FDI IN FIGURES

October 2017

FDI down 3% in the first half of 2017

- **Global FDI flows decreased by 3%** to USD 788 billion in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016.
- **The overall decrease was due to an 11% drop in Q2 after increasing 3% in Q1**.
- **Inflows to the EU decreased by 46%,** partly due to a drop in the United Kingdom from the very high levels recorded in the second half of 2016, **while outflows decreased by a more modest 12%**.
- **FDI inflows to the G20 decreased by 31%, but FDI outflows increased by 19%.** The drop in FDI inflows was greater in OECD G20 economies (-34%) than in non-OECD G20 economies (-23%). In contrast, FDI outflows from OECD G20 economies increased by 28% but were partly offset by a 22% drop in FDI outflows from non-OECD G20 economies, due to decreases in outflows from China.
- **OECD inflows decreased more modestly than in the EU and in the G20 as a whole, by 8%, while outflows increased by 10%,** driven by higher reinvested earnings of US parents in their affiliates abroad**.**
- **After a slow-down in 2016, OECD FDI flows of resident special purpose entities (SPEs) returned to very high levels in Q2 2017**, largely due to increases in FDI flows in and from Luxembourg SPEs.

In this issue

Find latest FDI data online

Detailed FDI statistics by partner country and by industry are available from **OECD's online FDI database** (see pre-defined queries). Find detailed information on inward and outward FDI flows, income and positions by main destination or recipient country, and by industry sector, as well as detailed information for resident SPEs and information on inward FDI positions by ultimate investing country. New data for 2016 will be available in January 2018.

1 Recent developments

In the first half of 2017, global FDI flows[1] decreased by 3% compared to the second half of 2016, to USD 788 billion but remained above 2013 and 2014 levels. In Q1 2017, FDI flows rose by 3% to USD 416 billion and then decreased by 11% in Q2 to USD 372 billion, continuing the pattern of highly volatile quarters observed in recent years. The overall decrease observed in global flows in the first half of 2017 was largely due to the drop in Q2; decreases were widespread, with drops recorded in 26 OECD economies in that quarter. In addition, FDI flows in the second half of 2016 were boosted by the Anheuser-Busch InBev acquisition of SABMiller, which boosted FDI inflows to the United Kingdom (see FDI in Figures – April 2017).[2] As a result, FDI inflows to the United Kingdom dropped from USD 125 billion in Q4 2016 to USD 3 billion in Q1 2017. Despite this drop in the United Kingdom, global flows increased by 3% in Q1, due to a return to positive investment from disinvestments in selected OECD economies, as well as a 68% increase of FDI inflows in the United States (to USD 80 billion).

[1] By definition, inward and outward FDI worldwide should be equal. However, in practice, there are statistical discrepancies between inward and outward FDI. Unless otherwise specified, references to 'global FDI flows' refer to the average of these two figures.
[2] www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-28/sabmiller-investors-give-go-ahead-for-103-billion-megabrew-deal.

Figure 1 shows global FDI flows from Q1 2013 to Q2 2017 and half-year trends.[3] The drop in the first half of 2017 continues the slowdown in global FDI flows since the post-crisis peak reached in 2015. Quarterly analysis of global FDI flows is complicated by the high volatility of the flows, which are often affected by a few very large deals during a specific quarter. High levels of FDI flows seen in the last half of 2016 persisted into Q1 2017 (USD 416 billion). In Q2 2017, FDI flows dropped to USD 372 billion, which is below the average of USD 394 billion for quarterly flows observed over the past 4 years. Looking at half-year values, FDI flows in the first half of 2017 were 3% lower than in the second half of 2016 but remain above half-year levels recorded in 2013-2014.

Figure 1: Global FDI flows, Q1 2013-Q2 2017 (USD billion)



Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database

Inflows

By region, FDI flows into the **OECD** area decreased by 8% in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016, from USD 502 billion to USD 462 billion (Figure 2). This development was largely due to a significant drop in FDI flows to the United Kingdom in Q1 2017 from very high levels recorded in Q4 2016 and to widespread decreases recorded in 26 OECD economies in Q2. As a whole, in the first half of 2017, FDI inflows to the OECD area accounted for 59% of global FDI inflows, a level comparable to the second half of 2016 but below the 68% recorded a year earlier.

FDI flows into **EU** countries decreased even further by 46% (from USD 324 billion to USD 175 billion), dropping to USD 58 billion in Q2 below the average quarterly inflow of USD 100 billion observed over the past 4 years. FDI inflows to the EU area accounted for 22% of global FDI inflows, down from 37% observed in the second half of 2016 but comparable to levels recorded a year earlier.

FDI inflows to the **G20** decreased by 31%, from USD 599 billion to USD 415 billion, and the drop was greater in OECD G20 economies (-34%) than in non-OECD G20 economies (-23%).

In the first half of 2017, the United States was the largest recipient of FDI inflows worldwide (at USD 161 billion), followed by Switzerland (USD 61 billion) and China (USD 55 billion).[4] After being the major recipient of FDI inflows in the second half of 2016, when Anheuser-Busch InBev acquired SAB Miller, the United Kingdom moved out of the top ten recipients in the first half of 2017.

[3] The measure was constructed using FDI statistics on a directional basis whenever available, supplemented by measures on an asset/liability basis when needed. See Notes for tables 1 and 2 on page 12 for details. Data are as of 15 October 2017.
[4] Hong-Kong, China and Singapore are not listed as major FDI sources and recipients respectively because it is thought that these economies are not the ultimate destinations or sources of a significant amount of their flows; instead these flows pass through on their way to other economies.

Figure 2: FDI flows, Q1 2013-Q2 2017 (USD billion)



Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database

OECD FDI inflows decreased by 8% in the first half of 2017 (to USD 462 billion) compared to the second half of 2016**,** but dropped more significantly in Q2 (by -9%, to USD 220 billion) than in Q1 (by -1%, to USD 242 billion).

