Foreword

In the course of the project ‘The Future of International Migration’ carried out by the OECD/IFP Secretariat in 2008/2009 a number of regional notes were commissioned from leading experts to help shed light on the diversity of situations and future migration trends in different parts of the non-OECD world. The aim of the regional notes was to provide a largely qualitative, personal assessment of the likely evolution in factors in the principal non-OECD regions which could influence outflows of people either in the form of intra-regional migration or, of particular significance to this exercise, to OECD countries, through to 2025/2030. More specifically, the experts were asked to give some consideration to the most likely trajectory that outward migration might take in the years ahead, together with some speculation about possible “wildcards” (unexpected events or developments which could impact significantly on pressures to migrate to OECD countries).

A regional note on India/Pakistan/Bangladesh was written by Prof. Binod Khadria, (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi). Sub-Saharan Africa was covered by Laurent Bossard (OECD Club de Sahel). Jeff Ducanes and Manolo Abella (ILO Regional Bureau, Bangkok) submitted a note on China and South East Asia/Asia Pacific. A note on North and East Africa was prepared by Flore Gubert and Christophe Jalil Nordman (DIAL, IRD, France). Jorge Martinez Pizzaro (CEPAL, Chile) drafted a note on Latin America. The Russian Federation and Eastern and South East Europe were covered by Prof. Dietrich Thränhardt (University of Münster, Germany). Prof. Philippe Fargues (European University Institute, Italy) provided information on the Middle East and North Africa. These papers can be found on the OECD/IFP webpage (www.oecd.org/futures).
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Data and analysis of global, African and West African migration are compiled from rough estimates. Official statistics are unreliable or inaccurate, including those from some OECD countries. Population surveys do not use the same criteria to differentiate nationals, migrants and foreigners: nationality, place of residence, and length of stay outside country of birth. There is consensus on the definition of a migrant as a person over 15 years old living for more than one year in a country of which he is not a national. This definition applies notably to those migratory flows towards Europe. Studies also cite available information on shorter intervals of population movement in West Africa (related to cross borders flows or trade transactions). There is no veritable quantitative evaluation of clandestine migration hence it is difficult to establish any quantitative forecasts. Global trends can thus be tracked using demographic data or the more numerous prospective studies, as demography is one of the measurable factors of migration.

I. International Migration Overview: From a Global View to the African Level: statistics

In 2005, there were 200 million migrants in the world, representing 3% of the global population. This figure is more than double that of 1970. There was a sharp increase in migration during the 1980s (100 million migrants in 1980, 150 million in 1990). Since then, the growth rate has returned to the levels comparable to those of the 1960s and 1970s.

More than half of the migrants are concentrated in 15 host countries. The United States tops the list as this country was built on immigration, sometimes receiving several millions of people each year between the mid-19th century and the early 1920s. Despite the downward trend of movements, the USA remains and shall remain an important host country, with about 35 million migrants currently living there. Only three other members of the G7 are main immigrant recipient countries alongside developing countries which are nevertheless regional economic hubs. OECD countries, with wealthier economies and more affluent lifestyles, receive a little less than half of the migrants identified in the world (97 million in 2000). 40% of these migrants come from other OECD countries. Migration not only flows from South to North.

African migration to developed countries is marginal. In 2004, there were 7.2 million officially identified African migrants in OECD Member countries, representing 13% of immigrants from non-member countries. They include 3.8 million North Africans and 3.4 million sub-Saharan Africans.

In North America, African immigration is quantitatively high (1.2 million people), but low in comparison to other communities. For example, in 2000, there were 8 million Mexicans and 900,000 Africans in the United States; in Canada there were 300,000 Africans, 750,000 Chinese, and 150,000 Vietnamese.

