

Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences

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This paper starts with a discussion of definitions of social capital, then turns to issues in measurement, and finally, presents some evidence on the consequences of social capital. In the last five years, I have been working exclusively on some specific and perhaps unique problems about social capital in the United States, so all of my examples are going to be drawn from the United States experience. I don't want to be interpreted as saying these trends are common to all OECD countries. It is just that the United States has been the main focus of my research for the past five years.

There are, among those of us who work in the area, some marginal differences in terms of exactly how we would define social capital, but Michael Woolcock correctly says in his paper that among the people who are working in this field, there has been a visible convergence, definitionally, toward something like the definition he offers. The central idea of social capital, in my view, is that networks and the associated norms of reciprocity have value. They have value for the people who are in them, and they have, at least in some instances, demonstrable externalities, so that there are both public and private faces of social capital. I am focussing largely on the external returns, the public returns to social capital, but I think that is not at all inconsistent with the idea that there are also private returns. The same is no doubt true in the area of human capital, i.e. there are simultaneously public and private returns.

In the great debate of the two Cambridges about "capital", the focus of much of the discussion was on whether physical capital was homogeneous enough to be susceptible to aggregate measurement. There is room for similar debates about human and social capital. Obviously there are many different forms of physical capital. For instance, both an egg-beater and an aircraft carrier enter into the American national accounts as little bits of physical capital, and yet they are not interchangeable. Try fixing your morning omelette with an aircraft carrier, or try attacking the Serbs with an egg-beater. The same thing is true about social capital. Social capital is certainly far from homogeneous.

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There are some forms of social capital that are good for some things and not for others. Now, it is not so easy to see yet exactly how we should add up all those forms in the same way that, I gather, it was initially not easy to see how we were going to add up all those different forms of physical capital. Accepting that there is no single form of social capital, we need to think about the multiple dimensions of social capital. High on the research priority list in the area of social capital, as far as I am concerned, is developing the theoretically coherent and empirically valid typologies or dimensions along which social capital should vary. I will give some examples of how social capital varies, but I don't think we are anywhere near yet a kind of canonical account of the dimensions of social capital.

Some forms of social capital are highly formal, like a PTA (Parent-Teacher Association) organisation or a national organisation of any sort, or a labour union, formally organised with a chairman and a president, and membership dues and so on. Some forms of social capital, like the group of people who gather at the bar every Thursday evening, are highly informal. And yet, both of those constitute networks in which there can easily develop reciprocity, and in which there can be gains. Some forms of social capital are densely interlaced, like a group of steelworkers who work together every day at the factory, go to Catholic Church every Sunday, and go out bowling on Saturday. That is a very dense, interconnected, multiplex form of social capital. There are also very thin, almost invisible forms of social capital, meaning networks and the associated norms of reciprocity, like the nodding acquaintance you have with the person you occasionally see at the supermarket, while waiting in line.

Don't be too dismissive of very casual forms of social connection, because there has been good experimental evidence that if you nod to people in the hall, they are more likely to come to your aid if you should have a fit or have a heart attack, than if you don't nod to them, even if you don't otherwise know them. Merely nodding to someone in the hall generates visible, measurable forms of reciprocity. So there are, as I say, these very evanescent forms and also quite regular forms of social capital, both formal and informal. I agree with Michael Woolcock that one of the most important distinctions is between bridging and bonding. And I certainly agree with him that not all social capital has good consequences for every one.

This was called most vividly to my attention in a book review that appeared on the front page of the New York Times several years ago, written by a former student of mine. He wasn't reviewing a book of mine, but somebody else's. In his review, he called attention to the fact that Tim McVeigh cooked up the Oklahoma City bombing in a bowling alley in Oklahoma City. The reviewer then juxtaposed this with my article written several years ago, called "Bowling Alone" (Putnam 1995), in which I called attention to the fact that Americans were no longer bowling in leagues. The last line of the New York Times review is "we all would have been better off if Tim McVeigh had gone bowling alone." The network of people who formed this conspiracy was indeed social capital – it enabled Tim McVeigh to do things he could not otherwise have done. However, this was clearly an example of social capital (involving as it did, both reciprocity and trust) that was put to genuinely destructive ends. In short, it had negative externalities. Of course, this possibility is not unique to social capital. In that same bombing, there were bits of physical capital that were put to destructive ends, the truck that was blown up, and there were bits of human capital that were put to destructive ends, the bomb-making expertise. What I wish to emphasize is that all forms of social capital, indeed any form of capital, can be used to ends that are in some instances destructive.

