With expenditures at 49% of GDP in 2009, the Slovenian government is slightly larger in size than the OECD average. After growing at around 5% per year since 2000, the Slovenian economy entered into a severe recession in 2009, contracting by over 8%. Slovenia’s fiscal position deteriorated substantially from an achieved balance in 2007 to a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2009. The central government collects just over half of all revenues and accounts for just under half of all expenditures. Local governments receive about 40% of their revenues as transfers.

About 23% of the economy was devoted to producing public goods and services in 2009, very close to the OECD average. Slovenia relies more on government employees in the production process than many other OECD countries, using outsourcing to a lesser extent. Outsourcing represents about 38% of the costs of producing public goods and services in Slovenia, compared with 43% on average in the OECD area.

The expenditure structure of the Slovenian government is close to the OECD average, with slightly larger shares of expenditures on social protection programmes and health and slightly less on administration (general public services) and infrastructure (economic affairs).

Gross debt has increased substantially in recent years, from about 30% of GDP in 2008 to 47.5% in 2010 due to large deficits incurred as a result of the crisis (note that OECD definitions of gross debt differ from Maastricht criteria). To aid in fiscal consolidation, the government has adopted a fiscal rule capping expenditure increases at the rate of potential output. The government also plans to address long-term threats to sustainability by reforming the pension and health systems.
At 14.7%, public employment as a share of the labour force in Slovenia is just under the OECD average of 15%, and has risen only very slightly (0.4%) since 2000. The government has planned to reduce the number of government employees by 1% in 2010 and again in 2011.

Source: International Labour Organisation. [General government employment] [Distribution by level]

Slovenia’s central government delegates almost all HRM functions to its line ministries, except the setting of the guidelines for performance assessment. The use of performance assessments is widespread—both for pay purposes and for career advancement—as well as the use of performance pay. Slovenia has not established a separate cadre of senior civil servants. The use of HRM strategically is at the same level as in most OECD countries, and this could be further improved. It lacks a general accountability framework for senior managers as well as proper workforce planning.

Source: OECD 2010 Strategic HRM Survey. [Senior management] [Strategic HRM]

Middle managers in the Slovenian public service receive total compensation well below the OECD average, while economists/policy analysts and executive secretaries earn slightly under the average. The total compensation structure is also flatter, with middle managers making only 1.2 times more than economists/policy analysts, and 2.1 times more than executive secretaries (compared to the OECD ratios of 1.6 and 2.4, respectively). A relatively large share (74%) of total compensation is made up of wages and salaries, and social contributions account for 12%. The contractual working week is 40 hours, and most public employees work around 225 days per year.

Source: OECD 2010 Compensation Survey. [Middle managers] [Economist/Policy Analyst] [Executive Secretary]

Achieving greater transparency in public procurement is important, especially given that Slovenia spent an estimated 12% of GDP on procurement in 2008. Like the majority of OECD countries, Slovenia publishes most public procurement information on its central procurement website: http://www.enarocanje.si/?podroecie=portal. Contracting entity websites may also disclose general information for potential bidders, specific guidance on application procedures such as templates and forms, tender documents, selection and evaluation criteria and contract modifications. Occasionally the tender documentation for new requirements on additional quantities of goods, services and works that will modify the actual contract is not published on the national public procurement platform. Instead, it is published on the website of the contracting authority. Currently, Slovenia does not publish on line information on justifications for awarding a contract to a selected contractor and does not allow tracking public procurement spending on line. This is done by 59% and 32% OECD member countries, respectively.

Providing an adequate degree of transparency throughout the entire public procurement cycle is critical to minimise risk of fraud, corruption and mismanagement of public funds in order to ensure fairness and equitable treatment of potential suppliers. Additionally, it allows for effective oversight by concerned institutions and the general public.

Source: OECD 2010 Survey on Public Procurement. [Transparency in public procurement]
In Slovenia, responsibility for regulatory management is shared by several bodies, with the Ministry of Public Administration playing a leading role in the development of an agenda for regulatory quality.

Within the Ministry of Public Administration, the Better Regulation and Administrative Processes Division is responsible for promoting regulatory reform. With the adoption of the Resolution on Legislative regulation in late 2009, the Minister also became responsible for reporting to the National Assembly on progress in regulatory reform. The Ministry of Public Administration has led key reforms to promote regulatory quality, particularly in the area of legislative simplification and administrative burden reduction. The Ministry of Economy has also taken part in the implementation of one-stop shops. With respect to the rule-making process, the Government Office for Legislation monitors and ensures legal regulatory quality. It carries out a formal quality check on all draft laws submitted to government. Each ministry is expected to act as gate keepers in their respective areas of competence, including with respect to impact assessment. Another player for regulatory management is the Government Office for Development and European Affairs, with has some competencies regarding the review of impact assessments, especially in the field of development planning.


Similar to most OECD countries, the Slovenian government publishes budget documents, audit reports and administrative data sets. This information is generally made available on a central portals and ministry or agency websites. The country’s Freedom of Information legislation – which includes among other provisions, the Access to Public Information Act – requires this information do be disclosed to the public. As do about half of OECD countries, Slovenia also has in place requirements for publishing information in open data formats, which promotes and facilitates the re-use of this information by other parties. However, the government does not publish lists of public servants and their salaries.

Source: OECD 2010 Survey on Access to Information. Disclosure of information | Publication channels

Similar to most OECD countries, the Slovenian Government has put laws and/or policies in place to promote the use of digital signatures and electronic filing in the public sector. Slovenia also administers public-private partnerships for e-government projects which can help increase innovation in public administrations through greater knowledge transfers and exchange of best practices between the public and the private sectors. The government’s single-entry procurement website allows businesses to perform tender searches, but does not allow users to track the outcomes of contracts. This is an important functionality for increasing transparency in public procurement transactions.

