



Government of Republic of Indonesia  
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**INVESTMENT FOR ASIAN DEVELOPMENT:  
Lessons so far, Challenges for the Future**

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**The OECD Initiative on Investment for Development**

**A Policy Framework for Investment:  
Investment promotion and facilitation**

**For consideration in Session 4**

This document is for discussion in Session 4 on “Getting the Policy Framework Right: Toward a Structured Approach”. It reproduces the draft background document on investment promotion and facilitation prepared for the 13 June 2005 Paris meeting of the Task Force responsible for developing the Policy Framework for Investment. This document has been prepared by the OECD Secretariat and does not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD or its Members. It will be revised in light of the discussions during the Conference and comments from delegates to Task Force and OECD Investment Committee-related meetings.

# THE OECD INITIATIVE ON INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>

## A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT: INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND FACILITATION

### 1. Introduction

1. As part of the OECD Initiative on Investment and Development, the Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) provides policy advice through a flexible and non-prescriptive approach aimed at creating an environment that is attractive to domestic and foreign investors and that enhances the benefits of investment to society. Investment by both foreign and domestic firms is recognised as one of the pillars of economic growth and sustainable development. Although domestic firms are by far the largest investors in developing and transition economies, foreign investors are often particularly sought after for their technology, skills and expertise and for their access to international markets.

2. Most governments, including sometimes at the sub-national level, now actively promote foreign investment through agencies mandated to this effect and offer a range of inducements to link multinational enterprises (MNEs) more closely to the local economy. The traditional aims of foreign direct investment (FDI) policy in terms of employment, exports and, to a lesser extent, import substitution still exist, but the overall emphasis is now much more on the contribution of foreign MNEs to the overall development and competitiveness of the local business sector.

3. The *Framework* covers investment policy; competition policy; trade policy; tax policy; corporate governance and responsibility, and market integrity; human resource development; infrastructure development; and public governance. This background document focuses on what other steps a government might take to promote and facilitate investment in the host country, including that of encouraging any potential spillovers from foreign investment to local enterprise development. It is intended to provide the basis for a separate chapter of the Policy Framework for Investment dealing with investment promotion and facilitation.

### 1. Strategic investment promotion: the overall framework

<b>Does the government have a clear strategy for developing a sound, broad-based business environment within which investment promotion and facilitation measures will be effective?</b>
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4. Measures to promote and facilitate investment can be successful if they take place within a broader context of sound economic and structural policies, leading to an environment that is conducive to business.<sup>2</sup> One recent study suggests that, without an appropriate business climate for investment, promotional efforts might actually make foreign investment less likely. Morriset (2003) reviews the performance of investment promotion agencies in 58 developing and transition countries in terms of the level of FDI inflows. He finds that investment promotion is more effective in a country with a good investment climate and can even be counterproductive if the country offers only a poor investment climate. “It seems more difficult to convince an investor to come back if he was disillusioned during his first visit to a country. The disappointed investor is also likely to be vocal about his disenchantment and, so,

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1. For background information on the OECD *Initiative on Investment for Development* and the *Policy Framework for Investment*, see Annex.

2. OECD (2002a), p. 3.

discourage other potential investors.”<sup>3</sup> He argues that countries with a poor investment climate would be better off spending limited resources on the climate itself rather than on promotion.

5. However, once a country is establishing a generally sound investment climate, governments can take additional steps to promote and facilitate investment. Foreign investors by themselves might be slow to perceive profitable opportunities in the host economy, especially in smaller, more remote markets or those with a history of political unrest. They might also prefer to deal with existing suppliers elsewhere rather than take the time and effort to establish contacts with local firms. Active promotional policies by the host government can encourage both investment and linkages with local firms. A common institutional approach to such promotion is to create an IPA or other institutional facility. Not only can the IPA help simplify administrative procedures, improve regulatory transparency and focus investment promotion, it can also serve as a conduit for private sector input into the reform process itself. In many cases, the IPA is also used as a vehicle for expanding linkages between foreign investors and domestic suppliers.

### 3. The Investment Promotion Agency

6. As part of the South East Europe Compact for Reform, Investment, Integrity and Growth, the OECD has formulated Strategic Guidelines on Investment Promotion addressed to investment promotion agencies (IPAs) based on practices developed in some of the most successful host countries for foreign investment.<sup>4</sup> These include:

- The establishment of an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA) or other institutional facility,<sup>5</sup> as well as its objectives and the relevant legislative and governance structures;
- To inculcate within the IPA a professional management and service culture, result-oriented ethos and innovative marketing approach in order to compete successfully in attracting new investment and to ensure satisfactory continuity of the organisation culture; and
- To define strategic policy options and set out the corporate strategy and marketing plan of the IPA to build competitive strength and achieve selected policy options.