I now turn to address issues of measurement, especially measurement of long-run trends, over the course of the twentieth century, in social capital in the United States. For many Americans that is an interesting question. In Putnam (1995) I conjectured that the long-run trends, at least the recent trends, in social capital in the United States were down. In that article I provided preliminary evidence that showed, at least by some measures, that membership in organisations was down. My recent book (Putnam 2000) looks in much more detail at the question of trends in social capital in the United States. In the course of doing research for that book, I faced the same problem that students of global warming face. That is, you know exactly what evidence you would have liked people to have collected 200 years ago so that you could now tell whether there have been subsequent trends in warming, but you are stuck with what data happened to have been gathered then. The solution that the global warming people use is to triangulate among different sources of evidence, any one of which is imperfect. However, if you get the same basic story from ice cores in Greenland, from tree rings in the Southwest of the United States, and from the temperature records of the British Admiralty, even though

any of those measures is subject to some error and none of them is exactly the measure you would want, concordance among different sources of evidence makes more plausible the claim that there has been an upturn in average global temperature.

I want to show you very briefly the kinds of evidence that I have brought to bear on the question of long-run trends in the United States in social capital, and I want to begin with the simplest kind of evidence that I used in my earlier article. I now show this evidence by means of market share measures for many major civic organisations in American life. What fraction of all Jewish women in America belongs to Hadassah? What fraction of catholic men belongs to the Knights of Columbus? What fraction of all adult men belongs to one of the “animal clubs”, that is, men’s organisations? (Animal clubs is a technical term. I only realised when I began doing this research that all men’s clubs in America are named for animals: the Lions club, the Moose club, the Elks club, the Eagles club, and so on.)

So for all these organisations we gathered market share data, as well as for many other organisations. What fraction of rural kids belongs to the 4-H? What fraction of girls belongs to the girl-scouts? What fraction of parents belongs to a PTA? And so on. We have done it for more than 30 large organisations. Virtually all of the individual graphs look like Figure 1, which in fact shows the average membership rates for 32 national chapter-based voluntary associations for almost the entire 20th century. By the way, an almost identical graph applies to professional organisations. If you ask what fraction of all doctors belongs to the AMA (American Medical Association), what fraction of all electronic engineers belongs to the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) – market shares is what I am talking about here – those graphs also look like Figure 1, that is, rising for the first two thirds of the century with a sharp dip during the Great Depression – many organisations lost half their membership between 1930 and 1935 – followed by a long period of very rapid growth, doubling on average in market share – the growth in membership numbers was even greater, because the total population was growing.

Probably that period between 1940 and 1965 was the most rapid period of civic revival in American history. Figure 1 doesn’t prove that, but I believe it was the case. And then suddenly, silently, mysteriously, inexplicably, all of those organisations began to experience levelling market shares and then decline in market shares, and gradually the

decline in market shares became so great that they began to experience absolute decline in the number of members. By 1997, in terms of market shares, the average organisation was back to Depression levels. Not all organisations' membership fell at the same time. The AMA actually was the first to peak in terms of its market share. Appropriately, the last of my organisations to peak and begin to fall was the Optimists. The Optimists didn't begin falling until 1980, but then they really plummeted and so they are now back down in terms of their market share below what they were in the 1930s.

But there are two reasons to doubt the adequacy of the membership data as a sufficient measure of social connectedness. First of all, it is based on membership in fixed organisations. I wanted to know membership across the whole of the century, so I needed some measures that would last across the whole century. But there might have been another shadow universe of organisations that was growing while these were declining, so perhaps this graph represents just changes in the pecking order of organizations, and not a universal pattern.

Secondly – and I want to underline this because there has been some misunderstanding of my own position on this, among other places in Steve Knack's paper – I do not believe, nor have I ever believed, that associations were some privileged form of social capital, except in the sense that associations tend to gather data on themselves and, therefore, it is easier to gather data on associations. Beyond this greater ease of measurement, there is nothing canonically superior about formal associations as forms of social networks.

