Higher Education Management and Policy

Volume 24/3

Journal of the Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education
Foreword


Volumes 24.2 and 24.3 will be the final issues of the journal.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank our editors and the editorial board for their hard work and support of the journal over the years; the authors, who have contributed their knowledge and experience in this field; and also our many readers.

We also give our thanks to Wanda Ollis, who has edited these last two issues.
The OECD’s Higher Education Programme has established a permanent forum in which education professionals can exchange experiences and benefit from shared reflection, thought and analysis in order to address the issues that concern them.

The Programme’s work has a global reach and includes monitoring and analysing policy making; gathering data; and sharing new ideas, as well as reflecting on past experience. These activities assist members to contribute to the development of higher education internationally, nationally and locally. The Programme’s strategic position within the OECD provides members with a recognised international network, drawing together higher education professionals, leaders, policy makers, managers and researchers. For more information on the benefits of IMHE membership, visit www.oecd.org/edu/imhe/join.
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Benchmarking university governance in the MENA region

by
Adriana Jaramillo and Hafedh Zaafrane,
World Bank, France; Consultant, Tunisia

How higher education institutions are managed is one of the most decisive factors in achieving institutional goals. The key role that university governance plays in the improvement of education quality has been the focus of attention in MENA economies since 2009. In this article, the authors present the findings of a screening tool developed as a benchmarking exercise that assesses the extent to which universities in the MENA region are following governance practices aligned with their institutional goals and international trends, and monitors their progress over time. They present the results of testing the methodology of the screening tool in a sample of universities in Egypt, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia comparing them across five dimensions: 1) context, mission and goals; 2) management orientation; 3) autonomy; 4) accountability; and 5) participation. The findings highlight vivid differences, especially notable in between private and public institutions.
Analyse comparative de la gouvernance des universités dans la région MENA

par
Adriana Jaramillo et Hafedh Zaafrane,
Banque mondiale, France ; Consultant, Tunisie

Le mode de gestion des établissements d’enseignement supérieur est l’un des facteurs-clés de la réalisation de leurs objectifs. Depuis 2009, les pays de la région MENA observent attentivement le rôle déterminant joué par la gouvernance des universités dans l’amélioration de la qualité de l’enseignement. Dans cet article, les auteurs présentent les résultats d’un outil d’évaluation conçu à des fins d’analyse comparative et visant à déterminer dans quelle mesure les universités de la région MENA suivent des méthodes de gouvernance conformes à leurs objectifs et aux tendances internationales, ainsi qu’à examiner leurs progrès dans le temps. Ils présentent les résultats de tests méthodologiques de cet outil d’évaluation sur un échantillon d’universités en Égypte, au Maroc, en Palestine et en Tunisie les comparent selon cinq critères : 1) contexte, mission et objectifs ; 2) orientation de la gestion ; 3) autonomie ; 4) responsabilité ; et 5) taux d’inscription. Les conclusions mettent en lumière de fortes différences, particulièrement criantes entre les établissements du secteur privé et ceux du public.
Introduction

Globalisation and mobility of students have brought important challenges to universities all over the world. In the past two decades, university reforms have occurred in most OECD countries, a trend now seen worldwide. In Europe, the Bologna process, the European Qualifications Framework and the declaration of the Lisbon goals are important and defining drivers of change in tertiary education. The effects of these European processes are seen outside of Europe; and the tools brought in to harmonise programmes, provide quality control and emphasise outcomes are being used widely, not only in economies in the European area or those aspiring to be part of the European Higher Education Area, but also in the United States, Canada, Australia and more recently, in Latin America, East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

University governance is one of the key elements that can lead to improving outcomes. Altbach and Salmi (2011) report that the important characteristics of successful world class universities are: leadership, government policy, funding, the ability to focus continually on a clear set of goals and institutional policies, development of a strong academic culture and quality of the academic staff.

University governance is an important driver of change: how institutions are managed is one of the most decisive factors in achieving their goals. There are many governance models that vary according to the national context, the type of institution, the historical legacy, and other cultural, political and, sometimes, economic factors. It is clear that there is no single model or “one size fits all” approach to university governance. It is also clear that choosing a governance model for adoption by a given institution must be a well thought out decision. As Trakman (2008: 43) suggests, “Good governance is much about timing and judgment: it requires boards of governors to recognise when a governance model is not working, why and how to repair it.”

The key role that university governance plays in the improvement of education quality has been the focus of attention in MENA economies since 2009. Higher education ministers and policy makers expressed their specific need for benchmarking university governance at a seminar held in December 2009 at the Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) in Marseille.¹
As a result of this request, the World Bank Regional Program on Higher Education based at the CMI, initiated the process of developing a University Governance Screening Card. The Screening Card assesses the extent to which universities in the MENA region are following governance practices aligned with their institutional goals and international trends, and monitors their progress over time. It is a tool that allows MENA universities to compare themselves with universities around the world.

The Screening Card was developed taking into account other benchmarking tools, such as the Australian Universities Benchmarking tools, the European University Autonomy Score Card, the United Kingdom Good Practice Code developed by the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) and the Governance Guidelines reviewed by the OECD. The Screening Card incorporates lessons learned from the use of some of these tools and provides a mechanism for monitoring changes introduced in governance practices and structures.

During a pilot phase from 15 June to 31 August 2010, the Universal Governance Screening Card tools and methodology were tested in a sample of universities in Egypt, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. These four economies expressed the most interest and readiness to participate in the benchmarking pilot. The pilot phase was a very positive step forward, ending with an empirical fine-tuning of the instruments. The universities’ reactions were very encouraging: the collection of answers often involved several actors, triggered their attention and elicited important conversations on important aspects of governance. The Screening Card thereby fulfilled one of its goals by raising awareness of governance matters within the institutions in which it was applied. After the instruments were fine-tuned, the project proceeded with data collection from a purposeful sample in each economy to represent the diversity of institutions in terms of their size, location, date of creation and type of legal entity type.

Universities were classified as public, private for-profit and private not-for-profit. This distinction was initially defined and taken into account in preparing the sample. In addition, each university provided its own classification. The size criterion for the universities was the average student enrolment per economy. Medium-size universities were defined as those within one standard deviation of the average enrolment in the economy; those below medium size were defined as small; and those with enrolment higher than one standard deviation of the average were defined as large. Location was defined as either a main or capital city or a small or intermediate city. The average age for all universities in each economy was estimated; universities older than the average age were considered old, while those “younger” than the average age were considered recent. To calculate the average, “historic”
universities such as the University Al Quaraouiyine in Morocco, created in 859 and Zitouna in Tunisia, created in 737, were not taken into account.

It was difficult to establish a difference between research universities, teaching universities and community colleges for several reasons: first, the distinction between research and teaching universities is not made in the economies studied; and second, not all economies have community colleges. The Screening Card thus designated universities as general, specialised, religious (three universities) and open (two universities).

Tables 1.1 to 1.4 describe the sample of universities studied by economy. It is important to note that in Morocco and Tunisia, there is no distinction between private for-profit and private not-for-profit; the law considers all private institutions as for-profit. In the Palestinian Authority, all universities are “private” by international standards. Representativeness is gauged by enrolment: the universities surveyed represented 78% of all enrolment in the Palestinian Authority, 60% in Morocco, 46% in Tunisia and 36% in Egypt (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Orientation</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Localisation</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private/for profit</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Old</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>General</td>
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<td>Private, not for profit</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Religious</td>
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<td>Public</td>
<td>Small</td>
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<td>Specialised</td>
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Table 1.1. **Universities in the sample by characteristic – Egypt**

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### Table 1.2. Universities in the sample by characteristic – Morocco

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### Table 1.3. Universities in the sample by characteristic – The Palestinian Authority

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<th>Localisation</th>
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Table 1.4. **Universities in the sample by characteristic – Tunisia**

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Table 2. **Sample representativeness (in terms of student enrolment)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>% of National Enrolment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>370 058</td>
<td>169 234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 shows the average self-perception of all universities in each of the five dimensions and the average results from the Screening Card questionnaire. Although the averages mask important differences between economies and institutions (analysed later in the paper), the comparison shows that the self-perception scores were higher in all dimensions except management orientation. Overall, universities perceived that they were more autonomous, defined clearer mission statements and had higher levels of stakeholder participation than they actually do, as revealed by the questionnaire. On the other hand, they perceived that their management did
not follow market-oriented practices. One possible interpretation for this is that perhaps universities did not perceive the use of market-oriented practices well and, as a result, they did not see themselves as following them. This point is further discussed later on.

Figure 1. **Four-economy average: Self-perception and questionnaire results**

Figures 2 and 3 present the individual university results by economy. Individual results for each dimension are illustrated with Tunisia at the bottom and Egypt at the top. Figure 2 shows the results of the self-perception and Figure 3 shows the results obtained through the questionnaire. Shades of grayscale are used to illustrate the scores, with black being 0 and white being 5. Overall, these figures show that universities’ self-perception followed the same pattern observed in the questionnaire results, indicating that there was awareness of the strengths and weaknesses at the institutional and national level. However, as mentioned above, there are differences in magnitude: the white and bright areas in the self-perception figures (Figure 2) become grey in the questionnaire figures (Figure 3); in some cases, the grey areas in the self-perception figures become darker in the questionnaire figures. Individual institution assessments and reports by economy are discussed in the pages ahead. The overall findings and a comparison between economies are the subject of this paper.
Figure 2. **Self-perception results by economy**
Highlights of the international comparison

The same university typologies used for the definition of the sample in each economy were used for the results analysis. However, no distinctive patterns emerged when size, age, or location of the institutions were analysed, while quite important differences were observed between public and private universities for all five governance dimensions and in all four economies. As a result, the analysis focused on the differences between private and public institutions.
**Dimension 1 – Context, mission and goals**

Defining the university or university system’s mission and goals, or more accurately the appropriate “mission mix,” is a fundamental governance question. This implies thorough discussion and analysis on topics such as: whether the mission of the institution should be focused on applied or basic research; if the focus has an international, local, or regional emphasis; and whether the objective of the university is to train scholars and academics, to train productive workers and employees, or to educate young adults for citizenship and their place in society.

Based on an analysis of the mission statements of the 41 universities in the sample, it seemed that there was no distinction between research, teaching and forming professionals. All participating universities stated a combined mission that included research, teaching, forming professionals and providing community service.

This “one size fits all” approach to defining university missions has some problems. In Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, the mission of public universities is defined by law. This could imply that universities do not engage in the process of defining their mission and that all public universities in a given economy have the same mission, at least on paper. This in itself is a challenge for the economy to guarantee that it is serving well the different needs that a university system is called upon to meet. At the same time, requiring universities to have the same mission makes it difficult for them to focus, develop a competitive advantage, excel in certain areas of knowledge or pursue specific objectives.

Staff composition and workload, as well as the incentives to perform, are derived from the definition of the university mission as either a research or teaching institution. Incentive structures are set around publishing research, which may not make sense for a non-research university, where the emphasis might instead be on promoting and teaching talent. Some universities in the sample did not state their mission formally; this is an important challenge to overcome, as the mission definition is the starting point for defining the governance model. The lack of differentiation is a concern, not only for the economy or system as a whole, but also for the universities themselves. Therefore, it would be useful to have a collective discussion in each economy to establish priorities and accept that not all institutions need to be involved in doing research, or to offer graduate programmes. That is, not all institutions need to be “everything for all people,” and defining specific missions can better meet system-wide goals and objectives.
**Actors involved in defining the university mission**

In terms of the actors involved in the statement of an institution’s mission, Table 3 shows the average results by economy. One important observation is that academic staff were represented well in defining the university mission in all institutions in the four economies studied. An important difference is noted between public and private universities in all economies. For instance, in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, it is clear that the economy at the national level has direct involvement in defining the mission of both public and private universities. In Egypt, private universities reported having 100% involvement of the economy at the national level, while this was the case in only 50% of public universities. This seems counter-intuitive, perhaps because of the perception that public universities should have greater governmental involvement in determining university matters. However, in terms of other stakeholders’ participation, in Egypt, the results regarding civil society representatives, faculty and staff were higher in public universities than in private ones. Tunisia showed the lowest level of participation from other stakeholders in the definition of the university mission in both public and private institutions (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Actors involved in the definition of the university mission (% positive responses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During their elaboration, which actor had a voice?</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>West Bank and Gaza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
<td>Private, not for profit (%)</td>
<td>Public (%)</td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government, national level</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government, regional level</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society representatives</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and business representatives</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities representatives</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicates/unions</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Palestinian Authority, it is clear that the government has a much lower level of intervention than in any of the other economies. This is largely due to the facts that: 1) there are only two governmental universities (not in the sample); and 2) the Palestinian Authority – for historical, political and economic reasons – has a lower level of intervention in university matters. The Palestinian Authority also showed the highest levels of representation of other actors, such as civil society, industry and staff, than the other three participating economies. Further, its governing boards have a high level of
power: they are independent and not accountable to any higher order organisation or entity.

**Dimension 2 – Management orientation**

As mentioned earlier, in all cases, the self-perception of Management Orientation scored lower than results from the questionnaire. The self-perception question on Management Orientation was, “Is the university management orientation following market-oriented polices?”, and may have been misinterpreted. This was actually discussed at the November 2011 Cairo workshop, and many institutions interpreted the self-perception question as following what the labour market is demanding. Based on this misunderstanding, it was concluded that the phrasing of the self-perception question should be revised to better reflect its meaning as results-based management. One of the underlying assumptions of Management Orientation is that good management is results-based; when the results of the questionnaire were analysed, it was observed that most universities used tools to monitor the achievement of their goals. This could help explain the higher questionnaire scores.

Most universities in the sample gave low scores on the self-perception of Management Orientation. This negative response was more frequent in Tunisia than in other economies. In Egypt, for instance, about half of the universities replied positively to this question, as did the private for-profit universities in Morocco and the Palestinian Authority. However, when the results of the questionnaire were analysed, it was observed that most of the sample (only 2 exceptions among the 41 universities) scored between 3 and 4.5 in Management Orientation. A possible explanation for this difference could be related to one important aspect of modern market-oriented policies, the extent of monitoring of goals and results and the use of instruments such as scorecards. Most universities in the sample stated that they had mechanisms to monitor achievement of goals and that they used performance reports typically evaluated by the president and/or the governing board (see Figures 4 and 5 and Table 4). The lack of evaluations conducted by independent agencies in Tunisia and Morocco is also evident in Figures 4 and 5 and Table 4.

Although the questionnaire did not ask for details on the types of reports used by governing boards, the fact that reports are used to evaluate institutional goals is in itself a measure of modern management. More information is needed to establish the extent to which the instruments used are using performance indicators and how these indicators are established.

The actors most heavily involved in monitoring institutional goals were the president and the governing boards in all economies. Academic councils
had high participation in all economies except Tunisia and the central government played an important role in all economies except the Palestinian Authority.
Types of university leaders and their selection process

All universities in the sample had presidents: there were no chief executive officers, provosts or rectors as university leaders. Generally, the governments of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia appoint the university presidents in those economies, and in the Palestinian Authority, university presidents are appointed by the governing boards. The only cases in which appointments followed a competitive process were in private universities in the Palestinian Authority, some private universities in Egypt and in public universities in Morocco (see Table 5). It is important to note that information in Egypt and Tunisia was collected prior to changes introduced after the “Arab Spring”; in both economies, university presidents are now elected.

Regarding qualifications, only in Morocco must the president have an academic profile, although he/she must also have a managerial background, as in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. In Tunisia, university presidents do not have a specific or formally stated profile. In most cases, and in all economies, presidents can be selected from candidates outside the university, and they are required to prepare a strategic vision for the university. Governing boards and private donors have a leading role in selecting presidents in the Palestinian Authority, as well as in private universities in Egypt and Tunisia. Senior academic staff only have a role in selecting the university president of public universities in Morocco and in some cases of private not-for-profit universities in the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian Authority has the most corporate-like governance in this regard, as the government is not involved in the selection process of the president, who is always appointed by the governing board. Palestinian universities also use evaluation reports more frequently than the other economies.
In all other economies, the government appoints the president of public universities. In some cases, there is consultation with the governing boards, but academic staff are consulted only in Morocco. Of the four economies, Morocco’s governance model seems to come closest to being academic: it is the only economy in which university presidents must have an academic background, and in which academic staff are involved in the university president selection process.

### Table 5. Selection of decision makers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are the following elements used to measure their attainment?</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>The Palestinian Authority</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
<td>Private, not for profit (%)</td>
<td>Public (%)</td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President – What is the selection process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment by the Government</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment by a Selection Committee (Board of Trustees)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive recruitment</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President – Who is implicated in this process?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government (Parliament, MoE or Regional authorities)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional leadership (Governing Board,...)</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Academic staff</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private owners or donors</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President – What are the requirements to be selected?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he is not necessarily an academic</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he needs to have a managerial profile</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he can be an external person from the university</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he has to meet a full job specification</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he is not necessarily a member of a political party</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/he has to propose a strategic vision for the university</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>President – What are the conditions of their mandate?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The length is less than 4 years</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s not renewable</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s renewable but the number of mandates is limited</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Dimension 3 – Autonomy**

Important differences between economies were observed in the self-perception results of Autonomy. On the one hand, Palestinian universities had a high perception of their autonomy, which, as discussed earlier, corresponds to the actual high degree of autonomy and low intervention from the government. In contrast, Tunisian universities had a very low perception of their autonomy (see Figure 6). This is not a surprise, not only because the role of the government in these two economies is very different, but also because the information was gathered in Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution.

**Figure 6. Autonomy: Self-perception results of public and private universities**

![Autonomy: Self-perception results of public and private universities](image)

**Differences in self-perception and scored results in public and private universities**

Interestingly, in Egypt, private universities reported low levels of autonomy, while public ones reported high levels. This seems counter-intuitive, but this pattern also emerged in other economies’ questionnaire results, particularly in reference to academic autonomy. Figure 7 shows public and private universities’ self-perceptions; in general, private universities perceived that they were more autonomous.

However, the results for Autonomy based on the questionnaire show that private universities had much less autonomy than they perceived (see Figure 7). This is in part due to the frequent responses given by private universities regarding their lack of academic autonomy. Private universities had much more autonomy regarding managing, selecting, recruiting and firing staff and using salaries to reward performance. On the other hand,
private universities had less autonomy to introduce new programmes, although they had autonomy in defining delivery modes and enrolment and admission policies.

Public and private universities: Opposite patterns of autonomy

Public and private universities had opposite patterns of autonomy, as shown in Figure 8. For instance, private universities reported more often that the government had control over their academic autonomy, although they reported having autonomy to charge fees, define enrolment and use their funds at their own discretion. This counter-intuitive observation might be due to the different perceptions that public and private universities have regarding the role of the government: private universities tend to think that the government has no role to play in how their institutions are managed. This could also indicate how much more control the government exerts over academic autonomy in private universities.

Lack of academic autonomy: An important concern

One area in which all economies and all types of universities scored systematically low was academic autonomy. Even in the Palestinian Authority, which had the highest degree of autonomy, academic autonomy was low. This is a concern, as academic autonomy has been reported to be a key element of success for high-performing universities. Autonomy in academic decision making is a critical element for innovating, producing knowledge and excelling on academic and research grounds.
No universities reported having the autonomy to introduce new programmes, and only 15% of public universities and 25% of private universities reported having the autonomy to define the structure of their curricula. Although most universities had the autonomy to assess student-learning outcomes and to engage in partnerships with other universities, most public universities did not have the possibility to set admissions policies or the number of students per programme. This was in contrast with private universities, which had the autonomy to define their admissions policies and to determine the overall number of students to enrol and number of students per programme.

**Autonomy in human resources management**

In human resources management, private universities had much more autonomy than public universities. In most cases, private universities had the autonomy to hire and fire staff and to develop staff development and training programmes. In all cases, private universities had the autonomy to evaluate staff performance, and, although in some cases they had the autonomy to set salaries, in most they had the ability to link salaries to performance. This is a significant difference from public universities, which in all cases could not set salaries, could evaluate staff performance in only 60% of cases and could link salaries to performance in only 10% of cases.
Financial autonomy

One unsurprising finding was the over dependence on government resources by public universities and on student fees by private universities, as shown in Figure 9. Tunisia and Morocco rely heavily on government funds, while the Palestinian Authority relies mostly on student fees. Less than 10% (mostly private universities) reported sources of revenue other than student fees, which indicates that these universities were not engaged in providing services and were not engaged with their local environments. In most universities in the sample, there is a need to develop alternative sources of revenue and to engage in research or provision of continuing education services.

Figure 9. Sources of funds by economy

Dimension 4 – Accountability

The correlation between autonomy and accountability is important. The more autonomous institutions are, the more likely they are to be subject to accountability measures. This correlation was observed in all four economies studied. Public and private universities in the Palestinian Authority and Egypt had higher levels of autonomy, and, as shown in Table 6, used more accountability measures. For instance, in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, human resources departments had policies that linked compensation and salaries to performance, unlike Morocco and Tunisia. In academic departments, compensation and salaries were attached to performance in private universities in all economies, in 57% of public universities in Tunisia and in 62% of public universities in Morocco. Needing to provide justifications for expenditures was a common practice in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority...
Authority, but was observed in only 50% of public universities in Morocco and 71% of public universities in Tunisia. Further, private universities in Tunisia and Morocco did not have standardised sanctions for professional misconduct.

Table 6. Performance, sanctions and incentives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What kind of policies to provide incentives/enforcing of rules are used to manage the staff of each department?</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>The Palestinian Authority</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
<td>Private, not for profit (%)</td>
<td>Public (%)</td>
<td>Private for profit (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources department</td>
<td>Reporting measures</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensations, salaries attached to performance</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing justifications for expenditures</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scorecards</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardised sanctions in case of professional misconduct</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial department</td>
<td>Compensations, salaries attached to performance</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting measures</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing justifications for expenditures</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scorecards</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardised sanctions in case of professional misconduct</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic department</td>
<td>Compensations, salaries attached to performance</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting measures</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing justifications for expenditures</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scorecards</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standardised sanctions in case of professional misconduct</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

External accountability

Public or external accountability is the extent to which outcomes (as opposed to inputs and outputs) are measured and to which clear definitions exist regarding who is accountable for the outcomes. It is important to examine how university leaders and governing boards are held accountable by society. Figure 10 shows the extent to which public and private universities conducted tracking surveys to learn about graduates and their employment rates or used statistics to establish efficiency measures, such as years required to complete a degree. The figure shows that most public universities had
statistics on completion rates, and that 70% of universities conducted tracking surveys to learn about graduates’ employment rates. However, when it came to disseminating information, only 30% of public universities and 53% of private universities made this information available on their websites.

Figure 10. **Tracking surveys and their dissemination in public and private universities**

![Figure 10](image)

**Dissemination of information**

The practice of disseminating information is another critical element of accountability. Figure 11 shows that the information most frequently made available were the goals and strategy of the university and, to a much lesser extent, information such as accreditation results. This represents a form of external accountability.

Although 70% of universities stated that they conducted tracking surveys, information that could be used to develop performance indicators, such as completion rates, number of years it takes to complete a degree, and data on graduate labour market insertion, was not readily available. This demonstrates, once again, that even if institutions make the effort to collect information, they seldom make it available to the public.

The above findings indicate that public or external accountability on service delivery – which makes public the extent to which institutions obtain outcomes that contribute to economic and social development – still has a long way to go. This is one of the most important claims arising from the Arab Spring. Young people want their public officers and leaders to be held accountable to society. Although this benchmarking exercise is a step in the right direction, there is still an important gap in terms of information, particularly related to academic performance indicators.
A “transparency index” was calculated according to universities’ performance in: development of indicators of monitoring graduates; and the diffusion, dissemination and sharing of documents on the mission and goals of the university, its strategy, the results of evaluations and accreditations; sharing of budgetary documents to non-government actors; and dissemination of financial audits outside the universities. The transparency index is the average of 18 parameters reflecting these indicators, and ranges from 0 to 100%. The 41 surveyed universities had an average score of 50%, with a minimum of 11% and a maximum of 95% (Figure 12).

The score distribution shows that private non-profit universities were the most transparent in their operation (index 55%), followed by private for-profit universities (50%) and then public universities (index 47%). The distribution by economy shows that Palestinian universities had the highest scores while Tunisian universities had the lowest (Figure 13).

**Dimension 5 – Participation**

Stakeholder participation in the decision-making process was the area in which all universities in all four economies systematically presented low scores. The low levels of participation in decision making throughout the MENA region are well known. The MENA region scores lowest on voice and accountability; universities are no exception to the practice of excluding stakeholders from decision making.
Figure 12. “Transparency index” of all 41 universities

Figure 13. “Transparency index” by economy and legal orientation of universities
The ability of academic staff to participate in decisions concerning the university is one critical factor to improving democratic practices, but also to determining academic excellence. Altbach (2011: 22-23) reported that one of the primary factors of success of the University of California at Berkeley is that “the internal governance of the university is mainly in the hands of the professors; key decisions concerning academic policy and direction, even if initiated by administrators, receive input from the academics.”

Figure 14 shows that academic staff were generally reported as having a “voice” when it came to defining goals and preparing the strategy of the university. However, the questionnaire asked more precisely if academic staff members were represented in academic, research or administrative councils; most of the universities in all four economies responded negatively. This contradiction may be related to misinterpretation of the questions, or could be due to the fact that academic staff actually do not have formal representation on these decision-making bodies.

Finally, private universities tended to have fewer mechanisms for the participation of students, civil society and other stakeholders than did public universities.
In an attempt to identify patterns, the five governance dimensions used in the Screening Card were correlated with system-level governance and two models were identified: i) government-driven, and ii) autonomous and government-steered, as defined by Fielden (2008). Table 7 (above) provides a summary of how each dimension is mostly likely to be observed in the two types of system-level governance.

### Table 7. **System-wide governance and the five dimensions of the Screening Card**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Level</th>
<th>Context, Mission and Goals</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government-driven</strong></td>
<td>Government-defined missions and policies</td>
<td>Government-appointed president</td>
<td>Centrally-managed budget Central control for new programmes and curriculum Central HR management</td>
<td>Central audits Central QA National driven curriculum Low accountability-no links between performance and rewards</td>
<td>Mainly on consultation basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomous-Government-steered</strong></td>
<td>Mission-oriented institutions Strategic plans prepared by institutions</td>
<td>Governing boards led</td>
<td>Competitive funds allocation Autonomy to introduce new programmes and set curriculum HR autonomy</td>
<td>External audits Independent external QA Performance-based salaries</td>
<td>High participation of stakeholders throughout the decision-making process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8. **University governance models**¹ and the five dimensions of the Screening Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Context, Mission and Goals</th>
<th>Management Orientation</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corporate</strong></td>
<td>Mission-oriented Decentralised</td>
<td>Results-based</td>
<td>High autonomy in all three areas, academic, financial and HR</td>
<td>High accountability in financial and HR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic</strong></td>
<td>Mission-oriented Defined in consultation with academic staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>High academic autonomy</td>
<td>High internal academic accountability</td>
<td>High participation of academic staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representational</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High external accountability</td>
<td>High participation of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trustee</strong></td>
<td>Mission-oriented Defined in consultation with trustee</td>
<td>Results-based</td>
<td></td>
<td>High internal accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Identifying patterns

In an attempt to identify patterns, the five governance dimensions used in the Screening Card were correlated with system-level governance and two models were identified: i) government-driven, and ii) autonomous and government-steered, as defined by Fielden (2008). Table 7 (above) provides a summary of how each dimension is mostly likely to be observed in the two types of system-level governance.
The five governance dimensions used in the Screening Card were also correlated with the four governance models defined earlier: corporate, academic, representational and trustee. Table 8 (above) summarises how each dimension is most likely represented in each of these models.