In Q1, FDI inflows decreased significantly in the United Kingdom from the very high levels recorded in Q4 2016, dropping from USD 125 billion in Q4 2016 to USD 3 billion in Q1 2017. This development was almost fully offset by increases in the Netherlands (from USD -17 billion to USD 19 billion excluding investments in SPEs), the United States (from USD 48 billion to USD 80 billion), Switzerland (from USD -13 billion to USD 13 billion), Norway (from USD -25 billion to USD -2 billion) and Finland (from USD -2 billion to USD 12 billion). **In Q2,** FDI inflows were less volatile than between Q4 and Q1, but decreases were recorded in other OECD economies. FDI inflows decreased in 26 OECD economies and were only partly offset by increases in the remaining 9 economies. The most important decreases in Q2 were in Belgium (from USD 7 billion to USD -13 billion) and the Netherlands (from USD 19 billion to USD 7 billion excluding investments in SPEs), but Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Poland and Spain also recorded declines between USD 4 billion and USD 10 billion. In contrast, FDI flows increased in Switzerland (from USD 13 billion to USD 49 billion), likely boosted in part by ChemChina's acquisition of Syngenta and Johnson and Johnson's acquisition of Actelion.[5] There were also increases in Ireland (from USD 9 billion to USD 29 billion) and, to a lesser extent, in Australia (from USD 9 billion to USD 20 billion) and the United Kingdom (from USD 3 billion to USD 14 billion).

In the first half of 2017, the 8% decrease in OECD FDI inflows was largely due to decreases in the United Kingdom (from USD 163 billion to USD 17 billion) and, to a lesser extent, Belgium (from USD 44 billion to USD -6 billion). In contrast, FDI flows increased and exceeded USD 20 billion in the United States (from USD 159 billion to USD 161 billion), Switzerland (from USD 28 billion to USD 61 billion), Ireland (from USD 22 billion to USD 38 billion), Australia (from USD 21 billion to USD

[5] http://fortune.com/2017/05/05/chemchina-syngenta-deal-acquisition/ and https://www1.actelion.com/media/media-releases?newsId=2113719

29 billion), the Netherlands (from USD 13 billion to USD 26 billion excluding investments in resident SPEs) and Finland (from USD -1 billion to USD 23 billion).

Examining financial flows by components--equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and intracompany debt--can shed further light on FDI developments within the OECD.[6] **FDI equity flows in OECD countries decreased by 31% in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016** and accounted for 55% of total OECD inflows. Equity flows in the Ireland, Switzerland and the United States accounted for 70% of total equity flows in the OECD in the first half of 2017. Large increases in equity flows in Switzerland and the United States were offset by the decrease in the United Kingdom.

Reinvestment of earnings in foreign affiliates resident in OECD countries increased by 16% in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016,[6] representing 39% of total OECD inflows. Reinvestment of earnings in foreign affiliates in the United States and Ireland increased by 17% and 10% respectively, and accounted for, respectively, 29% and 14% of total reinvestment of earnings of foreign affiliates in OECD countries. Reinvestment of earnings also increased in foreign affiliates in Australia and the Netherlands (excluding resident SPEs) to around USD 10 billion, and they doubled in Switzerland and the United Kingdom, to around USD 13.5 billion in each country.

Intracompany debt flows recovered from negative levels recorded in the second half of 2016, to around USD 30 billion in the first half of 2017,[6] representing 7% of total OECD inflows**.** In Norway and Switzerland there were significant increases of intracompany debt flows, which moved from negative to positive, as well as in Ireland where they increased but remained negative. These developments were partly offset by strong declines in Belgium, where high levels of intracompany debt flows were recorded in the second half of 2016, largely due to foreign parents reimbursing loans to their Belgian affiliates. There were also strong decreases in intracompany debt flows in the United States, from USD 37 billion to negative levels.

Figure 3: FDI flows by instruments in the first half of 2017[6] (USD billion)



Source: OECD International Direct Investment Statistics database

In the first half of 2017, FDI inflows in **non-OECD G20 economies**, decreased by 23% due to decreases in China (from USD 96 billion to USD 55 billion), India (from USD 27 billion to USD 19 billion), Russia (from USD 27 billion to USD 16 billion) and Saudi Arabia (from USD 4 billion to USD 3 billion). In contrast, FDI inflows to Argentina reached USD 5 billion from at USD 0.4 billion, and also increased in Brazil and South Africa by 4% and 6% respectively. FDI flows in Indonesia recovered from disinvestments (from USD -3 billion to USD 9 billion).

[6] OECD FDI equity, reinvestment of earnings and debt flows are estimated using FDI instruments reported by OECD countries, on either the directional basis or asset/liability basis as indicated in Table 1 on page 10. For OECD countries that did not report FDI aggregates by instrument on the directional basis, instruments were estimated using equity and reinvestment of earnings reported on the asset/liability basis. For OECD countries that did not report FDI instruments to the OECD, instruments were estimated using data available from the IMF Balance of Payments database or by using average instrument shares observed in unrevised data for historical years. Missing instruments for Q2 2107 were collected directly from national sources' websites when available or were estimated by distributing total FDI equally among instruments. For more information on FDI components, please see the notes on page 12.

FDI Outflows

By region, FDI outflows from the OECD area increased by 10% (to USD 623 billion) **in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016** but were very volatile. In Q1, they reached USD 350 billion, only 2% below the peak reached a year earlier (at USD 358 billion). In Q2, they dropped to USD 274 billion but remained above the average quarterly outflow of USD 262 billion observed over the past 4 years (Figure 2). In the first half of 2017, FDI outflows from the OECD area represented 79% of global FDI outflows, comparable to the second half of 2016 and up from 70% observed in 2015.

EU outflows decreased by 12% in the first half of 2017 compared to the second half of 2016 (from USD 273 billion to USD 241 billion) but were stable across quarters (at around USD 120 billion).