Of course it could be true that associations were becoming less common in America but that we were hanging out in bars more, that we were having more picnics, that we were seeing folks at our home at night more often, and those forms of informal social capital can be quite important. But I couldn't figure out where the picnic register in American society was located. Where would I go to find out about trends in picnics over time?

Both of these possible shortcomings of the membership data were solved when I discovered two massive new archives of data in the United States. These are infinitely interesting datasets.

One of them, the Roper survey, has asked national samples of Americans, every month over the last twenty-five years and continuing still, questions of the following

form: in the course of the last year, did you do any of the following things; did you sign a petition, did you write a letter to your congressman, attend a local meeting, serve as an official of a local club, serve on a committee of any local organisation, work for a political party, and so on. By political science standards, the Roper database is a huge one, with more than 400,000 surveys, and it shows unequivocally a decline in all these forms of civic participation. Figure 2, which happens to be the graph of the Roper data for the percentage of Americans who had, in the course of the last year, served either as officer of a local organisation, or as a committee member of a local organisation – any organisation, not just one of my 32 national organizations, shows a quite dramatic drop, basically a cut in half, over these years. Every one of the twelve different kinds of connectedness covered in the survey shows the same decline.

The most novel data, however, comes as a by-product from systematic surveys by a commercial marketing firm in Chicago called DDB Needham. Every month over more than twenty-five years the firm has surveyed very large samples of Americans, mainly on their consumer behaviour – do you prefer Nike or Adidas? Do you prefer Yoplait or Danone yoghurt? And so on – but they began to have the idea twenty-five years ago that it would be helpful to gather information about their respondents beyond their yoghurt-eating habits. If you are trying to write an ad for yoghurt, it would be useful to have in your mind something else about these people besides the fact they eat yoghurt.

Thus DDB began asking a broader range of questions. The questions included: How many times in the course of the last year did you go to church? Did you go to a club meeting? Did you volunteer? Did you work on a committee project? Did you have friends over to the house? Did you go on a picnic? At last I had found the picnic register! The answer, by the way, turns out to be that in 1975 the average American went out to a picnic 5 times per year. In 1999, the average American went on two picnics per year. Reductions of that order characterize almost every single measure of social activity in this survey: playing cards; having friends over to the house; dinner parties; having dinner with your family; going to club meetings; card games, and so on.

It gets boring after a while because all the graphs look the same. Figure 3 provides a typical example of the DDB data. In 1975, the average American went to 12 club meetings a year. Conveniently, that's once a month. By 1999, the average American went to five club meetings a year. There are many other questions...how many

times in the course of the last year did you give the ‘finger’ to other drivers, that is made rude gestures to another driver? That actually turns out to be an interesting datum. People were also asked about their tax evasion. And among the thousands of variables in this dataset, by far the best predictor of tax evasion is the number of times in the course of the last year that you gave the ‘finger’ to another driver. (I have a great idea for the IRS auditors, and if rational expectation is right, one of two things ought to happen: either the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) will get better at finding tax evaders, or else the apparent level of comity on American highways will improve.)

I have thus far described one set of indicators: formal membership and participation in many different forms of informal networks. I am trying to build up the evidence, both for you and for my larger American audience, for the claim that basically the same stories are being told by the ice cores in Greenland and the tree rings in Arizona.

Another form of evidence that fits perfectly with this picture comes from data on social trust. I am in agreement with Michael Woolcock that social trust is not part of the definition of social capital but it is certainly a close consequence, and therefore could be easily thought of as a proxy. Figure 4 shows what the trend is, based on many surveys asking the same question: basically, do you trust other people. The graph shows that there has been a forty-year steady decline, and a decline that is actually greater among American youth than among adults. Other analysis has shown very clearly that the decline in social trust in America is entirely generational, that is if you look at any birth cohort, average trust has not changed overtime, but each successive birth cohort over the last thirty-forty years has become adult with a lower level of social trust.

Now there are other indirect measures that one can use. A slightly less direct measure comes from data on organised altruism. Altruism (doing good for other people) is not part of the *definition* of social capital in my view, but it turns out empirically, at least in the United States and probably elsewhere, that a very strong predictor of altruism is social connectedness. That is, the people who give blood, give money, and have volunteered their time are people who are more connected. By far the best predictor of philanthropy, for example, is not how much money you have, but how many clubs you go to or how often you go to church. There is a very strong affinity between social connectedness and altruism. Therefore, it would be very interesting to ask about trends in philanthropy, or for that matter volunteering or blood-giving over time.

