Forum on competition and regulation: In pursuit of market efficiency
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This paper exploits firm-level data from the ORBIS database to assess international tax planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs).
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This paper investigates if tax planning by large multinationals distorts competition in their favour and allows them to crowd out other firms. The competitive implications of tax planning are frequently mentioned in the tax policy debate, but not yet documented empirically to our knowledge. This paper aims to fill this gap.
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This paper assesses how international tax planning affects real business investment by multinationals. Earlier studies have shown that corporate taxes reduce business investment. This paper shows that tax planning multinationals are less sensitive to corporate taxes than other firms in their investment decisions.
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This paper describes the main anti-avoidance rules against international tax planning by multinational enterprises in OECD and G20 countries.
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This paper assesses the redistribution of foreign direct investments (FDI) and tax revenues among countries due to multinationals’ response to international differences in corporate tax systems.
English, PDF, 763kb
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate the location of their debts to reduce their corporate tax burden. Indeed, by locating debts in higher-tax rate countries, MNEs can deduct interest payments against a higher tax rate. This paper provides evidence of such manipulation of debt location.
On January 26th and 27th the Ministry of Regional Development of Ukraine and the OECD organised a seminar in Kiyv focusing on recent decentralisation and territorial reforms in Ukraine and in OECD countries. T
Comments on the draft OECD Best Practice Principles on Stakeholder Engagement in Regulatory Policy are to be sent to firstname.lastname@example.org by 15 March 2017.
Work with OECD non-member countries, the LAC region, Southeast Asia and MENA.