FINLAND: PHASE 2

REPORT ON APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIbery OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIbery IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

MAY 2002
A. INTRODUCTION

I. Nature of the On-Site Visit

In September 2001, Finland was the first Party to the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions to undergo the Phase 2 on-site visit by a team from the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. Finland volunteered to be the first country to be examined in Phase 2 of the monitoring of Parties’ compliance with the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation.

The team from the OECD Working Group was composed of lead examiners from the Czech Republic and Korea as well as four representatives of the OECD Secretariat and a tax consultant. The meetings took place over the course of four days, and brought together officials from the following Ministries and other government bodies: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior, Office of the Prosecutor General, National Board of Taxation, National Auditing Board, National Bureau of Investigation, Money Laundering Clearing House, Finnish Security Police, Financial Supervision Authority, National Board of Customs, Research Institute of Legal Policy (Optula), Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and Office of the Chancellor of Justice.


Pursuant to the procedure agreed to by the Working Group for the Phase 2 self and mutual evaluation of the implementation of the Convention and the Revised Recommendation, the purpose of the on-site visit was to study the structures in place in Finland to enforce the laws and rules implementing the Convention and to assess their application in practice as well as monitor Finland’s compliance in practice with the 1997 Recommendation.

In preparation for the on-site visit, Finland provided the Working Group with answers to the Phase 2 questionnaire and translations of the full texts of all the relevant legislation, which were reviewed and analysed by the visiting team in advance. The on-site visit involved consultations in Helsinki with the various officials and civil society representatives as well as a visit to Turku to meet with prosecutors and gain a regional perspective of the issues. Following the on-site visit the Finnish authorities continued to provide the visiting team with follow-up information.

1. The Task Force is comprised of personal representatives of the Heads of government of the Baltic Sea States (i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden). The representative of the Task Force is an Operational Expert from the MLCH.
2. Methodology

The Phase 2 Review reflects an assessment of information obtained from Finland’s responses to the Phase 2 questionnaire, the consultations with the Finnish government and civil society during the on-site visit, a review of all the relevant legislation and known case law, and independent research undertaken by the Secretariat.

This review has not been prepared according to the format used in the Phase 1 reviews, which mainly described the relevant laws and followed the sequence of questions in the Phase 1 questionnaire. Since the purpose of Phase 2 of the monitoring process is to assess the implementation of the Convention and Revised Recommendation in practice, and most of the assessment is derived from the on-site visit, it was felt that the Phase 2 review needed to be fact based and evaluative, identifying potential problems in the effective prevention, detection and prosecution of foreign bribery cases. It is therefore organised according to the issues rather than the sequence of questions in the Phase 2 questionnaire.

The review contains recommendations (summarised at the end) with respect to each issue identified. Those recommendations that relate to the Convention have different legal weight than those that relate to the Revised Recommendation, due to the difference in the legal nature of the two instruments. However, some of the recommendations, which may appear to relate to the Revised Recommendation, might have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the implementation of certain requirements under the Convention— in these cases it will be up to the Working Group to determine whether a particular recommendation needs to be addressed as a matter of Phase 2 compliance.

3. General Observations during On-Site Visit

The on-site visit was characterised by the highest level of transparency and co-operation on the part of the Finnish government. The lead examiners are confident that the Finnish government fully disclosed all available relevant information in its possession regarding the implementation of the Convention and the Revised Recommendation, and that any deficiencies in the information obtained were due to internal shortcomings in data collection.

Finland has been named by Transparency International (TI) as the least corrupt country (out of approximately 90 countries studied) for two years in a row (2000 and 2001) according to the TI “Corruption Perceptions Index”. This Index measures the level of perceived corruption in the public service of each particular country. TI has also published a “Bribe Payers Survey”, but Finnish businesses were not among those that the countries surveyed were asked to rate in terms of their propensity to bribe.

The Finnish government is understandably proud of its excellent record of a low level of corruption in government. However it appeared to the lead examiners that Finland’s policy on implementing the Convention and Revised Recommendation is largely based on this record rather than a realistic assessment of the opportunities and pressures on companies to bribe in order to do business in certain foreign countries. The shared view of many of the officials interviewed was that bribery is not a significant problem in Finland and that therefore there is not a pressing need to ensure that adequate systems are in place for detecting and prosecuting the offence of bribing a foreign public official.

Since the coming into force of the implementing legislation, Finland’s criminal justice system has not handled any cases concerning the bribery of foreign public officials. For this reason comprehensive information concerning domestic cases would have provided the lead examiners with valuable information in understanding how in practice the foreign bribery offences would likely be implemented. The foreign bribery offences are incorporated by the original domestic bribery offences, and thus all the elements of the offence are identical. However, the criminal justice system has not dealt with many cases of domestic...
bribery, and, moreover, the data that has been collected on the cases that have been processed does not lend itself to a meaningful interpretation.

The main thrust of this Review is that regardless of Finland’s low level of corruption in government institutions, it needs to address the opportunities and pressures faced by Finnish businesses as well as foreign business headquartered in Finland with regard to foreign bribery. For this reason, many of the measures for preventing, detecting and prosecuting foreign bribery need to be fine-tuned in order for Finland to be prepared to detect and address foreign bribery cases when they arise.

B. EXPOSURE OF FINLAND’S BUSINESSES TO SENSITIVE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTS

Finland is located in the Baltic Sea region and borders on Sweden, Norway and Russia. It is the only member of the European Union that has a common border with Russia.

In 2000, 4.5 per cent of Finland’s exports (7 billion FIM) went to Russia and 11.5 per cent of its imports (20.5 billion FIM) came from Russia. The major sectors represented in Finland’s exports to Russia between January and June 2001 can be broken down as follows: metal and engineering (28%); chemical industry (18%); forest industry (13%); and telecom equipment (12%). The major sectors represented in Finland’s imports from Russia during the same period can be broken down as follows: oil, gas, coal products and electricity (65%); wood and forestry products (12%); basic metals (9%); and chemical products (8%). Russia is one of Finland’s major trading partners along with Germany, Sweden, USA and UK.

Finland is considered an excellent gateway to trading with Russia and the newly independent Baltic States due to its location and history of trade relations with these markets. In fact, Helsinki promotes itself to prospective foreign investors as the centre of the expanding markets in the Baltic region and Russia and an ideal situation for their Scandinavian operations. It also offers attractive features such as an excellent infrastructure, competitive living and labour costs, and the lowest corporate and capital taxation in the EU.

Domestic companies have also benefited from these expanding markets. For instance, it is reported that Kesko, Finland’s leading retailer, intends to capture a market share in Baltic retailing of between 20 and 25 per cent, and owns one of the largest retail chains in Estonia.

During the on-site visit, several Finnish officials described ongoing forms of corruption known to involve Finnish companies and Russian officials. For instance, it was reported that Finnish transport drivers delivering goods to Russia are commonly expected to pay bribes or similar fees to Russian officials at various checkpoints along their route in order to reach their final destination. The Ministry of Trade and

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2. On 30 October 2001, 10 FIM were valued at 1.68 EUR.
3. Statistics were obtained from the Finnish government and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.
4. Finland: Country Profile [Trade Partners UK (www.tradepartners.gov.uk)].
5. Helsinki: Centre of the New Northern Europe (Helsinki City Hall).
6. Ibid.
Industry has issued a study on transportation between Finland and Russia that identifies the harassment of Finnish truck drivers by Russian officials as a significant problem. The Finnish authorities advised the lead examiners that Finnish truck companies are not comfortable or accustomed to this practice and have therefore lost some of their markets to Russian truck companies.

The representative from the Task force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Region raised the issue of the percentage of bribes in business transactions with Russian officials. In his view, this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in respect of large construction programs. It was explained that larger companies have more resources to hide bribery transactions, and may hide the costs in their bookkeeping.

