The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries
Regional Note
South Asia

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Foreword

In the course of the project ‘The Future of International Migration’ carried out by the OECD/IFP Secretariat in 2008/2009 a number of regional notes were commissioned from leading experts to help shed light on the diversity of situations and future migration trends in different parts of the non-OECD world. The aim of the regional notes was to provide a largely qualitative, personal assessment of the likely evolution in factors in the principal non-OECD regions which could influence outflows of people either in the form of intra-regional migration or, of particular significance to this exercise, to OE CD countries, through to 2025/2030. More specifically, the experts were asked to give some consideration to the most likely trajectory that outward migration might take in the years ahead, together with some speculation about possible “wildcards” (unexpected events or developments which could impact significantly on pressures to migrate to OE CD countries).

A regional note on India/Pakistan/Bangladesh was written by Prof. Binod Khadria, (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi). Sub-Saharan Africa was covered by Laurent Bossard (OE CD Club de Sahel). Jeff Ducanes and Manolo Abella (ILO Regional Bureau, Bangkok) submitted a note on China and South East Asia/Asia Pacific. A note on North and East Africa was prepared by Flore Gubert and Christophe Jalil Nordman (DIAL , IRD, France). Jorge Martinez Pizzaro (CEPAL , Chile) drafted a note on Latin America. The Russian Federation and Eastern and South East Europe were covered by Prof. Dietrich Thränhardt (University of Münster, Germany). Prof. Philippe Fargues (European University Institute, Italy) provided information on the Middle East and North Africa. These papers can be found on the OE CD/IFP webpage (www.oecd.org/futures).
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1. Introduction

This paper explores and speculates about the emerging landscape over the next 20-25 years to the year 2030, of migration from three non-OECD countries in South Asia, viz., India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, to the OECD countries. It is one of a series of papers on select regions of the world, South Asia being one of them. It may be important to begin by asking the most obvious question in this context then: How are these three countries in South Asia different from the other four or five countries in the SAARC region which are not covered in this paper, and how are the three chosen ones similar to each other? I would like to point out that of the eight SAARC countries, two are land-locked countries of the Himalayan region (Nepal and Bhutan; except for Afghanistan, a new member which is also landlocked but large); two are island nations (Sri Lanka and Maldives), and the three (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) being talked about in this paper are large sub-continental countries with substantial coastline in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal respectively. For reasons of common colonial legacy and cultural as well as linguistic homogeneity amongst India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, apart from the relatively smaller volumes of migratory movements and/or lack of data from the other five South Asian countries (excepting for Sri Lanka), this paper could be read as a representative one for the region. In addition, the three countries share more or less common future prospects in terms of the ponderables, although they may be differing from each other in terms of the imponderables over the next two and a half decades.

The South Asian region is, however, dominated by India, whether in terms of landmass, population, or the gross domestic product. Consequently, no generalization about the region can be made, unless it applies to India. At the same time, anything could also hardly be a regional generalization if applicable only to India. More so, in a futuristic context when India is now being projected as a “global power” in the making, leading, along with China, the transformation of the 21st Century into what is being called an “Asian Century”.

Talking of international migration from South Asia to the OECD countries, one also has to bear in mind that the OECD too is not a homogenous destination for migrants from South Asia. Based on the historical and contemporary nature of this migration, the OECD can be classified into six broad groups of countries:

1. USA and Canada in North America;
2. United Kingdom in Europe;
3. Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific;
4. West European countries in the EU;
5. Japan and Korea in East Asia;
6. East European new members of the EU.

Almost 80 percent of the highly qualified migrants from India have continued to choose the USA as their ultimate destination for more than a decade and almost same is the case for the other two countries (Khadria, 1999, 2008a, *Hindustan Times*, 24 Sept., 2008). Canada is the second-best choice, and also as a route to move to the US. UK has always been a preferred destination, except that migration to the UK was overtaken by the US in the 1970s because of recession in the British economy and restrictive immigration policies, but it picked up again in the 21st century because of Britain’s economic strides.
coupled with demographic and ageing compulsions (Khadria, 2006d). Australia and New Zealand in the
Pacific are another group of destination that attracts Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, although their
profiles would differ in terms of the occupations the majority of the migrants engage in. All the OECD
countries in these three groups of destinations are primarily English-speaking and that is one major factor
behind these flows being large, as compared to the other three groups of OECD countries which are non-
English speaking. Western Europe is still a slight exception because of its historical links (Dutch, French,
Portuguese) with the Indian subcontinent, and also because of its contemporary initiative in starting
tertiary-level education in the English language to cater to the overseas students from Asia. Japan and
Korea have dominated in attracting more of the semi-skilled and unskilled migrants from Bangladesh and
India because of their Asian culture and Buddhist values. East European countries have themselves
started experiencing emigration to the west-European EU countries, and to fill the vacuum there, labour is
being imported from India (e.g., to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and so on), Bangladesh, and
Pakistan. Also, one has to keep in mind that although efforts are on within the EU to harmonise policies,
migration is one area where immigration in the EU from any third country or countries is still a sovereign
territory of the EU member states, and therefore guided more by bilateral norms and agreements. There is
also some amount of competition among the EU countries to attract highly skilled workers and tertiary-
level students from South Asia. In fact, this is the assumption behind the proposal to introduce, through
concerted efforts amongst them, a European Blue Card, along the lines of the American Green Card, to
attract 20 million high-skilled workers in the next 20 years.

2. The Push-Pull Dynamics of Migration between South Asia and the OECD

(i) Demography – Population, Labour Market, Education:

At least a fifth of the humanity on earth lives in South Asia, large majority in India, Bangladesh
and Pakistan. In contrast, it accounts for around 2 percent of the world's gross national income measured
at current exchange rates, and 6 per cent at purchasing power parity corrected exchange rates. While India
would register a massive increase in the absolute size of working age population (15-64 years) in 2030
over 2005 due to a growth of about 33 per cent, Pakistan and Bangladesh too would have massive rates of
growth of about 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively in 2030 over their respective populations in
2005, putting pressure for emigration.¹

While the male-female distribution would be more or less the same in all three countries by 2030,
India has been projected to enjoy what is called a “demographic dividend” in terms of youth population
dominating the age-structural-transition. The flagship flaunting this “demographic dividend” of India has
been the software IT skills embodied in the relatively younger contingents of Indian “knowledge
workers” - increasingly dominating the home turf in the migration-related business-process-outsourcing
(BPO) industry and the global arena through its diasporic presence in the services sector.² There is,
however, inconsistency in the logic of demographic dividend being realized in India in the 21st century
due to contradictions between (a) the numbers, and (b) the quality - of human resources. According to
December 2006 revised projections of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India for the
period 2001-2026, the population of India is expected to rise from little over 1 billion in 2001 (1.029
billion) to 1.4 billion in 2026 (1.400 billion), registering an increase of 36 per cent in 25 years.³ Within
this, and for a shorter period till 2016, India’s youth population in the age group of 20 to 29 is estimated
to increase by 64 million in the shorter span of 15 years - from 174 million in 2001, to 238 million. The
RGI pointed out that in the total population increase of 371 million during first quarter of the 21st century,
the share of workers in the age group of 15 to 59 in the total increase would be 83 per cent. This is what is being flaunted as the ‘Demographic Dividend’ of 21st-century India - an endearing term for the fast-ageing Europe – glossing over the fact that there would be huge discrepancies between the north and the south within India.