**Has an investment promotion agency been established? To what extent has the structure and mission of the IPA been informed by best practice in countries with a longer history of strategic investment promotion?**

7. Centralising many of the functions of government relating to foreign investment promotion and facilitation within a single agency is a popular method of organising and implementing a government’s strategic investment promotion policies. UNCTAD estimates that at least 160 national and more than 250 sub-national IPAs existed as of 2001, compared with only a handful two decades earlier.<sup>6</sup> The life cycle of an IPA can be summarised as follows: (1) image building; (2) investment generation; and (3) linkage promotion. At the same time, the IPA serves two additional functions at each stage of the life cycle: (a) information dissemination and investment facilitation; and (b) policy advocacy.

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3. Morriset (2003), p. 19.

4. Based on OECD (2002a), p. 12.

5. Governments do not always establish a separate agency but sometimes set up a division or a directorate within the existing bureaucracy to promote and facilitate investment. All references to investment promotion agencies assume such alternative arrangements.

6. World Bank (2004), p. 170.

8. At any given time, an IPA will perform all of these functions to varying degrees, but over time the IPA tends to reorient its resources towards the latter phases as the level of foreign investment increases in the economy. The principal aim of an IPA, at least in the early stages, is to draw attention to profitable investment opportunities in the host economy. Low levels of foreign investment are not necessarily evidence of a lack of such opportunities.<sup>7</sup>

9. Owing to limited IPA resources and faced with the almost limitless supply of potential investors promotional efforts have in some cases focussed on those firms most likely to invest. This requires an understanding both of how geography influences investment patterns and of “what investors are seeking, their view of the country as an investment location, the needs of their particular sector and company, the country’s competitive advantages for attraction of FDI and how it compares with other countries.”<sup>8</sup> An UNCTAD survey of IPAs found that they are focussing more and more on such targeting, to a greater extent than on either additional incentives or further liberalisation.<sup>9</sup>

10. Targeting of industries or even individual firms is sometimes referred to as the third generation of investment promotion policies.<sup>10</sup> It involves promoting particular locations to investors in specific activities. Such an approach takes time and relatively sophisticated institutional capacities. Targeting of the most likely investors can sometimes give way to an implicit industrial policy whereby targets are chosen based on a desire to develop certain industries deemed to be strategic. A discussion of industrial policy would go beyond the scope of this paper. However, there is a need for caution when targeting potential investors because identifying specific industries that might emerge as winners has always proven a difficult task. Furthermore, to the extent that targeting provides preferences for some firms over others, this could also have negative implications for competition. Nonetheless, proactive strategies based on sound analysis of the comparative advantages and market opportunities of a particular market or country, perhaps even taking into consideration the specific needs of different types of investors (e.g. market seeking, efficiency seeking and natural resource seeking) remains an important policy option, especially for countries that have particular advantages that the broader international investment community might not be aware of.

### **(i) Characteristics of a successful IPA**

<b>Has the IPA been given sufficient resources and funding? Does it enjoy adequate political support?</b>
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11. Experience suggests that strategic investment promotion cannot succeed if it is only a half-hearted effort. “Any undecided or ambivalent approach to FDI will weaken the competitive position of a country in attracting investment.”<sup>11</sup> The promotion agency must have active support at the highest political level if it is to convince investors that it can meet its commitments and if it is to be able to overcome turf wars with various line ministries. The IPA must also be staffed with qualified and motivated employees, ideally with private sector experience.

12. Morriset (2003) provides a number of insights into the characteristics of a successful IPA. Agencies with links to the president or prime minister and with private sector participation on the board have higher visibility and credibility and hence a better record in attracting foreign investment. Size also

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7. UNCTAD (1999), p. 17.

8. OECD (2002a), p. 29.

9. UNCTAD (2004), p. 34.

10. First generation investment promotion involves liberalising FDI regimes and adopting market-friendly policies. Second generation policies relate to the marketing of the country as an investment location.

11. OECD (2002a), p. 17.

matters: Morriset finds that “small agencies are not really effective in attracting FDI”.<sup>12</sup> A minimum budget is essential if promotion is to yield results. Overall, the author finds that IPAs can help countries to attract FDI: every one per cent increase in the IPA budget yields an increase in FDI of 0,25 per cent.