The patterns observed in public and private universities and the predominant characteristics in the five dimensions of the Screening Card are summarised by economy in Table 9 (above).

**Summary and conclusions**

The culture of benchmarking universities in the MENA region has been introduced. This benchmarking exercise represented an important first step towards monitoring university performance. Although the purpose was not to look at performance itself (i.e. the focus was on identifying governance trends), this initiative has increased awareness of the need to identify and collect performance indicators. Given the lack of information generally and, in particular, on performance indicators, and the absence of information-based policies, particularly prior to the Arab Spring, this exercise constitutes an important achievement regarding public accountability for higher education services. The openness and willingness of universities to share information, identify problems and plan reforms was timely, as civil societies across the
The Screening Card has demonstrated its capacity to assess and benchmark university governance. Strengths, weaknesses and areas of reform have been identified at the institution, national and regional level. Each surveyed university has its own assessment and is able to compare itself to other institutions in its own economy and abroad. In Egypt and Tunisia, where post-Arab Spring changes in how universities are managed have already been introduced, this baseline survey will be the basis for monitoring progress on those reforms. The information collected is useful not only for the 41 universities that participated in the exercise, but it also constitutes the basis for a regional and global benchmarking exercise; many economies in the MENA region and beyond are interested in joining.

Clear models and governance trends have been identified. Several trends have been identified, and, in particular, differences between public and private universities’ governance models have become evident. At the national level, two clear models emerged. To a great extent, they reflect European legacy, as one model follows a more autonomous and government-steered approach, coinciding with an Anglophone legacy as in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. A more centralised, government-controlled model is evident in Tunisia and Morocco, following a Francophone tradition. The autonomous, government-steered model shows more external accountability measures, higher levels of a “corporate” approach with the use of governing boards and higher levels of participation by civil society on such boards. In contrast, the government-controlled model shows more internal accountability and less external accountability; low financial, academic and human resources autonomy; and low levels of participation of civil society. All economies could explore the different models of governance used in American, Australian and East Asian universities to update their current frameworks.

There is room for improvement regarding awareness of the suitability of different governance models. One major finding is the lack of differentiation in the definition of universities’ missions. Although universities showed awareness of their strengths and weaknesses along the dimensions of governance, there was not necessarily a conscious decision on the type of governance model followed by institutions. This stems from the tendency to have centrally driven systems, a high level of intervention from the government in the mission definition and a lack of mission differentiation. This “one size fits all” approach undermines the potential for different governance models to suit the specific needs of a given type of institution.

The absence of a national vision for higher education was observed in most economies. One consequence of the lack of differentiated missions for
institutions is the absence of a National Strategy and a clear definition of the purpose of a higher education system. To evolve, systems will need to choose more specific university missions and build tertiary education systems with clearly defined institution types to serve different populations, each with a clear set of objectives and goals. As systems evolve, universities will need to adopt, more consciously, the governance models that best fit their mission.

**Self-awareness is important for developing a reform process.** Participation in this benchmarking exercise elicited healthy discussions inside institutions and prompted the introduction of reforms in all economies. Awareness of the governance model used (or not used) in an institution has important implications for: i) improving both the way the institution is managed and the education and other services it offers; and ii) enabling the institution to assess for itself how fit it is for its purposes.

It is clear that there is no one single model or “one size fits all” approach to university governance. It is therefore important to acknowledge the model being used to determine if it is the best approach for a particular institution, given its political, social and economic context. Good governance involves the ability to assess objectively when changes are needed.

**Benchmarking is critical to monitor implementation of reforms.** As each university has its own Screening Card with details on its score in each dimension, it will be able to plan its own institutional reforms and monitor its progress over time. Some critical points to mention regarding the overall findings include: the low academic autonomy observed in most economies for both public and private universities; the high dependence on government and student fees, limiting financial autonomy; and the lack of information shared on performance indicators and graduate insertion into the labour market. Institutions must discuss how to overcome these challenges collectively – as a higher education system within an economy – and individually, as each university develops its strategic plan to improve.

**The first steps have been taken to build a system to monitor performance and make evidence-based policy decisions.** The Screening Card served to identify governance trends and models and is applicable to universities in other regions. A critical next step in the MENA region is to correlate governance models with performance indicators. Economies in the region must make efforts to collect information on performance indicators such as student learning outcomes, skills developed, research and development capacity and insertion in the labour market. Once this information is available, it will be possible to correlate governance models with performance, a critical element for enabling economies to define policies based on accurate and meaningful information.
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Notes

1. The Center for Mediterranean Integration CMI is a World Bank-managed multi-partner platform for knowledge sharing.

2. Morocco and Tunisia do not have private not-for-profit universities, as the law stipulates that all private institutions are for-profit. In the Palestinian Authority, public universities are non-governmental, so in the sample there were only private universities.

References


Comparing international student and institutional objectives at Canadian colleges and universities: Implications for institutional strategy

by

Rod Skinkle and Sheila Embleton,
Academica Group, Canada and York University, Canada

Globalisation of higher education is critical to achieving many of higher education’s highest goals. This paper analyses the results of a survey of over 5000 Indian private high-school students (Skinkle and Embleton, 2011) revealing that 21% are seriously considering international education (IE). Those considering IE often stated their motivations as including improving leadership skills, meeting new people and giving back to society. There is however little research concerning the goals (and practices) of higher education institutions in relation to the aspirations of IE students. A primary motivation for many institutions is financial. The authors integrate the results of the survey with an empirical study of 65 Canadian professorial and administrative leaders at both colleges and universities, from 54 diverse institutions across Canada, to provide critical analyses of perceived benefits, threats and desired outcomes of IE in higher education. Strategic imperatives for IE management are presented.
Comparer les objectifs des étudiants internationaux et ceux des établissements d’enseignement supérieur canadiens : conséquences en termes de stratégie

par
Rod Skinkle et Sheila Embleton,
Academica Group, Canada et Université York, Canada

La mondialisation de l’enseignement supérieur est essentielle pour atteindre bon nombre des objectifs les plus élevés de l’enseignement supérieur. Cet article analyse les résultats d’une enquête réalisée en Inde auprès de plus de 5 000 élèves de l’enseignement secondaire privé (Skinkle et Embleton, 2011) et révèle que 21 % d’entre eux envisagent sérieusement de poursuivre leurs études supérieures à l’étranger, expliquant souvent qu’ils espèrent ainsi améliorer leur aptitude à diriger, rencontrer de nouvelles personnes et rendre à la société ce qu’ils ont reçu. Il n’existe cependant que peu de recherches concernant les objectifs (et pratiques) des établissements d’enseignement supérieur en relation avec les aspirations des étudiants internationaux. La motivation première de nombreux établissements est d’abord financière. Les auteurs mettent en parallèle les résultats de cette enquête et d’une étude empirique menée auprès de 65 professeurs et responsables administratifs de 54 établissements d’enseignement supérieur canadiens afin de proposer une analyse critique des avantages perçus, des menaces et des résultats escomptés de l’enseignement supérieur transfrontalier. Les impératifs stratégiques de sa gestion sont présentés.
Introduction

Given its importance in securing economic prosperity, national security, environmental sustainability and well-being for citizens worldwide, the globalisation of higher education has become increasingly important, for both individuals and nation states. The most obvious manifestation of global education involves student mobility and, in fact, hundreds of thousands of students each year cross national boundaries in search of international education opportunities that will improve their lives and enhance their career development.

Among receptor countries, Canada is increasingly playing a key role, along with a host of other developed countries, including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. In 2010, Canada held 4% of the world’s market share of international students, compared to 7% for Australia, 12% for the UK and 20% for the US (Association of Canadian Community Colleges, 2010). In 2008, Canada’s percentage of international students had doubled compared to 1992, reaching 8% of all university students in Canada (McMullen and Elias, 2011). The number of enrolments of international students in Canada is likely to grow substantially as international recruitment has become a strong focus.

In September 2008, the Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) officially launched the Canadian education brand, “Imagine Education au/in Canada”, to promote Canadian higher education abroad. Indeed, Canada’s 2011 federal budget is the first ever to set aside CAD 10 million over the next two years specifically to develop international education. CMEC, in partnership with provincial and territorial ministers of immigration, endorsed the development of an international marketing plan in June 2011 with the objectives of increasing Canada’s reputation and competitive and global identity in the higher education market (Council of Ministers of Education). Furthermore, the Government of Canada has also struck a national panel, chaired by the president of a prominent university, to review Canada’s current recruitment strategies and target countries to ensure strong growth in international student enrolment for years to come. In February 2013, the government announced that there were over 100 000 international students studying in Canada in 2012, noting an increase of 60% from 2004 (Citizen and Immigration Canada, 2013).
Significant challenges in this recruitment effort, however, remain, despite the increases. While Canada’s federal government may be leading efforts in the recruitment sphere, education remains a responsibility of Canada’s provincial governments, and some have their own provincial strategies.* Within Canada, consequently, a degree of competition for international students has begun to appear, potentially affecting the effectiveness of overall national recruitment strategies. Even within provinces, there appears to be little effort at effectively co-ordinating recruitment policies and strategies with the post-secondary institutions that will receive those students; which, in most cases are actively pursuing recruitment efforts on their own.

Given this level of diffusion, there is very little reliable information available regarding the scope and objectives of recruitment strategies and their effectiveness at the institutional level. In addition, little is known regarding the experiences of international students once in Canada, and of how such feedback may influence future recruitment planning.

This study represents a partial remedy of this deficiency, through analysis of information obtained from a first-ever national survey of post-secondary institutions regarding their international education strategies. Further, the study seeks to examine the fit between such strategies and the interests, needs and aspirations of international students themselves, as obtained by the authors from a previous survey of prospective applicants. Using the two datasets, the research helps to provide a much clearer picture of Canada’s international student recruitment efforts and their impact at the institutional level. This in turn provides a unique opportunity to identify key threats and opportunities associated with the recruitment process – at the institutional, provincial and federal level, and further to provide actionable recommendations of effective institutional strategy, given the stated goals of all three levels to increase international student enrolment.

**Methodology**

The research involved two separate field studies examining: 1) student aspirations and objectives in their pursuit of international education (Table 1) and 2) institutional strategies and structures designed to accommodate increased numbers of international students.

The first, conducted in February 2011, involved a survey of just over 5,000 Indian students attending private secondary schools in India. India has

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* British Columbia’s international strategy was released May 28, 2012, emphasising the need for two-way mobility: [www.aved.gov.bc.ca/internationaleducation/forms/InternationalEducationStrategy_WEB.PDF](http://www.aved.gov.bc.ca/internationaleducation/forms/InternationalEducationStrategy_WEB.PDF)
been an increasing source country for international students. In 2010, Canada had 17,525 international student enrolments from India compared to 9,564 in 2009, 7,306 in 2008 and 6,285 in 2005 (Institute of International Education, Project Atlas, 2013). The most recent figures (Canadian Bureau for International Education, 2013) show that this number has increased dramatically to 28,926 in 2012. These figures include all students at all levels (i.e. elementary, secondary, college, university and “other” types of educational institutions). The respondents for the survey were chosen from a sample of 58 schools selected from a population frame of 200 of India’s top private schools, which were specifically identified to provide a representative geographical distribution. Students from private schools were identified for the survey insofar as they were deemed far more likely than other students to possess the family financial means to study abroad. The sample consisted of students in grade 9 (11%), 10 (45%) or 11 (44%) (i.e. likely all aged 13-16).

The second study, conducted in April 2012, involved a survey of 65 senior institutional administrative staff representing 54 higher education institutions throughout Canada, achieving a 28% response rate among invited staff and 65% response rate among invited institutions. E-mail invitations were mailed to 230 contacts representing 50 universities and 33 colleges for a total of 83 higher education institutions (HEIs) across Canada.

### Table 1. Summary of survey attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student Survey</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>59 Private Schools</td>
<td>N = 5,117¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE Institutional Survey</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>54 Colleges/Universities</td>
<td>N = 65²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. School administrators distributed the surveys in-class. Results provide a Confidence Interval of ±2.9%, 19 times out of 20.
². Convenience sample selection to represent 10 provinces (and 1 territory) and a range of institutional sizes.

### Results

**Phase I study**

Of the 5,117 high-school students surveyed in Phase I of this project, two-thirds were planning to pursue higher education, including one-fifth, n = 1,070 (21%) who were interested in International Study (IS). This latter group consisted of 13% “expecting” and 8% “considering” studying abroad. Figure 1 illustrates the respondents’ higher education aspirations by degree.
The first notable finding is that only a relatively small proportion of those interested in IS selected undergraduate studies (9% and 10%). In fact, prospective IS students are significantly more likely than those who are not to express interest in pursuing graduate studies: MBA (33% vs. 29%), other Master's degree (21% vs. 16%) or a Doctorate (15% vs. 10%).

Indian students are interested in studying abroad primarily for two reasons – for the experience of living in another country and for the quality of education they expect to receive at institutions outside of India. The latter motivation is considered the most important as is the prestige a foreign credential provides. Students surveyed, who are interested in studying abroad, can be characterised as high achievers. They also appear to be more open to broadening their horizons and experiences, and to express a greater desire for both personal and intellectual growth than those who are not planning to leave India for studies abroad.

Further, IS students reveal a wide range of subject area interests and are most likely to express interest in more than one subject area (see Figure 2).

In order to understand better prospective IS student goals, we examined 39 possible influence factors. The relative perceived importance or lack of importance of these factors reveals IS students' underlying motivations and their key decision factors (KDFs). For this component we narrowed the focus to only those students that reported they had started researching their first-choice institution (n = 434) (See Figure 3).
An examination of the top 10 factors shows, perhaps not surprisingly, that institutional reputation factors are the most compelling with the overall institutional reputation tending to be more important than the programme reputation. Two outcome factors (graduates get high quality jobs and graduates get into top professional schools) are also among the most important KDFs. Only slightly less important are factors such as high profile research, undergraduate research and professor/instructor-student interactions.

Turning to the other end of the continuum – factors frequently promoted by HE institutions – such as small class sizes, clubs/social activities, student diversity and surrounding community attributes – appear to be far less influential.
Finally, because many HE institutions are increasingly using intermediaries (education agents) to assist with recruiting, we explored the use and influence of agents. The results reveal significant use, but influence appears to be a more complicated dynamic. Almost half of the students surveyed have used or intend to use an education agent. However, as the names of some universities, which have recorded high levels of enrolments of Indian students, had not been recalled in our survey, the data suggests education agents are not the best channels for spreading brand awareness. In addition, students are likely to use agents once they have chosen a university;
hence, they play little to no role in terms of influence in the decision-making process. Supporting this finding, we found on another item that education agents rank far lower than high-school guidance counsellors in terms of both use and influence, even below that of social media. Though it seems contradictory that so many students have used or intend to use an agent, and yet agents ranked low in influence factors, the explanation may come from Indian culture where students from high socio-economic backgrounds are used to using intermediaries to handle many mundane details of daily life. Thus, the agent really functions as an “assistant” that performs the many required necessities involved (e.g. completing application and registration forms, visa applications, travel details, residence permits, securing accommodation, etc.).

Phase II study

The advantages of increasing the presence of international students on Canadian campuses are clearly recognised by respondents to the second HE Institutional study. In open-ended comments, respondents refer to time-honoured objectives such as increasing diversity on campus and of the student body specifically, helping students to develop a broader world view and better preparing students to interact in an increasingly globalised economy. Respondents also clearly recognised the potential financial impact of an increased international student presence, particularly as these students pay twice or even up to three times the tuition normally paid by domestic students. A few also recognise the importance of international students as prospective immigrants, and the possible contributions they may make to local communities and Canadian society generally.

Reflective of this generally positive view is the post-secondary planning that has occurred on most campuses to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by international students. In the survey, over 90% of universities and colleges were reported to possess an “international office”, with mean employment of 15 staff, primarily full time. Just over 70% of post-secondary institutions had approved an international “strategy”, the bulk within the past five years. In the majority of cases as well, at 75%, post-secondary institutions have adopted a centralised, as opposed to decentralised, faculty or departmental approach.

International students certainly are arriving on Canadian campuses. Among this sample of institutions, international students represent 9% of the student body at universities, and nearly 13% at colleges. Perhaps given their lower international enrolments, universities are more likely to have established targets to increase enrolment, with 73% claiming such plans as opposed to just 47% of colleges. Those post-secondary institutions that have set targets look to mean international enrolments of approximately 13% by
2017. This represents an increase of approximately 4% for universities from current numbers, and a minimal increase for colleges. Similarly, colleges are much more likely than universities to have set revenue targets along with enrolment plans. Overall, 65% of colleges maintain revenue goals, as opposed to just 22% of universities.

Just over one-third of respondents reported that they have established target countries in their enrolment plans. As indicated in Table 2, institutions are recruiting from a diverse set of countries, with China and India remaining the two top source countries for both universities and colleges. Brazil (universities) and Mexico (colleges) also rank high on this list.

Table 2. **Target countries for IS student recruitment (by percentage of institutions surveyed targeting each country)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Universities (n=16) (%)</th>
<th>Colleges (n=8) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Malaysia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American region</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Region</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other mentions – Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Bahamas, Eastern EU, S. Africa, France, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, Bermuda, and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and UK

Increases in international student enrolment bring attendant pressures, in terms of student support services, whether in universities or colleges. To a significant extent, however, it would appear that investments in these types of services are not keeping pace with the growth in student numbers at post-secondary institutions generally. For example, while 80% of universities indicate that international undergraduate student plans are a high priority within their institution, just 58% reveal that provision of international student support services is similarly a high priority. Within the colleges, the gap is smaller; 75% claim support services to be a high priority. Similarly just under half of universities consider growth in their international student services...
divisions to have effectively kept pace with growth in students. Within the colleges, this number is slightly higher, at 50%. Therefore, about half of all institutions in this study acknowledge that support services have not kept pace with recruitment.

In terms of specific supports designed to attract and retain international students, the pattern in all post-secondary institutions is somewhat similar to what is occurring within the universities. While student recruitment may be a priority, actions designed to attract and keep those students are not uniformly maintained. For example, only 60% of universities and 45% of colleges offer targeted scholarships for international students. In addition, generally less than one-third of both offer training or information to assist faculty, students and alumni to interact, welcome and engage with international students. Programming developed to assist incoming international students often focuses more on the social and logistical than the academic or educational. For example, in both colleges and universities, high proportions (upwards of approximately 80%) organise tours and social activities, develop welcome and orientation materials, provide support for international student organisations, or provide student space or drop-in centres. Only about one-half, however, have developed widely accessible academic programmes or curricula specifically to which international students can contribute and that allow members of the academic community broadly to benefit from their presence and experience in an intentional manner (i.e. through structured programming).

Similarly, while most colleges and universities offer general academic counselling to international students (as they would to all students), just under 80% of universities and 65% of colleges offer career counselling. Less than one-half of both offer students access to internship programmes or leadership development programmes. Notably, given the aspirations of many international students, only about 40% of universities offer international students graduate programme advising and only approximately 20% of post-secondary institutions offer students access to professional development courses (see Table 3).

Looking to the future, both colleges and universities anticipate significant challenges in meeting the ongoing needs of international students on campus. Nearly 60% of university and college respondents feel that maintaining student-service levels will continue to be problematic, and nearly 50% are concerned with the ability of their institutions to achieve and maintain on-campus social and community integration. Respectively, 33% and 25% of university and colleges respondents envision issues in assuring faculty interest and involvement with international students, while one-third of all post-secondary respondents feel that there will be challenges in understanding and providing for students’ unique cultural and religious needs.
Discussion

There is an implicit assumption that the experience of living and studying within a different culture provides real benefits for IS students and domestic stakeholders alike. This is of course why it is equally important for “sending country” domestic students to also study internationally. The IS administrators consulted through this study speculate that there are numerous benefits, which can be grouped into three broad categories, as follows:

1. Personal and career development for the IS students through the education and experience of living and studying in Canada;

2. Enhanced learning and personal development for the domestic student population resulting from studying alongside international students; and

3. Financial benefits for the host institution deriving primarily from the higher tuition and related local cost of living/ spending, but also the potential for IS students to benefit the nation through permanent immigration.

In theory, the first category of benefits align well with the goals and expectations of the Indian prospective IS students. These students expect to receive a superior education and anticipate career benefits associated with having studied internationally. Regarding the second category of benefits, the findings that the IS students revealed generally broader interests, expressed higher motivation to experience a different culture, and overall higher educational aspirations, provide some suggestive, albeit very tentative,
evidence that such benefits will contribute to the domestic students’ learning and experience.

Notwithstanding that these assumptions warrant further research, both to test their validity and to better understand their elements, they nevertheless seem reasonable and have intuitive appeal most likely because they align with most of our own experiences and instincts about the benefits of international experience. However, it is conceivable to contemplate the reverse. That is, cultural immersion, if it is a negative experience, could arguably produce cultural insensitivity and its concomitant values for the individual – and hence for the broader societies.

This in turn may potentially affect the third category of benefits. If nation states set out to exploit international students with the primary purpose of offsetting shrinking internal HE budgets with higher international student tuition income, it is not difficult to contemplate seriously negative outcomes. The potential for this was evidenced in the now widely publicised incidents of racially motivated assaults against Indian students in Australia in 2010/11. We may further postulate that it is not that Australia did anything particularly different from other host nations, but rather that they were further advanced in terms of per capita international student participation levels. This leads to several important questions:
1. What have we learned from the experience?
2. What might we do to mitigate the causes of negative IS student experience? and
3. How might we enhance the positive benefits associated with IS experience?

For the Canadian national and provincial governments, hoping to realise financial gains through promotion of Canada as a “great place for international study”, the implication should be clear: the IS student experience will be largely impacted by the individual host institution. While it is true that much of a student’s experience is beyond the control of an institution; it is equally true that the institution, more than any other single entity, has the opportunity and the responsibility to positively affect the IS student experience through the fulfilment of the educational service “contract”. While where this contract begins, ends, and what it includes is debatable, the debate is much needed.

The current study adds to the body of knowledge and hopefully fuels debate by providing information about IS student goals and expectations in relation to the current state of institutional services and strategy. The results reveal some worrisome trends regarding the Canadian circumstance. Below, we highlight several prominent and interrelated themes and consider suggestions for proactive institutional strategies.
International student services

The survey of over 50 Canadian institutions reveals a positive picture with respect to providing traditional support services. For example, the majority of institutions are providing basic academic advising services and offer volunteer opportunities, co-operative (co-op) programmes and employment services. However, the availability of services and the level of services may be two different matters. The results reveal that at minimum, half of the institutional representatives feel that support services are lagging recruitment success. The majority plan to further increase IS student enrolment efforts and there is even more widespread acknowledgement of the challenges in maintaining appropriate levels of student services going forward. There are implications, of course, concerning government funding levels and for IS student fees; however, it is first important to understand implications in terms of the first two benefit categories professed by these respondents: benefits to the IS students and benefits to domestic-student learning and development. Contrasting the personal goals of potential IS students with the availability of meaningful programmes and services, the results are less positive.

Meeting IS student goals

There is significant evidence, for example, that Canadian post-secondary institutions are not meeting fully IS students’ aspirations regarding their ultimate career objectives. The bulk of students looking for international training opportunities belong to relatively affluent families and are clearly focused on career paths that will sustain and/or improve their standard of living. Potentially, studying abroad affords not only an opportunity to attain international experience, but also to acquire skills that may be translated domestically into solid career choices and better than average earnings.

One way to achieve this is through advanced graduate-level study. As the Phase I study of Indian students shows, the majority of aspirants are looking to complete a Master’s or PhD degree, particularly in the science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) areas where opportunities for advancement and elevated earnings are perceived to be more salient – especially in emerging economies. Given this abiding interest in advanced degrees, it is somewhat remarkable, consequently, that so few universities in the sample focus on this aspect, with fewer than half of the respondents offering graduate programme advising targeted to international students. Without question then, opportunities are being missed, to the detriment of both IS students and institutions themselves, insofar as they may be missing out on recruitment of top candidates for graduate programming.
Along these same lines, prospective IS students in the Phase I study express a desire for participation in more clearly defined career-related activities. For example, in selecting a prospective institution, nearly three-quarters of the students indicated that opportunities for participation in undergraduate research activities were either very or somewhat important. The institutional respondents to the survey, however, in no instance indicate this particular objective as a priority in terms of their IS programme offerings. Similarly, approximately two-thirds of the respondents expressed a desire to participate in professional accreditation activities and courses at their targeted institution. Fewer than one-half of the universities, and only a third of the colleges, however, indicated that they possess leadership programming of any kind, and just 20% maintain professional development courses. About half of the Phase I IS students also indicate that proximity to industry in their chosen field is a factor in choosing an international institution, while about two-thirds would like to participate in a co-op or internship programmes. Here universities perform slightly better, with 69% claiming availability of co-op programmes, and 50% internship opportunities. Among colleges, somewhat surprisingly, the numbers are much lower, with 45% offering co-op opportunities, and just 40% offering internships, indicating significant room for improvement.

**Meeting of domestic student goals**

Another apparent contradiction is that while institutions avow that cultural/global enrichment from the presence of international students is a major benefit for their domestic students, there is little to no emphasis on curriculum or any other systematic programmes to learn from international students’ presence and perspectives, within the curriculum or through extracurricular activities. This is most evident in the perceived benefits question and the open-ended comments. Additionally, although not at all the focus of this study, it is becoming apparent that as a nation, Canada needs to do more to get its own domestic students abroad to study or have other comparable formative experiences. For example, how similar are domestic students to the Indian students in terms of what they are seeking abroad? In addition, perhaps unlike the Indian students, to what extent have students at comparable grade levels contemplated study abroad, whether short-term or long-term? The Canadian rhetoric about the benefits to international students of studying in Canada would ring truer if more domestic students were to study abroad, and universities and governments were seen to encourage that experience; albeit, some provinces are taking minor steps in this direction. For example, Ontario Universities International (OUI) sends approximately 200 university students abroad each year; Ontario International Education Opportunity Scholarships (OIEOS) subsidises approximately 1 400 college and
university students to study abroad each year; and a recent British Columbia strategy argues strongly for BC students to study abroad. Far more remains to be done, however, if Canada is to break out of the complacency that assumes its “multiculturalism” is an adequate substitute for global experience.