FDI outflows from the **G20** increased by 19%, from USD 459 billion to USD 545 billion. Specifically, FDI outflows increased by 28% in G20 OECD economies but decreased by 22% in G20 non-OECD economies, mostly due to decreases from China. FDI outflows from G20 OECD economies were volatile across quarters. They increased by 39% in Q1 to USD 255 billion and then dropped 13% to USD 221 billion in Q2, but still remain higher than the average quarterly outflow observed over the past 4 years. FDI outflows from non-OECD G20 economies were stable at around 34 billion in each quarter, the same level as in Q4 2016, but down from Q3 2016.

In the first half of 2017, major investors worldwide were the United States (USD 220 billion), Japan (USD 87 billion), Canada (USD 53 billion) and the United Kingdom (USD 50 billion).[4] China was the second largest investor worldwide in 2016 but was out of the top five in the first half of 2017.

In Q1, OECD FDI outflows increased by 30% to USD 350 billion driven by significant increases from the United States (from USD 43 billion to USD 115 billion) and to a lesser extent from Switzerland (from USD -3 billion to USD 13 billion), Japan (from USD 39 billion to USD 54 billion), the United Kingdom (from USD 3 billion to USD 18 billion) and Austria (from USD -11 billion to USD 3 billion). Partly offsetting were decreases in Belgium (from USD 59 billion to USD 2 billion) and France (from USD 22 billion to USD -11 billion). **In Q2**, FDI outflows dropped by 22% (to USD 274 billion) driven by decreases in Switzerland (from USD 13 billion to USD -15 billion), the Netherlands (from USD 18 billion to USD -4 billion excluding from resident SPEs), Japan (from USD 54 billion to USD 32 billion), Canada (from USD 35 billion to USD 18 billion) and, to a lesser extent, from the United States where FDI outflows decreased by 10% but remained above USD 100 billion (at USD 104 billion).

In the first half of 2017, the 10% increase in OECD FDI outflows was largely driven by the United States (up from USD 137 billion to USD 220 billion) and the United Kingdom (up from USD -1 billion to USD 50 billion). This was partly offset by decreases from Belgium (from USD 65 billion to USD 3 billion), the Netherlands (from USD 60 billion to USD 13 billion) and France (from USD 30 billion to USD -3 billion).

In contrast to total outflows, equity investment flows from OECD countries decreased by 25% in the first half of 2017,[6] representing 34% of total OECD outflows (Figure 3). The decrease was particularly strong in Q1 2017, partly due to disinvestments recorded in Ireland, Switzerland and France. In the second half of 2017, equity outflows from Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, Luxembourg (excluding from resident SPEs), the United Kingdom and the United States represented 74% of total OECD outflows. Belgium and France recorded significant decreases in equity outflows which dropped to negative levels, as did Luxembourg and the Netherlands (excluding from resident SPEs) where outflows more than halved. These decreases were only partly offset by increases from Ireland (to USD 16 billion) and from the United States, where equity outflows doubled to USD 24 billion.

Earnings reinvested by OECD parents in their foreign affiliates abroad increased by 44% in the first half of 2017,[6] driving the 10% increase observed in total FDI outflows and representing 55% of total OECD outflows. This increase was largely driven by earnings reinvested by US parents in their foreign affiliates, which were above USD 90 billion in both Q1 and Q2 2017. In the first half of 2017, earnings increased from USD 134 billion in the second half of 2016 to USD 185 billion. This represents 54% of total earnings reinvested by OECD parents. Earnings reinvested in foreign affiliates also increased, but to a lesser extent, from parents located in the Netherlands (from USD -8 billion to USD 9 billion) and in the United Kingdom (from USD 7 billion to around USD 20 billion).

Intracompany debt outflows from the OECD increased by 67% in the first half of 2017,[6] representing 11% of total OECD outflows. However, they were highly volatile across Q1 and Q2: they more than doubled to around USD 100 billion in Q1 2017, and then dropped to negative levels in Q2. The situation varies across countries. In the second half of 2017, intracompany debt outflows from Luxembourg (excluding from SPEs) and the United States increased from negative levels to USD 4 billion in Luxembourg and to more than USD 10 billion in the United States. Increases were partly offset by decreases in intracompany debt outflows from Belgium (from USD 25 billion to USD 1 billion) and from the Netherlands (excluding from SPEs, from USD 29 billion to USD -10 billion).

In non-OECD G20 economies, FDI outflows decreased from China (from USD 93 billion to USD 41 billion) but increased from the other economies: Argentina (from USD 0.4 billion to USD 0.6 billion) Brazil (from USD -7 billion to USD -3 billion); India (from USD 0.4 billion to USD 7 billion); Indonesia (from USD -13 billion to USD 1 billion); Russia (from USD 10 billion to USD 15 billion) in; Saudi Arabia (from USD 2 billion to USD 3 billion); and South Africa (from USD 1 billion to USD 3 billion).in.

2 FDI in resident special purpose entities

An important feature of the OECD Benchmark Definition 4th edition is to identify FDI flows and positions of resident SPEs separately. SPEs are entities with little or no physical presence or employment in the host country but that provide important services to the MNE in the form of financing or of holding assets and liabilities. MNEs often channel investments through SPEs in one country before they reach their final destination in another country. Excluding investment into resident SPEs allows a country to have a better measure of the FDI inflows likely to have a real impact on its economy.[7]

FDI positions excluding resident SPEs are available for 17 OECD countries: SPEs are not significant in Korea, Chile, Poland, Norway, Estonia and Belgium, accounting for less than 5% of FDI in these economies, while resident SPEs in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Hungary, Iceland, the United Kingdom and Austria account for 25% or more of their inward FDI. SPEs play smaller, but still significant, roles in investment for Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden and Spain. At end-2016, FDI positions in SPEs hosted by these 17 countries represented 58% of their total inward FDI position.

FDI flows in and from SPEs are volatile due to the role SPEs play in the internal financing of MNEs and can be particularly affected by individual large deals. Figure 4 shows quarterly trends of FDI inflows and outflows to and from SPEs of 12 OECD countries[8] which reported information for Q1 2013-Q2 2017.