## **(ii) Investment facilitation and the one-stop shop**

<b>Has the government sought to streamline administrative procedures or considered the one-stop shop approach?</b>
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13. One-stop shops can deliver substantial savings in time and costs for users by providing seamless, integrated and easily accessible points of contact.<sup>13</sup> Many host governments seek to alleviate the administrative burden on potential investors through a one-stop shop which provides information on the necessary steps to start a business in that country – in effect a “tourist office for investors”. To the extent that informational barriers hinder the global flow of direct investment, a one-stop shop – whether as an office or a website – can help to facilitate such flows.

14. As well as providing information, one-stop shops are sometimes conceived as a way to centralise the approval process for foreign investment. This was particularly the case in the past when investments were screened. But allowing one agency to grant all licences, permits, approvals and clearances has often proved unworkable. In worst cases, the one-stop shop becomes one more stop, adding to the red tape facing the investor. Governments are rarely willing to vest decision-making authority within one single organisation, especially concerning an issue as politically sensitive as foreign direct investment. Line ministries also resist ceding their regulatory authority to another agency.

15. Because of these difficulties, many one-stop shops have failed to live up to expectations. UNIDO argues that “no research or evidence has been found that [the one-stop shop] is indeed the magic solution for sub-Saharan Africa”.<sup>14</sup> It proposes instead that the IPA should liaise closely and effectively with relevant government administrative entities rather than trying to internalise all approval and implementation functions. Nevertheless, an IPA that is conceived as a one-stop shop from the investor’s perspective (in the sense that it acts as a liaison between the investor and the various branches of government involved) can play a useful role as a facilitator or mediator in cases of difficulty.

16. Investment facilitation is not just about helping firms navigate administrative barriers. Once the country starts to attract the interest of investors, the “process of country visits, negotiations, advice, legal and regulatory matters, visits with existing investors, financing, location choice, property, recruitment, training, and post-investment facilitation must all be provided in a professional way to the investor”.<sup>15</sup>

17. Because potential investors often seek out existing foreign investors, particularly from their own country or sector, to ascertain their experience in the host economy, IPAs should also facilitate ongoing operations and expansion by existing investors. In an extensive survey of investment promotion in sub-Saharan Africa, UNIDO found that investors indicated that they were far more likely to be attracted to a location based on the recommendation of an existing investor. For this reason, satisfying existing investors should be the “centrepiece of any promotion strategy”.<sup>16</sup>

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12. Morriset (2003), p. 14.

13. OECD (2003c), p. 3.

14. UNIDO (2003), p. 66.

15. OECD (2002a), p. 43.

16. Ibid, p. 67.

### **(iii) Image building**

18. Image building is a foundation block in the process of attracting FDI. Its role is primarily that of focusing investor interest on the location and overcoming negative perceptions rather than directly persuading a multinational company to invest.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, it has been argued that “the perceived investment climate is as important as the actual one and so addressing negative perceptions is an important part of encouraging investment.”<sup>18</sup> As with any brand, the Agency needs to create an image of the host country in the eyes of investors. This is particularly important for countries with little track record in attracting foreign investment, those undergoing rapid political or economic reform or emerging from a period of civil unrest, and those countries which are too small to attract the attention of home country media and hence are not even on the map for multinational investors. In this context, regional promotion can play an important complimentary role to country-level promotion since many prospective investors think in regional terms (e.g. “should we invest in South East Europe or in the Baltic?”). The recognition of this fact has motivated the growing interest in regional promotion networks.

19. While neighbouring countries often see themselves as competitors for FDI, it is more likely that successful promotion in one country will enhance the prospects for investment in neighbouring countries, especially in those regions which are less well known by investors. For this reason, there are often economies of scale to be had by undertaking certain promotion missions jointly at the image-building stage.

20. The evidence suggests that such image building can be expensive but that, with a good deal of persistence, host countries can succeed in overcoming negative perceptions (Box 1 on Uganda). At the same time, image building should not detract from broader efforts to improve the investment climate or divert scarce resources away from other functions of the IPA. The UNIDO survey mentioned earlier found that “IPAs in the region play only minor role in the process of awareness creation”.<sup>19</sup> Morriset (2003), in a survey of 58 IPAs from various regions, found that image building does yield results in terms of attracting investment, but less than policy advocacy.

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17. OECD (2002), p. 40. SEE.