Turning to quality of population as the human resource in labour market, according to Ashish Bose, one of India’s leading demographers, one can question whether this kind of age-structural change causing an upsurge in youth and working age population would rather prove to be a ‘demographic burden’ for India instead of a demographic dividend? According to Bose, absorbing the vast increase in youth numbers will be a real challenge to all governments at the Centre and in the States for their political survival. Vast masses of unemployed numbers and unemployable youth will affect not only the productivity of labour adversely but also threaten rule of law (an indicator which is better for India as compared to Bangladesh or Pakistan) - one of the three elements the domestic private sector investment as well as the Foreign Direct Investment would always like to be assured of, the other two being infrastructure, and availability of skills. Of the total unemployed population of 45 million in 2001, over 10 per cent were unemployed graduates (GOI, 2001, Census of India). The number is estimated to have risen from 4.8 million in 2001 to 5.3 million in 2007.

Paradoxically thus, India faces a high rate of graduate unemployment co-existing with huge skill shortages, particularly because of non-suitability of large proportion of the graduates for the available jobs (NASSCOM 2005a, 2005b). The present graduate unemployment rate of 17.2 per cent in India is significantly higher than the overall rate of unemployment. And a higher proportion of nearly 40 per cent of the graduates are underemployed, i.e., not productively employed.

At the higher end of the skill spectrum, while India had, in 1991, a total of 10 million workers in ‘professional, technical and related’ fields to be classified as Human Resources in Science and Technology (HRST in short), according to India Science Report 2005, this rose to 27 million in 2004 (NCAER 2005) – an increase of two and a half times over a period of one and a half decade. As a proportion of the country’s total workforce, this is indeed a doubling from 3.6 percent in 1991 to 7.3 percent in 2004. However, while the numbers as well as the proportion of HRST have gone up steadily since 1991, the same cannot be said about the utilization of these resources. In 2004, only about 35 per cent of those holding HRST jobs were educationally qualified for those jobs. Indeed, this ratio has not improved with the passage of time. In 1991, this ratio was just 2 percentage point below 35; in 2004 it rose to just 2 percentage points above 35! India’s work force that does not have either a diploma or a graduate degree is currently estimated at around 327 million, i.e., around 89 percent of the country’s work force has an educational qualification of only high school or below. The overall stock of graduates in India was estimated to be only around 22 million in 2003-04. Total enrolment in higher education was 10 million, whereas the out-turn each year was 2.5 million.

The 2005 NASSCOM (2005a) Strategic Review and the NASSCOM-McKinsey Report (NASSCOM, 2005b), released by India’s National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM), both important documents, apprehended huge shortage in both the IT-related and BPO-related skills in India. The reports said that only about 25 per cent of the technical graduates were suitable for employment in the offshore IT sector, and as little as 10 to 15 per cent of general college students for the BPO industries. The reports estimated that by 2010 the two industries would have to employ an additional one million workers near five Tier-I cities in India, viz., New Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad,
Chennai and Mumbai. In addition, about 600,000 workers would be required across other towns in India (Economic Times, 17 Dec, 2005). On the required talent supply to meet this demand, the reports said India would need a 2.3 million strong IT and BPO workforce by 2010 to maintain its current market share, not to speak of increasing it further (Hindustan Times, 22 September, 2008). The potential shortfall of qualified employees, according to these two Reports, will be of nearly half a million (or 500,000, i.e., more than one-fifth of the 2.3 million vacancies would remain unfilled) – with nearly 70 per cent of the shortages concentrated in the BPO industry. There is also a serious and growing concern about the quality of the highest academic degree – the Ph.D. The fact that the highest number of Ph.D.s are awarded not by the most reputed universities indicates widely varying standards of quality control for the doctoral degree.

Given these shortcomings within the Indian higher education system, India has become a virtual “supermarket” (as the Indian media calls it) for internationally renowned educational institutions in other countries to shop in India and import “semi-finished human capital” - the best and the brightest of Indian students' (The Hindu, Nov 26, 2000). These students from a large middle-class find it better to get educated abroad for availing themselves with better job opportunities in India on their return (Khadria, 2006c).

Despite labour shortages in the home front, the increase in population would thus lead to emigration followed by return, virtually propagating temporary migration from South Asia as a whole to the OECD, particularly of the younger cohorts, unless the higher education sectors of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, (or Sri Lanka) absorbs them for quality education and equips them with the skills that their own labour markets require. This is what the 11th Five Year Plan document of India aspires to achieve by 2012 through the proliferation of what are called the “world class” and “central government funded” universities across the states, a target which, according to critics would look more like a “wild card” than the OECD global trends scenario of enrolments in tertiary education for India doubling to about 14.3 per cent in thirty years by 2030 only. Similar ‘wild card’ developments in Pakistan and Bangladesh too could short-circuit the same OECD IFP estimates for Pakistan from 6 per cent in 2000 to 13.6 per cent 2030, and for Bangladesh from 12 per cent in 2000 to 18.5 per cent in 2030 over much shorter periods, triggering higher rates of emigration of graduates than of students which is perceived now.

(ii) Economy – Growth, Infrastructure, Technology and Poverty

Although agriculture has still been the predominant sector of employment in South Asia, including in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, one peculiar feature of the region has also been a relatively early development of the services vis-à-vis industry, in spite of the emphasis being on industrialization as the chosen strategy of development for decades (Ahluwalia and Williamson, 2003, pp. 2-3). This has had a bearing on education and vocations in India that have currently become relevant to migration; although the picture of Bangladesh and Pakistan has certainly not been as rosy as of India as both the economies have been quite sluggish, due to political uncertainties impinging on the economic turf.

Every year, at the controversial and the elitist World Economic Forum in Davos, a star is chosen by assessing its superior economic power. Superior economic power is characterized by growth, infrastructure, and technology – determining “access to raw materials, volume and productivity of the domestic market, and a leading position in world trade, and the global financial markets.” In 2006, there was no contest. India’s scores were high, promising, and pretty well-known by then. No country captured the imagination of the Forum and dominated the scene as India did. “India everywhere”, said a logo at
Davos. Such marketing slogans, however, would not work if there were no substance behind them. Transiting from the earlier so-called “Hindu” rate of growth of around 3.5 per cent during the first three decades of planning since the nineteen-fifties to an average of 6 per cent over the last twenty five years, India has been the second fastest-growing country in the world—after China—averaging above 6 percent growth per year over the past decade and half since 1991.