After a slow-down in 2016, FDI flows in and from SPEs reached a new peak in Q2 2017, topping USD 300 billion. Similar high levels were observed in Q4 2013 and Q3 2015. This was due to significant increases in investments in and from Luxembourg SPEs, of respectively USD 309 billion and USD 338 billion. In the second half of 2017 as a whole, FDI flows in and from SPEs were USD

[7] For more details, see the OECD note on how MNEs channel investments through multiple countries.
[8] In Table 1, FDI Series, including and excluding resident SPEs, are only shown for 9 countries, because data on SPEs for 3 countries are not available separately for years prior to 2013, or are subject to confidentiality restrictions in selected quarters.

415 billion and USD 409 billion respectively. There were large equity flows in and from those entities. For FDI inflows to SPEs, debt flows were halved, but reinvestment of earnings tripled. For FDI outflows from SPEs, intracompany debt flows dropped to negative levels but reinvestment of earnings recovered from negative levels recorded in the second half of 2016.

In the second half of 2017, investment flows from Luxembourg and Dutch SPEs doubled compared to the second half of 2016, and investment in Luxembourg SPEs almost quadrupled. FDI flows in and from Luxembourg increased (to USD 320 billion and USD 275 billion respectively) and were largely due to equity flows: equity inflows increased from negative levels to USD 357 billion, and equity outflows from SPEs increased five-fold to USD 371 billion. Intracompany debt flows in and from those entities dropped to negative levels while reinvestment of earnings remained very limited. FDI flows from the Netherlands SPEs increased to USD 113 billion, but FDI flows in Dutch SPEs increased more modestly to USD 76 billion. The increase in FDI flows in and from Dutch SPEs were largely due to increases in intracompany debt flows and in reinvestment of earnings; equity flows from SPEs increased more modestly, and equity flows in SPEs dropped to negative levels.

In the second half of 2017, FDI flows in and from SPEs also increased in Austria, Belgium, and Denmark but there were decreases in other economies: FDI flows in and from Hungarian SPEs decreased from around USD 50 billion to around USD 18 billion, and FDI flows in and from Polish SPEs decreased from around USD 1 billion to negative levels. FDI flows in and from SPEs located in Chile, Iceland and Portugal remained very limited.

Figure 4: FDI inflows and outflows to and from OECD SPEs, Q1 2013-Q2 2017



Source*: OECD International Direct Investment statistics database*

3 Understanding the trade and investment nexus: bringing together FDI statistics and Trade in Value Added (TiVA)

Firms can supply foreign markets through both trade and investment channels. So taking a broader view that considers how a country's firms serve foreign markets through both trade and investment can provide a more complete picture of the international orientation of that economy rather than considering trade alone. However, it is important to recognise that these two channels have different impacts on the economies involved; tracing the income from trade and investment can illustrate these impacts.

Trade measured in value added terms, as in the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) Database, provides a better indication of the impact of trade on an economy than traditional gross measures of exports and imports, because it captures the value added by each country in the production of goods and services that are consumed worldwide. However, even trade measured in value added terms can overstate the impacts on the economy. Specifically, the value added of foreign-owned firms from exporting can be separated into two parts, one that stays in the economy and the other that may leave. The part most likely to stay in the economy includes compensation that foreign-owned firms pay to domestic workers , while the part that may leave includes profits that foreign-owned firms earn from exporting, which are often repatriated if they are not reinvested. Nevertheless, because domestic investors have claims on profits generated by their foreign affiliates, these profits will return to the economy when repatriated by their foreign affiliates.

As a result, income that an economy receives from its integration into global value chains via exports and investment can be broken down into four main components (Figure 5). Firstly, the traditional trade channel, measured by domestic value added by domestically-owned firms that export (solid light green). Secondly, the part of export production by foreign-owned firms that stays in the economy, measured by wages paid by foreign-owned firms to workers in the economy who produce exports (dark hash marks). Thirdly, profits that domestic parent companies receive from successful operations of their affiliates overseas, measured by FDI income receipts (light hash marks). These are all shown as a share of GDP. It is also important to consider profits generated by foreign-owned firms in the economy that are repatriated to the parent country; this is measured by FDI income payments and shown below the line for information.

Figure 5: Supplying foreign markets through trade and investment, 2014



Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added Data, OECD AMNE and OECD FDI (BMD4) statistics

Figure 5 provides a broader perspective on a country's 'export' orientation by including sales through foreign affiliates in conjunction with exports in order to obtain a complete picture of the global business activity of a country. It also recognises the role that MNEs play in delivering goods and services to international markets, and specifically that FDI income is a result of MNEs' active role in producing goods and services. This distinguishes it from other, more passive types of investment income, such as portfolio investment income.

Figure 5 provides a broader perspective on a country's 'export' orientation by combining sales through foreign affiliates with exports in order to obtain a complete picture of a country's global business activity. It also recognises that FDI income is a result of MNEs' active role in producing goods and services to international markets which distinguishes it from other, more passive types of investment income, such as portfolio investment income.

This broader view corresponds more to a national income, or ownership, perspective by focusing on income earned by residents and companies of the country's economy irrespective of where they operate, and not solely on income generated within the boundary of the economy. It can also show the role played by trade and investment in the evolution of national income over time.

Furthermore, from a statistical point of view, this broader notion of trade is important because the distinction between conventional "cross border trade" and investment income is becoming increasingly blurred. For example, intellectual property transactions within an MNE can be recorded as either trade in services or implicitly as direct investment income.

Finally, it also shows that some countries with a traditionally high export orientation may not receive as much income from the global economy as expected, while those with a traditionally low export orientation may receive more. Export orientation is measured, in trade in value added terms, by the share of domestic value added that serves foreign markets (the dark green bar in Figure 6). However, when an economy is a net recipient of FDI, the broader measure considering both trade and investment will generally be lower than the measure of export orientation from TiVA, as is the case for Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic. However, it will generally be higher when an economy is a net outward investor, as is the case for the United States and France. As a result, this broader measure can provide a more complete picture of the economy's international orientation and better reflect the international integration of countries that are home to MNEs, or are at the start of GVCs. It will also reduce the range across OECD countries as many of the countries with high export orientations, as measured in TiVA, are net recipients of FDI while those with low export orientations are home to large MNEs with significant investments abroad.