**Recommendations**

Based upon these findings, at least three major recommendations suggest themselves to ensure, more effectively, success in IS student recruitment strategies not just for Canada, but also for other countries looking to move down this path. These are as follows:

1. National and sub-national governments with responsibility for post-secondary education must work more effectively together to develop, not only strategies, but also mechanisms for monitoring success in the implementation of strategies designed to promote IS student recruitment. This includes mechanisms for collecting and analysing feedback on the experience of IS students, either centrally, or through post-secondary institutions themselves. Either way, this will provide a basis for learning from IS student experiences in order to better meet the aspirations of these students and to establish more firmly a meaningful service contract of value to all stakeholders.

2. Post-secondary institutions need to effectively shift their focus from IS students as a “commodity” to a “values” perspective that recognises their educational and career aspirations. This may involve a reprioritisation of services offered, to focus more on graduate programme counselling, professional development and internship programmes, or the development of whole new offerings that link IS students directly to their chosen career path – whether in Canada, or their own countries.

3. There needs to be a broader discussion and recognition of the full costs of recruiting and retaining IS students in Canada. Most post-secondary institutions maintain an abiding focus on increasing IS student enrolments in the absence of a concomitant plan and commitment to ensure that funding is available to provide appropriate support, and thus to ensure educational and career outcomes worthy of Canadian institutions.

**Further research**

Much work remains to be done to explore further the issues identified in this study and their impact. This would also most certainly involve the development of a larger student sample from a broader range of prospective recruitment target countries. Similarly, the Canadian institutional sample could be expanded to include additional respondents from eastern Canada, particularly the province of Quebec. The use of longitudinal surveying
strategies would also help to improve understanding of how trends are evolving over time.

Beyond the questions addressed here, there is considerable space for pursuing additional information associated with the IS student experience. For example research that looks at:

- enhancing knowledge and understanding regarding the role and impact of institutional utilisation of third-party recruitment agents;
- the current scope and impact of pre- and post-arrival English/French language training; and
- the relative weight of fee structures in student decision making, regarding target institutions and/or employment opportunities on arrival and post-degree, could improve governmental and institutional decisions and policies.

In addition, research that addresses the question of what motivates, or would motivate, Canadian students to study abroad is needed to create the conditions and to inform the government policies that would encourage growth in this area.

Such research will become increasingly important in the next few years as Canadian institutions wish to move quickly to implement their ambitious long-term IS student recruitment plans. It will also provide critical insight into experiences on the ground in light of the August 2012 release of the final report of the Canadian federal government’s national advisory panel on recruitment strategies and target countries as well as other aspects of internationalisation of Canadian HE (Advisory Panel on Canada’s International Education Strategy, 2012). Currently, most provincial governments and the federal government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, as well as many universities and colleges, are very much focussed on the value of international students in purely direct economic impact. For example, it is estimated that in 2010, “international students in Canada spent in excess of CAD 7.7 billion on tuition, accommodation and discretionary spending; created over 81 000 jobs; and generated more than CAD 445 million in government revenue” (Kunin et al., 2012). Institutions are increasingly looking to make up funding shortfalls from the significantly higher tuition fees generally charged to international students. In our view, for these benefits to Canada and its universities and colleges to be sustainable or possibly increased, it is urgent for us all to understand better what it is that brings international students to Canada, keeps them here, and gives them the quality of experiences that they were seeking. Without careful research adequately underpinning our actions, both in institutions and in government, our current progress could prove to be short-lived.
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References


Does culture affect post-secondary education choices?

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This paper first discusses the theoretical approaches regarding the choice of participating in post-secondary (or “higher”) education, starting with a presentation of the standard neoclassical economics approach, and then adding concepts taken from the emerging behavioural economics literature to take into account “cultural” factors that affect access. The paper then presents the results of an empirical analysis based on a very rich Canadian dataset, the Youth in Transition Survey, which follows youth from ages 15 to 25. It includes remarkably detailed information on family and other background factors, as well as schooling experiences, which provides evidence that points to the importance of cultural influences on PSE choices. Policy implications are then discussed.
Les facteurs culturels exercent-ils une influence sur les choix en matière d’études postsecondaires ?

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Introduction

In the “new knowledge economy”, ensuring access to post-secondary-education (PSE) for all those with the desire to participate and the talent to do so, without regard to family background, is of fundamental importance to every nation’s future economic prosperity, to the broader development of its population, and to the equality of opportunity among all its citizens.

The importance of PSE in economic terms can be shown in a simple way, as in Figure 1, which shows age-earnings profiles by level of schooling in Canada based on the 2006 Census.\(^1\) While average earnings are fairly clumped together up to about age 30, they then diverge sharply, with university graduates, in particular, pulling away from others. By age 50-54, when earnings peak, university graduates (“college” graduates in the American lexicon) earned, on average, almost CAD 80 000.\(^2\) Community college graduates (excluding the trades) come a distant second, in the high 40s. Trade school graduates are next, at a little over CAD 40 000. Those with high school diplomas (but no PSE credentials) averaged a bit under CAD 40 000, while those who did not finish high school earned just a little over CAD 30 000.

Figure 1. Average employment income by age, Canada, 2005 (CAD 1 000s)

These are obviously large differences and point to substantially unequal standards of living for the individuals represented, as well as very different contributions to the Canadian economy to the degree that earnings reflect productivity, as economists typically assume. Adding in benefits such as employer contributions to pension plans and medical insurance would widen these gaps yet further. Taking into consideration the non-pecuniary aspects of the jobs held (e.g. job satisfaction), the stability of employment and other such factors would generate even greater differences.

In the context of these apparent benefits of PSE, the dominant theoretical model for understanding who attends college and university has come from the economics discipline and is fairly simple: those who go to PSE are generally those for whom it is most worthwhile to do so – that is, principally, those who are able to do well in school, and who will then benefit the most from the schooling after graduating, particularly in terms of earnings and other future career opportunities.3

In short, those who go to PSE are those who should go, since the (future discounted) benefits are greater than the costs. Furthermore, what is right at the individual level is also – under certain assumptions normally made by economists – correct at the societal level as well, for similar reasons: the social benefits are also greater than the social costs.4

Within this paradigm, the main problem that arises is when an individual who “should” go to PSE (i.e. they want to) faces some sort of “barrier” that prevents them from doing so. The most obvious barrier, and the one most central to this standard model, is affordability. That is, some potential students may not be able to attend PSE, even though the benefits are greater than the costs, simply because they do not have the money needed to pay for the schooling and otherwise support them while in school. Moreover, as this is “suboptimal” from the individual’s perspective (i.e. they cannot go when they want to – and therefore “should” go), so too is it (again) from the social perspective.5

The primary policy remedies for such financial barriers are, therefore, similarly financially focused and are generally aimed at making the schooling affordable for those who wish to attend. This typically means the control of tuition fees and the provision of student financial aid for those who need it, including – in the Canadian case – provincially-regulated tuition fees and the existence of an extensive student aid system, grounded in the Canada Student Loans Program, its provincial counterparts, and various associated grant programmes.6

Given the focus of this model and this (resulting) policy orientation, researchers and policy makers alike have remained on the alert for evidence pointing to the existence of such financial barriers, and the empirical evidence
has, over time, appeared to be generally consistent with this model. Research
has, for example, shown for a considerable time that PSE participation rates,
especially at the university level, are much lower for those from lower-income
families, as well as other families that may lack financial resources (e.g.
Aboriginals, those living in rural communities, those from single-parent
families).\(^7\)

Generally, this evidence has been interpreted as indicating that the
standard PSE participation model described above holds and that the
affordability of PSE is the principal “barrier” of concern to policy makers. As a
result, the related policy levers have been manipulated over time: tuition
levels have been constrained, student financial aid has been made more
generous in different ways and PSE savings plans have been enhanced.

In short, the underlying theoretical model, the empirical evidence and
the policy prescriptions aimed at equalising the opportunity of going to PSE
have all had a “money” focus, and essentially reinforced each other: the model
points to money factors and the affordability barrier, the empirical evidence
suggests income does indeed matter, and the common policy prescriptions
make sense in this perspective.

Recent empirical evidence – in both Canada and elsewhere – has,
however, challenged this conventional perspective and a new understanding
that access to PSE is also a matter of “culture”, in addition to the “economic”
considerations, has been emerging.

“Culture” in this case means (among other things) an understanding of
and appreciation for the value and broad benefits of PSE, a sense that it is
something that might be possible (or even likely) for the young person in
question, and the preparation for that option, perhaps from a young age. This
culture may be related to economic or financial factors, but is assumed to play
an independent role, as well. In essence, two young people facing the same
economic/financial calculations (benefit and cost considerations) and having
the same financial means at their disposal may make different decisions
regarding whether to attend PSE, and this may be driven by differing cultural
orientations with respect to PSE as defined in this way.

For example, when the influences of family income and parental
education on participation in PSE are compared, the education effects
overwhelmingly dominate the income effects. Other evidence points to other
cultural factors and the importance of early preparation for PSE. In short, it
now appears that if a child is taught to value PSE, is prepared for PSE
(academically and otherwise), and ultimately wishes to attend PSE, there is a
high probability that the child will participate in PSE – and cost will not stand in
the way.\(^8\)
The policy implications of these developments are extremely important. If we want to increase the overall participation rate in PSE, or to level the PSE access playing field for under-represented groups, we must adjust our policy levers from their past emphasis on affordability to focus on these newly identified cultural factors.

This said, it is important to recognise that this situation holds in the context of existing PSE fee structures, a student financial aid system that essentially provides enough money to at least most of those who need it, and other policies that have undoubtedly been critical to making PSE affordable and thus opening up PSE opportunities for many who would not otherwise have had the chance to attend. In fact, it is to some degree because the “affordability barriers” have been successfully addressed that we can – and must – now turn to these “cultural barriers”.

The goal of this paper is to discuss access to PSE in the context of the recent empirical, theoretical and policy developments just outlined in order to place the issue of participation in PSE in the line of thinking that emphasises “the culture of PSE” as being a fundamental determinant of who goes to college or university – and who does not.

The general policy implication of these developments is that we need to go beyond the traditional policy tools, which focus on tuition fees, student aid, and other financial factors, to bring “the culture of PSE” into the lives of all youth so that PSE becomes a real, viable opportunity for everyone.

The paper is laid out as follows: the next section sketches out the competing theoretical frameworks that can be employed to understand PSE choices, including both the traditional neoclassical economics approach and newer concepts that stem principally from the field of behavioural economics. The third section presents empirical evidence on access patterns in Canada, based on the extraordinarily rich Youth in Transition Survey (www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=4435&Item_Id=85022&lang=en), which has been instrumental in changing thinking in Canada on these issues. The final section then reviews and summarises these developments, and draws some general policy implications.

**Access to post-secondary education: theoretical framework**

Since at least the time of Gary Becker and his development of the “human capital” framework (Becker, 1964, Cameron and Heckman, 1998), the dominant construct of PSE access has come from economics. There have always been problems with this approach, and in recent years, the rise of behavioural economics has provided ideas that can help modify this paradigm to allow “culture” – which is normally absent from the conventional model – to play a central role. The purpose of this section is to develop and discuss these ideas.
leading into the presentation of some empirical evidence on these matters in the next section.

**The standard economics approach**

In the standard “neoclassical” economics approach, individuals face a conceptually fairly easy choice and make a straightforward decision: whether or not they will go to PSE is based on the future benefits of the schooling versus the up-front costs.

The benefits of PSE are often thought of principally in terms of future labour market earnings, such as those seen in the age-earnings profiles presented. These higher earnings represent the returns to the human capital that is invested in and developed (through the schooling).¹⁰

The returns to schooling can also, however – at least conceptually – include any other benefits that accrue to the education, such as improved health outcomes, enhanced enjoyment of cultural activities and so on. The benefits can also include the inherent pleasure associated with the educational experience itself (“the love of learning”) or can be offset by any related disutility (“school is a drag”). At the social level, benefits may include reduced crime rates, a more engaged citizenry and other positive impacts on others (i.e. externalities with respect to the individual). These other effects – though, usually much more difficult to measure – are likely to vary considerably from individual to individual.

The costs of the schooling come in essentially two forms. First are the direct costs of the tuition and student fees, books and other directly school-related financial outlays required. The second form is the “opportunity” costs; a concept heavily emphasised by economists generally, which here take the form of the earnings foregone while the person is in school.

Individuals compare these (anticipated) benefits and costs and decide whether to attend PSE or not. Related decisions include whether to attend at the college level or the university level, the specific programme to enter, the particular area or discipline of study, and all other aspects of the effectively infinite number of decisions to be made regarding PSE. Each of these decisions entails a set of up-front costs and future benefits, and a corresponding set of choices. By the standard model, the individual makes all the relevant choices that leave them the best off – or which “maximises their lifetime utility” in the language of economics.¹¹

This choice is represented in Figure 2, which is very typical of what one finds in both basic economics texts and the essential ideas that underlie more advanced analyses and illustrates the general points being made. This schematic simplifies the full set of choices to a simple “PSE” versus “no PSE” decision, with the earnings and (in the case of the PSE option) cost streams
indicated. Those for whom the future benefits (earnings) outweigh the up-front costs will go to PSE; those for whom this is not the case will not do so. It is assumed that this simple illustrative choice scales up to whatever complexity exists in reality, including the almost infinite number of choice sets individuals actually face.

**Figure 2. Schooling decision**

![Figure created by the author.](image)

This decision-making process not only seems reasonable in many ways, but also can be demonstrated to have many desirable welfare-maximising properties at the societal level. In essence, individual decisions will, at least under certain sets of assumptions, result in an optimal use of society's resources because individuals are effectively slotted in where they fit best – PSE or not – reflecting the underlying benefits and costs of the schooling. Simply put, those who go to school are those who “should” go – at both the individual and societal levels. Those who do not go, should not go.

The only problems occur where individuals cannot afford the schooling. Those who “should” go cannot go. This is not only bad for the individual, but is also – given the optimising nature of the resulting decisions just referred to – not good for society, either.

The predominance of this analytical framework and its straightforward policy implications has thus resulted in the focus on affordability as the principal “barrier” to PSE. For example, the typically observed correlation found between family income and PSE participation rates has usually been interpreted as evidence of the existence of financial (affordability) barriers. Policy initiatives have therefore been mostly concerned with eliminating those (financial/affordability) barriers: keeping tuition fees down, providing student financial aid, and so on, so that those who want to go, are able to go.
Yet it can be argued, and the empirical evidence now increasingly suggests, that preferences – related to early exposure to “the culture of PSE” – are in fact important determinants of who goes on to college or university. So too is the (related) preparation for PSE, such as taking the high school courses and achieving the grades necessary to gain admittance to a PSE programme of choice. Meanwhile, the affordability barrier appears to be of much lesser importance.

In short, decisions regarding access to PSE are increasingly understood to involve a complex set of influences, experiences, relationships and developments that are rooted in the family and probably start quite early in an individual’s life – rather than related to a simple well-informed calculation of the future (monetary) costs and benefits made near or at the end of high school.

Below, we will see the importance of what is referred to here as “the culture of PSE” manifested in the empirical evidence in a number of ways. Parental education, for example, is a much better predictor of whether a child will go to PSE than is family income – and the income effects become much smaller when parental education is taken into account. The children of almost all immigrant groups go to PSE (especially university) at considerably higher rates than non-immigrant youth – some at outstandingly high rates (as much as 90%, versus an average of 36-38% in the overall population). Preparation also matters, as captured by grades and other test scores, which are, in turn, at least partly related, to the cultural factors mentioned above. Financial barriers are cited by only a small minority of those who do not attend PSE, while being “not interested”, expressed in one form or another, is the main reason given. Finally, PSE decisions are, in most cases, made early, when the child is young, and long before the sort of reasoned benefit-cost assessment, which is central to the standard model, will have taken place. In fact, in a substantial number of cases, individuals “always” knew they were going to PSE – a concept that is difficult to square with the benefit-costs calculus model presented above.

“Culture” thus appears to matter greatly to decisions regarding PSE. If, then, we wish to expand opportunities for PSE, including among currently under-represented groups – including the low-income groups upon which many of our concerns are typically focussed – it is important to go beyond financial considerations and turn our attention to these cultural factors.
Competing theoretical approaches to the PSE decision

The standard neoclassical model revisited

A number of critical assumptions underlie the standard economics approach just presented, at least in its purest – and arguably most commonly used – form.

First, individuals must have full and perfect information to make optimal choices, and to the degree that they do not have this perfect information, their choices will be suboptimal. In the case of making PSE choices, they must first know the future benefits (earnings and other) associated with all possible schooling options; this in a context of a wide range of options, including level of study, programme, discipline, particular institution to attend, etc. Also even the average profiles in the data, such as those shown in Figure 1 above, are only a starting point for knowing what any individual would earn under each of the schooling options available. Individuals must also know the costs of each of the schooling options, including the opportunity costs related to the time spent in study when they could be out working.

Second, individuals – these youths of age 16 or 17 or 18, or even younger when we consider that PSE decisions are often effectively made before that, and that earlier decisions are important if a youth is to be prepared to get into PSE and be accepted into a programme of their choice – must have a well-defined and perfectly understood set of goals regarding what they want in life: they must know their “preferences” in economics terms. How important will higher incomes be to the individual in later years? What about the other benefits that may accrue to the schooling, such as improved health, “cultural” enrichment, and so on? What kind of career will the individual find rewarding? Will they enjoy working with their heads, rather than with their hands? In addition, how will any such future benefits compare to, say, the burden of the hard work and effort associated with obtaining PSE today?

Third, the individual must behave in a “rational” way. They must follow through with the behaviour required to achieve the goals that they have set. They must choose the right level of schooling, the appropriate programme, and so on, and do all that is required to get into the chosen programme and succeed when they get there.

While assumptions – and their first cousins, abstraction and generalisation – are a natural and highly useful part of any theory-forming exercise, the theory will only be as good as the underlying assumptions, abstractions and generalisations. If these are fundamentally flawed, the model may be misleading, or worse. In what ways should we possibly be concerned about the neoclassical model concerning PSE decisions in these respects?
Does culture affect post-secondary education choices?

Three ways in which these assumptions may break down in a manner that will point us towards the potential importance of “cultural” impacts on PSE choices are now considered. All largely belong within the scope of “behavioural economics”, an emerging area of economics that combines traditional economic thinking, social psychology, the neurological sciences and even philosophy – among other influences – to provide new insights into how humans actually behave, as opposed to the assumptions embedded in economic models.

Making PSE choices in the context of imperfect information, complex information and bounded rationality

Economists have addressed the problems associated with imperfect information extensively, such as not knowing the wage or price distributions involved when wondering about whether to accept a particular job offer or to buy a good or service at a specific price.

In the context of PSE choices, young people will generally not know the full set of PSE options or the future consequences of these options, including subsequent labour market and other likely outcomes. What does a degree in a certain discipline actually represent? What sort of things do graduates with specific degrees do in the labour force? How much do these individuals earn? This is where the number of such choices available constitutes a very large set.

“Complex information” and “bounded rationality” are related concepts that have also become well entrenched in the discipline and could arguably represent some of the earliest foundations for behavioural economics, which have continued to be added to in important ways (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Rubenstein, 1998; Simon, 1957). These concepts, in a sense, represent the other side of the information coin: having too much information (rather than not enough) or having information that is difficult to understand or use.

While the information regarding PSE choices is likely to be highly incomplete, it is at the same time extremely wide and it is hard to know what each of the options may really mean. What does each option imply? What about combinations of PSE options, such as going first to college and then to university? Thus, the information is highly complex.

Bounded rationality relates to the idea that even if individuals do have access to the relevant/required information, its extensiveness and complexity leave them in a situation where they do not generally have the intellectual or other capacities required to “optimise” choices with the information available.

All these concepts are potentially relevant to PSE decisions on the part of youth, and can lead to important departures from the simple model – where arriving at the right decision seems quite tractable given the two simple options presented. The departure is based on recognition that real world PSE
decisions involve information that is, at the same time, both limited and almost limitless and exceedingly complex. Individuals are (therefore) likely to come up against problems of bounded rationality.

Youth are, in consequence, likely to resort to various “heuristics” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) – a term widely used in the behavioural economics literature to denote ways of arriving at decisions, in this case to make PSE choices. These heuristics are, in turn, a route by which “culture” can enter PSE decisions in an important way.

First, the information available to any individual pertaining to PSE will generally be related to the individual’s “culture”. For example, if a young person’s parents (and others in their family) went to university, they will probably have a better idea of the true costs and benefits of higher education, and understand that what may look like high tuition fees in the short run are perhaps quite small, in comparison to the long-run benefits of the schooling. That is, information pertaining to PSE is almost certainly incomplete and likely biased in a way that will lead those with a history of PSE in their family to see it as a more favourable investment for both monetary and non-monetary reasons.

Related information and decision-making concepts pertaining to behavioural economics include the importance of “availability bias” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009: 27-8) or “vivid experiences”, whereby individuals give more weight to those things that they see and experience around them, such as their parents having gone to PSE; “anchoring” (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971) and “framing” (Rabin, 1998), which refer to how options are presented, whereby PSE may be made to sound rewarding and fun, or at least worthwhile, if that is the message parents send, perhaps based on their own experiences at PSE; “status quo” bias, which refers to how individuals stay with current or previous decisions rather than searching for an optimal decision (Samuleson and Zeckhaouser, 1988); and other factors that affect the information available, how that information is processed, and the actual decisions made (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009: 19-21).

The upshot of all this is that two individuals who objectively face the same up-front costs and the same future benefits of going to PSE, and who should therefore make the same PSE decisions according to the standard economics model, may: i) have different (objective) information sets; ii) perceive the costs and benefits of the schooling differently; or iii) arrive at their decisions using means that will tend to favour either going to PSE or not, depending on whether or not they were raised in a “pro PSE” culture.
**How short-run behaviour can be inconsistent with long-run goals**

A second important area where behavioural economics has made great advances is in understanding that individuals do not always make the short-run decisions that are consistent with the long-run goals they have set (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). These decisions are, in a sense, issues of self-control, but are related to other and larger issues whereby short-term self-gratification often takes “irrational” precedence over actions that would increase our well-being in the long term. That is, short-term behaviour is not consistent with long-term decisions – which is essentially “irrational” in the economic choice paradigm, thus again pointing to a departure from the standard neoclassical model.

While self-control is the common term – and not far from the essential concept – that is relevant here, again behavioural economics has made significant contributions in this area, including introducing the terms “present value bias”, “myopic decision making” and “hyperbolic discounting”: that is decision-making that is essentially short-sighted and inconsistent with long-term goals (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).

As applied to PSE decisions, these concepts imply that individuals who make the “first level” decision to go to PSE may not adopt the behaviour needed to get them there. For example, they may not take the harder math courses in high school that they really need, they may not study for exams when required, or they may skip classes and jeopardise their academic achievement. That is, they may go for short-run gain that may put the long-run goals they really mean to achieve in jeopardy – and again, perhaps “irrationally”.

Culture can matter in this context of PSE decisions for similar reasons to those discussed regarding information sets and choice mechanisms, and again being raised in a culture of PSE is likely to lead individuals towards actually going on to PSE. Workspaces will be provided for the child, homework rules will be established, achievements will be rewarded – all guiding the individual through the short-term steps that are required for the long-term goal of going on to and succeeding in PSE to be met.

**Identity economics**

Identity economics incorporates individual identity – as it is created by social forces – into economic analyses. This term essentially represents the notion that individuals’ decisions and actions will be affected by who they are, as well as their place in society. In this way, their desire to conform to the group or ideal with which they “identify” can make hitherto nonsensical decisions make sense (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Race, gender and ethnicity, along with individual experiences that go into forming one’s identity, can help or hinder the decision-making process.
George Akerlof, an economist concentrating on identity economics, has focused particular attention on the application of these principles to teenagers and their school-related behaviour. If a young person’s “identity group” sits at the back of the class (when they show up at school at all), expresses disdain for the classroom experience, neglects their homework, actively avoids any appearance of looking or behaving like the “nerds” and “geeks” who do well in school, then this will heavily influence that individual’s behaviour – even though it may not otherwise be “rational” or “utility maximising”.

What is interesting to the issue of PSE decisions and the theme of this paper is that identity groups are, to a significant degree, “culturally” determined, heavily influenced by one’s parents, by who lives in one’s neighbourhood, and with whom one (therefore) makes friends and otherwise engages. Friends matter, family matters, cultural milieu generally matters and identity matters.

**How the competing theoretical approaches line up**

This contrast of the traditional neoclassical economics PSE decision-making model to some alternative approaches stemming mostly from the emerging field of behavioural economics is not meant to debunk the former with the latter. Indeed, the conventional model undoubtedly holds many truths and captures some important aspects of individuals’ PSE decisions. Future earnings surely matter, as do schooling costs. Individuals do “optimise” to at least some degree in at least some ways.

Nevertheless, the traditional framework does not capture the whole story, and might not even capture the most important determinants of individuals’ PSE decisions, especially when we keep in mind the relative youth of the individuals making the decisions; the incompleteness and complexity of the information on PSE options available and how individuals are therefore likely to resort to various “heuristics” for making their decisions; the discipline that is required to make it into – and successfully through – PSE and otherwise turn goals into achievements; the importance to youth of role models and “ideals”, as captured by their parents, their friends, and their broader cultural milieu; and other such factors.

All this is only meant to open up the idea – backed by some theoretical underpinnings – that PSE decisions may diverge from the narrow considerations and assumptions of the standard neoclassical economics paradigm that has driven thinking in this area for so long in an important way, and that “culture” may play an important role. Ultimately this is an empirical issue. In that spirit, and with that framework established, we now turn to the evidence.
Empirical evidence

This section presents empirical evidence on patterns of access to PSE that first identifies the origins of the earlier focus on affordability as the predominant “barrier” to PSE, then works through a set of additional findings that can be interpreted as steering us away from “money” and towards the importance of “culture” as being the main driver of access to PSE. Except where indicated, the evidence all comes from various studies based on the Canadian Youth in Transition Survey, Cohort A (“YITS-A”), which is briefly discussed, followed by the empirical findings themselves.

The YITS-A dataset, the measurement of access to PSE, the presentation of the findings

The YITS-A data is ideal for this analysis since it follows a representative sample of Canadian high-school students aged 15 in 1999 through their high-school years and beyond. It is extremely comprehensive in background information on the child’s development, experiences and attitudes while in high school, as well as detailed information on the family situation, especially in the first survey of the series.

The YITS-A, created by Statistics Canada in collaboration with Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, began with the completion of a written survey in early 2000 by those youth selected into the dataset (the sample was designed to be representative of all Canadian youth). In that year, interviews were also conducted with the parents of these students and with officials of the high schools attended. The YITS-A also contains the youths’ Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) reading scores (an international standardised test in which Canada participated). The students themselves (although not their parents or school administrators) were surveyed again at two-year intervals through to 2009, when they were age 25 (referred to as Cycles 1 through 6).

In this paper, respondents’ PSE status is measured as of Cycle 4 of the YITS, when they were 21 years of age. This was considered to be the optimal compromise between the ability to identify participation in PSE (which increases with age) and sample size (which decreases over time) and any associated potential sample bias (which may increase over cycles, despite the sample weights designed to counteract any such effects).

