

Executive Summary - France

Economic context and drivers of Better Regulation

France is a major player in the world economy. It faces substantial challenges, including loss of business competitiveness on world markets. At the same time, France can boast a range of advantages which should help it to rise to meet these challenges. The implementation of certain necessary structural reforms partly depends on a further strengthening of regulatory governance policy.

In recent years, French policies for Better Regulation have underlined a political will, which has grown in strength since 2004, to undertake reforms in order to improve regulatory quality. A stronger and deeper understanding of the importance of effective regulatory management within the administration has helped to promote this trend. A number of public reports on the quality of the law have fuelled discussion, and contributed to a promotion of the principles of regulatory quality. The perception of what some have labelled the "French disease" (which is not confined to France, but can also be found in some other countries), meaning a proliferation of regulations which need to be controlled, has led to a reassessment of the changes necessary to improve the rule-making process.

French policy on regulatory governance is also strongly linked to the reforms undertaken to modernise the state, in the context of a deep seated use of legal instruments as the dominant instrument of state intervention. The current initiatives, with regard to impact assessment or the reduction of administrative burdens, also fall within the wider framework of the general review of public policies (RGPP), launched in June 2007, immediately after the presidential elections. The RGPP aims to achieve budgetary savings and improve the effectiveness of public policies, including the quality of the services provided to citizens and businesses.

The relevance of effective regulatory governance for economic performance is not absent from the debates, but is less visible compared with other European countries where economic considerations have provided the main driving force of regulatory reforms. One of the government's regulatory policies is the reduction of administrative burden on businesses. Even if the aim of this particular programme is to promote the competitiveness of French businesses, this consideration is not at the "core" of French regulatory governance policy. The fact that economic considerations play a relatively minor role in regulatory policy is somewhat surprising in the context of post-crisis recovery. The lack of a clear link with economic policies means that regulatory governance policy is not particularly visible beyond a restricted group of administrative and political institutions.

Public governance framework for Better Regulation

The organisation of public governance in France is structured around the following features: shared executive authority between the President of the Republic and the prime minister; maintenance of strong central government (even though France has embarked on a process of decentralisation over the last three decades); a public administration characterised by recruitment, based on competitive examinations and key role played by distinctive formal groups of public servants (*grands corps de l'État*); and a significant public sector.

A range of extensive reforms undertaken since 2007 is leading – or will lead – to changes in this institutional framework:

- The constitutional law of 23 July 2008, provided parliament with new mechanisms. It should be noted that the new provisions to strengthen parliament have limitations, not least the willingness of members to make use of them. They are also conditioned by the reality of a parliamentary majority.
- The territorial reform began following the debate prompted by the report of the “Attali” Committee (2008) which, amongst other things, advocated the dismantling of one of the main subnational levels of government (that of the department).
- The reform of the public service includes a reduction in the number of public servants and an overhaul of the regulations governing the public service, so that there is a better match between needs and jobs.

Developments in Better Regulation and main findings of this review

Strategy and policies for Better Regulation

Since the OECD Review of Regulatory Reform of France published in 2004, France has undertaken a set of ambitious measures to improve regulatory quality; these measures constitute a major quality change. Three substantial fields of action may be distinguished. Two are upstream: the first tackles the process of drafting regulations by strengthening *ex ante* impact assessment; the second is the overhaul of public consultation processes. The third field is downstream of regulatory production. The French government has conducted a simplification policy which combines legal simplification and a reduction in administrative burdens. Special efforts have also been developed to reduce the backlog of EU legislation to be transposed into national law, and to speed up the production of secondary regulations necessary for the implementation of primary laws, two weaknesses emphasised in the OECD 2004 report.

Upstream and downstream policies are tending to join up. A discussion has begun on how best to combine *ex ante* impact assessment and the *ex post* simplification policies. To date, there is no integrated strategy in the field, but an evolutionary process is underway to provide a framework for future developments. This trend is also relevant to other EU countries.

