Greece-OECD Project: Technical Support on Anti-Corruption

Manual on Standard Procedures for the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan Cycle in Greece
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About the Greece-OECD Project

The Greek government is prioritising the fight against corruption and bribery and, with the assistance of the European institutions, is committed to taking immediate action. Under the responsibility of the General Secretariat Against Corruption, Greece’s National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) identifies key areas of reform and provides for a detailed action plan towards strengthening integrity and fighting corruption and bribery. The OECD, together with Greece and the European Commission, has developed support activities for implementing the NACAP. This project is scheduled for completion in 2018 and is co-funded by the European Commission and Greece. For further information, please see the project webpage.
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Executive summary

Objective

To identify standard procedures for the anti-corruption plan cycle and to explain the step-by-step procedures for:

1. the annual review and updating of the action plan, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the plan
2. the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the plan on a quarterly basis.

Stage 1: Revising and rationalising the current strategy/action plan

Drawing on standard approaches to the policy and review cycle for updating strategies and action plans (see the bibliography of relevant material at the end of this manual), this manual specifically uses the approaches for the Greek context. The existing strategy (“Transparency”, hereafter, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, or NACS) and the National Action Plan (NAP) is not fully suitable for annual review and updating, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP. The references in the NACS to the responsibility of ministries and departments – E4.A1-4, for example - needs to be systematically revised in terms of ministry and department action plans (APs), and their responsibilities – and thus those of the GSAC under E5.A1.5(5.4) - within the NAP. This manual suggests a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP and then integrating ministries’ and departments’ APs. Given the comprehensive nature of the Strategy and Action Plan, this manual focuses on prevention; it also uses UNCAC to provide a framework within which to rationalise and revise the NACS and NAP to make it more amenable for: 1) the development of indicators; and 2) for monitoring and reporting on a quarterly basis. It is specifically intended to facilitate the role of GSAC as the supervisory or oversight agency for the NACS and NAP.

Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional action plans

Once reframed as the preventative dimension of the NAP, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs can be drafted by individual ministries and departments. These are mainly management tools in the sense that they define objectives, measures, timelines, responsibilities, and indicators of success. To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicators and monitoring processes; and reporting.
Stage 3: Developing indicators

Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs will be monitored and reviewed by the GSAC. The APs will address the above steps as indicated by the template, which will provide guidance on their implementation by individual ministries and departments. The implementation of an AP by individual ministries and departments requires a number of means to measure implementation and progress. These will include indicators which, at the basic level, are quantitative indicators that allow assessment of output as a quantitative measurement of implementation, while other indicators, for both internal and external purposes, will allow a review of relevance, acceptability and effectiveness. The AP approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform platform and thus monitor, review and update the NACS and the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating

Regular monitoring, reviews and reporting ensures that the NACS and NAP follow a grounded strategic approach enabling continuous learning with four core purposes: judging the results of official actions and decisions in order to check their conformity with the set of objectives set out in the NACS and NAP; learning to improve the effectiveness of the interventions; accountability to programme stakeholders and taxpayers for the use of public resources; and overall anti-corruption progress. The stages apply to the areas addressed by UNCAC Chapter II – prevention – but may be replicated for the other areas addressed by UNCAC: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

The process

The process has five components:

- **Why:** Proposes the reasons and purpose for the changes.
- **What:** States what has to be done.
- **How:** Suggests the procedural aspects of revision and review.
- **Who:** Determines responsibility and ownership.
- **When:** Indicates the timetable for the changes.
Introduction

The objective of this manual is to identify standard procedures for the anti-corruption plan cycle and to explain the step-by-step procedures for:

1. the annual review and updating of the action plan, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the plan
2. the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the plan on a quarterly basis.

This manual covers four stages: Stage 1: Revising and rationalising the strategy/action plan; Stage 2: Developing sectoral and institutional action plans; Stage 3: Developing indicators; and Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating.

This manual is specifically intended for the Greek context, and thus its four stages are directed toward that context. It, therefore, does not address all aspects of standard procedures for an anti-corruption plan cycle but draws on them to facilitate work on the existing Greek NACS and NAP (as at June 2017), focusing on the specific UNCAC-related topic of prevention.

Each stage is supported by explanatory notes (Annex A) and a bibliography of relevant material.
Stage 1: Rationalising the strategy/action plan -
The process

Why?

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed, focussing on the topic of prevention within the UNCAC international standard as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed Action Plans (AP) can be developed, and the development of a revised NAP will promote common approaches across ministries and departments. The GSAC will draft guidance/template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs - including steps that address risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicators and monitoring processes, and reporting – so that each develops an AP, with indicators, to fulfil their requirements under the NACS (E4.A1-4) and NAP framework (III, 14, 1-3). The AP approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform template/format platform and thus monitor, review and update the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

What?

Monitoring is a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress while a review is an assessment of the performance of an organisation, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects. For the NACS and the NAP, this will require guidance to ministries and departments on what to report, by when and in what format to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and the NAP to the GSAC.

How?

This manual draws on UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focuses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches for other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery. Table 1 identifies
those components in the NACS and NAP that would fit into a preventative framework. Table 2 presents a revised NAP using UNCAC Chapter II.

Who?

The work for this stage would be undertaken by GSAC, with confirmation sought from individual ministries and public sector organisations that the revised NAP provides a realistic and realisable basis for proceeding towards Stage 2. The GSAC will then draft guidance/template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs, including guidance on how ministries and departments address ministry- and department-specific risks and threats.

When?

The revised NAP should be completed, circulated and confirmed within one month, to allow for the substantive stages to be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter.
Table 1. The existing NAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Current strategy</th>
<th>Current NAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of &quot;Transparency&quot;</td>
<td>Ensure ownership of all stakeholders and political backing for the national strategy by approval of the Parliament</td>
<td>Update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate</td>
<td>Update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate</td>
<td>Internal control units will regularly report cases of suspected corruption and submit proposals for developing anti-corruption activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detection of risk areas of corruption</td>
<td>Detection of risk areas of corruption</td>
<td>The General Secretariat Against Corruption in co-ordination with relevant key stakeholders will submit concrete proposals on what kind of actions can be implemented in enhancing the integrity of public service, municipal district areas and local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing of integrity in all processes in the public service, municipal district areas and local governments</td>
<td>Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government’s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment strategies and concrete action plans will be made to improve the situation by using co-ordinated and agreed approach to methods and evaluation procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consideration of the particular needs in high-risk topics and sectors vulnerable to corruption</td>
<td>Establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of the standards and principles on which the specific administrations or institutions should base their own efforts to enhance the fight against corruption regarding their own activities</td>
<td>Establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities</td>
<td>Development of a training policy to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and capacity development</td>
<td>A common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities will be provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor controlling of corruption</td>
<td>Strengthening of internal control mechanisms relating to anti-corruption</td>
<td>The General Secretariat Against Corruption will strengthen co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption; authorities will increase co-ordination and information sharing mechanisms for investigations of financial and economic crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliance of ministries and agencies with observations and proposals formulated by inspection bodies and the Ombudsman in case the compliance is obligatory by the law</td>
<td>Specific measures and actions to enforce compliance of ministries and agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures to ensure transparency of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary process</th>
<th>Measures to ensure transparency of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary process</th>
<th>Current NAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification of relevant anti-corruption measures and actions for public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary processes will be made</td>
<td>Publicity of all processes of public expenditure, public contracts and budgetary will be increased</td>
<td>Public procurement rules and procedures will be set fully in line with international requirements and recommendations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Improvement of legislation | Assessment of how to tackle corruption and related fraud issues specifically linked to the use of EU funds | The General Secretariat Against Corruption, as the Greek Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service, will monitor the implementation of the identified measures |

| Integrity codes of conduct | Codes of conduct and ethics for all public and local officials have to be established | General government bodies integrity codes of conduct will be improved by the Ministry of Public Administration |

| An enhanced system for detection and monitoring of declaration of assets, conflicts of interest and incompatibilities by public and elected officials | A general information system will be established introducing the electronic monitoring of declaration of assets and conflict of interests for all general government bodies | Necessary anti-corruption information will be made regularly available and training for newcomers, key middle-management groups and individuals in general government bodies |

| Development of a training policy to support long-term anti-corruption strategic planning and capacity development | A common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities will be provided | New legislation |