The growth of India’s GDP had accelerated to 8 percent in 2006 and in fact exceeded it in 2007. Many observers believed that India could as well expand to a higher double-digit rate for the next decade, averaging at 9 per cent per annum in the first quarter of the 21st century. It was being said that “while China's rise has already been close to 10 percent since 1980—India's is still more a tale of the future, a future that is coming into sharp focus in the 21st century.” A much-cited 2003 study by Goldman Sachs had projected that over the next 50 years, India will be one of the four BRICs – the fastest-growing major economies of the world - Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The report calculated that in 10 years India’s economy would be larger than Italy’s, and in 15 years it would have overtaken Britain’s. By 2040 it will boast the world's third largest economy, by 2050 it will be five times the size of Japan's, and its per capita income will be 35 times its 2003 level. Though India’s performance in 2007 was actually higher than the Goldman Sachs study had assumed, predictions like these are always dicey and treacherous as current trends in 2008 have proved to be more topsy-turvy.

A Survey carried out on the 1st of January 2007, (by HT-CFore9,) had asked respondents in India: “Do you think India would be a developed country by 2020?” No less than 61 per cent of the respondents said that India will be as good as any developed country by 2020. Fifteen years ago — or for that matter, at any time over the past two centuries — hardly anyone would have said so. All through, India was an international byword for poverty and economic sluggishness. The transformation is a resounding endorsement of the success of India’s economic liberalisation. Yet, quite a few respondents were realistic enough to express doubts about whether poverty in the country will be significantly reduced by 2020. A good 45 per cent would subscribe to the trickle down theory, believing that wealth creation will inevitably lead to wealth distribution as well. But the fact that 36 per cent ‘nays’ and 19 per cent “can't says” - together outnumbered the ‘ayes’— 55 to 45 — made the issue more debatable!

Even captains of industry like the President of the Confederation of Indian Industry had thought cautiously (Hindu, Jan 8, 2007). It is basically the entrepreneurial spirit which he thought was in abundance in India, and one could look beyond India’s borders for global markets. But, to sustain the cherished 9 to 10 per cent growth, he said, “We need to solve the question of growth being inclusive. We do have the capacity to create wealth, but seem to have neglected social issues - of skill development, education, and health.

Historically, a common influence behind such contradictions in the development strategies adopted by the three countries in the South Asian region – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh - have been their colonial legacy. The intellectual and political thinking till the end of the twentieth century had attributed economic underdevelopment of the region largely to the policy of laissez-faire and free trade that the British had adopted to suit their imperial economic interests of the times. In remaining closed to trade with the rest of the world, the three South Asian economies, unlike the East Asian countries, did not initiate much trade even amongst themselves. As a result, the region remained the least integrated internationally until the late 1980s. As a ratio of GDP, 14 per cent of external trade was the lowest for India in the region. Trade ratios of the other countries too were in the range of 20-30 per cent. The
economies were also not very receptive to private foreign capital until the 1990s. In 2001, the total FDI inflow to the region was US$4.2 billion, which constituted merely 2.5 per cent of the total flow to all developing countries. Tendulkar and Sen (2003) date the first wave of liberalization in Bangladesh to 1976, and in Pakistan to 1978, comparable to India's first phase of domestic liberalization in 1980. Subsequently all these retracted - Bangladesh in 1982, Pakistan in 1984, and India in 1990. A second wave of reforms began in 1989 for Pakistan, and in 1991 for Bangladesh and India. Thereafter, in India, each government has pursued an agenda of economic liberalization.

This was a break with the earlier policy package, whereby the governments were preoccupied with highly interventionist measures like those designed to manage the foreign exchange scarcity. Earlier, the countries of the region, especially India, were following an exceptionally closed-economy model. In the 1990s, policy reform in all the South Asian countries focused more on removing these barriers to the world markets (Ahluwalia and Williamson, 2003).

Around the same time, in the migration sphere too, the centre of focus showed signs of shifting from source-country determinants of migration to destination-country determinants. In the twenty-first century, as the trend shows today, it may be speculated that in the years to come over the next quarter of a century, migration flows would be formidable demand-determined and worker-seeking (i.e., because of excess demand for potential migrants in the OECD), as opposed to being supply-determined and work-seeking (i.e., due to oversupply of potential migrants in South Asia) that it was through most of the twentieth century. Migration has been broadly looked at as a one-sided game of loss or gain, leading to, for example, exodus or “brain drain” in the twentieth century, and circulation or “brain gain” in the twenty-first century so far. Even if the game were to remain one-sided in the next two and a half decades, the new perspective in South Asia would be to strike a triple-win - for themselves, for the migrant stakeholders in them, and for their countries of destination in the OECD - turning a migrant’s identity from that of an expatriate at the micro-level of the individual or a family to a body of transnational dual citizens in a diaspora at the meso level.10

(iii) Quality of Life – Cost of Living, Health, Environment

Quality of life in the three South Asian countries would depend primarily on prices, per capita consumption of food, and environmental factors like availability of water, sanitation etc. It may be too long a period to predict the annual rate of price rise in 2030 over now. For a shorter period, in 2013, inflation rate in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, has been predicted to be uniformly lower than 4 percent compared to 4 per cent, 7 per cent, and 9 per cent respectively in 2005. However, this would still remain an imponderable for 2030, as the inflation rate in India has unexpectedly crossed 12 per cent mark now in 2008. If the relative consumer prices continue to be much higher in South Asia, then there could be selective spurts of migration to those OECD countries where these would be stable at lower levels in terms of determining the cost of living.

Per capita food consumption in South Asia in 2030 would be still below the world average, although better than in sub-Saharan Africa, and therefore average health status in South Asia would be likely to be lower than in the OECD countries. Moreover, as production of food would be dependent on the vagaries of weather, the uncertainties of climate change would make it further unpredictable.

Although population living under medium, low and no water stress would remain constant between 2005 and 2030, those under severe water stress would increase.11 This may not affect emigration
from South Asia to the OECD countries directly, but indirectly it may cause marginal increase as those under water stress would also affect the quality of life of those without stress in these developing countries.

(iv) Security – Climate Change, Terrorism, Governance

The three countries together would be exposed to one-thirds of the global threat from coastal flooding, India and Bangladesh taking the brunt of it by 2070-80, and therefore earlier on in 2030 as well. This might create massive displacement and exodus, prompting those able to emigrate to emigrate to safer havens in the OECD countries.

On the count of political stability and absence of violence, although India is now better off than Pakistan which in turn is little better than Bangladesh, there can be no guarantee of these remaining low in any of the three countries over the next two decades. All three countries have fared poorly on the Transparency International’s latest corruption index of 2008, in terms of global perception: India ranked 84th (down from 72nd last year) with an index score of 3.4 out of 10; Pakistan 134th (index score of 2.5) and Bangladesh 147th (index score of 2.1). Recent terrorist bombings in major cities of India including the capital city of Delhi; terrorist attacks and political assassinations of leaders in Pakistan and Bangladesh leading to political upheavals, and uncertainty about the effectiveness of the rule of law makes migration from the whole of South Asia (including from Sri Lanka, and Nepal) quite vulnerable to sudden change.

