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Tax sharing and intergovernmental grants are two sub-central funding arrangements that are often difficult to disentangle. The dividing line is not drawn uniformly across OECD countries or across time, and rules established in National Accounts, Revenue Statistics and others give incomplete guidance. Moreover, tax sharing arrangements may differ according to how tax revenue is distributed across individual jurisdictions. In order to
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This paper describes the progress that has been made since 2006 in establishing statistical databases on tax autonomy and intergovernmental grants, aiming to better understand sub-central finance and intergovernmental fiscal relations. The paper is divided into two parts: a first part on taxing power of sub-central governments, and a second part on intergovernmental grants. Some of the work presented here is an update of earlier
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This paper analyses trends and driving forces in the revenue composition of sub-central government (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased significantly from 31 to 33 percent while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17 percent, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant
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This pilot study presents indicators that assess sub-central government (SCG) spending power by policy area. Traditional indicators – such as the share of SCG in total government spending – are often misleading as they underestimate the impact of central government regulation on sub-central spending patterns. In order to gauge true spending power, a set of institutional indicators is established, based on a detailed assessment of
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This report examines the use of indicator systems for measuring and monitoring the delivery of sub-central public services. Specifically, the report aims to assess if and how central governments use such systems, the critical choices they face when designing and implementing them, and the constraints under which the systems operate. Particular attention is given to the rationale for using indicators in the context of intergovernmental
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This paper compares and analyses the use of market mechanisms in core sub central policy areas, namely education, health care, transport, social protection, and environment. Arrangements like tendering, outsourcing, user choice and competition, user fees and performance-related funding can help to improve quality of service provision or lower its cost. With around 32% of total public expenditure and often wide-ranging spending powers,
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Fiscal equalisation is a transfer of resources across jurisdictions to offset disparities in revenue raising capacity or public service cost. It covers 2.5 percent of GDP or 5 percent of total government expenditure across OECD countries. Equalisation reduces fiscal disparities by two third on average and in some countries levels them virtually out. Strong equalisation comes at a price: on average, around 70 percent of a
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A study of grant design that integrates both theoretical and empirical insights from the fiscal federalism literature, and information obtained directly from practitioners concerning their experiences with the implementation of different types of grants.
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How fiscal rules can help minimise pressure on resources and ensure that they are used efficiently. Economics Department Working Paper 456 by Douglas Sutherland, Robert Price and Isabelle Joumard.
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This paper provides data and interpretation on the fiscal resources of sub-central government in OECD countries. It presents a set of fiscal autonomy indicators such as revenue and expenditure decentralisation, tax autonomy, intergovernmental grants and the stringency of fiscal rules.