Other forms of corruption were also described that do not appear to involve bribery but provide an understanding of the corruption landscape in which Finnish businesses find themselves in certain countries. For instance, officials from the Ministry of the Interior identified double invoicing as the most significant corruption problem involving Finnish companies and Russian officials. They stated that in these schemes two sets of documents are prepared—false ones, which are provided to the Russian officials, and genuine ones, which the company keeps. In most of these cases an intermediary is involved. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the lead examiners of a recent study of the customs authorities from ten EU countries as well as Russia, which was conducted as part of the ongoing EU-Russia “RAID” operation. The study focused on goods transported through Finland from those countries, and indicated that double invoicing was used in 40 per cent of the cases studied. 8

A representative of civil society provided information about the use of protection agreements in Russia by Finnish companies. These agreements are offered by officially registered security companies, which may be owned by organised crime groups, and members of the Russian police. The purpose thereof is to compensate for the inability of the Russian government to provide a sufficient level of security in respect of, for instance, the activities of organised crime groups engaging in forms of pressure such as extortion. In one publication describing the findings of a research project on this subject, it is stated that in St. Petersburg the majority of Finnish companies studied had been involved with the protection network covering the city. 9 However, the Finnish government informed the lead examiners that Finnish companies operating in certain markets, including St. Petersburg, find recommendations of the Finnish Security Police and the National Bureau of Investigation on selecting security companies very useful.

The general impression of the lead examiners was that Finland views these forms of transborder corruption as a problem originating in Russia and beyond the control of Finnish companies. The Finnish business community and officials seemed to regard Russian officials as the perpetrators of any illegalities and the Finnish companies as having no choice but to bow to unwanted pressures.

The on-site visit addressed the opportunities and pressures to engage in corrupt activities in Russia and the expanding market in the Baltic Region due to the proximity of these markets to Finland. However, Finnish companies are also involved in business transactions in other countries where the incentive to bribe may be just as compelling.

8. The Finnish authorities explain that the goals of the “RAID” operation, which was launched in 2000 as a Finnish initiative, are to 1) eliminate double invoicing, 2) expose criminal organisations behind such activities, 3) investigate related gains obtained through criminal activities, 4) deter and expose money laundering and commerce related crime, and 5) improve the flow of information and create contacts between officials in Russia and EU member states. The overall objective is to provide Russian officials with legal assistance pursuant to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance.

The Finnish companies represented at the on-site visit were of the opinion that bribery of foreign public officials, including Russian officials, is not a significant issue for their companies. They stated that if faced with a request for a bribe their representatives would withdraw from any involvement in the transaction that gave rise to the request.

The Finnish authorities underline that the situation faced by Finnish companies operating in Russia and the newly independent Baltic states is also faced by all European countries involved in those markets. In addition, they believe that it is very difficult for Finnish businesses to operate in certain countries due to the prevalence of corruption.

**Commentary**

Although in certain instances Finnish businesses may operate in corruption prone environments, the companies represented at the on-site visit do not consider bribery a problem. If this perspective is due to a lack of awareness of the Convention, then Finland should make every effort to ensure that it has (1) effective measures for preventing and detecting the bribery of foreign public officials, and (2) adequate mechanisms for the effective prosecution of foreign bribery offences and the related accounting and money laundering offences.

C. DOES FINLAND HAVE EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR PREVENTING AND DETECTING THE BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS?

1. **Need for Increased Awareness of the Offence of Bribing a Foreign Public Official**

The Finnish government stated that extensive public awareness activities regarding the Convention have not been undertaken with business, labour and non-governmental organisations because bribery does not pose a significant threat in Finnish society. A representative of the trade unions was of the opinion that the government has not made a sufficient effort to inform companies about the Convention and the OECD Guidelines. However, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has widely published the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which refer to the Convention, and they have also been published in a recent document as well as on the Ministry’s web site. In addition, the Guidelines were presented at a large seminar in Helsinki organised for business and government representatives in April 2001.

The lead examiners examined the codes of conduct of two of Finland’s leading companies and concluded therefrom that companies may not have sufficient awareness of the offence of bribing a foreign public official. One code requires employees to work honestly and aim to behave in accordance with good ethical principles, and observe laws and the regulations and instructions of the authorities. It does not make any specific reference to bribery. The other code refers to bribery of government officials and candidates in order to obtain or retain business. It does not expressly prohibit bribes to foreign public officials, bribes through intermediaries, bribes for the purpose of obtaining omissions of government officials, or bribes for the purpose of obtaining or retaining other improper advantage in the conduct of international business, although there is no reason to doubt that the intent is to cover all prohibited behaviour.

It does not appear that compliance programs are commonly used by Finnish companies to ensure that employees are adhering to codes of conduct and business principles. Consultations with the private sector did not elicit information about the methods to be used for internal controls such as staff performance assessments including adherence to the rules, disciplinary procedures for non-compliance or the availability of channels for staff to report suspected bribery activities.
The English version of a publication of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers entitled *Corporate Responsibility: What does it Concern* states that it is especially necessary for large and international companies to familiarise themselves with the UN’s declarations and agreements, EU initiatives and the OECD recommendations etc. There is no specific reference therein to the Convention or the offence of bribing a foreign public official. However, the Finnish authorities state that the Finnish version does contain a reference to bribery. The Finnish branch of the International Chamber of Commerce commented that it is particularly difficult for small and medium-sized companies to be kept abreast of developments concerning international instruments such as the Convention and to cope with solicitation in foreign countries.

A representative of the Finnish Bar Association informed the lead examiners that the Bar Association has organised training on the Convention for interested members.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has provided all Finnish embassies with a copy of the Convention. Additionally the Ministry has drafted a booklet on the anti-corruption measures within the Finnish Development Co-operation including a description of the main contents of the Convention. The target group of the booklet will be all those acting in the area of the Finnish Development Co-operation, authorities in Finland and in Partner Countries as well as private companies.

Neither the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman nor the Office of the Chancellor of Justice have had training programs regarding the Convention, although they have the authority to receive complaints about the conduct of the Finnish police in investigating the foreign bribery offence as well as the various Finnish government officials involved in the implementation of the Convention in practice (e.g. the handling of requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition).

**Commentary**

*The lead examiners were conscious of a high degree of openness and transparency between the Finnish government and the private sector, and vice versa. These aspects of the relationship between the public and private sectors are very tangible in discussions with representatives therefrom and are highly valued by Finnish society. It is therefore evident that a culture and framework is already well established for the dissemination of information by the Finnish government about the Convention. The lead examiners believe that due to these factors it would be a relatively simple matter for the Finnish government to deliver effective public awareness activities for the purpose of educating the private sector about the Convention. The business associations represented at the on-site visit expressed interest in helping companies with the issues related to the Convention, and thus would provide valuable partners in any public awareness initiatives.*

**Need for Awareness of Non tax-deductibility of Bribe Payments**

Closely connected to the need for increased awareness of the foreign bribery offence is the need for awareness of the non tax-deductibility of bribe payments. The tax authorities are not likely to detect bribe payments in the absence of a clear understanding that bribes are not tax deductible.

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10. The Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice are independent bodies that monitor the legality of the civil service and the actions of civil servants.
Currently, Finnish tax legislation does not expressly prohibit the deductibility of bribe payments, and according to an information booklet prepared by the Ministry of Finance\(^\text{11}\), neither bribes nor payments made in the course of committing a criminal offence are included in the all-inclusive list of non-deductible expenses. Moreover, the non-inclusive list of allowable expenses includes advertising expenses and 50% of entertainment expenses, both of which are categories of expenses under which bribes to foreign public officials could potentially be disguised. Officials from the Ministry of Finance explain that the prohibition against permitting deductions for bribe payments is contained in a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court (KHO: 1985/5265). They also state that the administration has a good level of awareness of the non-tax deductibility of bribes.

In the Spring 2002, the Finnish government is planning to present to Parliament a proposal of amendments to the Act on the Taxation of Business Profits and Income from Professional Activities, which will include a provision expressly denying the tax deductibility of bribes. In addition, the next version of the booklet Taxation in Finland published by the Ministry of Finance will expressly state that bribe payments are non-deductible. As it is not certain when the next version will be released, the Ministry of Finance has, in the meantime, updated the version of the booklet available on its web site to state that the expenses that are not deductible include “bribes paid to domestic or foreign officials”.\(^\text{12}\)

**Commentary**

The lead examiners welcome the intention of the Finnish government to clarify the non-tax deductibility of bribes through an amendment to the tax legislation. They also welcome the statement in the information booklet of the Ministry of Finance to the effect that bribes to foreign public officials are not tax deductible. The lead examiners believe that these initiatives will clarify the issue for tax inspectors and businesses and raise their awareness of bribery transactions.