(v) Future of Migration History - Remittances, Return Migration, Dual Citizenship

In migration history, remittances, return migration, and memberships of more than one nation are assumed to grow on a linear trajectory, and are therefore assumed to be relatively more predictable. However, there are caveats in each one of these to make them less predictable.

In South Asian countries, remittances have grown very rapidly. Close to ten per cent of the world remittances come to India. In 2006, India received USD 25 billion (27 billion in 2007) and ranked first in the world; Bangladesh with USD 5.5 billion, and Pakistan with USD 5 billion are also leading remittance receiving countries. There are discourses on policies to promote remittances as the dividend from brain drain. In contrast, what is paid little attention is the fact that the remittance potential of the students is preempted by a more recent trend of what I call the “silent backwash of remittances” to the developed countries in the form of overseas students’ fees (which are often multiple times their so-called home-student fee) - leading to huge financial costs to poor sending countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh through student emigration, and massive gains to receiving OECD countries. Recently, India doubled the annual limit for any Indian citizen to remit up to 50,000 US dollars to anywhere in the world. Naturally, a large component of the outflows under this scheme would swell the silent backwash of remittances to those advanced OECD countries who sell their higher education to the developing world as a profit-making export. Latest Reserve Bank of India figures put it at USD 4 billion, equivalent to one-sixth of the global remittances, and possibly not much less than the remittances coming from the OECD countries.

At the turn of the century, when the IT bubble burst in the wake of the American recession, hordes of NRI professionals lost their H-1B visa contracts in the US and were forced to return home to an uncertain career in India. The positive outcome emerged when opportunities of employment multiplied within India with the emergence of the BPO. Instead of labour moving out of India, the multinational
companies started moving their capital to India – triggering a wave of return migration of Indians, which rolled like a bandwagon of manna from the heaven to the Indian economy and still continues to dominate the debates. Remarkably, in fact, the BPO industry had also started attracting foreigners to India in search of employment. What is a lesser known fact is that nearly 800 Americans were working as interns at the information technology companies in India in 2006, and NASSCOM expects this number to grow (Associated Press News, The Economic Times, April 2, 2006). The total number of foreign nationals working in India was estimated to be over 50,000, with more than 12,000 registered at the IT hubs in Bangalore itself, the Silicon Valley of India (Asia Times Online, 2006). However, unexpected events like the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, leading to the panic of laying off of thousands of employees in the BPO sector in India would put a question mark on the sustainability of return migration, triggering fresh waves of migration from South Asia.17

Simultaneously, realizing that it has lagged far behind the other emerging Asian giant China in wooing its diaspora into India’s financial and manufacturing sectors, India has been lately very pro-active in creating an enabling legal structure to leverage what is now called the diaspora resources. Even if a late realization, the Indian government understood that to effectively mobilise the Indian diaspora, it would have to work more on the Indian bureaucracy to actually provide the long-promised “single window” of clearance to FDI, joint ventures, and technical collaborations.18 India could have tapped into the diaspora resources of a rich and successful Indian community settled abroad who had good reasons to ‘help’ India develop. However, it is more the failure with the middle-class non-resident Indians (NRIs) that made India turn towards the Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) with the offer of a dual citizenship, the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) for the POI - excepting for those having the citizenship of Pakistan or Bangladesh - to make them participate in the development of their motherland. In fact, India is counted high on the “soft power” business of cultural networking with the diaspora – strong media, popular Bollywood films, prize-winning diaspora literature in English, yoga, music, and so on. Recent publications like The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora – would stand further testimony to this proposition of India being high on this index of culture (Khadria, 2006b). In fact, both Bangladesh and Pakistan share this cultural proliferation as part of a pan-Indian sub-continental culture abroad – reflected in the popularity of cuisine, generically called “Indian” which includes Pakistani-Punjabi food, mostly cooked by Bangladeshi cooks! On the flip side, Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are all taunted as ‘Pakis’ in the UK and some other countries. However, the caveat here is that dual citizenships could trigger fresh waves of brain drain in terms of citizens of South Asia naturalizing themselves into the citizenship of the OECD countries, and avail themselves with the benefit of temporary return to their country of origin without having to seek re-entry visas when they go back to the OECD country of their residence and naturalized citizenship (Khadria, 2007b). Both Pakistan and Bangladesh also have some form of dual citizenship, Pakistan restricting it to citizens of 13 select countries of which 10 are OECD countries.19

3. Emerging Global Policy Trends and Patterns

(i) Policies in OECD Countries

Recent publications (OECD 2004) testify to the fact that while growth of permanent settler admissions in the developed countries from Asia have grown slowly, temporary worker entrants have grown more rapidly in the initial years of the twenty-first century. This has its own social implications. The first such implication is that return migration would become in-built in the process. Vice versa, the
policy of promoting return migration of workers would also imply a policy of promoting temporary migration (involving 5-7 years’ stay) over their permanent immigration (Khadria, 2006a).

Although the volume of immigrants in the labour market of a destination country rises, when the individual human faces that comprise it keep changing, the element of conflict in society may remain at a low level of equilibrium. An explicitly stated policy of return migration, involving only temporary stay rights for foreigners would thus allay the fears, in the minds of the native citizens, of being competed out by them. If so, it could naturally be a welcome preference for the strife-prone destination countries. Socio-psychologically speaking, this, like a “safety valve”, would suit the interest of those OECD host countries where racial xenophobia against the foreigners’ presence in the labour market is often a political headache for the state. It can lead to a persistent social strife if ignored or allowed to continue for long.

On the other hand, the social implications of temporary migration on the migrants and their family members in the origin countries could become welfare-reducing. The developing countries of origin in South Asia, particularly India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, would be overwhelmed by the bandwagon of promoting return migration, which is apparently aimed at benefiting them in all. So far, these origin countries have been quite complacent about the macro-level interests of the developed destination countries underlying these key trends. At the same time, they have also not been sensitive within themselves to the effects of return migration policy on the individual workers and their families as to whether there could be unexpected violations of human rights and undesired outcomes on the humanitarian fronts. For example, a natural corollary of any individual’s decision of return migration, when inherent in the decision of onward migration itself, would be about the joining or not joining of the spouse and the children abroad. When return becomes imminent, it would be more likely that only the primary worker would move and the immediate family, comprising the spouse and the children, would stay put in the country of origin for most of the time. Their dilemma would arise from the constraints of the job of the spouse in the home country: Whether to resign when leave would not be commensurate with the partner’s engagement abroad? It would also arise because of the schooling of the children in the home country: Whether to withdraw them from school when admission/readmission is going to be difficult in the country of origin? Under the circumstances, temporary migration would entail a compulsory separation among the members of the family, making the family “nomadic” in character, so to say, and making the return of the worker too a type of “forced migration,” although all the decisions within the concerned migrant’s family would seemingly remain “voluntary”. The challenge before social policy in neutralizing these negative effects would be that these would not be limited to labour migration but to high-skill migration as well.