The dependent variable employed is an indicator of whether the individual had enrolled in college or university at any point over the first four cycles of the survey, regardless of whether they continued in their studies after that. This is the standard definition of access to PSE used in the literature; continuing on to graduation and other aspects of persistence are
normally thought of as being a separate process. Access to college and university is differentiated, counting the latter if the individual attended both.

The results presented below represent the marginal effects of the variables indicated generated by a multinomial logit regression model where the outcomes are either i) no PSE, ii) college, or iii) university, and only a few other basic control variables are included (e.g. province and area size of residence). These effects are expressed as the differences in the probability of attending PSE associated with each variable shown, controlling for the other variables included in the models. Only the effects on university attendance are shown here, because this is where the differences are greatest.

**Empirical findings**

**Family income and parental education effects**

Figure 3 shows university access rates by family income level in comparison to the omitted middle-income category (CAD 50 000-75 000), for males. The first of each pair of bars shows the effects found in a model that does not include parental education; the second bars show the effects when parental education is included.

When parental education is omitted, the income effects are sizeable, with a difference in access rates of almost 30 percentage points between those from the highest- and lowest-income families. These are strong effects in a context where overall male university access rates are around 34%.

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Figure 3. Marginal effects of family income on access to university, males

This is the sort of evidence that has historically been taken as pointing to the importance of financial factors generally, and affordability in particular, in determining access to PSE. This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the conventional economic model with its focus on costs and benefits and a policy orientation focused on making PSE affordable.

The second set of bars, however, reveals a very different story. When parental education (i.e. the highest level of education attained by the youth’s mother or father) is included in the model, the university access gap across the highest and lowest family-income groups narrows to around 10 percentage points – or about a third of what it was previously. What were previously interpreted as income effects are thus seen to be omitted parental education effects that were captured by the income variable. (No previous data sets had accurate information on parental education and family income for the individuals included in their samples). Better data and a more fully specified model thus change the story greatly.

Figure 4 depicts the evidence for females. The story is much the same as for males except the income effects everywhere are stronger – in both the “unadjusted” (for parental education) models and where parental education is controlled. A similar decline as was observed for males in the differences in university participation rates across income groups, from almost 40 percentage points, where parental education is omitted, to around 20 points when it is included.

Figure 4. Marginal effects of family income on access to university, females
included – this in a context where overall university participation rates for females are about 50%.

Figure 5 shows the “final” income effects for males and females (i.e. with parental education included in each case). These results can be contrasted to those shown in Figure 6, which presents the parental education effects themselves (high school completed is the omitted group). The range in access rates across parental education groups is approximately 50 percentage points for both males and females, as compared to the 10-20 percentage points for income. Even if we ignore the highest education group (professional or graduate degrees), the range is in the 35-40 percentage point range for those with university degrees in comparison to less than high school completed, and still a full 30 percentage points when the comparison is made to those whose parents had only high school completed but no PSE.

These are strong effects and suggest that “culture”, as captured by parental education, is a much more important determinant of access to PSE than is “money”, as captured by family income.

**Adding additional background effects**

Figure 7 shows the results of a model that includes an additional set of background variables. To allow for simpler summary representations of the effects of the various influences, family income is included in the form of a single linear variable, and the same is done with parental education. Also
Figure 6. *Marginal effects of parental education on access to university, by sex*

Source: Statistics Canada (2002-07), Youth in transition survey, Cycles 1 to 4, Cohort A (database), using University of Ottawa at www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/irpe-epri/eng/data_yits.asp.

Figure 7. *Marginal effects of student/family characteristics on access to university, males and females*

Note: Figures 7 and 8 have different scales from Figures 3 to 6.
Source: Statistics Canada (2002-07), Youth in transition survey, Cycles 1 to 4, Cohort A (database), using University of Ottawa at www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/irpe-epri/eng/data_yits.asp.

included in this model are overall high school grades at age 15 (expressed as the student’s overall average in percentage terms); the student’s PISA reading score (range of 0-600 with a standard deviation of about 100); and an indicator of whether they are a visible minority immigrant (in this case meaning they came to Canada by age 15 in order to be included in the YITS).
This model requires some careful interpretation, since grades and PISA scores may be, at least partly, related to family background characteristics (thus diminishing the estimated effects of these) and, at least partly, endogenous to the decision to go on to PSE if that decision has already been made; it is, nonetheless, revealing.

First, the income effects are now quite small: a difference in family incomes of CAD 50 000 (a very large difference) is, for example, associated with only a 2 percentage point difference in university attendance rates. This further suggests that money in general, and affordability in particular, are not very important factors in determining university access rates.

Secondly, parental education still has a strong effect, with four years of education worth around 12 percentage points, or about six times the effect of CAD 50 000 of family income. Although these education effects are smaller than seen above, they represent those effects after controlling for grades and PISA scores, which are themselves, at least partly, affected by parental education (as well as income). Parental education thus has a sizeable “direct” effect on participation, as well as a sizeable “indirect” effect through grades and PISA scores.

Third, the grade and PISA score effects themselves are strong as well. Not surprisingly, having a higher grade point average or having a higher PISA score are both associated with much higher university attendance rates, pointing to the importance of early preparations.

Finally, even after controlling for family income, parental education, high school grades and PISA scores, being a visible minority immigrant is associated with university access rates almost 20 percentage points higher, on average, than those of non-visible minority students who were born in Canada. Canada tends to be an outlier in the PSE attainment rates of its immigrant population, and in some cases these are truly staggering, such as university access rates of almost 90% for first generation Chinese immigrants.17

This immigrant-ethnicity result is interpreted here as another expression of “culture”, although culture of a different type than that captured by parental education, since it is not the effect of past PSE experience on the part of the parents that is operating (parental education is controlled for in this model), but rather a drive to achieve PSE success that is somehow instilled in the first-generation Canadian born children of some immigrant populations.

**Early experiences and cultural capital**

Figure 8 demonstrates the effects of culture by showing the results of a model that includes not only family income and parental education, but identifies cultural influences in a different way. It includes a range of PISA
index variables that represent the environment to which the child was exposed and the experiences they had when young (age 15 in this case). These include the “cultural communication” the child experienced with their parents, their “social communication”, the family education support they received in the form of help with their school work, a proxy for family wealth, a proxy for home educational resources available to the child, cultural activities, cultural possessions, the amount they read, and the diversity of those reading activities.

Figure 8. **Marginal effects of PISA indices on access to university, by sex**

Note: Figures 7 and 8 have different scales from Figures 3 to 6.
Source: Statistics Canada (2002-07), Youth in transition survey, Cycles 1 to 4, Cohort A (database), using University of Ottawa at www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/irpe-epri/eng/data_yits.asp.

These can be thought of as representing various aspects of “culture” and family-based activities that would otherwise prepare the child for PSE. Figure 8 shows that almost all of the cultural variables matter – even as these variables are all included in the model together, along with parental education and family income. Parent-child communication matters, the resources available matter, activities matter – although there are a few anomalies and otherwise curious results. In particular, help with homework is negatively associated with access to university, but this could be an indicator of a child needing help. Also, cultural possessions, per se, don’t matter, but cultural activities do matter. Reading matters, but what the child reads does not seem to matter.¹⁸

Perhaps most importantly, these results would also seem to point towards the sorts of policy initiatives that could be adopted in order to change/
improve the child’s “culture” in a way that would put them on the path to PSE, perhaps especially for those who are at a disadvantage in terms of their family environment. We cannot change individuals’ families, but we can attempt to compensate for those who are disadvantaged in this respect.

**Barriers to PSE and when decisions are made**

Two last sets of results cast further light on PSE choices. Figure 9 shows what young people who did not go to PSE say regarding the “barriers” they faced. Almost 25% said their educational goals simply did not include PSE (shown as “goal is high school”), while 43% said they faced no barriers. These were the most prevalent responses.

![Figure 9. Among those who do not access, barriers to PSE(%)](source)


After this, 23% said that financial factors were at least one barrier they faced, but this does not separate i) those who could not afford to go, and ii) those who simply did not see the value in PSE and in that sense found “it costs too much”. Other work undertaken (not shown here) suggests that most of those who cite financial barriers did not face financing barriers per se, presumably leaving statements like “it costs too much” to be interpreted as the youths not seeing PSE as having sufficient worth, rather than their not being able to afford to go. The policy responses of these different interpretations are very different: with one, loans or grants are required; with the other, the attitude to PSE is the problem.

Figure 10 concludes the empirical results by showing when students say they made their PSE decisions. Results are shown for both college and
university students. Remarkably, a full 40% of those who went to university said they had “always known” they were going to university, and another 40% said they had decided by grades 9 or 10 (age 15-16). That leaves only around 20% who said they decided towards the end of high school or later.

These results suggest that PSE decisions are made early, in many cases very early. This is hard to square with the rational economics model, which assumes a set of careful calculations of future costs and benefits of PSE and the alternative options, and would further point towards these decisions’ being culturally determined.

**Conclusion**

This paper has argued that a new model is needed for understanding decisions regarding PSE attendance – a model that considers “culture”.

Economists, who have been the main proponents of the dominant established model, tend to be uncomfortable with notions of culture, but this paper has appealed to emerging ideas in behavioural economics to provide a theoretical foundation for going this route, while the empirical evidence presented has pointed to the apparent importance of cultural factors as determinants of PSE participation rates.

This proposition obviously suggests the existence of both an opportunity and a challenge for policy makers wanting to improve equity and opportunities for going on to higher education, especially for disadvantaged youth. The policy challenge is to understand and respond to the question of...
how PSE access opportunities can be improved, especially when cultural influences appear to be so important, and then to implement policies that accomplish this goal.

How can PSE opportunities be improved for children whose parents did not themselves have the experience of PSE and thus may be limited (as the data indicate) in terms of providing a “pro-PSE environment” for their children with respect to the values they form, the degree to which they are prepared for PSE, and the actual choices they make as to whether to attend a college or university?

The reality is that the types of programmes and policies needed to address cultural determinants of PSE enrolment are not yet known, particularly as this is a nascent area of research. However, we now understand that this is what we need to learn, so that we can then design and implement policies that are effective in this regard, thus getting us away from the old “financial factors” focus and onto one that has the potential of making a much greater difference. Further research, the implementation and evaluation of trial programmes and other such initiatives are needed to inform and guide the next steps towards achieving higher PSE enrolment rates.

Perhaps, for example, programmes and guidelines could be put into place whereby youth – perhaps especially disadvantaged youth – are taken for visits to college and university campuses starting early (possibly as early as primary school) so that institutions of this sort become something they know, and they may therefore consider attending one a real option in their lives. Academic support may also play a key role. Peer group/mentoring programmes could be initiated. Helping students prepare application forms for PSE when the time approaches may be part of a solution. Gándara (2001) has provided a typology for classifying and ordering policies of this type, while Orders and Duquette (2010) have provided a review of policies that have been attempted to these ends in a number of OECD countries.

While we have much to learn, what we do know is that equalising PSE opportunities is central to equalising life chances for children in care, that “culture” is probably critical to this, and policy has to follow in this vein.

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Notes

1. Such Census-based age-earnings profiles represent only a “snapshot” of earnings of individuals of different ages and education levels at a single point in time, and do not necessarily indicate how earnings change over time for given individuals of any given age cohort, but they are often used as a rough proxy of these, and serve our purposes here for this reason. These graphs include males and females together. Splitting the results by gender would show greater returns to PSE for females, lower returns for males.

2. The Canadian dollar currently trades at approximately par with the American dollar, and tends to range within a 10 or 15 cent band (either way) over time.

3. Costs may also factor into these decisions, with those for whom schooling costs are lower also tending to be more likely to go to PSE. But with costs being relatively equal across individuals (and their families), the emphasis is usually on the benefits side.

4. This relationship does not hold exactly when PSE is significantly subsidised by the state (as is usually the case in developed countries), when taxes introduce distortions and for other reasons – but the general principle of private and social benefits being related still generally holds.

5. Education is not like other kinds of investments in a number of important ways, which makes borrowing to finance the investment problematic. Most important is the lack of collateral, since the capital in which the investment is being made is embodied in the individual and cannot be seized if a loan is not repaid. Risk pooling is also an issue, due primarily to self-selection problems. These and related factors have given rise to government involvement in student loan programmes in Canada and most other developed countries. The issue remains as to the adequacy of these systems and the potential affordability barriers that may persist.

6. Other programmes aimed at helping students and their families pay for PSE include PSE tax credits, the Registered Education Savings Program (RESP), the Canadian Education Savings Grant (CESG), and others, but these are not specifically targeted to students in need, which is one reason why they tend to be
roundly criticised in the context of PSE “access” policies. See Finnie, Usher and Vossensteyn (2004a, b) for a general description of the Canadian student financial aid system and suggestions for reform to make it more effective at helping those who truly need the assistance.

7. See Finnie, Childs and Wismer (2011) on access to PSE by students from various under-represented groups, including those from low-income families.

8. For Canada, see Finnie and Mueller (2008) for evidence on these income and education effects in particular, and Finnie, Sweetman and Usher (2008) for a discussion of the “cultural” argument in the face of this and other related empirical evidence. Similar and related developments have been taking place elsewhere, especially in the United States, led by the work of James Heckman and various co-authors, including Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002) and Cunha and Heckman (2007). This latter work emphasises the importance of early childhood development, which represents a more restricted notion of “cultural influences” than is developed here, but similarly puts the focus on non-financial factors and the importance of what happens early in a child’s life as opposed to family income, liquidity constraints, and other financial factors that may come into play at the end of high school when PSE decisions are nominally made.

9. Some might argue that the conventional (economics-based) model can be elaborated to capture “cultural” influences, but this is rarely done, and variants that completely ignore cultural influences remain highly dominant.

10. The age-earnings profiles shown likely reflect more than the “returns to education”, since some of the earnings differences among those with different levels of education would likely have held even in the absence of any differences in educational attainment. That is, those with higher levels of schooling may have earned more than others without actually getting the schooling they did. But the differences by education level shown probably reflect the effects of the education obtained to at least some degree, and are sufficient to motivate the theoretical concepts discussed here. Also, the earnings patterns shown represent “earnings premia” rather than the returns to PSE directly, which need to take the costs of the associated investments into account (discussed below), but these details do not matter to the conceptual discussion here.

11. Economists typically assume costs and benefits in future years have a “discount rate” applied, which essentially assumes that a dollar held now is worth more than one that will be received in the future, if only because current dollars could be invested and earn a return, but the basic ideas being presented here do not depend on these more technical aspects of the model.

12. If costs vary across individuals, as may be the case where some parents pay for their children’s education and some do not, or the costs of financing the education otherwise differ, this can affect the decision as well, even beyond the affordability issue focused on here. See Carmichael and Finnie (2008) and Finnie (2005) on these considerations.

13. Other evidence suggests that tuition fees have relatively little influence on PSE choices (Coelli, 2009; Neill, 2009).

14. See Motte et al. (2009) for a general description of the YITS.

15. The reference date for each survey was 31 December of the preceding year. So, for example, all youth were age 15 as of that date in 1999, and many questions pertained to either activities leading up to and at that specific date. Subsequent
interviews were carried out in the spring of 2002 through 2010 and again used 31 December of the preceding year as the reference point, and generally covered activities in the two-year period since the preceding interview.

16. The results in this section are largely derived from Finnie and Mueller, 2008.

17. See Finnie and Mueller (2010) for a general analysis of PSE access rates by the children of immigrants.

18. See Childs, Finnie and Mueller (2010) for the full analysis from which these results are taken.

19. These results are taken from another dataset of PSE students, as described in Finnie, Childs and Wismer (2010).

References


The professionalisation of degree courses in France: New issues in an old debate

by
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In this article, the author discusses the professionalisation of university courses, noting that there are two different views concerning the mission of universities: the dissemination of knowledge and training highly skilled workers to benefit national economies. He explains that in France, for many years, due to the singularity of the organisation of its higher educational system, it was assumed that universities were not concerned with the professionalisation of degree courses. But from the 1960s onwards, there was a change that consisted in introducing vocational courses into universities. This movement is taking on a new form in the 2010s: the aim is to professionalise general courses to improve young graduates’ employability. To achieve this goal, the state provides subsidies to universities, partly on the basis of the employment rate of graduates. The author concludes that this situation may prove untenable for universities.
La professionnalisation des cursus en France : nouveaux enjeux d’un vieux débat

par
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Introduction

The question of the professionalisation of university courses is not new. In general, there are two conflicting views. According to the first of these, universities are firstly places of culture, whereas the second considers that courses in higher education should also provide the productive system with a flow of highly skilled workers. According to its usual meaning, professionalisation corresponds to the latter position. In France, until the end of the 1960s, the task assigned to universities was in line with the former point of view, even if they did concern themselves to some extent with the training of certain professionals. From the 1970s onwards, there began a continuous movement towards the professionalisation of university courses, in response to the rising problem of graduate unemployment. This consisted of introducing vocational courses into universities, that is to say courses oriented towards employment in the private sector. Today, this movement is taking on a new form: the professionalisation of general courses in order to improve young graduates’ employability.

To incite universities to professionalise general courses and to make them feel responsible for the future of their graduates in the labour market, the state has decided to change the way of calculating university subsidies. These are no longer calculated solely on the number of students, but also on the employment rate of graduates. This situation may prove untenable for higher education institutions. Indeed, the success of professionalised courses depends, amongst other factors, upon a number of conditions of study, including selective intake, reduced student numbers and close relations with businesses. Yet, none of these conditions applies to general courses of study within universities. In France, university admittance is open to all those who have completed high school (achieved the baccalauréat), thus universities cannot select their students. In addition, due to a lack of connections with the business world and the weight of student numbers, they are unable to offer professional work experience and training for students. As a result – except in the case of a total overhaul of the higher education system – it is difficult to see how it could be possible for general courses of university study to be professionalised, in the way understood by the authorities, while improving the professional integration of students.

This article first discusses the various definitions of professionalisation, noting, in particular, that, in the case of higher education, the focus is on
defining professionalisation as a concept of employability. It next presents the main stages in the professionalisation of university courses in France, focusing on the situation in the 2010s. Finally, it argues that if the French higher education system remains, as it is today, the professionalisation of university courses is unlikely to achieve the desired outcome of increased professional employment of graduates.

The professionalisation of educational training at universities in France: A historical perspective

**Academic educational training vs. professionalising educational training: The foundations of the debate**

The question of the professionalisation of university courses has been debated ever since the current higher education systems were set up in the 19th century. In short, there are two opposing views on this issue. One view, expressed in two different ways, believes that the mission of universities is primarily to be institutions that disseminate knowledge and/or create knowledge (Renaut, 1995). The first variation is known as the liberal or “Newmanian” approach. It affords priority to culture in general and believes in a kind of “neutral” intellectual education (knowledge in and of itself is sufficient). In some countries, such as the United States, this type of model can be found at all universities in the shape of “Liberal Arts” colleges, which are attended prior to undertaking professional studies (Burdoncle and Lessart, 2002). The second variation is known as the scientific or “Humboldtian” approach. It believes priority should be given to education by science and for science. This kind of scientific tropism has become more and more pervasive within the arts and humanities, with a significant increase in the number of mathematics and applied statistics modules being offered that allow students to expand their professional horizons to include public and private organisations for research, consulting or expert knowledge (e.g. sociology, psychology).

The Humboldt and the Newman models have two common fundamental characteristics. Firstly, they are implicitly based on the premise that higher education is not designed to teach students the kind of professional skills that can be directly applied in the workplace (this task is left to vocational colleges, which train operational staff). As a result, the role of universities is to disseminate general knowledge that would be useful in all areas of work. This is for two reasons: because this offers graduates far more potential career opportunities, as the focus is on their ability to adapt to new situations (when changing jobs, for example), and because professional skills are mostly acquired on the job anyway and can vary greatly from one company to another. Secondly, professional training and academic studies cannot
therefore be distinguished, because the latter in fact covers all the requirements of the former.

Although it was inspired by the Humboldt model, the second view which came from the United States (Harvard University) differs from it fundamentally. In this view, knowledge and research cannot be an end in themselves, but should be a vehicle for progress in all areas of economic and social life. This means that universities are there for the benefit of society, as a whole. Professional vocational training is just one type of training among many and should be considered as being on a par with academic studies. This does not detract in any way from one of the key missions of any university, which is to offer a high standard of general education designed to equip students with all the analytical skills they will need to understand and deal with the kinds of complex situations that they may have to face in their professional careers. In this way, professional vocational training would always have an academic component, but this would not be sufficient in itself, as discussed above. However, here professional vocational training has another practical component in addition to the first, and that is to immerse the student in the “concrete” professional world. It is implicit in this concept that the universities are keen to help the students they are educating to find their place in the world of work.

French universities stand more in the tradition of Humboldt and professional vocational training within the faculties has traditionally been limited to training doctors, lawyers and teachers. It was not until the 1960s that ideas started to take hold that universities could, and indeed should, be involved in training qualified staff for the private sector. This led to the expansion of the definition of professionalisation, altering it so that it became more and more to be associated with the idea of employability.

The specificity of the French case

While the French system takes its roots within the Humboldtian tradition, it is characterised by a specific aspect, which is not to be found in any other industrialised country. The professionalising process of its universities cannot be understood without taking into account the singularity of the organisation of its higher educational system.

It was decided during the French Revolution that certain higher educational establishments of a superior level, called “Grandes Ecoles” (Great Schools), were to be created as independent entities of the universities. Their destiny was to educate the nation’s administrative and technical elite. Since 1870, other similar establishments, focusing primarily on the economic sphere, such as the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC, 1881) were created. The common characteristics of these establishments are those that
differentiate them from universities: recruitment on the basis of competition ("concours") (while the high-school exam, the baccalauréat, is the only pre-requisition necessary for enrolment at a university), an accent on technical and professionalised knowledge, the creation of powerful networks within professionalised domains, and highly developed elitist thinking. Until the 1960s, the higher educational system was structured on this bipolarity, universities/Grandes Écoles. A certain kind of complementarity between the two types of institutions became institutionalised, which explains why the universities have put off professionalisation, for so long, to the benefit of these Grandes Écoles. In schematic terms, it was up to the universities to provide research and education for the cultural elite, while their professionalisation was generally limited to the training of middle- and high-school teachers, medical doctors and lawyers. The training of the economic and administrative elite was a task for the Grandes Écoles. This is what constitutes the French specificity.

In other countries, via such institutions as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Munich University of Applied Sciences (Fachhochschule) or the Anglia Ruskin University in Cambridge, the professionalising curricula are integrated into the university system and function accordingly (Schwartz, 1987). They are identical to other higher education curricula through the general practice of a high level of selection for entry.

Although university education has long lacked a professionalisation component, it has been central to the debate over the purpose of academic education within French universities. It is, however, only since the 1960s that professionalisation has become a question for national concern because of initiatives by individual universities to introduce the concept into their courses, rather than waiting for public policy changes. In fact, these initiatives only concerned a small number of scientifically oriented universities, which created new applied educational training based on the latest evolution within research without, necessarily, responding to any pre-existing demands coming from industry. The educational training offered was not to be adapted to the demands of the productive system. It should also be noted that universities focussing on the humanities and law were not at all concerned by such initiatives, at least not until an era of radical change during the 1960s.

The first stages in professionalising university educational training during the 1960s and 1970s

The diversification of the student population and an increase in the need for a qualified labour supply during the 1960s

The 1960s was marked by a breach within the French higher educational system leading to a commitment to the re-evaluation of the professionalising
mission of universities. This re-evaluation gave way to the creation of the first professional curricula. This revolution can be explained in the context of an era marked by a rapid and unprecedented increase in the number of students and through growing economic needs for a qualified labour supply within the productive system.

Along with the increase in the number of students, an evolution of the social structure of the cohort group at universities began. The “new” student cohort came, for the first time, from the middle and popular classes. Public institutions realised that the university could no longer provide education aimed, almost exclusively, at teaching and research, as the students coming from a more diversified range of social classes had diversified abilities and professional aims. Universities needed to adapt to provide preparation for professions within the private sector, in particular those within industry and management.

During the same period, the Commissariat Général au Plan (General Commission of Planning) or CGP, created after the Second World War, advised the government on economic matters. It was in charge of drawing up medium-term material and human investment policies to support modernisation of the country.

The CGP noted that technical, supervisory and managerial positions tended to be filled through internal promotion (the internal market) by personnel who had many years of on-the-job experience, but who generally held only a technical diploma, had completed a short vocational course (technicians and supervisors), or had gained a general diploma at a lower level equal to that of the baccalauréat. This posed problems in that increasingly complex production and management techniques required staff to have intermediate or higher-level qualifications that could not be acquired through on-the-job training, especially in a period of rapid technological change; a skilled labour shortage was bound to occur. The CGP proposed to adjust educational training to meet the needs of the productive sector, despite the efforts that would be required.

The Grandes Ecoles were considered too elitist to provide a sufficient number of potential skilled workers. Their role was thus not to be changed and they conserved something of a monopoly position in educating the nation’s management and administrative elites. The solution was the creation of the Instituts universitaires de technologie – University Technical Institutes (IUT) in 1966. These institutes provide two-year undergraduate vocational training.

As the IUTs were being brought into existence, it was decided that professionalising curricula within universities should be defined in order to provide them with an operational content and an official status. Clarification was necessary, in particular to define the concept of professionalisation. As a
general principle, a study course was said to be “professionalised” if it offered or developed skills that could be usefully applied in a professional situation. Chirache and Vincens (1992) noted that all higher education courses have a vocational element, to a greater or lesser extent, in that they have a vocational purpose. This is still the situation because such courses generally lead to employment for most of the students. However, using this definition, professionalisation could have a number of implications. Gayraud et al. (2011), for example, note that it could lead to:

- selective admission;
- a significant proportion of the curriculum’s being taught by industry professionals;
- work placements in companies which are recognised as being suitable for the particular degree course; and
- a curriculum mainly, but not exclusively, designed to facilitate employment in the private sector.

Thus, the creation of university technology institutes served to clear the path for the creation of new types of universities offering vocational training. From then on, the movement towards professionalisation would become unstoppable and would have an effect on ever-greater numbers of students.

**The change in the economic context in the 1970s**

In the decades that followed, another step was taken in the professionalisation of university courses. From the mid-1970s, it became more and more difficult for young people to find jobs, which led to the idea that making university courses more vocational would help in the fight against youth unemployment. Both the 1970s and the 1980s saw a radical transformation in the labour market for post-secondary graduates compared to that of the 1960s; it moved from having excess demand to excess supply.

During these years, the French government turned the professionalisation of higher education into a major objective on the assumption that it would lead to greater employment perspectives. However, at the same time, fewer higher education teachers were being recruited. Second and third cycle degrees were created in support of the government's goals to develop a complete professionalising curriculum within universities (until then only the first cycle was concerned). This was intended to widen the professional range of degrees and thereby create a larger pool of labour for highly qualified jobs.

Several new professional vocational diplomas were created within the higher education framework. Even though objectives changed over the years, the methods of achieving greater professionalisation remained the same:
expanding the range of training offered by creating new diplomas alongside more traditional academic qualifications. These courses all had certain things in common in that they were selective, industry professionals taught parts of the courses and they included fairly long periods of work placement. These characteristics were what set them apart from general courses, which, with very few exceptions, were open courses that remained distanced from the business world.

