policymakers and other actors to enable the undertaking and strengthening of climate action. For example, identifying the economic and other benefits of incorporating climate responses into various government portfolios.

Some key inputs, e.g. the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees Celsius (SR1.5) and future UNFCCC Synthesis reports on NDCs will highlight issues relating to the “where are we now” and “where do we need to be” questions, so it may be that discussions under the FD2018 could focus on the issue of “how do we get there” and “how do we encourage and inspire action”.

7. As highlighted in Ellis and Vaidyula (2017), the mandate of the FD2018 can be interpreted more or less broadly. The possible outputs of the FD2018 will be influenced by the interpretation(s) of the scope of the FD (e.g. whether assessment will be made relative to shorter-, medium- or long-term global trajectories, whether it focuses on efforts or outcomes) (Ellis and Vaidyula, 2017_[11]). Table 1 lists some of the potential content of outputs from the FD2018, and their associated implications.

2.1. Options for content of outputs

Table 1. Options for the content of FD2018 outputs

Options	Implications for the FD2018	Comments
Reiterate the expected implications of current levels of collective action	There are many existing or planned reports that already assess the state of collective progress and identify gaps in collective action (e.g. UNFCCC Emissions Gap Report). The FD2018 could provide value-added by focusing on the implications of these gaps for collective actions.	The SR1.5 and other reports could provide an updated understanding of the 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios respectively.
Take note of timeframes associated with collective peaking and identify a range of trajectories associated with “rapid [emission] reductions”	This would require the FD2018 to assess or highlight the results of analyses relating to the timing of peaking and extent of emission reductions under different scenarios.	This collective information could be useful in informing countries as they identify or establish targets for their future national emissions pathways.
Identify current cost-effective means of strengthening collective mitigation action; identify barriers to action	Information from various Parties or NPS (e.g. IEA, World Bank) could identify specific cost-effective emission reduction solutions, barriers to action, and/or aggregated mitigation potential for a given cost. As mitigation costs and potentials vary according to national circumstances, countries may have to consider if and how to apply these possible solutions to their situation.	Outputs that include information on the cost and mitigation potential of specific technologies or systems at the sector level could potentially help countries identify strengthened action at national level.
Take stock of collective efforts of Parties	This could involve the FD2018 summarising e.g. the current status and new developments in Parties' policy implementation; summarising current investment trends, and/or summarising progress in the development and deployment of low-GHG technologies	As laid out in Ellis and Vaidyula 2017, this output could be framed in terms of efforts and/or outcomes, and could help identify progress towards NDC goals
Summarise good practice associated with selected individual policies, technologies, systems	This could most feasibly be done at a bottom-up level, e.g. by identifying promising individual actions or tools. However, time and resource constraints would limit the number of such inputs that could be feasible to include in the FD2018. The FD2018 could reiterate certain thematic best practices identified in other processes under the UNFCCC (e.g. Technical Expert Meeting (TEM)). Specific modalities may be needed to ensure information from other processes can be fed into the FD2018 as appropriate (e.g. timing sessions such that a specific thematic TEM can inform the respective FD2018 discussion).	Good practices could be identified (e.g. energy efficiency in sector X), or linked with a specific country. These practices could disseminate options that could help countries achieve or overachieve their NDCs. This could also help to inspire those developing or implementing policies to identify means to strengthen climate action.
Summarise good practice associated with accessing or attracting Means of Implementation (MOI)	Similar to above. Some Parties interpret Article 4.1 (SB46, 2017 ^[5]) broadly, to include adaptation and MOI in addition to mitigation. A broader scope of FD2018 would require more resources and inputs.	Similar to above. Identifying good practice in relation to MOI is challenging to do at an aggregate level. This is because barriers to MOI can vary by sector as well as by country (e.g. technology risk, effective