| | For declaration of assets, effective monitoring of declarations and implementation of further actions will be done by independent bodies with investigative power through risk-based audits | |
Table 2. Revised NAP focussed on prevention components and setting forth a framework for ministry and department APs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNCAC Chapter 2 and articles as basis for ministry/department anti-corruption action plans</th>
<th>NACS/NAP [prevention component]</th>
<th>Main components of a revised NAP for public sector, focussing on prevention</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability</td>
<td>II. Implementation of the &quot;Transparency&quot; III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [10] III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [14]</td>
<td>Annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the GSAC by ministries and departments to allow GSAC to review and update the NACS and NAP on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate.</td>
<td>Ministries and departments; GSAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government’s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment APs will be made to improve the situation by using co-ordinated and agreed approach to methods and evaluation procedures with GSAC as supervisory and oversight body.</td>
<td>Ministries and departments; GSAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>The General Secretariat Against Corruption, as the Greek Anti-Fraud Co-ordinator Service, will monitor the implementation of the identified measures relating to legislation. The GSAC will update the strategy on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate</td>
<td>GSAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body or bodies, as appropriate that prevent corruption by such means as: (a) Implementing the policies referred to in Article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and co-ordinating the implementation of those policies (b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.</td>
<td>I. Tasks and duties of the Alternate Minister of Justice, General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC)</td>
<td>Annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the GSAC by ministries and departments to allow GSAC to review and update the NACS and NAP on a continuous basis, discussing new measures and tools as appropriate.</td>
<td>Ministries and departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 7</td>
<td>Education and training programmes</td>
<td>IV. Educational Actions [18]; VIII. Integrity Codes of Conduct [38]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to training and supporting staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code of conduct</td>
<td>III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [13;14]; VIII. Integrity Codes of Conduct [37]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to codes, conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, and disclosure</td>
<td>Ministries and departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [16]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to codes, conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, and disclosure</td>
<td>Ministries and departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 8</td>
<td>Reporting acts of corruption by public officials</td>
<td>VII. Improvement of Legislation [28]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to internal reporting, whistleblowing and professional standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits</td>
<td>III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [16]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to codes, conflict of interest, gifts and hospitality, and disclosure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disciplinary measures</td>
<td>VII. Improvement of Legislation [30]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 9</td>
<td>UNDAD Chapter 2 and articles as basis for ministry/department anti-corruption action plans</td>
<td>NACS/NAP [prevention component]</td>
<td>Main components of a revised NAP for public sector, focusing on prevention</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision making</td>
<td>I. Tasks and duties of the Alternate Minister of Justice, General Secretariat Against Corruption [3 Action 2 &amp; 3]</td>
<td>Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to procurement, transparency, access to information and communications policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Systems of risk management and internal control</td>
<td>III. Detection of Risk Areas of Corruption [12;14] V. Monitor Controlling of Corruption [19]</td>
<td>Vulnerable areas for corruption inside the general government’s structures will be identified. Development of risk-assessment APs will be made to improve the situation. Ministries and departments develop an AP that includes policies, procedures and indicators relating to auditing, monitoring and performance measurement. Internal control units will regularly report cases of suspected corruption and submit proposals for developing anti-corruption activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GSAC
Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional action plans - The process

Why?

Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption Action Plans (APs) should be drafted as part of the process of reviewing and updating the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, as well as monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis. The GSAC will draft a template/format that will indicate how ministries and departments should develop their individual APs. This provides ministries and departments with both general and ministry- and department-specific guidance to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and NAP, establishes a uniform approach to APs and sets the baselines from which GSAC can monitor performance and progress, and lead on monitoring and oversight roles assigned to it by the NACS and NACP.

What?

Using Table 2, the GSAC will develop a policy framework, template and reporting procedure that will seek to ensure that:

- The intentions of the NAP are cascaded to sector and ministry level, who in turn take responsibility for implementation and reporting through their own APs, which will also have quantitative indicators.

- As the approach is largely common and uniform, as will be the indicator data, the GSAC will be able to: 1) take a cross-cutting perspective; 2) take an interventionist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP; 3) map emerging and identified risk areas, sectors and activities; and 4) become the source for dissemination of good practice.

- GSAC will revise the NAP and NACS on the basis of AP evidence and give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis.

- GSAC will focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, able to report on overall progress and take the lead on co-ordination (such as co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption), areas of common purpose (such as common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for bodies with anti-corruption responsibilities and other relevant authorities) and reporting to government.
To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

**How?**

The NAP sets the basic requirements. The AP completed by the ministry and department within the guidance provided by the GSAC has two responsibilities; one is to guide the translation of the NAP requirements into individual ministry and department management and operational policies and procedures and the second is to expand, adapt, emphasise and prioritise both responsibilities in terms of the risks faced by drafting within the AP. Using Table 2 (see above, in Stage 1) and Table A.2 (see Annex A), with the support of GSAC, ministries and departments will develop APs and develop relevant and appropriate indicators within 3 levels – identification of the risks and the commitment of the ministry or department to address them (Level 1), the policies and procedures to deliver this (Level 2) and the parts of the ministry or department with responsibility for implementation, compliance or monitoring (Level 3).

**Who?**

Following the successful approach developed by GSAC and the Ministry of Health, the same template may be adapted for other ministries and departments.

**When?**

The process can only begin once the draft NAP is available and developed in relation to the core components. If the NAP is revised in one month, the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational within six months.
Stage 3: Developing indicators - The process

Why?

Monitoring of APs and thus the implementation of the NAP by ministry or department individually and on a comparative basis, year-on-year, and over a given period of time, enables the GSAC to maintain the focus on the achievement of the NACS and the NAP throughout each step of implementation. Monitoring feeds back information from the implementation level to the strategy drafters and the planning and oversight units and thus enables effective steering, informed decision making, and improved strategy design. Without monitoring, GSAC cannot identify problems; nor can it guide ministries and departments to update their APs; nor can it assess and report on risks across the public sector; and nor can it update the NAP, and thus the NACS. Monitoring requires informed assessments and good indicators.

What?

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans, the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be realistic and amenable to quantitative data. Each policy at Level 2 and each unit of activity at Level 3 in Table A.2 (see Annex A) will be translated into specific indicators (for example, in relation to the code of conduct, how many staff have received a copy, how many have been trained by the HR department or training unit in its contents, etc.).

How?

Each ministry within their AP will determine a range of, preferably, quantitative indicators, guided by GSAC so that they are available for comparability and uniformity.

All Level 2 - Table A.2 (see Annex A) - activities, such as training, will be recorded, both as an activity and on the HR records of staff, providing the organisation with four types of indicators suitable for monitoring and review:

- **Activity or procedure indicator**: Data on the existence of a policy and procedure.
- **Output indicators** (workload or unit produced): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.
- **Efficiency and productivity indicators**: Cost-effectiveness, the ratio of input to output, unit costs.
• **Effectiveness indicators**: Is the policy leading to change or enhanced awareness?

**Who?**

While the AP will designate responsibility and ownership, most ministries will have three sources to complete indicator data. Management will be responsible for the design and delivery of many of the Level 2 policies and procedures and, as part of the normal management information systems, be able to provide a number of indicator data. HR will also, particularly in areas of recruitment and training also able to provide indicator data. Finally, within their compliance role, internal control or internal audit can act as an organisation’s own watchdog on matters of propriety.

**When?**

As internal functions, most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a six-monthly basis.
Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating -
The process

Why?

Monitoring seeks to check progress against NACS and NAP objectives or intentions. It can be defined as the formal reporting and evidencing that expenditure and outputs are successfully delivered, and milestones met. Monitoring data are frequently administrative and quantitative and are often not generated primarily for evaluation; analysis of monitoring data can more generally help those undertaking supervisory and oversight roles to identify where an AP component is not being implemented as expected, or in accordance with the NAP, and further action is required to ensure it can achieve its objectives. In particular, monitoring is the basis for a review of the functioning of the NAP and ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs.

What?

The provision of AP information and data allows GSAC to revise the NAP and NACS, provide guidance to ministries and departments, and report on risk and progress because it has information on:

- **Context**: Assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of the AP, and thus the NAP and NACS.

- **Assessing the corruption pool**: Considering the risk, nature and types of corruption.

- **Confirming the current implementation landscape**: Reviewing the actual and potential issues in delivering the AP at the ministry and department level.

- **Reviewing effectiveness**: Considering the facilitators or inhibitors to an effective NACS and NAP at the ministry and department level, and how this is enhanced through joined-up action.

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1. There are a number of ways to ensure uniform and comprehensive returns; in the first instance, codified forms should be used to test and assess the process. Once completed an e-platform could be developed either through designed software or the adaptation of generic risk management software.
• **Ownership:** Considering measures and procedures that could ensure that organisations and stakeholders are fully engaged in the NACS and NAP.