2. **Need for Centralised Anti-corruption Authority and Specialisation in the Bribery Field**

During the on-site visit the lead examiners attempted to clarify the allocation of responsibility for the implementation of the Convention among the various ministries. Although there was a clear understanding that the Ministry of Justice had formal responsibility for the implementation of the Convention through the amendment to the Penal Code, there was no clear consensus on where the current responsibility lies. Some government representatives thought it might lie with the Ministry of the Interior since it contains a special inter-ministerial committee regarding economic crimes. However, a co-ordinating body for the purpose of implementing the Convention has not been established because the government does not perceive any need therefor.

The Ministry of the Interior is the Supreme Police Command and has direct authority over the Helsinki Police Department, three national units [including the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)], 5 provincial police forces and 90 local district forces. The NBI contains the Criminal Intelligence Unit, which is the focal point for all law enforcement agencies involved in international contact and cooperation, which in turn contains a Customs Unit (CID), Financial Intelligence Unit and an Intelligence Unit. The Money Laundering Clearing House (MLCH) is part of the Financial Intelligence Unit. Neither the Ministry of the Interior nor any of its constituent bodies contains a special anti-corruption unit.

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The allocation of responsibility for investigating an offence depends upon where in Finland the crime was allegedly committed. It is the responsibility of the local police authority to consider whether it has the resources and expertise to investigate a particular case. Where a case is deemed too demanding to be handled locally, the local authorities are expected to contact the NBI and negotiate whether responsibility will be transferred to the NBI or whether they will work together. Officials from the Ministry of the Interior stated that in practice responsibility for a case is almost automatically transferred to the NBI where it has international connections or has taken place abroad because the NBI is formally considered the central authority for investigating alleged offences with wide national significance or with links abroad. It is the opinion of the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior that responsibility in practice for cases involving foreign bribery would almost automatically be transferred to the NBI.

The police have customarily initiated investigations of domestic bribery based upon reports of the media, injured parties, the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice.

The Office of the Prosecutor General in Helsinki (PG), which is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, is the central administration authority of the prosecution service. It contains 4 units, including the Prosecution Unit, which consists of key prosecutors specialised in different fields. In addition local prosecution units consist of key prosecutors specialised in various fields, including environmental crime, drug-related offences, cyber-crime, financial crime and offences with an international connection. Pursuant to an order of the PG, these prosecutors can operate nation-wide. An area of specialisation concerning bribery or corruption has not been established. However, the Finnish authorities state that state prosecutors and key prosecutors specialised in financial crime and offences in public office deal with issues concerning bribery and corruption.

The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice also consist of bodies and departments with responsibilities related to the implementation of the Convention other than the investigation and prosecution of the foreign bribery offence. For instance, pursuant to the Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering, the Money Laundering Clearing House (MLCH) investigates suspected money laundering cases reported to it by financial institutions. Pursuant to the International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, the Minister of Justice makes decisions regarding requests for the provision of mutual legal assistance. These requests are filtered down to the NBI where they do not involve requests from judicial authorities. The Finnish authorities explained that in cases involving extradition where there is no applicable treaty, the NBI is charged with conducting an investigation into the matter.

The Financial Supervision Authority (FSA), which operates in connection with the Bank of Finland, makes inspections and supervisory visits about once every two years to supervised entities. Pursuant to the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority, it is obliged to inform the MLCH of anything in the operations of a supervised entity that gives reason to suspect the origin of funds connected with the operation in question.

**Commentary**

The lead examiners are of the view that there is not a clear consensus of where the responsibility lies for the implementation of the Convention, and believe that the effectiveness of the implementation of the

13. This allocation of authority is not made through legislation, but is the result of a co-operative agreement between the provincial police departments and the NBI.

14. Although section 15 of the Extradition Act states that “where the request is not immediately rejected...the (NBI) shall conduct an urgent investigation in the matter”, the Finnish authorities explained that in practice such an investigation is only conducted where there is no applicable treaty.
Convention could be enhanced by clarifying internally the responsibilities of state authorities in this regard. In Finland, one way in which this could be accomplished is by centralising the authority for the supervision of the investigation of foreign bribery cases including the gathering and sharing of information. In addition, the lead examiners believe that in order to ensure the effective investigation of foreign bribery cases and consistency in approach, consideration could be given to requiring the local police authorities to automatically notify the NBI when they become aware of a case involving the bribery of a foreign public official.

The lead examiners believe that the prosecution of foreign bribery cases in Finland would be significantly enhanced were the state prosecutors and key prosecutors in local prosecution units specialised in financial crimes and offences with an international connection further specialised in foreign bribery for the purpose of supervising and advising on such cases at the central or local level.

3. Need for Improved Reporting Obligations

Tax Authorities

Authorities from the Ministry of Finance and the National Board of Taxation stated that tax authorities are entitled to provide information regarding suspected bribery transactions to the police, prosecutorial authorities and courts of law. They are also permitted to report transactions that they suspect to involve money laundering to the MLCH.

During the on-site visit the prosecutors explained that two cases involving foreign bribery\(^\text{15}\) (one in the early 1990’s and the other in 1998) were handled as tax frauds, and had been revealed by reports of tax inspectors. It is the position of the Finnish government that pursuant to section 86 of the Tax Proceedings Act, there is an obligation on tax inspectors to report aggravated tax fraud to the competent authorities. However, section 86 does not provide a clear obligation to this effect—instead it “entitles” tax authorities to “omit to report” a case of tax fraud to the competent authorities if it is deemed to be “petty” having “due consideration to the amount of financial benefit sought and other circumstances connected with the offence”. Moreover, a representative from the MLCH explained that the lack of a statutory obligation on tax inspectors to report suspicions concerning foreign bribery is an obstacle to detecting cases.

Commentary

The entitlement to report suspected foreign bribery to the competent authorities is not contained in legislation and the entitlement to not report cases of petty tax fraud is not a clear direction to report tax fraud that is not petty—it could be interpreted to provide further discretion. The lead examiners believe that tax inspectors are key persons for detecting foreign bribery, and cite the cases presented by the Finnish prosecutors as evidence thereof. In addition, Finnish law does not impose a secrecy obligation on tax inspectors for the purpose of precluding reporting in this respect. The lead examiners therefore encourage the Finnish authorities to establish clear guidelines to the effect that tax inspectors are obligated to report cases of suspected foreign bribery and tax fraud to the competent authorities.

\(^{15}\) One case involved the bribery of an Estonian official and the other involved the bribery of a Russian official.
**Accounting Professionals**

The Accounting Act does not impose a duty on persons responsible for keeping accounting records for companies to report suspicious transactions to the competent authorities. Instead it states that confidential information may be submitted to the pre-trial investigation authorities and the public prosecutor. The Finnish government indicates that this issue will be considered in the context of a possible future harmonisation process within the EU.

**Commentary**

The lead examiners recommend that Finland consider establishing a clear obligation on persons responsible for keeping accounts to report suspected bribery transactions to either the competent authorities or the relevant management body, which in turn would have a duty to report to the competent authorities. This would improve the possibility of detecting cases of foreign bribery.

**Auditors**

The Auditing Act contains obligations regarding the reporting of information. In one instance auditors are required to make a critical comment in the auditor’s report to the Board of Directors where a partner or Chairman of the Board of Directors, etc is guilty of an act or negligence that may result in liability for damages or of any violation against a law. However, this is a very limited duty to report as it only applies where the partner, etc is guilty of a violation of the law, not where a suspicion exists. Representatives from the Ministry of Finance highlighted article 20 of the Auditing Act, which provides auditors with an entitlement to make remarks to the Board of Directors, etc about matters not covered by the auditor’s report, and stated that where an auditor does not report suspicions about foreign bribery he/she could be liable for damages caused to the company as a result of the failure to report. However, article 44 of the Act provides that auditors are liable for damages where they have been deliberately or negligently caused by a violation of the Act. Since there is not any obligation to report suspicious transactions, the failure to report would not appear to constitute a violation of the Act.

Moreover, the lead examiners believe that Chapter 5, section 25 of the Auditing Act may create an obstacle to the reporting of suspicious transactions. Pursuant thereto an auditor is forbidden from revealing information about an audited company to an “outsider”, etc where this could cause harm to the entity unless the auditor has a statutory obligation to reveal the information. Since there is no statutory obligation to reveal information about suspicions respecting foreign bribery, the lead examiners believe that an auditor would always be prohibited from reporting his/her suspicions to the competent authorities. The penalty for violating the obligation of secrecy is a punishment under the Penal Code of a fine or imprisonment for up to one year.