Options	Implications for the FD2018	Comments
Summarise information on future expected mitigation potential of mitigation options not yet widely used (e.g. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS))	This may require top-down indications (e.g. from expert NPS) of the mitigation potential of different technologies under specific cost assumptions.	institutional capacity). This information could be used by countries to identify the policy implications of the expected mitigation potential.
Identify information relevant to development of coherent policy frameworks that address multiple objectives , e.g. how to make infrastructure decisions that provide economic, environmental or social co-benefits.	The FD2018 could build on work that has been done elsewhere on issues related to policy coherence (e.g. Chapter 3 of the SR1.5, Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth (OECD, 2017 ^[6]), Identifying Opportunities for Coherence between the INDCs and SDGs report (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017 ^[7])). This could be done by seeking input from or forming linkages with relevant stakeholder and events respectively. It is not clear if and how contextual elements such as sustainable development, equity and poverty eradication which have been mentioned in Article 4.1 are to be addressed in the FD2018. Addressing co-benefits is one possible way to take into account such contextual elements.	Identification of co-benefits could serve as drivers of political will. For e.g. the NDCs of Bangladesh, India, Mexico, UAE and Ethiopia mention that mitigation and development strategies were developed with co-benefits (e.g. promoting public transit to reduce air pollution) in mind.
Identify specific guidance for NDCs including identifying gaps in information provided and information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding (CTU) of NDCs	Discussions under the FD2018 may wish to consider what lessons on an aggregated level are most relevant to NDC preparation in the early stages of the NDC cycle. Modalities of the FD2018 could usefully ensure that developments in CTU discussions – which may be occurring in parallel – can be fed into the relevant discussions in the FD2018.	Closing such information gaps could help during the information gathering phases in future collective stocktake and review exercises. Considerations for improving comparability of NDCs could be identified in CTU-related discussions.
Identify procedural lessons to inform the preparation of future collective stocktakes including on inputs; modalities; links between different workstreams within the process etc.	The FD2018 could decide to produce general lessons learned or target the output to inform a particular type of stocktake.	Lessons from the FD2018 could be used to inform preparations of other stocktakes such as the GST or the periodic review (see FCCC/SB/2017/L.1/Add.1).
No output	Having no output of the dialogue does not preclude inputs or discussion of the issues above. However, unless all Parties are present for discussions during the FD2018, having no output could jeopardise the FD2018 meeting its objective to inform NDCs.	The Paris Agreement contains no specific mandate for an output of the FD2018.

2.2. Options for format of outputs

8. The FD2018 may result in zero, one or multiple outputs. Decisions will be needed on the format of such outputs. These decisions can help determine for example, the type of outputs of the FD2018, the way of presenting information contained in outputs. The appropriate format can help ensure the information contained in outputs is communicated effectively and that the outputs best serve the purposes of the dialogue.

Table 2. Options and implications of the possible formats of FD2018 outputs

Options	Implications for the FD2018	Comments
Role of outputs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key messages and summaries • Recommendations to policymakers • Highlighting considerations for Parties to take into account (for example to revise NDCs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The role of outputs from the FD2018 will influence the modalities needed to establish these outputs. For example, if the FD2018 facilitator(s) are tasked with producing key messages or summaries, the procedure to agree on who the facilitator(s) are will take on greater importance than if the facilitator(s) have no role in the output. - Agreeing on recommendations from the FD2018 could be contentious, as these might need to be negotiated and there is currently no mandate for them. 	“Considerations” rather than “recommendations” may be easier to agree on.
Nature of output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Technical 	A technically-focused output (e.g. a summary of discussions) may need less negotiation in order to be agreed than a political statement (unless specific Parties can choose to opt out of such a statement).	If outputs are only technical in nature, it may not have as much impact on driving political momentum on climate action.
Types of output, if any <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Written <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Summary presentations from discussions ○ Declaration by individual or multiple Parties ○ Negotiated declaration (all Parties) ○ COP24 decision text ○ Other negotiated text • Oral <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Webinars ○ Summary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If outputs are to be negotiated, time constraints would need to be considered. Negotiated text (e.g. political declaration, COP24 decision) may enjoy the endorsement of more Parties and could have significant impact on political will. However, this wide participation may come at the expense of the level of ambition in the text. - The form of output chosen could affect the level of accessibility to its content. Thus, an oral summary would be available to fewer people than a written output disseminated on the UNFCCC website. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political declarations by individual or a sub-set of Parties could enable the dissemination of targeted messages. However, multiple such declarations from the FD2018 could result in diffusion of contradictory messages. - A variety of types of output is possible from the FD, e.g. negotiated and non-negotiated texts, summaries by an expert NPS or UNFCCCC etc.
Level of aggregation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggregated • Disaggregated⁵ (e.g. by sector, GHG) 	Aggregated outputs, e.g. sectoral mitigation trends or potentials could help the international community identify collective progress, or promising means to enhance it. Disaggregated outputs, e.g. specific lessons learned with particular policies or technologies, could help countries to implement mitigation responses that they judge as potentially promising.	The FD could produce either or both, as appropriate.
Body that prepares output: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNFCCC Secretariat • Facilitator(s) • Parties holding other functions (COP Presidency/ies, APA co-chairs) • Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) 	Choosing two co-facilitators (e.g. representing developed and developing Parties) to moderate discussions and prepare outputs could help to ensure balanced outputs.	The body/ies that prepares the output, and the mandate that it has for doing so, can influence the coverage and/or ambition of the output.