In four European countries, African migration is sizeable without being the majority:

- While in the Netherlands, the three largest foreign communities (excluding developed countries) are from Surinam, Indonesia and Turkey (approximately 200,000 people from each country), the Moroccan community is considerable (150,000 people).
- In Spain there are twice as many South American communities as African communities, among whom Moroccans are the majority (310,000 people).
• In the United Kingdom, nationals from the Indian sub-continent (1 million) exceed those from the African continent (830,000). Three African communities: South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria, each comprise about 100,000 people.
• Italy receives 1.3 million immigrants from developing countries. The largest immigrant community comes from the former Yugoslavia (200,000) followed by Morocco (155,000). Africans represent one-third of the immigrant community.

In three other European countries, more than 50% of immigrants from developing countries are Africans:

• In Belgium, the main immigrant community is from Morocco (100,000 people), followed by Turkey (70,000), and the Congo (DRC 40,000).
• In Portugal, immigrants originate mainly from former colonies: Angola is greatest (175,000), followed by Mozambique (75,000), Cape Verde (45,000), and Guinea Bissau (20,000). Apart from Africa, Brazil has the largest immigrant community, with 50,000 people.
• In France, Africans represent more than 75% of immigrants from developing countries. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia represent a total of 2.3 million people. Sub-Saharan African communities are much less represented: Senegal (80,000), Madagascar (70,000), Côte d'Ivoire (45,000), and Mali (40,000). Turkey (180,000) and Vietnam (115,000) are the largest non-African communities.

In 2000, Germany, an important country of immigration, was officially hosting a few more than 100,000 Africans and more than one million Turks on its territory.

II. West African Migration Dynamics: trends

2.1 To OECD Countries

In the early 2000s, OECD countries officially received 1.2 million West Africans. Despite the geographic proximity of Africa to Europe, North America is the main destination for West African nationals. This is mainly due to the immigration of Nigerians and nationals of other former English colonies. There is still a link between the former French colonies and their former colonizers; this also applies to Portugal and its former West African territories.

An analysis of the host countries of the 65,000 West African students in the university education system in OECD Member countries supports this observation. While the majority of francophones study in France (84% Senegalese, 52% Guineans), anglophones prefer the United States (60% of Gambian students, 50% of other nationals of Anglophone countries).

Though initially temporary and essentially unskilled and male, West African emigration became more sustainable as a result of family reunification policies implemented by some European countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Then there were new types of migrants: more women, students and skilled people. With migration policies in traditional host countries becoming more stringent, destinations began to be more
diversified in the early 1990s to Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain) and North America (United States, Canada).

With its quota system, green card and competitive policy attracting qualified migrants, the United States has more migrants with higher education degrees than those in European countries. This situation coupled with the tightening of European migration policies has led to a diversification in the destinations of West Africans who are increasingly attracted by the receiving policies in North American countries. On 25 September 2008, the European Council of Justice and Home Affairs, chaired by Brice Hortefeux, French Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Cooperative Development, presented a proposed directive concerning entry and stay conditions for third country nationals seeking highly qualified employment (Blue Card). The objective was to make Europe attractive and respond to the needs for qualified labour by establishing a shared and flexible precipitated procedure to admit highly qualified immigrants as well as attractive mobility and stay periods for them and their families. This proposal raises however questions in some European countries in which the need for qualified labour is not the same.

2.2 West African flows to North Africa

The links between West Africa and North Africa have long been based on the trans-Saharan caravan trade. During the last quarter of the 20th century, new circumstances emerged that revived trade and labour flow to North Africa. The development of the petroleum sector in Libya and Algeria led to pendular migration of workers, mainly West Africans and Sudanese. The establishment of the Community of Saharan-Sahelian States in 1998 helped improve relations with sub-Saharan Africa.

However, today Libya probably remains the North African country that receives most Sub-Saharan (nearly 300,000 according to the 1995 census; certainly more today). The census data obtained in the 2000s in other countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt) show a total of 20,000 West African migrants. It is very difficult to have a precise idea of the actual situation in view of the pendular, and often illegal, movements of the population. In recent years, it seems that sub-Saharan migration to North Africa has increased. These trends do not concern only “transit migration”. Some sub-Saharan migrants become established for long periods, while a minority of them goes on to Europe.