18. Commission for Africa (2005), p. 223.

19. UNIDO (2003), p. 50.

### Box 1. Uganda: from pariah to paragon

The example of Uganda demonstrates how persistence and political will can pay off even in what are seen as the most unfavourable circumstances and where much still remains to be done. The Ugandan experience highlights the following essential features:

Investment promotion should be embedded in an overall framework of liberalisation

Political support is essential

Consistency and persistence are more important than the actual state of openness

Investors will come even if certain elements of the enabling environment are still “under construction”

History has not always been kind to Uganda. Once dubbed the pearl of Africa, Uganda fell prey to dictatorship and armed conflict in the 1970s and 1980s. The economy was crippled, first by nationalisations in the 1960s and then by the expulsion of the Asian community in the early 1970s. Although only a small share of the total population, they were the mainstay of commerce and industry. In terms of investment attraction, Uganda is also hindered by its own geography: a landlocked country with few easily exploitable natural resources and located within an unstable region.

In spite of these drawbacks, Uganda has been one of the fastest growing economies in sub-saharan Africa and also one of the most successful at attracting inward investment relative to its economic size. Investment promotion has been a crucial element in the country’s development strategy but would probably by itself have yielded little extra investment had it not been part of a broad and consistent pattern of liberalisation which has assured investors about the direction the economy is heading. The Uganda Investment Authority has also enjoyed strong political support at the highest levels.

Uganda has managed to attract investment even though the 1991 Investment Code is “a restrictive and control-oriented regime for FDI, and if implemented to the letter or in an unsympathetic spirit, it could seriously deter FDI”.<sup>20</sup> Under the Code, the government has the authority to restrict any investment it deems contrary to the interests of Uganda. That Uganda has managed to entice investors in spite of this potential for restrictiveness speaks to the importance of a track record of liberal implementation of existing laws. Nothing assures investors as much as consistency.

Not everything is perfect in the eyes of investors. In addition to weak physical infrastructure, firms complain of delays and corruption in customs and tax administration and a poor record in the courts of adjudicating fairly and promptly on commercial disputes. The lower echelons of government have resisted attempts to reduce their regulatory role as a result of liberalisation. But with a government committed to reform, investors are more willing to abide by these shortcomings.

Source: UNCTAD 2000

### (iv) Policy advocacy

**Does the IPA have a mandate to promote the benefits of investment within government and civil society? To what extent does it maintain effective dialogue mechanisms with investors? Is it consulted by government authorities on regulations having an impact on investment?**

21. Most countries now accept that FDI can play a key role in economic development and consequently actively seek foreign investors. Support for such a policy among local consumers and workers or within the lower echelons of government is not always guaranteed. Foreign investment is often associated with more general market-opening policies and the private provision of infrastructure, both of which can prove unpopular within host countries. Allied to more general discontent, government ministries, regional governments and lower level civil servants have often resisted relinquishing their regulatory powers over foreign investors.

20. UNCTAD (2000), p. 22.

22. An IPA or a one-stop shop is not a substitute for regulatory reform. It can nevertheless serve as a useful exercise by indicating to the host government the extent to which business licensing requirements are cumbersome or redundant. It can also send valuable signals to foreign and domestic investors that the government is serious about reform and promoting investment.”<sup>21</sup> A more direct approach to simplifying procedures would be to improve the efficiency of each individual ministry responsible for particular aspects of investment approval. In Tanzania, for example, a “no objection” provision in the Investment Code means that unless a ministry objects within 14 days, the Tanzania Investment Centre is entitled to approve the application.<sup>22</sup>

23. Successful investment promotion is an exercise in persuasion: persuading foreign firms to invest and to seek out local partners; local consumers and workers to accept the presence of foreign firms; and convincing all branches of government of the advantages of less and more efficient regulation of business. As the interlocutor between the government and the foreign investor, the IPA is well placed to act as the chief advocate for foreign investment within the government and the main source of feedback to government policymakers on the concerns of foreign investors. It can take the lead in convincing an often-ambivalent local population about the benefits of inward investment, as well as serving as a spokesman for the private sector in any reform process and interlocutor with non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

24. Morriset (2003) finds that IPAs which spent more time on policy advocacy were more successful in attracting investors, possibly because of the role of such advocacy in leading to improvements in the investment climate.