⁵ Disaggregation in this paper refers to sectors, gases and not country-level or regional disaggregation.

3. Outcomes

9. Decisions on outputs of the FD2018 will influence the possible scope of its outcomes. Possible outcomes include:

- **Driving and inspiring political willingness to act on climate:** a key outcome of the FD2018 could be to engage political actors to display willingness to act on climate. This demonstration of willingness could drive trust among Parties about the extent and ambition of others' actions and in turn, facilitate greater political momentum. A FD2018 that can engage a variety of actors, including high-level actors, could better enable this.
- **Enhancing mitigation action by Parties and NPS:** the FD2018 could enable enhanced climate action by Parties and NPS by providing targeted and useful information. Such an outcome could also be triggered by providing long-term and credible signals for example, from a political declaration or a technical output that outlines key solutions in the future. Such outcomes could also facilitate development of NDCs such that they represent a progression.
- **Informing the development of long-term climate strategies:** greater understanding of climate pathways and impacts at different time scales could enable Parties to establish long-term climate strategies. This information could also enable Parties to develop NDCs or adjust medium-term strategies to align with the long-term strategies.
- **Facilitate development of subsequent NDCs such that there is greater transparency and integrity:** information targeted at better informing the preparation of NDCs (e.g. CTU improvements) and information on best practices and barriers could facilitate Parties' efforts during development and communication of future NDCs.
- **Subsequent stocktakes taking note of lessons learned from the FD2018:** there are other stocktakes expected under the Convention that may conduct similar discussions in the future. Lessons learned while preparing for and during the FD2018 can help improve the preparations for these future stocktakes.

10. Table 3 identifies which of the possible outputs from the FD2018 (as laid out in Table 1) address which of the possible outcomes from the FD2018. This table highlights that some outputs (e.g. identifying current cost-effective means of strengthening collective mitigation action) can influence multiple possible outcomes, whereas other outputs (e.g. procedural lessons for future stocktakes) influence only a small number of possible outcomes. Further, Table 3 highlights that while no outputs from the FD2018 could still enable some possible outcomes, it would not facilitate others.

Table 3. Linking content of outputs to possible outcomes

Options for content of outputs	Possible outcomes				
	Drive political will	Enhance mitigation action, including by NPS	Inform long-term strategies	Facilitate CTU of NDCs	Influence future stocktakes
Implications of current levels of collective actions	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	–	–
Timeframes associated with collective peaking and rapid reductions	✓	✓✓	✓✓	–	–
Cost-effective means of strengthening collective mitigation action	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	–	–
Take stock of collective efforts	✓	✓✓	✓	–	–
Good practices related to individual policies, technologies, systems	✓✓	✓✓	✓	–	–
Accessing or attracting MOI	✓	✓✓	✓	–	–
Future expected mitigation potential	✓✓	✓	✓✓	–	–
Coherent policy frameworks with multiple objectives	✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	–	–
Specific guidance for NDCs	–	–	–	✓✓	✓
Procedural lessons for future stocktakes	–	–	–	–	✓✓
No output	✓	✓	–	–	–

Note: the titles of the options for (possible content of the) outputs and options for outcomes have been summarised to include only key words.