According to the IOM (2004), in recent years, return migration has acquired the thrust of policy by many governments. Return migration here means the act of going back from a country of destination to the country of origin, and the policies vary in inducing different categories of return, for example, voluntary, forced, assisted, or spontaneous, among others. This is an issue, which despite being largely uncharted so far, would perhaps be important enough to be included explicitly in the agenda of social policy responses towards neutralizing the adverse effects of international migration on the migrants. Apparently, the returning migrant and the family of the migrant are left in the lurch in this whole process of return migration, there being no follow-up efforts for their re-integration in the home country.
(ii) Policies in South Asian Countries

India has institutionalized state capacity to respond to the crises, which lead to the repatriation of its citizens at the time of need – political strife, war, or individualised harassment. These more proactive social policies were developed following the repatriation of several thousand low-skilled returnees from the United Arab Emirates to Kerala during the Gulf War in early 1990s, and put into operation time and again, the latest being for evacuation of Indians from Lebanon in 2006. However, there have also been cases in some OECD countries too where Indian government had to intervene to diffuse crisis arising from the arrest of some high-skilled migrants by the immigration authorities on trivial grounds. Although, the proportions of high-skilled migrants (foreign-born) from South Asia living in the OECD (2007, Chart 1.3, p. 32) are reported to be higher than the low-skilled (India: 5.4 per cent high-skilled, which is the highest proportion for any single country, as against 1.6 per cent low skilled; Pakistan: 1.1 per cent high skilled against 0.9 low-skilled; and Bangladesh: negligible high-skilled as against 0.4 per cent low-skilled), as growing numbers of low-skilled (semi-skilled and middle-skilled) migrant labour are being wooed from South Asia, particularly into the new EU member countries in eastern Europe, and bilateral agreements are being signed, e.g., with the Indian government, this social policy provisioning has become important for the OECD-oriented migration too.

4. Social Policy Provisioning in South Asia: Examples from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh

It is in the above backdrop that emerging priority concern of governments in almost all origin countries of Asia is to ensure the well-being of migrant workers and to secure the basic provisions. Countries of origin have two main policy options for achieving this:

- Regulatory measures for labour migration, and
- Provisioning of supportive social services for migrant workers and their families.

Although these are not entirely mutually exclusive domains of policy intervention, broad distinctions of areas of operation could be delineated. Countries of origin do have a range of policy strategies which extend the scope and improve the efficiency of their regulatory mechanisms, including, for example, regulation of enrolment of students, recruitment of workers, developing and enforcing minimum standards in employment contracts; information dissemination to migrants; assistance in the country of destination and promoting inter-state cooperation; etc. However, the supportive social service provisioning for implementing these have not been so explicitly discussed. Keeping this discrepancy in view, the following section lists some of the initiatives taken Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, steps which would influence the contours of policy and practical interventions in future.

Bangladesh:

The Bangladesh Missions in host countries now perform the following duties:

- Receive and hear the complaints of migrant workers;
- Take up the matter with the employers;
- Provide legal assistance;
- Arrange repatriation of stranded migrant workers; and
- Repatriation of remains of workers who have died abroad.

Bangladesh also operates a welfare fund for providing legal support and initial sustenance.
Pakistan

- Orientation and Briefing Centres function in Protector of Emigrants (PE) Offices, in Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. All migrant workers register with the PE. Offices are given pre-departure briefing about their countries of employment. They are also informed about the customs, local conditions and relevant laws in the country of destination.
- Community Welfare Attachés are posted in the manpower importing countries. They maintain liaison with the Pakistani workers and provide them with the necessary help to solve problems in coordination with the host authorities.
- Under the Emigration Ordinance of 1979, a welfare fund has been created. It is being managed by the Overseas Pakistani Foundation (OPF) for the welfare of migrant workers and their dependants in Pakistan. Education, training, housing and medical facilities, and other services are organized for the families of Overseas Pakistanis by the OPF.
- The Government has taken measures to improve the skills and attitudes of the workers in demand abroad in accordance with international norms and standards.
- The majority of the emigrants remit their saving through the official channel. The Government of Pakistan has banking arrangements in some of the manpower importing countries.

India

In the year 2004, the Government of India established a new ministry called the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), which acts as a nodal agency to deal with issues related to Indian migrants abroad. However, apart from MOIA, the Ministries of Home Affairs, Commerce, External Affairs and the Department of Science and Technology also interact with the Indian migrants in various capacities.

The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, is working towards two basic objectives:
- To take note of the problems of the Indian migrant communities in various countries and to initiate measure to overcome those problems; and
- To involve the Indian migrants abroad for India’s larger development purposes.

Towards these goals, the Indian government has floated a number of schemes.

5. The Future Drivers of Immigration Policies in the OECD

The stereotypes of the push and the pull factors have not necessarily proved to be the drivers of country policies for migration from South Asia to OECD countries at the macro level. The main factors steering the future migration between these two regions, therefore, need to be identified and grouped together in a generic classification: These I have grouped as Age, Wage, and Vintage. Further, I would also prophesize on how the driving force of the dynamic conflict of interest between the South Asian and OECD countries is likely to be resolved in future – more through what I would call “equitable adversary analysis” at the policy making level in contrast to the “hide-and-seek” type of game-theoretic moves that countries are used to making (Khadria, 2007b)

The first one, Age deals with the neutralization of the adverse effects of “age-structural change” that can be brought about through remigration because it is the younger cohorts of the returnees that re-migrate a second or third time, the older cohorts tending to staying in the country of origin and adding to
the stocks of older workers. The second determinant, Wage, refers to the comparative advantage lost by the country of origin when younger returnees take away with them more cost-effective production functions due to their lower wages, perks and pensions and older returnees add to cost of production. In addition, there has been a lot of hype about the diaspora resources like remittances breaking all records in India, and being substantial for Bangladesh and Pakistan, but then there have been no queries on these silent reverse flows in terms of lowering of wages and perks that determine the quantum of remittances. The third determinant, Vintage, implies the state of the art knowledge workers and localised service workers' because the indigenous supply of skilled labour or human capital - whether high-skilled “knowledge workers” or low-skilled “service workers” - would not be adequate to meet the requirements in the OECD countries. For low-skilled workers, in fact, this could go beyond the global labour-market divide that distinguished futurologist Peter Drucker had predicted for the beginning of the 21st century: globalised knowledge workers and localised service workers (Drucker, 1993; Alibinia, 2000; GCIM, 2005). Contrary to Peter Drucker’s forecast, the divide between the high-skill and low-skill work may go overboard and create a boom, in the OECD, in attracting immigrants in the so-called “dirty, dangerous and difficult” sectors of the low-skilled “service work”, like agriculture and recycling. These will be the sectors where - in the wake of the ongoing climate change which is leading to the emergence of a global “green economy” - too few green jobs would be created, as the latest ILO report, “Green Jobs: Towards Decent Works in a Sustainable, Low-Carbon World,” has predicted (ILO, 2008). The report says that the global market for environmental products and services is projected to double from the present USD 1,370 billion per year to USD 2,740 billion by 2020, with half the market in the energy efficiency and the balance in sustainable transport, water supply, sanitation and waste management, and by 2030 employment in alternative energy sector may rise - to 2.1 million in wind power and 6.3 million in solar power, as renewable energy generates more jobs than fossil fuels do. Projected investments of USD 630 billion by 2030 will translate into at least 20 million additional jobs in the renewable energy sector, leading to newer dimensions of migration flows in directions so far unanticipated. Since the “stock” of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere by the industrialised OECD countries over the years is higher than the current “flow” of emissions by the countries like China in North Asia and India in South Asia, either low-skilled service workers would move to the OECD countries to fill the 3-D jobs, or the polluting industries would some way to silently shift their location to the developing countries in South Asia, particularly in India and Bangladesh.