An attempt to profile clandestine migrants and to quantify flows to North Africa: These migrants are mainly men, relatively young and capable of financing a long, costly and physically painful journey. They are also relatively well-educated; many of them hold the equivalent of a GCE A level and above; only a minority is illiterate. It is very difficult to quantify these flows. An annual figure of about 100,000 sub-Saharan is most often given for the 2000s. The routes through Libya, then Italy through Algeria and Morocco then Spain, seem to represent the bulk of flows to date. The number of those arrested in North Africa and on the European coasts is better known. In 2000, Spain arrested 3,500 West African migrants (7,000 this year). The same year, Morocco announced the arrests of 3,000 West Africans and in Algeria 4,000 sub-Saharan were arrested. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that just over 4,000 Malians, Nigerians and Sudanese were arrested for illegal immigration in Libya in 2004. However, it seems that in 2000 arrests of sub-Saharan remained below those of emigrants from North Africa.
The transit period is getting longer. More stringent control of European borders makes clandestine migration land routes time-consuming and more difficult. This leads to more or less temporary settlement of migrants for several years. This trend is confirmed by specific observations. Accordingly, the link town of Tamanrasset in South Algeria increased from 3,000 inhabitants in 1966, including 10% sub-Saharan, to 65,000, including 50% sub-Saharan, at end of 1990. Similarly, in 2005 the port town of Nouadhibou in North Mauritania had 10,000 West Africans who were planning to emigrate to Europe, representing 10% of its population. For the same year, Morocco estimates that there were 20,000 sub-Saharan around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as well as the border town of Oujda at the Algerian border. Although access conditions are becoming ever-more difficult, the arrival of migrants has not decreased. Conditions make the journey increasingly dangerous and the migrants more vulnerable. For many years researchers and observers have shown that more stringent policies lead to the opposite effect of expectations. It is difficult to forecast statistics over several years in which the flows are evolving. The factors on which they rely are difficult to discern and their impact on migration hard to predict (quality of dialogue between West African and North African countries, evolution of the negotiations between Europe and North Africa, bilateral agreements encouraging greater migration control between North and West Africa, labour needs and development of potential growth zones, declining European and increasing African demography, etc.).

2.3 Intra-Regional Migration

World history demonstrates that demographic transition corresponds to a period of great population mobility. Indeed, it is when the population increases rapidly that the need to change from one environment to another (from urban to rural areas, from poor to rich areas) is greatest. West Africa, like the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, is at the core of this transition and mobility phase, which other developing regions have already experienced.

Over the past 45 years, the number of inhabitants in West Africa increased from 88 million to 290 million (that is, multiplied by 3.3) while the urban population increased from 13 million to 128 million (that is, a 10-fold increase). Over the same period, it is estimated that more than 80 million West Africans migrated from rural to urban areas. Urbanisation was the first result of mobility of the West African population, even though urbanisation is no longer one of the major reasons for mobility.

Quantitative estimates of intra-regional migration are more random. Calculations based on population surveys indicate that countries of the region currently host about 7.5 million migrants from another West African country, representing 3% of the regional population. This rate, which has been increasing since 1990, is above the African average (2%) and largely exceeds that of the European Union (0.5%). Furthermore, these evaluations of migrant populations do not adequately portray the reality of the flows. The movements were closely examined only for the 1976–1980 and 1988–1992 periods during which between 500,000 and 1 million people, respectively, moved from one country to another each year. The West African Long-term Perspective Study (WALTPS) estimates that nearly 30 million West Africans
changed country of residence between 1960 and 1990, representing an average of one million people per year. Despite statistical uncertainties, West Africa therefore appears as an area of intense intermixing of populations. This trend should continue.