• **Change:** Proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for the review and revision to the NACS and NAP.

**How?**

The data – ministry and department reports, policies and procedures, internal reviews, indicators, etc., provide the basis for aggregated information and informed assessment on ministry and department performance in terms of the NAP and the AP. The basis of that information has three purposes. The first concerns an inter-ministry comparison against the NAP to assess progress. Secondly, it allows the GSAC to focus on undertaking reviews in terms of outcome or effectiveness indicators where effectiveness is about whether an AP has been designed taking into consideration the sector’s context and its specific corruption challenges. Thirdly it allows GSAC to identify good practice, map progress across sectors or in relation to specific areas or on a year-by-year basis.

**Who?**

GSAC is the lead agency in the process. Given that responsibility for developing, implementing and reporting on APs will fall on ministries and departments, GSAC undertakes monitoring for the purposes of a review of the functioning of the NAP at ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs, mapping progress and issues for reform, etc. Monitoring should include consultation – and where appropriate - with all the main stakeholders, including Ministers, the leadership teams of the ministries and linked agencies, the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, civil society organisations, etc., to ensure a full understanding of and commitment to the process.

In terms of reviews and recommendations, GSAC should also seek to triangulate any report or recommendation with owners, staff and stakeholders. Once the data is compiled, the draft report should be discussed with management to ensure both factual accuracy and also to identify the underlying reasons for the weakness and in turn helps the GSAC identify where to focus the capacity development response in order to treat the cause and not just the symptom.

In many cases it is a good idea to organise a validation workshop or meeting before finalizing the assessment results and preparing the report, especially with operational staff. As well as providing an opportunity to validate the findings and/or identify and correct mistakes and misunderstandings, more importantly it provides an opportunity to share information and ensure buy-in and commitment from all staff, which is important for the future implementation of the capacity development response. Similar workshops could also bring together all relevant stakeholders or separate workshops for different stakeholder groups to ensure more open discussion. This process will increase trust among them and increase the credibility of the exercise, strengthening ownership over the results and laying a strong foundation for the way forward. Having validated the findings and made any necessary adjustments the primary client or assessment owner would normally give formal approval of the findings of the assessment.
GSAC is also responsible for disseminating the final assessment report to stakeholders and partners.

When?

If ministries and departments are able to submit their returns to an agreed timetable then GSAC can produce quarterly progress reports and an annual review report. Revisions to the NAP and thus to APs should be undertaken annually or bi-annually. If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a quarterly or six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.
Annex A

Explanatory notes

Stage 1: Rationalising the strategy/action plan

Context

The manual is specifically intended for the Greek context, and thus its four stages are
directed toward that context. It, therefore, does not address all aspects of standard
procedures for an anti-corruption plan cycle but those intended to facilitate work on the
existing Greek Transparency (National Anti-Corruption Strategy; NACS) and the National
Action Plan (NAP, as at June 2017), focusing on the specific UNCAC-related topic of
prevention.

Currently, the NACS and NAP are not fully suitable for annual review and updating,
including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the
NAP. Although this manual focusses on the NAP, the NAP itself is a combination of
strategy, action plan and descriptive narrative. In order to achieve the purposes of the
manual – reviewing and updating the NAP annually and review and updating of
indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP – the NAP itself has to be revised
so that its activities and initiatives are grouped, co-ordinated and drafted in ways that
use those activities and initiatives as a framework for ministry and departmental
reporting and thus for measurement, reporting, review and updating.

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed Action Plans
(AP) can be developed, and the development of a revised NAP will promote common
approaches across ministries and departments. The NAP should also be revised so that –
acknowledging the different anti-corruption issues faced by sectors, and institutions
within sectors – a baseline of preventative activities and initiatives is established. The
public sector should be the first step for this work, in part because of the primary focus
of UNCAC, and in part because evidence of implementation of, and progress in, is both
the basic building block of the NAP and the NACS and the basis of demonstrating within
government and to citizens effective anti-corruption initiatives.

While there are explicit references in the existing NAP to the responsibility of ministries
and departments, these need to be systematically revised in terms of ministry and
department action plans (APs), and their responsibilities – and thus those of the
GSAC - within the NAP.

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practical approach to linking and
rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed. Given the comprehensive nature of
both, from public engagement to asset recovery, this manual focusses on prevention as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The manual proposes using UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focusses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches for the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

Using UNCAC to provide a framework within which to rationalise and revise the NACS and the NAP makes the NAP more amenable for: 1) the development of indicators; and 2) for monitoring and reporting on a quarterly basis. It also focusses on cascaded APs to ministries and departments to facilitate the supervisory and oversight roles of GSAC.

Why?

The NACS serves as the framework against which more specific and detailed action plans can be developed (see Table 1 above), and the development of a realistic general and specific NAP forces a degree of vertical integration within ministries and departments and the development of common approaches across ministries and departments if each develops an AP within the NAP framework. The responsibilities of ministries and departments are spelt out in the existing NAP - annual reports of actions against corruption are submitted to the General Secretariat Against Corruption (GSAC) by the general government authorities; establishment of sector-specific strategies is a part of this action plan, and they are implemented independently by relevant authorities – but not codified nor developed as coherent and integrated APs based on the existing NAP.

This approach allows GSAC to receive, collate and compare APs indicators on a common or uniform platform and thus monitor, review and update the NAP as well as APs, and report on evidence-based progress.

What?

Before the purposes of the manual can be delivered, a practitioner approach to linking and rationalising the existing NACS and NAP is proposed, focussing on prevention within the UNCAC international standard as a template for similar approaches to other parts of the NACS and NAP.

The OECD proposes three levels of assessment:

1. \textbf{Monitoring}: A continuing function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Monitoring}: A continuing function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.
\end{itemize}

\footnotesize
• **Review**: An assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects.

• **Evaluation**: The systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Monitoring clarifies what is being done; it links activities and resources to objectives; it translates objectives into performance indicators process and sets targets; routinely collects data on these indicators; results compares actual results with targets; and reports progress. Reviews assess performance in terms of operational performance, organisational productivity and organisational effectiveness\(^2\) in terms of delivering the NACS and the NAP.

This will require guidance to ministries and departments on what to report, by when and in what format to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and the NAP to the GSAC. The scope of the current NACS and NAP is significant; much of the work is also ongoing. It is important that ownership, particularly in terms of prevention and particularly in terms of the roles and responsibilities of ministries or departments, is a management responsibility. NACS and the NAP cannot be delivered in silos and nor can they be the sole responsibility of the GSAC; they need to be mainstreamed into human resources, regulatory, and performance management systems and practices within ministries and departments (see Figure A.1). They should also be embedded in broader public administration’s anti-corruption efforts, aligned to the NACS.

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An AP should have clear goals and timelines which set the context for both owners, or those responsible for implementation, and those undertaking monitoring, review and evaluation work. Clear plans of action can and should be made public, ensuring overall transparency and helping to mobilise popular support and pressure to achieve the expected outputs and outcomes.

Clarifying what actions must be taken, at what time and by whom, assists in planning future actions and evaluating past or ongoing AP deliverables. The exercise of developing and drafting APs assists in planning, by encouraging planners to consider issues such as how to implement each element, the timing and sequencing of various elements and a realistic assessment of what can be achieved within the specified timeframe within ministries and departments, and across sectors. This approach is central to revising and updating the NAP.

A redrafted NAP should, therefore, identify activities and initiatives that allow themselves to be measured or at least a means to provide quantitative indicators. Good indicators will allow for monitoring the implementation process by demonstrating that proposed activities or initiatives are taking place along the planned timeline. Without indicators, action plans are only declarations of intent.

By working from the bottom up in terms of delegating much of the translation of the NAP into institutional APs, with the same indicators, there will be vertical integration between the ministry and departmental APs, the NAP, and the NACS. Further, much of that responsibility will lie with management, HR departments, internal control or internal audit, all of whom will be involved in identifying, understanding and adapting the main preventative components in the revised NAP for their own APs. They will also be best placed to identify, record and report on relevant and appropriate indicators.

Finally, this adds an additional dimension in that it offers the means for horizontal integration in that both institutional APs and indicators may be compared, so that annual review and updating of the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, and the procedures for monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis, can be shared, and work to a common and uniform approach, allowing the GSAC to act in a supervisory and oversight role.