Quite a lot of the earlier segmentation in the world labour market was attributed to two supply-side factors, so to say, relentlessly casting the shadow of underdevelopment over the economies of South Asia, viz., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (and Sri Lanka too) – the erstwhile Indian sub-continent - until

6. A New Perspective of Migration in the South Asian Countries

The discourse with respect to migration to the OECD countries, in contrast to that directed towards the Gulf and South-east Asia has of late provided a new connotation for the term “3-D”. In the past, these were jobs not in demand by the native population. From being engaged in “Dirty, Difficult, and Dangerous” jobs, the South Asian migrants in the OECD countries are expected to demand - over the next two and a half decades - jobs which would be more likely to be called “Desirable, Demanded, and Diasporic”. This would happen not because these jobs are not in demand from the native citizens but because the indigenous supply of skilled labour or human capital – whether high-skilled “knowledge workers” or low-skilled “service workers” - would not be adequate to meet the requirements in the OECD countries. For low-skilled workers, in fact, this could go beyond the global labour-market divide that distinguished futurologist Peter Drucker had predicted for the beginning of the 21st century: globalised knowledge workers and localised service workers (Drucker, 1993; Alibinia, 2000; GCIM, 2005). Contrary to Peter Drucker’s forecast, the divide between the high-skill and low-skill work may go overboard and create a boom, in the OECD, in attracting immigrants in the so-called “dirty, dangerous and difficult” sectors of the low-skilled “service work”, like agriculture and recycling. These will be the sectors where - in the wake of the ongoing climate change which is leading to the emergence of a global “green economy” - too few green jobs would be created, as the latest ILO report, “Green Jobs: Towards Decent Works in a Sustainable, Low-Carbon World,” has predicted (ILO, 2008). The report says that the global market for environmental products and services is projected to double from the present USD 1,370 billion per year to USD 2,740 billion by 2020, with half the market in the energy efficiency and the balance in sustainable transport, water supply, sanitation and waste management, and by 2030 employment in alternative energy sector may rise - to 2.1 million in wind power and 6.3 million in solar power, as renewable energy generates more jobs than fossil fuels do. Projected investments of USD 630 billion by 2030 will translate into at least 20 million additional jobs in the renewable energy sector, leading to newer dimensions of migration flows in directions so far unanticipated. Since the “stock” of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere by the industrialised OECD countries over the years is higher than the current “flow” of emissions by the countries like China in North Asia and India in South Asia, either low-skilled service workers would move to the OECD countries to fill the 3-D jobs, or the polluting industries would some way to silently shift their location to the developing countries in South Asia, particularly in India and Bangladesh.

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the end of the 20th century: (a) Quantitative overpopulation, and (b) qualitative brain drain were considered the two major stumbling blocks in South Asia’s quest for development throughout the 20th century. The more “notorious” of these two negative factors has of course been the so-called “curse” of over-population vilified by the last five decennial counts of India’s population till the 1991 census, the year after which India changed its course of journey - by reforms – the so-called “LPG” – liberalization, privatization and globalization - in almost all the sectors of the economy. Until then, and for almost a decade thereafter, India’s all-round poverty; India’s food-shortage; India’s unemployment were all reminders of just one big failure – on the population front: The failed trajectory of India’s family-planning policies that were pursued vigorously to contain the numbers - at times, with unwarranted aggressiveness.

Brain Drain has been the second “villain”, or a lesser evil, in the story of India’s underdevelopment. It was believed to have led to a qualitative depletion of vital human capital embodied in an ungrateful diaspora that left the country in the lurch: a perception of deserting the “motherland”, and settling in the so-called “greener pastures” abroad. Nobel laureates scientists like Har Gobind Khorana, or Subramanyan Chandrasekhar had become icons of such desertion that took place through the brain drain.

In a sharp break from this trend, two publications in the 21st Century have turned the tables for India in times ahead: One was the 2001 Census (GOI, 2001), and the other a Report of a High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora, also published in 2001 (ICWA, 2001). These two “events”, I should say, have brought about a major paradigm shift in the 21st century, leading to a complete turnaround in both these perceptions in South Asia, bringing in a makeover of the villains into heroes overnight. Today, as mentioned earlier, the “demographic dividend” inherent in India’s age-structural-transformation is being projected in the Census for the first quarter of the new century. This, together with the “brain gain” through noticeable return migration of the so-called “Global Indian Diaspora”, as precipitated by follow-up initiatives of the Diaspora Report, is being viewed as a new engine of development, signalling the arrival of India on the global map of the so-called “superpowers of the 21st Century”: “Without recognition of its growing stature, there was no way that the international system would have modified the nuclear regime to admit the country to the high table (by the NSG in Vienna recently).” (‘Touch and not go’, Hindustan Times, Sept.22, 2008).

7. Some Concluding Observations
a. Geo-politics of Changing Clusters

What is applicable to India is not necessarily true for other countries of South Asia. This is because the three countries of South Asia covered by this study too have some heterogeneity amongst themselves, which could be of importance for the future of migration. There are similarities among the countries, arising from the large density of population and extensive poverty, often in contrast to the neighbouring East and South-east Asian region. However, within the region, the differences are important because in considering any typological grouping of countries, it should be kept in mind that geographical proximity would not necessarily imply identical policy measures to be always well-suited. Apart from physical features like the landmass, access to sea, size and density of the population, etc., intangible factors like political milieu, culture, values, and traditions that make the “social capital” may ask for very different policies for specific countries.