A spatial analysis over an extended period shows that, to date, most migration is to coastal areas, as a result of the development of cash crops, port urbanisation and degradation of the natural environment in the region’s Sahelian areas. This migration responds to the need to seek economic opportunities, to diversify risk and reduce poverty.

Nowadays, three sub-systems (the Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire axis mainly because of the cocoa and coffee economy, Nigeria and its petroleum godsend, as well as Senegal because of trade and groundnuts) continue to attract West African migrations. However, their role has changed: Côte d’Ivoire has become a transit country, a stepping stone for wealth accumulation before proceeding to other regional or international destinations. Economic or labour reasons guide migrations to or out of Senegal, playing a double role of an immigration or emigration country. Senegalese emigrants are turning increasingly to new African destinations (Cameroon, Angola, Congo, and South Africa) or international destinations. Nigeria is a transit zone, where human trafficking networks are organised, in particular. After polarising West African migration for more than one decade, Nigeria itself became a country of emigration to the outside world.

The existence of employment and production areas was at first enough to satisfy this intra-African circular mobility. This mobility henceforth opens up to other areas in search for new opportunities in case the development of growth potential zones is inadequate.

2.3.4 Refugees Remain Primarily in the Region

Since independence, there have been successive tensions in West Africa, in particular: the Biafra war in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970, the elimination of the political opposition leaders of the Sékou Touré regime in Guinea, the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau from 1963 to 1973, border tensions between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, the Chadian crisis from 1982 to 1990, the Tuareg conflict in Mali and Niger from 1990 to 1997, conflicts in the Mano River countries from 1989 to 2000 and, more recently, the crises in Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. These episodes generate more or less a massive exodus within the countries concerned (internally displaced) and abroad (refugees). xvii

Africa is the continent which receives the greatest number of refugees in the world: 2.7 million. xviii After Central Africa, in 2004 West Africa was the second region of asylum on the continent with 725,000 refugees. This figure does not take into account the numerous daily cross-border movements of people going back and forth between their work place and refugee camps along the borders, rest areas for the night. From one year to another, statistics vary significantly. In the 1990s, Guinea received refugees fleeing from neighbouring Liberia, and then from Sierra Leone. Over the same period, Côte d’Ivoire received a large number of Liberian nationals who were then forced to go to Ghana in 2002. In 2005, Chad received 225,000 Sudanese.

Since the movements of West African refugees came as a result of poor people fleeing in emergency situations, they mainly fled to neighbouring countries, in particular the nearest border countries. The
number of people who had the means to seek asylum in developed countries was and will stay marginal. Experience shows that the desire to return is very strong (nearly 600,000 Liberians returned to their country in 2004). The longer the exile, the more refugees engage in local economic activities, establish social relations and settle in the host area or country. These populations, some of whom lose their refugee status over time, then become migrants.

III. Some Issues for the Future focusing on some factors of migration

3.1 New opportunities for the continent in regard to climate change

Climate variability is deeply rooted within West African society. The 1930-1960 wet periods, the 1970-1980 droughts and the return of rainfall in the 1990s and 2000s illustrate this clearly and have demonstrated the population’s vulnerability, in particular in the Sahel zone. The climate changes analysed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate the future trends likely to develop at the global and African levels: rising temperatures, rising sea levels, changes in the level and variability of rainfall, etc. They create new challenges and risks, but also provide new opportunities for the African continent.

However, climate projections for West Africa are not sufficiently reliable. The complicated and uncertain measurement of the climate’s future impacts on the region calls for a measure of prudence in their analysis. However, this does not prevent examining the past and developing certain world-wide and regional projections, while bearing their intrinsic limitations in mind, or from raising certain questions about West Africa’s future.

Climate variability and characteristics

Africa has gone through different climate periods in the past. Before the end of the ice age (-18,000) the continent was almost a desert. Then a rainy period began between -12,000 and -5,000. It led to the eradication of most arid areas and enabled the development of agriculture and cattle breeding in what is known today as Western Sahara. The existence of a gigantic Lake Chad during the Middle Holocene period (over 6,000 years ago) attests to these historical fluctuations.