Figure 6: How considering investment changes the measure of an economy's international integration



Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added Data, OECD AMNE and OECD FDI (BMD4) statistics

Launched for the first time in 2017, Trade and Investment Statistical Country Notes for all OECD countries provide more information on the role of international investment in the integration of each country into global value chains. The Notes are available at: www.oecd.org/investment/trade-investment-gvc.htm.

FDI outward flows | FDI inward flows

Table 1	FDI outward flows 2016					2017[p]		FDI inward flows 2016					2017[p]	
In USD millions	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Y	Q1	Q2	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Y	Q1	Q2
OECD[1]	**357 564**	**151 568**	**299 310**	**269 629**	**1 078 069**	**349 635**	**273 602**	**393 305**	**225 507**	**256 429**	**245 584**	**1 120 827**	**242 069**	**220 267**
Australia[2]	722	1 263	- 862	- 727	395	- 2 988	1 258	11 701	9 624	7 497	13 285	42 107	8 775	20 188
Austria*	5 432	- 906	3 253	- 10 837	- 3 055	3 087	- 1 260	2 103	742	- 899	- 10 872	- 8 923	1 308	- 553
Belgium	- 31 601	- 11 184	6 365	58 716	22 296	2 157	757	784	- 14 470	5 200	38 786	30 300	7 208	- 12 951
Canada	11 746	10 773	21 020	27 010	70 549	35 371	17 938	6 978	10 108	7 614	10 557	35 257	6 553	1 473
Chile*	1 342	620	1 954	2 283	6 198	1 707	-123 (A)	3 861	2 608	2 221	2 480	11 170	2 402	- 313 (A)
Czech Republic	736	852	108	- 712	984	- 57	361	343	4 295	2 220	- 106	6 752	2 414	1 565
Denmark*	6 503	858	3 542	3 582	14 486	5 978	6 547	513	126	- 322	608	925	- 2 154	- 10 661
Estonia	- 3	159	159	37	352	80	42	185	129	173	427	915	57	245
Finland[2]	16 784	- 4 422	1 230	- 206	13 386	9 831	299	3 179	- 11 800	1 000	- 1 705	- 9 327	12 234	11 040
France	2 849	23 967	8 822	21 672	57 311	- 11 406	8 660	18 532	3 307	5 758	746	28 343	13 677	3 747
Germany	15 738	- 19 627	9 102	32 052	37 265	27 555	15 801	7 619	3 867	655	102	12 243	5 930	- 2 644
Greece	537	- 2 240	235	- 10	- 1 478	663	- 529	327	530	1 160	1 101	3 118	1 146	584
Hungary*	- 10 225	383	300	942	- 8 600	2 630	1 159	- 9 987	- 349	1 953	1 899	- 6 483	2 963	447
Iceland*	- 352	49	- 298	- 599	- 1 199	- 164	47	- 46	- 356	406	- 491	- 487	- 133	- 237
Ireland	36 823	- 3 051	1 206	9 557	44 535	4 893	24 903	18 888	- 18 820	- 5 764	27 994	22 298	9 257	28 614
Israel[2,4]	1 638	1 194	8 060	2 180	13 072	1 424	1 200	2 846	2 690	2 796	3 571	11 903	2 303	2 134
Italy	3 686	1 791	5 697	6 480	17 653	6 450	- 1 857	3 838	1 033	4 859	11 235	20 965	3 773	3 438
Japan[6]	34 693	19 699	51 789	39 210	145 230	54 190	32 496	3 212	1 721	6 813	- 254	11 388	4 257	119
Korea[2]	5 308	5 797	5 387	10 782	27 274	11 423	5 988	42	3 903	3 090	3 791	10 827	4 441	2 687
Latvia	- 13	43	94	20	144	95	38	- 91	- 187	253	173	149	167	176
Luxembourg*	3 800	6 977	15 866	8 905	35 548	14 753	13 522	2 124	9 706	16 516	10 373	38 718	7 598	4 773
Mexico*	3 308	- 1 515	- 3 482	682	- 1 009	1 169	2 490 (A)	10 747	6 093	4 562	6 045	27 447	7 946	5 788 (A)
Netherlands*	88 495	17 871	51 867	8 061	166 294	17 551	- 4 215	47 809	13 875	30 488	- 17 464	74 708	19 155	6 754
New Zealand	- 11	- 386	2	457	62	336	359	935	387	868	721	2 911	350	1 089
Norway[2]	12 603	7 375	- 3 388	- 7 686	8 905	- 2 286	2 429	12 429	- 1 925	- 1 884	- 24 572	- 15 953	- 1 788	135
Poland*	2 263	- 901	1 603	4 948	7 912	1 719	497	6 522	1 245	2 356	3 294	13 418	3 028	- 2 340
Portugal*	623	416	788	200	2 024	13	704	2 585	1 650	791	1 110	6 134	2 422	2 240