The Finnish authorities state that the issue of the duty of auditors to report has been publicly debated in Finland, and recently a committee established by the Ministry of Trade and Industry thoroughly examined the subject, issuing a report in July 1998\(^{16}\), which included an international comparison survey. The Finnish authorities emphasise the current duty of the statutory auditor to examine and report material fraud and error in his/her reports, which they state is required by the obligation to observe good auditing practice.


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under section 16 of the Auditing Act. They explain that the manner of reporting (i.e. directly to the competent authorities, or to the Board of Directors or shareholders) depends upon the situation. The Finnish authorities state further that Finland imposes a duty to report directly to the competent authorities in specific situations prescribed by law, and that these obligations are in accordance with international regulations and the BCCI directive.

The Finnish authorities explain that the reporting duties of statutory auditors have been under review and it is likely that this issue will remain on the agenda when the auditing legislation is reviewed during the next months. They advise that due to the principle of confidentiality, they do not support an obligation on auditors to report suspected bribery directly to the competent authorities.

A further impediment to the effective reporting by auditors of suspicious transactions may be present in the rules under the Auditing Act regarding the independence of auditors. Pursuant to these rules an auditor cannot be, for instance, a partner, a member of the Board of Directors or the Supervisory Board, the Managing Director, a spouse of one of the aforementioned or an employee of the company in question. However, the rules do not prohibit former partners, spouses of employees and shareholders of the parent or affiliates (including foreign subsidiaries) from participating. The Finnish authorities indicated that the Auditing Act shall be amended in the near future in order extend the prohibitions for participating in audits and harmonise it with the recommendation of the EU Commission concerning the independence of auditors.

Commentary

The lead examiners recommend that, consistent with Sections V B (iii) and (iv) of the 1997 Recommendation, Finland consider requiring the auditor to report indications of a possible foreign bribery offence to management and, where appropriate, corporate monitoring bodies, and that such body in turn has a duty to report suspicions of bribery to the competent authorities. They feel that such an obligation would not violate the auditors’ duty of confidentiality. They further consider that Finland would improve its compliance with section V B (ii) of the 1997 Recommendation regarding the independence of external auditors by broadening the prohibitions under the Auditing Act for participating in audits, and encourage Finland to make the amendments that are currently under consideration as soon as possible.

Financial Institutions

According to statistics provided by the MLCH, in 2000 and so far in 2001, money exchange bureaux have provided the majority of reports of suspected money laundering to the MLCH. However, neither the Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering nor the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority establishes money exchange bureaux as reporting entities. Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior and the MLCH concluded that they are covered by the Act on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering.

According to statistics provided by the MLCH, real estate agencies have made 5 reports of suspected money laundering to the MLCH since the beginning of 2000. The reporting obligations under the Act on

17. The Finnish authorities explain that the obligation to observe good auditing practice incorporates ISA 240, which contains the duty of auditors to report material fraud and error in their reports.

18. At the time that this review was prepared, the Finnish authorities indicated that the EU recommendation would be published soon.
Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering apply to real estate agents referred to in the Real Estate Agents Decree. On the other hand, pursuant to the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority, real estate agents are not supervised by the FSA. The MLCH confirms that real estate agents are under the supervision of provincial governmental agencies, and that this supervision has been very haphazard and not functional, with the result that there has been no verification of the implementation of money laundering laws in respect of real estate agencies.

**Commentary**

The lead examiners recommend that Finland ensures that in practice the absence of an express obligation in the law on money exchange bureaux to report suspicious transactions does not decrease the effectiveness of money laundering legislation. Additionally, given the potential for money to be laundered through real estate transactions, Finland should consider adopting a consistent and effective approach to monitoring the compliance of real estate agencies with their reporting obligations.

4. **Need for Witness Protection**

The Finnish legislation does not include an act regarding the protection of witnesses and informants. A project to develop such an act is currently pending in the Ministry of Justice. Representatives from the Ministry of Justice advised that at this stage the content of the draft legislation is not certain and that the measures to be included have been debated for some time. They caution that Finland is too small a society to provide the comprehensive type of witness protection that is available in larger nations (e.g. change of identity, change of residency and anonymous witness statements), but that it might provide for the possibility of, for instance, video taping witnesses’ testimony.

Officials from the Ministry of the Interior had different views on the significance of the absence of legislation on witness protection. Some felt that in practice it has not created any problems, but others felt that its absence has created real obstacles to investigating and prosecuting cases. The Ministry of the Interior explained that regardless of the lack of a specific Act on witness protection, the legislation provides many specific measures for protecting witnesses, including the following:

- Hiding the witness during the trial.
- Taking contact information from the court.
- Following the witness.
- Obtaining a restraining order.
- Hearing the witness in court without the presence of the public.
- Prohibiting the publication of the name and address of the witness in the citizen register.
- Charging a person who threatens a witness pursuant to the Penal Code with the offence of threatening a person to be heard in the administration of justice, for which the penalty is a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years.
- Permitting the changing of a person’s name and domicile (although identity numbers cannot be changed).
− Prohibiting police staff from disclosing the identity of informers, pursuant to section 44 of the Police Act.

Commentary

The lead examiners encourage the Ministry of Justice in its endeavour to develop witness protection legislation.

Protection of Whistle Blowers

A trade union representative explained that one of the main reasons that employees of companies are reluctant to report is the absence of protection of whistle blowers in labour legislation and companies’ codes of conduct. The representative was not aware of any initiatives on the part of the Finnish government to address the situation. In addition, the offence under Chapter 30, section 5 of the Penal Code in respect of a violation of a business secret could provide further disincentive to the reporting of bribery by employees.

Commentary

The lead examiners recognise that the issue of whistle blower protection is inextricably connected to the broader issue of witness protection, and believe that it would be reasonable for the Ministry of Justice to include consideration of this issue in its project to develop witness protection legislation.

5. Need for Broadened Investigative Powers

Some of the prosecutors stated that the low rate of conviction for domestic bribery offences is due to evidentiary problems. The lead examiners believe that this may be in part due to the lack of legislative authority to intercept communications and undertake undercover operations where there is reason to believe that the offence of bribing a foreign public official has occurred.

Representatives from the Ministry of the Interior explained that it is highly probable that draft legislation providing a legal basis for the interception of telecommunications and undercover operations in respect of aggravated bribery, including foreign bribery, will be submitted to Parliament in the near future. The prosecutors confirmed that evidence obtained from communications interceptions and undercover operations would be admissible in court.

The lead examiners feel that due to the nature of the offence of bribing a foreign public official, these types of investigative techniques are important tools for obtaining evidence. The planning and executing of the foreign bribery offence would routinely involve use of telecommunications networks. However, due to technological impediments to the effective interception of communications and problems that will surely

19. Pursuant to the Coercive Measures Act, bribery of a foreign public official is not one of the offences for which an order for the interception of communications or undercover operations may be obtained.

20. These impediments include cellular phone features such as call forwarding, problems encountered in intercepting digital voice communications and high-speed data, and fibre optic lines.
arise as a result of emerging technologies, this measure should be complemented by investigative techniques that are not heavily reliant on technology, such as undercover operations.

Commentary

The lead examiners welcome the Finnish government’s intention to submit in the near future draft legislation to Parliament for the purpose of providing a legal basis for the interception of communications and undercover operations in foreign bribery investigations, and believe that such powers will significantly enhance the ability of the investigative authorities to gather evidence.

D. DOES FINLAND HAVE ADEQUATE MECHANISMS FOR THE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF FOREIGN BRIBERY OFFENCES AND THE RELATED ACCOUNTING AND MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES?

1. What is Finland’s Record concerning Prosecutions of Bribery and the Related Money Laundering and Accounting Offences?

Statistics compiled by the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 disclose that 6 cases of active domestic bribery were reported to the police in 1998, 7 cases in 1999 and 9 cases were reported in 2000. Statistics provided by the Office of the PG disclose that 2 convictions were obtained in 1998 for active domestic bribery (both for non-aggravated offences), 2 convictions were obtained in 1999 (one for non-aggravated bribery and one for aggravated bribery) and 1 conviction was obtained in 2000 (for non-aggravated bribery). The Office of the PG reported that since 1995 legal persons have been subject to fines only five times, and none of these cases involved bribery.


Statistics compiled by the Office of the PG disclose that in 1999, 226 convictions for “single crime” accounting offences were obtained and 403 convictions for “several crimes in sentence”, and in 2000, 238 convictions for “single crime” offences and 424 for “several crimes in sentence”. Information is not available about how many crimes were reported in those years.