The climate in Africa today is almost the same as 2,000 years ago, with more arid or more humid phases. The era of the first great Sahelian empires (10th to 15th centuries) was a rainy period during which living conditions were far more favourable than they are today. However, in the early 19th century, the continent was struck by an arid period that lasted a few decades. The stream flow of the Nile fell considerably and Lake Chad dried up. These fluctuations continued during the next century. After a short dry period, a humid phase began, lasting until the 1960s. The 1970-1980 decade was once again marked by an aridification of the climate, which was a heavy burden on the population.

Today, most of the African continent is tropical, except for the Mediterranean region and South Africa. Rainfall varies according to an enormous gradient of +1 mm/year in some Saharan regions to +5,000 mm/year at the equator. There is very little variation in temperatures, generally high, throughout the year.
However, day-night temperature variations are greater – as much as 10-15°C (even more in the deserts), whereas inter-annual variations South of the Sahara remain between 6 and 10°C.

**Contrasting picture of climate change**

Climate models are relatively useful when it comes to forecasting temperature changes in Africa. In its latest report, the IPCC confirmed that in the 21st century, global warming would be more intense in Africa than in the rest of the world. The average rise in temperature between 1980/99 and 2080/99 would be between 3 and 4°C for the continent as a whole, 1.5 times greater than at the global level. The increase would be less marked in coastal and equatorial areas (+3°C) and the highest increase would take place in the Western Sahara region (+4°C).

However, the results of rainfall projections remain uncertain. North Africa, Southern Africa and East Africa are some of the regions where there is less uncertainty. Africa’s Mediterranean coast, like the Mediterranean coastline in general, is likely to experience a decrease in precipitation (-15 to -20%) over this century. The drying-out process will affect the Northern bank of the Sahara and the West African coast up to its 15° latitude North (Dakar’s latitude). At the other end of the continent, less rainfall is expected during the winter and especially in spring in Southern Africa. Along the tropical belt, the results achieved by the models show an increase in rainfall in the Horn of Africa. However, no conclusions can be drawn regarding rainfall in West Africa (see Map 3).

Apart from climatic uncertainties and its vulnerability, Sub-Saharan Africa could benefit from this situation in terms of energy diversification/transition and agricultural trade. Due to its low energy consumption, it is the lowest greenhouse gas producing region today. But biomass use (80% of energy demand) is the primary cause of deforestation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Electricity production consumes an increasing amount of thermal energy (oil and gas): 80% today, as compared to 2/3 some 25 years ago. In the future, its energy supply choices will be increasingly dictated by environmental issues and the climate challenge in particular.

Africa has considerable hydroelectric, solar and wind energy potential that could be developed within the framework of the CDM or with investment in clean energy and development. A regional approach may be better suited for attracting this kind of investment, all the more so since several countries share these resources (e.g. cross-border river basins). Vegetation, in particular Central Africa’s forest resources, makes this region an important “climate protector” for the world due to the role of carbon sinks. If the forest were recognised as a world public good, an energy transition mechanism could be envisaged in order to limit the consumption of this environmental resource.

Climate change will certainly have an impact on agricultural surface areas at world level and on the food security of its population. It seems that along with Latin America, the African continent will suffer the largest agricultural land losses. But these losses would be marginal as compared to potentially cultivable land. In 2080, the African continent will still have the largest potential agricultural land area (see Figure 3).

North America, Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia will see a rise in their agricultural potential. New land will be cultivated and crop intensity will increase. However, the realisation of a greater part of Africa’s
agricultural potential can also be envisaged, in order to meet the rising need for food products in Asian countries and the development of bio-fuels (bio-diesel from palm oil) in Europe and America (ethanol from cereals), although greater caution is called for in the case of this hypothesis. Africa will have to find the right balance between land resources, food security and the development of new partnerships and external markets.

