Regulation is one of the key levers of government intervention. When properly designed, it can help achieve environmental and social objectives, and contribute to economic growth. The OECD Review of Regulatory Policy of Peru assesses the policies, institutions, and tools employed by the Peruvian government to design, implement and enforce high-quality regulations. These include administrative simplification, evaluation of regulations, public consultation, and the governance of independent regulators, amongst others. The review provides policy recommendations based on best international practices and peer assessment to strengthen the government’s capacity to manage regulatory policy.
Regulators operate in a complex environment at the interface among public authorities, the private sector and end-users. As “referees” of the markets that provide water, energy, transport, communications, and financial services to citizens, they must balance competing wants and needs from different actors. This means that they must behave and act objectively, impartially, and consistently, without conflict of interest, bias or undue influence - in other words, independently. What distinguishes an independent regulator is not simply institutional design. Independence is also about finding the right balance between the appropriate and undue influence that can be exercised through the regulators’ daily interactions with ministries, regulated industries and end-users. This report identifies the critical points where undue influence can be exercised at different moments in the life of a regulator and discusses some of the avenues for developing a culture of independence, including through interactions with stakeholders, staffing and financing.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the 2008 financial meltdown—whose aftershocks are still reverberating globally—have at least one trait in common: they reflected breakdowns in the regulatory process. This is not to say that the principal industry actors in both catastrophes were mere bystanders, but with better regulatory oversight, the disasters could have been prevented.
This report measures the administrative costs generated by formalities in the municipalities of Colima and Jalisco.
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This guide provides recommendations that can be implemented in the short term and focuses, amongst others, on formalities dealing with business start-ups, obtaining construction permits, registering property in Mexico
The APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform is a voluntary tool that APEC member economies may use to evaluate their respective regulatory reform efforts.
The OECD has a long standing engagement with Southeast Asia on regulatory reform, both regionally through APEC and ASEAN and bilaterally with individual ASEAN member states.
One of Chile’s biggest strengths is its very sound macroeconomic framework that reinforces its economic resilience. This is partly based on a prudent regulatory and supervisory framework governing the financial system. Furthermore, the government’s Agenda for Productivity, Innovation and Growth, co-ordinated by the Ministry of Economy with the participation of other ministries and state services, constitutes a good opportunity to use regulatory policy as a driver to reform the policymaking framework of Chile. For example, Chile has already made substantive progress in making regulations more accessible and communicating administrative requirements. However, while in Chile national regulations provide the general framework for administrative procedures and an efficient state administration, the lack of a comprehensive regulatory reform programme has reduced the possibility of achieving even better economic outcomes and unleashing resources to boost productivity. The regulatory policymaking framework lacks some key features seen in other OECD countries (e.g. stakeholder engagement, regulatory impact assessment, oversight body) that would make sure that regulations are designed in the best way. Good practices in rule-making procedures are also rather limited. This review presents the way forward for improving the government’s capacity to ensure high-quality regulation in Chile.
Regulators operate in a complex, high-risk environment at the interface between the public and the private sectors. They often share some responsibilities for the sectors and industries they regulate with other public institutions. And yet, if the lights go out, tap water stop running, trains break down or phones stop working, they are often held to account. In this challenging environment, the governance of regulators is critical. The role of the regulator and how it co-ordinates with other public institutions, the powers it is given and how it is held accountable for exercising these powers are key elements of a governance architecture that needs to be carefully crafted and appropriately implemented if the regulator is to succeed in combining effective regulation with a high level of trust. This report looks at the way in which four regulators – the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), Portugal’s Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR) and the UK Office of Rail and Road (ORR) – have addressed these governance challenges. The report identifies approaches to implement accountability, transparency and co-ordination and helps identify some lessons that can help guide how these principles can be translated into practice.
This innovative book combines results from research conducted in Colombia about how communications services consumers make consumption choices with OECD expertise in regulatory policy, behavioural economics, and data analytics, in order to help improve the consumer protection regime in Colombia. It focuses on the types of incentives that should be provided to change both provider and user behaviour, and considers where appropriate regulatory interventions may be needed to ensure that these incentives are realised. This work supports the Communications Regulator of Colombia in redesigning its consumer protection regime. This effort has refocused the regulatory framework from “protecting rights” towards making the market function best; this involves encouraging the providers to improve the quality of their services and rates offered in the market and to foster a better understanding of what is being offered and how. The book also makes specific recommendations on possible follow-up experiments to test some of the possible solutions to help communications services consumers better understand the information provided by service operators.