**How?**

The manual proposes using UNCAC to collate and shape existing NAP initiatives into a framework within which to draft AP templates. Given the scope of the NACS and NAP, the manual focuses on the public sector and on prevention within the guidance of
UNCAC Chapter II. This will also act as a template for similar approaches to the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery. Table 1 identifies those components in the NACS and NAP that would fit into a preventative framework. Table 2 presents a revised NAP using UNCAC Chapter II.

Who?
The work for this stage would be undertaken by GSAC, with confirmation sought from individual ministries and public sector organisations that the revised NAP provides a realistic and realisable basis for proceeding towards Stage 2.

When?
The revised NAP should be completed, circulated and confirmed within one month, to allow for the substantive stages to be undertaken as soon as possible thereafter.

Stage 2: Developing ministry/department institutional APs

Context
Focussing on preventative dimension of the revised NAP, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs can be drafted. These are mainly management tools in the sense that they define objectives, measures, timelines, responsibilities, and indicators of success. To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

Why?
Ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should be drafted as part of the process of reviewing and updating the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of the NAP, as well as monitoring and reporting on the NAP on a quarterly basis. This provides ministries and departments with a template to fulfil their requirements under the NACS and NAP, establishes a uniform approach to APs (as well as policies, procedures and indicators) and sets the baselines from which GSAC can monitor performance and progress, and lead on monitoring and oversight roles assigned to it by the NACS and NACP.

What?
Using Table 2 (above, in Stage 1: Process) and Table A.1 (below), the GSAC will develop a policy framework, template and reporting procedure that will seek to ensure that:

3. There are a number of ways to ensure uniform and comprehensive returns; in the first instance codified forms should be used to test and assess the process. Once completed, an e-platform could be developed, either through designed software or the adaptation of generic risk management software.
• The intentions of the NAP are cascaded to sector and ministry level, who in turn take responsibility for implementation and reporting through their own APs, which will also have quantitative indicators.

• As the approach is largely common and uniform, as will be the indicator data, the GSAC will be able to: 1) take a cross-cutting perspective; 2) take an interventionist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP; 3) map emerging and identified risk areas, sectors and activities; 4) become the source for dissemination of good practice, and 5) take an overview of progress.

• GSAC will revise the NAP and NACS on the basis of AP evidence and give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis.

• GSAC will focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, able to report on overall progress and take the lead on co-ordination (such as co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption), areas of common purpose (such as common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for bodies with anti-corruption responsibilities and other relevant authorities) and reporting to government.

To achieve this, ministry/department institutional anti-corruption APs should undertake an approach within the following steps: risk assessment; action plan design; implementation, indicator and monitoring processes; and reporting.

**How?**

The NAP sets the basic requirements. The AP has two responsibilities; one is to guide the translation of the NAP requirements into individual ministry and department management and operational policies and procedures and the second is to expand, adapt, emphasise and prioritise both responsibilities in terms of the risks faced by drafting within the AP. Using Table 2 and Table A.1, with the support of GSAC, ministries and department will develop APs and develop relevant and appropriate indicators.

Thus the steps in drafting an AP are two-fold. First is the assessment of the main corruption risk and threats a ministry or department may face. The main objective of risk analysis is to point out where in the AP framework from Figure A.1 corruption might potentially arise. AP drafters will need to identify under each of those activities where the key decisions points are and whether their respective decision-making processes suffer from monopoly, discretion, lack of transparency and/or lack accountability.

**Risk and corruption: Institutional context and operating environment**

This may be undertaken by a small group looking at Corruption Pattern Analysis - summarising the nature and scale of current and potential corruption by activity or function within the ministry or department, looking at the types of corruption, number of offences, perceptions, etc., remembering that the scope may include – in addition to bribery - abuse or misuse of office, breaching confidentiality, nepotism, favouritism and patronage, to influence-peddling, post-employment offers,
lobbying, etc., and seeking to identify typical characteristics to identify patterns, types, sectors and trends.

The assessment will identify: 1) what types of corruption have occurred; 2) are occurring and 3) may occur. This provides the context between the organisation and its risk environment and is often established, among assessment techniques, using SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) and PEST (political, economic, social and technological) frameworks. Understanding the external and internal threats means understanding and assessing:

- **Who**: Internal or external; corruption; influence; senior or junior; etc.
- **What**: What types of corruption are most likely.
- **Where**: Where are the vulnerable parts of the organisation in its processes, functions, etc.?
- **How**: How will the corruption occur?
- **Why**: Why may staff become involved?
- **Means**: How will they do it and how easy is it for them to conceal their actions from scrutiny and detection?
- **Opportunity, Incentive and Risk**: What would encourage or discourage the likelihood of corruption occurring?
- **Prevention and Deterrence**: what could be the more effective ways of dissuading staff from being involved in corruption and being willing to report its presence?

The risk assessment allows the organisation to do three things: set standards for organisational integrity and translate them into appropriate policies and procedures based on the NAP; identify its intentions to its staff, customers and stakeholders; and identify who within the organisation will be responsible for implementing and monitoring compliance.

One example of how ministries and departments can demonstrate identification of risk – and thus policies and procedures to mitigate, prevent, manage or displace that risk – is in the area of public procurement as outlined in Table A.1.
Table A.1. AP risk indicators for procurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement process risk area</th>
<th>Indicators to confirm risks identified and addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Needs assessment and market analysis | • Lack of adequate needs assessment  
• Influence of external actors on officials decisions  
• Informal agreement on contract |
| Planning and budgeting | • Poor procurement planning  
• Procurement not aligned with overall investment decision-making process  
• Failure to budget realistically or deficiency in the budget |
| Development of specifications/requirements | • Technical specifications are tailored for a specific company  
• Selection criteria is not objectively defined and not established in advance  
• Requesting unnecessary samples of goods and services  
• Buying information on the project specifications. |
| Choice of procurement procedure | • Lack of proper justification for the use of non-competitive procedures  
• Abuse of non-competitive procedures on the basis of legal exceptions: contract splitting, abuse of extreme urgency, non-supported modifications |
| Request for proposal/bid | • Absence of public notice for the invitation to bid  
• Evaluation and award criteria are not announced  
• Procurement information isn’t disclosed and isn’t made public |
| Bid submission | • Lack of competition or cases of collusive bidding (cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation, market allocation) |
| Bid evaluation | • Conflict of interest and corruption in the evaluation process through:  
  o Familiarity with bidders over time  
  o Personal interests such as gifts or future/additional employment  
  o No effective implementation of the “four eyes-principle” |
| Contract award | • Vendors fail to disclose accurate cost or pricing data in their price proposals, resulting in an increased contract price (i.e. invoice mark-ups, channel stuffing)  
• Conflict of interest and corruption in the approval process (i.e. no effective separation of financial, contractual and project authorities)  
• Lack of access to records on the procedure |
### Annex A. Explanatory Notes

**Mapping of Corruption Complaints Mechanisms in Greece**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procurement process risk area</th>
<th>Indicators to confirm risks identified and addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Contract management/ performance | • Abuses of the supplier in performing the contract, in particular in relation to its quality, price and timing:  
  o Substantial change in contract conditions to allow more time and/or higher prices for the bidder  
  o Product substitution or sub-standard work or service not meeting contract specifications  
  o Theft of new assets before delivery to end-user or before being recorded  
  o Deficient supervision from public officials and/or collusion between contractors and supervising officials  
  o Subcontractors and partners chosen in an on-transparent way or not kept accountable |
| Order and payment | • Deficient separation of financial duties and/or lack of supervision of public officials leading to:  
  o False accounting and cost misallocation or cost migration between contracts  
  o Late payments of invoices  
 • False or duplicate invoicing for good and services not supplied and for interim payment in advance entitlement |


One good example of how the risk assessment is translated into a number of identified areas of risk and vulnerability and thus amenable for preventative policies and procedures is the 2017 Plan for Higher Integrity and Reduced Corruption in the Health Sector, drafted by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with GSAC and OECD.

**Institutional action planning**

The AP identifies a number of risks and the commitment of the ministry or department to address them – see Table A.2, Level 1 - against which a number of measures are proposed. These would be addressed in two approaches in the AP. One would seek to design out the opportunity and incentive for dishonest practices by having a number of practical policies and procedures. These are intended to streamline services and functions while improving the efficiency and transparency of the ministry or department. The other would directly address the risks and threats by specific policies intended to mitigate, displace or ban those activities or areas most prone to corruption.