#### **(v) Investment generation through specific incentives**

**What mechanisms have been established for the evaluation of the costs and benefits of investment incentives, their appropriate duration, their transparency, and their extra-jurisdictional consequences?**

25. The usage of financial<sup>23</sup> and other specific incentives directed at attracting foreign investors is no substitute for pursuing the appropriate general policy measures (and focusing on the broader objective of encouraging investment regardless of source). In some circumstances, incentives may serve either as a supplement to an already attractive enabling environment for investment or as a compensation for proven market imperfections that cannot be otherwise addressed. However, OECD Investment Committee work finds that authorities engaging in incentive-based strategies face the important task of assessing these measures’ relevance, appropriateness and economic benefits against their budgetary and other costs, including long-term impacts on domestic allocative efficiency.<sup>24</sup> Authorities need also to consider their commitments under international agreements. The relevance and appropriateness of FDI incentive strategies should be examined at regular intervals. Transparency and accountability at all levels of governments greatly increases the success of such evaluations. Investment incentives have effects beyond the jurisdiction that offers them, which need to be carefully considered. Some forms of competition among states for FDI may lead to sub-optimal results for all states, including waste of economic resources and social costs.

26. It is for these reasons that the OECD Investment Committee developed a Checklist for Assessing FDI Incentive Policies (see Box 2). The Checklist serves as a tool to assess the costs and benefits of using

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21. OECD (2002c), p. 136.

22. Ibid, p. 101.

23. See also the background document for the Policy Framework for Investment dealing with tax policy [DAF/INV/TF(2005)4].

24. It is at the same time recognised that doing so can in practice be difficult and it requires resourceful and competent public agencies.



incentives to attract FDI; to provide operational criteria for avoiding wasteful effects and to identify the potential pitfalls and risks of excessive reliance on incentive-based strategies. The Checklist and its application to considerations of investment incentives can have a positive effect in minimising potential harmful effects of incentives both for those that employ them and for other governments seeking to attract foreign investment.

#### **Box 2. The OECD Checklist for FDI Incentive Policies**

##### *The desirability and appropriateness of offering FDI incentives*

- Are FDI incentives an appropriate tool in the situation under consideration?
- Are the linkages between the enabling environment and incentives sufficiently well understood?

##### *Frameworks for policy design and implementation*

- What are the clear objectives and criteria for offering FDI incentives?
- At what level of government are these objectives and criteria established, and who is responsible for their implementation?
- In countries with multiple jurisdictions, how does one prevent local incentives from cancelling each other out?

##### *The appropriateness of strategies and tools*

- Are the linkages between FDI attraction and other policy objectives sufficiently clear?
- Are effects on local business of offering preferential treatment to foreign-owned enterprises sufficiently well understood?
- Are FDI incentives offered that do not reflect the degree of selectiveness of the policy goals they are intended to support?
- Is sufficient attention given to maximising effectiveness and minimising overall long-term costs?

##### *The design and implementation of programmes*

- Are programmes being put in place in the absence of a realistic assessment of the resources needed to manage and monitor them?
- Is the time profile of incentives right? Is it suited to the investment in question, but not open to abuse?
- Does the imposition of spending limits on the implementing bodies provide adequate safeguards against wastefulness?
- What procedures are in place to deal with large projects that exceed the normal competences of the implementing bodies?
- What should be the maximum duration of an incentives programme?

##### *Transparency and evaluation*

- Have sound and comprehensive principles of cost-benefit analysis been established?
- Is cost-benefit analysis performed with sufficient regularity?
- Is additional analysis undertaken to demonstrate the non-quantifiable benefits from investment projects?
- Is the process of offering FDI incentives open to scrutiny by policymakers, appropriate parliamentary bodies and civil society?

##### *Extra-jurisdictional consequences*

- Have authorities ensured that their incentive measures are consistent with international commitments that their country may have undertaken?
- Have authorities sufficiently assessed the responses that their incentive policies are likely to trigger in other jurisdictions?

## **(vi) Facilitating linkages**

27. Countries benefit from FDI in part because the intangible assets (proprietary technology, management and marketing skills) transferred between the parent and its foreign affiliates spill over into the local economy. These spillovers arise largely through linkages between foreign investors and local firms, whether as suppliers, customers, partners or competitors.

28. At the broadest level, the benefits from inward investment depend on the enabling environment. Open trade and investment regimes combined with an active competition policy generally provide a fertile environment for the transfer of technology. The underlying assumption is that the more a firm is forced to compete, the more technology it will have to transfer to the affiliate in order for it to be competitive in that market. At the same time, the host government can undertake measures to improve the absorptive capacity of the local economy in order to enhance technology transfers, such as through education and training and investments in human capital. “Countries that succeed in continuously fulfilling the evolving skills needs of industry will have a very strong competitive advantage in attracting new investment and moving up the skill and value chain in the type of industry attracted.”<sup>25</sup>

29. Governments used to try to mandate linkages through local content, local equity or joint venture requirements and sometimes even direct technology transfer obligations. Some, such as local content and export obligations, are being phased out as part of multilateral trade negotiations. Performance requirements are also not accepted in a range of bilateral investment agreements. Most have largely been discredited by the lack of empirical support for their effectiveness. Some large markets have been able to impose performance requirements and still attract investment, but for most smaller countries the risk of dissuading MNEs from investing is too great to permit imposing stringent performance requirements.