Slovak Republic	205	62	33	- 53	248	52	184	301	- 1 289	672	21	- 295	973	348
Slovenia	72	42	81	92	287	136	18	403	458	419	- 19	1 260	368	- 129
Spain[2]	17 537	20 302	7 002	5 331	50 173	12 374	8 397	11 768	14 879	6 862	- 1 773	31 736	12 940	3 579
Sweden	8 457	5 948	2 723	3 431	20 559	4 564	12 480	4 493	3 196	9 653	1 421	18 764	3 685	3 143
Switzerland[2]	38 605	- 4 687	9 015	- 2 821	40 111	12 611	- 15 128	21 343	- 11 160	- 14 691	- 12 884	- 17 392	12 568	48 825
Turkey	695	810	542	811	2 859	872	840	2 683	2 550	3 142	3 647	12 023	2 875	2 039
United Kingdom	- 3 964	- 7 903	- 4 296	2 966	- 13 196	17 623	32 560	50 127	22 619	38 081	124 756	235 583	3 497	13 743
United States	82 573	81 182	93 829	42 912	300 496	115 231	104 738	144 233	164 547	111 939	47 610	468 330	79 875	81 181
Total World[1,3]	**460 322**	**270 904**	**393 214**	**341 048**	**1 465 487**	**417 889**	**368 878**	**537 669**	**369 396**	**416 363**	**465 935**	**1 789 366**	**413 847**	**374 806**
European Union (EU)[1]	**162 858**	**31 304**	**116 735**	**156 211**	**467 108**	**120 467**	**120 396**	**174 683**	**40 727**	**126 233**	**197 304**	**538 949**	**117 484**	**57 897**
G20 countries[1]	**228 178**	**199 886**	**241 710**	**217 272**	**887 045**	**290 165**	**254 711**	**333 050**	**298 632**	**257 732**	**341 723**	**1 231 139**	**220 928**	**194 018**
G20-OECD countries[1]	**157 315**	**116 195**	**187 508**	**183 810**	**644 828**	**255 490**	**220 913**	**259 686**	**229 346**	**193 984**	**221 493**	**904 511**	**141 598**	**131 758**
G20 -non OECD countries[1]	**70 863**	**83 691**	**54 202**	**33 461**	**242 218**	**34 675**	**33 798**	**73 364**	**69 286**	**63 748**	**120 230**	**326 628**	**79 330**	**62 260**
Argentina	249	206	184	248	887	334	248	2 108	697	882	- 427	3 260	3 508	1 666
Brazil	- 3 399	2 596	- 1 743	- 4 887	- 7 433	- 4 747	1 966	12 055	14 570	10 675	20 634	57 933	18 348	14 206
China	58 793	65 408	56 609	36 393	217 203	20 519	20 541	41 133	33 652	26 194	69 578	170 557	33 072	21 926
India[2]	2 588	2 014	- 3 016	3 462	5 048	4 143	3 017	11 384	5 895	13 983	13 196	44 458	9 141	10 253
Indonesia	- 56	263	- 1 578	- 11 052	- 12 423	276	1 211	2 730	3 593	4 941	- 7 744	3 521	3 030	5 786
Russia	9 057	8 270	2 701	6 923	26 951	13 129	1 686	1 298	8 445	4 886	22 547	37 176	9 816	6 381
Saudi Arabia[2]	2 115	4 491	947	1 050	8 603	272	2 830	1 883	1 852	1 711	2 007	7 453	1 736	1 753
South Africa[2]	1 517	443	98	1 324	3 382	749	2 298	773	582	476	439	2 270	679	288
***Data excludes SPEs. Corresponding data below including SPE's[4]:**														
Austria	- 25 804	- 899	3 253	- 10 847	- 34 295	3 561	- 1 051	- 29 179	4 972	- 1 158	- 10 333	- 35 698	1 490	- 419
Chile	1 330	627	1 944	2 265	6 165	1 713	-123 (A)	3 890	2 638	2 242	2 496	11 266	2 349	- 313 (A)
Denmark	6 695	1 018	3 676	3 662	15 051	6 054	9 654	535	149	- 300	631	1 015	- 2 061	- 9 943
Hungary	- 7 863	648	282	51 825	44 892	19 995	2 028	- 7 598	- 49	2 064	52 840	47 256	20 134	1 376
Iceland	- 350	51	- 296	- 597	- 1 191	- 162	50	- 43	- 355	408	- 489	- 479	- 131	- 234
Luxembourg	- 478	45 144	99 290	66 065	210 022	- 48 009	351 718	13 500	- 14 853	109 785	307	108 739	18 283	314 010
Netherlands	107 929	17 146	108 882	5 983	239 939	128 586	- 2 597	62 472	10 765	76 514	- 8 356	141 396	102 359	- 397
Poland	2 272	- 920	1 603	5 691	8 645	1 719	468	6 531	1 227	2 356	4 037	14 151	3 028	- 2 369
Portugal	750	429	1 119	211	2 506	60	594	2 537	1 735	809	1 112	6 193	2 526	2 313