The expression "Better Regulation" does not always accurately reflect the nature of French regulatory governance policy. The term goes beyond simplification and legal clarity. Strictly speaking, there is no regulatory governance strategy in France, but rather a set of measures intended to improve regulatory quality, basically propelled by the perception of "French disease". In other words, an overproduction of regulations that

needs to be controlled. The economic dimension and the economic cost of excessive regulation or of "poor" regulation have not yet been fully taken into account.

Continued progress in regulatory governance depends on maintaining strong political will. The progress achieved since 2004, for instance, on impact assessment, administrative simplification and the transposition of EU directives, has depended on a strong political will on the part of the government and parliament. It should be emphasised that many of these policies are "work in progress", and at a midpoint of implementation. Processes and tools need to be set up and implemented, a lengthy and exacting process. Regulatory governance is a long-term policy, with little immediate political gain, and subject to short-term pressures.

There is no clear communication which brings together the different strands of regulatory governance. This reflects the lack of any integrated policy and the dilution of certain initiatives in the RGPP. It is above all presented as an initiative in favour of "users" (citizens and businesses) and improved public services, rather than a support for economic recovery. The various reforms are the subject of separate internal communications within the administration in an *ad hoc* fashion (such as in February 2010 on progress with the simplification plan). This does not provide clear visibility for these reforms, either within the administration, or outside it (for stakeholders).

France stands out (positively) in terms of the large number of reports on regulatory quality. The reports by the *Council of State* and other *ad hoc* committee reports which focus on specific aspects, such as the *Balladur* report on local governments and the *Warsmann* report on regulatory quality, may be cited. These assessments, although not regular events, have given rise to substantial changes, which suggests strongly that it would be helpful to conduct these assessments on a more systematic basis.

France has several players who may be able to provide regular evaluations of regulatory policy over time. The *Cour des comptes* (Court of audit), independent of the executive, has not yet undertaken studies on regulatory governance, but could be very useful for general assessments. The programmes to reduce administrative burdens and impact assessment processes could be candidates for this approach, as can be seen in other countries. This approach could be envisaged as part of the development of public policy assessments outlined in the recent constitutional revision. The *Council of State* remains a major player. A new section (the administration section) was recently set up, enabling it to take a more in-depth cross-cutting view of state reform and its objectives.

Institutional capacities for Better Regulation

There has been real progress, based on structures firmly rooted in the French institutional landscape. Regulatory governance in France depends on several key-players, most importantly the *Council of State*, the prime minister's services and the General Directorate for the Modernisation of the State (DGME) in the Budget Ministry. It has been decided to develop the network around specialised units: the legislation and quality of the law service in the General Government Secretariat (SGG) and the General Secretariat for European Affairs (SGAE) within the prime minister's services; and the DGME within the Budget Ministry. The SGG deals mainly with the flow (production of regulations), the SGAE covers the transposition of EU legislation, while the DGME looks after stock management (administrative simplification). The *Council of State* remains a key element both upstream (through its consultative function for the government and its control of legal quality) and downstream (as the administrative judge of last resort).

The question is – on which actor should France now depend within the government to secure the long-term future of these reforms? The SGG appears to be best placed to tackle cross-cutting issues. It is emerging as a key-partner to ministries in their law making processes. It does not have any direct sanctioning powers, but its close relationship to the head of the government gives it a strong persuasive platform from which to encourage progress. However, as is the case of many of its counterparts in other countries, as a prime minister's service, it is more likely to play a co-ordination role than that of a powerful driver of a regulatory governance network. Furthermore, it has few resources (compared to the ministries). The French government decided to build regulatory quality policy on a network of correspondents throughout the ministries rather than to establish a single regulatory management body, which is difficult to fit in with the existing institutional structures and the administrative culture. Nevertheless, this network must still be based on a strong and clear political intention, associated with a clearly recognised centre of gravity, without which, it runs the risk of gradually disappearing.

