



Foundations of System-Wide Stress Testing

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Introduction

Stress tests:

- Evaluate resilience against financial shocks
- Key post-crisis regulatory innovation


Introduction

Stress tests:

- Evaluate resilience against financial shocks
- Key post-crisis regulatory innovation



Single-Institution “Microprudential”



System-Wide “Macroprudential”

- ✓ Initial shock
- ✗ Endogenous shock amplification

“Need a robust and [easily]
implementable framework”



A “robust and implementable framework” for system-wide stress tests

- Existing **frameworks** and **models** fail to meet the challenge:

Framework shortcomings

- ✗ Highly tailored to **specific settings**
- ✗ **Not flexible** to new implementations
- ✗ ‘**Reinventing** the wheel’

Modelling issues

- ✗ Multiple, simultaneously operating **amplification mechanisms**
- ✗ **Heterogeneity** in institutions, contracts, (regulatory) constraints, behaviours...

Objectives & Contributions

Framework for system-wide financial stability analysis


- A **generic method** to model:
 - Interacting **contagion** mechanisms
 - Banks and **non-banks**
 - Multiple interacting **constraints**
- A **flexible, modular, scalable** framework

EU implementation of a system-wide stress test and policy experiments

- **System-wide analysis and calibration**
- Centrality of “**usable capital**”

Generic System-Wide Stress Testing

- **Python-based system-wide simulation engine**
 - Simulation engine also available in **C++**
 - Open-source **library** available online
- Flexible 'ontology' ('**building blocks**')



Implementation: EU Financial System

Initial adverse shock

- **European Banking Authority 2018 Stress Test Scenario**
- Used as a **microprudential benchmark**

Five building blocks

- **Financial institutions:** banks (42), hedge funds, asset managers
- **Contracts:** tradable assets, interbank contracts, repo, other
- **Markets:** price formation via price impact function
- **Constraints:** risk-weighted capital ratio, leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio, margin call, repayment obligations
- **Behaviours:** contractual and regulatory obligations


Implementation: Institutions and Interconnections

Hedge Fund	
Cash	Repo
Tradable Assets	
	Equity

Bank	
Cash	Deposits
External Assets	LT Funding
Interbank Loans	Interbank Deposits
Reverse Repo	Repo
Tradable Assets	Other
Other	Equity


Asset Manager	
Cash	Shares
Tradable Assets	

Policy experiment 1: From Micro to Macro: A Macroprudential Overlay to the EBA 2018 Stress Test



- Key finding: The financial system may be stable or unstable given a microprudential stress test outcome, depending on its shock-amplifying tendency. Therefore, microprudential stress tests are poor predictors of stability and system-wide stress test are necessary.


Policy Experiment 2: 'Usability' of Buffers and Contagion



- Key finding: Systemic risk decreases in an increasing 'usability' of regulatory capital buffers.

Policy Experiment 3: Calibration of Buffers with System-Wide Stress Tests

Key finding: The size of regulatory buffers needed to confine systemic risk may be underestimated if calibrated with microprudential stress tests, which do not capture system-wide amplifications, rather than with system-wide stress tests.





Policy Implications and Discussion

1. System-wide stress tests are **necessary** complements to microprudential stress tests to assess systemic risk – and further research in this area continues to be critical.
2. The **usability** of capital is key to systemic resilience.
3. The **calibration** of capital buffers should explicitly take into account system-wide dynamics.

More in the paper...

Amplification of Contagion Mechanisms



- Key finding: Contagion mechanisms may mutually amplify systemic risk. The degree of amplification is heterogeneous in the market liquidity and differs among contagion mechanisms.

Thank you for your attention.

Any questions?