The DAC Guidelines
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The DAC Guidelines
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed:

– to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;

– to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and

– to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Austria (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (12th December 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).

In order to achieve its aims the OECD has set up a number of specialised committees. One of these is the Development Assistance Committee, whose Members have agreed to secure an expansion of aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to improve their effectiveness. To this end, Members periodically review together both the amount and the nature of their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral and multilateral, and consult each other on all other relevant aspects of their development assistance policies.

The Members of the Development Assistance Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Communities.
Preface

OECD governments in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to expand and improve their efforts in situations of past, current, and potential violent conflict, often in countries where they have worked for many years. Painful experience shows that preventing violent conflict brings enormous benefit to human life, poverty reduction and growth.

The ground-breaking DAC guidelines on *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* have guided work in this field for the last five years, primarily in the design and implementation of development co-operation for conflict prevention in post-conflict recovery. They reach beyond the role of development to activities and approaches that involve broader areas of international assistance to promote greater coherence and co-ordination. At that time, the DAC specified that these guidelines were “work in progress” and identified areas that should be further developed.

Knowledge and practice have evolved since then. Substantial progress has been made on some fronts over the last five years, while other challenges remain. Though the initial guidance is still highly relevant, a 2001 Supplement to that work, *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*, addresses some new challenges and changes in certain areas. It includes information on how to: mainstream conflict prevention in policy formulation; take account of the relationship between security and development; strengthen peace processes and build partnerships with state and civil society actors; work with business to promote growth and avoid fuelling violence; and enhance donor co-ordination and policy coherence.

Development Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials responsible for development co-operation met at their annual High Level Meeting in April 2001 and reaffirmed their commitment to conflict prevention as central for poverty reduction and sustainable development. Both sets of guidance were recognised as important for enhancing the role of development co-operation for conflict prevention and peace-building by the G8, at the Summit in Denver in 1997, and at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome in 2001.


The extensive work to develop guidance on conflict prevention attests to the deepening interest in conflict-related development assistance. The DAC established a special Task Force to address this topic in 1995 which continues today as the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. This guidance can be used to help donors in their work with countries involved in conflict and with their own government counterparts in other ministries. It can also lend support to the international community as it strives to co-ordinate aid and assistance, and provide guidance to partners in developing country governments, civil society organisations and business.
Acknowledgements

Part I *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001*

This guidance is based on the work of the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, chaired by Ambassador Marika Fahlén, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden), who also chaired a series of regional consultations on the DAC guidelines with partner countries. Bernard Wood made a substantial contribution in drafting this work and discussing it with Task Force Members. Francesca Cook, Paul Isenman, Massimo Tommasoli and Lisa Williams served as editors, ably assisted by Marcia Byström. Dylan Hendrickson and Peter Uvin also provided valuable input. Since 2001, DAC work on conflict prevention has been pursued by a Network chaired by Minister Plenipotentiary Roberto Toscano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy). As Chairperson of the G8 Conflict Prevention Officials’ Meeting, he brought this guidance to the attention of the G8 Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Rome in July 2001.

Part II *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997*

In 1997, the DAC Task Force was chaired by James H. Michel, former DAC Chair, with Paul Sciarone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), and Claudio Spinedi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy), leading its two working groups. Rémi Paris, Robert Scharf and Bernard Wood served as editors.
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Acronyms

ACP       African Caribbean Pacific States
ANC       African National Congress
ASEAN     Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CG        Consultative Group
CSCE      Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSOs      Civil Society Organisations
DAC       Development Assistance Committee
DDR       Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
EC        European Commission
ECOWAS    Economic Community of West African States
EOD       Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU        European Union
ICORC     International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia
ICRC      International Committee for the Red Cross
IDA       International Development Agency
IDEA      International IDEA/The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDPs      Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs      International Financial Institutions
IFRCS     International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGPRA     Income Generating Project for Refugee Areas
IMF       International Monetary Fund
IOM       International Organisation for Migration
NGO       Non-governmental Organisation
OAS       Organisation of American States
OAU       Organisation of African Unity
ODA       Official Development Assistance
OECD      Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OOF       Other Official Flows
RMR       Resource Management Regime
SAARC     South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
UCAH      Unidade de Coordenacao para Assistencia Humanitaria
UN        United Nations
UNDHA     United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP      United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR     United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF    United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDIR    United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNOPS     United Nations Office for Project Services
UNITA     União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
WB        World Bank Group
WFP       World Food Programme
WTO       World Trade Organization
PART I
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001
MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON HELPING PREVENT VIOLENT CONFLICT: ORIENTATIONS FOR EXTERNAL PARTNERS

The widespread recurrence of violent conflict and its ruinous impact bring us to renew our commitment to building peace and addressing conflict. We reaffirm conflict prevention as an integral part of our efforts to help partner countries reduce poverty, promote economic growth and improve people’s lives, in the context of sustainable development. We intend to promote a culture of conflict prevention in our work with developing countries, shared consistently across the different parts of our own governments. We endorse Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, a supplement to the DAC guidelines on conflict, peace and development co-operation. This Supplement relates primarily to collective conflict – among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

We will strive to increase coherence among our policies – trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs and defence, and development co-operation – that impact on conflict prevention. We will strengthen our capacity to analyse risks and causes of violent conflict through approaches such as vulnerability analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building. This will help identify coherent strategies and opportunities to prevent conflict.

It is important to understand and take account of the political economy of violent conflict. Powerful groups, businesses and individuals, using violent or non-violent means, can acquire a vested interest in sparking and perpetuating violent conflict. Just as it is important to limit the proliferation of weapons, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, corrupt resource deals, rent seeking and the flow of economic resources that can stoke or be the aim of violent conflicts. This can be done through joint international actions including: UN and G8 embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds; the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions; OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and the DAC Recommendations on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement.

Conflict prevention is an integral part of the quest to reduce poverty.

Coherent policies can help ensure that our work has maximum positive impact.

It is important to counter negative economic dynamics, fight corruption and combat illicit trafficking.
Africa has been hit the hardest by violent conflict. But every region of the world has experienced widespread violent conflict with its devastating impact on human lives and development. We will improve our prevention initiatives and responses to violent conflict through better co-ordinated decision making. This will involve, wherever feasible, shared analysis, effectively co-ordinated and agreed strategic mechanisms and frameworks for action.

Lasting peace and structural stability require long-term processes. We will encourage and support early action and seize opportunities to strengthen co-operation in societies, in particular those at risk, to help prevent the outbreak of collective violence. Where this can be done it is far less costly in human, political, environmental and economic terms than coming in later to stop violent conflict and repair the damage.

Experience, research and our consultations with developing countries point to some fundamental principles that underpin conflict prevention strategies:

- Recognise the potential – and limits – of the international community to take actions that favour peace and discourage violence.
- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace.
- Act on the costly lessons learned on the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
- Support peace-building initiatives early on and continue even when peace processes are perceived to have been achieved.
- Actively engage women, men and youth in policy-making processes and peace-building.
- Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.
- Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy and tackle social and political exclusion.

Security from violence, extreme economic and social deprivation and environmental degradation is essential for poverty reduction, as emphasised in the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction. As reflected in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, reinforcing security and peace requires integrating a gender perspective at all levels of conflict prevention, rehabilitation, peace negotiations and operations.
We recognise the need to help partner countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security to prevent conflict. This is an integral aspect of good governance and public sector management. Security reform includes promoting transparency, the rule of law, accountability and informed debate, and reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate oversight of security systems. Security reform involves a range of actors from the military and the police, to judicial and penal systems, ministries of foreign affairs, trade, commerce and civil society organisations (CSOs). Such reforms are key to getting security-related expenditures right. Given restrictions on Official Development Assistance eligibility, interested OECD governments may need to draw on non-ODA sources to assist activities in this area.

A legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society reinforce each other. We will strengthen our partnerships with the state and civil society, including women’s organisations, to advance prevention efforts. Dilemmas arise on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit large-scale human rights abuses, target civilian populations, or foster unrest or wage war in neighbouring countries.

Integration into society of all people uprooted and affected by violent conflict – women, men, youth and children – is an important challenge for development co-operation. This includes the demobilisation and disarmament of combatants. Reintegration depends on jobs and growth but can only be fully achieved with reconciliation.

We will help societies grapple with the challenges of justice and reconciliation in the wake of violent conflict. There are no easy formulas. But there are ways for external action, including development co-operation, to open spaces for dialogue and peace-building and to support solutions that respect basic international norms.

We encourage trends towards partnership with business – domestic and international – to raise awareness of how firms can be good corporate citizens, avoid feeding the negative dynamics of conflict, and make positive economic and social contributions to preventing violence.

Enduring peace rests on fundamental principles of governance, human security, democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights, gender equality and open and fair market economies. It relies on good governance at the national, regional and international levels. We commit to furthering our efforts and working together, across our governments, to strive towards peace.

Good governance requires legitimate and accountable systems of security, and has national and international implications.

Building wide and deep partnerships helps prevent violent conflict.

Opening space for dialogue and peace-building can help societies grapple with the challenges of reintegration, justice and reconciliation.

Business can help actively prevent violent conflict.

Good governance is fundamental to peace.
Executive Summary

Violent conflict and its ruinous impact on people’s lives demands that the development co-operation community renew its commitment to peace and prevention. To prevent violent conflict, societies must build voluntary co-operation that results in peaceful co-existence among diverse communities within and between nations. Conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Development agencies now accept the need to work in and on conflicts rather than around them, and make peace-building the main focus when dealing with conflict situations. This is a significant step toward long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts. This Supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century (see full text in Part II) relates primarily to collective conflict – conflict among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

To work effectively toward peace, development agencies need to work alongside partners in developing countries before, during and after conflict. Promoting peace-building and conflict prevention require that donor agencies work with other relevant branches of their governments and other actors in the international community. With a “culture of prevention” and in-depth analysis, such as peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building, donors can work better together to achieve sustainable peace. Policies also need to be clear, coherent, comprehensive and co-ordinated in order to improve effectiveness in conflict prevention and management. Relevant policy areas involve trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defence, and development co-operation. Responding to this imperative, development agencies are accepting the risks of moving more deeply into this sensitive political terrain.

Economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability and regeneration are major goals of development co-operation that require structural stability. Structural stability embraces the mutually reinforcing goals of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by dynamic and representative political structures, including accountable security systems capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Experience and research point to some basic principles for preventing conflict that are enumerated in more detail in this Supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines. These principles call on the development community to:

- Recognise the potential – and limits – of the international community to take actions that favour peace and discourage violence.
- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace.
- Act on the costly lessons learned on the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
Actively engage women, men and youth in peace-building and policy-making processes. All actors need to take better account of the pervasive linkages between gender differences and violent conflicts and their prevention and resolution.

Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.

Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion.

Engaging long term and using a conflict prevention “lens”

“Moving upstream” to help prevent violent conflict at its source is a shared goal of the development co-operation community. Donors are learning to apply a conflict prevention “lens” to policies in many departments to make them coherent and comprehensive. The “lens” is a metaphor for looking at how conflict prevention can be incorporated into all arenas of policy, e.g. from development to trade, investment and foreign policy. This can also be referred to as building a culture of prevention. Concrete actions such as analysing and monitoring developments in conflict-prone situations are steps toward detecting and curbing conflict early on. Growing evidence suggests that early preventive action that works is far less costly than coming in later to stop violence and repair damage. Working with a human rights focus as part of a conflict prevention lens is important and helps minimise potential negative side effects of development co-operation and other external partners’ in conflict situations.

Donors recognise that all aid can influence conflict situations and create incentives or disincentives for peace. They are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peace-building both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues. To do so, they need to:

- Disentangle and analyse factors of grievance and greed at play as conflict situations evolve.
- Devise appropriate ways to evaluate, monitor and assess their action and its impact in close collaboration with developing country partners, particularly since this type of development co-operation work does not always fit a general framework for “results-based management”.
- Extend this concern for the impact of aid on conflict to the design of policies aimed at macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in order to encourage growth in incomes, employment and public services.
- Target assistance to help strengthen democratic systems toward the structural stability that allows for the non-violent resolution of conflicts, taking account of the distribution and the transfer of power, as well as the protection and inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups.
- Recognise how important it is for countries to form political parties and support this step as part of a democratic process and as a way to promote the transformation from violent conflict to peace. The perspective of democratic, inclusive governance is an important aspect of this dynamic process.
■ Maximise opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict, including support to a range of state functions and activities as well as partnerships with CSOs.

■ Promote multiculturalism and pluralism by reinforcing activities that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement and support partners working toward this goal.

Setting up monitoring and evaluation systems presents a challenge in these complex new areas of development co-operation. Sharing results, establishing benchmarks and evaluating lessons are vital to improving approaches and co-ordination.

Ensuring peace through security and development

Security, including “human security”, is a critical foundation for sustainable development. This implies protection from systematic human rights abuses, physical threats, violence and extreme economic, social and environmental risks, and territorial and sovereignty threats. It is a primary pre-condition and goal for poor people to make lasting improvements in their lives. The DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, and consultations with the poor in all regions, have underlined how critical basic security is for them.

Poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other. The requirement for security in this context has to go beyond the classic requisites of defence from military attack and extend to the well-being and the protection of persons and property. Actors in international, national and local government and civil society have thus come together around a changing concept of security aimed at freeing people from pervasive threats to their lives, safety or rights. This is especially critical for the poor.

Helping developing countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security – in defence, police, judicial and penal systems – has become a high priority, including for external partners, even though there are risks involved. Security system reform should be treated as a normal part of work on good governance. Though this is a vital area for donors, not all development agencies are equally ready or have the mandate to engage in activities directly related to improving security systems. Development agencies are working together to define agreed uses of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in such activities.

Donor assistance can help improve the capacity of relevant civilian bodies in government to manage the security forces more effectively. Within developing countries, there is growing recognition of the need to use the same principles of good public sector management in the security sector as apply to all public sectors. These principles include transparency, accountability and informed debate and participation and are key to getting military expenditure and other security-related spending planned and implemented right. Reinforcing legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight of security forces, in particular the role of relevant parliamentary committees, is one such area for assistance.

Supporting regional co-operation

Even with the predominance of intra-state conflicts, there are cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts. Strategies for prevention, peacekeeping, and recovery can be regionally designed. Many national conflicts can only be dealt with effectively in their regional contexts, taking account of cross-border influences. Regional co-operation and integration – through economic, environmental and other measures – can contribute to peace-building, particularly around scarce common goods such as water. Donor support should focus on strengthening the capacity of relevant regional institutions.
Co-ordinated foreign policy actions are needed to support regional and sub-regional co-operation in combating drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, and controlling illicit or irregular arms trade, as well as the flow of arms generally. Such co-ordinated action can also underpin peace negotiations and regional peacekeeping capabilities, help build regional networks for the protection of human rights, refugees, peace initiatives, and democratisation, and establish security reform processes. The business sector, including foreign investors, also has a role to play in regional co-operation.

While pursuing “regional solutions for regional problems” is a good principle, there are situations – like those in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes and central African regions and others – which call for a response by the whole international community to support regional actors.

**Peace, justice and reconciliation**

The international community, including donor agencies, can assist peace-building before violence erupts, support peace processes and opportunities, help societies grapple with the complexities of justice and reconciliation in the wake of violent conflict, and encourage fundamental principles of democracy. There are no easy formulas, but there are ways to support national solutions that respect basic international legal norms.

Once the peace is deemed won, donors tend to focus their support more on the state, away from civil society. This happens even when donors have channelled support exclusively to civil society during the conflict. But donor support to civil society peace-building initiatives should begin early and continue. Further efforts are required to include marginalised or weakened segments of society in peace processes and to recognise women’s abilities to manage survival and negotiate and implement peace at the local and informal levels. More can be done to involve women in national level peace negotiations.

A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation is to promote open and continuing communication as a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and to avoid relapses into violent conflict. Support for non-partisan and peace-building media is important here.

To avoid the recurrence of conflict, long and short-term peace rely in part on:

- Demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants, including women and child soldiers.
- Reintegration of all people uprooted and affected by conflict – women, men, youth, children and the ex-combatants, among these.

In supporting peace processes donors, the international community and developing countries need to realise that the challenge of reintegration depends on jobs and growth, but can only be fully achieved with reconciliation.

**Partnerships for peace**

Peace-building hinges on trust and co-operation among groups and is reinforced by wider and deeper partnerships. A legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other. However, a crisis of legitimacy exists in many states, not only in “failed” or “failing” ones. Signs of this can be seen when the state takes on an oppressive and predatory role in relation to society, foments internal conflict and abrogates its core functions as “protector”. Donor engagement with oppressive regimes can be problematic. At the same time complete withdrawal of donor involvement may have negative impacts and be read as a signal of external indifference. Normal partnerships are difficult or
impossible to maintain in some conflict situations. But experience and realism now suggest that external partners, including multilateral institutions, can play key roles in encouraging partnership between government and civil society organisations, including with those who are excluded or in opposition. The extent and types of partnership must be gauged by the country situation.

For donors to enter into effective partnerships for conflict prevention with developing countries, a pivotal requirement is greater coherence and co-ordination among donors themselves. The recent pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership among development co-operation actors offers an important opportunity to address conflict issues and co-ordinate more effectively (e.g. Comprehensive Development Frameworks, country-produced poverty reduction strategies and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks).

It has become clearer that a constructive relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation entities requires shared objectives, common approaches to planning processes, and co-ordination mechanisms. In harmonising these efforts, donor and humanitarian assistance agencies entrusted with these responsibilities cannot escape the need to work together better through quite long transition periods.

**Working with business**

Another widening space for stronger partnerships is with business – local, national and international – to help maximise its positive economic and social contributions and to ensure against feeding into the negative dynamics of conflict. At times this involves dialogue between external partner governments and firms that are taking actions that worsen violent conflict.

Virtually all developing countries are now convinced they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate strong enough economic growth for sustainable development. Fostering private sector-led growth in jobs and incomes within a rights and rules-based approach is a basic long-term component of conflict prevention.

A widening community of business actors is already moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and pursuing a “triple bottom line” of profitability, social responsibility and good environmental practices. Enlightened economic self-interest of firms can lead them to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict. Donors should support these trends by taking steps such as raising awareness of conflict prevention issues in national and international business communities.