Progress in recent years is the result of monitoring and discipline (including penalties) as well as the development of methodologies and support tools. The administrative culture is gradually changing with, for instance, the development of progress charts, impact assessment, the establishment of networks of correspondents on administrative simplification and quality of the law, and the development of new forms of consultation. The beginnings of a change in culture are evident. Two issues need attention. First, the administrative culture remains marked by the dominant weight of legal training and, in comparison to other countries, there is little sign of an economic culture. Second, the development of regulatory quality requires particular attention to the training of civil servants, including in-house training. Acculturation must continue so that the processes and tools which have been set up function effectively.

Transparency through public consultation and communication

Since the 2004 OECD review, the French approach to public consultation has experienced major changes. France has moved away from a model based largely on corporatism, though with plenty of scope for traditional elements. The method chosen for reshaping the approach has not been to do away completely with traditional institutionalised forms (advisory boards or committees) and pursue “all-out use” of the Internet, but to supervise them more closely, diversify consultation procedures and involve stakeholders more effectively beforehand in drawing up public policies. These lines of action reflect recognition of the need to reform public consultation so that it is more effective, and to adapt consultation methods to changes in society, while taking account of the institutional heritage and some degree of wariness among many administrative authorities regarding the effectiveness of open consultation over the Internet.

In recent years, significant breakthroughs have been achieved in revitalising public consultation. First of all, rules have been devised governing the establishment and operation of all advisory boards, and almost 40% of these boards were abolished in June 2009, following a process of review with “cut-off” clauses. This rationalisation of the advisory boards will only have a long-term impact if it occurs in conjunction with regular monitoring of the rules for the establishment and the work of the boards. Second, ministries have developed new consultation methods to involve stakeholders more effectively in drawing up public policies prior to the process (the *Grenelle* forum, Internet forums on reforms or major schemes under consideration, and the establishment of a “Business Council”). Third, with the January 2007 law for modernisation of the social

dialogue, the reform of public consultation has also affected the processes of consultation and negotiation involving the government and “social partners” (trade unions and business representatives).

The work undertaken has to be part of a broader and more ambitious policy for reshaping public consultation. This need is recognised by the administration, which is seeking to establish clearer guidelines, but it has not (yet) resulted in comprehensive reflection and discussion. While reform of the advisory boards may make the system less cumbersome, it must be part of a strategic vision of what public consultation is expected to achieve. There is a need to strengthen the openness and diversity of consultation procedures, beyond experimentation with new methods. It is increasingly hard to rely solely on predetermined expert groups in more complex societies.

Consultation currently lacks a baseline methodology to support a clearer strategy and raise its profile. During the OECD discussions, several interlocutors (from within and outside the public administration) highlighted the need to establish more structured procedures and, more generally, to develop guidance on consultation. Reference was made to how the views of stakeholders were often not considered and to the lack of feedback on consultation (a frequently mentioned weak point, and not solely in France), partly because of the pressure of time.

Much attention is focused on access to the law. Considerable effort has been invested and maintained in developing mechanisms for accessing the law, and in particular the *Légifrance* and *monservicpublic.fr* websites.

The development of new regulations

Since 2004, steps have been taken to strengthen rule-making processes. The government's work programme has been set up (and remains the government's internal working document), which, every six months, establishes the government's overall direction, containing the list of bills, orders and decrees. The time limits for implementing the acts' application decrees *have been reduced.* An application has been developed to dematerialise the regulatory production chain. Finally, the support tools for drafting laws have been strengthened. The rules for drafting legal texts have been grouped in the "legal drafting manual" (*guide legistic*). This voluminous manual (500 pages) concentrates on legal drafting and does not adopt a comprehensive approach to the production of regulations. It has still to be integrated into the online tools for the production of regulations. The need to strengthen legal drafting capacities in the various ministries was often emphasised at OECD meetings, particularly to produce texts that are clearer and easily accessible.