For the first approach, in management terms, the organisation’s leadership develop an AP that reflects the requirements of the revised NAP in Table 2, but is shaped by the risk assessment and which will describe in detail what the organisation will do to implement anti-corruption as an organisational objective; see Table A.2. Thus the identified areas in the NAP will, at Level 2, each have a stated policy and procedures.
ANNEX A. EXPLANATORY NOTES - 33

Table A.2. The AP framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Risk profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standards/values of the organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Recruitment, promotion, performance and conduct, and disciplinary procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional standards/whistleblowing policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict of interest and declaration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asset recording and protection policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gifts, travel and hospitality policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff rotation policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complaints and investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code of integrity/conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IT use policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asset use policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Ethics or integrity advisers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complaints unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchasing or contracts department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal audit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional standards or compliance unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the second approach, there will be specific policies and procedures, which would in turn include processes and procedures that would facilitate addressing allegations of corruption (for example, contracts and supplies staff may, in addition to the standards requirements on gifts and hospitality may also, if they are determined to be staff in “at risk” posts, also any contact or meetings they have in an official capacity with contractors/suppliers, where these take place outside of working hours or relate to gifts and hospitality or relationships they have in a private or domestic capacity).

For both, the AP will also indicate the allocation of resources and internal ownership to implement the AP and complete the process by stating: 1) what milestones and indicators will allow the organisation and others to measure awareness, performance and progress; and 2) what internal review arrangements will be in place to monitor and report on the working of the AP. In terms of Level 3, it is the responsibility of each ministry or department to identify which existing units or sections will be responsible for implementation, monitoring or compliance (and it is recognized that not all ministries and departments will have all the units or sections noted for Level 3 in Table A.1).

For the purposes of this manual, two examples are given.

The first example involves a code of conduct. A code of conduct is not primarily an anti-corruption tool but a general statement of public sector organisational integrity. It is intended to explain the principles of public service and thus the conduct associated with such service. It is framed in a statement of the values and standards of the organisation, followed by specific requirements to deliver those standards. A code is primarily intended as a preventative process, and one that fosters transparency and
accountability, and thus trust, in the conduct of public officials as part of their democratic commitment to working in the public interest and for the common good. These reflect, for example, the Council of Europe's Model Code for Public Officials,\(^4\) whose Articles 4–11 set out:

... the public official’s general obligations to act lawfully, obediently, ethically and loyally. He or she is expected to be honest, impartial, conscientious, fair and just, and to act politically neutral, only in the public interest and with courtesy to all with whom he or she has contact. He or she must not allow his or her private interests to affect, or appear to affect, his or her public position nor take undue advantage of that position.

Public servants are required to ensure that their official powers and position are not used improperly, and in particular, they are required to refrain from conduct that uses public office for private gain or partisan advantage. This reflects ethical principles and behaviour that stem from two inter-related roots: first, standards of morality and moral behaviour that reflect - and culturally accepted to be the right way to exercise public office, and second, the rules or standards governing the conduct of members of a service or profession, here a public service ethos and public service ethics.

The purpose of a code is to present expected standards, from which it would be assumed that those who subscribe to the code would not wish to become involved in unethical or corrupt conduct and who also wish to report those who do. The design of a code would be ministry- or department-specific but would build on standards, requirements and implementation (see Table A.3).

Table A.3. Code of conduct in practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Implementation/enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principles of public office and values of the organisation; conflicts of interests; gifts and benefits</td>
<td>Senior public officials support the code and lead by example</td>
<td>The introduction of a core statement of standards, values and principles, and a code of conduct, set of standards with variations for different categories of public officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery</td>
<td>Staff are involved in all stages of code development and implementation</td>
<td>Requirements and procedures on assets, hospitality and gifts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination and harassment</td>
<td>Support mechanisms are in place to encourage the use of the code</td>
<td>The related processes for awareness, guidelines, training, and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness and equity</td>
<td>Compliance with the code taken into account in relation to career progression, etc.</td>
<td>The responsibility for and capacity to enforce compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making public comment about the organisation</td>
<td>Code of conduct (and general corruption awareness) training is ongoing</td>
<td>Provide staff with a way to raise concerns within the organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling confidential information</td>
<td>The organisation continually promotes its ethical culture (a code of conduct is</td>
<td>Investigatory procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of resources – facilities, equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other sources include: International Code of Conduct for Public Officials contained in the annex to the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996; the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials [Resolution (97)] and the OECD’s Recommendation of the Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service Including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service [1998 - C(98)70/FINAL].

\(^4\) Other sources include: International Code of Conduct for Public Officials contained in the annex to the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996; the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials [Resolution (97)] and the OECD’s Recommendation of the Council on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service Including Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service [1998 - C(98)70/FINAL].
The second example concerns procedures and known risk areas relating to procurement. If this is an identified risk from the small group looking at *Corruption Pattern Analysis* (see above) then the policies and procedures would be as much intended to prevent a known risk and explicitly address potential threats as part of those policies and procedures (see Table A.4).
Table A.4. Institutional anti-corruption procurement procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedures, whether manual or electronic, for all purchases, contracts and external commitments above the level of petty cash and minor allowable personal expenses, identify and record the following procurement steps</th>
<th>Risk assessment red flags to be recorded</th>
<th>Misconduct issues to be formally recorded internally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The originator of the requirement</td>
<td>• “Product familiarisation” visits and associated hospitality</td>
<td>• Any actual or potential unethical approach or inducement, evidence of restrictive practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The purpose for which the requisition was made</td>
<td>• Acceptance of samples, demonstration models and so on outside of a contract</td>
<td>• Possible conflicts of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The route by which the requisition was approved</td>
<td>• Payments to become or be retained on a list of approved suppliers or similar (or in retail buying, payments by suppliers to secure favourable shelf positions); similarly, payments towards joint projects/ventures. (Such payment demands must be related to tangible benefits accruing or expected to accrue to the supplier, and should not have the effect of excluding other businesses, especially small businesses, from consideration, and must not be, or appear to be, the “price paid” for winning business.)</td>
<td>• Information on illegal or unacceptable practices by a supplier which could be to our discredit if we were known to be a customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The methods adopted in accordance with the procedures below (or any variation from procedure, with reasons) to procure the requirement, with all relevant documentation (for example requests for quotation, tender documents and so on) and the reasons for decisions made</td>
<td>• Reciprocal or countertrade, where being a customer of the organisation is a condition for becoming a supplier</td>
<td>• Failure by a supplier to meet our requirements, in terms of quality, quantity or delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The source of supply</td>
<td>• Imposition - of a nominated supplier by an internal or external customer</td>
<td>• All requests by a supplier to vary the terms of a contract after it has been agreed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The compliance or otherwise of the goods or service, and of the supplier or contractor, with the requirement as specified in the contract or other agreement</td>
<td>• All actions are taken to remedy any defect as recorded above, and the results</td>
<td>• Occasions where the prices or other terms offered by a preferred supplier or under a call-off contract appear to be less favourable than is available elsewhere in the marketplace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All actions are taken to remedy any defect as recorded above, and the results</td>
<td>• The route by which payment was authorised, and when, to whom and in what sum any payment(s) are made</td>
<td>• Reluctance or refusal by a preferred supplier to bid for a contract, or to enter a realistic bid; reluctance or refusal to supply under the terms of an existing framework or call off contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, the ministry or department where there is an ongoing risk of corruption, should not only establish additional requirements for staff in “at risk” posts, but also ensure contractors and suppliers are aware of a specific policy and set of procedures designed as a robust internal deterrence through a published and resourced investigative plan (see Figure A.2 below).

**Who?**

Following the successful approach developed by GSAC and the Ministry of Health, the same template may be adapted for other ministries and departments, as follows:

**Risk assessment**

- Meet and talk with all the main stakeholders (the minister, the leadership team of the ministry, heads of linked agencies [like hospital CEOs, if the health sector, or colleges for the education sector], the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, etc.

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- Ask them what the main corruption issues are. There are probably 20-30 different sorts of corruption issues. This is what makes an AP different from a NAP; the former will vary according to each ministry or department while the NAP offers a baseline from which each ministry or department should expand according to their particular environment. Each AP will be at a more detailed level than any NAP, and the solutions will similarly be ministry or department specific.

- As GSAC and the specific ministry or department develops an understanding of the main corruption issues it faces, go back and have second meetings with the more informative interviewees, to test that understanding on them.

- Sometimes there is already guidance on what the typical ministry or department corruption issues are (e.g. defence, health, education); use this material as a framework to test in the meetings.

- Draft a risk assessment profile.

**Developing the AP I**

- Once the profile is available, discuss with all those involved in the risk profile whether the NAP provides preventative guidance, whether the AP should develop the NAP baselines further or whether new solutions to each issue are needed.