**Countering negative economic forces**

However, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, rent-seeking and corrupt resource deals that fuel and thrive on conflict. This can be done through G8 and UN embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds and be supported by other international instruments. Donors must take account of the political economy of violent conflict in which powerful groups and networks, using violent and non-violent means, develop a vested interest in their perpetuation, as well as the corrupt and ethnically biased economic practices that can help start them.
Notes

1. In Part I, “conflict prevention” means the prevention of violent disputes, controversies and conflict. It includes the notion of long-term engagement, not only short-term response. Non-violent conflict is a normal part of society. What has to be prevented is the use of large-scale violence to address or resolve conflict as well as activities that can destabilise and lead to collective violence.

2. When development agencies working in crisis or in pre-war situations circumvent conflict-related issues they are, in the terms of the guidelines, “working around conflict”. When they modify their programmes and make efforts to recognise the conflict they are “working in the conflict”. When there is an attempt to proactively prevent, mitigate or resolve the conflict(s) this is “working on the conflict”.

3. Defined in the 1997 guidelines entitled Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, found in Part II, Box 1, “Terms and time-frames”. Structural stability requires voluntary co-operation between individuals and groups in a society and between communities based on their belief that the benefits of co-operating outweigh the costs entailed.

4. As one illustration, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict estimated in 1999 that if effective preventive measures had been taken in nine countries affected by conflict or in possible conflict situations in the 1990s, OECD countries alone could have saved more than US$ 160 billion. This does not account for the incalculable human costs to those countries in conflict (Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (eds.), The Costs of Conflict, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1999, page 225).

5. “External partners” refers to any actor, government or non-governmental (NGO), or any multilateral institution, development bank, bilateral aid agency, or private sector representative that has a legitimate partnership with the developing country in question. In this context, it also indicates that different OECD government ministries or departments, not just their development agencies, can have a role to play.

6. This includes: working with international refugee law; international humanitarian and human rights law and conventions including the convention on the rights of the child; and the convention on eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.

7. Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and Development”, addresses security reform processes, one key aspect of providing human security, but does not discuss the security, sustainable development and human security linkages at any length.

8. See, for example, Voices of the Poor, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2000.

9. Prospects of serious action on these issues by the international community have been heightened by UN Security Council action against embargo-breaking trafficking in diamonds and subsequent measures undertaken by the main actors in the international diamond trade to stifle the illegal traffic in conflict diamonds.

1 Some basic guiding principles

The experiences of the development co-operation community, other external actors and developing countries provide the basis for the following principles for effective action in conflict situations.

**Recognise the potential – and the limits – of external influence**

Outside influences can shift balances and relationships between conflicting parties to some degree. These can be positive or negative. Coherent and comprehensive policy responses, involving diplomacy, security relations, finance and trade, and development co-operation are crucial. Addressing potential root causes of conflict with coherent responses early on is more likely to help prevent violent outcomes or ensure that outside influences are positive. As for all development co-operation, local ownership is vital and irreplaceable. Outside actors need to adopt a realistic modesty in their approaches and put priority on areas where co-operation can make the most difference with limited resources.

Development co-operation and other external actors must:

- Work on conflict, rather than working around it.
- Accept and manage the heightened risks encountered in this type of work.
- Recognise that the potential influence of outsiders has its definite limits. Most conflict situations have powerful internal dynamics and long histories of grievance and recrimination.
- Acknowledge that political will to forge solutions, from all actors, is crucial.
- Be more creative in providing aid that promotes systems that allow for the peaceful management of conflicts, for example, countering predatory state behaviour and systems of nepotism and one-sided benefit.

**Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good**

All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results. The first principle for aid policy makers is to do no harm and to guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts. Since the cost of not acting is usually equally unacceptable, donors need proactive and innovative approaches in different conflict situations that strengthen incentives for peace for key actors, and help strengthen security for both people and countries. They need to work coherently with other external actors, such as their own ministries of foreign affairs or defence, international organisations, NGOs and entities responsible for humanitarian assistance and relief. In trying to help steer a society away from potential dangers towards positive directions, donors need to be open and flexible in their support to a variety of, sometimes evolving, options. As they do so, external actors have to recognise that, in conflict situations:
Perceptions of all involved often matter as much as facts.

Who gets, or does not get, which share of benefits can be as important as the total benefits generated.

“Not doing harm” does not mean not taking considered risks.

Speed and “efficiency” in development operations may sometimes need to be sacrificed to some degree for greater stability and peace, as well as local “ownership.”

Development discourse can be used and abused for many political purposes.

Broadly, processes by which development outcomes are produced are as important as the results.

Be transparent and communicate intentions

Transparency and full communication with key actors in a developing country and among all external actors are essential to making the objectives of external actors clear. This makes actions and policies more likely to be sustainable and improves mutual trust and confidence on all sides. But there are difficult dilemmas to manage. In some conflicts, public transparency on approaches to peace-building entails risks for donors and other external partners as well as for national actors. But this does not preclude their responsibilities to be accountable, open and clear with each other. It should help avoid unco-ordinated and conflicting actions between them. This is important in relation to the perceptions of local protagonists and other actors. Basic ground rules will need to be tailored to particular conflicts.

Widen and deepen dialogue

Encouraging and sustaining broad and inclusive dialogue – with demonstrated follow-through – is critical. It is one way that development co-operation and other external partners can address different interests and perceptions of contending groups in a conflict, listen to the marginalised and ensure that the wisdom and bridge-building potential of a wide range of possible “connectors”; including Diasporas, are kept in the picture. This must be done carefully for several reasons. Dilemmas arise about how representative certain groups actually are, what risks are involved in deciding who and how to consult; and how to encourage constructive solidarity, especially in volatile situations. External partners can be facilitators, for example by providing acceptable space and platforms for dialogue. The media can play an active and positive role in informing populations and providing space for dialogue and exchange. Donors and international media can reinforce open debate by supporting accurate and responsible media coverage.

Reinforce local capacities

External actors – multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental – individually and collectively need to identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions, even in the most grave conflict or post-conflict situations. Resources provided should, however, be commensurate with absorption capabilities. Local capacities should be supplemented, reinforced or strengthened by external resources, not substituted or overwhelmed by them. Too many resources can detract from or undermine local efforts and create avoidable dependencies. Donors should give particular consideration to understanding and, where appropriate, supporting indigenous and customary peace-building capacities and other potential connectors, such
as women’s organisations with the potential to play bridging roles. These can have a major impact on building solidarity and boosting local confidence and capacity.

**Recognise women as stakeholders and peacemakers**

War is a “gendered” activity with a strong division of labour. Most fighters are men, most institutions involved are male-dominated, and definitions of masculinity and femininity are created and mobilised. Women become the bearers of the culture that their men are fighting to defend. They also hold economies together and keep communities functioning. This is why women are so often targeted in armed conflict – and become prey to the destruction of whole communities and cultural identities. Women respond to evolving and difficult environments and often find themselves making or partaking in decisions formerly made by males in their communities, devising coping strategies at different scales. These responsibilities need to be acknowledged in post-conflict rehabilitation and negotiations.

Although conflicts affect men, women, youth and children differently, all suffer during times of war. Yet, the long-term effects of traumatic experiences are marked by gender differences. Despite the increase in involvement of civilians, men are still more likely to be killed during and missing after war. Men and boys are more likely to be directly involved in fighting and perpetuating violence, forcibly or otherwise. Men and women can experience trauma, rape, harassment, beating and torture, arbitrary detention and sexual slavery and servitude. They are often singled out as targets for different types of violence based on their gender.

Women play complex and important roles as bridge-builders and peacemakers. These contributions to peace often go unrecognised, especially at the more formal levels. There is a clear need to make fuller use of the genuine potential of women’s groups, networks, and modes of operation in peace-building activities.

**Address implications of war-affected youth and children**

“Children who grow up in a climate of murder, abduction and terror tend to reach adulthood with no idea of what it means to be able to learn, to play, to live safely at home with their families, or to socialise with their peers. And so they perpetuate the cycle of war and violence to the next generation. That is why we believe, with every fibre of our being, that protecting children from the impact of armed conflict is so basic that it is everyone’s responsibility - governments, international organisations and every segment of civil society: community workers, teachers, elders, parents, celebrities, children and all sectors of the business community.” – Graça Machel.

Conflict can forever change a child’s aspirations and capabilities by subjecting him or her to horrific physical, psychological, sexual and societal violence, as noted in the Ministerial Statement from the International Conference on War-Affected Children, held in September 2000. Young people’s frustrations over both present prospects and future outlooks may lead them to destructive engagement in violence, and their energies may easily be lost to offers of lucrative benefits from dubious activities. Children and youth are directly targeted by armed conflict and constitute a large segment of refugees, but their rights and perspectives are not always included in relief efforts. Security and well-being of youth and children is part of the overall security environment and human rights system and ultimately an issue of governance. Many development co-operation programmes work intensively on activities on the special re-entry needs of children and youth. This includes children and youth as refugees and asylum seekers. Programmes for children
and youth address issues such as psychosocial care, protection, family tracing and reunification, education, training and access to information, health and defence of children's rights.

The significant advances that have been made in addressing the problem of war-affected children and youth in the international legal arena and security reform objectives can be mutually reinforcing. The proliferation of non-state security forces that are virtually immune to outside influence can only be effectively addressed in the context of efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. Long-term solutions lie in a dual strategy of working at all levels to outlaw and end the recruitment of children in conflict, and addressing the lack of jobs and educational opportunities that can be such powerful “push” factors of economic necessity for the young people concerned.

With the 1989 adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2000 Optional Protocol to eliminate the use of child soldiers in armed conflict, political and legal awareness and commitment have strengthened to address the special problems of war-affected children and youth. The UN Security Council agreed that the impact of armed conflict on children constitutes a threat to long-term peace and stability. A Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2001 “A World Fit for Children” will review the first decade’s progress with the Convention and is expected to further focus the attention of the entire international community.

Act in timely and flexible ways, and think long term

Promoting peace is a dynamic process that requires long-term commitment. Sustainable peace is not something that can be produced rapidly or with a technical “quick fix.” It is a process rather than a clear state that can be achieved once and for all. Long-term vision, therefor, should be maintained, even in short-term complex crises.

However, experience and analysis constantly point to a tension between the need to act quickly and flexibly in complex conflict situations, where matters can rapidly deteriorate and many lives can be lost, and the need to ensure that actions contribute to positive recovery in the long term. In order to be fully informed, it is important to learn as much as possible about potential vulnerabilities by: strengthening analytical capacity and information systems, using tools such as vulnerability and risk analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments, and scenario-building, and engaging in dialogue with other actors. This is true for all external actors. To illustrate the kind of balance required, an analogy can be drawn to the kinds of protocols for rapid response used in the best hospital emergency rooms. Drawing on vast experience, a number of urgent actions are prescribed based on identified symptoms, with an awareness of both the dangers of a mistaken action, and the requirements for longer-term recovery.

Humanitarian assistance by itself cannot bring about peace. It can only help people survive in the short run although it can provide space for further peace-building initiatives. The growing experience with unanticipated conflict situations shows the need to better calibrate relief with development aid and its long-term goals. Humanitarian relief and humanitarian assistance has too often been left to serve as the only response in complex emergencies and peace-building. There is a risk of a “suspension” of development-based approaches in relief efforts and of current development activities. For example, refugee camps rarely provide education even though children may remain there indefinitely. Humanitarian aid may become a substitute for coherent and explicit policymaking, and opportunities and needs to forge social capital and cohesion may be missed.
Use creative, incentive-driven approaches for constructive engagement

Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for violent conflict regardless of whether these effects are deliberate. How can incentives be managed to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution? Numerous alternative or complementary approaches for constructive influence are available for external actors, including donors, to try to mitigate conflict and reinforce peace-building. These include some of the following examples:

Long-term, coherent and constructive engagement: This allows external actors (donors, governments, and others) to engage in policy dialogue and use a wide range of other incentives for peace. Long-term engagement can be misinterpreted and carries risks with it. For example, continued engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate or stop them. In some circumstances actions can appear to be impotent at least in the short run. Dilemmas arise on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit gross and systematic human rights abuses, target civilian populations and foster or wage war in neighbouring countries. This includes situations where legitimately elected governments are overthrown or governments maintain armed intervention in other states, unrelated to a clear case of self-defence as recognised by international law. But such risks are worth running in some cases. External actors must be clear, including with their own publics, about their assessments, concerns and goals.

Negotiated benchmarks: Donors should seek to negotiate political benchmarks for improved governance in the context of their long-term commitment.

Transparent and co-ordinated conditionalities: Where specific conditionality on aid flows is still to be applied, as part of a broader framework of incentives for peace, a more explicit policy should be articulated. It should be explained as clearly and transparently as possible to minimise misunderstanding. Broader experience with conditionality demonstrates that it rarely works unless linked to domestically-owned reforms. In conflict-related situations specifically, experience suggests that conditionality for aid needs to be:

■ Based on clear analysis and specified conditions.
■ Co-ordinated among donors to prevent donor shopping.
■ Used as a last resort rather than regularly employed.
■ Based on ethics of responsibility with provisions for transparency and accountability.
■ Monitored and evaluated clearly, and preferably jointly.
■ Part of a broader strategy of using incentives for peace.
■ Anchored in civil society, with a strong domestic base for the policy goal sought.
■ Exercised in compliance with humanitarian principles.
■ Consistently applied across cases.

Sanctions: Controversies over sanctions as an instrument to influence the course or prevention of conflict are based to some degree on their potentially adverse impact on social and economic welfare of people in the country in question. “Smart” sanctions that are clearly targeted against those individuals responsible for atrocities might
minimise adverse social and humanitarian impact. These include, for example, freezing individual bank accounts, blocking entry visas, and other such personalised, tailor-made sanctions.

**Act on the costly lessons learned about the need for co-ordinated and coherent action and policy**

Improving co-ordination between donors, and more broadly within the international community, is a major preoccupation of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance efforts. Equally important, there is growing recognition of the need for greater and better synchronised coherence between the actions of different ministries in OECD countries, other foreign policy actors and international institutions. Co-ordinating at the regional level and addressing issues from a regional perspective are essential. Recognition of the complementarity between mandates and responsibilities of different actors is key to better coherence. Experience since the 1997 guidelines (Part II, Chapter 2, “Co-ordination within the International Community and In-Country”) reveals improvements in co-ordination, and in some aspects of policy coherence, e.g. with respect to countering illegal resource flows that feed conflict.

However, international organisations, governments and individual ministries, and international non-governmental actors still rarely exercise the level of discipline and co-operation that responsible behaviour would dictate. The growing movement toward improved co-ordination in development co-operation in general needs to be re-doubled in conflict situations when strategic frameworks can be used to guide the activities of all agencies. Drawing on the sometimes disastrous experience documented in case studies and recognising the difficulties that often delay formal co-ordination arrangements, and in the absence of an agreed framework, donors and other external partners should consider how to have less formal and more flexible ground rules for actions and decision making in order to reduce the dangers of unco-ordinated actions.
Notes


2. This term refers to the wide range of individuals and institutions in a society that normally have natural tasks in maintaining inter-group peace – including justice systems, police forces, school teachers, clergy and other respected and trusted figures. Even where their roles have not been strong enough to prevent violent conflict, they may continue to have latent potential for rebuilding non-war relations.


4. The Cotonou Agreement, concluded in 2000 between the European Union (EU) and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) states, is an example of a framework with clear benchmarks, mutual accountability mechanisms and use of peace-building tools.
2 Integrating a conflict prevention “lens”

Understanding conflict

To create a “culture of prevention” in development co-operation and foreign policy action, the international community needs to better analyse the causes and dynamics of conflict and peace in order to understand how their actions will affect the “structural stability” of a society or country. They need to be more aware of the political aspects of any activity and understand how its aims, design, and implementation may interact with the political and economic dynamics in that society, including their effect on poverty. In short, all actors need to apply a conflict prevention “lens” to policies and activities.

Donors need to be politically sensitive about how activities generate benefits or cause poverty, dislocations and inequities between different groups such as returnees and local populations. In Rwanda, many donors abandoned targeting for fear of being seen as partial to one side. In Afghanistan, they strengthened targeting to women, out of a concern for the need to counterbalance and contest exclusionary government policies. Others abandoned their aid in protest to those policies.

Box 1: The «Three Thousand Houses» - Sri Lanka

The project sought to provide 3000 houses in a community consisting of equal percentages of Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim populations. The decision by the community was to allocate the houses equally between each group, i.e. 1000 houses to each group. Despite complaints about this decision, the whole community accepted it, and the houses were introduced. Yet, these populations had not been affected equally by the violence: some groups in the community in fact had a far greater need for housing.

This example illustrates how the standard development criteria (needs-based decision making, efficiency, product-oriented rather than process-oriented approaches) may have to be modified to meet peace-building objectives. In this case, the principle of equity (needs-based allocation) was subordinated to the political expedient of equality (arithmetic allocation). It gets more complicated yet: we have to ask ourselves, even if the decision was made by the communities themselves (as it was), did this development project reinforce politicised ethnic boundaries? In some ways it did. Was there an alternative? Perhaps the full example of success in this project would only have come when the communities themselves made their own decision based purely on need rather than ethnic or religious groups. The task development co-operation faces now is how to get there from here.

design activities better targeted at conflict prevention and peace-building to promote structural stability in societies. It is important to:

- Encourage institutional cultures that promote in-depth understanding of the specific dynamics of a particular conflict and the impact of any actions.
- Foster constant dialogue, local thinking and awareness with partners in government and civil society so that viable solutions emerge and become part of aid agency approaches.
- Promote multiculturalism and pluralism by rewarding projects and partners that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement; help build or reinforce interdependency in communities; and guard against polarisation between perceived “winners” and “losers”.

To help understand and foresee the impact of development programmes in conflict-prone and divided societies, development co-operation activities can:

- Recognise that resilient, diversified economies are less vulnerable to conflicts and not so easily destabilised by them.
- Profile the socio-economic and gender realities of all communities on the ground and ensure that impact assessments address economic, ethnic, regional and gender issues and sustainable poverty reduction activities.
- Analyse and disentangle the often intertwined factors of grievance and greed that may be at play in the evolution of a conflict situation (see Part I, Chapter 8, “Countering negative economic forces”).