It would be misleading to directly compare the number of reported crimes to the number of convictions for a particular year because the offences reported in a particular year were not necessarily prosecuted in the same year. It is fair to say that a comparison of the two statistics provides an indication of the average rate of conviction. The lead examiners are concerned that the rate might be relatively low for bribery and money laundering offences, but are unable to make any conclusive comments in this respect because of the lack of international comparative data. The rate is not known for accounting offences, but it would appear by the number of convictions that Finland has a fairly successful record in this regard.

Commentary

The lead examiners believe that the rate of conviction for bribery and money laundering offences could be improved by removing impediments to obtaining evidence and/or impediments to effectively prosecuting the offences. This Part of the review will examine whether the mechanisms for prosecuting the offences are adequate.

2. General Impediments to Prosecuting the Offence of Bribing a Foreign Public Official

a. Interpretation of certain Concepts in the Offence

Pursuant to section 14 of the Penal Code, bribery is only considered aggravated where the briber intends to induce a public official to “act in service contrary to his/her duties with the result of considerable benefit to (himself/herself) or to another person”, or “the value of the gift or benefit is considerable”. Additionally, the bribery must be considered aggravated “when assessed as a whole”. The Finnish authorities did not provide any judicial authority on the interpretation of these concepts. They state, however, that it is customary for the Finnish legislation to make the distinction between aggravated and non-aggravated offences, and that the Penal Code also does this with respect to theft, embezzlement, fraud, tax fraud, bankruptcy offences, forgery and assault. They further state that, despite the lack of experience concerning bribery offences, taking into account the criteria applied to similar offences in this respect, it should not be difficult for the relevant authorities to differentiate between aggravated and non-aggravated bribery in the absence of guidelines.

During the on-site visit, it was evident that these concepts are not interpreted uniformly by the police and the prosecutors. For instance, the police suggested that 10,000 FIM would normally be considered “considerable”, whereas the prosecutors were of the opinion that 50,000 FIM would be the threshold. One official stated that the courts would not concentrate on the monetary value of the bribe and the benefit. The preparatory documents to the implementing legislation state that the damage or loss need not be financial.

The lead examiners are of the view that the differentiation between non-aggravated and aggravated bribery is particularly important in the Finnish system because the penalties for the aggravated offence are significantly more severe and are linked to a much longer statute of limitations. The penalty for the non-aggravated offence is a fine or imprisonment for up to two years, and the penalty for the aggravated offence is imprisonment for at least 4 months and at the most four years. Moreover, the non-aggravated offence contemplates a bribe for the purpose of obtaining a breach of duty of a foreign public official, whereas countries that differentiate between aggravated and non-aggravated bribery normally distinguish the two offences on this ground.

Commentary

The lead examiners believe that Finland should consider providing guidance to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors concerning the differentiation between aggravated and non-aggravated bribery, due, in particular, to the uncertainty about the interpretation of the meaning of a “considerable benefit”, as well as the low number of domestic bribery cases from which to make an analysis of this issue. In addition, it

22. See paragraph 89 for the lengths of the respective statute of limitations.
would be advisable for the Working Group to follow-up decisions of the court in this regard as litigation of
the foreign bribery offence evolves.

b. Requirement of Precision in the Elements of the Offence

The Finnish authorities explained that the “principle of legality protected by the Constitution” prohibits the interpretation of a Penal Code provision in a way that is detrimental to a suspect. One of the relevant provisions from which this principle is derived provides that “the exercise of public powers shall be based on an Act” and “in all public activity, the law shall be strictly observed”. Another relevant provision provides that no one shall be “deprived of liberty arbitrarily or without a reason prescribed by an Act”. Due to this principle, the lead examiners feel that it is likely that Finnish courts would interpret Penal Code offences strictly, only applying the elements of an offence stated expressly therein. A narrow interpretation by the courts of Finnish bribery offences could result in a failure to address all the elements of Article 1 of the Convention (i.e. application of the offence where the bribe is made through an intermediary and the possible lack of coverage with respect to bribes to certain foreign public officials).

Bribes through Intermediaries

The bribery offences do not expressly apply to bribes through intermediaries. In addition, no information is available regarding the prevalence of the use of intermediaries in Finland for this purpose, and there have not been any domestic cases prosecuted involving intermediaries. The prosecutors stated that they do not imagine that the absence of specificity in the offence in this regard would be an impediment to prosecuting cases involving bribes through intermediaries, but they did concede that their job would be made easier by an explicit reference to this element in the offence.

Commentary

The lead examiners recommend that the Working Group follow-up the application of the offence in respect of bribes through intermediaries as litigation develops in this field.

Overlapping Definitions of Foreign Public Official

There is an overlap between the definition of “an official of another Member State of the European Union” and the definition of a “foreign public official”, both of which apply to the bribery offences. The former definition is much narrower in application in that pursuant thereto it is necessary to refer to the legislation of the foreign country for which the official performs public functions in order to determine if the person in question is “subject to criminal liability as a public official or civil servant”. The lead examiners have some doubt as to how these overlapping definitions would be applied where the public official in question were an official of another Member State of the EU to whom the broader definition applied but not the narrower one. Would the alleged briber be able to argue that, pursuant to the principle of legality in the Constitution, the overlap should not be interpreted to the detriment of him/her?

The Finnish authorities state that it is the intent that in such a situation the broader definition would apply. However, to avoid any uncertainty a draft amendment of the definition has been prepared that removes the overlap.
Commentary

The lead examiners have reviewed this proposal, and are satisfied that it removes the overlap. In addition, they encourage the Finnish government to submit the amendment to Parliament as soon as possible.

c. Necessity of Proving the Foreign Public Official had the Requisite Authority

According to the Office of the PG, proving the foreign bribery offence necessitates proving an element that is not prescribed by the offence itself—that the bribe was intended for a foreign public official who has the “exact powers” to provide the act or omission that the briber intends to obtain. The Office of the PG acknowledges that it might be difficult to obtain the co-operation of the foreign government in providing the information needed to prove whether the official had the requisite power, especially in countries where the local police may not be eager to pursue the case.

Commentary

The lead examiners recognise that this practice would not necessarily create an obstacle to proving domestic cases because the relevant information would be readily available, but are concerned that it places too heavy a burden on the prosecution in foreign bribery cases. They also draw attention to Commentary 3 on the Convention, which requires that it is understood that every public official has a duty to exercise judgement or discretion impartially and that this aspect of the offence is defined autonomously, not requiring proof of the law of the particular official’s country. The lead examiners therefore recommend that the Working Group follow-up the application of the offence in this respect to assess compliance with Commentary 3 and to ensure that the practice does not impede the effective prosecution of foreign bribery cases.

3. Impediments to Successfully Prosecuting Bribery Offences Involving Legal Persons

Since the liability of legal persons was created under Chapter 9 of the Penal Code in 1995, legal persons have been subject to criminal liability only five times and never in relation to bribery. The Office of the PG explained that the criminal liability of legal persons has mainly been applied to environmental crimes, and that the average fine has been 20,000 FIM. The lead examiners are concerned that the scant use of the relevant Penal Code provisions could be due to a lack of clarity in respect of certain key elements of liability, in particular prosecutorial discretion, the statute of limitations, and applicability of criminal liability to state-owned and state-controlled companies.

Standard of Criminal Liability

The lead examiners recognise that the standard of criminal liability in respect of legal persons was clarified through an amendment to the Penal Code in 2001 regarding the involvement of management required for liability, and believe that as a result the prosecuting of offences involving legal persons should be less burdensome. Previously, Chapter 9 stated that a person belonging to the management must have been an

23. Pursuant to Chapter 9 of the Penal Code, a corporate fine shall be at least 5,000 FIM and at most 5,000,000 FIM.
accomplice or allowed, etc the offence. Liability is now expressly extended to the case where a person is exercising a de facto management function regardless if he/she is formally a part of management.

**Prosecutorial Discretion**

Chapter 9 of the Penal Code appears to provide wide prosecutorial discretion in respect of legal persons, and the Office of the PG acknowledges that prosecutorial discretion is more clearly limited in law in respect of natural persons. Additionally, the Office of the PG confirmed that an injured person would be competent to force the prosecution to take place, but concede that there have not been any cases where this has occurred.

