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The interaction between income distribution and the Great Recession

Stylized Facts on the Cross Country nexus

NERO-Meeting OECD

Paris, 18th June 2012

Karl Aiginger

The hypothesis:

- Income distribution became less equal in the years preceding Great Depression as well as Great Recession
- ⇒ **Increasing inequality one cause of crises**

The research questions:

Did **countries** with larger **shifts** in the distribution suffer a **deeper/longer** output loss in 2007/2010?

Thus with less equality (**level**)?

- **The Great Recession versus the Great Depression, Economics: E-Journal, Vol. 4, 2010**
- **"Why Growth Performance Differed across Countries", Review of Economics and Finance, No.4 /2011**
- **Strengthening the Resilience of an Economy. Intereconomics, October 2009**
- **Why labor market response differed in the Great Recession, WIFO Working Paper 396/2011 (jointly with Horvath, Th. and Mahringer, H.)**

- Decreasing wage shares reduce growth, if the "gap" is not invested (**underinvestment**)
- Polarization reduces consumption because of lower consumption ratios for rich people (**underconsumption**)
- Inequality fosters **volatility**:
 - investment and luxury goods more volatile *

Policy reactions to rising inequality may mitigate problems in the short run, but aggravate them in the long run

- Expansionary monetary policy
- Cheap credits to low income people
- High government deficits
- Export strategies

Inequality may not **cause** crises, but be "**co-determined**" by third causes

- Policy shift, globalization, technology
- Education
- Technology
- Currency issues
- Some hypotheses refer to polarization, some to profit share
- Evidence on past crises (Atkinson, Bordo, Acemoglu) *

⇒ **No cross section investigations so far relating to Great Recession 2007/10**

Four sub-indicators using GDP data:

- GDP change in 2009
- Cumulated change of GDP 2008/09/10
- Decrease in quarterly GDP from peak to trough
- “Trend” change 08/09/10 vs. 2000-2007

⇒ **Single indicator: First Principle Component
maximizing the information value**

■ Top 10:

**China, India, Poland, Australia, Korea,
Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, Norway,
Belgium**

■ Low 10:

**Greece, Hungary, Finland, Romania, Slovenia,
Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia**

Method: Principle Component Analysis (*Aiginger, 2011*)

Five indicators (three personal, two functional)

- Gini of household incomes 2005 (and 2005 vs. mid 80s)
- Poverty rate mid 2000s (and vs. mid 90s)
- Interquintile ratio mid 2000s (and vs. mid 90s)
- Wage/income ratio 2007 (and 2007 vs. 1995)
- Wage/income ratio adjusted for number of employees

Single indicator: PC for pre-crisis level (PC-DISTR-level)

Single indicator: PC for pre-crisis change (PC-DISTR-change)

No correlation between

Output performance and level of distribution

R = 0.08, 0.05, 0.07, -0.06, -0.06, **0.08**


Output performance and change in distribution

R = **-0.33***, 0.06, -0.01, -0.01, -0.01, **-0.05**

Neither with overall indicator (**bold**)

Nor with any single indicator
(with the exception of **Gini change**)

The relation between output performance and level of distribution



High performers in crisis, **high equality** 2005

Switzerland (**6**; **6**)

Norway (**9**; **13**), Belgium (**10**; **11**)

High performers in crisis, **low equality** 2005

Poland (**3**; **34**), Korea (**5**; **25**), New Zealand (**8**; **30**)

China (**1**; **27**), India (**2**; **20**) *

⇒ **Average rank of 10 top performers in output 20**

Remark: **blue** = rank in PC Output
red = rank in equality level

Low performers in crisis, **low equality** 2005 (level)

Lithuania (**35**; **24**), Latvia (**37**; **19**), Estonia (**36**; **26**),
Greece (**28**; **33**), Ireland (**34**; **28**), Romania (**31**; **31**)

Low performers in crisis, **high equality** 2005

Iceland (**33**; **1**), Slovenia (**32**; **5**), Finland (**30**; **7**),
Hungary (**29**; **4**) *

⇒ **Average rank of 10 low performers in output is 18**

Remark: **blue** = rank in PC Output

red = rank in equality level

Performance of countries with "improving" distribution (ranks)

	PC- Distribution change	PC-Output	PC- Distribution level
	Rank	Rank	Rank
Iceland	1	33	1
Turkey	2	12	36
Greece	3	28	33
Portugal	4	15	29
Spain	5	20	23
Denmark	6	24	2
Italy	7	22	32
Switzerland	8	6	6
Belgium	9	10	11
Korea	10	5	25
Top 10		18	20

Performance of countries with increasing inequality (ranks)

	PC- Distribution change	PC-Output	PC- Distribution level
Slovenia	28	32	5
Slovakia	29	23	15
Canada	30	7	16
Poland	31	3	34
Latvia	32	37	19
Estonia	33	36	26
Austria	34	13	10
Norway	35	9	13
Finland	36	30	7
Germany	37	18	14
Low 10		21	16

	Values		
	Level	Change	
PC distribution	0.08	-0.05	
Gini	0.08	-0.33	xx
Poverty rate	0.05	0.06	
Interquintile ratio	0.07	-0.01	
Wage share ¹⁾	-0.06	-0.01	
Wage share adjusted ¹⁾	-0.06	-0.01	
Wage rate long ¹⁾		-0.30	x
Wage rate long adjusted ¹⁾		-0.34	xx

1) Remark: Minus implies that output performance better for lower wage share (more inequality)
 x: t-statistic at 5% level. - xx t-statistic at 10% level.