Conflict and risk analysis and assessment

Peace and conflict impact analysis, and risk and vulnerability assessments, should be mainstreamed to become as common as cost-benefit analysis. These tools can identify potential harm and constructive actions, improve coherence and provide different branches of all governments concerned with fresh insights and angles to contemplate further actions.

For these reasons, donors have been encouraged to continue efforts to develop improved conflict and risk analysis and impact assessments. Many bilateral and multilateral

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**Box 2: Early warning and risk indicators**

Early warning tools can help promote explicit and timely attention to risk factors. This helps encourage a “culture of prevention” and provides information required for situation-specific judgements. Certain early warning signs are described below.

- The loss of political space for opposition, civil society and media to engage in public discourse.
- Social, economic and political exclusion of certain groups from mainstream development.
- Large proportion of unemployed youth.
- Impoverishment, rapid decline of access to basic services and livelihood opportunities.
- Distorted distributional effects of development, and increasing horizontal inequalities.
- A rising sense of indignity, and human rights violations.
- Increased insecurity and perceived threats.
- Migratory flows, both internal and external, for economic and political reasons.

Source: Most of these indicators were suggested by participants in the DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000. A resource for continuing work on indicators is the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (www.fewer.org).
actors, and NGOs have already tested instruments and operational tools intended to assess conflict potentials. These may be categorised as peace and conflict impact assessments, strategic conflict analysis, conflict vulnerability analysis, and analysis of early warning response and preventive assistance measures. Many donors are sharing experiences on the use of these operational tools with a view to propagating good co-ordination and best practices amongst all external actors.

The DAC Latin America Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000, raised the following points related to prevention:

- External actors are better able to engage constructively and help prevent violence when they know and analyse the ways in which the conflict is transforming.
- Conflict is a normal part of societal transformation. Maintaining legitimate space for opposition and protest can keep societies from resorting to violence. Conflicting tendencies in societies should not be suppressed.
- Dissemination of information on humanitarian law and human rights norms, and how they relate to local traditional value systems, may help groups establish creative measures to reduce brutality and increase the accountability of all warring parties. As shown by the case of Chiapas, promoting a cultural resistance to violence can contribute to humanising war and dissuade many people from resorting to violence.
- Promoting citizenship and a culture of peace and social cohesion is an investment in prevention. This can be done through formal and informal education at all levels.
- Criminalisation, corruption, and the emergence of economies which breed violence cause “human security” problems and eventually threaten state security. Providing expanded development alternatives might curb these tendencies.

Illegal economic activities and illegal trade routes often sustain and transform conflict. For example, the link between violent conflict and drug trafficking in Colombia has been a formidable complicating factor in negotiating political peace. These illegal activities can be prevented in part by disseminating information on consequences of national and international legal norms and punitive measures.


Such tools need to consider the social and political dynamics of conflict and include a focus on the specific impact of conflict on women, men, youth and children and their potential contributions to peace. There is rarely one, simple, universal formula. Furthermore, causes and grievances are replaced or transformed as conflict evolves. For example, “victims” may themselves become perpetrators of abuses over the course of a conflict, resulting in new long lasting grievances among other sections of the population. Analyses should therefore not be expected to deliver “objective” results, or a single “truth”.

“In Africa, political, economic and social reforms are taking place in a short period of time, producing significant numbers (of people) who feel they have been detrimentally affected. These rapid reforms are not allowing institutions and societies to adjust in a gradual way, thus contributing to instability and insecurity. The donor community needs to strengthen the credibility and transparency of its support to the process of political reforms.” – DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 1999.

Analytical approaches to understanding the potential impact of an activity on conflict should be guided by a human rights focus. The rights-based perspective, comprehensively applied, should help ensure attention to the legitimate immediate and longer-term interests of all individuals and representative groups. This will help maximise benefits and minimise negative side effects of development co-operation in conflict and conflict-prone situations.
The concern for the impact of development co-operation must extend beyond the effects of individual aid programmes and projects. Although many of the stabilisation and adjustment activities of the Bretton Woods institutions are not generally considered security-related, their work can have far-reaching implications for poverty, peace, conflict and security. Their recognition that combating poverty requires increasing opportunity, security and empowerment for the poor highlights this linkage.

The widespread de-stabilising impact — and conflict-causing potential — of major macroeconomic imbalances and downturns (particularly extreme inflation) are well known. The G8 in 2000 recognised that economic downturn, and its social fallout can have explosive consequences for welfare and stability. It underlined support for “assistance to build capacity and ensure appropriate social investments in education, health and nutrition, and other programmes targeting vulnerable segments of society, seeking to protect these expenditures during economic downturns and times of crisis.” In parallel, governments need to address how stabilisation programmes affect the capacity of states to provide basic security, as their first function, and to modernise their security sectors. Because conditions of economic crisis and violent conflict come together in so many countries, the interdependent challenges of security, economic stabilisation and development must be analysed collectively, and activities designed to respond to all three.

It is important that all actors be aware of the possible unintended negative side effects of aid and other external activities. More positive frameworks would strengthen the foundations of structural stability and sustainable development so that countries can achieve and maintain the underpinnings needed for a peaceful society. At the same time, many conflict situations require external actors to take calculated risks whereby unintended negative consequences can not always be avoided.

Box 4: Contrasting impacts on peace and conflict of two water projects in Sri Lanka

The Gal Oya water management project in Sri Lanka generated both development and peace-building benefits. Interestingly, its peace-building function was entirely incidental to the project which was designed and implemented according to development criteria. By cultivating the mutual interests of members from different ethnic and socio-economic groups, the project managed to thrive even in the midst of severe communal conflict. And perhaps more importantly, it resulted in the construction of ad hoc institutions of inter-communal co-operation beyond the scope of water management. In other words, it had a significant, positive impact on the incentives for peace within a particular area of Sri Lanka.

Another water project in Sri Lanka — the Maduru Oya project which was one component of the massive Mahaweli Project — illustrates the dangers of not considering the peace-building requirements of development projects. Although the Maduru Oya project was designed to meet a number of development objectives, the failure to fully consider the highly political issue of population displacement and resettlement in the context of a communal civil war, ultimately led to its downfall. The project would have resettled displaced Sinhalese villagers in the Batticaloa District where Tamils constitute two thirds of the population and where ethnic tensions were escalating. Opposition to what some called the West Bank plan to alter the demographic and thus political balance in the East had reached a critical point even before project implementation started. What does the Gal Oya teach us about successful peace-building? Some of the factors that contributed to its success as a development project also contributed to its success in peace-building explained in part by its thoroughly participatory development approach. The emphasis on promoting participation — as both a means and an end — generated a number of operating principles which have clear peace-building implications:

- Ensuring continuity of personnel to make a learning process more feasible.
- Having a network of supportive, committed people in a variety of positions.
- Avoiding partisan political involvement.
- Attracting and retaining the right kind of community leadership.
- Going beyond narrow conceptions of self-interest.

Notes

1. The World Bank Group (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

2. G8 = Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Russia and the United States. G8 Information Centre, www.g7@toronto.ca.
3 Security and development

Security as a vital base for development

The security of persons, property and assets, and the protection of human rights are fundamental to sustainable development and a pre-condition for people to improve their lives, particularly the poor. Assets include public goods such as common water points, access roads and social infrastructure. Development co-operation aims to support and help create the conditions for dynamic and representative governing structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Poorly functioning security systems can create or destroy prospects for peace, and social and economic progress. There is growing concern over the interaction between development and security and the role this plays in shaping people’s lives.

In a “post-conflict” country, security is widely seen as one of the crucial elements for any reconciliation and long-term development. It requires both ending the insecurity resulting from war, and new forms of (criminal) insecurity that so often hit countries that have been in conflict for a long time. Insecurity limits the likelihood of reconciliation, undermines the legitimacy of the institutions of the state, and hampers possibilities for recovery and economic development. It has become a widening area for donor involvement, with specific activities in training and capacity building.

The concept of security has shifted away from a fundamentally military focus on protecting territory and sovereignty with strength of national defence forces. The new conceptualisation includes the responsibility, principally of the state, to ensure the well-being of people. As a consequence, discussions of security issues, “systems” and actors have become comprehensive and no longer refer to military systems only.

The majority of victims of violent conflict and complex emergencies are civilians. This has led to a convergence of conventional development and anti-poverty actions with peace-building and reconstruction efforts. The development community is often involved in the implementation of peace agreements and rehabilitation. Different actors from the same (OECD) governments are now working more closely together in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Traditionally, this was not the case since the strategic objectives of development and security practitioners were often parallel or in opposition with each other, partly because their focus tended to be uni-disciplinary.

Governance and security

The way traditional security forces interrelate with political, judicial and penal systems, and the rule of law, or lack of it, influences the overall security system of a country. This governance aspect is of particular concern to the development community, as is civilian capacity within the government and civil society to oversee and control these “security” actors. The influence the business community may wield over security issues, security actors and the overall security framework is also of growing concern (see Part I, Chapter VII, “Working with business”).

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Assessing security needs

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Box 5: Security-related definitions

“Security” is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme and widely used by development actors.

The “Security system” includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).

“Security sector reform” is the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

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Assessing security needs

National security reviews, including the development of effective threat assessments, can help a country elaborate an overarching policy on national security in the context of national development goals. Reviews provide a basis for managing security resources more effectively. Efforts to improve security expenditure management should be set in the broader context of strengthening the institutional framework in which public spending and security decision-making occurs, ensuring due transparency and attention to corruption. The widening, and worrying, role of private security activities is an important element. In many countries they undermine the “public goods” character of providing security of persons and property — the most basic function of government. Both donors and partner countries need to invest in deepening and widening their understanding of security challenges and possible responses. Governmental, parliamentary, civil society and independent research capacities should be reinforced, and direct dialogue with security professionals should be regularised. These goals can be further strengthened when

assessments take into account opportunities for strengthening security through regional co-operation, and the needs for regional peacekeeping capabilities.

In accepting the legitimate needs for well-functioning security systems with professionalised security forces, a single-minded focus on down-sizing the security forces and reducing military and/or security spending, often a key component of donor conditionality, may not be consistent with the need to enhance security as a foundation for development. Strengthening state capacity to fulfil legitimate duties may help restore and maintain security. More stability may come from redistributing spending from the military to the police to provide correct security for productive economic activity. Informed debate and participation strengthen such governance and are important keys to getting expenditures right.

In conclusion, the governance approach to security systems recognises that countries have legitimate security needs that must be met efficiently and effectively. It requires a security system with security forces that are the right size, appropriately tasked, and cost-effectively equipped. This has implications for the way resources are managed, including the budget planning and execution process. Civilian government must be able to oversee the security forces and their spending.

**Increased policy coherence**

Actions by donors and other parts of their governments may indirectly compound security problems, especially in “failing” and war-torn countries in which the patterns of civil/military relations are extremely skewed. A focus therefore on policy coherence and co-ordinated action is crucial. The capacity to address and carry out operational activities for this “cross-cutting” policy domain is often lacking in departments in OECD and developing country governments. Ideally, sensitivity to security issues would be incorporated across all areas of government. The aim would be to broadly agree on the security challenges with the partner country and identify appropriate roles for their different government departments and those of various external actors. But co-operation between government departments occurs sporadically. Actions are rarely set in broader contexts. And when they are, actions in areas touching on security issues can remain hostage to concerns from other government departments, such as strategic geopolitical, trade and business interests. There is a clear call for greater policy coherence.

**ODA eligibility of peace-related assistance**

The ODA eligibility of peace-related assistance is an area of sensitivity and high risk, but many OECD countries have accepted a role in security reform, in several cases through their development co-operation programmes. However, not all DAC Members are equally ready to engage directly in work on security issues which frequently involve other parts of their governments (especially Defence and Foreign Ministries) or in activities such as military training and equipment supply, that do not qualify as ODA. These distinctions reflect some longstanding concerns related to security co-operation, as well as questions of appropriate mandates and budgetary responsibilities. The rules and issues on which types of expenditure should be categorised as ODA are periodically reviewed and monitored by statistical experts of DAC Members who meet in the Working Party on Statistics of the DAC.
Box 6: Eligibility of peace-related assistance as official development assistance

From the earliest stages of the collective international aid effort in the 1950s and 1960s, donor countries have worked together in the DAC to agree on definitions of the characteristics and boundaries of aid that should be categorised and calculated as Official Development Assistance (ODA) for purposes of international reporting and comparisons. The basic criteria that have always been applied are that aid, to be counted as ODA, must be provided to or for specified developing countries and territories, by the official sector in DAC countries, with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, and meeting a minimum level of concessionality in the financial terms.

Many, if not most, of the donor countries have provided other forms of international assistance over the decades, which have been reported on nationally and internationally, as appropriate [included in DAC reporting as Other Official Flows (OOF)]. The statistical experts of DAC Members have discussed interpretation of the ODA eligibility rules, reaching decisions by consensus, as in all DAC deliberations.

With the growing recognition over the 1990s of the close linkages between peace, security, and development, and expanding activities by donors in related areas, the eligibility of these expenditures as ODA has become a topic of considerable discussion. It has not always been easy for Members to reach consensus on some components. The reasons for these difficulties include differing judgements as to whether development is the main objective of some such forms of assistance. This is compounded by a special sensitivity (and, in some countries, legal restrictions) around security-related assistance in the light of much Cold War experience, and other instances of assistance to security forces which subsequently engaged in human rights violations, attacked neighbouring countries, or committed other abuses. In addition, the large scale of some peace-related international assistance in the 1990s has intensified concerns about the possible diversion of limited and declining levels of ODA expenditure from core development co-operation work to activities that might more appropriately be financed from other budgets. If other budgets claimed some of their expenditures as ODA, these would count towards the UN target for ODA of 0.7% of Gross National Product (GNP). In this case, traditional and non-traditional aid activities would go towards fulfilling the ODA target.

Discussions among Members have led over the years to agreement on the eligibility of a broad range of assistance to be classified as ODA. These include activities under UN post-conflict peace-building operations: demobilisation; the conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; and explosive mine removal for developmental purposes. A number of civilian, security-related development activities, including civilian oversight of police forces, police and judicial reform, and justice systems, may also be included in ODA. ODA eligibility does not yet cover support to civilian oversight of defence and military issues and sectors.

As of December 2000, a number of other areas of peace-related activities were still being debated for ODA eligibility, with no consensus emerging. These include support for: security reviews that examine the roles of security forces such as military, gendarmerie, police and security institutions and mechanisms such as intelligence, foreign affairs, justice and penal systems. Other areas being considered are: the management of security-related expenditures; military reforms and training and sensitising military forces in areas such as human rights; civilian expertise on security issues; civilian oversight of the military; regional confidence-building and peacekeeping capacity; preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; and building developing countries’ research capacities on external security matters.

In general, there is not a consensus to broaden ODA eligibility to include expenditure items within the security sector itself. Several Members are also concerned that even if parts of certain activities could be considered ODA-eligible, identifying and accounting for these components could be extremely difficult.

Developing countries need help to face massive and fast changing security challenges.

No matter what approach donors take to engaging directly in security-related support, there is a new appreciation internationally of the legitimate role of a properly governed security system to ensure an environment in which any development can be advanced and sustained. The testimony of the poor on how much a basic lack of security maintains and deepens their deprivation has been widely heard. Developing countries need help to face massive and fast changing security challenges. They range, for example, from basic policing and core defence requirements, to border control and natural resource protection, and the fight against international crime, hostage-taking and various forms of illicit trafficking in goods and people, very often women. The military is often diverted to non-military functions because of the institutional weakness or under-funding of other necessary services. Therefore, before support to these non-traditional activities of the military is removed, the capacity of other parts of the government or the private sector to take them over should be ensured.
**Demobilisation and reintegration**

The demobilisation and the sustainable reintegration of former combatants into society, and removing arms from circulation, are fundamental to the long-term success of peace processes and establishing well-functioning security systems. Successful peace processes build confidence between all actors to allow former combatants to enter into their implementation, e.g. through security guarantees against reprisals outside the law. It can be helpful to designate a specific negotiating table on reintegration issues to identify long-term and short-term objectives. In this way all parties, including security forces, minority communities and the opposition, can establish a common understanding over time. In supporting these processes, donors need to realise that the challenge of full integration can only be achieved with reconciliation (see also Part I, Chapter 5, “Peace processes, justice and reconciliation”).

The formal disbanding of military formations is the start of a process that only concludes successfully when ex-combatants have been effectively reinserted into civilian society. Trust is an essential element of the whole reintegration process. Convincing ex-combatants to release their arms and help curb the illegal flows of small weapons reinforces reintegration. But demobilisation and reintegration are fundamentally about the need for new forms of livelihood for ex-combatants, including female, that ultimately require the creation of new jobs. The task is all the tougher because child soldiers and other ex-combatants often have no other job market skills. Many of the ex-combatants concerned may never have been part of a normal, peaceful society, so that the challenge is one of basic social and economic integration rather than reintegration. An overly technical approach to demobilisation and reintegration underplays the critical economic, social, political and psychological barriers to effective reinsertion. This can be a difficult job.

Successfully incorporating ex-combatants requires economic sustainability, which has a longer time-frame than the political dimension of demobilisation and integration. A lack of employment and income-generating opportunities for ex-combatants increases risks of economic migration into activities that may include crime, arms and goods trafficking and private armies. Different approaches (e.g. “bridging” public works projects, micro-enterprise) work better in different settings and require flexibility and creativity. Employment training is often not relevant to the local market and does not compensate for years of lost education. Ex-combatants must often adapt their skills to several fields before they find employment, and income generation schemes tend to require high maintenance as well as financial and technical support to succeed. The political will of donors and the state to provide long-term support, and to engage the private sector, is thus vital.

Reintegration efforts have good results when they are part of a broader local development programme that integrates combatants, their families and displaced persons into the community. This requires shared benefits as well as broad and sustained support to reconciliation processes. Where this does not occur, ex-combatants may be subject to discrimination or face other problems. The state’s active role in this area can be reinforced but not substituted by international assistance. It is key to ensure national and community based ownership and responsibility for programmes in a manner that sustains them. Where no adequate support services are in place, a vacuum can be created that produces frustration among demobilised persons, and have a potentially destabilising effect on the overall peace process.