30. There is also the risk that such requirements could result in fewer spillovers. For example, when foreign investors are given a protected market as a quid pro quo for performance requirements, they have little incentive to transfer the latest technology to their affiliates, and local firms are often happy to partake in the economic rents created by protection rather than enhancing their own competitiveness through linkages with foreign firms. The same result of weak technology transfers can arise when the investor is forced into a joint venture with a local firm. When Kodak invested in China, for example, it was allowed only one wholly-owned subsidiary, while the rest of its affiliates had to form joint ventures. The result was that Kodak invested six times more in its wholly-owned affiliate than in the joint ventures, and the former ended up producing its most advanced film and camera technologies.<sup>26</sup>

31. Performance requirements have largely been supplanted by a more flexible system in which incentives are offered to the investor in return for the fulfilment of certain obligations relating to linkages. Investors are in theory free to refuse such obligations, although when they include exemptions from import duties, the export oriented investor might find its options limited. Nevertheless, some host country governments have successfully promoted linkages by offering positive inducements for firms to comply.

32. The countries most frequently cited in this regard are Singapore, Ireland and Malaysia. Under Singapore’s Local Industry Upgrading Programme (LIUP), the Economic Development Board provides financial and organisational support for an engineer or manager from a foreign affiliate to assist local suppliers over two to three years. As of 1999, the LIUP resulted in linkages between 670 local business and 30 foreign affiliates and 11 large local enterprises, government-linked companies and government agencies. The general consensus concerning the LIUP is that “Singapore’s approach, combining a targeted FDI promotion strategy with a linkage programme, has had positive effects on economic deepening”.<sup>27</sup>

33. If Ireland and Singapore are generally considered as success stories, there are nevertheless certain key facts which need to be kept in mind by any government wishing to follow in their footsteps. Firstly, linkage programmes are expensive: the two countries spend over \$40 million each annually, for a

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25. OECD (2002a), p. 34.

26. World Bank (2004), p. 172.

27. UNCTAD (2001), p. 177.

population of under four million in each case.<sup>28</sup> This compares with an annual average budget of only \$450 000 among the 58 IPAs surveyed by Morriset (2003). Secondly, the Economic Development Board of Singapore and the Irish Development Agency have strong powers within the government to shape and implement policy in this area. Thirdly, both countries have a large pool of skilled workers and of small firms with the capacity to become suppliers to foreign affiliates. The success of these programmes depends in large part on the active and willing collaboration of existing investors. By providing financing and organisational support, the relevant government bodies reduce the perceived risks to foreign investors from engaging in capacity building among suppliers.

### **3. International co-operation to encourage investment and linkages**

34. In the long run, support for improvements in host country business climates and technical assistance to develop local human capital and supply capacity in local firms will have the greatest impact on investment flows to developing countries. Development assistance by bilateral and multilateral donors provided over \$20 billion each year towards business climate improvements in developing countries between 1998 and 2002. Much of this went towards infrastructure (54 per cent), followed by policy-based support (33 per cent) and technical assistance (13 per cent).<sup>29</sup> But such improvements often take time to bear fruit. In the interim, there are many measures which can expand both global investment and linkages with local firms.<sup>30</sup> Such measures have proliferated in recent years.

#### **(i) IPA capacity building**

**Has the government explored and made use of the various initiatives aimed at building capacity with respect to investment promotion, such as those offered by FIAS and MIGA? Has the IPA joined regional and international networks?**

35. Various international organisations participate in capacity building with regional IPAs (see Box 3 for the example of MIGA). In addition, the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) provides networking opportunities among IPAs and facilitates the exchange of best practice. WAIPA also assists IPAs in advising their respective governments on the formulation of appropriate investment promotion strategies.

36. The Foreign Investment Advisory Service within the World Bank Group provides investment climate diagnostic studies at the request of host governments. These studies look generally at the legal and regulatory environment in the country concerned, as well as competition policy, market structure and privatisation. They also examine investment promotion policies and institutions and direct and indirect taxation regimes, including investment incentives. In addition, FIAS investment promotion assistance consists of recommendations for a combination of policy, regulatory and procedural reform; institutional frameworks for investment promotion; and methods for monitoring effectiveness. FIAS projects include advice in the following areas:

- developing strategic approaches to attract FDI;
- designing the legal foundation for investment promotion;

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28. World Bank (2004), p. 171.