Bills introduced by the parliament need attention. Since the constitutional revision of 2008 provides greater scope for parliamentary initiative, the issue arises of the need to reinforce the procedures ensuring the quality of draft laws proposed by the members of parliament, including impact assessment. There is the risk of a “fast-track” procedure under which government initiatives are promoted through the intervention of one or more members of parliament.

France has set up a new system for impact assessment, which gives it a leading position in Europe, at least in principle. Since 1 September 2009, impact assessment has been a constitutional requirement. This anchoring constitutes a "first" in comparison with other countries. According to the new provisions, an impact assessment must be attached to all bills the government sends to parliament. Failing this, the conference of presidents

of the parliamentary chamber to which they have been initially referred, may refuse to put the bill on the agenda, including if it considers that the impact assessment is inadequate. In the event of a disagreement between the parliament and the prime minister, the question is referred to the *Constitutional Council*.

Recourse to a constitutional and organic text underscored the difficulty of making headway on impact assessment in the rule-making process without imposing a substantial constraint. Earlier efforts (based on prime ministerial circulars) did not succeed in making impact assessment a part of ministries' practice and culture. They also failed because of a lack of rigour and penalties. In the current system, three elements should help: the system is based on a review process in which all the players (government, parliament, *Council of State*, administration) are engaged. The obligations and the practical details for control are laid down very precisely by an organic law, and cannot therefore be easily changed. Substantial penalties may be incurred if an assessment turns out to be inadequate (*Council of State* comments and may refuse to put the draft regulation on the parliament's agenda. This refusal may be endorsed by the *Constitutional Council*).

The first months of the new regime are encouraging. The government bills introduced to parliament now have an impact assessment with a significant scope and which is published on the *Légifrance* site. The SGG has developed methodologies and reference materials, while leaving each ministry room to manoeuvre in adapting the impact assessment's structure and content to its field of activity. The initial months show that impact assessment dossiers have started to be used as an argument during the parliamentary debate, and are also taken into consideration in the broader public debate.

The current interest in impact assessment must be maintained over time and resist pressures. The commitment – both political and administrative – made by the various stakeholders, in the first place the prime minister, the *Council of State* and the National Assembly's Law Commission was a key factor in setting up this system. It is essential that the government and the parliament maintain strong and sustainable political attention so that the threat of penalties remains credible.

The system does not clearly incorporate public consultation procedures and does not sufficiently draw attention to the “zero” (do nothing) option. In order for impact assessment to be a genuine decision-making tool, it must be accompanied by a public consultation tool to collect the elements required for good decision-making. The studies' publication (and the comments received) should contribute to the tool's quality. Impact assessment must also reflect on the actual need for the law. The analysis must therefore start far enough upstream of the reform project itself.

The methodological tools need to be strengthened. Developing impact assessment will require the methodology to be updated and developed in more detail, particularly for economic analysis and cost calculations (so far as possible), a point raised by several interviewees. With regard to calculating the cost of administrative information obligations, the *Oscar* tool should continue to be developed and updated so that it remains relevant. Efforts to determine what statistics need to be collected must also continue. Particular attention should be given to impacts on France's competitiveness internationally.

The right balance must be found when determining the system's field of application and the proportionality of the effort devoted to impact assessment. The current system is mandatory for all government bills, and does not apply to bills initiated by members of

parliament and to draft decrees. There are no details with regard to updating the impact assessment to take amendments to a government bill into consideration. It would also be useful to consider the content and the accuracy of the assessment, relative to the importance of the draft text, so that the efforts are proportionate.

An ambitious reform has been initiated, and institutional capacities need to match this ambition. The SGG must ensure that the impact assessments are undertaken from the start of the drafting process, that the methodology is developed, and that adequate support tools are put in place. The quality and the reliability of the current impact assessments depend to a large degree on individual ministries. It is important to improve economic skills so that economic aspects both in the SGG and in the ministries are better taken into account. It is also important to strengthen the *Council of State's* capacities to evaluate impact assessments.