- Develop Level 2 and Level 3 recommendations that build on existing policies, procedures and resources - choose the practical recommendations and not hopeful ones like “more staff”, or “a better prosecution system”, but things like using administrative sanctions, or implementing small public focused transparency ideas, like publishing waiting lists, or publishing procurement bidders and winners.

- Speak to those making the plans for the other ministries to get more ideas. Speak to GSAC experts.

- Once the ministry or department has a range of possible practical reform measures, go and talk again to the interviewees. This will mean going back to the interviewees for a second time, or even a third time, trying out solutions for each corruption issue on them and getting their input on other possible solutions.

- Read up what has been done in the same sector in other countries.

**Developing the AP II**

- Using the NAP and available guidance, review and revise, or draft from new, policies and procedures relating to institutional action planning (see above). The AP will be different from a NAP but only in terms of the detail or focus or nature or level of implementation; the NAP offers a baseline from which each ministry or department should expand according to their particular environment. Each AP will be at a more detailed level than any NAP, and the solutions will similarly be ministry or department specific.
• Meet and talk with all the main stakeholders (the minister, the leadership team of the ministry, heads of linked agencies, heads of relevant units [HR, audit, etc.]), unions and representative associations, within the ministry or department.

• Think through implementing the AP in terms of priorities, public perceptions and political risk. Should the focus be on tough measures, or on educative measures, or on measures visible immediately to the public, or on controls, or on public monitoring, or on strong action by the political leadership, or some combination? Speak with the minister and his/her political advisers, to see how the politics of it might work, or not work;

• Think through how actions, etc., can be measured by what type of indicator that will be relevant, clear, and comprehensible to a range of stakeholders as well as suitable for ease of collection, collation and use by management and by GSAC, and amenable to regular updating without adding any additional burden to the roles and responsibilities of those who will compile them;

• Draft the AP and circulate it among staff and management. GSAC will map against other APs and the NAP.

• The final draft will include activity, output and outcome indicators against which the AP can be monitored and reviewed, internally and externally.

**When?**

The process can only begin once the draft NAP is available and developed in relation to the core components. If the NAP is revised in one month, the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational within six months.
Figure A.2. Anticipating procurement fraud or corruption with a robust investigation response

Who should be notified:
- HR to ensure company policies are followed.
- Decision taken regarding keeping staff at work/suspend.

Evidence:
- Primary documentary evidence should be seized when examined to prevent destruction/tampering.
- Electronic evidence of e-mails timely seized in line with DPA and Business Disclosures Act.
- Ensure evidence is logged including date/time seized, from where and by whom.
- Ensure Securely stored.
- Ensure CCTV evidence is retained. Remember to investigate how long CCTV is kept.

Interviews:
- Is there sufficient expertise internally to deal.
- Witness should be interviewed as soon as possible.
- Potential suspects interviewed. Is this on tape, contemporaneously. With/without caution?
- Ensure you have an interview plan. Know what you want to ask prove. Consider at what point would you consider a caution.
- Are there any conflicts of interest? These should be recorded.

Other Considerations:
- Do you need external resources e.g. Commercial Procurement, independent Quantity surveyor.
- Will there be any Public Relations issues?
- What are the timescales for the report. Is this historic / ongoing fraud?
- Costs. Is there budget for the enquiry? Is the enquiry cost effective?
- Ensure all decisions are recorded in a decision log to justify actions taken.
- Ensure that all process weaknesses are addressed as the enquiry progresses. Don’t wait until the end.

Stage 3: Developing indicators

Context
Monitoring and reviewing the implementation of an AP requires a number of means to undertake both. At the basic level are quantitative indicators that allow assessment of output as a quantitative measurement of implementation. For monitoring and review purposes, further outcome and effectiveness indicators are necessary; impact indicators could be more relevant to evaluations.

Why?
Monitoring of APs and thus the implementation of the NAP by ministry or department individually and on a comparative basis, year-on-year, and over a given period of time, enables the GSAC to maintain the focus on the achievement of the NACS and the NAP throughout each step of implementation. Monitoring feeds back information from the implementation level to the strategy drafters and the planning and oversight units and thus enables effective steering, informed decision making, and improved strategy design. Without monitoring GSAC cannot identify problems; nor can it guide ministries and departments to update their APs; nor can it assess and report on risks across the public sector; and nor can it update the NAP, and thus the NACS. Monitoring requires informed assessments and good indicators.

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans, the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be both SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) and FABRIC; (see Table A.5).
Table A.5. Designing indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Making the framework effective</th>
<th>Criteria for information and data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focused on the organisation’s aims and objectives; any performance measures used should map clearly onto objectives and priorities.</td>
<td>Relevant to the purpose of the performance framework and to what the organisation is aiming to achieve.</td>
<td>Accurate: Providing a fair picture of performance, with sufficient accuracy for the intended purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate to, and useful for, decision makers within the organisation, and meeting the needs of stakeholders outside the organisation.</td>
<td>Able to avoid perverse incentives: Should not encourage unwanted or wasteful behaviour.</td>
<td>Valid: Recorded and used in compliance with relevant requirements, including the correct application of any rules or definitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced: Giving a picture of what the organisation is doing, covering all significant areas of work.</td>
<td>Attributable: The activity measured must be capable of being influenced by actions that can be attributed to the organisation; with clarity about where accountability lies.</td>
<td>Complete with processes to monitor for, and act on, incomplete, missing or invalid data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust: For example to withstand organisational or personnel changes.</td>
<td>Well defined: With a clear, unambiguous definition so that data will be collected consistently, and the measure is easy to understand and use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated: With the organisation’s business planning and management processes.</td>
<td>Timely: Producing data quickly and frequently enough for the intended purposes; and informing timely decision making.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost-effective: Balancing the benefits of performance information against the costs.</td>
<td>Reliable: Reflecting stable and consistent data collection processes across collection points and over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comparable with either past periods or similar programmes elsewhere.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verifiable with clear documentation behind it, so that the processes that produce the measure can be validated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**What?**

In monitoring anti-corruption strategies and action plans the use of good indicators for success play a vital role since they are the benchmark against which one can track progress. Indicators measure implementation and progress in putting each separate activity or initiative stated in the AP into practice. Good indicators should be realistic and amenable to quantitative data. Each policy at Level 2 and each unit of activity at Level 3 in Table A.1 will be translated into specific indicators (for example, in relation to the code of conduct, how many staff have received a copy, how many have been trained by the HR department or training unit in its contents, etc.). The next section provides the detail of how this may be achieved.

**How?**

Each ministry within their AP will determine a range of, preferably, quantitative indicators, whose compilation, collection and collation should be within existing management roles and responsibilities, and will be guided by GSAC so that they are available for comparability and uniformity. Indicators can be used to identify positive procedures or activities or

All Level 2 - Table A.1 (see Annex A) - activities, such as training, will be recorded, both as an activity and on the HR records of staff, providing the organisation with four types of indicators suitable for monitoring and review:
- **Activity or procedure indicator**: Data on the existence of a policy and procedure.
- **Output indicators** (workload or unit produced): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.
- **Efficiency and productivity indicators**: Cost-effectiveness, the ratio of input to output, unit costs.
- **Effectiveness indicators**: Is the policy leading to change or enhanced awareness?

In the case of a code of conduct, the data from the ministry or department would, using a binary system (Yes/No = 1/0) or numeric (or percent) information, address the components outlined in Table A.6.