Growing fiscal constraints have led to increased attention on improving the efficiency of tax administrations. The "cost of collection ratio," for instance, is one efficiency measure which compares the annual administration costs incurred by a revenue body with the total revenue collected over the course of a fiscal year. Over time, a decreasing trend could reflect greater efficiency in terms of lowered costs and/or improved tax compliance. In Slovenia, the administration costs of collecting 100 units of revenue have decreased from 2005 to 2007 before increasing again by 2009, albeit not surpassing the 2005 level. The increase from 2007 to 2009 could be partly explained by macroeconomic conditions, such as a drop in revenues following the crisis.


The average length of stay (ALOS) for acute care indicates the average number of days that patients spend in hospital for curative care. Similar to other OECD countries, in Slovenia the ALOS decreased from 2000 to 2008 (from 7.1 days to 5.7 days respectively). This reduction is slightly higher than that of the OECD average over the same period. Over time, reductions in ALOS could reflect efficiency gains, as it could signal that hospitals are expanding early discharge programmes, shifting to day-case surgery for suitable procedures, utilising less invasive procedures, and/or improving pre-admission assessment, all of which can help reduce costs. Too short a length of stay however could cause an adverse effect on health outcomes.

Source: OECD Health Data 2010. [ALOS for acute care]
Production costs are a subset of total government expenditures, excluding government investment (other than depreciation costs), interest paid on government debt and payments made to citizens and others not in exchange for the production of goods and services (such as subsidies or social benefits). Production costs include compensation costs of general government employees, outsourcing (intermediate consumption and social transfers in kind via market producers), and the consumption of fixed capital (indicating the level of depreciation of capital).

Structure of government expenditures: Data on expenditures are disaggregated according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which divides government spending into 10 functions. More information about the types of expenditures included in each function can be found in Annex B of Government at a Glance 2011.

“Gross general government debt” refers to general government gross financial liabilities that require payments of principal and interest. For the European Union countries, gross public debt according to the Maastricht criteria is not presented here (see Annex Table 62 of OECD Economic Outlook No. 89). These data are not always comparable across countries due to different definitions or treatment of debt components. Gross debt is used rather than net debt due to the difficulties in making cross-country comparisons of the value of government-held assets, and because it is more relevant in the context of debt interest payments.

HRM Composites: The indexes range between 0 (low level) and 1 (high level). Details about the theoretical framework, construction, variables and weighting for each composite are available in Annex E at: www.oecd.org/gov/indicators/govataglance.
- The delegation index gathers data on the delegation of determining: the number and types of posts needed in an organisation, the allocation of the budget envelope, compensation levels, position classification, recruitment and dismissals, and conditions of employment. This index summarises the relative level of authority provided to line ministries to make HRM decisions. It does not evaluate how well line ministries are using this authority.
- The performance assessment index indicates the types of performance assessment tools and criteria used, and the extent to which assessments are used in career advancement, remuneration and contract renewal decisions, based on the views of survey respondents. This index provides information on the formal use of performance assessments in central government, but does not provide any information on its implementation or the quality of work performed by public servants.
- The performance-related pay (PRP) index looks at the range of employees to whom PRP applies and the maximum proportion of base pay that PRP may represent. This index provides information on the formal use of performance related pay in central government, but does not provide any information on its implementation or the quality of work performed by public servants.
- The senior management index looks at the extent to which separate management rules and practices (such as recruitment, performance management and PRP) are applied to senior civil servants, including the identification of potential senior civil servants early in their careers. The index is not an indicator of how well senior civil servants are managed or how they perform.
- The strategic HRM index looks at the extent to which centralised HRM bodies use performance assessments, capacity reviews and other tools to engage in and promote strategic workforce planning, including the use of HRM targets in the assessments of middle and top managers. The index does not reflect situations where strategic workforce planning has been delegated to the ministry/department/agency level.

Compensation data: Total compensation includes wages and salaries and employers’ social contributions (those to statutory social security schemes or privately funded social insurance schemes, as well as unfunded employee social benefits paid by the employer, including pension payments paid through the state budget rather than through employer social contributions (mostly for some pay-as-you-go systems)). In most cases data are for six central government ministries/departments only (interior, finance, justice, education, health and environment or their equivalents). Working time adjustment compensates for differences in time worked (both weekly working time and holidays). Compensation was converted to US dollars using purchasing power parities (PPPs) for GDP from the OECD National Accounts database. Differences in compensation policies can be the result of different bargaining powers; the state of the labour market (such as compensation in the private sector for similar positions); specific labour shortages; and the attractiveness of the government as an employer. While the survey uses the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) to standardise job categories, full comparability of responsibilities behind the occupational titles across countries presents difficulties in some cases. Annex D in Government at a Glance 2011 fully details all limitations to data comparability, including those related to the measurement of employer’s social contributions (which were based on sources outside the survey for a number of countries, leading to potential inconsistencies).

Regulatory governance: The OECD average refers to the following number of countries:
- Functions of oversight bodies 2005: OECD30. Data are not available for Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia.
- Functions of oversight bodies 2008: OECD34. Data for Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia are for 2009.

Tax efficiency: Tax administration efficiency ratios are influenced by differences in tax rates and the overall legislated tax burden; variations in the range and in the nature of taxes collected (including social contributions); macroeconomic conditions affecting tax receipts; and differences in the underlying cost structures resulting from institutional arrangements and/or the conduct of non-tax functions.

Country Note: SLOVENIA