For notes to this table refer to page 12

Source: OECD and IMF

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For notes to this table refer to page 12

Table 2	FDI outward positions						FDI inward positions					
	In USD million			As a share of GDP (%)			In USD million			As a share of GDP (%)		
	2 014	2 015	2016[p]	2 014	2 015	2016[p]	2 014	2 015	2016[p]	2 014	2 015	2016[p]
OECD[1]	**19 623 632**	**19 607 954**	**20 246 228**	**39.8**	**42.2**	**42.6**	**16 618 786**	**16 700 574**	**17 738 104**	**33.7**	**35.9**	**37.3**
Australia	446 588	396 443		30.6	31.9		562 815	537 367		38.6	43.2	
Austria*	224 039	210 530	205 843	51.1	55.8	53.3	182 785	164 897	154 287	41.7	43.7	39.9
Belgium*	554 624	590 438	568 673	104.3	129.8	121.9	496 519	524 095	475 046	93.4	115.2	101.9
Canada	1 089 941	1 074 055	1 221 098	60.8	69.2	79.8	958 142	760 669	947 965	53.4	49.0	62.0
Chile*	94 494	99 460	107 601	36.2	41.0	43.6	211 137	220 734	237 201	80.9	91.0	96.0
Czech Republic	18 235	18 591	17 941	8.8	10.0	9.2	121 512	116 628	117 207	58.5	62.4	60.0
Denmark*	167 395	168 880	176 000	47.5	56.0	57.4	95 766	91 482	97 116	27.2	30.4	31.7
Estonia	6 423	6 218	6 576	24.5	27.6	28.2	20 896	18 862	19 369	79.7	83.6	83.0
Finland	117 307	92 926		43.0	40.0		93 896	80 822		34.4	34.8	
France	1 294 151	1 254 275	1 259 355	45.4	51.5	51.1	700 027	688 355	697 562	24.6	28.3	28.3
Germany	1 389 794	1 342 450	1 335 723	35.7	39.8	38.4	860 364	789 228	786 031	22.1	23.4	22.6
Greece	32 431	27 288	22 432	13.7	14.0	11.5	24 567	26 951	28 383	10.4	13.8	14.6
Hungary*	40 663	35 335	24 676	29.2	29.0	19.8	99 573	84 334	79 946	71.5	69.3	64.3
Iceland*	8 415	7 637	5 889	49.0	45.5	29.4	7 889	7 851	9 741	45.9	46.8	48.6
Ireland	619 374	887 536	832 722	240.0	305.4	273.2	416 050	866 243	839 543	161.2	298.1	275.4
Israel[2,4]	79 011	84 696	98 112	25.6	28.3	30.8	89 619	99 313	107 295	29.0	33.2	33.7
Italy	490 650	468 366	472 327	22.8	25.7	25.5	352 482	340 515	344 741	16.4	18.7	18.6
Japan[6]	1 152 007	1 228 767	1 315 146	23.8	28.0	26.6	171 664	174 146	190 544	3.5	4.0	3.9
Korea[2]	260 502	285 932	306 145	18.5	20.7	21.7	179 441	179 544	184 970	12.7	13.0	13.1
Latvia	1 361	1 424	1 524	4.3	5.3	5.5	15 070	14 743	14 184	48.1	54.5	51.2
Luxembourg*	181 429	193 598	211 846	273.7	333.5	353.4	252 430	213 702	210 485	380.8	368.1	351.1
Mexico*	187 833	185 588		14.5	16.2		580 195	613 071		44.8	53.4	
Netherlands*	1 044 222	1 229 815	1 393 569	118.7	162.2	179.3	745 751	739 274	814 475	84.8	97.5	104.8
New Zealand	17 996	17 026	16 740	9.0	9.7	9.0	76 625	66 605	70 403	38.2	37.9	38.1
Norway*	162 028	172 432	178 314	32.4	44.6	48.1	173 127	147 487	147 359	34.7	38.1	39.7
Poland*	21 797	22 281	27 076	4.0	4.7	5.8	211 951	183 869	185 042	38.9	38.5	39.4
Portugal*	46 785	47 739	49 141	20.4	24.0	24.0	103 177	103 695	106 042	44.9	52.1	51.8
Slovak Republic	2 820	2 462	2 651	2.8	2.8	3.0	49 738	46 016	43 740	49.4	52.7	48.8
Slovenia	6 477	5 997	6 023	13.0	13.9	13.5	12 385	12 642	13 650	24.8	29.4	30.5
Spain*	494 476	466 260	482 689	35.9	39.1	39.2	566 539	516 344	511 276	41.2	43.3	41.5
Sweden*	377 441	357 510	362 045	65.8	72.1	70.9	293 526	280 757	271 912	51.2	56.6	53.2
Switzerland*	995 343	1 025 178		141.6	152.8		672 680	716 871		95.7	106.9	
Turkey	39 513	35 602	38 453	4.2	4.1	4.5	182 065	155 796	140 597	19.5	18.1	16.4
United Kingdom	1 681 283	1 557 448	1 438 348	56.1	54.4	54.9	1 581 494	1 408 010	1 388 241	52.7	49.2	53.0
United States	6 276 784	6 007 773	6 361 419	36.0	33.2	34.2	5 456 888	5 709 658	6 555 622	31.3	31.5	35.2
Total World[1,3]	**24 440 617**	**24 749 298**	**26 065 878**	**31.1**	**33.4**	**34.6**	**26 138 991**	**26 331 002**	**28 302 697**	**33.3**	**35.5**	**37.6**
European Union (EU)[1]	**9 093 931**	**9 261 458**	**9 264 195**	**49.0**	**56.7**	**56.7**	**7 840 635**	**7 826 334**	**7 804 443**	**42.3**	**47.9**	**47.8**
G20 countries[1]	**16 082 281**	**15 800 633**	**16 633 480**	**26.5**	**27.3**	**28.3**	**16 017 439**	**15 721 295**	**17 256 794**	**26.4**	**27.1**	**29.3**
G20-OECD countries[1]	**14 309 046**	**13 836 699**	**14 330 045**	**34.9**	**35.3**	**35.7**	**11 585 576**	**11 356 359**	**12 386 709**	**28.2**	**29.0**	**30.9**
G20 -non OECD countries[1]	**1 773 235**	**1 963 934**	**2 303 436**	**9.0**	**10.5**	**12.3**	**4 431 863**	**4 364 936**	**4 870 085**	**22.6**	**23.3**	**26.0**
Argentina	36 180	37 843	39 735	6.4	6.0	7.3	89 716	79 773	72 110	15.8	12.6	13.2
Brazil[2]	175 727	159 642	172 441	7.2	8.9	9.6	614 853	468 671	625 876	25.0	26.0	34.8
China	882 640	1 095 909	1 317 238	8.4	10.0	12.0	2 599 102	2 696 344	2 865 941	24.8	24.5	26.1
India[2]	132 741	139 038	144 086	6.5	6.7	6.4	265 838	282 617	318 498	13.1	13.5	14.1
Indonesia	25 396	29 351	58 931	2.9	3.4	6.3	217 487	222 410	250 073	24.4	25.8	26.8
Russia	329 831	284 217	335 653	16.0	20.8	26.2	290 054	264 315	379 329	14.1	19.4	29.6
Saudi Arabia[2]	44 699	63 251	80 668	5.9	9.8	12.6	215 909	224 050	231 502	28.6	34.7	36.0
South Africa[2]	146 023	154 683		41.7	48.9		138 904	126 755		39.7	40.1	
***Data excludes SPEs. Corresponding data below including SPE's[4]:**												
Austria	325 179	291 068	254 597	74.2	77.2	65.9	273 217	243 403	204 856	62.3	64.6	53.0
Belgium	577 205	610 211	590 557	108.5	134.1	126.6	556 016	551 774	500 240	104.6	121.3	107.3
Chile	96 960	101 791	110 090	37.2	42.0	44.6	212 557	221 986	238 557	81.4	91.5	96.6
Denmark	195 914	189 334	202 578	55.6	62.8	66.0	125 056	112 894	124 266	35.5	37.5	40.5
Hungary	166 110	146 761	185 796	119.3	120.6	149.4	223 670	196 814	238 364	160.6	161.7	191.7
Iceland	11 570	11 079	9 331	67.3	66.0	46.5	11 077	11 293	13 183	64.5	67.3	65.8
Luxembourg	3 827 058	4 383 910	4 419 156	5 772.5	7 552.2	7 371.7	3 194 941	3 669 835	3 634 080	4 819.1	6 322.0	6 062.1
Netherlands	4 981 039	4 937 286	5 096 839	566.3	651.4	655.8	4 179 789	4 021 126	4 086 421	475.2	530.5	525.8
Norway	163 695	174 388	181 044	32.8	45.1	48.8	174 522	149 473	149 467	35.0	38.7	40.3
Poland	24 390	23 589	29 195	4.5	4.9	6.2	214 514	185 177	187 161	39.3	38.8	39.9
Portugal	54 781	56 709	57 576	23.9	28.5	28.1	120 353	117 180	118 670	52.4	58.9	58.0
Spain	518 941	492 514	516 838	37.7	41.3	41.9	598 024	543 899	545 941	43.5	45.6	44.3
Sweden	402 119	374 402	379 413	70.1	75.5	74.2	320 610	302 690	290 615	55.9	61.1	56.9
Switzerland	1 085 447	1 129 768		154.5	168.4		779 062	839 827		110.9	125.2	