“The emphasis on efficiency of aid must not undermine the need to support locally initiated, often fragile processes of peace and reconciliation.” – DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.
Reducing the means of violent conflict: landmines, and small and light weapons

The widespread and complex problems (and experiences) of landmine removal are a major development co-operation challenge, because anti-personnel and land mines prevent large portions of land from being developed, instill fear and mistrust in populations and can be used as part of silent coercive tactics. The promotion, coming into force, and ratification by some 140 signatories to the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Convention, and the political and legal basis for ending this scourge have been strengthened. At the same time expertise and best practice in landmine removal and rehabilitation programmes have been widely disseminated, and indigenised. These activities continue to be an important preoccupation of OECD countries. There is less coherence in some OECD countries which continue to produce a large proportion of the world’s landmines. In the year 2000, landmine use continued in areas such as Angola, Burma, Chechnya and Kosovo, and much still remains to be done in spite of marked improvements in most regions. Illicit trafficking of landmines continues, and 70 million landmines remain planted in one-third of the world’s nations.

“...The proliferation of small arms and light weapons outside formal control of the state is one of the serious challenges to peace and security. Research indicates that the Southern Asian region alone may have upward of 7 million sophisticated military-type weapons outside state control.” – DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

Some of the most appalling levels of violence have continued to be perpetrated with small arms and rudimentary weapons. There is widespread consensus on the need to do all possible to limit the proliferation and illegal circulation of small and light weapons. International efforts to come to grips with this problem have been encouraged by the progress made in banning landmines. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on Import, Export and the Manufacture of Light Weapons, 1998, and experience in Central America demonstrate the potential impact of local initiatives and political will. Donors are engaged in a variety of supportive activities aimed at: reducing the demand for small arms and light weapons; strengthening appropriate supply-side behaviour; and helping partner countries tackle the trade routes which results in the illicit supply of such weapons. As an illustration of the range of possible areas for targeted assistance, while often working with regional and international security organisations, donors can:

- Support public information activities at national, regional, and international levels to inform and advocate against small and light weapons.
- Help develop national and regional consultation mechanisms, including codes of conduct, in connection with legal manufacturing, transit, transfers, and reduction/control of small and light weapons.
- Provide support to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination as well as training and information sharing between law and order forces and customs officials.
- Support weapons collection and destruction programmes and related disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration processes of ex-combatants (micro-disarmament).
“Lack of transparency in the security sectors of a large number of Asian countries increases threat perceptions and reduces potential for civilian oversight. Nearly half of the Asian countries do not even participate in the UN Register for Arms.” – DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

In addition, donors can help in the following areas to create an appropriate supportive environment for more direct small arms initiatives which:

- Support education on small arms, reconciliation and peace-building in order to promote the non-violent resolution of disputes.
- Underpin local and national mechanisms, including traditional methods that contribute to the alleviation of any root causes of conflict, and are able to manage change without resort to violence.
- Provide support to ensure appropriate budget making in defence, including accountability and right sized force structures, and arms procurement procedures.

Since much of the activity in the effort to limit small arms and light weapons is carried out by Interior or Justice Ministries in DAC Member countries, the development cooperation arm needs to communicate and co-ordinate well with them, at home and at the regional and international levels.

International support for disarmament processes often does not achieve the expected success due to the absence of a climate of security following the termination of armed conflicts. Given persisting tensions between groups, disarmament is a long-term challenge that cannot be separated from broader confidence-building measures. Development assistance of a technical nature can be complemented with efforts to enhance political dialogue between divided groups.
Notes

1. Predictable patterns of sustainable development provide security including human security, but this report does not address these linkages.


3. This illustrative list is drawn from the terms of reference for the UNDP Trust Fund on Small Arms.
Supporting regional co-operation and consultation

Even with the predominance today of intra-state conflicts, there is wide recognition of the cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts themselves, and in strategies for peacekeeping, recovery and prevention. At the same time, the potential positive benefits of regional co-operation and peace-building seem slow and difficult to realise and promote, although there may be some grounds for restrained optimism, for example in Central America and the Mekong River Basin. Meanwhile, examples of negative regional dynamics seem both abundant and powerful, with Central Africa perhaps providing the most prominent case in recent years.

The history of the European Union (EU) – cited as “probably the most successful example of conflict prevention in the last half-century” by the UN Secretary-General in July 2000 – continues to inspire hopes that the model of economic and functional co-operation can be applied elsewhere in the world as a basis for regional or sub-regional “security communities” within which major conflict becomes impossible. The further enlargement of the Union itself is in part an additional initiative toward wider European stability and security. At the same time, the EU and the European Commission (EC), in their own international activities, have a special interest and capacity for supporting regional co-operation and consultation efforts elsewhere, on a region-to-region basis. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is sometimes cited as a hopeful example of a co-operative framework in a tinderbox region.

In recent years, however, even quite strong and resilient regional organisations like those in Southeast Asia have been tested by the combined pressures of economic crises and cross-border environmental, refugee and insurgency spillovers. This happened even after making some major progress in extending the membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) throughout the region, largely driven by political and security concerns for peaceful management of disputes and “constructive engagement” of differences among the countries of the region.

Despite the continuing difficulties, visionary leaders within regions, and external partners, continue to believe and invest in the need for much stronger regional consultation. Ensuring that consultations take place regionally as well as nationally is vital. Even from the perspective of economic growth alone, and its attendant potential benefits in so many other areas, many donors are giving steadily greater weight to regional programmes, or regional linkages within more traditional country programmes.

Regional economic co-operation and integration (through trade liberalisation and other measures) can achieve important benefits even for poor regions and can be managed on a basis of “open regionalism” that is compatible with wider multilateral liberalisation and helps countries capture the gains. This can be supported by a regional emphasis on the increasing interest and activity of donors in trade-related assistance – both to help developing countries to negotiate and apply international trade disciplines, and to strengthen the capacities needed to integrate and operate successfully in the globalised economy.

Looking ahead, donors and others are investing in strengthened regional consultation and co-operation for the management of shared resources and environmental challenges.
in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia, where the obstacles are formidable. But some encouragement can be drawn from the steady strengthening of co-operation on infrastructure, even in war-torn regions, and among the Mekong River Basin countries.

The regional dimensions of conflict

A number of guidance points on the regional dimensions of conflict and its prevention have been amplified in the last five years, such as the need to resist any tendency to compartmentalise conflicts to fit existing bureaucracies and funding mechanisms. In the case of Rwanda, the regional dimension of the conflict did not disappear with the breaking up of refugee camps and return of the refugees; if anything it became even more intractable.

Policy coherence for regional consultation and co-operation needs to encompass diplomatic and possibly military and peacekeeping efforts – including arms trading, peace negotiations, and regional peacekeeping capabilities, and co-operation on economic and other fronts. International action and attempts to influence it need to be directed to all sides in conflicts in a manner that is consistent with the objectives sought. In acute conflict situations, the scope for the use of aid is limited and primarily useful to creating incentives or disincentives to the governments of the countries donors work in, but typically it cannot do the same with rebel movements, or neighbouring governments. Support for democratisation within countries should seek supportive action from or within neighbouring countries and at the regional level, since it can be difficult for countries to build and maintain democracy when surrounded by non-democratic regimes.

In security reform processes, neighbouring countries need to be considered and treated as main stakeholders. This is in part because they can play active roles – either for peace, or for fostering conflict or waging war in a region. Regional instability contributes to the maintenance of large standing armies and to elevated levels of military spending. Tensions and suspicion that lead to militarisation can be reduced through effective regional mechanisms for enhancing security and co-operation, along with internationally-supported confidence-building measures [similar to those used in Europe with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] that can include the disclosure of information by countries on military strategy, force size and procurement plans. Once sufficient levels of confidence are achieved, regions can focus more on positive, “win-win” scenarios to strengthen security and co-operation. Foreign offices of OECD countries can play a lead role here at the diplomatic level, complemented by capacity building within regional organisations supported by development and defence ministries. In terms of peacekeeping capacities, finding “regional solutions for regional problems” is a good principle. However, there are situations, like those in Central Africa, East Timor, the Great Lakes region, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and others, which call for a much wider response by the whole international community, a more regional approach to solutions and added help to regional actors.
Assistance for regional capacities

While the cardinal development co-operation rule of respecting local ownership and local leadership applies strongly to support for regional co-operation, several specific opportunities for constructive external assistance have been identified and, in many cases, tested. Donors should:

- Help ensure that regional engagement is supported through regional diplomacy and flexibly resorts to sub-regional bodies, where appropriate.
- Assist in forging regional networks between community groups and civil society engaged in peace activities to stimulate mutual learning in transforming communal conflicts.
- Protect and promote the role of regional mechanisms in areas such as human rights. Neutral legal forums can offer balanced solutions to concrete cases of human rights violations that may be too politically contentious for national systems.
- Further support regional and sub-regional capacities for early warning, with a clear understanding of the criteria for predictable regional response.
- Support regional and sub-regional response capacities whenever such capacity has a comparative advantage in addressing situations of emerging or escalating conflict.
- Recognise and support the role of regional bodies in addressing cross border issues such as security and the illegal economy.
- Support measures to reduce the production, export, redistribution and recycling of small arms and light weapons.
- Assist in the development and financing of integrated programmes for peace and post-conflict reconstruction among countries of sub-regional groupings emerging from conflict situations.
- Help support longer-range work on regional economic, environmental and resource-management co-operation. Regional environmental security and resource management are challenges that will inevitably grow more critical, with possibilities either of new co-operative solutions or widening conflict. They merit major investment in analysis, capacity building and diplomatic support, and development assistance could make a notable contribution.

Forced displacement and the related issues of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are especially important dimensions of regional peace-building and conflict prevention approaches. The scale of the problem of forced displacement – both within and across borders – is one that calls for greater use of regional mechanisms and efforts. The linkages need to be made between the situations of refugees and IDPs and other regional issues including trafficking in human beings and drugs, indented labour and cross border natural resource management. Donors should support momentum in existing cross border co-operation in different regions, as well as in transnational or regional exchanges on these issues. Capacities for technical training and research at the regional level should be strengthened.

Regional institutions should be encouraged to take responsibility in meeting the challenges of conflict which result in flows of refugees across state borders, even though more effective regional approaches to tackle forced displacement are currently constrained by political sensitivities and by differing capacities for engagement by member states.
In the regional consultations, people from developing countries stressed that “sovereignty with responsibility” needs to be emphasised. Clear statements, standards and norms comprising the responsibilities of sovereignty and a system of accountability are needed at various regional levels.

Development co-operation strategies should reflect such regional and cross-border approaches. External assistance on refugee and IDP issues should be addressed within a holistic approach to conflict resolution and prevention. For states in crisis, a comprehensive settlement integrating political negotiations, aid engagement, and refugee protection and repatriation should be attempted under a common international strategy. Current separate actions on relief do not address the dynamics of causal linkages between political crises and humanitarian outcomes, and micro project-level action does not add up to meeting the macro-level challenges of large refugee and IDP populations.

Development co-operation should better address other factors which lie behind population flows. These include land dispossession, environmental change, HIV-AIDS, etc. The particularly vulnerable position of women to and during displacement needs to be fully recognised and reflected in programming.2
Notes

1. Regional consultations were co-ordinated by the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America. They provided distinct and compelling perspectives from the diverse vantage points of different groups and interests in many developing countries. They gave tangible reinforcement to the guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, Part II and fed into newer work on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, Part I.

Lessons emerging from violent conflict identify ways to prevent both recurrences and new conflicts. This entails ensuring that peace processes address differing viewpoints on issues of justice and retribution and what is required to reconcile differences so that further violence is avoided. A high risk factor for the outbreak of violent conflict is a history of past conflict, especially when the root causes and impacts have not been satisfactorily confronted and addressed.

Development agencies are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peace-building both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues.

Supporting peace processes

Leaders need to recognise that winning the peace is just as important as winning the war. Negotiated peace agreements often bring together those individuals who provoked or maintained conflict in the first place. In order to have peace settlements and agreements in which all major protagonists feel ownership, perceptions of mutual benefit between them are crucial. When peace processes work towards providing the conditions necessary for participatory democratisation processes, they lay the foundations for peaceful dialogue.

Sustained, comprehensive and committed support to conflict resolution by the international community in all areas (diplomatic, political, technical, financial and in the security sector) is key to supporting peace processes. Mending war-torn societies takes time, and predictable and sustained commitments of aid within realistic time perspectives contribute a great deal to creating a positive and constructive approach.

For the donor community, some of the most prominent elements identified as contributing to the success of peace processes are to:

- Recognise and address the high expectations raised by peace agreements.
- Build confidence between all the different parties.
- Proactively engage in peace processes by facilitating dialogue between all local parties concerned including civil society, even on contentious issues. A clear understanding of the principles of neutrality and impartiality in these politically-charged contexts is crucial.
- Provide opportunities for civil society groups of all types, business, media, religious groups, professional associations, women’s groups, youth, and academia to become engaged and play a constructive role in peace-building and reintegration.
- Ensure clarity on donors’ objectives linked to aid, especially during low-intensity conflict situations, not least in terms of mitigation, prevention and the resolution of conflict. The frequent perception that donors and their governments are applying double standards can be detrimental. Approaches to similar situations of conflict in different countries (inter alia in relation to human rights) are seen as inconsistent.
This inconsistency in turn undermines the credibility of aid objectives and donor motivation, and undermines confidence.

- Overcome institutional and political resistance (explicitly managing the risks) to offering assistance to countries in a state of fragile peace, as they emerge from war and struggle to prevent a relapse into violent conflict.

- Consider factors that contribute to effective implementation of peace agreements, such as flexibility to react to early warning signs around sensitive issues before they give rise to new conflicts. Early warning signals of impending unrest include the inability of public authorities to pay the civil service and meet public service responsibilities, and the national military assuming government responsibilities.

- Take into account the dynamics through which war-torn societies perceive an increased tendency towards violence and brutality in general, mostly towards civilian populations. This can disrupt social cohesion for long periods.

- Build the capacity of people and organisations defending human rights by strengthening monitoring skills, training in legal rights and state obligations in relation to international conventions, and consulting with resource persons from within the region who have experience in working in similar situations.

- Bolster state-sponsored or independent institutions like national human rights commissions in order to improve capacity and state accountability. Within active conflicts, donors can support more energetically various initiatives to build humanitarian space, e.g. for immunisation campaigns. These can include, for example, days of tranquillity, zones of peace, and temporary cease-fires.

- Avoid overburdening fragile and emerging state structures, by ensuring better co-ordination of coherent policies and working towards the fiscal sustainability of the state, through fiscal reforms aimed at increasing state revenues.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (October 2000) expresses concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and are increasingly targeted by combatants. It also recognises the consequent impact on durable peace and reconciliation efforts and calls upon the Security Council, the United Nations Member states and all other parties (i.e. non-state actors, militias, humanitarian agencies, civil society) to take action in four areas: participation of women in decision-making and peace processes; incorporating gender perspectives and gender training in peacekeeping operations; protection of women; and gender mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and programmatic implementation mechanisms.

“The greatest challenge in a peace process comes once the peace accord has been signed and is expected to yield concrete outcomes. Unrealistic expectations on the immediate benefits from peace can do more harm than good and generate a risk that those who perceive themselves as losers in a peace process become its very spoilers, either by breaking the peace or through other forms of violence, notably criminal activities.” – DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.
Supporting local capacities and initiatives

International support for civil society in peace processes, justice processes and reconciliation is important. The development community and other external actors need to recognise that:

- Communities have the capacity to initiate peace-building activities even at the height of conflict, before formal peace processes are initiated. Donors should be aware of such initiatives and support them where appropriate.

- A peace agreement is only one step in a peace-building process. There is rarely an identifiable end; peace-building efforts need to continue if peace is to be sustained and peace agreements are to be respected. Once the peace is deemed “won”, donors have tended to shift their support heavily towards the state – away from civil society. Consultations emphasised that donor support to civil society peace-building initiatives should not be curtailed when peace processes are perceived to have ended.

- Aid can play a catalytic role in promoting peace-building dialogue between contending partners, and can help create the climate for reconciliation. Such dialogue, however, to produce sustainable results, needs to be driven by the protagonists’ genuine commitment to peace and reconciliation, and not by the promise of aid.

- Donors have a responsibility to avoid drawing the most competent people out of local civil society institutions or organisations to better paid positions in international organisations and bilateral agencies.

The international community particularly needs to take a more active role to:

- Help build the capacity of CSOs to enable them to meaningfully participate in formal peace processes and power structures. This includes support for training and leadership development. Donors and other external actors need to bring influence to bear on states and warring parties engaged in peace processes, to accept a structured role for CSOs. Such assistance needs to be sensitive to special interest groups such as women, youth and disarmed young militants.

- Promote the engagement of the marginalised and weakest segments of society in peace processes. These groups should have broader access to independent information and better opportunities to voice their concerns and interests. This can be complemented by training on negotiating skills, for example to enable their active participation in peace processes, including in the verification and implementation stages.

Understanding gender issues in violent conflict and peace-building

War itself is a “gendered” activity, as explained in Part I, Chapter 1, “Some basic guiding principles”. Analysis and policy relating to violent conflict and peace processes are often gender blind. To try to prevent violent conflict and mitigate the social, political and economic consequences of war, the strengths and needs of men and women should be addressed. This does not always occur because it is assumed that gender differences are not relevant at this level.
Some governing systems use coercion and force to engineer consent and acquiescence in society. To create more participatory frameworks of governance, such methods may need to give room to alternative models that lead to voluntary conflict resolution and alternative discourses on issues of justice and reconciliation. Women’s initiatives for peace and conflict resolution are collective and collaborative in nature, often focused on the principle of community action, across ethnic, linguistic, religious and other divides. This is in part because their principal objectives are to fulfil the practical needs of households and the community, and to maintain security and livelihoods. Women’s individual and collective experiences of building co-existence within and among communities during conflict, coupled with social and gender analyses, should provide donors and developing country governments with a useful resource base, especially for the post-conflict and reconciliation phases.

In heavily militarised or insecure societies, the general level of violence, including domestic and gender-based violence, increases and becomes a major source of daily insecurity for women, men and children all over the world. Children, men and women undergo sexual and physical violence and abuse, as well as psychological and emotional trauma as a consequence of long periods of living in insecure conditions, witnessing extreme forms of violence and being victims of violence themselves. Human rights violations include rape, harassment, beating and other forms of torture, arbitrary arrest and detainment, and various forms of sexual slavery and servitude.