Migratory flows will depend on the reaction of West African markets to these new opportunities. As has been the case for generations, these opportunities are guided by the opening of new growth or production basins. Thus this rhythm of intra-regional migration could continue along with the redeployment towards new agricultural zones if they become further developed through investment. However it is difficult to quantify the impact that this could have on migration towards OECD countries.

Perhaps more than elsewhere, analyses of this region have remained inadequate and the conclusions arrived at by climate projections and their consequences are too uncertain for an effective anticipation of the risks and opportunities linked to climate change. At a time when the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) and the “regional plan of action for reducing vulnerability in the face of climate change in West Africa” are being formulated, the development of more reliable information systems adapted to local and regional contexts should be at the heart of the strategies adopted.

### 3.2 Emigration to Counterbalance Population Decline in Europe?

Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is a continent in the process of populating. Though half as populated as Europe in 1960, it now has 1.2 times the number of inhabitants. In 25 years, it will be twice as populated as the European continent. Africa’s youth population is also significant. In 2005, 60% of the sub-Saharan population was below 25 years of age as compared to 30% in Europe.

In 2007, there were 807 million inhabitants in sub-Saharan Africa which represented 84% of the African continent’s population; the population increase in Africa is thus essentially linked to that of sub-Saharan Africa. The yearly population growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa reached its peak of 2.9% in 1980-1985. It has since been falling (2.5% in 2000-2005) and should reach 1.3% in 2045-2050.

Sub-Saharan Africa is nevertheless progressing: the fertility rate is on the decline after a long period of being high. In 40 years, the fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 1.3 children. More pronounced in Southern Africa (-3.4 children) than in East Africa (-1.4), this decrease was only -1.2 children in West Africa.

It has been clearly established that all the countries of the world, even the poorest, have left the first phase, although the HIV/AIDS epidemic has reversed the trend for several African countries that have been hard hit by the pandemic: Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa.

United Nations projections foresee the (global) end of the transition towards 2035-2040, with a fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman, as a result of the same factors everywhere in the world: the health revolution and its corollary, the contraceptive revolution, the meeting of basic needs, as well as the elimination of illiteracy, especially for women.

West Africa is home to 39% of the sub-Saharan African population (with East Africa just behind, at 38%), or 316 million people in 2007 including Chad and Cameroon. The regional population should be more
than 400 million by around 2020 and exceed 500 million between 2030 and 2035. Forecasts for the future should be considered cautiously. While they illustrate a regional trend, they should be regarded with greater circumspection at the national level. It is indeed impossible to predict the region’s future population and settlement restructuring/composition, in particular intra-regional migration dynamics.

We will be 7 billion human beings by mid-2012 and over 9 billion by 2045. That same year:

Africa will have 1.9 billion inhabitants,
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 billion, and
West Africa 0.6 billion.

The concept of demographic transition is somewhat controversial:

1. It masks the diversity of peoples and cultures by analysing one of their deepest and most complex dimensions – reproduction – using a single pattern.

2. It assumes a closed system of “natural” entries and exits linked to births and deaths, and therefore neglects international migration, which is growing globally.

3. Finally, the balance expected at the end of the transition may prove to be an imbalance, or a demographic deficit, in other words a higher level of deaths than births. This pattern is currently experienced by a growing number of European countries or countries such as Iran and Brazil, thus causing population decline preceded and accompanied by population ageing. We now speak of a population crash or demographic winter for these countries.

Many developed countries are thus in the process of depopulating. According to Eurostat, no EU member country (apart from Ireland) attained the fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman required for rejuvenating the population. With zero immigration, the EU would lose 3% of its population, or 15 million inhabitants, by the year 2030. xxvi

Globally, the proportion of young people (the under-15s) is expected to fall from 28 to 20% between 2005 and 2050 and that of the over-60s to increase from 10 to 22%. In 2050, the proportion of young people could still be 29% in sub-Saharan Africa, 28% in West Africa and only 15% in Europe. In sub-Saharan Africa, West, Central and East Africa are experiencing a fall in the median age, which is considerably increasing the dependency ratio, unlike Southern and North Africa, where the median age is increasing.