Legend: ✓✓ = a strong influence of an output in affecting an outcome, ✓ = little influence on an outcome, – = no influence or not applicable.

4. Modalities

11. The facilitative nature of the FD2018 presents an opportunity for Parties and other actors to come together to build mutual trust and discuss progress towards the long-term global goal referred to in Article 4.1, in the spirit of *Talanoa*⁶. In order to enable such a dialogue, an appropriate procedural framework for the FD2018 is needed.

12. Choices on modalities will define such a framework. These choices will reflect a trade-off between the comprehensiveness and scope⁷ of the process with the time, resource and other constraints of Parties, the UNFCCC, other potential participants.

13. As outlined above, modalities of the dialogue could influence e.g. how many and what types of inputs are able to feed in to the FD2018, as well as who is able to speak at the dialogue. Decisions on the themes for discussions could help influence the type of information that is highlighted and exchanged. Decisions on whether FD2018 discussions are to be held concurrently (or not) with negotiations on finalising the Paris rulebook, or with other negotiations under the subsidiary bodies, will influence the time available for discussions in the FD2018. Such decisions will thus also influence the ease with which information developed outside the UNFCCC process (e.g. IPCC special reports) can be disseminated and/or influence the FD2018.

14. There are many elements to the modalities of the FD2018 including timing, duration, phases etc. This section does not address all of these elements nor does it provide options for or implications of these elements but instead raises the following key questions.

15. Level and depth of dialogue

- a) Level: Will the discussions in the dialogue be focused, e.g. whether technical/political, by sector? How transversal would any political discussions be (e.g. involving multiple levels or government and different ministries)? Will they be high-level discussions, or at the working level?
- b) Themes: Would it be helpful to organise the dialogue under specific themes and workstreams and if so, what could these themes/workstreams be (e.g. the four questions on where we are now, where we want to be, how do we get there and how do we encourage and inspire action, see Box 2)? How many workstreams could take place under the aegis of the FD2018 and within each theme?
- c) Sequencing: how can event(s) related to the FD2018 be planned so as to leverage interlinkages with other processes and events, both within the Convention and outside of it? For example, how can FD2018 discussions be best timed compared to other relevant events e.g. benefit from or feed in to a relevant thematic TEM or a high-level event such as the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA)?

⁶ The philosophy of *Talanoa* – recognised by many Pacific island nations including Fiji, the incoming COP Presidency – can be understood as communicating productively and together (Farrelly and Nabobo-Baba, 2012_[11]) and (Talanoa & Development Project, 2017_[10]).

⁷ As highlighted in Ellis and Vaidyula (2017), a FD2018 with a broader scope is likely to require a larger number of inputs and discussions – which could impact the modalities of the FD2018.