In the new paradigm, there are a lot of expectations about India achieving the status of a “Superpower” of the 21st Century, expectations which cannot be applied to Pakistan or Bangladesh. Rather than truly belonging to the South Asian grouping, say of the SAARC, India is considered part of a
different league, an emerging block called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), all four countries belonging to different geo-political regions – Latin America, the Russian Federation, South Asia, and North Asia respectively) – still a new cluster of fast-track economies that the OECD has been considering, since May 2007, for offering membership. It is interesting to note in this context the results of the latest “Executive Quiz” released by The Korn/Ferry Institute (ekornferry.com), which is focused on perceptions about international career options by today’s business leaders: “Executives around the world overwhelmingly favour developing economies over the more established global powers such as the US, Europe and Japan for job opportunities. Sixty-four per cent feel that Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC nations) offer the best career options, compared with 22 per cent who selected the US and just 9 per cent who selected other developed economies such as Western Europe and Japan.25 This may pave the way for South-South cooperation in migration among the BRIC nations; but what about such cooperation among the three countries of South Asia, viz., India, Pakistan and Bangladesh? Given the geo-politics of international relations among any two countries of this troika, this looks like a remote and far-fetched possibility to fructify even in a time-horizon of the next two and a half decades from now, and hence OECD will have to deal with each one of them independently. In fact, the OECD may find an indirect route in ASEAN to deal with India, now that India has entered into a free-trade-agreement (FTA) with ASEAN.26

b. Three Kinds of Future Transfer Issues

There would be three potential future issues of collaboration or conflict of interest between countries facing the push and the pull of migration: Labour transfer issues, financial transfer issues, and Knowledge transfer issues. Migration concerns with the aging population structures in the developed OECD countries are primarily labour market mismatch issues, prompting policies that encourage youth immigration to fill the quantitative physical gaps of numbers. Soaring migration of medicos and nurses and care-workers to look after the ailing and the aged, health tourism, etc., would be part of this group of labour transfer issues. Second, wage concerns would be related to temporary migration replacing permanent migration, the former leading to higher turnover of migrant workers and therefore slower growth of the overall wages bill, perks and pension commitments to foreign workers in countries of destination. Dynamics of remittances and tax liabilities of migrant workers would also form part of this group of financial transfer issues. The third group would comprise the competitive agendas and strategies of nations to accumulate quality human capital for generating latest vintages of knowledge through cost-effective talent flows embodied in the mobility of professionals in cutting-edge areas like information technology, biotechnology and so on, as well as the mobility of tertiary level students in a variety of fields. National security concerns of the post 9/11 immigration regime and issues like dual-citizenship would also belong to this genre of knowledge transfer issues, including globalization or segmentation of the curriculum between citizens and foreigners.

Apart from the above macro-level engagement of the policy makers, migration researchers would endeavour to observe and analyse the day-to-day life of the individual migrants and communities because of the fact that migration would increasingly be recognized as applied human subject. The immediately relevant space for collaboration between researchers and policy makers would be the financial issues where incentives and penalties could divert the “diaspora dividend” like remittances into the right channels – of education and health for the masses. More challenging, however, would be the areas of labour transfer and knowledge transfer issues where the conflict of interest across countries will be not static but dynamic – spread over different time-horizons for receiving and sending countries. Still, these would not be insurmountable. Most problematic would however be the area of policy implementation.
Academics and researchers would make the recommendations, and the policy makers would introduce the necessary amendments in the policy. Beyond these, there is no space for a combined monitoring of how the policies would actually be put into practice. Most of the violations of the international norms begin with the discriminatory treatment that migrants receive at the foreign consulates located in their own countries in South Asia. The vulnerability of migrants and instability of policy-practices are the most hurtful areas that would need bilateral and multilateral intervention. Unfortunately, this has been an area which the countries have considered as “non-negotiable sovereign territory” when it comes to opening it up to multilateral negotiations where both policy makers and academics can influence decisions – whether by lobbying or moral suasion. This, I guess would be questioned, put under test, and possibly be replaced by a system of “equitable adversary analysis” between the OECD and the South Asian countries for creating a situation of triple-win.

c. Redefining the “Push-Pull” Factors in Driving Future Migration

Futuristically speaking, one could also analyse how the “push” factors in the three South Asian countries would determine emigration to the OECD countries, and how the “pull” factors in various clusters of OECD countries would cause immigration from the three South Asian Countries. In fact, the stereotype classification of the causal determinants of migration into “push” factors (in non-OECD countries) and “pull” factors (in OECD countries) has its own limitations because they imply the determinants to be intrinsically negative in the former and positive in the latter, both from micro perspective of the migrant and the macro perspective of the country of origin. One vital policy lesson that ought to be derived, and kept in mind, from this analysis of the push and the pull classification itself is the need for prefixing the adjectives of negative and positive in redefining the push and the pull of migration: To identify those push factors in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, which are and/or can turn positive and overtake the negative-push factors and therefore would be likely to be encouraged. For example, these three countries may consciously revamp their training facilities and introduce certification for the low-skilled (unskilled and semi-skilled) migrants to the OECD standards, and thereby create a comparative advantage for themselves vis-à-vis the labour exporting countries from other regions of the world, or even over each other amongst themselves through ministerial/departmental/institutional reorganisation of the emigration process (or the “emigration cycle”, as the OECD calls it), for labour export to the new EU member countries in the OECD. Similarly, there could be pull factors in the OECD countries which are not necessarily positive any longer but have actually turned negative and, therefore, need to be corrected or minimised by the governments through long-term strategic thinking. Growing need for immigrant health professionals, particularly nurses and care-givers for the aged and the ailing in the OECD could be such a pull factor which is negative in the sense of being caused by age-structural-imbalance in Europe, Japan, and so on. Long-term demographic and education strategies in the OECD countries would be needed to correct such negative pulls.
Appendix: Overview Table