29. World Bank (2004), p. 191.

30. Within this context, trade preferences, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in the United States, and the European Everything But Arms initiative can play an important promotional role by expanding the markets to which countries benefiting from such schemes can export (which, in turn, can encourage investment). This topic is dealt with in the trade chapter of the PFI.

- designing the organisational framework for national and sub-national IPAs;
- conducting surveys to help client governments better understand how prospective and lost investors perceive the country.<sup>31</sup>

### Box 3. MIGA's Investment Promotion Toolkit

Recognising the many challenges faced by IPAs in their outreach efforts to investors, the World Bank Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) developed the Investment Promotion Toolkit. The toolkit is designed to support investment promotion intermediaries in achieving their objectives for attracting and retaining FDI. It serves as a handbook on investment promotion that can be used by IPAs, investment consultancies, sector ministries, international development organisations, national, state and local economic development agencies, and privatisation agencies, among others.

The Toolkit consists of nine modules: understanding trends and drivers behind FDI; developing an IPA; creating an investment promotion strategy based on the location's strengths and weaknesses; building effective partnerships with other organisations; strengthening the location's image; targeting and generating investment opportunities, including maintaining a lead tracking database; servicing investors, including visits, follow-up and aftercare; monitoring and evaluating activities and results; and utilising information technology.

Source: OECD (2002a, p. 41), based on MIGA.

37. UNCTAD publishes both Investment Policy Reviews and Investment Guides (jointly with the International Chamber of Commerce) in order to improve the policy environment for investment in the host country and to call attention to investment opportunities in that market. UNCTAD's Advisory Services on Investment and Training (ASIT) has 30 years of experience in providing training aimed at increasing the capacity of developing and transition economies to attract and benefit from FDI. ASIT services cover investment policies, enabling legal and regulatory frameworks for investment, and investment promotion strategies.

38. UNIDO has an active technical assistance programme with sub-Saharan IPAs. The UNIDO-Africa Investment Promotion Agency Network comprises sub-Saharan IPAs, UNIDO offices and an advisory panel from the private sector. The Network is a working group which explores practical, low cost schemes to improve the effectiveness of its member agencies in mobilising domestic and foreign investment. It is also a permanent platform for training, capacity building and continuous linkage to UNIDO's worldwide network of Investment and Technology Promotion Offices.

39. Another example of a regional initiative working with IPAs is the MENA-OECD Investment Programme which is working with MENA IPAs as key actors to improve the investment framework and promote a more positive image of the region. Apart from their concrete project oriented work, key challenges for IPAs in the MENA region remain the provision of effective policy advocacy in areas such as changes in regulatory frameworks, enactment of investment-friendly policies, building competitive sectoral strategies, effective investor targeting, the provision of post-investment services, and promoting linkages between international and domestic investors.

40. Faced with this plethora of training programmes, IPAs are not lacking advice on how to adopt best practices elsewhere. But resources are often limited and choices have to be made, and it is not necessarily clear that all countries can pursue the same strategies. More empirical work is needed to help IPAs choose among the tools available to promote investment. In addition, Morriset (2003) demonstrates that IPA effectiveness in investment generation is partly a function of external factors: the local business

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31. FIAS (2004), p. 20.

climate, the degree of political support and the resources available. IPA promotion can doubtless be made more efficient and focused, but such training and advice should not divert attention from the broader policy environment in which the IPA operates.

## **(ii) Promoting linkages**

**Have the various initiatives aimed at promoting investment through linkages, such as UNIDO's Subcontracting and Partnership Exchanges and the Asia-Africa Investment Technology Promotion Centre, been fully taken advantage of?**

### **International agreements promoting technology transfer**

41. International agreements can be used to foster greater linkages. In the area of intellectual property, the TRIPs Agreement contains specific provisions for technology transfer. Article 66(2) requires developed country members to “provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base”.

42. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises represent a political commitment on the part of adhering governments to promote observance of their recommendations for MNEs based in any signatory country and operating anywhere in the world. They provide government-backed voluntary principles of good corporate conduct and include procedures for implementation and follow-up. Under the Guidelines, enterprises should: (1) encourage local capacity building through close co-operation with the local community, including business interests, as well as developing the enterprise's activities in domestic and foreign markets, consistent with the need for sound commercial practice; (2) encourage human capital formation, in particular by creating employment opportunities and facilitating training opportunities for employees; and (3) adopt, where practicable in the course of their business activities, practices that permit the transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies and know-how, with due regard to the protection of intellectual property rights.