**Table A.6. AP indicators for code of conduct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Efficiency and productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The code contains both open guidelines about desirable behaviour (value orientation) and closed guidelines pointing at prohibited behaviour (compliance orientation)</td>
<td>- Number of staff who have received a copy of the code</td>
<td>- Cost of giving all staff a copy of the code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code relates both to the behaviour of individual employees and to the collective behaviour of the organisation as a whole</td>
<td>- Number of staff trained in the code</td>
<td>- Cost of training staff in the code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code identifies the main risks from the corruption profile</td>
<td>- Number of “at risk” staff trained in the code</td>
<td>- Cost of training staff in the code including for “at risk” staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code contains specific components for “at risk” staff</td>
<td>- Number of promotions of staff trained in the code</td>
<td>- Cost of maintaining requirements of the code, including those relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code includes reference to relevant Level 2 policies and procedures relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest</td>
<td>- Number of staff who have completed requirements of the code, including those relating to gifts, hospitality and conflict of interest</td>
<td>- Cost of verifying asset and income declarations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code indicates how responsibility is distributed within the organisation</td>
<td>- Number of reports on potential corrupt conduct by staff</td>
<td>- Cost of staff dealing with breaches of the code and disciplinary cases brought in breach of the code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The code is used as an instrument enhancing public integrity</td>
<td>- Number of breaches of the code; the number of disciplinary cases brought in breach of the code</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of outcome indicators, the process can be developed to triangulate organisational intent, compliance practice and staff perceptions of implementation and relevance. For example, Table A.7 indicates the inter-related nature of questions to staff on one aspect – a code of conduct - of the organisational integrity framework.
Table A.7. **Outcome indicators for code of conduct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component – code</th>
<th>Management response</th>
<th>Compliance questions</th>
<th>Compliance response</th>
<th>Staff questions</th>
<th>Staff response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Method: Focus group</td>
<td>Method: Document &amp; interview</td>
<td>Method: IT survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it exist?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Do you know if the organisation has a code?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does it cover main areas?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Is it relevant to your work?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it updated annually?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Are you made aware that the code is updated annually?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is it given to all staff individually?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Have you received a copy?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is training provided in code?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Have you been trained in the code?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there an ethics advisor to answer questions?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Do you know the name of the ethics advisor?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there registers?</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Do you trust the advisor?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of productivity and effectiveness of the AP, the indicators are intended to demonstrate value for money and some evidence that the anti-corruption activities have some impact on staff:

- **Organisational productivity**: Indicators are expressed as ratios, making it possible to collect comparable data across compliance, sanctions, content verification, investigations, information access (for example, if this lies with the ministry or department, what is the ratio of personnel to declarations regarding content verification? What was the average number of working days required to check one declaration for completeness? What is the percentage of cases that were subject to internal inquiry due to suspicious findings?).

- **Organisational effectiveness**: Because performance is based on a combination of design and capacities, it is important to take all components of the AP into consideration when establishing goals and their tracking mechanisms; for example, information on the resources (personnel, facilities, technology, and so forth) for training; the quality of those resources (for example, types of technology employed, quality of staff, and so forth); and staff surveys on questions of awareness of ethics, willingness to follow procedures, or report wrongdoing, etc.
Looked at another way, the indicators will demonstrate the following in terms of the NAP:

- **Output indicators** (workload or unit produced): Examples of quantitative data at the output level include the number of diagnostic studies performed, number of civil servants trained in anti-corruption measures, or the number of investigations performed.

- **Outcome indicators** (effectiveness in meeting objectives): Correlated with particular functions, examples include the quality and impact of developed policies and procedures. Outcomes should also be compared to studies and measurements conducted by other organisations.

- **Efficiency and productivity indicators**: Cost-effectiveness, ratio of input to output, unit of assessment costs; levels of compliance with the policies and procedures, or levels of trust among staff tracked in surveys.

**Who?**

While the AP will designate responsibility and ownership, most ministries will have three sources to complete indicator data. Management will be responsible for the design and delivery of many of the Level 2 policies and procedures and, as part of the normal management information systems, be able to provide a number of indicator data. Individual ministry and department personnel or human resources departments should also produce quantitative information on recruitment, training and disciplinary matters. Finally, within their compliance role, internal control or internal audit can act as an organisation’s own watchdog on matters of propriety. In particular, auditors may develop a general appreciation of the framework of governance and standards of conduct within which the entity conducts its activities from their work to gain an understanding of the overall control environment. Other procedures that may bring such impropriety to the auditors’ attention include:

- reviewing documentation of the decision-making processes at the senior level
- assessing the entity’s control environment, particularly the absence of policies and procedures in relation to areas where there are significant risks of fraud, corruption or other impropriety
- reviewing organisational culture, whistleblowing arrangements and so on
- reviewing the results of internal audit examinations
- performing substantive tests of details of transactions or balances.

Each ministry and department should submit agreed data monthly, if possible. It would be sensible to develop a self-assessment checklist (or, as noted, consideration be given to an e-portal reporting process) which would request ministries and departments to submit data in relation to each provision of the AP and to provide or attach detailed information to substantiate their responses. If ministries and departments report partial or non-compliance with a given provision, they would be requested to explain why. They are further requested to explain what action should be taken to achieve full compliance, and whether technical assistance would facilitate greater compliance. By responding to...
this set of questions, ministries and departments are stimulated to analyse implementation gaps and their underlying causes and identify the most suitable forms of technical assistance that can support implementation.

**When?**

If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format is provided to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.

**Stage 4: Monitoring, reviewing, reporting, revising and updating**

**Context**

Regular monitoring, reviews and reporting ensures that the NACS and NAP follow a grounded strategic approach enabling continuous learning with four core purposes: judging the results of public actions in order to check their conformity with the set of objectives set out in the NACS and NAP; learning to improve the effectiveness of the interventions; accountability to programme stakeholders and taxpayers for the use of public resources; and overall anti-corruption progress. The stages may be developed for the other UNCAC areas: public engagement, criminalisation and law enforcement measures, measures dealing with international co-operation, and asset recovery.

The procedures for an annual review and updating of the AP and thus the NAP, including the review and updating of indicators for monitoring implementation of both, is based on the revised NAP.

The procedures are based on a standard OECD approach. The OECD proposes three levels of assessment:

- **Monitoring**: A continuing function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.

- **Review**: An assessment of the performance of an intervention, periodically or on an ad hoc basis. Reviews are usually less comprehensive and/or in-depth than evaluations. They tend to emphasise operational aspects.

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- **Evaluation**: The systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project or programme, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

Reviews are distinct from evaluation and more closely associated with monitoring. They are periodic or ad hoc, often light assessments of the performance of an initiative and do not apply the due process of evaluation or rigour in methodology. Reviews tend to emphasise operational issues. Unlike evaluations conducted by independent evaluators, reviews are often conducted by those internal to the subject or the commissioning organisation.\(^2\)

Reviews\(^3\) are appropriate if the project or the programme is analysed in order to, e.g. interpret already existing results, work out lessons learnt together, or develop future strategies, which result from lessons learnt. Reviews fall within a standard policy cycle (Figure A.3).

![Figure A.3. The policy cycle](image)


**Why?**

Monitoring seeks to check progress against NACS and NAP objectives or intentions. It can be defined as the formal reporting and evidencing that expenditure and outputs are

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successfully delivered, and milestones met. Monitoring data are frequently administrative and quantitative and are often not generated primarily for evaluation; analysis of monitoring data can more generally help those undertaking supervisory and oversight roles to identify where an AP component is not being implemented as expected, or in accordance with the NAP, and further action is required to ensure it can achieve its objectives.4

In particular, monitoring is the basis for a review of the functioning of the NAP and ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations of the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs. Monitoring thus is the basis for reviews in that it clarifies the institutional anti-corruption preventative framework, links activities and their resources to AP intentions, translates intentions into practice into performance indicators, establishes the routine collection of data relating to the indicators and thus reports progress to managers and alerts them to problems.

For GSAC, this, in turn, allows them to review and assess why intended objectives results were or were not achieved, specific causal contributions of activities to results, examines implementation processes, explores unintended results, compares actual results across ministries and departments, highlights significant concerns or achievements, and offers recommendations for improvement.5

Specifically:

- The NAP framework is delegated to ministries and departments to implement, both at a base level and developed to reflect corruption risks of their sector.
- As the AP approach is largely common and uniform - and thus the indicator data - the GSAC is able to collect, collate and aggregate the data to indicate implementation, output and outcome by ministry and department. Collectively the data allows GSAC to:
  - take a cross-cutting perspective
  - take an interventionalist role where there are outliers in terms of implementation of the AP
  - disseminate good practice.
- The GSAC can use the feedback and the data to give direction to ministries and departments on updating APs, reporting back to GSAC on a regular basis, and to revising and updating the NAP.


• The GSAC can focus on its primary role and responsibility as a supervisory and oversight agency, revising the NAP, providing guidance on drafting APs, requiring monthly reports in order to undertake progress reports by sector and collectively, report on overall progress and update the NAP. The oversight role will also facilitate the lead on co-ordination (e.g. GSAC will strengthen co-ordination of the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption) and areas of common purpose (common training policy and programme with activities and capacity development for anti-corruption agencies and other relevant authorities).

**What?**

The provision of AP information and data allows GSAC to revise the NAP and NACS, provide guidance to ministries and departments, and report on risk and progress because it has information on:

- **Context:** Assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of the AP, and thus the NAP and NACS.
- **Assessing the corruption pool:** Considering the risk, nature and types of corruption.
- **Confirming the current implementation landscape:** Reviewing the actual and potential issues in delivering the AP at the ministry and department level.
- **Reviewing effectiveness:** Considering the facilitators or inhibitors to an effective NACS and NAP at the ministry and department level, and how this is enhanced through joined-up action.
- **Ownership:** Considering measures and procedures that could ensure that organisations and stakeholders are fully engaged in the NACS and NAP.
- **Change:** Proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for the review and revision to the NACS and NAP.