- d) Format:
- How can discussions under the dialogue be organised to be dynamic, interactive, facilitative, and contribute to driving political momentum? How many discussions could be held?
 - How can the FD2018 balance inclusivity e.g. ability for the FD2018 to gather input from multiple Parties, and potentially also NPS, and practicability e.g. time and resource constraints available for the FD2018?
 - Could high-level events (e.g. similar to Ministerials organised on specific topics in the run-up to COP21) be organised under the FD2018 (see Box 3)? If so, how could such events feed into FD2018 event(s) held at COP24?
16. Linking FD2018 discussions with other processes (inside and outside the Convention)
- a) Inputs from external processes and events:
- How can key information from processes and events external to the FD2018 discussions be taken into account within the FD2018? This is of particular relevance for the IPCC SR1.5, which will only be available towards late 2018. Who decides which event(s) outside the Convention feed in to the FD2018, and how is the information fed in to the FD2018?
 - Will such information be incorporated on an informal basis (e.g. quoted by speakers during technical presentations of a formal FD2018 event) or on a formal basis (e.g. an official input in the FD2018 discussions)?
- b) Clashes with external processes: Given scheduling challenges and the small sizes of some delegations, are there certain discussions that should not be organised in parallel with the FD2018 (e.g. discussions related to the Paris rulebook)?
17. Timing and capacity constraints
- a) Constraints during COP24: If any discussions under the FD2018 are organised solely during COP24, what formats would ensure that the dialogue leads to the desired results, while ensuring that sufficient time at COP24 is available for negotiators to undertake the technical discussions needed to finalise i.a. the Paris Rulebook?
18. Role of NPS
- a) Participation by NPS: Would NPS be able to attend and observe or participate in all discussions under the FD2018 or would some discussions remain “among Parties”, as per the FD2018 mandate?⁸ How can information from specific discussions (e.g. technical presentations by NPS on a certain topic) feed into a FD2018 dialogue “among Parties”?
- b) Possible roles: What roles could NPS play in providing input to the FD2018? For example, providing written input, intervening in discussions, being selected to present on certain topics. NPS could provide technical information that could help address the “how do we get there?” question (e.g. technology development, technology update or cost trends in selected sectors).

⁸ Several Parties have expressed that they are open to the idea of including NPS within the FD2018. (SB46, 2017_[5])

- c) Challenges in receiving inputs from NPS: There are too many NPS for all to be directly involved in FD2018 discussions (for example 29 intergovernmental and 379 NGO participants were registered to participate in COP22 (UNFCCC, 2016_[8])). How could the interface between NPS and Parties occur, how many NPS would participate, and who would decide which NPS representatives participate?

Box 3. Key issues related to the organisation of high-level political dialogues

Any high-level political dialogue(s) under the FD2018 could help underscore key conclusions from technical discussions, increase political will, and inspire further action. The format of such dialogues could thus be important in enabling dynamic discussions that inspire policymakers and other actors to undertake more ambitious climate action.

High-level political dialogues at the FD2018 would need to be conducted using a format that is feasible and in keeping with its time and resource constraints. Some key questions on the organisation of such a dialogue have been identified and briefly explored below:

What format of discussions could allow for greater interaction and dynamism? How could balance be ensured in such discussions?

The format of many previous high-level dialogues (e.g. UN Climate Summit 2015) has involved political actors presenting prepared statements in a plenary session. This format affords all those who wish to make a statement with an opportunity to speak and specify priorities, actions etc. This format can also facilitate a balance in views. However, such a format does not facilitate interactive discussions. Possible formats for interactive high-level discussions include round tables or breakout groups. Greater interaction between FD2018 participants could enable greater understanding on certain issues, which may be useful to agree on key messages contained in outputs of the FD2018.

How could discussions be focused?

If the FD2018 aims to agree on key messages, this will be facilitated by focused dialogue. There is precedent for this in the UNFCCC context. For example, the high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance organised at COP19 encouraged participating Ministers to come prepared for interactive discussions on specific questions. Certain Ministers were then invited to act as “icebreakers” who would trigger discussions by “delivering concise and forward looking thoughts” on the set topics (UNFCCC, 2013_[9]). Co-chairs then asked participants for their views via specific guiding questions but participants were not allowed to present statements. Another format, employed by the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED), involved certain expert NPS (e.g. IPCC) presenting on certain topics after which Parties could ask questions and discuss.

To what extent could NPS input into discussions under the FD2018?

NPS involvement in discussions under the FD2018 could help to i.a. identify promising climate responses and highlight best practices. Other solutions can be found to facilitate NPS viewpoints at any high-level political dialogues. High-level NPS events could be held in parallel or prior to and external to any political dialogues. This could help highlight certain key issues that may be captured in the political dialogues. Alternatively, the Climate Champions could represent NPS views either by participating in discussions or by producing an input to feed directly into any political dialogue (CCXG September 2017 Global Forum, 2017_[4]).

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