For notes to this table refer to page 12

Source: OECD and IMF

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Notes for Tables 1 to 2

Data are updated as of 15 October 2017.

p: preliminary data | |: break in series
(A): asset/liability figure used for 2017 only

Tables 1 and 2 show FDI statistics at the aggregate level on a directional basis, except for selected countries for which the asset/liability series is used (see number 2 below). Data for Q2 2017 for Chile and Mexico correspond to asset/liability figures, while data for earlier years correspond to directional figures. For more information on the two presentations for FDI, see Asset/liability versus directional presentation. FDI terms are defined in the FDI Glossary.

Financial flows consist of three components: equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and intracompany debt. Equity capital is often associated with new investments, such as greenfield or M&As, even though it can also reflect extensions of capital or financial restructuring. Nevertheless, equity capital flows are often taken as a sign of the amount of new investments related to FDI. Reinvestment of earnings is the portion of earnings that the parent decides to reinvest in the affiliate rather than receive as a dividend and can be an important source of financing for affiliates. This component of financial flows tends to be the least volatile. Changes in the reinvestment of earnings reflect both changes in the earnings of affiliates and in the amount of earnings that parents choose to distribute. The reinvestment ratio is the share of earnings that the parent reinvests. It can be an indication of the parent's perception of investment opportunities available to the affiliate: if the parent sees the opportunity to make profitable investments in its affiliates, the parent might choose to reinvest more money in them. However, many other factors can influence the share of earnings reinvested. For example, if the parent is in need of cash, they might pay higher dividends. The third component of financial flows—intracompany debt–is the most volatile component of financial flows and is often driven by the short term financing needs within a company rather than larger overall macroeconomic phenomena. As such, intracompany debt is often the most difficult aspect of financial flows to explain.

For data going back to 2005 in Tables 1 and 2,(in Excel format), see www.oecd.org/investment/statistics.htm.

1. **OECD, European Union (EU28), World, G20 aggregates**:

   FDI outward and inward flows (Table 1) were compiled using directional figures when available. Missing quarterly directional figures were approximated using the ratio between annual asset liability and directional figures; or by distributing annual directional figures equally among the four quarters; or using unrevised historical data. When directional figures were not available and could not be approximated, asset liability figures were used.

   FDI outward and inward stocks (Table 2) were compiled using directional figures when available. When directional figures were not available and could not be approximated, asset liability figures were used. Data for 2016 include positions at end-2016, or at-end 2015 when 2016 data are not available.

   Resident SPEs from Austria, Belgium (FDI positions only), Chile, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway (FDI positions only), Poland, Portugal, Spain (FDI positions only), Sweden (FDI positions only) and Switzerland (FDI positions only) are excluded.

   The European Union aggregate corresponds to member country composition of the reporting period: EU15 for data up to and including 2003, EU25 for data between 2004 and 2006, EU27 for data between 2007 and 2012 and EU28 starting from 2013.

2. **Data series on asset/liability basis:** The data series is on an asset/liability basis as opposed to directional basis for Australia (Table 1 only), Finland (Table 1 only), Israel, Korea, Norway (Table 1 only), Spain (Table 1 only) and Switzerland (Table 1 only) and for the following non-OECD countries: India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.

3. **World aggregate**: is based on available data at the time of update as reported to the OECD and IMF. Missing data for countries for Q1 and Q2 2017 were estimated using the overall growth rate observed between, respectively, Q4 2016 and Q1 2017 and Q1 2017 and Q2 2017. Growth rates were calculated from data for OECD countries, for non-OECD G20 countries, and for 50 non-OECD and non-G20 countries in Q1 and 20 non-OECD and non-G20 countries in Q2. World totals for FDI positions are based on available FDI data at the time of update as reported to OECD and IMF for the year ended or the latest available year. By definition, inward and outward FDI worldwide should be equal. However, in practice, there are statistical discrepancies between inward and outward FDI. Unless otherwise specified, references to "global FDI flows" refer to the average of these two figures.

4. **Special purpose entities (SPEs)**: Information on resident SPEs for Estonia and Sweden (FDI flows only) is confidential. This information is not yet available separately for Canada, Ireland and Mexico. The information is available separately for Austria, Chile, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. However, the information is not displayed in the tables for all countries, due to limited availability of historical data or to differences in data vintages. Resident SPEs are not present or not significant in Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and the United States.

5. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

6. Directional flows for Japan: only annual data reflect annual revisions, so the sum of quarters may not add up to the annual data.

FDI in Figures is published twice yearly. For queries, please contact **investment@oecd.org**. Find data and more detailed FDI statistics at **www.oecd.org/investment/statistics.htm**.

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