The best data comes from data on philanthropy over time. The metric used here is not absolute number of dollars given, because of course that rises every year, but what fraction of income of Americans is given to all forms of charity. Figure 5 shows the results. Not accidentally, it has exactly the same profile over time as does the membership data that I quoted before. It rises steadily until 1964 – the 1930s jump by the way is a change in the denominator, not the numerator. Even though people had less income during the Great Depression, they continued to give, which drags the fraction up. But basically, through both Great Depression and then through the post war boom, Americans gave an increasing fraction of their income, while since 1964 there has been a steady decline. There is a little bump in the late 1980s and that is driven entirely by the Reagan tax cut, a one-year change in deductibility which pushed donations into that one year and out of the two adjacent years. Essentially the same graph applies to giving to the Catholic Church, protestant churches, the United Way. If you were to look at all these graphs, you would see that it does not have anything to do with any particular recipient organisation because the same general pattern applies across all.

Someone said earlier in the conference that it is reasonable to think that social capital and institutional enforcement might be in some sense alternative ways of providing social order. Social capital does facilitate informal contract enforcement – the logic of that derives from the basic theory of social capital, that is game theory: if I have dense ties and networks of reciprocity with other people then I don't actually have to have a contract with my neighbour; both he and I are going to rake the leaves. We just do it without a contract and I don't sue him if he doesn't rake his leaves. Thus, if social capital is declining in the United States, that might have implications for other forms of contract enforcement. So I thought I would look at the relative share of lawyering in the American economy as a whole and how this fraction has changed through time. In 1900, there were 41 lawyers per every 10,000 employees in the United States. In 1970, there were 39. This was a little known Putnam's constant: historically there were about 40 lawyers, plus or minus one, for every 10,000 employees in America. This number was rock-steady over the first seventy years of this century. And then this number started to increase, just as trust and social capital started to decline, so that by now lawyers' share in the workforce has more than doubled.

A corollary to Putnam's law was that there should be one doctor for every lawyer, or one lawyer for every doctor, in America. But that too has changed, because the post-1970 jump in lawyering has not been matched by one for doctoring. Thus the jump in lawyers per capita is not simply a reflection of a general increase in professionals in America; it is unique to lawyers. In fact, over most of the century, the ratio of engineers to lawyers shifted sharply in the direction of more engineers per lawyer, but since 1970 that trend has reversed. You would think that as a country becomes more technologically intensive, more and more of its workforce would be trained engineers, but in fact since 1970 that trend has completely reversed.

What I claim to have shown so far is that by a variety of different measures there has been a massive transformation of social bonds in America over our lifetime. And it is very important for my countrymen and me to figure out why that happened and how we can reverse it.

My responsibility in the OECD context is to talk about the concept of social capital, about the measurement of social capital, and about its consequences. What I have done so far is illustrate how a workaday researcher in the field of social capital looks desperately for different measures of social capital and tries to triangulate among those measures to see if there is any convergence among stories told by different indicators.

My book (Putnam 2000) deals with the extent, causes and consequences of these changes in much more detail. Specifically, it deals with four questions:

The first is, "What has been happening to American social capital?" It has not always been in decline. Within living memory, Americans were spending more and more time playing cards with each other, giving more money, connecting more and more. Suddenly, for some mysterious reason, in the middle 1960s those trends began to reverse and they have been reversing quite sharply over the last thirty-five years.

The second question in the book is, "Why?" But I am not going to address that question here.

The third question is, "What can we do about it in the United States?" I have some ideas about that, but again I am not going to address those here.

The fourth question is, "So what? Does it matter?" That is what I am going to deal with here. What evidence is there for plausibly believing that it is not just a matter

of warm cuddly feelings that we are lacking? There are measurable consequences to social capital.

Think of me now as explicating and giving a particular example of many of the generalisations that Michael Woolcock has offered, for example on the effects of social capital on crime, health and so on. I am going to talk about those in the particular context of my research project, taking advantage of the fact that in the United States we have fifty states, which hold some things constant but not others. Across all the American states, I have developed 13 different measures of social capital. Many of these I have already described: the fraction of people in the state who had in the previous year served on a committee of some local organisation, or as an officer of a local organisation, the number of club meetings attended, the number of club memberships, the turnout at the presidential election, the number of public meetings attended, and so on.