The management and rationalisation of existing regulations

The French government has made substantial and sustained efforts over time to codify the law, which distinguishes France from the majority of other European countries. Today, more than 40% of the laws in force are grouped into almost 70 codes. However, not all legislation can be codified and maintaining existing codes requires considerable resources when faced with the flow of new regulations or amended regulations. Codification must be not only an *ex post* remedy for the proliferation of regulations but needs to be associated with efforts to control the flow of regulations upstream, initially impact assessment.

Since 2003, annual simplification laws have embedded simplification in the French political landscape. These laws have helped to simplify the legal stock in a large number of domains and also made it possible to reduce administrative burdens on businesses and citizens. The regular use of simplification laws has raised the visibility of administrative simplification policy. The approach can however, lead to a proliferation of measures, undermining clarity.

Since the OECD review of 2004, the French government has developed a distinctly more active policy for the reduction of administrative burdens. A major element was the programme to "measure the reduction of the administrative burden" (MRCA), rooted in France's commitment to reduce administrative burdens on businesses by 25%, made at the end of 2007. Substantial progress has been made, including a mapping of the information requirements burdening businesses, the quantitative measurement of almost 800 of these obligations, the development of a methodology (based on the SCM), and a data base (*Oscar*).

Since 2008, the government has given a new slant to its administrative simplification policy, which led to a plan to simplify 15 measures in the autumn of 2009. It was decided to re-focus efforts on a small number of measures (irritants) and to base this selection on an analysis of life events. The change in orientation underscores a willingness to respond better to priorities as expressed by users of the administration, including businesses, and to communicate better in order to encourage and sustain interest (political, in the administration, among users). However, this change occurred without the measurement work carried out within the scope of the MRCA being the subject of an *ex post* and detailed assessment of the whole. Furthermore, no plans were made to update *Oscar* which, in the long run, runs the risk of devaluing the capital invested, just at the point when this tool could be used to help strengthen impact assessments.

More strategically, the policy to reduce administrative burdens is not clearly attached to economic policy objectives. Above all, it is incorporated into the wider state modernisation programme (RGPP), in which the main objective is to make the state more effective. In so doing, business competitiveness, even if it is mentioned and is the subject of specific initiatives (such as the simplification of business creation procedures), is not a prime objective. In the current context of the emergence of the world economy (and that of France) from one of the more serious crises in its history, it would be timely to create a more direct and closer link between the policy on reducing administrative burdens and boosting the economy.

The objectives to be attained have not been clearly determined or assigned. The 25% reduction objective was a step towards a more quantitative and specific approach, which can be found in the MRCA programme. The objective was set globally, without taking into account the flow of new regulations and without setting detailed objectives by ministry. With the slant towards life events, it is even more important to stay on course with regard to clearly determined objectives. However, if the 25% reduction objective is not to be officially abandoned, it is not clear, in the absence of well-defined quantitative monitoring, how progress made towards achieving this objective can be assessed.

An issue which needs attention is the co-ordination of administrative simplification actions throughout the administration. Discussions held by the OECD showed that the project to reduce administrative burdens is somewhat out of touch with ministries' initiatives, which do not fall clearly within an overall programme. The lack of specific objectives by ministry, for which they must be held accountable, has made it difficult to mobilise shared support for the project, and, more broadly, for administrative simplification.

There is a need for more information on progress. Until recently, no detailed and regular information was provided on the progress of the administrative burden reduction programme, so much so that this policy has remained relatively invisible both for the external stakeholders and for the rest of the administration. The publication in February 2010 of a follow-up sheet on the 15 simplification measures is a step in the right direction.

Compliance, enforcement, appeals

Enforcement activities are (rightly) moving towards increased consideration of risk and better co-ordination between inspection services. “Obligations based on results” have replaced “obligations of means” while risk analysis is increasingly used to target controls. The policy on state modernisation and application of EU regulations have also led to the regrouping of some services (which in France are primarily under the remit of central government) and to improve co-ordination of inspection bodies. Simplification and co-ordination of inspection and control activities are concerns raised by business representatives.