Violence, especially sexual, can undermine one’s role and position in the household and the community, and undermine confidence. In the former Yugoslavia many thousands of men and boys were rounded up, murdered and imprisoned just because they were men. Thus, there should be special programmes designed to raise awareness and sensitivity to these issues and to deal with all aspects of violence. These should focus on the causes of violent acts and the psychological traumas leading men (and women) and groups in power to become more violent. Special ways of dealing with victims of violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict need to be supported and examples include the ad-hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court. Donors should support building databases and gender-specific statistical material.

Women as peacemakers

Focusing on women solely as victims of violent conflict can obscure their roles as potential peacemakers in reconstruction and rebuilding processes. Around the globe women and their organisations have initiated dialogue and reconciliation in communities and villages. Their coping experiences during war provide them with specific perspectives and insights that should not be lost. Indeed, their voices and viewpoints regarding peace and security issues are essential to the peace and policymaking processes at all levels.

Donors are currently redefining their policies for conflict reduction strategies to include the relevant gender perspectives and identify requirements for specific attention to women or men. Donors should:

- Support women’s organisations during conflicts to enable them to become involved in mediation, negotiations and attempts to institutionalise the peace process. Seeking peace requires insights into the economy, the community, and social and health situations. Women are often well informed on these issues and have devised coping strategies.
Donor policies and programmes can extend support to women’s organisations that focus on the conflict situations; and encourage women’s coalitions and alliances for peace-building across regions and sub-regions. It is just as important to strengthen the position of women within mixed and mainstream organisations working, for example, on human rights, relief and rehabilitation and peace building.

Encourage capacity building for women in public life. Women, who have more prominent public roles in conflict, whether as peacemakers or combatants, may find that in times of peace there is an attempt to push them back into traditional roles. One factor that contributes to this is the shift in donor funding away from support to civil society towards more support to formal state administration. Strengthening the position of women within mixed and mainstream organisations, such as working on human rights, relief and rehabilitation and peace-building, is an important part of capacity building. Peace-building and peacemaking processes should incorporate women as decision-makers at each level and consider their concerns at every stage. Promotion of the redistribution of power and the construction of sustainable and democratic political procedures provides opportunities for advancing gender equality.

Support the representation of women in peace processes. The effect of militarisation during the pre-conflict period is often to marginalise women from the decision-making processes. This is replicated in peace processes where negotiations take place between authorities controlling different areas, which may not be accountable to the population they control. There is much positive experience of women’s activism during peace processes. For example, in parts of Latin America, women have been successful in insisting that peace processes should not be at the cost of amnesty for human rights abuses.

Improve women’s access to resources during post-conflict rehabilitation and reconciliation processes. Many arrangements for public administration and legislation are renegotiated after a war. These can provide opportunities for securing or increasing women’s legal rights, their control over key resources such as land, and their access to education and mechanisms for justice.

Develop special ways of dealing with women (and men) youth and children who have been victims of gender-based violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict. Some examples of distinctive approaches can be found in the ad hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court. The rape of males and females as a systematic weapon of war to demoralise communities under threat has recently been recognised as a war crime by the United Nations.

Consider designing special programmes to deal with the psychological and emotional trauma of all aspects of violence against women and men. This would be useful not only to address those aspects of violence that are particularly linked to the conflict but also to raise awareness about the rise in the general level of violence in a heavily militarised society, including domestic violence. These programmes should focus on the causes of violent acts and the psychological traumas leading men to become more violent. Work is needed to strengthen gender-specific information, including databases and statistical material, on these problems.
“There is a need to transform formal space in peace processes to allow informal groups to sit at the negotiating table.” DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

Peace-building through democracy building³

The 1997 DAC guidelines outline some of the main ways that donors can help strengthen democratic systems toward the structural stability that allows for the non-violent resolution of conflict, taking account of the distribution and the transfer of power, as well as the protection of minorities and marginalised groups (see Part II, Chapter 1, “Understanding violent conflict and its links with development”). Subsequent experience has taught donors more about how to target assistance to these objectives. Most of the principles and lessons apply in anticipatory and preventive efforts, but they often emerge most sharply following periods of violent conflict.

Cold war strategies focused on short-term stability rather than longer-term sustainability. More of today’s conflicts are propelled at least in part by quests for self-determination or adequate recognition of communal identity rather than by ideology or extra-territorial conquest. Issues around the internal political organisation of a state are much more important in managing conflicts today, since identity conflict is complex, persistent and intractable, and thus much less amenable to compromise, negotiation and trade-offs.

More attention needs to be given to the types of political choices that those negotiating an end to violent conflict must make in order to rebuild their country. The way democratic procedures and institutions are developed and implemented, i.e. the clarity, quality of preparation and participation, timing, can play a more constructive role in post-conflict peace-building than has been the case to date.

The international scene is littered with post-conflict settlements that broke down in part because of inappropriate and unsustainable institutional choices for deeply divided societies. Where perceived imbalances in economic distribution coincide with identity differences, there tends to be heightened potential for conflict. Poorly designed democratic institutions often do not, or cannot, promote peaceful co-existence. Instead, they can inflame communal conflicts. In deeply divided societies, a combination of simple majoritarian political institutions and “winner take all” elections can often make things worse, especially if there is a rush to hold elections without leaving adequate time for political and procedural preparation.

It may be necessary in many cases to move away from thinking about the resolution of conflict towards a more pragmatic interest in a society’s capacities to manage conflict without violence, a cornerstone of DAC Members’ agreed approach in their 1997 guidelines (see Part II, Policy Statement). Government systems that embody the main hallmarks of democracy and have the institutional capacity to uphold them have the best chance of durably helping manage conflict without violence. For a system of government to be considered democratic, it must combine three essential conditions: meaningful competition for political power among individuals and organised groups; inclusive participation through free and fair elections and a supportive level of civil and political liberties. (This includes protecting freedom of political expression and the right to organise political formations.) When civil society has direct access to Ombudsperson systems, states may act more responsibly.

Donors recognise how important it is for countries to form political parties and support this step as part of a democratic process and a way to promote the transformation from violent conflict to peace. The perspective of democratic, inclusive governance is an
important aspect of this dynamic process of transformation. A static view could well consolidate an autocratic form of democracy and lead to descent into violent conflict. Authoritarian systems can present an illusion of short-term stability but are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term.

**Post-conflict justice and reconciliation**

Establishing the conditions necessary to promote justice and reconciliation is an essential task for societies in transition. It is also one of the most difficult and complex, heavily shaped by: cultural norms and expectations in the society concerned; the presence or absence of a peace accord and the way it was negotiated; the presence and strength of inter-group "connectors"; and other factors. In the end, distinctive national solutions need to be found in each case, but it is important that these solutions respect basic international legal norms.

“It is important, where possible, to begin a process of reconciliation before conflict has ended. The processes have to be set in motion while the conflict is raging, by identifying and working with stakeholders. Victims of conflict should not be looked upon and addressed merely as victims but as stakeholders. This is part of the empowering process that will lead to reconciliation and social cohesion.” – DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.

With all the complexities, however, it is clear that protagonist groups must find a sufficiently acceptable balance between concerns of justice and reconciliation, so that they can move peacefully forwards. The dilemmas are often challenging:

- On the one hand, truth and justice (as ultimately interpreted by all those involved) are seen as indispensable conditions for reconciliation. They require the recognition of the suffering of victims, the identification of atrocities and human rights violations, and the guaranteed ability to bring to justice those who are individually and institutionally responsible for crimes.

- On the other hand, experience has underlined the potential contradictions between peace and any absolute sense of justice by stressing that “more” peace cannot always coincide with greater justice. Those who have lived through such processes stress, however, that even if “full” justice cannot be achieved, it is necessary to give clear priority and some formal recognition to reconciliation, as evidence of the tangible willingness to enforce justice. Reconstructing the history of pain and social wounds, and differentiating between war actions and brutality, are considered key. Using traditional and customary mechanisms for reconciliation may be helpful, especially for people who have limited access to formal state systems. At the same time, a focus on exemplary cases – possibly to be tried in international courts – could be the basis of a learning mechanism for the society as a whole.

In some cases and circumstances, amnesty has been considered an acceptable contribution to collective reconciliation. General amnesty, however, can tend to create impunity for crimes committed during the conflict and can leave the structures that committed the violations intact. This can create resentment in society leading to mistrust and seeds for further conflict over the long term. In order to support reconciliation, all involved in the transition, including donors, must help generate long-term processes that give priority to the legitimacy and dignity of the victims and of all those who have suffered the violence of the conflict. This requires that the truth about the past be known by society at large and that individuals and institutions recognise their responsibilities for past violations, including the armed forces.
“The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions or Committees provide an opportunity to deal with the feeling of injustice on the part of the victims and their families with regard to atrocities committed either by the state or other groups. There is potential, however, if gross abuses of human rights are not punished, for a culture of impunity to emerge. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions should not be seen as an alternative to punishing those guilty of such crimes; they can complement other legal processes.” DAC Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on Peace, Conflict and Development Co-operation, 2000.

A key element to consider in reconciliation is the emotional nature of the dynamic between victims and perpetrators of past human rights violations. Psychosocial trauma emerging from conflict should be given greater attention in reconciliation efforts. The rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as citizens should be respected and promoted broadly. Solutions to their humanitarian plight should be a national priority in peace-building and reconciliation efforts.

A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation, and an important way to help address the emotional dynamic and psychosocial trauma, seems to be the need to promote wide, open, and continuing communication. This is a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and potential returns to violent conflict. Donor countries and agencies can play an important role in giving tangible and moral support through steps such as providing whatever protection possible for non-partisan and “peace-building” media, and others who take risks in exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Reaching beyond local level support and protection, the creation of the International Criminal Court may represent progress in establishing international mechanisms for dealing with violent crimes and human rights abuses that occur during times of internal conflict. This may particularly be the case when the balance of power in transition does not favour criminally prosecuting the people responsible for past violations under the state’s own jurisdiction. There is still, however, a clear need to establish national judicial frameworks and legal systems able to manage any reconciliation process.

The case studies demonstrate that post-conflict justice has become an increasingly important field for ODA (see Part I, Box 6, “Eligibility of peace-related assistance as official development assistance”). In Rwanda, more than a hundred justice projects have been funded. In Bosnia, too, there was significant donor involvement in the justice and police sectors. Both cases saw the establishment of war crimes tribunals – a testimony to a certain degree of coherence between foreign policy and ODA within a strategy of strengthening incentives for peace. However, in both cases, the positive effects of these tribunals have been long awaited and are only starting to emerge. Budgetary shortfalls account in part for the slow progress.

A sustainable reconciliation process takes time. It is necessary to allow enough time, since unresolved grievances might bring about new conflict. Reconciliation must therefore be considered a crucial factor in future conflict prevention. Often in a post-conflict situation, donors are perceived as concentrating only on demobilisation, and post-conflict reconstruction of physical infrastructure – almost exclusively implemented by the government and chosen from a government dictated priority list. There is a frequent misconception, therefore, that peace comes when open hostilities end. The reality is that new conflicts will often emerge. The end of violent conflict, through peace treaties, etc. may only establish the foundations for stability and economic development. Structural changes needed to address the root causes of the original conflict, such as political participation, are rarely addressed or implemented in a comprehensive manner.
The international community has often been seen to have lost interest when the conflict and crisis is perceived to have “gone away”.

“Donors are working with a short-term perspective on processes that may take a generation. Building capacities and then withdrawing because the donor does not feel enough progress is being made may be more destructive than not having become involved in the first place. It creates unsustainable capacities that may collapse when the donor leaves.” – DAC Latin America Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 2000.
Notes

1. Editorial Note: At the G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Rome, 18-19 July 2001, ministers stressed in their “Conclusions of the G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting: G8 Roma Initiatives”, the importance of Resolution 1325 and their commitment to strengthening the role of women in conflict prevention.


Engaging in partnerships for peace

The nature of the relation between state and society is evolving in many countries, particularly in states affected by conflict. There is a crisis of legitimacy of the state in many countries, not only in “failed” or “failing” states. This is characterised by an oppressive and predatory role of the state in relation to society, an inability to fulfil its core functions, and involvement in internal conflict. Since peace-building hinges on strengthening trust among all groups, this ambivalent relation between the state and its people has implications for donor-state and donor-civil society partnerships.

As an important precept, experience and realism suggest that legitimate state institutions and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other to prevent conflict. The development co-operation community should seek ways to engage the state and mechanisms of governance and rule of law at all levels and with all partners. This includes local, civil society, regional and private sector partners. Donors often face a dilemma: should they engage with oppressive regimes, which would appear as though they de facto support them, or disengage and lose opportunities for positive influence? Depending on the type of governance prevailing, donors should therefore try to balance relations with partners at all levels. Furthermore, a key requirement for effective partnerships for conflict prevention is better co-ordination and coherence with other departments of donors’ own governments, and between all external partners involved. The current and potential contributions of the multilateral institutions merit greater recognition and support to improve co-ordination.

“We should not ignore that between prevention and rehabilitation there is the plight of countries in a situation of ‘neither total peace nor total war’. Hence a large space is left unaddressed - that of countries struggling not to fall back into war and which have not yet crossed the bridge towards rehabilitation. In these countries, development assistance could make a significant difference.” – DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation 1999.

Partnership with states

In situations of weak governance

During conflict, many governments cease to function or operate effectively, particularly in areas of heavy violence. Even when the worst violence has ended, existing governments may remain weakened, or fledgling governments may be in place. These weakened institutions face several obstacles: often, competent staff have fled or been killed; records and infrastructure have been destroyed; and policies must be developed from scratch – a daunting task even under the best of circumstances. At the same time, the needs of the population tend to be more acute: refugees need to be resettled; critical infrastructures rebuilt; service delivery programmes regenerated; and the economy kick-started.

A sense of urgency therefore typically prevails. A dilemma arises between the need to act quickly in a crisis and the need to engage in longer-term dialogue with government and civil society to ensure that programmes are nationally and locally owned, and to build mechanisms and processes that will reinforce and improve state capacity. To avoid
this, capacity-supporting and building concerns should be added to any donor strategy from the very beginning, even in the most urgent response. The Central American peace process is often cited as an example whereby implementation has visibly benefited from relatively strong local ownership instilled early on.

**In situations of repressive or divisive governance**

Providing development or even humanitarian assistance to, or through, oppressive regimes engaged in conflict with their own citizens can serve in effect to support or legitimise the regime. This can happen through diversion of resources away from intended beneficiaries, fungibility of assistance or conferring a “moral” legitimacy by being perceived to support the regime in question. However, complete withdrawal of donor assistance, including via NGOs, and disengagement may have negative impacts. It risks, for example, encouraging state actions contravening human rights standards, possibly leading to state collapse, or denying humanitarian assistance to affected populations. Balancing these opposing risks is a difficult task. It should be informed by in-depth country analysis.

Donors and all external actors need to recognise these dilemmas head on. Experience suggests that donor countries should seek opportunities for continued engagement with such states. In situations of internal oppression and conflict, it is usually not a question of whether humanitarian assistance should be provided but how best to provide it in ways which minimise potential negative effects. Humanitarian assistance should not be driven by partisan or narrowly defined political concerns. Assistance to such states should be based on analysis to clarify the impact of aid conditionality and sanctions to minimise the impact on civilians of conflicts over which they have little or no control.

Conditionality clearly works best when it builds on a strong domestic basis for the desired policy goal. This is most evidently the case where a peace agreement exists: donors can condition their aid to the implementation of the agreed-upon provisions. Another possibility occurs where there exists a strong and organised civil society with a clear agenda that backs sanctions or conditionality, as in the case of South Africa with the African National Congress (ANC).

**Strengthening state capacity and governance**

Donors need to maximise opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict. This can include support to a range of state functions and activities. Training government staff on peace-building approaches and exposing them to peace processes in other countries is one example. Others examples include: strengthening state capacity to implement joint conflict management initiatives with CSOs, NGOs and customary organisations; reinforcing justice systems; improving capacity to analyse and respond to local level conflicts; and strengthening human rights monitoring and accountability mechanisms, etc.

Development co-operation needs to maximise opportunities to support all governance approaches. Its work must focus on influencing and reinforcing state policies of social inclusion based on principles of equality and non-discrimination (specifically addressing gender-based discrimination). This should include support aimed at building links between state and civil society and enhancing appreciation of the social contract between state, citizens, and civil society, and the conditions needed to make it a reality. Preventing conflict in divided societies requires keeping a cross-section of the community involved, communicating and overseeing post-conflict processes.
The 1997 guidelines address issues of good governance and civil society as “foundations for peace-building,” with a number of key principles and specific orientations for donors (see Part II, Chapter 4, “Foundations for peace-building”). Governance support often focuses on capacity building, training, skills transfer, etc. in areas such as the judiciary, accountability institutions, security systems and constitution building.

These processes seem to be difficult areas for donor involvement. Some key orientations for donors engaging in state capacity building approaches require them to:

- Seek out opportunities to identify and influence potential change agents and structures within a state/regime since state institutions and regimes are not monolithic.
- Aim at supporting effective, functioning, viable and legitimate state institutions rather than specific governments in power.
- Identify and seize opportunities to work with and support the peace-building capacity of local level, regional, national and other governance structures. In doing this, it is worthwhile for donors to make the extra effort to co-ordinate and devise appropriate divisions of labour.
- Adopt a long-term view of engagement based on analysis of conflict and state roles/interests in relation to it. Donor support should be provided in a phased way with close and continued monitoring. It also needs to be linked to more consistent lobbying or advocacy work by donor countries in order to maintain political will of public opinion.
- Include views of local society in implementation combined with support to the capacity of CSOs to monitor state behaviour and hold it accountable. Enhancing participation of marginalised ethnic, regional or political groups in political processes and discourse is key.
- Recognise that these approaches will involve genuine dilemmas, and need to be handled on a case-by-case basis.

**Partnership with civil society**

A central component of conflict prevention and peace-building through development co-operation should be strengthening civil society’s role in these areas. Donors need to develop effective partnerships with a wide range of CSOs, keeping in mind the strength of diverse societies that can be undermined by polarisation.