I have, for the sake of simplicity, combined all of those measures, via factor analysis, into a single measure. You can think of that as the latent variable that is measured by the overlap among all these individual indicators. Operationally what I will mean by social capital in what follows is the degree to which a given state is either high or low in the number of meetings citizens go to, the level of social trust its citizens have, the degree to which they spend time visiting one another at home, the frequency with which they vote, the frequency with which they do volunteering, and so on.

Figure 6 provides a social capital map of the United States. It is appropriate, I think, given the venue of our meeting, that the best single predictor of the level of social capital in American states is distance to the Canadian border. Being closer to the Canadian border means more social capital. Actually, if you looked at that graph in more detail you would see that it can be described in terms of a barometric map with one high, centred over Minneapolis-St. Paul, and one low, centred over Baton Rouge, Louisiana. There are probably deep historical roots of that pattern. It is not an accident that the low social capital is very clearly associated with the depth of slavery in the nineteenth century, and that is because slavery as a system and the post-slavery reconstruction period were institutionally designed to destroy social capital. This is what slavery was about; it was about destroying social capital, because social capital, among Blacks at least, and later in post-slavery, social connection between Blacks and poor Whites, would have threatened

the structure of power. I am sure it is not an accident that there is a strong correlation between past slavery and current levels of social capital.

There are a few outliers to the general pattern. Nevada is lower than where it should be; perhaps if you know something about Nevada you have guesses as to why this might be true. Utah is higher than where it should be, and this is quite explicable because of the Mormon Church.

The other variable that strongly predicts social capital, across the American states, is the pattern of immigration. The best single migration-based positive determinant of social capital is the fraction of the population that is of Scandinavian descent. Another fact is that if you rank Americans today by their level of social capital or social trust or social connectedness, and you rank the countries from which their ancestors come, even as long ago as two or three generations, those two rankings are perfectly correlated, even though the connection between those two streams is on average two or three generations old. If you think of the causal mechanism that must underlie that, the concordance is stunning.

Now, that is the laboratory in which I want to offer illustrative evidence of the claim that social capital has powerful effects on lots of other things. The various panels of Figure 7 display a number of pair-wise relations between the index of social capital and a number of important social and economic outcomes. These are all partial relations based on multivariate regressions in which everything possible has been held constant because states differ in so many ways.

The general pattern is that social capital drives out other possible competing variables in regression analysis. There is no way to be entirely sure in which direction causality runs. I can't be sure there is no other causal variable, but I have gone through many potential variables that could make this spurious. That is relevant because the horizontal axis in Figure 7.1 is the social capital index, and the vertical axis a composite measure of educational performance (SAT scores, test scores, high school drop out rate). This is an extremely robust finding; it does not depend at all on which particular measure you use. The relationship shown is strong enough to pass what is known in political science as the inter-ocular trauma test – it strikes one between the eyes.

The relationship between educational performance and social capital is much stronger, two orders of magnitude stronger than, for example – again controlling for

everything else – spending on schools or teacher/pupil ratios or any of the obvious things that are more usually thought to increase educational performance. Figure 7.2 shows a composite measure of child welfare (it includes teen pregnancy, infant mortality and a variety of other measures of how well kids do) and again there is a very strong relationship showing that, in general, the welfare of children is higher where social capital is higher. Figure 7.3 shows that states where children watch less TV have higher levels of social capital, a relationship I study in much more detail in my book.

Crime is strongly negatively predicted by social capital; this is true at the state level, but it is also true at the community and neighbourhood levels. Once again the strongest predictor of the murder rate is a low level of social capital. It is stronger than poverty; it is stronger than other plausible measures. Figure 7.4 shows that murder rates are lower in states where social capital is higher, and Figure 7.5 shows that people are generally less pugnacious where social capital is high.

As Michael Woolcock and other authors have pointed out, there is very strong evidence of powerful health effects of social connectedness. The evidence is strong not only in American states, but also in Finland, Japan, and other countries. Controlling for your blood chemistry, age, gender, whether or not you jog, and for all other risk factors, your chance of dying over the course of the next year are cut in half by joining one group, and cut to a quarter by joining two groups. This is not cheating; these are prospective studies. It is not that people who are healthy become joiners, it is clear from the studies that the arrow runs in the other direction, from joining to health. These are big effects, as can be seen in Figure 7.6. Once again, these same results are confirmed by a multitude of individual-level, over-time studies.