Alternatives to judicial appeals have been developed, in particular, administrative appeals and the mediator. This meets the need to reduce the number of cases that come before administrative courts. The mediator fills in (or attempts to fill in) the gaps in the formal system. A major necessary improvement relates to the need for greater transparency in relation to information about appeals procedures, in particular time limits for referring a case which are often very short. Another difficulty lies in the delays for taking cases forward, as the number of cases continues to rise.

The interface between member states and the European Union

Since the 2004 review, there has been a marked improvement in timely transposition. France used to be a “poor performer” in the EU with regard to transposition. It has made up considerable ground in transposing directives and has achieved its policy goal of reducing its transposition deficit to below 1%. This can be put down to the introduction of careful planning and monitoring arrangements. The government has set up a system to monitor transposition very closely, with a strong “name and shame” factor. It is important to maintain the frequency of high-level group meetings as well as political pressure via the European Inter-ministerial Committee.

Quality control needs to be stepped up. The main weakness of the current system is its failure to cover the quality of transposition (this is not unique to France). Quality control relies heavily on the European Commission (done at the end of the process). Working on the quality of transposition requires increased anticipation (upstream, as soon as the negotiation starts) and use of impact assessment by lead line ministries.

France should be more active in developing Better Regulation issues at the EU level. There is a need to take forward the major discussions it launched during its EU Presidency. This includes law accessibility, including with respect to the interaction between EU and national legislation, and use of ICT for better access, interaction between impact assessment at the EU and national level, interaction between impact assessment and administrative simplification. A lack of resources appears to be hindering the ability to follow up actively on these various issues at the EU level.

The interface between subnational and national levels of government

Complex structures at the subnational levels heighten the need for a coherent Better Regulation policy. Over the past three decades, France has moved forward in a decentralisation process intended to shift new powers and responsibilities to local officials and subnational levels of government. Better Regulation is all the more necessary because the subnational structure rests on a large and diverse range of municipalities, which are a fundamental point of contact for businesses and citizens.

Substantial progress has been made towards including subnational governments in the process of making regulations. The Advisory Board for Regulatory Evaluation (*Commission consultative sur l'évaluation des normes – CCEN*) has recently been established so that proposed regulations from the centre can take account of the financial consequences downstream (thereby avoiding unfunded mandates). Strengthening consultation with local governments would help identify impacts of draft laws and decrees at the local level, beyond financial impacts.

Progress could also be made to encourage understanding of Better Regulation principles and good practices at the local level. Exchanges of good practices between local governments are currently very limited compared to other countries. Such exchanges could be helpful to local governments, for example in the development of model or standard administrative acts, or methods for public consultation. Such exchanges could take place whilst respecting the fact that no local authority can have jurisdiction over another local authority.

Key recommendations

<i>Better Regulation strategy and policies</i>	
1.1.	Regroup the different initiatives to create an overall strategy. Launch an integrated communication strategy covering the initiatives and the vision for the future, highlighting the link to economic performance. Produce an annual progress report, which could be sent to the prime minister and parliament by a minister given the responsibility for co-ordination of the strategy, its implementation, and its communication. This report would be made public.
1.2.	Elaborate a communications strategy that regroups the different initiatives, showing the interaction, leaving room for communication on individual reforms. Ensure that communication is targeted to meet the needs of the administration as well as those of the general public, outside the administration.
1.3.	Reinforce and make more systematic the evaluation of Better Regulation policies. Anticipate the evaluation of key programmes, such as impact assessment. A global evaluation could also be done to show the link between Better Regulation policies and economic performance. Consider which body would be best placed to carry out such evaluations.
<i>Institutional capacities for Better Regulation</i>	
2.1.	Evaluate capacities and mechanisms in place for ensuring that line ministries take full and active responsibility for their part in simplification policies.
2.2.	Consider what the adequate role and resources (including in terms of economic capacities) of the SGG should be to ensure an efficient monitoring of Better Regulation policies from the centre of government.