Before engaging, donors need to assess the full context of the conflict, present and past, and the role of civil society actors in relation to it, in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. Donors should ensure a real appreciation for the range of local actors and look beyond civil society actors who are “approved” by the state to those who represent voiceless sectors. In some cases, donors have failed to be properly informed of what activities already exist before initiating prevention related programmes.

In addition, donor relations with civil society should go beyond just funding NGOs to include genuine community level activities, “citizen peacemakers” and civil society organisations. However, donors need to keep in perspective what civil society organisations can and cannot do. Donor support to civil society has to be placed in a broader context from within a co-ordinated strategy to address the conflict while also encouraging effective use of diplomatic instruments to influence the political direction of states in conflict.
Donor capacities and co-ordination for partnership

Developing country partners repeatedly stress that in order to enter into effective partnerships with other actors for conflict prevention, donors must have greater coherence and co-ordination between themselves (see Part II, Chapter 2, “Co-ordination within the international community and in-country”). This includes the need for improved and shared analysis of conflict situations as a precursor to developing joint approaches to conflict situations in particular countries and regions. It further implies that the donor community needs to equip itself better to respond in a more timely and sustained manner to crises, and break out of a recurrent pattern of slow programming and spending after the pledging of support. This demands that donors exercise policy coherence and co-ordination across government ministries and departments, which can involve foreign policy, defence, trade and others.

The weakness or lack of co-ordination between external actors (including multilateral agencies and international NGOs) is partly due to widely recognised factors, such as:

- The multitude of actors, often numbering in the hundreds and including many transient ones (most dramatically exemplified in Bosnia and Rwanda).
- The high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination entails.
- The need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests.
- Competition for influence and visibility between donors.
- The general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for manoeuvre by the discipline of co-ordination.

There are both urgent needs and good opportunities for more coherent support to locally based initiatives to overcome inter-communal violence well before formal cease-fire or political settlements have been reached. Strategies for peace-building should foster locally driven peace processes early on and be responsive to priority concerns of affected populations. Differing studies all highlight the need for more effective engagement in meeting protection and security concerns of war-torn societies, whether in Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo or in many places in Africa. Promoting initiatives for peaceful co-existence among and between war-torn communities is accepted as both a humanitarian and a developmental endeavour. The UN Secretary-General’s call for a reinvigorated capacity for UN peace operations in the “Brahimi Report” argues in favour of deploying integrated teams with expertise from development, human rights, police, humanitarian and civil administrations working in tandem with local capacities, whether at the level of the state or civil society. The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 agrees that more women are needed as special representatives, envoys, observers, civilian police and humanitarian personnel in the field and as part of peace operations.

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Today there are more examples of collaborative projects, better sharing of information, and more readiness to recognise the high costs and dangers for intended beneficiaries from uncoordinated action. At the same time, however, working out agreed common “strategic frameworks” for assistance has not yet been carried far enough, lacking a sense of serious strategic co-ordination, or any pronounced impetus toward a proactive approach to co-ordination. A strategic framework approach can serve to co-ordinate donor approaches to states in conflict situations and ensure that they are based on a common set of principles. The Task Force’s case studies in four major conflict situations indicate that in developing such a framework, donor agencies should:

- Be aware of the complexities of a situation and the geo-political and economic considerations that may have an impact on the conflict and on its resolution.
- Ensure that diplomatic initiatives dovetail with humanitarian and development strategies.
- Strive for a spectrum of engagement and of responses that emphasise the inter-dependence of state and civil society, and seek “win-win” scenarios.
- Respect the need for flexibility in aid responses as a consequence of the dynamic and changing nature of conflict.
- Recognise the limitations of donor responses and of the risk factors involved in providing assistance to communities in conflict, both for the provider and for the recipients.
- Be aware that the primary criteria for determining activities and programmes for assistance in conflict situations should focus on the benefits to the civilian population living in the conflict areas and ensure consideration of their views and opinions.
- Ensure approaches are gender-sensitive and are based on the principle of equality between women and men; this work could be informed by UN documents and by work done by other agencies and institutions on the specific issue of women in conflict situations.

“The core values leading to political reforms are basically the same, namely good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights. All donors seem to agree on these values. The problem is that the donor community operating in African countries is not homogenous: national differences, interests, perceptions and even rivalries are there to be seen, all of them trying to influence the process of political reforms, their own way.” – DAC Africa Regional Consultation on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, 1999.

Co-ordination also fails for more complex reasons. First, decision-making in aid agencies is often slow and centralised. Second, understandable and legitimate differences often exist between donor countries in their assessment of the situation. A concerted donor strategy of incentives for peace, therefore, is hard to achieve. Yet, it is widely agreed that an appropriate measure of co-ordination is a necessary precondition for the effective use of incentives. The recommendations of the 1997 guidelines remain relevant today (see, in particular, Part II, Chapter 2, “Co-ordination within the international community and in-country”, “Best practices identified”). In addition, further work has suggested approaches that may be considered stepping stones toward the ideal of full-fledged co-ordination. They are:

- Transparency: donors should be more clear and transparent in their assessments, concerns, goals and strategies.
Local ownership creates a solid basis for co-ordination.

Decentralisation of decision-making allows for more flexible and rapid response, including opportunities for joint action.

Leadership can still be exerted by donors – preferably multilateral ones – who are willing to internalise the cost of co-ordination.

Innovation in diversity, meaning that some countries may be more willing and able than others to take risks, to innovate, or to engage conflicting parties in dialogue.

Joint analysis, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes may contribute to joint knowledge, render criteria of success explicit and, possibly, strengthen the potential for policy harmonisation.

Sharing techniques on efforts to integrate a conflict prevention lens into all humanitarian and development work in conflict-prone countries, conflict awareness training, and development of models, tools, and best practices should be exchanged with other donors and local partners.

The recent, more serious pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership styles in development co-operation should have its impact in conflict-related work, where it can be especially critical. The objective of working together, within a comprehensive development framework, guided by a country’s own Poverty Reduction Strategy (which should itself increasingly take account of conflict potentials) should be reinforced by further international consensus and co-ordination on peace-building and peace operations. UN Development Assistance Frameworks and Common Assessments are being adapted to take account of conflict potentials. Questions in existing development assistance co-ordination forums such as Consultative Groups and Round Tables also need more attention. It is noteworthy that the National Human Development Reports (www.irhd.md/nhdr) and medium-term economic frameworks prepared by some countries already reflect a strong consciousness of conflict risks and security concerns.

Effective partnership engagement on conflict issues also requires that donors commit long term to developing countries, their governments and CSOs, at both micro and macro levels, and co-ordinate their engagement. As part of a commitment to co-ordination, they must work to strengthen coherence between development, trade, economic, security and classic foreign policy initiatives.

Managing the risks and building trust

Donors face a fundamental choice of strategies when attempting to strengthen incentives for peace in violence-prone countries. One strategy relies more heavily on trust, with a commensurate willingness to accept risks. It seeks to strengthen the government’s own capacities to finance and manage its own priorities. This strategy is largely based on the use of non-conditional incentives. Donor influence here comes from the increased capacity for dialogue that follows from this strategy, and from strengthening capacities and dynamics that favour peace.

An alternative strategy emphasises control that leads to a reduced dialogue. It seeks maximum and direct control over the use of funds, either by keeping the funds and their use in the hands of the donor or by delegating them to third parties (NGOs or multilateral or bilateral arrangements). This strategy of control often coincides with a greater use of disincentives.
In reality, donors never find themselves at either of these extremes. Where they end up reflects differences in: (a) their assessment of the nature of the situation; (b) their level of confidence in the government and consequent willingness to engage with it in some form of partnership; and (c) their willingness to engage and take risks. All these judgements should ideally be based on high quality political analysis.

There is broad debate on issues of aid allocation and selectivity. But there is widespread agreement that donors as a group should not turn their backs on countries in conflict and other “poor performers”. The cost of escalating conflict and “failed” states requires continued attention in aid allocation to these countries.

An interesting example in Rwanda of aid to a conflict country consists of a judicious combination of elements of a trust strategy with control mechanisms. One donor has made significant long-term programme commitments under a mutually agreed protocol containing political benchmarks. At the same time, budget support is accompanied by requirements of budgetary transparency and monitoring, allowing, among others, for a better tracking of military expenditures. Here, an attempt is made to marry trust and control, and local ownership.
7 Working with business

Virtually all developing countries are now convinced that they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate the economic growth that is a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for their sustainable development. The fostering of such a private sector is thus a basic long-term component of conflict prevention. At the same time, a widening community of business actors around the world is moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and a “triple bottom line” of profitability, social and environmental responsibility.

Under the right conditions, the private sector may be able to help prevent violent conflict. Like public and aid supported investments, the private sector needs to be guided by an informed commitment to guard against side effects of its investments which may have negative impacts on the “structural stability” of the local and national host society, and plan for ways in which it can ensure the maximum positive benefits.

Roles of business in conflict situations

Business — local, small and medium-sized enterprises, multinationals and large national companies — can play a useful role in conflict situations. Conflict implies higher risks and costs for businesses, and it is therefore in the interest of most businesses to support efforts that prevent, resolve or avoid exacerbating conflicts. Challenges include how to:

- Develop a sufficiently long-term perspective to promote sustainable development and help reduce conflict, and strike a balance between long-term thinking and short-term investment horizons, with the need for quick returns in unstable situations.

- Understand the role of some trade actors or networks in causing or exacerbating conflict — in particular in extractive industries (diamonds, oil, forest products, etc.) that are major sources of revenue for warring parties and arms sellers.

- Encourage big business to stimulate local development, job creation and basic social infrastructures, especially in remote areas. This can contribute to long-term social stability and improved local livelihoods.

- Link the social investment programmes that are sometimes supported by companies, in particular in the health or education sectors, to wider development and conflict concerns.

- Harness the potential role of companies as powerful players who could use their influence positively on political actors not only to negotiate immediate conditions for their investments but also to avert violent conflicts.

- Ensure that the use by companies of private security firms to secure installations and protect staff is not at the expense of the security of the local population, and that illegitimate armed groups are not being inadvertently supported or financed by them.
**Business and development co-operation**

Building business-donor partnerships is a new and challenging area for development co-operation. An enlightened economic self-interest is part of the incentive for firms to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict, and to avoid exacerbating situations or taking advantage of “chaos” for business interests.

Further work is needed on raising awareness of conflict prevention issues among the national and international business communities, and on developing and reinforcing norms (some of which already exist in current codes of conduct). Important issues include:

- The social responsibility of firms and implications for their behaviour as stated through codes of conduct. States can play a role in reinforcing codes.
- Taking more account of the role of the media, which is increasingly part of the globalised business world and, in particular, its linkages with the commercial system and its awareness-raising potential.
- Considering the current role and further potential of consulting companies, as well as think tanks or academics, in analysing conflict and social impacts.
- Exercising greater transparency and debate around sovereign guarantees — a governance issue.
- Drawing attention to examples of best practices in employment creation, technical training, social services, etc., and using public awareness campaigns to influence consumer behaviour as well as to disseminate/share best practices.

**Orientations for development co-operation**

The following key areas and actions have been identified where donors could engage productively to help enhance the development and peace-building aspects of private sector activity:

**Capacity building**

- Support government capacities to define or enforce national legal frameworks and corporate governance regimes in line with international laws/norms, in order to ensure accountability, in particular for corporations in the extractive industries, *e.g.* OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions.
- Support efforts to find solutions for special claims of indigenous peoples such as those for ancestral land rights, and formalisation of control over investment projects, employment preferences, etc.
- Provide support for the effective enforcement of national legislation on labour and environmental standards.
- Promote the use of peace and conflict impact assessments by local, national, international/big businesses (whether national or foreign).
- Encourage Diasporas to become engaged in positive development roles in their countries of origin.
■ Explore the scope for support to partnership programmes that can be developed through co-operation between government, NGOs and enterprises, i.e. development of clear laws and local regulations, compensation, community funds, grant making activities, capacity building and creation of local employment.

Helping create an enabling environment

■ Explore how development co-operation assistance can foster and promote private sector development, with particular respect to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in order to create more opportunities for employment and other local spin-offs which will reduce risks of disaffected groups (e.g. ex-combatants) engaging in violence.

■ Support local co-operation and bridge building, and building social capital, e.g. through agricultural co-operatives and small entrepreneurial activities.

■ Streamline and improve codes of conduct on specific issues, and risk-insurance mechanisms.

■ Identify types and areas of collaboration between national and international trade unions to work with national and international NGOs to lobby companies to respect relevant rights and standards.

■ Engage business in responding to natural disaster relief.

Creating space for dialogue

■ Define country-specific approaches, and creation of fora for dialogue between industry, the government, NGOs and other actors to agree on common principles of engagement.

■ Identify mechanisms and create space to involve the private sector in the peace-building process.

■ Work with chambers of commerce and other business associations — with both economic development and civil society bridging functions.

■ Promote greater policy coherence (for example in the field of environment or as regards policies on trade access, export subsidies, or intellectual property rights).
Countering negative economic forces

It is important to focus on controlling the proliferation of weapons. It is just as important to control the flows of economic and other resources which continue to fuel, can be the aim of, and often stoke violent conflicts, as well as some of the corrupt and nepotistic economic practices that can help spark and thrive on them (see Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and development”).

The experience of recent years has highlighted the phenomenon of the transformation of conflicts over time, with a political economy of violent conflict taking shape in which some powerful groups and networks take on a compelling vested interest in continuing warfare. This is coupled with an increased importance of economic factors such as the exploitation of valuable natural resources and linkages with systems of organised crime of global reach.

Some of the key orientations that have emerged for external actors are:

■ Disentangling the political, economic and criminal interests and actors at play and working to find the appropriate responses to each. When a “rebel” movement is, or has degenerated into, an organised crime organisation, responding with political solutions is likely to be misguided and ineffectual. But some governments have become highly corrupt, and ineffective at reinforcing laws to counter organised crime.

■ Strengthening norms to ensure enforcement of the prohibition of bribes, ensuring transparency and defining appropriate mechanisms to ensure such enforcement, recognising corruption as an obstacle to civil peace, as well as economic development (see *OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*).

■ Understanding the economic aspects of civil wars and, in particular, working to counter the criminal forms of business often flourishing in situations of conflict and the rent-seeking and loot-seeking “spoilers” – who can in some cases include the military engaged in profitable activities – that tend to exacerbate and perpetuate conflicts, and obstruct peace.

■ Discouraging and, where illegal, preventing the negative roles that can sometimes be played by individual and corporate citizens (including Diasporas) from feeding conflicts in other countries, e.g. *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*, *OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*, *OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*.
Recognising that conflict prevention should enhance transparency in trade transactions, eliminate corruption at all levels, as well as exploitation of common goods which sustain the power of kleptocratic groups or regimes and fuel conflict.

Working with countries in troubled regions to prevent the spread of cross-border corrupt business practices and illegal resource flows. Criminality, corruption and conflict usually go hand-in-hand.

Establishing international norms to strengthen accountability in the use of private security firms – by public bodies or private enterprises.

The control over territory for cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs is part of the economic forces fuelling conflict, as are the growing interlinkages between criminal trafficking in illicit commodities and in human beings – it is becoming clear that the “trade routes” are the same. The prospects of serious action on these issues by the international community has been heightened by the exposure by the UN Security Council on embargo-breaking trafficking in diamonds, and the subsequent measures undertaken by the main actors in the international diamond trade to stifle the traffic in “conflict diamonds.” Donors and their counterparts will need to address the political economy of violent conflicts as a major focus of their work in the future.
Conclusion

Enduring peace rests on fundamental principles of democracy, human security, respect for the rule of law and human rights, gender equality, good governance, and social and economic development in the context of sustainable development and open and fair market economies. Helping developing countries to achieve these goals will not be easy. But OECD/DAC Member countries are committed to working together – across different parts of government – to improve the analysis of violent conflict, build a culture of prevention, use a lens of conflict prevention and try to ensure more coherent policies. They intend to improve co-ordinated, timely action among and between all external actors and with developing countries in [potential] violent conflict settings. A broad range of solid partnerships between development co-operation and government, civil society including women’s organisations and the private sector in developing countries are key to success and human security.

Lasting peace requires that men, women and children feel secure from violence and extreme economic, social and environmental damage. In many cases, this may call for reformed security systems and particular support in demobilisation, reintegration, justice and reconciliation processes. As part of building human security, external actors are also trying to understand the political economy of violent conflict and work to dismantle the negative economic forces that can perpetuate violence.

In the face of these challenges, donor agencies intend to work together and with other internal and external actors. The guidance provided in this volume is based on experience provided by practitioners in donor agencies and their governments, and conflict experts world-wide, and is intended to contribute to donor governments’ policies and operational activities to help prevent the scourge of violent conflict.
PART II
Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, 1997
POLICY STATEMENT ON CONFLICT, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Development Ministers, Aid Agency Heads and other Senior Officials responsible for Development Co-operation, endorsed this Policy Statement and the accompanying guidelines at the High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in May 1997.

Violent conflict in developing countries engages the basic values and interests of our societies. Together with others in the international community, our countries are committed to finding better ways to help prevent such conflicts at their roots – before the toll of human and material destruction spirals and before an international response becomes vastly more difficult and costly.

We have made it a priority for the DAC to work out policy guidelines to help chart and improve our development efforts and participation in the multilateral system in this complex field. On the basis of proposals from a special task force set up for this purpose, we have now endorsed these Guidelines for use in work with our development partners around the world. They should be seen as a work-in-progress since there are many aspects of this work where further learning and exchange are needed.

Principles and Goals for Our Action

In our 1996 report, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, we outlined a shared approach to development co-operation. This approach can play a vital role in conflict prevention and peace-building. Work in war-torn or conflict-prone countries must be seen as an integral part of the co-operation challenge. Wars have set back development severely in many countries, including in some of the poorest; excessive military expenditures have too often taken priority over more productive public investments and responses to complex emergencies have come to represent a major claim on development co-operation budgets. More basically, helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable development.

