Comment les institutions influencent la redistribution liée aux chocs macroéconomiques

L‘article analyse comment les institutions influencent la redistribution qui résulte des chocs macroéconomiques. Premièrement, l’article propose un modèle à agents hétérogènes en équilibre général à dynamique stochastique où les contraintes de crédit sont endogènes.

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Information Exchanges Between Competitors under Competition Law - Competition Policy Roundtable - OECD

Information exchanges among competitors increase transparency in the market, which can lead to efficiency enhancing benefits but may also present competition risks. The challenge for competition enforcers is how to approach this conduct within the context of traditional competition laws. The assessment of the legality of information sharing is generally carried out within the context of traditional competition law prohibitions against

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Le partage du risque macroéconomique : les perdants (et gagnants) des chocs macroéconomiques

L’article analyse comment les risques macroéconomiques sont répartis au niveau international et individuel. Il propose des réformes qui pourraient contribuer à une meilleure redistribution de ces risques.

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Competition and Procurement - 2011

This book presents the key findings resulting from discussions held at a series of best practice roundtables on competition and procurement.

Pro-active policies for Green Growth and the Market Economy - Competition Policy Roundtable - OECD

What types of policies nations should use to address the threat of global climate change? This document discusses the implications of different market-based policy alternatives and shows that not only competition enforcement and advocacy can make such policies more effective, but that the policies themselves also have effects on competition. An executive summary and an aide-memoire of that discussion as well as an analytical note by

Non-OECD observers to the Competition Committee

Observership by non-OECD economies in the Committee is actively encouraged based on a strategy which outlines criteria for identifying potential observers and defines their role and participation in the work of the Committee.

Emission Permits and Competition - Competition Policy Roundtable - OECD

Tradeable emission permits are considered an efficient instrument for achieving a given emission target at lowest possible economic cost. Tradeable permit schemes, also called cap and trade schemes, have become major pollution control instruments. They have been implemented at a national level and, as in the European Union, at supra-national level. The main idea behind emission permits is to create a system of property rights for

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Innovation and stimulating change in business practice and consumer behaviour

Watch this recording of the 2011 OECD Forum session on innovation and stimulating change with Simon Brooks, European Investment Bank; Marie-Louise Knuppert, Danish Confederation of Trade Unions; and Björn Stigson, World Business Council for Sustainable Development.

Financial regulation and consumer protection

Watch this recording of the 2011 OECD Forum session on financial regulation and consumer protection with Ted Menzies, Steingrimur J. Sigfússon, Federico Ghizzoni, Marilena Lazzarini, John Hope Bryant and Renato Flores.

Chili - Examen d'accession sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence 2010

Examen d'accession du Chile en matière de droit et politique de la concurrence.

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