Definition:
The median age is the value dividing the surveyed population into two equal parts.
The United Nations has proposed projections taking into account immigration rates comparable to those of today. These calculations show that while the EU population will increase by 1.5% in 2030 (an increase of 8 million inhabitants), this would not prevent Italy from losing 2.6 million inhabitants; Poland would lose 2.3 million, and Germany 1.2 million, etc. Some countries, such as Ireland, Great Britain and France, are the exceptions. However, for all the countries, the ageing population poses the problem of maintaining the working population at an acceptable level. Some scenarios are alarming. Accordingly, the EU with 25 countries could lose 48 million of its working population between 2020 and 2050. This median scenario indicates that the potential working population of the EU would fall after 2015. The replacement index for the working population would fall from the current 1.1 to 0.76 in 2020.

In view of these prospects, the European Union met in Lisbon in 2000 and began a process of capitalizing as much as possible on the potential active population of member countries. The countries set the target employment rate at 70% of the working age population in 2010. The mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy shows that these targets would not be attained in many member countries. In order to offset the shortage of labour estimated at 13 million and attain the targets of 2010, the entry of 43 million migrants would be necessary.

While debate by experts is not closed on the exact level of European labour requirements, the idea that Europe will have to meet the challenge of a declining population and the need for a working population from outside is now generally accepted.

3.3 A New Geography of Migration

In light of demographic challenges, many factors will determine the geography of world and African migration in coming decades: economic growth in developed countries, emerging countries, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, increased exploitation of West African oil resources (Nigeria, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, etc.) and its economic and financial impacts, the trend of commodity prices, world geo-strategic relations and risks of instability.

Within this context of major uncertainties, it seems that some trends will continue. The first trend concerns the increase in international labour migration, the consequence of economic globalisation and trade development. Unless exceptional circumstances arise, the growth recorded over the past five decades should continue. The United Nations suggests that the number of international migrants to developed countries should reach 2.2 million per year over the 2005–2050 period. This figure represents only 4% increase in the population of developing countries over the same period.

The second trend reinforces the first. It indicates that migration policies of developed countries are geared towards selective migration which will nevertheless increase because of problems of demographic recession.

The third trend is that of high mobility in Africa, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, due to very high demographic growth. This mobility will, as in the past, lead to internal, regional and international movements.
Despite these trends, the changing nature of migration throughout history makes it very difficult to propose any forecasts, and also raises a few questions. What will be the position of West Africa in migration to developed countries? Will West Africans find new host countries in Europe, America, and even Asia? What will be the relationship between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa? What is the future of mobility within the West African region?

**The need for a dialogue between West Africa, North Africa and Europe**

A number of factors link North Africa to Europe: in the seven European countries where there is high African immigration (Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and United Kingdom), North African nationals are by far the highest in population, except in the United Kingdom. The Moroccan migrant communities are dominant in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, in France and the Netherlands. Today, 5% of the population of Morocco lives in Europe. Algeria and Tunisia have historic migratory links with France. The geographic proximity of Europe to North Africa is strengthened even confirmed by “migratory proximity”: the three large European countries bordering the Mediterranean (Spain, France and Italy) are the major host countries.

This double proximity calls for dialogue. Four considerations should be taken into account:

- North Africa has a reservoir of highly skilled labour. In Morocco, 75% of unemployed women have university degrees, and students with higher education wait for between one and three years to obtain their first job.
- North Africa is an important economic area for Europe (particularly for its energy supply, as well as for the solvent market it represents).
- The demographic pressure in North Africa is less than that of sub-Saharan Africa.
- A recent phenomenon, which could become significant, is developing: expatriation of retired Europeans to the southern Mediterranean coasts in search of more pleasant and less expensive living conditions. Several tens of thousands of French nationals have already settled in Tunisia and Morocco.