General curriculum subjects are equally concerned by the professionalising movement. The Faure law, voted in 1968, reorganised the French university system and introduced for the first time a concept of professional orientation among students as being one of the university's missions, general curriculum subjects included, if these contribute to the enlargement of the disciplinary horizon of the student. This differentiates it from educational training, the goal of which is to train students for a specific profession. The aim is clearly to draw students' attention to that which concerns the employment issue by accompanying them in the formulation of a coherent professional project. What is most important is that, textually, universities had no obligation to obtain employment results for their graduates. In other words, they were held to putting in place information and orientation services, but not to take care of their professional insertion by making sure they had an offer of educational training that answered to the needs of the productive system. However, there is nothing that kept them from proposing optional professionalising modules, nor to include compulsory business internships within their educational training.

Factually, until the 1990s, the sole idea of professionalisation (even in the simplest of its expressions) within general curriculum subjects met great hostility from part of the university world (Renaut, 1995). This is due to the fact that, for many teacher-researchers, the university could not be asked to submit the educational training it dispenses to the needs of the employment market. This would reveal a utilitarian conception of knowledge and this would mean derogation from its historical mission, which is the transmission of "expert" and disinterested knowledge and of research. Subsequently, universities have applied the minimum imposed by the law, when it comes to the orientating and informing of students. Very few have proposed optional professionally oriented courses, or otherwise favoured co-operation with the business world.

Despite the resistance from part of the academic world, the 1960s and 1970s nonetheless represent a historic rupture within the history of the French higher educational system. The affirmation of a professionally oriented mission for universities and the implementation of explicitly business-oriented curricula – which generated contacts between two worlds that had previously ignored each other – constitute some of the greatest changes
known to the higher educational system since the 19th century. In addition, the structure of the university system changed because the gap between the Grandes Ecoles and the universities narrowed, thanks to the creation of professionalising curricula. The higher educational system was no longer characterised by the bipolar opposition between Grandes Ecoles and universities, but, rather, consisted of a first group uniting the traditional open general curriculum subjects in the universities, a second comprising the closed professionalising curricula with academic status, and finally the Grandes Ecoles.

The new era of professionalisation

The question of youth employment, which gave rise to the issue of employability, was to become a central focus of EU employment policies and became the recurring theme of university policy makers in France. The Attali Report (1998) was representative of this new direction. Specifically, it was to lead the universities to consider carefully how to re-orient courses offered to meet the demands of the labour market by making it easier for graduates to integrate into the working world. The latest chapter on the process of professionalisation was written in 2007, resulting in legal reforms relating to the freedoms and responsibilities of universities (Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités, the LRU), which constituted a clear break with the past.

Professionalisation and employability

The notion of employability as a university concern dates from the 1920s in the United States in debates concerning unemployment and labour markets (Gazier, 1998). The notion was barely used in Europe until the 1990s, because it was considered much too vague in view of the diversity of admittance rules for tertiary education institutes. However, it was strongly supported as a central element of employment policy, particularly concerning young people, as part of a European strategy linked to the neoliberal movement (Haug, 2001). The definition of employability used by European institutions could be summarised as: “a group of factors that have an effect on the individual’s capacity of finding a job or of changing the one he/she already has; this capacity being, amongst other things, influenced by the skills that can be sold by this individual” (Gazier, 2001; McQuaid and Danson Green, 2005).

Employability implies the capacity to build, entertain and develop useful skills, adapted to the labour market, while ensuring productivity, flexibility and mobility. Important elements of employability should be acquired during studies: a recognised qualification (degree), knowledge (general and professional), suitable business behaviour and adaptation capacities. In this
perspective, the professionalisation of university courses has become closely linked to the employability of young people and it should thus be improved.

In this light, universities should adapt the content of their courses to meet the needs of industry and ensure that their graduates are able to respond to the needs of the labour market. The main problem is in identifying these needs. Should priority be given to teaching vocational subjects (preparatory skills and knowledge relating to a particular trade or career or a range of trades or careers), to general education, or to the development of the ability to adapt and behave in a way that is valued in the workplace (self-management skills)? As far as academic courses are concerned, it is clear that providing students with employability means developing attitudes that are of value on the labour market (i.e. soft skills such as communication, interpersonal, critical thinking, decision making, problem solving).

**New procedures and challenges of the professionalisation**

**Why should academic Bachelor’s degrees have a vocational emphasis?**

Although new training courses have hitherto been intended to parallel existing academic courses, a new trend is to give vocational emphasis to all university courses. Although Master’s degrees are also affected, the most revolutionary and problematic changes concern academic Bachelor’s degrees. Any attempt to give vocational emphasis to academic Bachelor’s degrees has long been postponed, especially in the liberal arts and the social sciences. This is because, until the end of the 1980s, graduates from these courses managed to enter the employment market without much difficulty. After years of significant decline, the recruitment of teachers for secondary education began to rise substantially at the beginning of the decade when the Socialists came to power (1981), whereas, at the same time, the number of students had risen very slowly.

The situation changed profoundly in the 1990s when a sudden change in supply and demand occurred simultaneously, making it more difficult for liberal arts and social science students to find jobs. Workplace demand for these qualifications continued to decline steadily for 15 years and private-sector employers offered few alternative openings for liberal arts and social science graduates, who experienced the greatest difficulty in finding a career (Table 1).

Despite the declining labour force demand for liberal arts and social science graduates, over the same period, liberal arts and social science courses saw the most rapid expansion in student numbers, compared with other disciplines. In 2008, more than half (53%) of Bachelor’s students were enrolled in such courses, while 21% were studying law or economics and 26% science, medicine and engineering (Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 2010). This
situation results partly from the continuity of disciplines between high school and higher education in France. Many students have no specific idea about their future careers and consider their university studies to be a continuation of their subject choices at high school. This situation is very specific to France, especially compared to the United Kingdom or Germany where the university system works differently, in particular because pupils’ studies are much less specialised in secondary school academic courses than in France. For example, in 2009-2010 in Germany, the proportion of university students enrolled in different specialities was 19% in liberal art and social sciences, 31% in law, economics and politics and 50% in science, medicine and engineering (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010).

A second factor which led the regulatory authority to increase the vocational emphasis in Bachelor’s degrees derives from the decline in opportunities for graduates, some students having continued their studies to Master’s level, although they would have preferred to have entered the labour market straight after obtaining their Bachelor’s degree, if it had offered them sufficient job opportunities. The regulatory authority considered it had good reason to improve the employment prospects of these students by improving the vocational emphasis of the syllabus of Bachelor’s degrees.

Methods of increasing the vocational emphasis of academic Bachelor’s degrees

A fundamental question is what actions can contribute to reaching the objectives set for universities by the regulatory authority. There are two sides to this: course content and funding.

A new vocational emphasis in course content could make academic degrees comparable to vocational Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees. This would

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<th>Table 1. Analysis by discipline of graduates with Bachelor’s degrees about integration in the labour market three years after finishing education in 2008</th>
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<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degrees</td>
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<td>– Liberal Arts and Social Sciences</td>
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require the development of courses intended for clearly specified careers and offer students experience in the professional environment through compulsory job placement. Such a vocational emphasis, if it is to be effective in providing employment opportunities (Table 1), still presents several problems. First of all, it cannot include all courses, as it remains necessary to maintain the “traditional” disciplines to produce teachers and researchers. Furthermore, universal application of the principle would certainly lead to the disappearance of entire academic disciplines for which this kind of vocational emphasis would be very difficult to apply (Latin, Ancient Greek or Philosophy, for example). There is also the question of research in universities which would be at risk of becoming merely centres of higher vocational education.

Funding is a crucial element of the reform: vocational courses are more expensive than academic ones. In 2007, the last year for which comparisons are still available, the difference between average expenditure per student in university vocational courses and in academic courses is approximately EUR 1,000 per year, an additional cost to the taxpayer of approximately EUR 1.3 billion. The current state of public finances does not permit this kind of increase in expenditure. Besides, this kind of vocational emphasis presumes that graduates will be able to find placements in a professional environment, which may be idealistic. The supply of job openings is inevitably inferior to demand in certain professions, which implies limiting student numbers to enhance their chances of employment on graduation.

Well aware of these difficulties, as part of the 2007 Plan réussite en licence (Plan for success at Bachelor’s level), the minister decided on another, limited vision which consists of courses with early vocational emphasis alongside academic teaching. The central idea of the reform was to provide students with multidisciplinary skills that could be used in all professions, such as computer literacy and modern languages, and encourage them to think seriously about their future careers. To establish contact with the world of work, students were incited to seek placements from their first year onwards by allowing them to validate these work experiences as optional credits in their courses. In the third year of the Bachelor’s degree, placements became compulsory. The choice at the end of their Bachelor’s degree to pursue further study or enter the world of work was, thus, to be made clearer.

Contradictory injunctions?

At first sight, the LRU does not seem to be fundamentally different from the Faure law when it comes to the university’s mission of professionalisation. However, the two texts are philosophically radically different. While within the Faure law universities essentially aim to accompany students in their professional project, the LRU goes much further by adding the notion of professional insertion to the idea of professional orientation. The LRU aims to
produce professional, employable graduates, which requires adapting the content of educational training to the needs of the labour market. However, academic courses are “only” expected to provide their students with “soft” employability – socialising them to the working world – so there is a contradiction with former legal texts in that universities now have an obligation of achieving results and are evaluated according to a certain number of criteria corresponding to professional insertion (their success or failure in finding employment). The success to be measured is, therefore, as much the student’s as that of the university. This new mission does, then, together with criteria put in place to help combat failure in Bachelor’s exams, generate a rather difficult situation which results in contradictory injunctions for universities and academics.

For academics

As Barrier and Musselin (2011) demonstrated, the role of universities has diversified and increasingly a certain number of activities which had been considered marginal have become a part, if not always officially recognised, of the normal activities of teachers and researchers. This is a reference to administrative tasks, but also to relationships with outside bodies (the search for financing) and more recently of pedagogical supervision of students (management of placements, pedagogical support from the first years). The Belloc report (2003) recognised these changes and found that the universities could not fully assume all the new tasks which were imposed on them; consequently it was inevitable that specialisation for teachers and researchers became widespread. In practice, this would consist of adjusting teaching tasks according to other roles undertaken (research, administration, pedagogical support...). This proposal was enshrined in the LRU.

The problem remains that under present provisions, this law prioritises research because the hours spent on teaching and other tasks, some of which are related to the vocational emphasis in courses, constitute an adjustment tool for services provided by the teaching staff overall. The share of time spent on teaching and administration is deemed to be the remainder after research has been evaluated. In so far as this is a zero-sum game within an unchanging budget, reducing prestigious research hours automatically increases those spent on other services. In addition, further reducing the incentive to develop non-research activities is the fact that the right to a professor’s post is essentially based on the evaluation of her or his research, especially for the disciplines that require a special examination known as the agrégation (law, economics, management, politics, medicine, pharmacology).

Thus, there are contradictory demands. While the regulatory authority requires universities to support Bachelor’s degree students by making themselves responsible for time-consuming activities for which they have no
particular competence (working out a career plan, career advice...), university teachers are encouraged to spend as little time as possible on all activities except research if they want to improve their career prospects. A rational, optimal use of working time, within the current system, would be to leave the least career-enhancing jobs, which remain indispensable to the functioning of these institutions, to less-fortunate colleagues. In other terms, for academic staff, the opportunity cost of time for research is much less than it is for administrative and teaching activities.

For the universities

There are three possible student-selection processes that contribute to quality and recognition of degree courses: the payment of tuition fees, entry examination and the ability to introduce course failure (Fernandez and Rogerson, 1998; Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 1998). For political reasons (the fear of political agitation on campus), universities are still not allowed to select students or increase the course fees, which remain amongst the lowest for any high-income OECD member country. At the same time, as we have seen above, the state is asking universities to improve their students’ academic success and employment prospects.

A special feature of French higher education is the way it is structured around the contrast between closed institutions – which operate on a student-selection basis – and the open institutions – the vast majority of university courses – for which merely passing the baccalauréat allows students to enter. Universities are the only adjustment tool for the whole system; many students choose to go to university because they failed to enter the selective institutions. The state, thus, assigns the universities both a role as educator and a “social” mission; they are the guarantor of the legal right for all high school graduates to enter a higher education institution. Until the time of the reform (the LRU law), it was implicitly agreed that the exercise of this right meant accepting particularly high undergraduate failure rates and employment prospects that were less favourable for university graduates than for graduates from selective institutions. Correctly considering that this situation led to the waste of public money, the state decided to change the method of calculating subsidies to higher education institutions.

These subsidies are no longer based solely on the number of students, but also on their performance, such as their rate of success in degree examinations and the employment rate of graduates. Universities should therefore feel themselves responsible for the future of their graduates on the labour market and consequently modify the courses they offer. However, do the universities really possess the means to improve the employment prospects of academic Bachelor’s degrees simply by adding courses with
vocational emphasis and involving teachers in students' professional training?

This seems very doubtful. In fact, if the graduates of vocational courses enjoy favourable employment prospects, this is not just the result of the practical nature of the teaching they have received, but above all because these courses are very well regarded by the professions, with whom they have a strong profile. Otherwise, this recognition is the result of certain special circumstances: selection (the necessary condition for obtaining the cooperation of business circles), lengthy placements and limited numbers (about 20 students for each discipline in vocational courses). The vocational content of the teaching is only one element, which accounts for the success of these courses on the employment market.

More specifically, the lack of selection for universities may have as much effect on the employment prospects of graduates as the content of the courses. As Félouzis (2008) has emphasised, the major problem for academic university courses in the eyes of employers is their uncertainty about the real “quality” of the graduates. Consequently, employers are confronted with the traditional problem of adverse selection, because the quality of the job seeker’s qualification is uncertain in the case of university graduates. In the context of the excess of supply over demand for trained personnel on the job market, it is hardly surprising that employers give priority to graduates from the selective institutions, including academic graduates from institutions like “Sciences Po” (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris), whose quality is usually considered superior and more consistent than university graduates, thereby reducing the risk of recruiting a weak candidate. The contradictory demands on universities consist of being given objectives that cannot be attained simultaneously: not selecting their students and improving their employment prospects is partly dependent on course selection as perceived by employers.

Conclusion

From both an individual and collective point of view, it is very much to be hoped that universities will be able to award degrees that allow their students to enter the job market under optimum conditions. In the present state of the higher education system, it is unlikely that the measures that have been taken are likely to improve the employment prospects of graduates with academic Bachelor’s degrees.

The problem goes beyond the question of course content, even if it remains useful to provide students with skills that will be useful in the world of work. In fact, without in depth reform or a genuine upheaval in the French higher education system, it is difficult to imagine how the university might comprehensively carry out its assigned task of social insertion. What does
that mean? Primarily, it is vital that the universities cease to be the adjustment tool in a system that must be unified by ending the gulf between selective and closed courses. In fact, as the only open part of the higher education system, universities are obliged to accept weaker students or students who are unsuited to academic studies after having been refused by selective institutions. These students have a high failure rate and when they manage to pass a Bachelor’s degree, it is often after several unsuccessful efforts, harming their future employment prospects because failures are a negative signal to employers.

The establishment of selection for university, or, at least, career advice, seems inevitable if study conditions and employment prospects are to improve. This means that technical and vocational courses must be expanded for students for whom academic courses are inappropriate. Finally, the financing of higher education must be reconsidered. The generalised vocational emphasis of higher education, however it may be organised, is costly, perhaps too costly. In the present state of public finances, it is difficult to imagine how the necessary resources for financing an emphasis on vocational training could be found, if it is to be effective for social insertion. It is no coincidence that the very controversial question of raising course fees, which are very low in France, is constantly being raised.

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Attracting European academics to Turkey under the Erasmus programme

by

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This study explores the extent to which European lecturers experience barriers to participation in the Erasmus programme in relation to Turkey. The evidence indicates that, although the number of Turkish lecturers who participate in the programme has constantly been increasing, mobility from the European Union (EU) to Turkey is low. A question arises as to what measures should be taken to reduce obstacles to the academic mobility and to improve attractiveness to the Turkish higher education institutions (HEIs) to European academics. In order to understand how mobility might be increased, the study investigates key drivers and barriers that might hinder mobility and draws conclusions about ways to improve participation.
Attirer les universitaires européens en Turquie dans le cadre du programme Erasmus

par
Gönül Oğuz,
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Cette étude examine dans quelle mesure les enseignants européens rencontrent des obstacles à leur participation au programme Erasmus en Turquie. Les résultats montrent que, bien que le nombre d’enseignants turcs qui participent au programme soit en constante hausse, la mobilité de l’Union européenne (UE) vers la Turquie est faible. La question se pose de savoir quelles mesures devraient être prises pour réduire les obstacles à la mobilité et améliorer l’attractivité des établissements d’enseignement supérieur turcs pour les universitaires européens. Afin de comprendre comment augmenter la mobilité, l’étude détaille ses moteurs principaux et les obstacles qui pourraient l’entraver, et tire des conclusions sur les moyens d’améliorer la participation.
Introduction

The European Union (EU) encourages higher education institutions (HEIs) and lecturers to make full use of mobility programmes. The Erasmus Programme (EP), initially launched by the European Commission (EC) in 1987 as a student exchange programme, evolved – as an element in the EU Lifelong Learning Programme 2007-2013, of which the EP is a major part – to include higher education staff. Teaching staff, who desire to spend time at another institution outside of their home country, can apply under the programme for visiting lectureships and training. The individual chooses the receiving institution. The average duration of the staff mobility period, for both teaching assignments and staff training, is up to six weeks or at least five teaching hours, but a minimum duration of five working days is recommended strongly for lecturers, so that they may provide a meaningful contribution to the teaching programme. The objectives for visiting academics are set by an inter-institutional agreement between the home and host institution. The partner HEI is required to agree on the programme of activities to be undertaken by the visiting staff prior to the start of the mobility period. All activities must be integrated into the curricula of the host institution in terms of teaching assignments.

The Erasmus funding is the most important factor that determines the level of participation. The national agencies in each country are endowed with an Erasmus budget to manage the various programmes under its auspices. The extent to which visiting staff receive financial support to contribute to subsistence costs and to cover travel costs varies significantly across countries, since the allocation of the Erasmus budget in each country is decided by the national agencies. It should also be noted that a grant is managed by the HEIs in each participating country.

Approximately 3 100 HEIs in 33 European countries take part in the Erasmus programme. As a result, the HEIs in the participating countries introduced measures to organise mobility actions for teaching assignment and staff training. Apart from the EU27 member states, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey are eligible for the Erasmus scheme.

Academic mobility, as part of the Erasmus programme, is a key element of Turkey’s integration process with the EU. The programme is likely to
enhance the quality and reinforce the European dimension of the Turkish higher education (HE) system. At the same time, spending time abroad may help Turkish academics to develop specific skills relevant to Turkey as a non-European country. The programme may also benefit European academics through sharing knowledge and expertise with academic staff from the HEIs in Turkey.

Erasmus participation is primarily influenced by cost-benefit considerations. This study pays particular attention to the debate on the real benefits and challenges of working abroad. Its main goal is to shed light on existing barriers to participating and to suggest how the programme could be further improved in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, the aim of this article is to highlight methods to improve the inward mobility of EU academics through the Erasmus programme in Turkish HEIs. Hence several basic questions are addressed, including:

- To what extent do barriers restrain the European academics from participating in the Erasmus scheme in Turkey?
- To what extent do the Turkish national policies facilitate or hinder inward mobility?
- To what extent do European lecturers seize the opportunities that the HEIs offer them?
- To what extent does teaching in Turkey lead to academic credit for the European academics?

The study is based on the recent publications of the European Commission and other independent studies in this field. It provides a quantitative overview of academic mobility across the participating countries and analysis of the basic facts and statistics. It draws upon explanatory and interpretative models in the existing literature on academic mobility to further highlight the incentives and barriers to mobility.

**Quantitative trends**

Although considerable commentary exists regarding the Erasmus scheme, it is difficult to obtain separate quantitative data about academic mobility. This is partly due to the fact that the participating countries do not monitor mobility potential effectively. The lack of data has placed limitations on what can be inferred from the overall patterns and trends. In spite of this, data from the European Commission (Education and Culture DG) is used to form the basis of the preliminary assessment of mobility flows. Hence, it has been possible to obtain quantitative trends of “inward” and “outward” mobility since 2004.
An increasing trend of outgoing staff mobility for teaching assignments was recorded in most participating countries between the 2004/05 and 2008/09 academic years (see Figure 1). This trend is more visible in Turkey than any other participant countries. Turkey experienced a rise in the number of outgoing staff throughout the 2004/05 to 2007/08 academic years. Flows almost tripled in number from 583 in the 2006/07 academic year to 1,521 in 2007/08, but this number dropped in the next year by almost 500. Poland sent the highest number of lecturers to other countries under the Erasmus staff mobility programme in the academic year 2008/09 with 3,079 (10.8% share), followed by Spain with 2,925 (10.2%) and then Germany with 2,696 (8.5%) (European Commission, 2010). Against this increasing trend, the number of staff going abroad for assignments stagnated or declined in eight countries in 2008/09 on the previous academic year. They included Austria (-6.3%), Denmark (-18.7%), Greece (-4.0%), Finland (-3.8%), Ireland (-2.1%), Latvia (-13.4%), Norway (-6.4%) and Turkey (-30.2%). The decline in outgoing teaching assignments in this academic teaching year was highest in Turkey followed by Denmark and Latvia. Despite this, the figures show overall growth in the number of European academics taking advantage of working abroad. This is particularly true for Turkey.

In regard to incoming mobility, the relative increase was, however, markedly the lowest in Turkey (20.9%) between years, comparing to other countries, notably Slovak Republic (35%) and Sweden (24.3%) (see Figure 2). The highest number of incoming teaching assignments was recorded in Germany with 2,913 (10.2% share) then Italy with 2,681 (9.4%), followed by Spain with 2,597 (9.1%). A decreasing trend in incoming teaching assignments in 2008/09 was observed in several countries, including Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Malta, when mobility decreased from the previous year. Five countries experienced stagnation in incoming mobility between years, notably Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,* Ireland and France.

In principle, it is crucial to achieve balance between incoming and outgoing academic staff. However, few HEIs in the participating countries have the capacity to do so. Since 2004, many countries have experienced a significant imbalance between incoming and outgoing lecturers, particularly

* Footnote by Turkey:
The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”. Footnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Turkey and Romania. Figure 3 illustrates that the number of incoming lecturers, in most countries, was higher than outgoing in the 2008/09 academic year. The level of incoming and outgoing lecturers was most balanced in Austria, the Netherlands and Iceland.
To sum up, the quantitative data show that the Erasmus programme has achieved the objective to enhance academic mobility (Baron, 1993: 53). The Erasmus participation has grown significantly across much of Europe, but flows between inward and outward mobility, in most countries, were unbalanced, at least through until the 2008/09 academic year for which data is available. Outgoing mobility from 2004/5 to 2008/09 academic year was higher in Turkey than the incoming mobility for teaching assignments, while other countries experienced a reversed balance. Turkey had a considerable level of imbalance in the ratio of incoming and outgoing academic staff. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Turkey is mainly a country of supplying academic staff to the EU rather than a receiving country.

**Barriers and drivers of Erasmus mobility**

**Academic integration**

The concept of academic integration relates to the cultural relocation costs of the European lecturers in a new country, together with some of the integration costs usually borne by academic staff. Here, a focus should be placed on the factors affecting the integration of academics into the host institutions and academics' ability to live in local communities within the Erasmus scheme.
At the extreme of this debate is the “safety valve” for the sending countries. Individuals’ assessment of benefits and costs of mobility will, as Bonin et al. (2008) rightly argue, depend on socio-psychological characteristics, such as personal preferences and expectations. Most people value mobility, but are too risk-averse to pursue it because that mobility might threaten their sense of security (Oğuz, 2012: 199). Although the links between mobility and safety are problematic and need more empirical study, it is highly likely that potential exchange candidates may be deterred by international reports of instability in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Applying this reasoning to academic mobility is intuitively appealing, resting on the assumption that upsurges in unrest will lead to a lower probability of inward mobility. Although this logic may not be as applicable to Erasmus mobility as it is to short-term job-related migration, internal conflicts seem to pose threats to academic mobility in general.

The teaching environment also may pose either barriers or incentives. For instance, some studies highlight a positive relationship between smaller class size and aspects of teachers’ working conditions (see Hattie, 2009; OECD, 2009). These studies underline greater flexibility for innovation in the classroom, improved teacher morale as well as job satisfaction as outcomes of smaller classes. Such outcomes in turn lead to academic integration. Data from the OECD shows that on average in OECD countries, the number of students per class is 13 at the tertiary level (OECD, 2011). In most countries, the student-teacher ratio is less than 15. The ratio is higher in Turkey with approximately 18 students per teacher. The lower available resources affect the degree to which Turkey is able to attract academics.

Academic mobility is not only a means of developing new skills, but also a mechanism for providing valuable exchange of good teaching practices and methods for the foreign staff by the HEIs in destination countries. In this light, the role of language in developing mutual understanding among the European and Turkish lecturers should not be underestimated. Table 1 presents a survey analysis of self-perceived known foreign language of adults between the ages of 25-64 in 2009 with 1 being the average for all of Europe and with national averages ranging from 0.3 (Turkey) and 2.5 (Norway). The HEIs in Turkey are working to transform the educational system, particularly focusing on the issue of linguistic diversity, in order to attract European lecturers. Nevertheless, greater measures are needed to improve language competencies. It is likely that inward mobility will remain low in the face of language barriers. Language issues could be addressed in two ways: one is to switch to teaching, at least some classes, in English and the other is to offer intensive conversational Turkish language lessons to incoming academics and their families. These schemes would be targeted clearly to promote academic mobility.
According to the European Council (2010), the benefits of working abroad are substantial, as “mobility provides a means of enriching human capital and strengthening employability through the acquisition and exchange of knowledge, the development of linguistic and intercultural competences, and the promotion of interpersonal contacts…” (European Council, 2010).

It is generally agreed, that academic mobility aids in career progression, although in the Erasmus scheme, the time spent in a host country is too short.

Table 1. **Self-perceived known foreign language of adults (25-64 years), 2007, percentages**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>German</th>
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<td>10.4</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<td>31.4</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>80.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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1. Slovak was not recorded as a foreign language in the Czech survey whereas Czech was recorded as a foreign language in the Slovak Republic survey.
2. The table shows the proportion of respondents who listed foreign languages they can use (up to 7 languages, regardless of level of knowledge).

See appendix 1 for country abbreviations.

to capitalise career development objectives. The European Commission acknowledged this benefit in its report in 2008, as part of its strategy to boost staff mobility substantially (European Commission, 2008). Focusing on the drawbacks of the Erasmus scheme, European lecturers may not be willing to participate in short-term assignments that do not provide the career enhancements of longer-term mobility. Moreover, short-term mobility may have the potential to distort academic life; hence, the gains and losses are imbalanced.