**Statute of Limitations**

The Penal Code provides a limitations period of ten years for aggravated bribery and five years for non-aggravated bribery (i.e. the period after the commission of the offence within which a criminal action can be brought). Moreover, Chapter 9 of the Penal Code states that a legal person cannot be sentenced to a punishment where the offender cannot to be sentenced due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but that in any case the minimum period shall be five years. However, representatives from the Office of the PG stated that the limitations period in respect of legal persons is five years for bribery cases. It would therefore appear that the limitations period that has been applied in practice to legal persons is the minimum period.

**State-owned and State-controlled Companies**

The lead examiners are of the view that state-owned/controlled companies play a significant role in the Finnish economy. Finland owns shares in more than 40 companies, twenty-two of which fall under the administrative domain of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. According to the Ministry, during the expansion of the ownership base in many state-owned companies, during a period of about ten years, Finland has become a major owner of publicly listed companies. As of 2000, Finland owned shares in eleven listed companies, seven of which are industrial and energy companies.24

The Finnish authorities explained that they have no experience regarding the application of the criminal liability of legal persons to state-owned and state-controlled companies, but believe that for liability to apply thereto the company would probably have to be majority state-owned.

**Commentary**

*The lead examiners are of the opinion that Finland should consider providing guidance to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors clarifying the application of the relevant Penal Code provisions to legal persons in respect of prosecutorial discretion, the statute of limitations and coverage of the law regarding state-owned/controlled companies, in order that the authorities would be able to more efficiently pursue legal persons for the foreign bribery offence.*

4. Are the Relevant Sanctions Sufficiently Effective, Proportionate and Dissuasive in Practice

a. Foreign Bribery Offence

Statistics provided by the Office of the PG indicate that since 1998 the following sanctions have been applied for the active domestic bribery offences: one term of conditional imprisonment for 7 months (aggravated offence), 25 day-fines (once), 50 day-fines (once) and 80 day-fines (twice). Pursuant to Chapter 2a of the Penal Code, day-fines for natural persons are calculated on the basis of 1/60 of the average monthly income of the person fined, the minimum number of which shall be one and the maximum number 120. Information is not available on the actual amount of the day-fines that have been ordered. In addition, information about the relevant sanctions is not currently available in a manner that links penalties to essential information about the cases (e.g. amount and purpose of the bribe, whether the bribe was successful). The Finnish authorities state, however, that statistical information can be compiled in such a manner.

The lead examiners have been informed that a fine penalty is not available for aggravated bribery, and that for non-aggravated bribery a fine is available by itself or in conjunction with conditional imprisonment. They were also informed that conditional imprisonment is converted to actual imprisonment where the offender commits another offence.

In Finland first-time prisoners are normally released on parole after having served one-half of their sentence. According to officials from the Ministry of Justice, a person on parole is required to serve the rest of the sentence in prison if he/she commits another offence, but parole rarely entails the imposition of other conditions such as regular reporting to the authorities.

Commentary

The lead examiners recognise that criminal sanctions in Finland are traditionally less severe than in some other jurisdictions, and realise that the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for non-aggravated and aggravated bribery are consistent with similar economic crimes such as theft and embezzlement. However, due to the absence of information for the purpose of interpreting sentencing statistics, they cannot determine whether the Finnish authorities have sought severe enough penalties for bribery within the parameters of the Penal Code. The lead examiners therefore recommend that in order to be able to evaluate whether future penalties for bribery are proportionate, dissuasive and effective, statistical information be compiled along with essential information about the offences to which they apply, and that the sanctions for domestic and foreign bribery be revisited by the Working Group following the development of some case-law in this regard.

b. Money Laundering Offence

Information about the level of sanctions for the receiving offences does not appear to be available, although the MLCH informed the lead examiners that the average value of property laundered where there has been a conviction is 200,000 FIM. In addition, the Finnish authorities stated that the courts consider property valued at 170,000 FIM to be “very valuable property” for the purpose of triggering the application of the aggravated receiving offence.
Commentary

Again, due to the lack of information about sanctions, the lead examiners are not in a position to comment on the effectiveness, etc of the sanctions imposed in practice to money laundering offences. They therefore encourage the Finnish authorities to compile the relevant statistical information for the purpose of a future assessment.

c. Accounting Offences

Incomplete Statistical Information about Sanctions

According to statistics provided by the Office of the PG, imprisonment has rarely been ordered for accounting offences. In the years 1999 and 2000, the most common penalties were an average fine of 47 day-fines for a “single crime” and 50.5 day-fines for “several crimes in sentence”. Conditional imprisonment, which was the second most common penalty, was ordered for just over 3 months on the average for a “single crime” and 3.7 months for “several crimes in sentence”. Community service was also ordered on a few occasions, ranging from 82 hours for a “single crime” to 113 hours for “several crimes in sentence”. The lead examiners have difficulty interpreting these statistics in the absence of essential information about the offences in question, including the actual amount of the fines.

Insufficient Knowledge of where the Responsibility for Bookkeeping lies

During the on-site visit, the lead examiners were provided with different explanations about who is the person responsible for keeping a company’s accounts. Some officials were of the opinion that the responsibility lies with the managing director and the board of directors. A representative of the accounting profession believed that management has the responsibility and that each person in management would be charged with the accounting offence in question. Representatives from the business sector stated that the Chief Financial Officer of a company has the responsibility for ensuring that bookkeeping is according to the law. However, the Finnish government states that the responsibility is clearly defined in legislation, including Chapter 8, section 6 of the Finnish Company Act, which states that the Board of Directors is responsible for supervising the book-keeping and the control of financial matters, and the Manager Director is responsible for ensuring that the bookkeeping complies with the law and the financial matters are handled in a reliable manner.

The Office of the Prosecutor informed the lead examiners of a recent Supreme Court judgement (KKO: 2001:86) in which it was decided that anyone who exercises actual authority in respect of bookkeeping can be prosecuted for an accounting offence. In addition, in a 1993 judgement of the Court of Appeal of Turku, Board members were sentenced for negligent accounting offences even though they did not participate in management and did not know anything about the offences, because they were obliged to make themselves familiar with the status of the company’s accounts.

25. According to legislation, the amount of one day-fine is 1/60 of the net monthly income [at least 40 FIM (6.8 Euro)].
Non-applicability of Accounting Offences to Legal Persons

The accounting offences under the Penal Code and the Accounting Act do not apply to legal persons. Representatives of the Office of the PG indicated that the absence of the liability of legal persons in this respect has not impeded the prosecution of accounting offences because it has not been difficult to identify the person “behind the offence”. It was acknowledged, however, that the absence of an accounting offence in respect of legal persons means that a legal person could not be considered to have laundered the proceeds of an accounting offence since no offence would have been committed in such a case.

Exemptions from Obligation to keep Consolidated Accounts

Pursuant to Chapter 6, section 1 of the Accounting Act, most companies above a certain size limit are required to prepare consolidated accounts (i.e. the requirement for a parent company to include in its bookkeeping the accounts of both the parent company and controlled subsidiaries). The Finnish authorities state that the exemptions thereunder are consistent with those under the 7th EU Directive. In addition, pursuant to the Company Act (Chapter 11, article 10 and Chapter 12, article 1) consolidated accounts are compulsory for a parent company if it intends to distribute assets (dividends). The Finnish authorities state that there is no inconsistency between the two requirements because in practice they are applied so that a company that distributes assets is required, despite its size, to prepare consolidated accounts. They state further that this requirement makes the preparation of consolidated accounts almost mandatory for most limited companies in Finland.

However, the lead examiners noted that chapter 6, article 17 of the Accounting Act, which is based on the 7th EU directive, permits the non-consolidation of the accounts of subsidiaries with dissimilar activities in certain cases, and that in the GAAP 2000 Survey this was viewed as an issue that could lead to differences from the International Accounting Standard 27.26 In addition, the relevant legislative provisions appear to only apply to the preparation of consolidated accounts for domestic subsidiaries.

The Finnish authorities informed the lead examiners that the EU is planning to amend the 7th directive in order to remove the possibility of not consolidating the accounts of subsidiaries with dissimilar activities, following which the Finnish Accounting Act would also be amended.

Commentary

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104(1). With respect to the apparent non-availability of essential statistical information about sanctions for accounting offences, the lead examiners reiterate their comments regarding the foreign bribery and money laundering offences to the effect that the Finnish authorities consider compiling the relevant information for the purpose of a future assessment.