2.3.	Consider setting up an inter-ministerial committee to provide political support to Better Regulation policies as a whole. The Inter-ministerial Committee on Europe (CIE) could be taken as a template. Nominate a minister in charge of following up and communicating on Better Regulation policies.
2.4.	Strengthen administrative culture as necessary for implementation of Better Regulation policies. Review training policy so that civil servants fully grasp Better Regulation tools. Review economic skills.

Transparency through public consultation and communication

3.1.	Engage a discussion on the overhaul of public consultation. This could be partly based on targeted audits, for example, on open consultation processes on the Internet.
3.2.	Establish consultation guidelines. Set up a consultation portal (in which the forum website could be integrated). Encourage ministries to share their experiences in order to highlight good practices and the most useful processes.
3.3.	Consider how to improve <i>Légifrance</i> (the public website publicising legal processes) further.

Development of new regulations

4.1.	Continue to reinforce basic processes for making new regulations. Further develop online tools, in particular by integrating the <i>legistic</i> guide and developing training programmes in parallel. Continue to focus on monitoring delays for issuing secondary regulations necessary for the implementation of laws and for transposing directives. Publish the government programme to increase its visibility.
4.2.	Encourage strengthening of procedures for making new regulations when they are initiated by members of parliament.

4.3.	Define a policy for consultation regarding impact assessment. Clearly integrate the “zero option” at the very beginning of the impact assessment process.
4.4.	Reinforce methodological tools, including quantification of costs as far as possible. Establish an adequate framework and sufficient resources for the maintenance of the <i>Oscar</i> database.
4.5.	Consider extending impact assessment to draft decrees. Encourage a similar development for draft laws initiated by members of parliament as well as for parliamentary amendments.
4.6.	Integrate economists in the teams responsible for impact assessment. Set up a common training programme across ministries to promote culture change.
4.7.	Evaluate the implementation of impact assessment in a regular and detailed way. Publish these evaluations. This could be integrated in the annual report proposed.
4.8.	Highlight possible ways of integrating <i>ex ante</i> impact assessment and <i>ex post</i> simplification.

The management and rationalisation of existing regulations

5.1.	Evaluate the contribution of codification to regulatory governance and more particularly its capacity to control regulatory inflation.
5.2.	Make a clear connection between administrative simplification policies and economic challenges.
5.3.	Set up clear objectives on administrative simplification and processes for allocating objectives to the different bodies in charge of conducting simplification. These bodies should be made accountable for the implementation of policies in a detailed and public way. Do not abandon quantification.

5.4.	Prepare and publish scoreboards on the effective implementation and specific results of simplification initiatives, for both government and external stakeholders, in addition to general communication on RGPP.
5.5.	Establish a schedule for regular evaluations. Identify the body which is best placed to carrying out these evaluations.

Compliance, enforcement, appeals

6.1.	Encourage co-ordination between inspection bodies, including through mergers if necessary.
6.2.	Monitor the transparency of the different appeal processes for businesses and citizens, and time taken in processing appeals.

The interface between member states and the European Union

7.1.	Maintain pressure on the monitoring of the transposition of EU directives by ministries.
7.2.	Continue to reflect on the interaction between impact assessment undertaken at the European Commission's level and the national level, and on integration of impact assessment in the transposition process.
7.3.	Reinforce France's role in discussions on Better Regulation at the EU level. Consider how to secure adequate resources to support this objective.

The interface between subnational and national levels of government

8.1.	Consider monitoring and an extension of the scope of the work of the Advisory Commission on Evaluation Standards (CCEN).
8.2.	Encourage the development of good practice exchanges

	between local governments.
8.3.	Improve communication on local regulations by identifying possible tools and measures (<i>e.g.</i> legal portals, progressive codification of local regulations).