Correlation: 0.34 - significant at 5% level

■ ***Several top performers had decreasing Ginis***

Australia (4, 9) - Korea (5, 4) – Switzerland (6, 3) –
Canada (7, 16) - Belgium (10, 8)

■ ***Several low performers had increasing inequality:***


Latvia (37, 37) - Estonia (36, 33) - Lithuania (35, 36) –
Slovenia (32, 27) - Romania (31, 35) - Hungary (29, 31)

■ ***A tentative Interpretation:***

Anglo Saxon countries group 1

New member countries group 2


Better output performance/decreasing Gini



- Change in wage ratio 2005/1995 not significant
- Extending “upcoming period” to 1985-2007
 - R= 0.34 significant 5 % level ($p = 0.04$)
- 6 of top 10 have decreasing long run wage ratio
 - specifically NO, PL, NZ, AUS, CA, BE
 - only 2 of top 10 **in**creasing wage ratio: CH, KOR
- Low performers with increasing wage: GR,RO,LT, EE

Caveat: direction of causality?

Increasing wage rate does not increase resilience



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- Long run polarization decreases resilience
 - Wage shares increases do **not** foster resilience
 - Rational for the "surprise"
 - Wage increases below productivity, lead to unsustainable current account deficits
 - Technological competitiveness enables stable profits and resilience

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- **More on correlations**
 - **Outlier elimination (China, India, Iceland)**
 - **Ranks instead of quantitative values**
 - **Adding inequality to “best practice” in regressions**
 - **Specifically to current account 2007 (CA)**
 - **Inequality level marginally significant (+)**
 - **Inequality change significant at 5 % (-)**
 - **Gini change insignificant**

- **There is an interaction between inequality and CA**
 - **Gini change works through current accounts**
 - **Other components impact additional to CA**
- **Countries with wage increases larger than productivity loose competitiveness**
- **Lower wage shares seem to have cushioned crisis**

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- **Data quality (wage shares/part time/household/Individuals)**
 - **No causality analysis possible, no panel econometrics**
 - **Long run data seem to be more important than short run**
 - **Dependant variable : one crisis only**
 - **Cross section evidence maybe difficult in world with globalizing trade and finance**

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- **Upcoming period too short (10-20 years)**
 - **Country sample too small (37)**
 - **Output performance insufficiently measured**
 - **Crisis not yet over (Greece 2011, 2012)**
 - **Shifts in distribution not measured adequately (tail risks, uncertainty)**

- Lower wage rate and high polarization increases **global** volatility, not the national economy
- Countries are hit if they have **fundamental** weaknesses, not only those from distribution
- Countries could counteract increasing volatility by distribution according to **different strategies** (openness/credits/redistribution/subsidies)
- Distribution is not a single important component but only **if it interacts** with other
- Current account, credit booms, sovereign debt are weaknesses amplified if distribution changes

- **Testing the influence of different time spans**
- **Including policy reactions (leverage, deficits etc)**
- **Share of industrial sector (and its development)**
- **Socioeconomic systems (liberal, coordinated, emerging countries)**
- **Investigation of interactions**
 - **Current accounts, Gini, wage share**
 - **Liberalization – current accounts**

- **No easy** cross section link between crisis and distribution
- If anything there could be a **bifurcation** hypothesis
 - Increasing wage share did not stabilize (aggravate)
 - Decreasing GINI increased resilience
- Research on crisis and distribution is interesting
 - It is important to find factors increasing resilience
 - **Impact** of polarization/decreasing wage shares

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Towards a new path of growth for Europe (Welfare, Wealth and Work for Europe)

■ Goal:

- More social, ecological, dynamic; consistent with EU 2020 strategy (smart, sustainable, inclusive)**

■ Tendered as 7th Framework Program

- Winner: WIFO + team of 32 partners, 4 years programme**

■ Start: April 2012

■ Scientific Board:

- Aghion, Amable, Arrow, Banda, Chichilnisky, Corneo, de Grauwe, Eichengreen, Fehr, Fitoussi, Foray, Giddens, Hewings, Nowicka, Sapir, van der Ploeg, Verloo, Walby, von Weizsäcker, Wilkinson.

■ Policy Board:

- Almgren, Amato, Bayer, Beyrer, Crouch, Dow, Ederer, Elmeskov, Fischler, Görres,, Horvat, Hutschenreiter, Nowotny, Pesendorfer, Radošević, Raidl, Schor, Tumpel-Gugerell .

- **Globalisation**
- **Welfare model under pressure**
- **Demography/Ageing**
- **New technologies and post industrialism**
- **Ecological issues/climate change ***
- **Constraints:**
 - **deficits and public debts**
 - **Imbalances in world and within Europe**
 - **Instability of financial system.**



- **European Welfare State**
- **Ecological and biophysical dimension of new path**
- **Drivers for change: innovation, industrial policy, innovation policy**
- **New governance and institutions on the EU level**
- **Regions in transition**