104(2). The lead examiners also advise that the accounting profession and companies themselves need to have a more precise understanding of the legal responsibility for bookkeeping. They feel that, in light of the absence of liability of legal persons for the accounting offences, it is particularly important that there is more widespread knowledge about the broad responsibility for bookkeeping. It is

26. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) Survey is a survey by the large accounting firms of national accounting in fifty-three countries.
therefore recommended that, in light of the Supreme Court judgement in which it was decided that anyone who exercises actual authority in respect of bookkeeping could be prosecuted for an accounting offence, the Finnish government should consider informing accounting professionals about the practical consequences thereof to clarify responsibility and raise public awareness in this regard.

104(3). The lead examiners are concerned that in the absence of the liability of legal persons for the accounting offences, it may not be possible to effectively address accounting offences connected with the concealment of foreign bribery, and recommend that the Working Group follow-up this issue to determine whether Finland is able to effectively address accounting offences connected with the concealment of foreign bribery.

104(4) The lead examiners believe that the removal of the possibility of not consolidating accounts of subsidiaries with dissimilar activities would improve a parent corporation’s ability to detect bribe payments made by subsidiaries, and therefore would welcome the amendments to the Accounting Act expected by the Finnish government. In addition, they recommend that Finland consider whether the relevant laws need to be amended to expressly extend the requirement to keep consolidated accounts to companies with controlled foreign subsidiaries.

d. Confiscation

The Office of the PG informed the lead examiners that although pursuant to the Penal Code there is discretionary authority to order confiscation of both the bribe and the proceeds of bribery in respect of the active bribery offence, in practice confiscation of the bribe has not been ordered because there have not been any actual bribes to confiscate, and the proceeds have not been confiscated because it is “too difficult to assess the surplus”\(^{27}\).

The Office of the PG explained that where the property in question is in the possession of a third party (i.e. a person other than the offender) it could not be confiscated from him/her unless it was proven that he/she is not the bona fide owner. Additionally, the Finnish authorities explain that despite the lack of experience with confiscation in respect of bribery, they believe that it is possible to confiscate the bribe when it is still in the hands of the briber if there is something concrete involved, such as banknotes in an envelope or perhaps the amount of money promised in an e-mail message.

It was also explained by the Office of the PG that confiscation is not considered a punishment under the Finnish criminal legal system, and pursuant to a Supreme Court judgement (KKO: 1996-11-127) it is not possible to order confiscation (i.e. forfeiture to the state) where a victim with a right to compensation is in existence. It appears that confiscation would not be available even where the victim has not requested compensation. However, the Finnish authorities indicate that an amendment to Chapter 10 of the Penal Code will come into force in the beginning of 2002, according to which the financial benefit of an offence shall be ordered forfeited if a victim does not avail himself/herself of the right to compensation.

The Finnish authorities also stated that although it is normally the case that there is a victim with a right to compensation in respect of financial crimes, there is normally not a victim in respect of bribery and thus the proceeds of the offence can be confiscated.

Contrary to Article 3.3 of the Convention, monetary sanctions of a comparable effect are not available where confiscation is not possible for any reason.

\(^{27}\) The Finnish authorities explained that the surplus is normally assessed by obtaining an expert opinion.
Commentary

The lead examiners recognise that identifying the proceeds of bribery can be difficult, but feel that the high burden of proof where a third person is in possession of the property in question could be a further obstacle to confiscation. They are also of the opinion that, in light of the absence of the authority of the court to order monetary sanctions of a comparable effect and the seemingly low sanctions that have been applied to domestic bribery offences, a future assessment by the Working Group of the sanctions for foreign bribery should include an assessment of the application of confiscation.

The lead examiners welcome the amendment to the Penal Code, which will come into force early in 2002, for the purpose of requiring forfeiture of the proceeds of an offence where the victim does not avail himself/herself of the right to compensation, and feel that it removes a significant obstacle to effective confiscation.

e. Lapse of Sanctions

Pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Penal Code a sentence of imprisonment shall lapse within five years if it is for at most one year, and within 10 years if it is for over one year and at most four years. The enforcement of a fine (for natural as well as legal persons28) shall lapse five years after the day the final judgement was given, and the enforcement of a sanction of confiscation shall lapse ten years after that day. It is the position of the Finnish government that it is not probable that these provisions could provide an obstacle to the effective application of sanctions to the foreign bribery offence, as this has not been the situation with other offences. In addition, the Finnish authorities state that the executive authorities are active in the enforcement of punishments.

The Finnish authorities informed the lead examiners that a convicted person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment is not necessarily taken into custody at the time the sentence is pronounced. And once the period of imprisonment lapses, Finland does not have the authority to impose the sentence even if the person evaded capture. The Office of the PG and a representative of the MLCH explained that there have been cases where convicted persons avoided imprisonment by hiding in the US.

With respect to fines, the Finnish authorities indicated that pursuant to Chapter 2, section 4 of the Penal Code, a court order could be obtained to convert a fine to imprisonment. However, the lead examiners have discovered that this provision appears to have been repealed in 1999. Additionally, the authority to convert fines in this way would not provide a workable alternative in respect of legal persons. The Office of the PG explained that since so far legal persons have been subject to fines of such a “trifling amount”, the provision on the lapsing of fines would not influence their behaviour in this respect.

A representative of the MLCH explained that the sanction of confiscation could not be converted to imprisonment.

Commentary

The lead examiners believe that the provisions on the lapsing of sanctions could provide another obstacle to the application of effective, persuasive and dissuasive sanctions and could seriously undermine

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28. The corresponding provision for legal persons is in Chapter 9 of the Penal Code.
deterrence. They therefore recommend that the Working Group assess the impact of these provisions in any follow-up on the imposition of sanctions in practice to the foreign bribery offence.

5. **How effective is the Application in Practice of Nationality Jurisdiction**

Pursuant to Chapter 1, subsection 11(1) of the Penal Code, in order to establish nationality jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction over an offence committed abroad by a Finnish national) an offence must be punishable under the law of the place of commission and a sentence could have been passed for it also by a court in that state (dual criminality). The language of this requirement appears to impose quite a strict form of dual criminality, which would appear to prevent establishing nationality jurisdiction in certain cases. 29

Officials from the Ministry of Justice reported to the lead examiners that an amendment to the Penal Code that would remove the requirement of dual criminality in respect of nationality jurisdiction is before Parliament, and is expected to be passed sometime in 2002.

**Commentary**

The lead examiners welcome the legislative initiative before Parliament and are confident that the removal of the requirement of dual criminality for the establishment of nationality jurisdiction will correct the impediments to effective nationality jurisdiction identified above.

6. **How effective is the Application in Practice of the Money Laundering Offences**

Chapter 32 of the Penal Code contains “receiving offences” that include subsections that refer expressly to money laundering. Pursuant to these provisions, any offence can constitute an offence for which it is a crime to launder the proceeds therefrom (i.e. the “predicate offence”). Representatives of the MLCH informed the lead examiners that so far there have not been any money laundering cases connected to domestic or foreign bribery.

The lead examiners have identified the following impediments in the law, which they believe may be obstacles to the effective prosecution of money laundering and thus a reason for the absence of cases connected to bribery:

(i) Contrary to Article 7 of the Convention, the money laundering offences do not apply “without regard to the place where the bribery occurred”. The Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Prosecutor explained to the lead examiners that the money laundering offences only apply to foreign bribery that takes place abroad where the country in which the bribery occurred has a foreign bribery offence.

29. The requirement of dual criminality would appear to exclude establishing nationality jurisdiction in the following cases: (i) The statute of limitations has expired in the foreign state but not in Finland.

(ii) A defence that does not exist in Finland is applicable in the foreign state.

(iii) A Finnish national bribes a foreign public official from country “B” abroad in country “A”, and country “A” has not established the offence of bribing a foreign public official. Officials from the Ministry of Justice provided that in practice nationality jurisdiction would be extended where country “A” has a domestic bribery offence and one of country “A’s” own officials was bribed (but not an official from country “B”)

(iv) A Finnish company bribes abroad in a state that has not established the criminal liability of legal persons.
(ii) *The offences only apply to third persons, not the person who committed the predicate offence.

(iii) To prove a money laundering offence, it is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the “predicate offence” took place, even where the money laundering offence in question involves “a reason to believe” (“negligent receiving offence”) that the property was acquired through an offence.