We have seen that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for sustained political commitment and action to avert crisis and support peace.
Humanitarian agencies increasingly have encountered moral dilemmas as they have attempted to respond to the needs of vulnerable populations in conflict situations. Development co-operation, as well, must play its role in conflict prevention and peace-building alongside the full range of other instruments available to the international community: economic, social, legal, environmental and military. All the instruments the international community can bring to bear on the root causes of these crises are required. The humanitarian community cannot be the sole vehicle for response to complex crises. There is a clear need for international responses that are more co-ordinated, coherent and integrated – between governments, and inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Developing countries are ultimately responsible for their own development. This cardinal principle of development co-operation must be respected – even in countries in crisis, and even when division is rife and local capacities are severely weakened. The task of international assistance is to help strengthen a country’s indigenous capacities. This must be done in ways that are even-handed and that encourage broad participation throughout society. This also means ensuring that programmes address the special needs of women, children and youth who often bear the brunt of the consequences of conflict.

We know that prolonged economic decline can be a source of conflict. On the other hand, economic growth alone does not prevent or resolve violent conflict, and can sometimes even intensify tensions in society. Development co-operation efforts should strive for an environment of «structural stability» as a basis for sustainable development. This concept embraces the mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social and economic development; supported by dynamic and representative political structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means.

Development assistance will have the most impact in conflict prevention when it is designed and timed to address the root causes of violent conflicts, as well as the precipitating factors, in ways that are relevant to local circumstances. These may include the imbalance of opportunities within societies, the lack of effective and legitimate government, or the absence of mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of differing interests within society at the local, national and regional levels.

Development co-operation efforts should recognise the important role played by women in conflict resolution in many regions of the world. Emphasis should be given to the empowerment of women in peace efforts and in the mobilisation of support for conflict resolution, mitigation, and prevention. Integrating women fully into all phases of the process will enhance the opportunities for building a just and equitable society.
Roles of Development Assistance in Different Phases of Conflict and Peace

Experience has confirmed that deep-rooted societal conflicts do not follow any standard, predictable patterns or cycles. Many of the measures for conflict prevention and peace-building may also be useful in reaching durable peace after a violent conflict. Bearing in mind the need for flexible approaches, it is useful to chart here some of the main lines of action for development co-operation in different phases of conflict. A primary objective of development co-operation in every phase is to enhance the rule of law and promote popular participation in democratic processes. (Critical areas of assistance are outlined in the Guidelines.)

Within overall efforts by the international community to promote peace-building and conflict prevention, development assistance programmes will find their most important role in promoting the democratic stability of societies. Where tensions have not escalated into violence, a great number of possible measures can be geared to help defuse the potential for violent conflict. These range from more traditional areas of assistance, such as economic growth and poverty reduction programmes, to democratisation, good governance (including justice and security systems) and respect for human rights. There is growing interest in innovative activities to strengthen mechanisms for enhancing security at lower levels of armaments and military expenditures.

Where organised armed violence has wound down but where it is still unclear if the situation will again deteriorate, it is important to move beyond saving lives to saving livelihoods, and at the same time help transform a fragile process into a sustainable, durable peace in which the causes of conflict are diminished and incentives for peace are strengthened. Where ethnic or even genocidal violence has occurred, concerted effort will be needed to help overcome the enduring trauma, promote reconciliation, and help prevent renewed outbreaks of violent conflict.

Post-conflict reconstruction is much more than just repairing physical infrastructure. When civil authority has broken down, the first priority is to restore a sense of security. This includes restoring legitimate government institutions that are regarded by citizens as serving all groups and that are able to allay persisting tensions, while carrying out the challenging and costly tasks of rebuilding. Efforts by developing countries and international assistance must fit within the context of a sound, even if rudimentary, macroeconomic stabilisation plan. Post-conflict situations often provide special opportunities for political, legal, economic and administrative reforms to change past systems and structures which may have contributed to economic and social inequities and conflict. Initiatives for participatory debate and assessment of the role of the military in relation to the state and civil society have been productive in post-conflict settings. In the wake of conflict, donors should seize opportuni-
ties to help promote and maintain the momentum for reconciliation and needed reforms.

In situations of open conflict, other policy instruments such as humanitarian assistance, diplomatic initiatives and political or economic measures tend to move to the forefront of the international response. Contrary to many past assumptions, we have found that a sharp distinction between short-term emergency relief and longer-term development aid is rarely useful in planning support for countries in open conflict. Development co-operation agencies operating in conflict zones, respecting security concerns and the feasibility of operations, can continue to identify the scope for supporting development processes even in the midst of crisis, be prepared to seize upon opportunities to contribute to conflict resolution, and continue to plan and prepare for post-conflict reconstruction.

**Key Actions Needed**

The new DAC Guidelines represent our collective view and commitment on basic changes in the ways in which the international community responds to the need for conflict prevention and peace-building. Drawing upon the many detailed points addressed in these Guidelines, we would emphasise the following ways in which development co-operation can better respond in the future:

- Recognise structural stability as a foundation for sustainable development and help advance public understanding of peace-building and conflict prevention objectives and strategies as explicit parts of co-operation programmes.

- Strengthen our agencies’ means to analyse risks and causes of violent conflicts in partner countries at an early stage, and to identify opportunities for aid efforts to help address these root causes. The overriding objective of this work is to enhance the capacities of partner-countries themselves – civil society and government at all levels – for peace-building and conflict prevention.

- Work with colleagues within our governments to ensure that all our policies – including in the areas of security, political and economic relations, human rights, environment and development co-operation – are coherent in fostering structural stability and the prevention of violent conflict. This includes support for the provisions of cease-fire agreements, UN arms embargoes, and work to help prevent illegal arms supplies from fuelling conflicts. Harmonised and responsible behaviour with respect to the supply of military goods, especially the supply of small arms, is critical in these situations. Our dialogues with partner countries should promote similar coherence on their part.
Strive for greater coherence and transparency in conflict prevention initiatives and responses to conflict and complex emergencies by the international community. This involves early warning that is more closely linked to decision-making and better organised and co-ordinated among the various multilateral, regional, bilateral and non-governmental actors. Wherever possible, a shared analysis should lead to agreed strategic frameworks for action and to agreed responsibilities for leadership in co-ordination, taking into account the local, national, regional and international context.

Encourage and support initiatives by countries from regions or subregions where conflicts or tensions are emerging. This should aim to help them to better contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, building on the critical mediation and facilitation roles which they may be in a position to play.

Seek to reduce institutional, budgetary and functional barriers between relief assistance, rehabilitation and development co-operation planning, that can produce contradictions, gaps and obstacles to well co-ordinated assistance. Reform of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system – working with the political, military and humanitarian arms and the international financial institutions – must in future strengthen the synergies in the total international response.

Work in the appropriate fora for internationally agreed and adhered to performance standards and principles for humanitarian and rehabilitation activities that govern the operating methods of implementing agencies (inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental).

Act on the need for responsive procedures for resource mobilisation and delivery in crisis situations while maintaining essential accountability. This includes building capacity for crisis management and crisis resolution as well as ensuring that assistance does not contribute to prolonging the conflict.

Encourage efforts to promote open and participatory dialogue and strengthened capacity to meet security needs at reduced levels of military expenditures, including through strengthened capacity for the effective exercise of civil authority over military forces.

Monitor and evaluate performance in the areas of assistance for peace-building and conflict prevention, and continue our work, including through the DAC, to refine and amplify best practices in these fields of vital importance for sustainable development.
1 Understanding violent conflict and its links with development

Conflict prevention – a central development goal

Increasingly, violent conflict is taking place within, rather than between states. This intra-state conflict occurs primarily in developing countries, many of which suffer from cycles of civil violence, and its principal victims are civilians. Beyond their direct toll of death and destruction, these conflicts leave behind a legacy of deep and enduring social, political and psychological wounds. They can reverse decades of economic progress and impede future development.

Social and political tensions are inevitable in the process of socio-economic development. Although prolonged economic decline can be a potential source of conflict, economic growth alone does not prevent or resolve violent conflict, and may sometimes intensify tensions within society. The possible escalation of these tensions into open confrontation and violence can be a major obstacle to sustainable, people-centred development. Sustainable development must therefore be underpinned by institutions capable of managing socio-political tensions and avoiding their escalation into violence.

Work in conflict-prone and war-torn countries has always been a part of development co-operation activities. Helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage tensions and disputes without violence is a vital part of development work. While it may sometimes be difficult to articulate and analyse, this “peace-building” objective must form the cornerstone of all development co-operation strategies and programmes. Development agencies can also be catalysts for the broader inclusion of societal groups in discussion and negotiation processes. Women, and women’s groups specifically, should be encouraged to participate in efforts to prevent conflict and build peace. They can often exert considerable influence in bringing warring parties to the negotiating table, and lend another voice to the search for peaceful solutions.

Development co-operation efforts should strive for an environment of structural stability as a basis for sustainable development. An environment of structural stability is one in which there are dynamic and representative social and political structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes without resort to violence. This is one of the primary foundations on which to build social peace, respect for human rights and human rights obligations, equitable access to development resources, and sustainable development. Strengthening economic development will provide a valuable, and often indispensable base for these efforts.

While concentrating on fields of action in which it has a comparative advantage, development co-operation can also work with other instruments; including diplomatic, military and economic ones, to strengthen the possibilities for peace and development. Over the long-term, it can contribute to alleviating the root causes of conflict and help to develop institutions capable of managing and resolving disputes in a peaceful manner. Development assistance and humanitarian aid can also help consolidate fragile peace processes by supporting societal reconciliation, political development and physical reconstruction.
Conflict prevention refers to actions undertaken over the short-term to reduce manifest tensions and to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict(*).

Peace-building and reconciliation focuses on long-term support to, and establishment of, viable political and socio-economic and cultural institutions capable of addressing the root causes of conflicts, as well as other initiatives aimed at creating the necessary conditions for sustained peace and stability. These activities also seek to promote the integration of competing or marginalised groups within mainstream society, through providing equitable access to political decision-making, social networks, economic resources and information, and can be implemented in all phases of conflict.

Structural stability embraces the interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, social and economic development, supported by dynamic and representative political institutions capable of managing change and resolving disputes without resorting to violent conflict.

Emergency relief involves immediate, survival assistance to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. Most relief operations are initiated at short notice and have a short implementation period with project objectives generally completed within a year. The main purpose is to save lives. External financial and personnel inputs are often predominant. The most complex relief operations are those resulting from drawn-out civil conflict.

Rehabilitation operations overlap with relief operations, and objectives are normally targeted for achievement within two years. The principal aims are to initiate reconstruction of infrastructure at the national and local levels and to save livelihoods. As beneficiary self-sufficiency is a major objective, programme management is progressively put under local control. Cost recovery schemes, large-scale employment generating projects and revolving funds operations can be introduced. In situations of continuing instability, disaster prevention (avoiding a return to the emergency) and mitigation (reducing the impact of any deterioration in the situation) are essential aspects of the rehabilitation effort.

Development operations have long-term objectives, extending beyond two years, and presume conditions of security and a functioning administration pursuing national objectives and strategies in partnership with external actors. Feasibility studies and full project appraisal, economic rates of return, environmental impact assessments and social analysis (including gender) are normal. Beneficiary and local government ownership should be sought.

It is important to note that emergency relief, rehabilitation, and development operations are not necessarily sequential but are often carried out simultaneously. These distinct forms of assistance can be classified based on their immediate objectives and duration, rather than according to any presumed logical or chronological sequence leading from relief to development, which is rarely seen in reality. Failure to ensure that these operations are structured to be mutually reinforcing, however, can result in their becoming mutually undermining.

With their intimate understanding of local conditions, development agencies can often contribute special information and insights on conflict causes. However, we have seen that humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for a long-term and sustained political will and commitment in the international community to support peace. Development cooperation, as well, needs to be much more alert and sensitive to the political context.

A framework for analysing conflicts

The causes of conflict are varied and intertwined. It is difficult to delineate clearly or weigh the influence of different elements. These range from destabilising social conditions, such as extreme social disparities and exclusion, to government lacking the appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of differing interests within society. A comprehensive and integrated knowledge of the needs for state and civil society to work properly together is key to understanding the origins and dynamics of violent conflict. Indigenous capacities may already exist. Supporting them to the extent possible, and ensuring that they are not displaced, can strengthen the possibilities for peace and development.

(*) The notion of “conflict prevention” has evolved. It has been extended to mean the prevention of violent disputes, controversies and conflict, as noted in Part I, “Executive Summary”. It includes the notion of long-term engagement, not only short-term response. Non-violent conflict is a normal part of society. What has to be prevented is the use of large-scale violence to address or resolve conflict as well as activities that can destabilise and lead to collective violence.

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Theories on how and why violent conflicts occur distinguish between structural factors on the one hand, and accelerating or triggering factors on the other.

**Structural conditions**

Structural factors, which must be viewed on a long-term horizon, are those which create a potential climate for violent conflict without, however, making its eruption inevitable. They include such interrelated political, social and economic factors as population density, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the state of the resource base, the structure and ethnic make-up of society, and the history of inter-group relations. Certain patterns of socio-economic organisation can result in a high degree of vulnerability to conflict. For instance, ranked societies with sharp patterns of stratification in which a politically-dominant group controls the state and access to wealth, education and status, often suffer from a high-degree of vulnerability to conflict.

**Accelerating or triggering factors**

Accelerating or triggering factors are the events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict. Since triggering factors depend heavily upon the specific context, it is not possible to list them systematically. Some examples include: economic decline, changes in the degree of internal state cohesion; shifts in internal control of the central authority, including the military; change in the internal distribution of power, including access to government power and privilege; shipments of (small) arms; interventions of neighbouring states, regional powers and organisations; and large movements of people and capital.

**The phases and dynamics of conflict**

Conflict is not a static, unchanging state of affairs but rather a dynamic process. While distinct phases can be distinguished, they do not necessarily follow a sequential pattern. A combination of factors will generally determine whether a conflict escalates or recedes. Hence, the passage from one phase to another is not necessarily the result of a single event or factor at the exact moment of transition. Notwithstanding the diversity of the causes and escalators of conflict, almost all crises can usefully be subdivided into four main, difficult to separate phases, as follows:

- Situations of submerged tensions.
- Situations of rising tensions.
- Eruption phases of open confrontation and violent conflict.
- Fragile transitional and post-conflict situations.

In theory, it is possible to define a conflict cycle in terms of peace - conflict - reconciliation. The actual situation is far more complex. It is often quite difficult to define the moment at which peace or normality has been transformed into conflict, or vice versa. A clear progression from conditions of peace to heightened socio-political tensions culminating in violent conflict before receding back again to peace is the exception rather than the norm. Similarly, at a given point in time, certain parts of a country may be at peace while conflict lingers in others, flaring up periodically. Many countries are characterised by both peace and conflict simultaneously. This situation may span years or even decades.

**Sources of conflict and their development links**

As a general rule, a society endowed with a good balance and distribution of solid social and economic resources, as evidenced by high human development indicators, is able to manage tensions with less risk of institutional and social breakdown than a society marked by destabilising conditions such as pervasive poverty, extreme socio-economic...
disparities, systematic lack of opportunity and the absence of recourse to credible institutions to resolve grievances. In the absence of such capacity, the following are some of the causes and contributors to conflict:

**Problems in managing transition and rapid change**

Processes of basic change often create social and political dislocations; without adequate opportunities to participate in national civil society, the political process and labour markets, this can erode social cohesion, and weaken traditional authority structures. Change can sometimes result in a loss of cultural identity and the uprooting or marginalising of communities. Economic and political transitions also generate tension, especially where the power balance shifts in favour of some groups and away from others. Power struggles can erupt between groups competing in the development process, even where they enjoy some of the benefits of economic prosperity. Transition processes at play during the decolonisation period, the current transformation from authoritarian to more participatory states, and the evolution of former centrally-planned economies, illustrate this.

**Widening socio-economic disparities**

Imbalanced economic growth and disparities in the distribution of its benefits can also increase tensions. This may disturb established patterns of production and distribution of income and wealth. The allocation of resources and benefits sometimes reaches only those groups which control the state apparatus. This can result in the marginalisation of vulnerable groups and the neglect of less dynamic regions. These inequalities are particularly important when coupled with increased perceptions of disparity, and a lack of institutions to respond to these inequalities, such as often occurs in fast-growing urban populations.

**The exploitation of ethnic and other differences**

Ethnic, religious and cultural differences, in themselves, seldom cause conflict. In an atmosphere of heightened tensions resulting from socio-political conflicts, however, they can offer fertile ground for political exploitation. Factors which may contribute to the polarisation of ethnic and cultural differences include: economic, social and political dislocation resulting from imbalanced development itself; the legacy of colonial boundaries; illegitimate or weak state institutions; the forced assimilation of minorities; and aspirations of increased autonomy by territorially-concentrated ethnic groups.

**Resource-based conflicts**

Competition over shared resources can also contribute to increased tensions, without resilient political means to manage such competition. Localised and regional scarcity of water and productive land (sometimes caused by rapid changes in population density), changes in land tenure systems, environmental disruption or degradation, and regional crises, lead to conflicts over the management, distribution and allocation of resources. Conflict over internationally shared resources can threaten the stability of neighbouring countries and sometimes even entire regions.

**The legacy of violence**

Violence and the damage it inflicts sharpen and entrench polarities in society. This intensifies insecurity, hatred, reprisals and revenge, all of which strengthen the “conflict history” of inter-group relations. In addition to hindering economic progress, it can contribute to aggravating the vulnerability of certain groups to adverse conditions, resulting in extreme cases in large-scale humanitarian crises. As a result of the exploitation of ethnic, religious and cultural factors, this often ensures the recurrence of conflict even when general economic conditions improve. Another frequent legacy of prolonged
conflict, the ready availability of arms (especially small arms), can also contribute to fuelling conflicts, by enhancing the propensity to resort to violence.

External actions to support conflict prevention and peace-building
Planning a coherent approach to conflict prevention and peace-building

Conflict is a dynamic process. However, its course can be influenced by international action. Conflict prevention and peace-building approaches must be coherent, comprehensive, integrated and aimed at helping address the root causes of conflicts. The close cooperation of all policy instruments (diplomacy, military, trade and development cooperation), based on their respective comparative advantages, is required to ensure coherence and co-ordination. Approaches to conflict prevention must also take account of its potential international dimensions. Neighbouring and regional countries, the United Nations system, regional organisations and other states may all have essential roles to play, with the understanding that those participating directly must inspire the requisite levels of trust in the countries concerned.