### **Matching suppliers with foreign investors**

43. UNIDO Subcontracting and Partnership Exchanges (SPXs) act as technical information, promotion and matchmaking centres for industrial subcontracting, OEM and partnerships between main contractors, suppliers and subcontractors. The SPX Network provides detailed, standardised, updated and certified data on approximately 20 000 manufacturing companies worldwide. To date, more than 60 SPXs have been set up with UNIDO's assistance in more than 30 countries. SPXs also organise “Supply Development and Upgrading Programmes” for clusters of small-scale suppliers and subcontractors to assist them in meeting the higher resolution quality requirements of major international contractors and buyers.<sup>32</sup> The OECD also provides South Eastern European countries with these sorts of matching opportunities to promote investor-local enterprise linkages.

44. Forum based activities such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process have also been contributing in this effort. The Asia-Africa Investment Technology Promotion Center (AAITPC) was established by TICAD in 2003. The activities of the Center are funded by the Japanese Government and implemented through UNIDO in order to promote Asian investment in Africa by providing opportunities between businesses in the two regions.

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32. Liang Dan (2003), p. 83.

## Summing up

45. Investment promotion and facilitation measures can make a difference. Multinational enterprises are sometimes slow to spot profitable investment opportunities and often hesitate before using local suppliers. But successful promotion is expensive and resources need to be used wisely. Some IPA roles are more useful than others, depending on the stage of development of the host economy and the existing stock of FDI in that country.

46. Investment promotion should complement, not compensate, for a poor investment climate. Without a suitable enabling environment, promotion might even be counterproductive. Similarly, underfunded IPAs might also make matters worse since an ineffectual IPA reflects badly on the overall investment climate in the eyes of investors. Successful IPAs are characterised by private sector participation on the board and strong political support. One-stop shops are not effective, if they do not help to simplify regulations and mandate a rapid response to investor requests from each relevant ministry.

47. The positive impact of an IPA may be indirect: through its role in helping to shape policy. The IPA is often the government interlocutor with investors and through its function as a one-stop shop is intimately aware of the complexity of local regulations. There is evidence that the more resources devoted to policy advocacy, the greater the inflows of investment. Agencies in poorer countries should consider also concentrating their efforts on satisfying existing investors than on spending money on expensive advertising campaigns and missions to potential home countries. An existing investor's recommendation is often the best promotional tool.

48. Targeting of investors or industries is often a strategy born of necessity. Such targeting should be based on an assessment of those MNEs most likely to invest and with an industrial profile that best fits with the existing industrial structure in the host economy. It should also be based upon sound analysis of the advantages and opportunities in the country concerned.

49. Linkages depend first and foremost on the quality of local human capital and on the domestic policy environment. Investors can nevertheless often benefit from the matchmaking services of the local IPA, but such services demand strong institutional capabilities. Successful linkage promotion programmes rely heavily on the foreign investors for training and capacity building. They can only function in an environment of trust.

50. The following are the main issues and questions identified in this paper concerning investment promotion and facilitation that policy makers should consider in the context of efforts to improve the investment climate:

1. Does the government have a clear strategy for developing a sound, broad-based business environment within which investment promotion and facilitation measures will be effective?
2. Has an investment promotion agency been established? To what extent has the structure and mission of the IPA been informed by best practice in countries with a longer history of strategic investment promotion?
3. Has the IPA been given sufficient resources and funding? Does it enjoy adequate political support?
4. Has the government sought to streamline administrative procedures or considered the one-stop shop approach?
5. Does the IPA have a mandate to promote the benefits of investment within government and civil society? To what extent does it maintain effective dialogue mechanisms with investors? Is it consulted by government authorities on regulations having an impact on investment?
6. What mechanisms have been established for the evaluation of the costs and benefits of investment incentives, their appropriate duration, their transparency, and their extra-jurisdictional consequences?
7. Has the government explored and made use of the various initiatives aimed at building capacity with respect to investment promotion, such as those offered by FIAS and MIGA? Has the IPA joined regional and international networks?
8. Have the various initiatives aimed at promoting investment through linkages, such as UNIDO's Subcontracting and Partnership Exchanges and the Asia-Africa Investment Technology Promotion Centre, been fully taken advantage of?

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