(iv) Corporate criminal liability does not appear to apply to the “negligent receiving offence” even though it would typically be the case that a legal person involved in money laundering (e.g. a car dealership) would have “reason to believe” that the property was acquired through an offence. Moreover, representatives of the Office of the PG acknowledge that where corporate criminal liability applies, in practice it is impossible to convict a legal person without having convicted the person behind the offence of money laundering.

(v) *Attempted money laundering has not been criminalised.

The Ministry of Justice informed the lead examiners that draft amendments to the Penal Code provisions on money laundering have been prepared for the purpose of consultations. According to the MLCH, these proposals would change the law as follows:

(i) Money laundering would be made an independent crime and not part of the receiving offences.

(ii) Negligent money laundering would be criminalised. Since the current offences cover the “reason to believe” standard, it would appear that the new standard would cover cases where the person concerned “should have known” that the property in question was obtained through an offence.

(iii) Attempted money laundering would be criminalised.

(iv) The burden of proof would shift to the alleged offender where he/she has unexplained property.

**Commentary**

The lead examiners welcome the recommendations for changes to the law on money laundering. However, they remain concerned that by not addressing all of the impediments in the law identified by the lead examiners, Finland will not be able to effectively prosecute money-laundering offences connected to the bribery of foreign public officials.

7. **Impediments to the Effective Provision of Extradition**

Pursuant to section 9 of the Extradition Act, in the absence of an applicable treaty on extradition a request for extradition must be based on “an enforceable sentence” “on the basis of adequate evidence” or on a

* Points (ii) and (v) were also identified by the MLCH as “problem areas in the present law”.

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warrant for detention based on evidence indicating the “probable guilt” for the offence. In addition, the extradition process involves, where the request is not immediately rejected by the Minister of Justice, the transmission of the relevant documents to the NBI, which shall conduct an urgent investigation into the matter.

In Finland, the process for extradition in the absence of a treaty is significantly different than the practice where a treaty applies. Where there is no applicable treaty and extradition is requested for the purpose of enforcing a sentence, it is necessary to consider the adequacy of the evidence. Similarly, where there is no applicable treaty and extradition is requested for the purpose of trying the person concerned, the Finnish authorities are required to undertake an investigation and become involved in the actual weighing of evidence. The lead examiners consider that this is a very high standard to meet, in particular where the offence was committed abroad and all or most of the evidence is available in a foreign jurisdiction. In addition, since Finland does not consider the Convention to be a legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence of bribing a foreign public official, the non-treaty practice will apply in respect of requests for extradition from Parties to the Convention where there is no applicable treaty.

The Finnish authorities indicate that the Convention cannot be regarded as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence of bribing a foreign public official where there is no applicable treaty because it does not address the requirement for an enforceable sentence based on adequate evidence, etc.

**Commentary**

_The lead examiners consider that the standard for providing extradition in Finland is high where there is no applicable treaty and are concerned that effective extradition may be impeded. They therefore recommend that the Working Group follow-up this issue to determine whether Finland is able to provide effective extradition to Parties to the Convention in respect of the foreign bribery offence in the absence of an applicable treaty._

**E. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Summary**

A high level of transparency and accessibility are well-entrenched characteristics of the Finnish government. This was particularly evident during the consultations with the private sector and civil society, which praised the Finnish government for its openness and custom of consulting with them about legislative and policy initiatives.

Pursuant to the Finnish Constitution, the legality of the civil service and the actions of civil servants are monitored by two independent bodies: the Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Office of the Chancellor of Justice. These bodies have the authority to receive complaints from anyone, regardless of nationality and regardless of the country where the complaint originates, concerning the conduct of all the various Finnish government officials involved in the implementation of the Convention in practice (e.g. police investigations, the handling of requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition).

For two years in a row (2000 and 2001), TI has rated the level of perceived corruption in Finland’s public service as the lowest out of approximately 90 countries studied. The Working Group recognises the commendable record of the Finnish government in this regard.

During the on-site visit, it was evident that up to now the Finnish government has based its policy on implementing the Convention and Revised Recommendation on the low level of corruption in the Finnish
government. However, more attention should be given to the opportunities of and pressures on Finnish companies and foreign companies located in Finland to bribe in order to compete in sensitive national markets.

In conclusion, based on the findings of the Working Group with respect to Finland’s application of the Convention and the Revised Recommendation, the Working Group makes the following recommendations to Finland. In addition, the Working Group recommends that certain issues (para. 9.) be revisited following the development of litigation of the foreign bribery offences.
2. Recommendations

**Recommendations for Ensuring Effective Measures for Preventing and Detecting Foreign Bribery**

The Working Group recommends that Finland:

a) Undertake effective public awareness activities for the purpose of educating and advising the public and private sectors about the Convention and consider involving interested business associations and other non-governmental bodies in the delivery of these initiatives. (Revised Recommendation, Article I)

b) Clarify internally the responsibilities of state authorities for the implementation of the Convention. (Convention, Article 5)

With respect to the reporting of suspected bribery to the appropriate authorities, the Working Group recommends that Finland:

a) Establish clear guidelines to the effect that tax inspectors are obligated to report cases of suspected foreign bribery and tax fraud to the investigative authorities. [Revised Recommendation, Articles II (ii) and IV]

b) Evaluate whether an obligation that persons responsible for keeping accounts report suspected bribery transactions would improve the prevention and detection of foreign bribery cases. (Revised Recommendation, Article V)

c) Require auditors to report indications of a possible foreign bribery offence to management and, where appropriate, corporate monitoring bodies, and consider requiring that such body in turn has a duty to report suspicions of bribery to the investigative authorities. [Revised Recommendation, Article V B, (iii) and (iv)]

d) Ensure that in practice the absence of an express obligation in the law requiring that money exchange bureaux report suspicious transactions to the Money Laundering Clearing House (MLCH) does not decrease the effective implementation of money laundering legislation, and undertake a consistent and effective approach to monitoring the compliance of real estate agencies with their reporting obligations to the MLCH. (Convention, Article 7)

**Recommendations for Ensuring Adequate Mechanisms for the Effective Prosecution of Foreign Bribery Offences and the related Accounting and Money Laundering Offences**

The Working Group recommends that Finland:

a) Consider providing guidance to law enforcement agencies and prosecutors clarifying the application of the relevant Penal Code provisions to legal persons in respect of prosecutorial discretion, the statute of limitations and coverage of the law regarding state-owned/controlled companies. (Convention, Articles 2, 5 and 6)

b) Provide statistical information to the Working Group about the application of sanctions under the legislation implementing the Convention (i.e., the foreign bribery, accounting, and money laundering offences) to evaluate whether penalties are proportionate, dissuasive and effective in practice. (Convention, Article 3.1; Phase 1 Evaluation, section 4).
c) Inform accounting professionals of the practical consequences of the recent Supreme Court decision in which it was decided that anyone who exercises actual authority in respect of bookkeeping could be prosecuted for an accounting offence, to clarify responsibility and raise public awareness in this regard. (Convention, Article 8.2)

3. **Follow-up by the Working Group based on the Development of Litigation**

The Working Group will follow up the issues below as litigation of the foreign bribery offences develops:

a) Decisions of relevant authorities, including the courts, in regard to the differentiation between aggravated and non-aggravated bribery. (Convention, Article 1.1)

b) Decisions of relevant authorities, including the courts, with regard to cases involving bribes to foreign public officials through intermediaries. (Convention, Article 1.1)

c) The application of the foreign bribery offence to determine whether it is necessary to prove that, pursuant to the laws of the foreign public official’s country, the foreign public official had the exact powers to provide the act or omission that the briber intended to obtain. (Convention, Article 1.1; Commentary 3)

d) The application of sanctions under the legislation implementing the Convention (i.e. the foreign bribery, money laundering and accounting offences) and in the framework of this assessment the Working Group will also:

   (i) review the application of confiscation due to the absence of the authority of the court to order monetary sanctions of a comparable effect and the seemingly low sanctions that have been applied to domestic bribery offences. (Convention, Article 3.3; Phase 1 Evaluation, section 2)

   (ii) assess the impact of the Criminal Code provisions on the lapsing of sanctions (in respect of fines, confiscation and imprisonment) (Convention, Article 3.1)

e) The consequences in practice of the non-applicability of the accounting offences to legal persons to determine whether Finland is able to effectively address accounting offences connected with the concealment of foreign bribery. (Convention, Article 8.2; Commentary 29; Phase 1 Evaluation, section 5).