**Quality of the HEIs**

The relationship between academic mobility and institutional frameworks has been studied intensively since the early 1990s (Barnett, 1992). Analysts have come to perceive the quality of HEIs as one of the major issues facing Europe in the coming decades (Kanji, Malek and Tambi, 1999). The quality of education, in a broad sense, is best captured by institutional factors, such as curricula, university autonomy and quality assurance. The quality assurance mechanisms in HEIs are diverse across Europe. Many HEIs in Europe have been enhancing internal quality assurance systems, mainly through inter-institutional co-operation, mutual assistance and benchmarking exercises (European Commission, 2009: 10). The reality is that improving HEI institutional quality will benefit the Erasmus programme.

HEIs in Turkey are undergoing modernisation processes similar to what is occurring in Europe. Since Turkey achieved the status of full candidacy to the EU in 1999, it is working towards harmonising education policies and structures to that of the European Union laws and regulations (Taşpınar, 2006: 75). The Bologna Declaration set in motion the most significant European co-operation process in the field of higher education. With 46 signatory countries, reforms have now affected countries within and beyond Europe. However, the awareness of the Bologna process in Turkey is lacking. Universities are still not able to use the opportunities created as a result of the active participation in the Bologna process (Erçetin, 2006: 21), suggesting deficits in policy direction and lack of understanding regarding the goals articulated. The launch of the Bologna process initiative “Towards a European Higher Education Area” in 2010 sets forth clear objectives and priorities, specifically:

“[The] introduction of the three cycle system (bachelor/master/doctorate), quality assurance and recognition of qualifications and periods of study. ... [and] three key priorities – mobility, employability and quality, and emphasised the importance of higher education for Europe’s capacity to deal with the economic crisis and to contribute to growth and jobs” (European Commission, 2013).
The HEI reform process in Turkey must adopt these goals and priorities to create a higher education environment attractive to lecturers throughout the EU to enhance mobility options within the Erasmus programme.

Nevertheless, the reform process is ongoing and moving towards harmonisation. In parallel to the intensification of EU-Turkish relations since 2005, Turkey is involved in the pan-European process of reforming HEIs within the accession partnership framework. It is hoped that, under this system, academic mobility will eventually be facilitated among the participant countries.

There is some evidence to suggest that attracting foreign lecturers is associated with institutional autonomy. Taking into account all the features of autonomy collectively, which includes organisational, academic, financial and staffing autonomy (Estermann and Nokkala, 2009), a 2010 study by the Economic Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), “on the correlation between the higher education system in Turkey and competitiveness, identified that the lack of autonomy across universities in Turkey affected innovation performance adversely” (TEPAV, 2010). The research concluded that, among other things, HEIs in western European countries benefit from greater autonomy than those in Turkey. Turkey is among the group of nations with the lowest institutional autonomy. A main problem is, as Özcan (2011) argued, the Turkish HE system is centralised and the same laws, with strict rules, govern all HEIs (public and private). Thus, the HEIs have no flexibility to diversify or create the institutional landscapes necessary to compete within the EU or globally (Özcan, 2011). Although Turkey has much to realise in the complete shift towards open innovation, which characterises many of the EU nations, it is not moving towards HE institutional autonomy. Hence, it stops far short of realising any possible effects this may have in attracting foreign academics or enhancing academic mobility.

Several diverse issues must be addressed in the effort to modernise HEIs in Turkey. Creating better governance and funding systems must go together with improving autonomy to attract academics and enhance research capacity. Generally, the quality of education is linked to government spending on HEIs, among other things. In the EU27, public expenditure on education accounted for between 2% and 8% of the GDP of the member states in 2007. Annual public expenditure on education was the highest in Denmark (7.8% of GDP), Cyprus (6.9%), Sweden (6.7%) and Malta (6.3%), while Turkey recorded relatively low expenditures (2.8%) (European Commission and Eurostat, 2011).

As of 2009, laws that created a performance-based budgeting system came into effect. This could be an important step toward enhancing financial autonomy, if an HEI meets performance indicators. However, the necessary follow-up procedures and a transparent mechanism for allocation of budgets
based on performance – within a quality management system – have yet to be established. Therefore, universities have legitimate complaints about inadequate budgets and lack of control over spending patterns and priorities in the budget (i.e. they operate with “line-item” rather than “block grant” or lump sum budgets), as well as excessive centralist bureaucratic tendencies and obstacles (Özcan, 2011: 9). To this end, it is difficult for Turkey to meet the challenges created by the internationalisation of HEIs, assuming that expenditure on education may help foster academic mobility. Surely, Turkey will be unable to compete with its EU counterparts within the context of the Erasmus scheme without necessary revisions to its financing system.

Yet, as always, other problems will arise from the outcomes of internationalisation. Perhaps the most important is a new paradigm shift from traditional perceptions about the roles the HEIs play. One consequence of this shift is the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs – a modernisation agenda for HEIs in Europe, which includes as one of its aims, investing in knowledge and innovation. A feature of this aim is the objective to remove obstacles to the cross-border mobility of researchers. The reform of universities in the framework of the Lisbon strategy entails three major goals, notably: improving quality to make them more attractive (locally, nationally, regionally and internationally); improving governance and increasing and diversifying funding. Consequently, the EU member states are deeply engaged in transforming their HEIs with particular focus on these three issues. It is important to understand the harmonisation process of Turkey as part of the European Higher Education Area of the Bologna Process. Turkey is, in essence, in a “catch-up” position. As a result, Turkey is required to launch a wider range of reforms covering all aspects of performance from institutional structures to academic quality assurance standards. It is reasonable to claim that the prospects for academic mobility will depend on the success of Turkey’s harmonisation process, which will likely lead to equal conditions for inward mobility within the Erasmus scheme.

Although Turkey is at an advanced stage of implementing the Bologna process recommendations, significant quality differences exist in terms of numbers of teaching staff and infrastructure. Further challenges are the recognition of qualifications, quality assurance and establishment of a national qualifications framework based on the European Qualifications Framework (EQF). Since November 2011, the Vocational Qualifications Agency is the sole body responsible for the entire qualification process. However, an independent and fully functional Quality Assurance and Accreditation Agency remains to be established in line with the European Standards and Guidelines. Preparations for the agreed quality assurance agency for higher education have not yet started (European Commission, 2012: 80). Quality is key to attracting academics; hence, it is paramount for Turkey to effectively reform
the higher education system and the institutions to meet EU standards. A standardised HE system across the EU should enhance academic mobility (both through the Erasmus scheme and apart from it) creating more flows across the EU member states and Turkey.

**Transparency of the HEIs**

Debate about the Erasmus participation has often focused on the idea of transparency. Access to information is a crucial factor for mobility. Mobility takes place if the situation is fully transparent for people concerned (see Harris and Todaro, 1970). A lack of information about a destination country acts as a deterrent to mobility. The underlying question is whether European HE staff have reliable and sufficient information to choose Turkey. Unfortunately, they do not, as Turkish HEIs lack the transparency necessary to attract participants in the Erasmus programme.

Transparency and corruption are closely linked. Difficulties in developing transparency are underscored by corruption. Recent research demonstrates that democratisation can be diluted in the face of corrupt practices and, in such cases, democracy is nothing more than a formality (Today’s Zaman, 2008). The existence of corrupt practices is closely associated with the institutional, socio-political, economic and cultural structure prevailing in a given country (Hallak and Poisson, 2007: 88). With the launch of the Third National Programme in 2008, Turkey has taken significant steps in the fight against corruption. As a result, it has achieved some progress in implementing anti-corruption measures. As such, the government adopted a 2010-2014 strategy for enhancing transparency and strengthening the fight against corruption in February 2010. The strategy aims at developing preventive and repressive measures against corruption as well as improving public governance by introducing more transparency, accountability and reliability measures into public administration (European Commission, 2010). The strategies appear to have had some positive effects as Turkey’s 2012 global “Corruption Perceptions Index” ranking shows some improvement at 54 after deterioration in previous years, when its corruption ranking fell to 61 in 2009 from 58 in 2008 (Transparency International, 2012). Nevertheless, further reforms are required to dismantle corruption practices. As the 2012 Transparency International survey evidence reports, three institutions are perceived to be the most affected by corruption in the nation: business and the private sector, public officials and civil servants and education. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to encourage academic staff to choose Turkey as a destination country as long as the perception of Turkey as a “closed society”, “open to misinformation” and “corrupt” remains.
**Erasmus budget**

Participation in the Erasmus staff mobility programme is affected by costs; in other words, the level of mobility depends on financial support. Thus, as financial sources are linked to mobility incentives, it raises fundamental budget questions.

There is an ongoing debate in the EU as to how to increase Erasmus funding for academic mobility. According to Eurostat data on Erasmus statistics for 2010/2011 the decentralised actions (mobility actions) have dominated the Erasmus budget spending (96%) since 1988 (European Commission, 2012). The total decentralised funds for staff mobility (staff training and teaching assignments, etc.) amounted to 6.88%, while 7.87% of funds went to organisation of mobility in the academic years 2010/11. The greatest share of the budget supports the core of the programme, student mobility (81.8%).

Although funds for Erasmus mobility have seen marked change since its beginning with only 11 participating countries in 1988 compared to the 32 in 2010, and a general increase in its mobility actions budget at the onset of the Lifelong Learning Programme in 2007, it has not kept up with increasing mobility costs, and is not expected to keep up with increases in cost of living. For example, the programme supported nearly 43 000 staff mobilities in 2010/11, a year-on-year increase of 13.3% (the 2009/10 increase was 3.8%). However, the average EU monthly grant received by staff was EUR 662, which represents a decrease from EUR 673 the previous year. To this end, decreases in Erasmus mobility will most likely be caused by restrictive budgets.

**Implications for policy**

After identifying the main barriers for academic mobility, the following solutions are suggested:

- **Institutional priorities and actions:** As the quality of HEIs in Turkey presents an obstacle to inward mobility, the harmonisation process reforms in the education sector should be quickly adopted; especially those in regard to curricula, university autonomy and quality assurance. These reforms are expected to stimulate Turkey’s competitiveness in the Erasmus schemes.

- **Language training:** A lack of linguistic diversity presents a major barrier to both inward and outward mobility. It is essential to increase significantly the number of languages offered for study in Turkey through appropriate deployment of resources, such as offering intensive language study courses.

- **Transparency:** The Erasmus participation requires the development of clear progression towards transparency. This should be addressed at the national
policy level with clear mandates to public and private HEIs to make known and accessible information regarding decision-making processes, budgets, staff recruitment, curricula, assessment practices, research resources and practices, international co-operation and the other variables used by the EU to measure transparency in university ranking systems (e.g. U-Map and U-Multirank). A commitment to openness not only lies at the heart of change in academic mobility, but also is an effective tool to increase institutional attractiveness.

- **Collaboration**: Closer ties among participating institutions should be developed to improve information flows, enhance co-operation and co-ordination of mobility. To meet the increasing demand for European lecturers, the Turkish higher education system must be better aligned with those of the Erasmus scheme partners.

- **Assurance of quality**: Attracting academics from the EU requires investment in infrastructure and resources (human and physical) given that quality of the working environment is crucial for inward mobility.

- **Funding**: Turkey will not attract inward mobility exchanges without adequate funding. Although this is in part a feature of EU Erasmus funding policies, it is important to note that since Erasmus has been a part of the Lifelong Learning Programme, national agencies in the participating countries manage their own Erasmus budget. It is therefore of utmost importance to review Turkey’s Erasmus funding policies.

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**References**


Oğuz, G. (2012), EU Enlargement and Turkish Labour Migration, United Nations University Press, Japan.


## Appendix

### Country abbreviations

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Managing change in higher education institutions in Tanzania: A historical perspective

by Coletha C. Ngirwa, Martin Euwema, Emmanuel Babyegeya and Jeroen Stouten,
The Open University of Tanzania, Tanzania and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

This paper examines the history of the management of the higher education sector in Tanzania. It reveals that government policies and management styles throughout the period from 1961 to the early 2000s created a culture of resistance within the higher education institutions, leading to struggles and many attempts to change the management of the sector. The authors analyse the effects of management practices in higher education and propose a model of institutional change that yields positive outcomes based on institutional needs and those of the academic faculty members.
Gérer le changement dans les établissements d’enseignement supérieur en Tanzanie : une perspective historique

par
Coletha C. Ngirwa, Martin Euwema, Emmanuel Babyegeya et Jeroen Stouten,
Université libre de Tanzanie, Tanzanie et Université catholique de Louvain, Belgique

Cet article étudie l’histoire de la gestion du secteur de l’enseignement supérieur en Tanzanie. Il révèle que les politiques gouvernementales et les méthodes de gestion, depuis 1961 jusqu’au début des années 2000, ont encouragé une culture de résistance à l’intérieur même des établissements d’enseignement supérieur, menant à des luttes et à de nombreuses tentatives de changement de la gestion du secteur. Les auteurs analysent les effets des pratiques de gestion dans l’enseignement supérieur et proposent un modèle de changement des établissements donnant des résultats positifs en fonction des besoins de ces établissements et de leurs enseignants.
Introduction

The United Republic of Tanzania is a union of two countries – Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It is in the eastern part of Africa and has been ruled by Arabs, Portuguese, Germans and the British. In the 18th century, Arab merchants came to the coast of Tanzania, Portuguese explorers (Vasco Da Gama) in 1498, Germans in 1840s and the British after World War 1. After a considerable time under colonial rule, Tanzania achieved independence from the British on 9 December 1961, with Julius Nyerere as Prime Minister. Tanzania is currently recognised as a developing country with poor technology in all sectors (Mwamila and Diyamett, 2006).

The Tanzanian higher-education sector has, among its objectives, to provide advanced knowledge and skills through teaching, research and consultancy to society. Universities, in particular, have been contributing highly trained personnel to all socio-economic and political sectors (Astin and Astin, 2000). Since independence, the higher-education sector and its institutions have experienced a multitude of innovations and changes in their curricula, processes and procedures, and in legal status. In addition, the sector has increased greatly in terms of size, student numbers and new institutions. These changes would require effective management to achieve their intended goals.

The academic community enjoys a culture of openness and debate (Boulton and Lucas, 2008), which can make management somewhat challenging. Gappa, Austin and Trice (2007) posit a model of academic needs such as “respect, employment equity, academic freedom and autonomy, flexibility, professional growth and collegiality” (in Gappa and Austin, 2010: 8) which must be realised for institutional harmony, motivation and effective performance (Gappa and Austin, 2010). Institutional and government leaders are responsible for management processes that should promote these objectives as they guide initiatives for change. Throughout the changes that occurred from 1961 into the 2000s in Tanzanian universities, academics struggled to have their workplace needs met, while the management of the tertiary education sector failed to create the appropriate policies and/or manage the institutional changes. This article reviews management processes in the tertiary education sector at both the policy level and institutional level to analyse their impact on the university community and the development of higher education in Tanzania. It looks at several related issues including the
ways in which government leaders reformed the higher-education sector; the management of these changes in tertiary institutions; and the impact of the governmental and institutional style of management on the community of tertiary institutions. It then looks at suggested leadership styles appropriate for university leaders to adopt in managing tertiary institutions; these are especially important during processes of institutional change. First, a historical review highlights the important aspects of eras of change in Tanzanian higher education and how the sector was managed, before discussing these historic events in the light of literature on academic needs and leadership.

**Higher education and political domination**

When Tanzania became independent in 1961, it had only one university college, affiliated to the University of London. In 1963, this became the constituent college of the University of East Africa. In 1970, the University College Dar es Salaam transformed into a national university, the current University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).

After independence most African presidents took charge of leading their national universities (Omari, 1991; Teferra and Altbach, 2004). A president could control most of the university structures and practices (Omari, 1991).

In Tanzania, for instance, the ruling and the sole political party (TANU) exercised much power over the university through centralised management (Omari, 1991). The government dominated the university's activities through the formulation of policies that governed the provision and practices of higher education. One of the popular policies was the Musoma Resolution of 1974, through which the government set university entry criteria (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).

Other objectives that influenced educational provision included the building of a socialist and egalitarian society and free education from the primary through to the university level (Omari, 1991). The government's centralised control over university functions came to be resented by university communities. The following section presents examples of the types of conflict that existed between the university community and the ruling power.

**Conflicts associated with the management of change**

In 1965, students protested against apartheid in southern Africa. As part of the protest, they destroyed resources at the British and American embassies in Dar es Salaam (Omari, 1991). The students were punished by president Nyerere. As part of the punishment, “one argumentative student” had to acknowledge blame and fault to the UK and US ambassadors on behalf of the other demonstrators (Omari, 1991: 183). Omari (1991) noted that elitism in
Tanzanian society had become widespread and, in response to student demonstrations, the government set new criteria for entry and completion of university studies. Admittance criteria required students to undergo three months of military training and three months of volunteer work in communities. University graduates were required to work for two years on 40% of their final salary (Omari, 1991). In 1966, student protests in opposition to these policies led to the expulsion of 223 students from the university (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003; Omari, 1991). In 1967, several expatriates or non-Tanzanian academics were expelled from the sole university college for what government claimed was criticism of its policies at a conference on “The Role of the University in an Independent Tanzania” (Omari, 1991).

Political officials, rather than academics, held the higher administrative posts (i.e. vice chancellor and chief administrative officer) in the university during this time (Omari, 1991). The administrators were sometimes accused of muffling students’ free expression and there was a short student strike against an “authoritarian style of management” in 1971 (Omari, 1991). The movement, known as the “Akivaga crisis”, marked the beginning of democratic discussions that led to the formation of democratic committees and associations at the university (e.g. the University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Association) (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).

The education policy, which stressed for “functional, complete and terminal” education at each level of education, and that introduced vocational skills in the secondary school curriculum, caused uproar in the university community (Omari, 1991: 186). The university community, especially academics, thought that the policy would degrade the university to an institution for “in-service training of workers” instead of “fresh-from-school students” (Omari, 1991). The policy aimed to enable secondary school leavers to be self-employed, necessitating the secondary school curriculum to integrate agriculture education, domestic science, commerce and vocational education (Omari, 1991). The policy, imposed by the government, without consultation with the university community, was misinterpreted leading to chaos and ineffective implementation (Omari, 1991). In 1977, five indigenous lecturers were fired from the university (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003) with no clear reasons given for their dismissal. A year later, in 1978, students protested against what they called “greed by politicians” when the latter were fighting for larger salaries; as result about 350 students were expelled from the university (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003; Othman, 2009). In 1979, 16 foreign lecturers were asked to leave the university, likely because they were thought to disapprove of how the university was being managed (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).
Higher education during the country's economic crises (1975-1985)

The Tanzanian economy was in steady decline throughout the 1970s. The breakdown of the East African Community in 1977, followed by the Tanzanian-Uganda war in 1978-1979 led to a collapse of the economy in the early 1980s. The higher education sector was affected in various ways: insufficient funding; low quality; decreasing enrolment; and a lack of lecturers and teaching resources (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003; Mollel, 2005; Omari, 1991). Othman (2009) also associated the university’s problems with the country’s dependency on international financial institutions that recommended budget cuts leading to, among other things, inefficiency in research. In 1990, there were efforts to remedy the university crises through management policies and processes (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).

Problems beset the higher education sector throughout the 1960s to the 1980s. While some of these were social and others political, the majority were caused by poor management and policy decisions, such as the centralisation of power, the lack of participation by academic leaders and the exclusion of the academic community in formulating and initiating the changes that were being introduced. Omari notes that, “The new policy was formulated secretly and announced abruptly as a decree, so it was quite unexpected by the university community. Understandably, there was no applause for the lack of participation by the wider academic community. This increased tensions and mutual suspicions between academics and administrators, and made the implementation of the innovation difficult and a top-heavy, up-down operation” (Omari, 1991: 187).

This brought about negative responses to organisational change. “...[R]esistance is neither a sudden nor a direct response to a particular instance of change, but, rather, a function of the quality of the relationship between agents and recipients in which change agents are and have been active participants and contributors” (Ford, Ford and d’Amelio, 2008: 63).

An outcome of long-term non-consultative leadership behaviour is employees’ resistance to change (see Ford, Ford and d’Amelio, 2008). At the same time as economic crises buffeted the university, its administrators cultivated a bad relationship with their subordinates. The unhealthy relationship in higher education institutions was certainly an outcome of the prolonged autocratic leadership approaches that were being taken: “...apathy, neglect of the welfare of staff and students, lack of consultation, unilateral decision-making, bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape, [and] bureaucratic domination...” (Shivji, 1993: 6). “Autocratic atmospheres” have been linked to people’s “tension” and “frustration” (K. Lewin, 1947, in Bernerth et al., 2007: 305-306). The behaviours were inconsistent with the notion that “better
educated and more independent people expect to be consulted rather than to be told what to do” (Stewart, 1999: 237).

Changes in management of higher education (1980 to 2000)

Participation of the academic community in the management process had started with reforms to the higher education sector that began in the 1980s. Among the changes were: the institution of the 1985 Science and Technology Policy (URT, 1996); the 1990 Kuhanga Committee; the establishment of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education in 1990; the inception of the Higher Education Accreditation Council in 1995; and the establishment of the National Council for Technical Education (NACTE) in 1997 (Mollel, 2005). Finally, the 1995 Education and Training Policy changed everything. Through its Education Supplementary Act No.10 of 1995, the policy opened the door for private-sector participation in education provision (Ishengoma, 2007; Mollel, 2005).

The changes provided some sort of autonomy and opportunity for participation by the respective communities in the management process of their education institutions. The Tanzania Commission for Universities web site lists 11 public and 17 private universities, 4 public and 15 private university colleges, and another 14 centres or institutes that it recognises (Tanzania Commission for Universities, 2013), illustrating the extent to which the public and private sector are engaged in the provision of higher education.

The Sokoine University of Agriculture became Tanzania’s second university after the University of Dar es Salaam in 1984. The University of Dodoma and three private universities are the most recent to join the sector. Four of the oldest private universities were established in 1996, immediately after the enactment of the Education Supplementary Act No. 10 of 1995.

Currently the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training, and the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU) administers higher education on behalf of the government. Public universities are owned and funded by the government. Private universities are privately owned and funded. The balance of the tertiary institutions are under their respective ministries and the National Council for Technical Education (NACTE). NACTE governs non-university tertiary institutions that offer technical, semi-professional and professional courses at certificate, diploma and degree levels (NACTE, 2006). Institutions under NACTE are categorised in five fields of study (Table 1).

As evident from the table, there are 202 tertiary institutions other than universities in Tanzania. Of these institutions, 46 (22.8%) are unregistered under NACTE. The field of Health and Allied Sciences seems to be more popular, as it is in developed economies, with a higher number of institutions, 95 (47.1%).
The Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU) regulates all fully accredited universities. Universities and fully registered tertiary institutions under NACTE have been supported by the government through students’ sponsorship in medical, education and science courses, and through the Higher Education Students’ Loans Board – Act No. 9 of 2004. Apart from the expansion of higher education through legislation, there were also other reforms in response to strikes, boycotts and demonstrations by the university community.

**Major developments at UDSM**

Significant changes in the higher education sector occurred during the period 1988-1993. First, two academics replaced government officials in the positions of vice chancellor and chief administrative officer (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003). Secondly, changes aimed at staff motivation and retention, were implemented at the Faculty of Engineering of UDSM (currently, the College of Engineering and Technology); these changes motivated other faculties to adopt the initiatives (Luhanga, 2009; Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003).

From 1989-1991, the UDSM created a steering committee to take stock of all the problems facing the university. The result was the “Management Effectiveness Review Report”, which spelt out the genesis of the university’s problems. Discussion of the report in workshops and other venues, led to the creation of the Institutional Transformation Programme (ITP), which guided the full reformation of the university (Luhanga, 2009; Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003). External donors supported the ITP (e.g. the German Agency for Technical Cooperation and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Department for Research and Cooperation). Regional and international education organisations also provided support, particularly in the form of experience in implementing institutional reforms (e.g. the Centre for Higher Education Transformation, the South African Association of

### Table 1. Higher learning institutions under NACTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of study</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Preparation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business and Management</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Other Sciences</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Allied Sciences</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Welfare</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>156</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>202</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the period 1988-1997 was characterised by government trials to fulfil the academic needs of the nation and work to reform the higher education institutions. However, although, it had released some of its hold over academic autonomy, especially in the administration, there were still limitations to their functions. Thus, public universities maintained their quest for less government management and more autonomy.

Higher education in the 2000s

In 2005, the higher education sector proposed the Universities Act that would provide the autonomy public universities sought. The Act was presented in the parliament to replace the previous legislation to establish public universities. For instance, the UDSM Act No. 12 of 1970 emphasised exaggerated centralisation and limited the university's powers to make important internal decisions (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003). On 13 April 2005, Universities Act No. 7 of 2005 was passed in the National Assembly (URT, 2005).

The Universities Act included, among other things, the establishment of the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU) (Universities Act, Part II). It is established that the TCU controls “...criteria for student admission to universities in the United Republic [of Tanzania]; proposals of outlines of academic programmes or syllabi and general regulations of curriculum submitted to the commission by universities; the long-term planning, staff development, scholarship and physical development strategies and programmes of universities; [and] recurrent and development budgets for public universities” (URT-Universities Act, Section 5, 1c). In other words, the TCU ensures university standards, in terms of curriculum, admission, staff qualifications and academic programmes. However, the university and university colleges' management and functions were devolved from state power (albeit, nominally as discussed later) and handled by their respective councils, or governing boards, in case of university colleges (URT-Universities Act, Section 45, 1).

The Act made some changes regarding the procedures used to appoint a university vice chancellor (VC), whereby in a public university the VC is appointed by the chancellor, while in a private university the VC is appointed by the owner/sponsor. In either case, recommendations from the university council would be taken into consideration (Section 36, 2a, b).

The welfare of the university community is also covered in the Act; for example it covers the establishment of the “convocations, staff associations and students’ organisations, which are all to be run by the institution itself through its council/governing board (Universities Act, Section 48, 1a,b,i,ii).
With regard to student affairs, the Act stipulates that in each institution there shall be an organ that deals with student appeals (URT-Universities Act, Section 50 (6)). It adds that there shall be an integrity office with a qualified person who will handle students’ welfare (URT-Universities Act, Section 50, 1). Generally, the Act focuses on the democratic governing of university functions and practices, including solving the long-term complaints of public universities.

There were other changes in the higher education sector in the 2000s. Many universities and university colleges were established during this period. Some of the tertiary institutions changed from ordinary tertiary institutions to universities, such as the Institute of Development and Management, which became Mzumbe University; and some colleges became institutes (e.g. the Dar es Salaam Technical College became the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology). Others expanded to create constituent colleges, as did the University of Dar es Salaam, which established the Dar es Salaam University College of Education (DUCE) and Mkwawa University College of Education (MUCE).

The number of students enrolled for the 2009/2010 academic year in tertiary institutions was 123,434. Of these, 89,449 were in public institutions, while 33,985 were enrolled in private institutions (TCU, 2013). Statistics of students enrolled in other higher learning institutions, specifically technical and vocational institutions that fall under the NACTE, are not included, thus the total number of students enrolled in the higher education sector is even higher. Although the number of enrolments has significantly increased since the early 2000s, this does not illustrate that Tanzania has been successful in the provision of higher education, especially when one compares this figure with its total population of 44,928,923 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Besides, development in higher education should be looked at not only in terms of quantity, but also of the quality of education provisions (Othman, 2009).