Figure 7.7 shows that interstate variance in the percentage of tax evasion, as measured by the IRS, is strongly related to differences in social capital at the state level. No other variable does as well at explaining why states differ in tax evasion. In other words, where people are connected by dense networks of engagement and reciprocity, they are more likely to comply with the law, very probably because they are more confident that others will, too, so they will not be "suckers" in this dilemma of collective action. Figure 7.8 shows that states where people are more connected with each other are also marked by greater tolerance.

Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show that economic inequality and civic inequality are less in states with higher values of the social capital index. Here the causal arrows are likely to run in both directions, with citizens in high social capital states likely to do more to reduce inequalities, and inequalities themselves likely to be socially divisive.

Finally, I can add some preliminary new evidence to connect social capital to self-assessments of individual welfare. One of the important contributions of this conference has been to highlight the importance of considering evidence at the individual as well as the community level. Here is another example. Using a combination of the DDB replies to four questions asking individuals for a self-assessment of their own happiness, I have discovered that happiness increases with both their own and their state's measure of social capital. By contrast, an individual's measure of happiness rises if his or her income is higher but falls if the average state income is higher. Thus, although people value their own income more when their neighbours earn less money, people feel better off when either they or their neighbours have higher levels of social capital. At the state level, one's own level of education has a strong positive effect on happiness, but there is no effect from average state levels of education. At the county level, both individual and average education levels have a significant positive effect on happiness. At the county level, the social capital index keeps its strong individual effect, but the general level becomes insignificant, probably because of the increasing measurement error at the county level. The fact that community levels of human and social capital appear to increase happiness, while the reverse is true for income, suggests to me that returns from human and social capital are far broader than whatever positive effects they may have on material standards of living,

But it is important to end with a note of caution. Despite this very wide range of promising results, suggesting that social capital has a multitude of measurable consequences, I am not yet in a position to rule out all other explanations for these patterns. All the relationships in American states that I have shown are quite robust, in the normal statistical sense, that is they do not depend on which particular measure or which particular year you use. These are robust relationships, and they are controlling for all the other obvious suspects that might be interfering. Moreover, virtually all these state-level studies are consistent with individual- and community-level studies by other researchers. However, we are in the early days of this research. We have got to pummel

a lot of different datasets. We must look at lots of micro level data, not just at the very aggregated level of states. We must also compare data across countries, and we have to do experimental work.

In many of my examples, one could reverse the arrow of the effects of social capital, and tell a story where the arrow runs to social capital instead of from social capital. In the end, it is only going to be through detailed empirical research that the relative importance of the two possible directions of causation can be established. What I have hope to have established so far is that this is a plausible enough field that it is worth paying more attention to.

But it will be a long time, in my view, before we get to a level of cross-national, reliable measurement of social capital that will allow us to do for social capital what Robert Barro and others have done for human capital. We are nowhere near having the same clear metric as years of education is for human capital and we are certainly not near having that kind of data over time. I don't think the case is closed that social capital is a strong predictor of everything. But I think it is probably a powerful predictor of many things, enough so to make it well worth our attention.

References

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Putnam, Robert (2000) *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster).

Figure 1
Average membership rate in 32 national
chapter-based voluntary associations, 1900-1997




Figure 2
Active organizational involvement, 1973-1994




Figure 3
Club meeting attendance dwindles, 1975-1999




Figure 4
Four decades of dwindling trust
Adults and teenagers, 1960-1999




Figure 5
The rise and fall of philanthropic generosity, 1929-1998




Figure 6

Social Capital in the American States






Figure 7.1
Schools work better in high social capital states



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High

Figure 7.2
Kids are better off in high social capital states




Figure 7.3
Kids watch less TV in high social capital states

TV Watching by 4th and 8th Graders 1990-1994




Figure 7.4
Violent crime is rarer in high social capital states




Figure 7.5
States high in social capital are less pugnacious





Figure 7.6
Health is better in high social capital states



IRS Criminal Referrals and Convictions 1992-1996

Figure 7.7
Tax evasion is low where social capital is high




Figure 7.8
Social capital and tolerance go together




Figure 7.9
Social capital and economic equality go together




Figure 7.10
Social capital and civic equality go together