**Expected Relative Importance of Factors in Future Migrations to the OECD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration from:</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demography</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Age-structural-advantage; Demographic Dividend)</td>
<td>(Economically Active Population size would increase)</td>
<td>(Density of population would push people out)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Insulated from external shocks; low dependency on remittances)</td>
<td>(Vulnerable to internal shocks; high level of corruption))</td>
<td>(Exposed to internal and external shocks: high corruption; high dependency on remittances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tertiary Education</strong></td>
<td>High/Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ambitious targets of tertiary enrolment Vs. large number of middle-class students escape from under-supply/low quality education)</td>
<td>(No ‘wild card’ likelihood of massive increase in supply)</td>
<td>(No ‘wild card’ likelihood of massive increase in supply)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Climate Change</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Coastal and inland flooding can displace large masses; Shortage of “green jobs” in OECD)</td>
<td>(Prone to earthquakes-can lead to flight of people; Shortage of “green jobs” in OECD)</td>
<td>(Coastal and inland flooding can displace large masses; Shortage of “green jobs” in OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard of Living</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Avenues for maintaining higher standards are plenty inside the country)</td>
<td>(A mixed picture of high standards and poverty around)</td>
<td>(Escape from poverty around)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dual Citizenship</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Will facilitate greater mobility)</td>
<td>(Limited to few countries in OECD)</td>
<td>(Bureaucracy creates hurdles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity &amp; Governance</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Democracy and civil liberty)</td>
<td>(Political instability and military regime)</td>
<td>(Political instability and military interventions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unstable Immigration Policy Changes in OECD Country</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Can cause graduate unemployment due to sudden restrictive immigration)</td>
<td>(Anyway facing restrictive immigration regimes)</td>
<td>(Cannot absorb graduate unemployment caused by sudden restrictive immigration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Notes:
1 The migration flows within South Asia consist mainly of people recruited to perform unskilled and blue-collar work, often illegally. Technical and skilled workers comprised a tiny proportion of the intra South Asian migrant flows from Bangladesh to India. The United Nations (2001) had projected that during the period 2000-2025 the population of Bangladesh would grow from 137 million to 211 million. It said, “These increases, which in proportional terms are significantly greater than those projected for India, will tend to raise substantially the volumes of future immigration both from Bangladesh … to India.” United Nations (2001), as cited in Dyson, et al. (2004:128). See also United Nations (2003, 2006). However, by and large, the in-migration data in destination countries in Asia are not well-structured. As for emigration data in origin countries, estimates are difficult in India because the law does not require college graduates (and non-graduates who have previously worked abroad) to submit their contracts to the Protector of Emigrants for approval prior to accepting employment abroad.
4 See, Khadria (2004a), also (2004b).
5 The term “semi-finished human capital” was first used in 1994 by Majumdar (1994).
7 See, the latest Report of the High Level Group on Services Sector, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, March (GOI, 2008).
8 See, Jim O'Neill’s Dreaming with BRICs, 2003.
9 Hindustan Times, Jan., 2007.
11 Going a bit further down the years beyond 2030, it would perhaps be interesting to prophesize in this context by making reference to a futuristic science fiction of sorts - set not in 2030, but in the year when India should be celebrating its 100 years of Independence: year 2047.
12 According to River of Gods, first published in 2004, by Ian McDonald, the well-known contemporary British science-fiction writer, a number of changes occur in the country by the year 2047: One and a half billion people; and machines, called AIs (short for “Artificial Intelligence”) rule the roost. Still, most changes are logical extensions of current trends: There are nine million gods; and “Mother India” is all the contradictions and paradoxes she has always been – “beautiful and terrible, staggeringly poor and fantastically rich, unimaginably ancient and a leader of the IT revolution, all at the same time.” Men vastly outnumber women due to selective abortion that had been taking place. Religious fundamentalists are orchestrating street protests. Capital cities still display a vast disparity in wealth between old slums and gleaming new colonies. Western backpackers visit India for the usual reasons, and so forth. Thus, surprisingly little has changed in Ian McDonald’s India of 2047. What has changed significantly though is that India itself has been fragmented into twelve semi-independent nations, smaller countries carved along cultural, geo-political and religious lines: In a way very much reminiscent of a pre-Independent India!
13 The scenario depicted is one where the monsoon has failed for three consecutive years, and the Bengali sub-nationals are trying to change the weather by towing a giant iceberg into the Bay of Bengal! Of the others in 2047 India, Bharat, a poor sub-nation with its capital at Varanasi, is on the verge of war with the Delhi-led Awadh, which is rich, and which is creating a dam to block the holy river Ganga for its drinking water, and deprive others. Incidentally, The Ganges, considered to be the most sacred river in Hinduism, is so polluted now that although 70 million pilgrims took the ritual dip in it at Allahabad in January this year for the Ardh Kumbh Mela (the big religious fair), the Sadhus (India’s holy men) skipped it lest they would be risking jaundice, scabies, typhoid and other water-borne diseases. (ST, March 14, 2007). The River of Gods, however, presents a simulated scenario of feuding India in the year 2047 created by Ian McDonald, by which time the Ganga might have been cleaned of its pollutants, hopefully!
14 Bangladesh has a chronic history of trade deficit and currently workers' remittances meet more than two-thirds of the trade deficit (Afsar).
15 See, BBC (2004), also BBC (2006a, 2006b), and IIE (2005).
16 The rupee fell to Rs. 46.90 a dollar, its lowest level in two years, following worries over capital outflows from share sales by foreign institutional investors. The Reserve Bank of India asked Lehman Brother’s NBFC and primary dealer arms not to remit money in forex without its approval. Dollar borrowing rates in the London Market, or LIBOR, doubled overnight to 6.44 per cent, the highest on record. This happened as banks accumulated cash in anticipation of more failures of financial institutions. The central banks of the UK, Switzerland and Japan, and the European Central Bank (ECB) pumped huge funds into the system in a bid to cool it down. See, Hindustan Times, Sept 17, 2008.
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, are called the four pillars of Wall Street. Lehman currently employs about 2,500 people in India, most of who run the risk of losing their jobs. Merrill has about 600 people here. “We have not been told anything as yet, but everyone thinks it’s a matter of weeks before we are asked to pack up,” said a Mumbai-based Lehman executive, who oversees back-office support for the company’s operations in Sydney and Tokyo. See, Hindustan Times, Sept 16, 2008, New Delhi.

With nearly half of their revenues coming from banking and financial services segments, India’s top software exporters said ... they were closely monitoring the crisis spreading across financial markets all over the world. While Infosys and TCS, the country’s two largest IT firms, said they did not comment on individual clients, the third largest IT firm, Wipro, said it was in dialogue with failed LB, although revenues from it were modest. The fourth largest software exporter from the country, Satyam, also said it was “concerned” at the developments in the U.S.” See, Hindustan Times, Sept 17, 2008.

According to “World Investment Report 2008” released by UNCTAD (2008) on 24 Sept, 2008 (See, The Hindu, 25 Sept., 2008), India has emerged as the top FDI destination after China, but ahead of the US, UK, and Germany. In 2007, India recorded a 17 per cent increase in FDI inflows in the wake of robust economic growth and improved investment environment owing to further opening up of sectors such as telecommunications and retail trade. During the year, FDI inflows soared to USD 23 billion (comparable to remittances of USD 27 billion) and the main reason for the surge were strong cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The Report, however, notes that India would find it difficult to fund USD 495 billion infrastructure development programme spread over till 2012, one reason being lower FDI inflows to India, despite the fact that these “flows to developing countries are likely to remain stable” and not much affected by the current global financial crisis. It is quite likely that India would no longer belong to the club of typical developing countries and therefore be more exposed to global volatilities that would affect the developed countries, leading to a dip of 10 per cent to USD 1,600 billion in global FDI in 2008 over 2007.


See, also Government of Bangladesh and IOM (2004).

See, also Gazdar (2003), and Siddiqui and Mahmood (2005).

See, GOI, MOIA (2008).

See, Khadria (2008b). For an evolution of these ideas, also see my earlier writings (Khadria 1999, 2001, 2002, 2006e, 2007a)


Overwhelmingly, the largest barrier to accepting an international post is family consideration (62%), followed by language (13%), difficulties returning to country of origin (8%), security (5%), cost (5%) and living standards (4%). See, Hindustan Times, Shine supplement, page 3, September 23, 2008.