Despite improvements in higher education due to the Universities Act, which did decentralise some powers to public universities, as noted previously, higher education policy remains in the domain of the ruling party; there is little stakeholder involvement in policy decision making. Moreover, although the university vice chancellors are now members of the academy and appointed by the individual chancellors of each institution, rather than the president of the country, chancellors remain presidential appointments. Hence, management reforms are, to some extent at least, cosmetic.

Universities cannot plan, input or alter curricula or introduce new programmes, as they did before the creation of the TCU and the Universities Act, unless approved by the TCU, which is a government instrument. Thus, although there were developments in higher education, the management of
tertiary institutions seems to remain persistently problematic. Some of the management decisions are still centralised, particularly when the university would like to introduce major changes. A lack of understanding of the needs and interests of the university community appears to be at the root of several of the problems, particularly the importance of participative leadership in the process of creating policy and implementing change. Drawing on the “Essential Elements Model” (EEM), which addresses the specific needs of academics, we created an emergent model and use leadership styles to explain the problems of managing changes in Tanzanian tertiary institutions. We also use the model to suggest effective ways of managing changes in tertiary institutions. Although the university community encompasses leaders, students, academic and non-academic staff, we focused our discussion on leaders-academic staff relations in implementing changes in tertiary institutions.

**Essential elements model (EEM) in higher education**

The essential elements model, posed by Gappa, Austin and Trice (2007), illustrates effective methods and the necessary conditions for higher education leaders to understand and manage the academic institutions to create a well-functioning and healthy working environment. The model is rooted in past (20th century) needs of academics in their work and working environment (Gappa and Austin, 2010). Their main concerns are: “…employment security…academic freedom…and certainly faculty involvement in shared governance…and respect accorded members of professoriate” (Gappa and Austin, 2010: 7).

According to Gappa, Austin and Trice (2007), equal-value treatment, without considering employment basis (permanent/contract), and training opportunities are also important factors in creating a well-functioning institution with committed and satisfied academic staff. The model presents valuable insights for higher education leaders managing university functions and individuals. Utilising it could lead to institutional harmony, development, and academic motivation and commitment to the institutions. Institutions with motivated groups improve performance and staff retention (Gappa, Austin and Trice, 2007). These were clearly lacking throughout Tanzania's higher education history. For example, it could be said that the policy implementations prior to the mid-2000s failed due to poor communication, and uninvolved and unmotivated staff. Mkude, Cooksey and Levey (2003) also noted that unmotivated academics were leaving the university (UDSM) for other job opportunities. A motivated community requires what Wiseman and McKeown (2010) call “multiplier leaders”. These leaders believe in their people and promote their talents through involvement and valuing. Such approaches also are prioritised in the EEM.
An emergent model of managing change in higher education

Figure 1 illustrates the effects of both positive and negative conditions in managing a higher education institution. It highlights how the negative conditions that besieged the higher education sector throughout the past decades discussed here, led to multiple problems and several episodes of reactionary approaches to change by students, faculty members and the government. The emergent model fits in the reviewed history of management of higher education in Tanzania. The model shows how the key links between government policy and leadership skills can lead to alternate paths, either towards effective management of higher education institutions or ineffective management of higher education institutions (Figure 1).

Using the history of the University of Dar es Salaam as an example, the emergent model identifies the root cause of the unhealthy conditions at the university: directive government policies and leadership. Leaders did not consider academic needs, especially those of academic freedom, autonomy, respect and collegiality. Moreover, the management processes were not participatory. Exercising power and following directive leadership behaviours (e.g. centralised power, dictates, force and proceeding without negotiations) created the unhealthy environment that led to negative perceptions, chaos and strikes at the University of Dar es Salaam and other institutes, leaving the higher education institutions in a general state of dysfunction. Maintaining unfavourable policies and centralised management created an atmosphere of cynicism, uncertainty and poor relationships. The opposite approach, however, (favourable policies arrived at through participation and negotiation and positive leadership that sought to fulfil the needs of the academic staff members) can lead to acceptance of organisational change initiatives.

In sum, the manner in which leaders consider people's needs determines institutional harmony and people's motivation to perform their duties. Employees' motivation has been associated with people's participation, commitment and effective organisational change (Cummings and Worley, 2009; Jones, Jimmieson and Griffiths, 2005; Longenecker and Rieman, 2007). Leaders can rectify unsupportive factors for change by considering the needs of academic faculty and the institution, and enacting supportive policies in the process of change.
Poverty and managing institutional change

The history of higher education in Tanzania should also be looked at through the lens of poverty. As a lesser developed country, emerging from colonial rule, the higher education sector was fraught with difficulties that would certainly be exacerbated by poverty, as would a poor working environment (Mkude, Cooksey and Levey, 2003; Mollel, 2005; Othman, 2009). Thus, poverty also had a role to play in influencing academics’ negative attitudes towards organisational change.

Education is not about the number of classrooms one builds or the levels of student’s intakes one attains, though that is very important. It is about the quality of that education...Our universities take pride for having raised the students’ numbers, but what about the teaching facilities? Is a single class of 400 students a best way of conducting teaching?... Are the seminar rooms meant for 20 to 30 people but now taking more than 60 people conducive for learning? (Othman, 2009: 11).

Insufficient resources could be one of the factors which cause difficulties in managing changes in higher education organisations (Rutherford, Fleming and Mathias, 1985) and in African universities in particular (Teferra and Altbach, 2004). Luhanga (2003, 2009) maintains that academic staff at the UDSM resisted change due to heavy workloads, an adverse working environment with scarce resources and job stress (see Othman, 2009 for details about adverse working environments). The number of academic staff in Tanzanian universities is also reported to be insufficient compared to the number of enrolled students (TCU, 2013). Staff retention is still a major challenge in universities. In addition, increase of student enrolment without adjusting resources seems common in higher education institutions.
Conclusion

The history of Tanzania’s institutions of higher learning is fraught with complex factors that demanded change. However, managing change was mishandled at all leadership levels – government and institutional. The former style of management by the Tanzanian government suggests what Dixon (2008) called “Disengagement leadership – it is a leadership of punishment, leadership of fear, leadership of insecurity and leadership of crisis management”. This history underscores the importance of participatory management, which demonstrates the need to promote autonomy, encourage teamwork and secure people’s motivation and commitment to tasks and thereby obtain their best performance.

The government managed higher education institutional-community chaos (complaints, strikes and demonstrations) through firing lecturers, expelling students and imposing rule instead of focusing on the causes of the problems. This approach is one of the factors that led to stagnancy in the sector. The HE sector did not begin to grow and improve until the government acknowledged the need for policy change; in particular, policies that reformulated universities as autonomous institutions. There are still problems within the sector that need to be resolved. There is still a need for the government and institutional leaders to understand academic needs more fully and the needs of HEIs, in general, in the realm of management issues and resource allocation.

Further studies

This review adds to the existing change-management literature by developing greater understanding of management processes in the higher education sector in Tanzania from historical-theoretical perspectives. It details how directive leadership, based on a lack of consideration of workplace and individual needs, poor communication, force, and punishment, ends with a frustrated work group, poor relationships and resistance to change initiatives, as well as poorly functioning institutions. It presented models illustrating how participative leadership tends to fulfil people’s needs, promote motivation and commitment and help bring about effective change. These processes are under studied in the Tanzanian context. Although empirical studies are available, most of which focus on the UDSM (e.g. those cited herein such as Luhanga, 2009; Mkude et al., 2003; Omari, 1991) and Luhanga et al., 2003, there are few theoretical or applied research attempts to deepen understanding of the evolution or contemporary situation of the HE sector in Tanzania. This review and analysis opens up researchers in Tanzanian higher education to address the issues brought up here, especially those that will further knowledge about management styles, best leadership practices and quality assessment strategies. Since the Tanzanian Commission
for Universities (a government-controlled entity) is the authority for these, research that examines the role it plays in the management and practices within universities could help to foster the changes still necessary.

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Increasing participation and attainment in higher education in Australia: The early effects of a “demand-driven” system

by

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This article examines the early outcomes of the policy reforms that aim to increase substantially the proportion of Australians with a bachelor’s degree and improve equity of access. The changes rely on student choices dictating the flow and overall volume of government funding. The authors analyse the new policies and their implications for students and higher education institutions, focusing on: i) the initial evidence of impact on student numbers and the nature of the patterns of growth; ii) the effects on equity and the mix of students enrolled, both overall and between institutions; iii) the impact of increasing enrolments on government fiscal constraints and the pressure on student charges; iv) ensuring learning outcomes for all students and high-level outcomes for the most capable; and v) the role of universities and the place of other higher education providers in an increasingly diverse system.
Accroître les inscriptions 
et les taux de réussite 
dans l’enseignement supérieur en Australie : 
les premiers effets d’un système axé 
sur la demande

par
Conor King et Richard James,
Innovative Research Universities (IRU), Australie et Centre d’étude
de l’enseignement supérieur, Université de Melbourne, Australie

Cet article examine les premiers résultats des réformes destinées à 
améliorer l’égalité d’accès et à augmenter sensiblement la 
proportion d’Australiens déttenant un diplôme de premier cycle
universitaire. Les changements reposent sur l’idée que les choix des
étudiants doivent dicter la répartition et le volume global des
financements publics. Les auteurs analysent les nouvelles
politiques et leurs conséquences sur les étudiants et les
établissements de l’enseignement supérieur, en mettant l’accent
sur : i) les premiers effets des réformes sur le nombre d’inscrits et
la nature des modèles de progression ; ii) les conséquences en
terms d’équité et de mixité des étudiants, à la fois au niveau
global mais aussi entre les établissements ; iii) l’impact du nombre
croissant d’inscriptions sur les contraintes budgétaires du
gouvernement et les pressions sur les frais de scolarité ; iv) la
garantie de retombées positives pour tous les étudiants et encore
plus positives pour les plus brillants d’entre eux ; et enfin, v) le rôle
des universités et la place d’autres prestataires de l’enseignement
supérieur dans un système de plus en plus diversifié.
Introduction

The year 2012 was a landmark in Australian higher education with the commencement of a dramatically new approach to the allocation of undergraduate university places. A new national funding policy has removed the cap on the number of university places made available within each university, which previously were determined through annual negotiation between each institution and the federal government. From 2012, Australian universities are able to enrol as many students as they wish – based on their own determination of student eligibility or readiness for particular fields of study. Each enrollee will generate the same level of government and student resourcing for his or her university, calculated by the fields of study in which they enrol. In essence, Australia has moved from a policy environment with both tight volume and price regulation to one in which volume is uncapped within a framework of fixed pricing.

The new national policy settings are designed to create what is being described as a demand-driven system – a higher education system that is shaped by patterns of student demand and by the responsiveness of institutions to the demands. The intention is to expand higher education participation through the mechanism of universities’ responding to market opportunities in which quality and relevance, not price, are to be driving factors.

The Australian demand-driven system is a major policy experiment with potentially far-reaching ramifications for the character of the system overall, for conceptions of the purposes of higher education and for the relationship between universities and communities. The uncapping of volume of university places is one outcome of the recommendations of the 2008 Review of Australian Higher Education, known also as the Bradley Review, for its chair, Professor Denise Bradley. The Bradley Review (DEEWR, 2008) provided a blueprint for major reforms to the higher education sector, including increasing the proportion of Australians holding bachelors’ level qualifications; improving equity of access; diversifying providers; improving student finance arrangements and strengthening quality assurance and the regulation of standards. In effect, the Bradley Review called for a major national push towards a universal participation higher education system (using Trow’s 1973 formulation of phases of system development based on...
participation rates) and offered a model for the policy settings needed to achieve this feat.

This paper analyses the early effects of the Australian reforms by mapping the supply-side and demand-side reactions to the new policy settings, using data available as of January 2013. As the paper will show, the new policy is broadly achieving the objectives sought. Reactions on both the supply-side and demand-side have been strong. One might say, “so far, so good”. However, the aggregate national patterns mask some differences by location and type of institution; there are significant effects to be monitored on the uptake of places by field of study and the new patterns of enrolment by under-represented groups such as people from lower socio-economic status (SES) backgrounds and people living in rural and relatively remote regional areas.

The context for policy reform: The recent phases of growth in Australian higher education and the issues confronted by the 2008 Review of Australian Higher Education

When the Review of Australian Higher Education commenced in 2007, the review panel faced a number of challenges. There was concern about the stalling or faltering rates of domestic participation, a somewhat chaotic system of tuition fees and student-support arrangements underpinned by income-contingent loans (James et al., 2007), a failure to achieve diversity in higher education providers and programmes, little improvement in equity of access (CSHE, 2008; James, 2012; James, 2009), an over-reliance on international student fee revenue and concerns about standards, especially in international education. Change was needed.

Despite a relatively small population, Australia had developed an international reputation for a high quality, innovative and highly internationalised university system. The Bradley Review reforms were designed to prepare Australia’s higher education provision for a new national and international context. Unlike previous national higher education reviews conducted over the past two decades, the recommendations of the Bradley Review panel largely gained traction with the government and with the higher education community and this led to their adoption, in the main part, with implementation taking full effect from 2012 (see DEEWR, 2009).

The Bradley Review recommendations created a model for a universal participation higher education system and would usher in a new phase of expansion in participation, though one quite different from previous waves of growth. The evolution of Australian higher education post-World War II is marked by three major periods of reform and expansion. The first phase, in the decade following World War II, was marked by the establishment and
building of new universities. The second phase, the 1960s through the 1980s, saw steady growth under the binary system of universities and degree-granting colleges of advanced education and the abolition of university fees in the early 1970s. Phase three commenced in the late 1980s, when the reforms, led by the then Minister John Dawkins, ushered in massification by the removal of the binary divide and the introduction of the innovative Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). This scheme had an income-contingent deferred tuition payment structure, administered through the income taxation system, designed to fund growth in participation without creating negative effects to access for financially disadvantaged people.

Twenty-five years on from the Dawkins reforms, which largely shaped the character of Australian higher education as it is today, the 2008 Review of Australian Higher Education has heralded a major phase change. However, this new phase of growth is decidedly different in character to previous transitions. It is not based on investment in infrastructure, nor in systemic restructure, nor in a radically new way of financing. Rather, the Bradley reforms place faith in the university system's capacity to expand through a funding mechanism that encourages institutions to compete for students within a common resourcing allocation model, a competition based on students' perceptions of the value of particular courses and universities.

The Bradley Review reforms: Policy architecture for expansion and equity

The Bradley response to the issues facing Australian higher education was to propose an architecture for growth in undergraduate education as a major step towards creating a more responsive tertiary sector. The central elements include:

- an explicit national target for raising participation rates and attainment rates;
- an explicit national target for improving equity, framed around low SES participation;
- improved student finance arrangements;
- the uncapping of volume of places to drive up provision of places and increase diversity;
- a new regulatory paradigm, with explicit attention to standards and to tighter regulation, preparing for the inevitable anxiety about standards as participation rates grow and providers diversify; and
- additional base funding for university places, some based on university performance against outcome measures.
The two key targets are the national target for 40% of 25-34 year olds to hold at least a bachelor’s degree by 2025 (from a base in 2008 of around 29-30%) and a national target of a 20% share of places for people from lower SES backgrounds by 2020 (from a base share that has hovered in the 14-15% range).

The uncapping of undergraduate places is the central policy tool for achieving these outcomes, though other policy devices play a role too, including a federal programme of funding support for equity (the Higher Education Participation and Partnerships Program, HEPPP) and annual mission-based compacts between each university and the federal department that establishes targets and indicators, tailored to institutional contexts, as well as national priorities.

The government only approved a portion of the additional funding per place the Bradley Review recommended and has since reduced the funds to be allocated based on performance measures. This opens up the question of whether the changes can be effective within current per place funding levels.

The effects of the new policy settings were in some ways difficult to predict. The label “demand-driven” probably exaggerates the reality and the policy settings might better be described as a partially demand-driven system: there are limited policy mechanisms for compelling individual institutions to expand their enrolments; student demand may not align with employer demand.

Thus, strategic decisions by the suppliers (HEIs) remain pivotal to future patterns of student enrolment and will influence the overall patterns of growth, the fields of study that grow or shrink, and conceptions of student eligibility and ineligibility. Further, geographic and cultural factors (and accommodation shortages) may limit the creation of a vigorous demand-driven market. Australia is a large continent with a dispersed population and university students have shown little interest in interstate mobility for the purposes of higher education participation. The market in higher education and the competition for students is thus played out in a localised context, usually in the major capital cities and often only between a handful of universities.

There is also the perspective that the new policy settings are incoherent because they did not permit potential students to consider price in deciding the institution and course for which to apply. Thus, the present demand-driven system offers very limited capacity for price signalling and no capacity to test the willingness of some market segments to pay more for a higher education course and others to prefer to pay less, possibly for what might be perceived as a course of moderate quality.
The early effects of uncapping places: The demand-side and supply-side reactions

The core of the post-Bradley changes was to create a funding system that encourages universities to expand by enrolling significantly more students, drawing, in part, on people who previously were less likely to consider higher education; particularly those who are considered less prepared or qualified for higher education admittance. The new funding system policy is combined with quality assessment policies that subject universities to a comprehensive national standards and quality regulatory system intended to ensure that graduates meet minimum standards of achievement. In addition, the creation of the My University website (http://myuniversity.gov.au/) launched in March 2011, supports a government strategy to make available greater information about providers, their courses and student outcomes to improve the basis on which potential students choose the institution with which to enrol.

This section of the paper considers the initial response to the opening up of funded places; the section to follow examines the implications for the quality of outcomes.

Table 1. The estimated growth in government-funded places from 2009 to 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual undergraduate funded places</td>
<td>439 468</td>
<td>464 524</td>
<td>482 371</td>
<td>506 004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 target undergraduate funded places</td>
<td>417 912</td>
<td>417 912</td>
<td>417 912</td>
<td>417 912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth against 2009 base (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage growth over 2009 (%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. Estimates from universities in March 2012

Source: Tables provided to universities by the Australian Government Department of Employment, Education and Workplace Relations in May 2011 and updated in August 2012 (Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education).

Table 1 illustrates that the rate of growth of government-subsidised places over the past four years has been remarkably high. Overall, universities responded to the intent to remove the caps through significant growth in provision in advance of policy implementation, encouraged by the initial decision to fund institutions up to 110% of their government grant and to retain student contributions for all enrolled students. In 2009, universities enrolled an additional 5% of places, largely in advance of the government’s response to the Bradley recommendations, but knowing the timeline proposed for their future implementation. From 2010 to 2012, the increases continued so that by 2012 the number of funded places was 21% over the 2009 targets under the previous policy regime. This growth contrasts with the generally modest growth over the early years of the decade.
University estimates in advance of confirmed national data on 2012 enrolments show an intent to enrol to 129% of the 2009 base requirement, but the actual growth is somewhat less than the estimate, 121%. That not all universities were able to meet hoped for numbers indicates that the willingness of universities to expand exceeds the available pool of applicants who are judged eligible or sufficiently well-prepared for higher education. It may also be the case, as in the past, that students are not willing to take up places in particular universities or fields of study, though these may be available.

Major questions go to where the growth has taken place and whether there has been a decline in any type of institution, group of students or areas of study. All but one university had more funded places in 2012 than in 2009, with an average institutional growth of 17%. Growth tends to be lower, at 11%, in the universities whose main base is within the inner capital cities. These are primarily the older research-focussed universities and the newer universities of technology. Indeed some of the older, research-focussed universities have stated plans to contain or reduce undergraduate places, though this has yet to be realised. The financial drivers for growth act to prevent the formal aim of those universities. Growth is also negatively associated with the size of the universities, with smaller universities taking the opportunity to grow towards a size that is considered more sustainable in the Australian context.

A regular concern raised with demand-driven funding is that it may cause some universities to fail financially if there are significant patterns of student choice for some universities over others, with particular concerns being expressed for universities based in rural areas and those in outer metropolitan areas. The presumption has been that students will choose, where possible, universities based in the inner cities. These arguments rarely address why a university that few students will choose over other options should be kept operational.

However, the data so far suggests that this situation appears unlikely to eventuate – in fact, growth has been higher within the “concern set” of universities than those to which the students were considered likely to flow.

A geographical factor of significance in Australia is variation between states. Bachelor's degree attainment is higher in Victoria, New South Wales (NSW) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and is lower elsewhere, including in the population growth states of Western Australia (WA) and Queensland (ABS, 2012). The allocation of places under the previous arrangements tended to reflect this with proportionately more places available in Victoria and NSW than in the other states. Efforts to address this saw the allocation of additional places since 2000 target Queensland and WA,
but with mixed results. Universities in WA have all struggled to grow, and initially the Queensland allocations struggled to be filled. The lifting of the caps has led to variable growth by state, but not in relation to current attainment. The lifting of the caps has led to fairly similar growth by state, without a closing of the gaps between states. Growth from 2009 to 2012 is slightly lower in Queensland, WA and South Australia (SA) at 12% than in Victoria and NSW-ACT at 13%.

There are some early signs of competition for the existing student market among institutions. This occurs primarily where there are multiple universities within a major city such as in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. Where the market-leader university expands there is some flow-on effect to other universities. In the Melbourne market, the 2012 round appears to have supported a major expansion by the universities situated at the upper middle of the market. These universities have retained largely students with high-entry qualifications and expanded their intake of those with medium-level qualifications. There is some evidence that universities rated more lowly have struggled to achieve their preferred levels. However, they appear likely to have more students than in 2009. It is the capacity to keep growing that has been challenged. If the pool of potential students does not continue to grow there could be more direct competition for the same pool, which could then lead to pressure on some universities.

There may also be a relationship to the downturn in international students in Australian universities. The lack of growth in international students is likely to have increased the capability of Australian universities to expand places for domestic students, and for some universities, pushed them into expanding Australian student numbers more vigorously than they might otherwise have done.

It is important to consider the demographic patterns of student enrolling and the changes that are occurring. The university expansion has been supported by a major leap in total applicants for university in 2010, 2011 and 2012, the first such increase since the mid-1990s. The knowledge that universities were able to provide places and university marketing campaigns seem likely to have helped drive increases in demand.

The modal group of enrolling students is school leavers, but it is important to note that these students make up only around one-half of all new enrolments in Australia. For these students there is a standard national measure of relative capability or readiness for higher education based on school achievement, the Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR), which all Australians in a school leaver cohort receive, regardless of whether they have completed the senior school certificate. The ATAR places them from 0.05 (lowest rank) to 99.95 (highest rank).
A decile analysis (Group of Eight, 2012), of the applicants and entrants to university who have an ATAR, shows that there has been growth in two notable ATAR bands. First, among those with higher rankings, a rank of 70 or more, a higher proportion is now seeking university entry. This accounts for about a quarter of the growth (Group of Eight, 2012). It is important to recognise this growth, for it shows that expansion is not simply a question of those less academically able entering higher education. It shows that not all high achievers from secondary school wish to pursue higher education, but that it is more and more likely that they will.

Second, more applications and offers for university places relate to people with midlevel (40 to 70) ATAR ranks. The implications for the assurance of appropriate educational achievement outcomes are considered in the next section. The relevance here is that the growth is making university entry the norm for the top half of school leavers and a likely proposition for most of those completing senior secondary schooling. ATARs of 30 or lower are primarily notionally allocated to those in the cohort who do not stay on in secondary school.

The Australian system measures the balance of social groups accessing universities via quartile analysis, where the share of university places held by the lowest quartile, defined as people of lower socio-economic status (SES), is a key marker of the equity performance of institutions and the system overall. Quartiles are defined historically by a geographical measure – home location, based on postcode prior to entering university – though recently these data have been supplemented by additional information on students’ access to government income support. The indicator is thus not precise to the individual, but has shown significant differences in aggregates, with the share of enrolments from the lowest quartile sitting at around 15% for many years, against a national reference point of 25% for the proportion of low SES people in the nation as a whole.

The government has set a national target of achieving a 20% share of places for low SES people by 2020, and provided a per-head funding loading to create an incentive to improve social balance. The question is whether, against the overall growth in places, access for the lowest quartile will increase faster than for other quartiles.

There is clear evidence of university efforts to recruit more students from the lower quartiles in response to the additional funding. The loading has made social balance a factor of interest to the academic units of the universities, not just to the central equity units. The loading has also provided an additional source of funds for programmes that assist students in making the transition to higher education; in particular, to address gaps in learning skills from school and other previous education experiences.
The early evidence suggests a slight improvement in access, from 16.1% of undergraduate students in 2008 to 16.8% in 2011 (DIISRTE, 2012, Appendix 2 Equity Groups, Table 2.5); however, such levels have been seen before; hence longer term improvement is required before there can be any confidence in a genuine and major shift in access. The increase is modest and needs to continue at a greater pace for the government target to be met. Further, little is known at this stage of the reforms about patterns of student retention, and also patterns of student movement between universities during first and second year of courses.

The intent of the demand-driven system is that Australians should be encouraged to pursue the degree area they identify as most useful for them. Student choice is thus given primacy in the judgement about what skill sets will be needed in the future. One concern with the policy is that students may not choose wisely and skill gaps will emerge in the future. Analysis of this issue should be set against the nature of the previous arrangements where student choice of discipline was already strongly influential on the balance of places universities made available. While universities could not meet all previous demand, they could be financially penalised for not enrolling to expected levels; hence, attracting students was an important issue.

The previous funding arrangements also permitted a degree of enrolment beyond the targets, with universities able to retain the student charge for the additional students. This created some incentive for flexibility to meet demand, where it existed, for lower cost courses for which the student contribution represented a significant part of the standard funding or for which the cost at the margin for additional students was low. Universities had much less capacity to respond to any increase in demand in science and other mid- to high-cost disciplines.

The distribution of the additional student places, as universities move to the new arrangements, shows that universities have expanded across the full range of disciplines. This is particularly noticeable for science, engineering and related disciplines where there have been regular concerns in the past that Australia is producing too few graduates. The upturn shows that there is both interest from potential students and financial capacity from the universities for growth.

For government there has been concern that the expansion has come faster than predicted causing additional expenditure in the early years, at a time when economic circumstances have made additional expenditure harder to sustain. However, by 2012 the pace of growth had begun to ease...
A demand-driven system and quality

The previous section has demonstrated that, to date, Australian student demand and the supply of places have worked well together to permit a general expansion of the higher education system, which has been advantageous to most institutions and different groups of students, while also appearing to be producing a wide range of graduates by discipline. The government’s expansion target certainly looks achievable, the social balance target less guaranteed perhaps, but may be possible.

Another major concern is whether the universities can deliver the education at the standard required in a context of rapid expansion and lower levels of student preparedness. Thus, this concern has two specific subthemes: whether the broader range of students is capable of learning that justifies the conferment of a bachelor’s degree; and whether universities can achieve that outcome for all students within the financial resources available to them.

The formal mechanism for ensuring standards is the new national agency, the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), which has the prime responsibility for the external monitoring and cyclical assessment of all higher education providers. To guide the assessment of providers there are national standards that cover areas such as the operation of the organisation, aspects of teaching and learning, expectations for research for universities and the determining characteristics of the qualifications which may be conferred.