**How?**

The data – ministry and department reports, policies and procedures, internal reviews, indicators, etc., provide the basis for aggregated information and informed assessment on ministry and department performance in terms of the NAP and the AP. The basis of that information has three purposes. The first concerns an inter-ministry comparison against the NAP to assess progress. Secondly, it allows the GSAC to focus on undertaking reviews in terms of outcome or effectiveness indicators where effectiveness is about whether an AP has been designed taking into consideration the sector’s context and its specific corruption challenges. Thirdly it allows GSAC to identify good practice, map progress across sectors or in relation to specific areas or on a year-by-year basis.

Undertaking a number of such reviews will enable GSAC to review both the NAP and APs and also provide reports on the overall progress of a ministry or department, by means of the AP, toward the objectives of, for example, Article 5 of UNCAC in achieving “effective, co-ordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of
society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.”

Thus GSAC can report on ministries and departments along the lines of Table A.8; it can also produce reports along the lines of the 2017 Plan for Higher Integrity and Reduced Corruption in the Health Sector.

Table A.8. Institutional Integrity audit

| • Sound risk management plans that address corruption risks? | • A commitment to recruiting the right people (those that most closely share the values of the organisation) and developing them so that they continue to provide high-quality, ethical contributions and services (for example, recruitment policy and procedures, individual performance management, ongoing training and development)? |
| • A clearly stated and understood code of conduct? | • Sound internal boundaries to behaviour which reflect core values (policies and procedures for the organisation’s operations such as gifts and benefits, conflicts of interest, procurement, contracting out, revenue collection) and that are conducive to high ethical performance (flexible and efficient, not rigid and overly bureaucratic)? |
| • Sound corporate, strategic and business plans that are consistent with the organisation’s purpose and values? | • Sound audit processes? |
| • Clearly stated and understood roles and responsibilities? | • A commitment to and policies and procedures that encourage learning and enable continual improvements to the organisation’s corruption resistance and ethical performance (monitoring and evaluation, participative decision making, training and development)? |
| • A commitment to, and strategies in place for, open and honest communication? | • The messages you are sending about ethical behaviour are being received and accepted by staff, contractors, suppliers or clients? |
| • Effective awareness programmes for staff, clients, contractors, suppliers and the community (such as practical ethics training for staff, guarantees of service for clients, publicity on rights and responsibilities for clients, contractors and suppliers)? | • The strategies your organisation decides to use to promote ethical behaviour and enhance corruption resistance are effective? |
| • Clearly stated and understood policies, systems and procedures that enable individual staff, clients, community members to have their concerns resolved without reprisals or detriment to themselves (including internal/external reporting, grievance handling, complaints handling)? | |


How GSAC conducts its institutional reviews is for GSAC to determine but it has, in addition to the provision of an AP on a monthly or quarterly basis, the potential to balance APs with:

- reviewing complaints procedures from the public, reports from those bodies responsible for anti-corruption investigations, audit reports, parliamentary proceedings, undertaking public opinion surveys, and other sources
- holding hearings into aspects of the institutional activity
- subject to prior agreement and an arranged agenda, undertaking monitoring or compliance visits to institutions
- publishing league tables or “corruption-prone” reports on the public sector
- undertaking research into legislation and administrative procedures
• taking evidence on and hearings for an annual review of progress on the strategy or action plans

• taking evidence on and hearings for systematic review of progress on the AP or any aspect of the work and responsibilities of the ministry or department.

The review would present the quantitative data from ministries and departments. The narrative part of the report then uses this information to explain, confirm, qualify the compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance with the NAP generally and in specific areas. The review would aim to report on the presence, implementation and operational effectiveness of the AP as follows:

• conducting an analysis of trends of causes and consequences of corruption and thus an objective assessment of risks and thus the purpose of an AP and NAP

• assessing the impact that the legal, organisational culture and political context may have on the effective implementation of an AP, generally and by sector

• undertaking the collection and collation of adequate information or statistical data on variations in the implementation of the APs, in terms of both outliers and successes

• reviewing the ownership of the AP and its integration into wider prevention and organisational integrity arrangements

• reviewing the intended and actual processes involved in the administrative audit and inspection mechanisms of corruption

• reviewing the monitoring and review processes to update an AP

• proposing the parameters – structural, cultural, strategic and operational - for improved effectiveness and impact of an AP.

Based on an amended OECD framework, the report would provide an evidenced assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of APs in terms of:

• **Relevance/context/environment**: What are the main types of corruption and does the existing AP approach address the main types of corruption in public office, and does its structure achieve this? Does it encourage trust? Does it fit within other anti-corruption arrangements?

• **Efficiency/productivity/performance**: Are the objectives being achieved economically and efficiently? Does it have appropriate management and operational arrangements?

• **Effectiveness/communication**: Is the AP useable and useful? Is it recognised in terms of management roles and purposes?

• **Delivering objectives**: Does the data indicate improvements year on year? Is it used by other agencies and civil society? Does the AP provide functioning prevention anti-corruption arrangements?

• **Comparison**: Do the APs highlight different approaches and consequences across sectors?
**Sustainability:** Is the implementation of the AP sustainable? How is the sustainability or permanence of AP and its effects to be assessed, monitored, revised and resourced? Does the AP demonstrably contribute to reaching higher level development objectives in the, for example, NAP or NACS?

Finally, the report will develop recommendations both for revising the APs and the indicators, as well as the NAP. It will also include areas where the GSAC has responsibility as lead agency.

In terms of reporting - the communications of results of monitoring and reviews - this helps maintain support for the strategy, not only by keeping stakeholders and citizens abreast of progress but also by disclosing obstacles and explaining what is being done to overcome them. Periodic reporting helps citizens hold government accountable for strategy results and provide opportunities for citizen input into strategy execution.

**Who?**

GSAC is the lead agency in the process. Given that responsibility for developing, implementing and reporting on APs will fall on ministries and departments, GSAC undertakes monitoring for the purposes of a review of the functioning of the NAP at ministry and departmental level, allowing GSAC to report on progress and to make recommendations with regard to the revision and updating of both the NAP and the APs, mapping progress and issues for reform, etc. Monitoring should include consultation – and where appropriate - with all the main stakeholders, including Ministers, the leadership teams of the ministries and linked agencies, the main professional groups, unions and representative associations, companies in the industry and industry associations, civil society organisations, etc., to ensure a full understanding of and commitment to the process.

In terms of reviews and recommendations, GSAC should also seek to triangulate any report or recommendation with owners, staff and stakeholders. Once the data is compiled, the draft report should be discussed with management to ensure both factual accuracy and also to identify the underlying reasons for the weakness and it, in turn, helps the GSAC identify where to focus the capacity development response in order to treat the cause and not just the symptom.

In many cases, it is a good idea to organise a validation workshop or meeting before finalising the assessment results and preparing the report, especially with operational staff. As well as providing an opportunity to validate the findings and/or identify and correct mistakes and misunderstandings, more importantly, it provides an opportunity to share information and ensure buy-in and commitment from all staff, which is important for the future implementation of the capacity development response.

A similar workshop could also bring together all relevant stakeholders. In some cases, it can be preferable to organise separate workshops for different stakeholder groups to ensure more open discussion. It generally starts with a presentation of the data, followed by a discussion of the results and the rationale for the scores assigned, and to build consensus on priorities in moving forward.

During the workshop, all stakeholders should be given an opportunity to express their views openly. This will increase trust and increase the credibility of the exercise, strengthening ownership over the results and laying a strong foundation for the way
forward. Having validated the findings and made any necessary adjustments, the primary client or assessment owner would normally give formal approval of the findings of the assessment. GSAC is also responsible for disseminating the final assessment report to stakeholders and partners.

**When?**

If ministries and departments are able to submit their returns on a monthly basis, then GSAC can produce quarterly progress reports. Revisions to the NAP and thus to APs should be undertaken annually or bi-annually.

If the NAP is revised in one month, and GSAC’s guidance/template/format to ministries and departments three months after that, then the process of discussion and drafting an AP should be available in three months and operational/published within six months. It would be expected that each ministry and department would produce the first report/review of their AP within one year of this. Thereafter reporting on the AP should be annual, although most of the examples of indicator data should and could be collected, collated and returned on a quarterly or six-monthly basis to allow interim reviews by GSAC.
Reports on monitoring, review and evaluation