Europe considers North Africa a close neighbour and partner. Indeed, Europe could encourage North Africa to provide help in exchange for compensation and protection from clandestine sub-Saharan immigration. This is in line with the Community initiatives (Barcelona Declaration to establish a global European–Mediterranean partnership), bilateral initiatives (Spanish aid to Morocco and Italian aid to Libya for border surveillance) or multilateral initiatives (5+5 Forum associating North African countries and the five Mediterranean European countries). European–Mediterranean dialogue therefore seems to be well on track.

On the other hand, co-operation in migration and development between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa is still far from being structured. For the moment, it is limited to bilateral discussions between a European country and an African country (Spain – Senegal, Spain – Mauritania, France – Mali, France – Senegal, etc.) for the implementation of more effective methods of limiting departures or incentives for the return of migrants in exchange for compensation. These bilateral approaches certainly have their limits. Clandestine emigration has become difficult through one country to another: from North Africa to
Mauritania, then to Senegal and Guinea. New routes could develop through Egypt and the Red Sea. Furthermore, implemented bilateral measures are not coordinated and could lead to misunderstandings between West African countries. A bloc-to-bloc dialogue between the European Union and West Africa is probably a logical option, knowing that the EU and ECOWAS, joined by Mauritania, have embarked on the implementation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which envisages in the short-term the creation of a free trade area between the two entities.

Lastly, a tripartite European–Mediterranean–West African dialogue is also needed as a logical and necessary prospect, since it would help bring together, around the same table, the emigration countries of West Africa, emigration and transit countries of the same region (Senegal, Mauritania, in particular) as well as emigration and transit countries of North Africa.

**What does the future hold for regional mobility?**

West African human geography has evolved significantly over the past few decades. Mobility has led to a network of towns that did not exist in 1960, populated empty regions, and drawn the Sahelian fringes closest to the desert to the South. Intra-regional migration and urbanisation, in particular, have played a key role in the reconstruction of settlements.

Despite tensions and period of expulsion, intra-regional migration has played a beneficial regulating role for the areas of departure as well as for the host areas. There is consensus that the “Ivorian miracle” of the 1980s owes much to the inflow of Sahelian labour to the cocoa and coffee plantations of the south of the country. Similarly, it is very likely that the central plateau of Burkina Faso would have found it difficult to sustain a fast growing population on steadily deteriorating lands. If there had not been any urbanisation or migration since 1960, Burkina Faso would have had a rural population of 15 million inhabitants instead of the current 6 million. Migratory strategies are in response to the search for economic opportunities, and can adapt to markets by diversifying destinations or activities. While the freedom of movement reduces social and demographic pressure in the areas of departure, it “limits the propensity of migrants to settle permanently in host areas” of the region or abroad.
Bibliography


Fall A.S., 2002, Enjeux et défis de la migration internationale de travail ouest-africaine, Université du Québec en Outaouais, Gatineau.


Databases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Database Description</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Migration Policy Institute</td>
<td>Data on world migrations</td>
<td><a href="http://www.migrationinformation.org/index.cfm">http://www.migrationinformation.org/index.cfm</a></td>
</tr>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Database on immigrants and expatriates in OECD countries</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,2340,en_26493931_34841519_1_1_1_1,00.html">http://www.oecd.org/document/47/0,2340,en_26493931_34841519_1_1_1_1,00.html</a></td>
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</table>
1.5 million Irish immigrants entered the United States in 1848; 1.3 million Italians in 1913.

In 2002, there were 1.06 million foreigners who entered the country (OECD, 2004).

Statistics obtained after processing DELSA-OECD data for the 2000s, excluding Germany.

Newspaper articles show the figure of one million or more in 2000/2001, including 500,000 Chadians.


Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005.

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