Initially it was proposed that the Higher Education Standards Framework be comprised of five domains: provider standards, qualification standards, teaching and learning standards, research standards and information standards. Presently, the first two domains form the threshold requirements for whether or not a higher education provider can operate. The other domains are as yet unwritten. The Higher Education Standards Panel is currently reviewing the threshold standards and the overall structure of the standards framework.

How the national standards might influence the student market, if at all, is unclear. Should there be mechanisms in future for acknowledging standards above threshold, this might enable institutions to demonstrate high levels of achievement and provide additional data-based ways of attracting future students. There is little evidence on whether such information would influence choice of institution, either as an explicit factor applicants consider or as part of the general sense of the value and reputation of the institution.

The hard edge of the debate is whether 40% of the population (i.e. the 40% target for bachelor’s degree attainment) is capable of higher education. Those who support the general expansion of higher education, along with other
forms of post-secondary education and training, argue that the level of education attained across particular societies is a reflection of employment and economic developments. Many world economies are reaching a point where some post-secondary qualification is needed for an effective working life. Within that, a high proportion will require higher education. In Australia, employment is higher amongst those with post-secondary degrees, with unemployment most notable for those who have not completed secondary education, particularly women.

Australian universities have shown that people from many educational backgrounds can gain from university education, achieving learning outcomes that match or exceed those required for a degree. The expansion in places now underway pushes the balance of students more towards those with greater educational support requirements. The challenge is to provide the support required by students to ensure that all students, of all ability levels, develop to their potential.

The funding changes are likely to be generating greater differences between universities in how they meet the needs of their students. Some argue that there should be much more diversity across universities, whether in the degrees they provide or the approaches to pedagogy. Diversity could also extend to greater use of non-university education providers (e.g. colleges, vocational education and training institutions), which are not eligible for direct government support. There has long been diversity in provision, although this is sometimes underestimated. The impact of demand-driven funding could encourage universities to articulate their differences as a basis for attracting students. However, the countervailing force is that, for many potential students, reasonable local access is important. This is likely to mean that similar degrees will remain to be provided by most universities, but with some distinction in delivery.

The debate is more relevant in the institutions in major cities where delineation of approaches may be possible. In the regional cities and rural areas, universities retain the challenge of providing a sufficiently broad array of courses to local populations to provide an effective counter to local people moving elsewhere to study or choosing to study through distance education.

The unresolved debate is the level of investment required to allow the universities to deliver in these various ways and to create genuinely new and viable business and educational models. The Bradley review recommended a 10% increase in government funding per place and a further analysis of resourcing needs. The government has provided about 3.5% (IRU, 2012) for enrolment of low SES students and performance against targets for enrolments of students from under-represented groups. As of 2012, these are the only ways in which the government has increased funding per student.
The funds tend to provide relatively greater support to the institutions attracting students who are new to higher education, thus supporting the expansionary objective. The subsequent Higher Education Base Funding Review has argued that the funding gap is closer to 20% across the combined government and student resource (Lomax-Smith, Watson and Webster, 2011).

There is little realistic chance of government funding increasing to such a degree. The other source of additional resourcing is the contribution from students. The Bradley reforms are predicated on universities competing to meet student needs in different ways with broadly similar resource bases. If part of the resourcing solution is to gain a higher total contribution from students there are two main ways in which to do this within the Australian context. The first is to build on the current arrangements, and consistent with Bradley, reset the capped amount payable by students to increase the total payment. The second is to move away from a capped charge to allow students to pay an amount determined by each university with the intent of adding price considerations into applicants’ choice of course. To date, uncapping tuition fees has been viewed as politically unacceptable, however the national mood may be turning, albeit slowly. Certainly, there is little confidence that the present volume deregulation and price regulation policy settings will last very long given the budgetary implications and the uncertainties around growth in particular fields of study and their relationship to national labour force needs. The higher education sector is thus in a period of uncertainty with regard to developing long-term institutional strategies for revenue.*

**Conclusion**

Australia is in the midst of a major experiment in a push towards universal participation in higher education. The principal policy tool is the uncapping of places, which is designed to create responsiveness to student choice, to expand choices and to raise the levels of provider competition. The evidence to date suggests the policies are achieving their goal of growth. However, there is much to be learned about other effects over time, including the impact on the vocational educational and training sector (VET) now that higher education providers are recruiting in the demographic heartland of VET institutions. As well, new patterns of student engagement seem likely, with pathway proliferation into higher education, more students dipping in and out of higher education across their lifetimes and more fluidity in the

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* Parliamentary elections on 14 September 2013 led to a change of government. The newly elected Liberal-National Coalition government established a review of the demand-driven system, to be completed by early 2014. Future policy directions are uncertain at the time of writing, however a calming of the recent rapid growth in participation seems likely.
boundaries between study, work and life. Finally, and not least, there is the issue of academic standards. With admissions standards changes to allow for enhanced entry, at least for some institutions, there will be more diverse interpretations of quality emerging and how the national regulator will ensure standards of outcomes remains to be seen.

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References


Managing the oversight of international branch campuses in higher education

by

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Over the past two decades, many colleges and universities established physical presences in foreign countries. The development of such foreign educational outposts has meant that institutions have had to learn how to manage across geopolitical borders. This study used interviews with senior officials at institutions operating one or more international branch campuses to identify the three primary areas of oversight of concern to multinational universities: faculty, curriculum and finances. In each of these areas, the authors identify differing managerial strategies used by institutions and explore how these strategies relate to whether the branch is viewed as an integrated or separated component of the institution’s governance structure.
Assurer la supervision des antennes internationales des établissements d’enseignement supérieur

par

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Au cours des vingt dernières années, de nombreuses universités ont établi des antennes à l’étranger. Avec le développement de ces avant-postes, les établissements d’enseignement supérieur ont dû apprendre à diriger au-delà de leurs frontières. Cette étude s’appuie sur des entretiens avec de hauts dirigeants d’université gérant un ou plusieurs campus satellites internationaux afin d’identifier les trois principaux aspects que les universités internationales doivent superviser : corps enseignant, programmes d’études et finances. Dans chacun de ces domaines, les auteurs recensent les différentes stratégies de gestion utilisées par les universités et les analysent selon que le satellite est considéré comme un élément intégré ou séparé de la structure de gouvernance de l’université.
Introduction

The recent growth in international branch campuses emanates primarily from universities in Western countries opening branch campuses in the Middle East and Asia. Some have critiqued the phenomenon as one that gives primacy to Western academic norms, perspectives, language and knowledge creation (Bashshur, 2010; Rostron, 2009). However, it is not entirely clear that Western universities seek to exert Western education as the dominant educational form in the host country. A perception exists that Western universities engage in cross-border programmes for material gain, through the tuition revenue gained either by expanding their programmes or through improving their academic resources and worldwide standing by strengthening global networks (Green et al., 2007; Naidoo, 2010). These perceptions often characterise the entrepreneurial motives of cross-border higher education as being in opposition to local educational development, although Lane and Kinser (2011) argue that universities’ private motives can be compatible with host countries’ public goals.

In light of these divergent opinions of the functions of international branch campuses (IBCs), this qualitative study seeks to expand understanding about the oversight that home campuses exert over their branch campuses and the principles that guide that oversight. Specifically, the purpose of the study is to gain insight into the universities’ understandings of the role of the international branch campus in the host country; the motivations for operating a branch campus; and the relationship between home campus and host country priorities. The primary research question guiding the study is: how does the home campus engage in oversight of its international branch campuses? In addition, the study seeks to infer the operational principles that guide the development of the oversight process, as well as how the operational principles affect oversight mechanisms.

Theoretical framework

In theory, oversight of an activity should be linked to the reason for the activity. As such, the entity engaging in the oversight process (the principal) is attempting to ensure that some other entity (the agent) is doing what it is supposed to be doing. The purposes of international branch campuses are not always clear. As a result, this study is guided by two frameworks. The first is conceptual, based on an OECD framework (OECD, 2004; Naidoo, 2010) that
suggests the motivations to engage in cross-border activities (both from the perspective of home institutions and host countries) could be classified into four categories. The Mutual Understanding perspective highlights the academic, cultural, social and political bases for engaging in transnational programmes. The Skilled Migration rationale emphasises efforts to draw international students to source countries in order to increase the country’s skilled labour. Transnational programmes feed students to a source country through transfer between branch and home campuses. Revenue Generation describes income seeking as a motivation for transnational programmes. Capacity Building views transnational education as a means of filling demand for higher education in receiving countries. This conceptual framework will be used to interpret the analysis of home campus operational principles for the IBCs and determine if our findings fit within or expand the OECD analysis.

Second, we rely on principal-agent theory as a means of understanding the organisational dynamics associated with the oversight process. How higher education institutions engage in oversight has been a growing interest among higher education scholars for the past four decades (McLendon, 2003). Drawing on economics and political science, principal agent theory has proven to be a particularly robust framework in higher education for understanding the relationship between the entities involved in the oversight relationship (Lane and Kivisto, 2008). However, very little is known about how institutions regulate cross-border higher education initiatives, particularly public colleges and universities with a physical presence in more than one country. Hence, the purpose of this study is to investigate the ways in which institutions manage and provide oversight of their growing global footprint. Oversight is generally defined as the monitoring of organisational activity and/or attempts to control organisational activity (Lane, 2007; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Ogul, 1976).

The principal-agent relationship develops when one entity contracts with another to fulfil certain goals or objectives. Originally applied to individuals, researchers have now applied the principal-agent relationship to organisations as well (Lane and Kivisto, 2008; Moe, 2005). The basic problem at the heart of the principal-agent relationship is ensuring that the agent fulfils the goals and wishes of the principal. In this study, the focus is on how the home campus ensures that the IBC operates in the best interest of the home campus; this can be particularly problematic as many IBCs are located thousands of miles away from the home campus. Principal-agent theory assumes that the agent is motivated to act in its own self-interest and the principal must use a combination of rewards, punishments and oversight to compel the agent not to “shirk” on its duties.

The literature on oversight is guided largely by the monitoring aspects of the principal-agent framework. Political scientists have used the principal-
agent model to describe the different aspects of the relationships between various types of organisations: policy products, bureaucratic influence, oversight, control, shirking and information asymmetry. The model's level of flexibility and adaptability in studying an array of organisational relationships and products is one of the reasons for its popularity and usage in political science (Miller, 2005).

The work of this study extrapolates from previous work on public bureaucracies. In seeking to understand why public bureaucracies exist, Moe (1984) explained how governmental hierarchies produce principals and agents. First, he suggested that the government acts as an agent of the voters in establishing the supply of public goods and in taxing each individual to cover the cost of those goods. Second, government contracts with agents, in the form of bureaucracies, to fulfil these two goals. The contract is often implied in the relationship as governments often create their own agents. Following their creation, however, these agents become semi-autonomous from the principal and, therefore, possess the freedom to engage in “shirking” (i.e. evading one’s work or pursuing one’s own goals in lieu of the goals established by the principal [Fiorina, 1982]). Once an organisation is created, it becomes a legal entity in its own right, and the laws of organisational momentum and administrative rules (Moe, 2005: 21) protect its survival and structure. Thus, some sub-organisations, such as branch campuses, possess a level of autonomy as they implement policy (Bohte and Meier, 2000; West, 1997). Unlike principal-agent relationships in the private market where the agent can voluntarily disengage from the contract, organisational agents do not have such a choice and thus are forced to continue operating within the organisation that created them. The principal-agent model holds great possibilities for the development of a theory of higher education governance. This paper, however, more narrowly focuses on the oversight aspects of emerging multi-national colleges and universities.

Methods and data

This is a qualitative study consisting of interviews at approximately 58 branch campuses and home universities and colleges with foreign locations. The home campuses in the sample are located in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), India, Belgium, Malaysia and the Netherlands. Branch campuses are located in the Czech Republic, China, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Qatar, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Interviews were conducted with administrators who are closely involved in the operation or oversight of their institution's international branch campus. Research participants were recruited by identifying appropriate individuals through university web sites or personal references. Interviews were conducted on site, either at the home campus or
branch campus location by one or two researchers (out of seven researchers involved) using a common interview protocol that covers issues of branch campus operations, regulations, and oversight. Most interviews were recorded and supplemented with the interviewers' field notes. Interviews that were not recorded were immediately documented from field notes.

Once the interviews were finished, an iterative coding process, including both open and axial coding, was employed to address the research questions. The codes were used to identify the type of oversight mechanisms that exist, and to identify the purposes of the IBCs as viewed from the administrator perspective. The codes were compared with the OECD framework to assess the extent to which our findings fit with rationales in the extant literature.

Results

The focus of this paper is on the oversight mechanisms. Three areas of oversight are most prominent in discussions of branch campuses:

1. Oversight of faculty, including faculty hiring;
2. Oversight of the curriculum and degree standards; and
3. Financial oversight, including evaluation of programme success.

These areas of oversight will be discussed and related to the internal and external processes that encourage or enforce campus procedures. In this study, the concern is with policies at the institutional level. Although quality assurance and accreditation policies are often considered a means of oversight by government agencies, they are considered here as influencing campus oversight policies and will not be assessed separately. See Lane and Kinser (2011) and Kinser and Lane (forthcoming) for a more explicit discussion of the external quality assurance issues that affect cross-border higher education.

Faculty oversight

Faculty who teach at branch campuses can be employees of the local campus or the home campus; they can teach full-time or part-time; and they can be considered part of the home campus academic community or be segregated from the home campus with no rights of tenure, departmental affiliation or continuing appointments. Each strategy implies a distinct oversight perspective. Further complicating matters, some institutions use a combination of these approaches.

Perhaps the most obvious division is between those faculty employed by the home campus and stationed at the branch campus versus those that have contracts abroad. Campuses that had faculty as employees of the branch delegated more authority away from the home campus, and invested more
heavily in branch-campus administration. The home campus generally recognised a distinct identity among branch-campus faculty because of this, often describing them as having backgrounds and characteristics that made them more suited for branch-campus teaching than faculty at the home campus. This does not necessarily mean that branch faculty were considered inferior to home-campus faculty. In fact, a common perspective offered by home-campus administrators was that faculty qualifications were similar, but branch faculty had more of a commitment to internationalisation or the specific geographic region.

In other cases, the employment status of the faculty reflects local employment law (Harding and Lammey, 2011). Foreign faculty must have work visas, for example, and therefore guarantees of employment cannot be assured beyond the terms of the visa. In some countries, in contrast, labour laws provide more employment protection for the branch-campus faculty than may be available at home. Financial considerations may also encourage different employment practices. For example, one institution pays branch-campus faculty substantially less than home-campus faculty due to differences in the standards of living; while other branch campuses pay substantially more than the home campus for the same reason.

Whether full-time or part-time faculty are used depends on the type of programme and the availability of local faculty to serve the branch campus. As in the private higher education sector generally, part-time faculty are often available for moonlighting from their public sector jobs (Kinser et al., 2010). In certain countries, faculty teach at multiple institutions as a matter of common practice and academic culture. Part-time faculty also may be preferable for programmes that seek to develop practical or professional competencies if drawn from industry. The largest proportion of part-time faculty emerged from programmes that used current home campus faculty for short-term teaching spells at the branch campus. This is seen in many cases as a benefit for the faculty member, getting to spend a few weeks in a desirable foreign location in exchange for teaching a few class sessions. While the first two strategies may be compatible with a locus of oversight at the branch, in practice, most faculty hiring relies on home-campus evaluations of instructor suitability to the programme and generally places less emphasis on review by branch administrators.

The relationship of the faculty member to the home campus represents a third aspect of branch-campus oversight. Different patterns emerged from the interviews. The basic distinction was between branch-campus faculty who were considered part of the broader home-campus academic community and those who were explicitly separated from the home campus. The latter case would be analogous to a US state system of higher education, where members of the faculty of one campus (say, the State University of New York-Buffalo)
have limited relationships with the faculty of another campus (say, State University of New York-Albany). Variants on this were most common, regardless of whether the faculty were employed by the branch or the home campus. If employed by the branch, the faculty tended to identify strongly with the location, and often included some aspects of self-governance or shared governance practices. If employed by the home campus, they typically seemed like contingent faculty with contractual obligations for branch teaching, rather than assuming full responsibility for the academic programme.

Including branch-campus faculty as members of the home campus academic community was less frequently seen, though it often emerged among universities with more experience in international activities, or those that had established research expectations at the branch location. The extent of the relationship could vary from membership in cross-campus departments, to common tenure expectations and opportunities, to multi-campus teaching opportunities irrespective of primary-campus affiliation. In one instance, the assumption that the department chair would reside on the home campus was open to consideration, because the size and status of the branch programme had become greater than at home. In others, common review of applicants and joint decisions on hiring were conducted both by home and branch campus personnel.

**Curriculum oversight**

Oversight of the curriculum occurs in two primary ways. The first involves initial home-campus programme approval, which may also entail approval from quality assurance agencies in the home and host countries. The second aspect of curricular oversight involves maintaining programme quality, including ensuring that courses and degrees are equivalent across all locations. In some countries, the curriculum-oversight process is more standardised than in others, especially when the tradition of external examiners for degrees is well established. In other countries, it can be a somewhat confusing mix of internal and external oversight that involves multiple constituencies with potentially conflicting expectations.

At the institutional level, site visits revealed several strategies. Initial academic approval from a home-campus faculty body is typical, often proceeding under rules established for approval of any new academic programme. In the US, for example, this is required for accreditation purposes, though most interviewees portrayed this as an internal imperative as well. Once programmes have initial approval, however, oversight often transitioned to an administrative office at the home campus, and in some cases was conducted almost entirely by branch-campus administrators. In the latter case, the branch programmes avoided much scrutiny from the home campus,
and in at least one case remained under the radar during an institutional quality assurance review.

A distinctive pattern emerges particularly at universities with extensive branch-campus operations. Several universities reported structures where global programmes are considered as one entity, but offered in different locations. Typically, centralised academic co-ordinators ensure that the curricula in all locations are equivalent (or at least comparable), with some flexibility in adapting a syllabus to local needs and faculty expertise. At the extremes, some branch campus faculty were expected to replicate the curriculum developed on the home campus without consideration of local conditions. At the other end of the spectrum, branch campus faculty had freedom to achieve learning outcomes in the ways they thought best. In one case that tried to balance the extremes, there is a master syllabus for each course with an established core of material that must be covered and cannot be changed (“invariant outcomes”). There is flexibility within the master syllabus to cover material relevant to the cultural context (“contextual outcomes”) that is crafted by each branch campus. Finally, faculty can infuse their own expertise into their syllabus (“instructor outcomes”).

A third version emerges in institutions that operate branches as separate corporate entities, where they establish local oversight of all academic programmes, typically with the approval of host-country quality assurance regimes. The branch campus essentially acts as an “independent Malaysian university” or an “an autonomous university of the United Arab Emirates” rather than a child campus of the home location. These tend to look more like spin-offs than formal branch campuses, and develop their own somewhat duplicative administrative structure with dotted line reporting back to the home campus and usually significant representation from the home campus administration on the local governing board. The programmes may be audited by the home campus, however, or still be subject to home-country quality assurance review, even if the host country considers them independent or autonomous entities.

Finally, some universities have set up global divisions that centralise all oversight of academic programmes separate from the regular curriculum. This contrasts with a model that adds the branch campus to the portfolio of an office or administrator who has primary responsibility on the home campus. The latter scenario was more common in institutions that had only one or two branches, while the former was seen mostly in those cases with more extensive global operations. With a global office, the branch campus operation can become rather segregated from main campus activities, as other entities do not have to be involved in decisions or approvals. On the other hand, the model that delegates oversight of programmes to an existing body on campus
can tend to overload those charged with reviewing programmes, especially considering the entrepreneurial start-up nature of many branch campuses.

Academic freedom issues are frequently mentioned as a concern in the literature on branch campuses (Altbach, 2011; Green, Kinser and Eckel, 2008), though very few specific cases have actually been documented. This did not emerge as a key concern for many constituents in their review of academic programmes. On the one hand, there was a general uneasiness connected with operating in countries that do not have the same traditions of free expression and dissent as in Western countries. On the other hand, individuals located in the host country had no specific complaints or examples of academic freedom issues. Still, one can be reasonably sure that constraints exist, even if not acknowledged as such. In China, for example, a member of the Communist Party may sit at the head of campus life and represents the government’s interest in the branch. Although academic authority remains with the branch campus head, the explicit political presence on campus suggests that pressure to conform to government restrictions is acknowledged implicitly. In some cases, home-campus pressure has made academic freedom a contractual issue with setting up the branch campus, such that host-country authorities are explicitly required to support autonomy of academic programmes. It is clear neither whether these contracts have ever been tested, nor whether they have any more nuanced fall-back than closing the branch. Based on other research (Green, Kinser and Eckle, 2008), it is likely that a fair amount of self-censorship occurs. That, plus a dominance of programmes that fall to the technical side of the curricular spectrum, suggests that academic freedom remains untested. The efficacy of oversight provisions to guard against violations, therefore, is difficult to evaluate.

**Financial oversight**

Three basic models comprise the structure of international branch campuses. The first is a wholly-owned subsidiary model, where the branch is incorporated locally for the purpose of providing education services in country while remaining under the complete control of the home campus. In this model, there are no partner organisations or other entities with financial interests in the operation (Lane, 2010). A home-campus administrator leads the oversight and the branch is treated like a separate academic or administrative unit. The branch is intended to remain financially separated from the home campus, with firewalls and other prohibitions against spending domestic resources in support of the international presence. In practice, however, there is some blurriness in that dividing line, especially regarding the administrative time devoted to managing the enterprise.
The second model is a branch-partner relationship, where the international location is supported by one or more partners that have ownership stake in the venture. As is the case in all branch campuses, the home university maintains 100% control over academics, but the partner in this model has some management responsibilities and/or contributes financially to the endeavour. In other cases, the partner serves as a landlord for the branch, providing space and services for a fee or as a proportion of revenue (Lane and Kinser, 2013). Financial oversight is trickier under this model, because rarely is this a silent partner. Typically, the arrangement is predicated on some enrolment predictions that have significant implications for sustainability if they are not met. Moreover, the partner may have its own set of financial expectations for the branch, which may not be fully compatible with an academic institution's primary focus on quality delivery. As a result of the partner's involvement, the financial oversight becomes imbedded in the legal arrangements, with multiple individuals and offices engaged on the home-campus side.

The third organisational strategy is an extended campus model. In this form, the branch is established as a programme or division of an existing campus unit, developing few, if any, new or distinctive structures. Oversight typically occurs through existing mechanisms on the home campus, using existing administrative offices and budgetary processes. There may not be any effort to separate financial records for the branch other than what may be necessary for currency exchange or tax reporting, and home government oversight for state institutions can be quite lax or even non-existent. Sustainability of the branch programmes under this model is measured by enrolment – have a critical mass of students matriculated – rather than calculating whether the revenue is sufficient to meet total programme expenses. Examples were few, but could be seen when a home campus extended its natural geographic service area beyond the national border to encompass a nearby foreign population centre.

How home campuses evaluate programme success is difficult to assess fully in this data set, as many branch campuses were relatively new and still could be considered in start-up mode. Much of what emerged from interviews, then, was a focus on matching initial projections to current outcomes. On that score, it seems clear that a trend of overpromising and underperforming is standard. Initial interest in expanding overseas centred on revenue diversification and nearly all efforts were intended to be revenue-neutral if not profitable for the home campus. To be sure, several branches have established sustainable long-term financial models that allow for the continuation and expansion of branch activities. In other cases, it was apparent that maintaining institutional flexibility to close an unsuccessful or unprofitable international location was considered an important component of
sustainability. Most had recognised that early ambitions needed to be tempered with reality. It is not easy to make money with an international branch campus, and most were satisfied if they could establish – or foresee establishing – a break-even enterprise.

When discussing whether they would consider expansion of their international presence, home campus representatives, often gave little importance to the financial issues that they had encountered in their current efforts. This seemed particularly evident when the original advocates of the initial expansion were still actively involved. The imperative of global expansion and the prestige of operating a branch campus still held sway over the dull economics of sustainability over time. Home campuses that had experienced leadership transition were typically more cautious in how they expressed the plans, ranging from being open to the right opportunity to outright pessimism towards the whole branch campus phenomenon. A few universities had gained confidence from their current activities and were actively seeking expansion on a global scale. These saw the international presence as part of a broader global agenda intimately tied to the mission of the university, and had developed the oversight infrastructure internally to support that mission. Most, however, were still thinking rather small, with limited expansion plans, whether enthusiastically pursued or not.

**OECD framework**

The study further demonstrates that institutions engage in cross-border activities for a range of reasons. Those reasons can be classified largely within the OECD framework categories. We found that many administrators attest to wanting to develop a mutual understanding that helps further the internationalisation of the home campuses curriculum. In terms of skilled migration, those interviewed were not specifically concerned about building a strong local workforce. However, they were very focused on attracting high-quality students and producing high-quality graduates. They were not concerned about their role in retaining graduates in the region. While few administrators explicitly stated that the purpose of IBCs is to generate revenue for the home campus, the pecuniary aspects of the enterprise were clearly very important. There was a very clear sense that the IBC had to generate at least sufficient funds to cover their own costs of operation and there was great concern that the IBC not negatively affect the financial standing of the home campus (though there was evidence that some branch campuses received financial assistance from the home campus). Finally, many of the stated reasons for developing an IBC fell under capacity building. This can be considered in two dimensions. On one hand, the institution was concerned about building its own capacity and saw that expanding its global footprint allowed it to reach more students, build its reputation and expand its
international networks. On the other hand, there was also recognition of the role the IBC could play in helping build the local economic capacity of the region, both through the production of graduates and through developing local research capacity. It is important to point out, however, the difference between recognising a role in producing local graduates, but not being overly concerned whether or not the graduates actually stayed in the region.

**Conclusion**

Home-campus administrators engaged in a range of oversight activities that included locating decision-making power on the home campus, having IBC staff report to both IBC and home campus officials, site visits by senior leadership officials and so forth. An additional finding of the study is that the oversight mechanisms did not directly align with the purposes of the institution. That is, the oversight mechanisms did not specifically focus on what was deemed as the mission of the IBC. Rather, oversight in many cases was motivated out of fear that the actions of the IBC would negatively affect the home campus. As such, the mechanisms seemed to be designed to ensure the IBC did not engage in activities that would adversely affect the financial or reputational aspects of the institution. A compounding factor was the locus of the home campus and how the home country defined quality. For example, most US-based IBCs focused a great deal of attention on the quality of inputs and were concerned that students in the IBCs met the same admission standards as that of the home campus. On the other hand, UK and Australian institutions were most concerned that the students at the IBC scored similarly to the home campus students on the standardised exams that all students took at the end of the semester.

Little is known about the motivations of universities to open IBCs, or how they engage in oversight of their campuses in host countries. The information that is currently available is largely anecdotal or is based on a single university’s perspective. This study fills a gap in the knowledge of cross-border higher education by providing a broad-based and comprehensive understanding of universities’ motivations for operating international branch campuses and their perspectives on the branch campuses’ roles in the host country. This information will be useful for university leaders, branch campus managers, policy makers and other stakeholders.
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