Coherence of policies and instruments is an important goal for both national governments and the international or multilateral systems. At the national level, this requires coherence among political, economic, diplomatic, military, humanitarian and development co-operation policies. While policy coherence is difficult at the national level where, for example, arms sales may undermine regional security or human rights policies, it is even more difficult to achieve at the international level. A lack of policy coherence among states on questions of conflict and development policies can be the result of real differences in national priorities, approaches to conflict resolution, or ideas about the root causes of conflict, but it can also result from a lack of co-ordination among relevant actors.

The long-term role of development co-operation in helping to create appropriate institutions for conflict prevention and resolution is only one of the relevant factors at work. In most cases, the long-term perspective of development co-operation limits its use as a short-term expedient. Nor can development programmes proceed without consciousness of the conflict factors. In all cases, assistance on the part of outside agencies will require a high degree of political judgement to be constructive. Given their
own potentially destabilising impacts, development programmes have to be carefully screened to avoid exacerbating existing tensions in conflict-prone countries or regions (see Part I, Chapter 1, “Some basic guiding principles”, and Chapter 2, “Integrating a conflict prevention lens”).

**Orientations for external support in conflict situations**

**In situations of submerged tensions**

Even in times of relative peace, structural conditions could over time make a country vulnerable to potential eruptions of violent conflict. Visible actions to address root causes of unrest, based on suitable early warning, analysis of information, and the rapid flow of signals, are vitally important. Activities could be aimed at improving the allocation and management of natural resources, reducing poverty, targeting socio-political activities in support of participatory development, promoting good governance, limiting the flow and diffusion of arms, especially light weapons, civic education, ensuring respect for human rights as well as measures supporting the self-help potential among crisis-threatened population groups, and promoting the creation of dialogue and mediation structures. There is a specific need to assess the divisions within these societies, and then determine the appropriate ways to minimise such schisms.

**In situations of rising tensions**

Where crisis conditions in society become manifest (as evidenced by, for example, social unrest, armed opposition, mass demonstrations, etc.), timely prevention measures must be considered and rapidly implemented. Appropriate measures can counter potential triggers that might otherwise push the conflict towards open confrontation and mass violence. Under the rubric of preventive action there are a wide range of instruments available for mediating and settling conflicts. At this stage, it becomes particularly important to monitor and prevent the stockpiling of arms by the conflicting parties. Though short-term measures to de-escalate the crisis will be necessary, long-term efforts aimed at peace-building should continue and may even be intensified. Conflict prevention, peace-building and resolution initiatives need to be closely co-ordinated if they are to play an effective role in support of other activities. As in the case of the preliminary phase, activities will have the most effect if targeted at the root causes of conflict.

**In violent conflict situations**

In organised violent conflict and confrontation, preventive diplomacy and military measures are generally utilised for moderating conflict, ending hostilities and starting peace negotiations. Humanitarian aid and, where possible, continued development activities should support these efforts. In some circumstances this may require collaboration to implement cease-fires so that humanitarian assistance for war victims and displaced persons can be provided. The delivery of humanitarian assistance in such conditions presupposes assent and co-operation of the parties involved in the conflict. Negotiations with warring parties regarding the deployment of peacekeepers and the organisation of humanitarian aid itself can simultaneously open the way for other diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending the conflict. These initiatives require close co-ordination among security policy, diplomacy, humanitarian aid and development co-operation organisations.

**In fragile periods of transition and during the post-conflict phase**

Peace-building and conflict resolution initiatives, in addition to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities, are important for ensuring successful peace negotiations. Of critical importance before reconciliation is possible is the re-establishment of security and the rule of law. Where ethnic or even genocidal violence has occurred, concerted effort will be needed to help overcome the enduring trauma, promote reconciliation, and
help prevent renewed outbreaks of violent conflict. This is best achieved by linking measures in the following areas: the demilitarisation of conflicts including disarmament and demobilisation; mine clearance and reform of armed forces; the reintegration of uprooted populations; reconciliation between the parties in conflict, including the creation of mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution; and long-term economic, social, political and ecological reconstruction that help to alleviate the structural conditions that made the country vulnerable to violent conflict. In this regard, the post-conflict period presents an opportunity for addressing the structural causes of conflict as identified above under the heading “In situations of submerged tensions”.

**Early warning**

**Needs and resources for early warning**

Early warning can be concerned with the monitoring and analysis of early signals of potential conflict, the escalation of violence and impending humanitarian disasters. Based on this analysis, it can help to stimulate early action. There are different timeframes for different kinds of early warning. Central to an effective conflict prevention capability is the capacity to identify, monitor and analyse the long-term underlying causes of conflict (see Part I, Box 2: “Early warning and risk indicators”).

Building on efforts already being made internationally, the systematic monitoring of early signals of potential conflict can be helpful in anticipating trouble spots in time to respond effectively. This requires selecting, monitoring and analysing key political, social and economic indicators which might include: military expenditures, power-sharing formulae, human rights conditions, ethnic violence, population movements, social and economic disparities, the functioning and access to basic services, freedom and diversity of the press, and external support for extremist groups.

Networks with early warning, monitoring and analytical capabilities are worth encouraging. These should be comprised of individuals and organisations that can alert political decision-makers of impending conflicts and that have sufficient credibility to encourage them to act on their warnings. Within such networks, regional and sub-regional institutions involved in conflict prevention often merit special support to strengthen and encourage their early warning capacities – they may also constructively participate in (informal) consultations and negotiations, as well as fact-finding missions.

Due reliance should also be placed on field workers and local partners familiar with conditions on the ground to collect and monitor information on conflict potential. This requires a co-ordinated approach, with the pooling of information within the donor community (in particular on long-term solutions for specific problems), between governments, international organisations and NGOs. This will allow refined quantitative data to be augmented by the analysis and judgement of “qualitative” warnings.

Effective early warning mechanisms must be able to provide interdisciplinary, integrated analyses that anticipate the questions and needs of policy-makers. They must address what might happen if the situation continues to deteriorate, and how various causal factors are linked. A recognition of this complexity is essential to prevent misguided responses – for example, treating a single factor as the exclusive cause of the conflict – disregarding the complex interrelationships from which it arises. In issuing early warning signals, the tools available to help prevent violent conflict and the appropriate timeframes for action, must be kept in mind. It may also be useful to present policy options or at least point to a set of possible actions, linked to the analysis presented. Alternatively, the formulation of scenarios may make the mass of information more readily usable while enhancing the ability to react swiftly to signs of escalation in violence-prone areas.

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Bridging the gap between early warning and early action

It is difficult to secure attention for warnings very far in advance of a potential conflict. When conflict is more imminent, it is often difficult to agree on needed actions. Thus far, international efforts to create and use early warning (especially on long-range issues) have had limited effectiveness. In part, this is a consequence of the inadequate quality, accessibility, and timeliness of the information provided by forecasting and analysis. Clearly the lack of sufficient analytical capacity, and an analytic framework through which the information can be weighed which would include an integrated analysis of political, social and economic factors, creates critical bottlenecks in this regard. There is also a tendency to monitor the situation as it evolves instead of the long-term structural factors which are more difficult to analyse. An excessive focus on the trigger factors precipitating an escalation towards violence may detract attention from a more effective long-term preventive focus.

Even where accurate information and analyses have been made available to policy makers, there has often been a failure to respond. Sufficient political will is a vital connection between information and action. Thus, if an early warning mechanism is to be useful, it must help contribute to creating the political will and capacity to act at the national and international levels, including in the donor community. This may also help to mobilise the necessary resources for a timely response. Possible instruments for multilateral and bilateral preventive assistance can include the following: policy dialogue, including in the context of consultative groups, sanctions, demarches supporting peace processes, and actions to deal with impending conflict. Areas that enhance the capacity and effectiveness of timely political action include: strengthening co-ordination and co-operation; the elaboration of “emergency procedures” (including guidelines for co-ordination); and streamlining existing budgetary procedures for funding preventive activities (see Part I, Chapter 6, “Donor capacities and co-ordination for partnership”).

The media and public opinion can be instrumental in fostering support for humanitarian action at the political level as well as informing the public of the underlying causes of violent conflict and consequent humanitarian emergencies. International awareness of the potential importance of the long-term problems creating conditions ripe for conflict must be stimulated. The sometimes inconstant and inconsistent interests and influence of the media and public opinion may contribute to an ad hoc approach to conflict prevention, thereby undermining more coherent and sustained efforts and initiatives.

The special role of development co-operation

A central focus of assistance should be to improve the general economic, political and social climate in partner countries, by supporting measures to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state as well as the emergence of a strong civil society. Such efforts should facilitate the building of consensus on central economic, social and political issues. Assistance for the promotion of democracy, participatory mechanisms in the political system, and the rule of law can all be elements of a peace-building strategy helping to integrate individuals and groups into society, building their stake in the system and preventing their marginalisation and potential recourse to violence.

At the community level, donors can specifically help facilitate negotiations and reconciliation processes, particularly in the case of weak states or where large areas or regions are outside the control of the central government. Such assistance, having a primary peace-building and reconciliation objective, should focus on nurturing the appropriate social or institutional networks and organisations that can act as stabilising points in society in tandem with efforts aimed at the national-level. This can include support for the
development of intermediary social organisations such as local NGOs, business associations, multi-ethnic committees, women’s organisations and helping marginalised groups obtain better access to justice systems, the civil administration and the media. Realism requires donors to recognise that some governments may perceive active social or institutional networks as a threat and respond accordingly.

When a country is in crisis, external efforts to contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building may meet considerable opposition from domestic actors in the name of national sovereignty. Outside interventions may be viewed by parties to the conflict as partial to one side. In such politically volatile situations, or when a situations is on the verge of erupting into violence, the role and potential impact of development co-operation initiatives carried out through established authorities must be carefully examined. The continuation of development programmes designed in the pre-conflict phase can therefore be very problematic during civil war. The protection of civilians and aid workers is of paramount importance if aid is to be used constructively in the immediate pre-conflict, during and post-conflict phases.

Peace-building activities should normally be intensified with the outbreak of violent conflict, to reinforce other efforts and activities. The post-conflict consolidation phase can be particularly fragile and unstable. To address the potential for renewed conflict requires an in-depth, comprehensive understanding of its background and root causes. Measures formulated to deal with the consequences of war, such as reconstruction programmes, should simultaneously focus on preventing the relapse back into violent confrontation.

The dynamic nature of intra-state conflicts makes it difficult to distinguish clearly when and where violence ends and the conditions for genuine peace are established. In this light, an attempt should be made to identify, to the extent possible, the common characteristics of different phases of conflict as a contribution to helping the development community agree on what stage a particular country is currently in. Development co-operation agencies must adjust to operating in unstable conditions, and consider the scope for supporting development processes even in the midst of crisis conditions. They also need to be prepared to seize opportunities for conflict resolution, and they need to plan for post-conflict reconstruction. In such uncertain operational environments, however, the risk of failure must be recognised.

In formulating approaches towards development co-operation in situations of conflict the following principles must be kept in mind:

- Development co-operation should strive for an environment of democratic structural stability as a base for sustainable development.

- Donors should seek to develop their capacity to analyse the socio-political context in which development co-operation is provided.

- Detailed analytical work should form the basis of judgements to be made on the relative importance of explicitly addressing the root causes of conflict within development co-operation strategies.

- Where appropriate, this should lead to the exploration of opportunities for preventive action. These should build the capacity of partner countries and actors to address the root causes of conflict, and develop the institutions and mechanisms needed to facilitate the accommodation of competing interests within society, and the peaceful management of socio-political disputes.
Development co-operation is only one instrument of foreign policy: mechanisms for co-ordination between policy instruments available to donor states (military, political, development, and trade) must be strengthened.

Similarly, greater policy coherence within the multilateral system between political, military and development elements must be encouraged.
2 Co-ordination within the international community and in-country

**Key principles**

Developing countries are responsible for their own development. External assistance must build on, and not substitute for national capacities, resources and initiatives. A basic principle of development co-operation is that the integration of external assistance into national efforts is the responsibility of the partner country. In essence, the present set of Guidelines is, in itself, an instrument designed to improve co-ordination toward common objectives, for which the country itself should have ownership (see Part I, Chapter 6, “Engaging in partnerships for peace”). This is a dominant concern of the strategies expressed in *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*, OECD, 1996.

There is broad agreement on the purposes of aid co-ordination: resources should be delivered as efficiently and effectively as local conditions allow; the contributions of the many donors involved should be complementary and allocated in line with indigenous priorities and policies. Furthermore, external assistance must be managed so as to ease the burdens on partner countries and not add to their own co-ordination problems.

Given that co-ordination is voluntary, its success depends upon the extent to which it adds value to the operations of individual donors and agencies. Such value-added results might include independent needs assessment, and access to information or the conduct of diplomatic negotiations on behalf of all donors, in order to secure safe passage and access to victims in areas in conflict.

The voluntary character of aid co-ordination also makes it fundamentally different from the concept of “management”, which implies substantial control of the various elements present. Good co-ordination should not be construed as forcing all activities into a single mould. Diversity of approaches, including experimentation with new methods, can contribute to co-ordination.

**Adapting aid co-ordination for countries in crisis**

In conflict-prone countries, particularly in situations of rising tensions, the need for donors to adopt common approaches is especially important. Yet, it is all the more difficult to achieve in view of the large number of humanitarian and development assistance actors operating during emergencies. Donors often increase their contributions in times of disaster, which usually results in a larger field presence. Numerous international NGOs establish field operations, and national NGOs may also expand their activities. In such conditions, the United Nations organisations have a key role to play on behalf of the international community.

In situations of violent conflict a country may not have a government able to define and articulate national priorities and co-ordinate donor assistance. In some extreme cases, the collapse of a central authority can give rise to situations where different factions exercise *de facto* control in different parts of the national territory. The delivery of relief aid in areas outside government control often requires negotiating with non-governmental
or anti-governmental actors in the conflict. As noted in Part II, Chapter 1, external assistance may be viewed by parties to the conflict as partial to one side.

At the post-conflict stage, a negotiated settlement will need to deal with competing interests as regards the future political structure. Pending successful completion of peace negotiations, there may be little certainty as to what power structure will eventually emerge.

While the main parties in a conflict generally take part in the formulation of post-conflict reconstruction plans, notably in the context of peace negotiations, the international community may temporarily have to take more initiative than is normal, in identifying priorities and ensuring a proper match between foreseeable needs and anticipated resource availability.

In such situations, donors and implementing agencies should strive to work with representative actors at the national, regional and local level rather than defining priorities themselves. Even in situations where the main parties are part of the negotiated settlement, donors and implementing agencies should strive to work with representative actors at all levels. This places a special responsibility on the many agencies involved (UN agencies, bilateral donors, multilateral financial institutions, regional organisations, and local and international non-governmental organisations), to co-ordinate their programmes and ensure that relief assistance reinforces and complements longer term development co-operation.

**Building-blocks for effective donor co-ordination**

In practical terms, aid co-ordination is based on five elements: a) a common strategic framework for assistance; b) timely access to resources allowing for flexible implementation; c) leadership among international actors; d) mechanisms for field-level consultation and sharing of information; and e) the availability of resources specifically earmarked for co-ordination purposes.

Even when these conditions are met, co-ordination can be constrained by differing views on co-ordinating or lead agency mandates and the need for participating agencies and organisations to surrender a measure of independence and accept the consensus implicit in meaningful co-ordination. Successful co-ordination requires discipline by the participants.

**A common strategic framework for assistance**

Co-ordination should be based on a broad consensus among the main actors as to how their respective actions and initiatives will contribute to the attainment of shared objectives. Local ownership should be given the maximum effect possible. Since external assistance can never be divorced from the local, national and international political context, this consensus must be based on an intimate understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict (including the “political economy of war”) in order to avoid counter-productive impacts of external assistance. This should include in particular the regional dimensions of conflict both with respect to its causes and potential consequences.

Based on this consensus, donors should attempt to formulate and agree on a common integrated strategic framework addressing the contents and priorities of the programme as well as the policy and operational roles of different actors according to their comparative advantages. This situation-specific and time-specific strategy will implicitly define the respective mandates of different actors. Therefore it should be agreed upon at headquarters-level as the strategic approach forming the basis of the dialogue with local counterparts at the field-level.
Based on a shared analysis of the most pressing needs for political, economic, administrative or social rehabilitation, this strategic framework can provide a guide for prioritising resource allocations across sectors and geographical areas, determining the division of labour among actors, and defining common approaches towards key policy issues. By definition, it is not a list of projects but rather a dynamic instrument mapping out the transition from relief to longer-term recovery assistance.

This strategic framework should also play a key role in facilitating the phasing out of humanitarian assistance, avoiding the creation of dependencies perpetuating aid supported activities and in helping to ensure that longer-term assistance is provided within the context of a sound macroeconomic stabilisation plan. This is covered in more detail in Part II, Chapter 5 “Peace processes, justice and reconciliation”.

(*) Strategic frameworks for assistance have tended to focus on countries recovering from crisis and conflict. Similar approaches in cases of conflict prevention are not well developed.
Flexible resources and procedures

The availability of flexible resources, combining elements and features of emergency relief and development, contributes to effective aid responses in unstable environments. Countries emerging from crisis and conflict typically find themselves on the edge of bankruptcy and need some immediate injections of funds in order to maintain basic services and avert further economic destabilisation.

Planning, programming and disbursement procedures must allow for timely responses to changing circumstances and take account of the exceptional human resource constraints facing many countries emerging from crisis. Flexibility with regard to the areas and activities eligible for support, in line with the special needs and priorities of countries in crisis or recovery, is also essential in order to strike a balance between immediate humanitarian needs and the requirements of rehabilitation, long-term reconstruction and peace-building. Timely fulfilment of pledges for resources is also critical.

Flexibility on the part of donor agencies must be reflected in the way fund-raising instruments (expanded consolidated inter-agency appeals, special donor consultations, round-tables, consultative groups, etc.) are prepared. By mapping out clearly the rationale and funding requirements of peace-building and reconstruction programmes, the strategic framework can help guide donors in their decisions, relative to aid resource allocations.

Leadership among international actors

While always seeking to encourage local capacity, ownership and responsibility, reaching consensus on, and commitment to, a common strategy may require a facilitating mechanism for external partners. This may include the designation of an independent co-ordinating authority to monitor donors’ adherence to agreed principles.
Experience suggests that the co-ordination of technical and financial assistance benefits from the leadership of a bilateral or multilateral agency or donor that is recognised as credible by donors and aid recipients. Different agencies and donors have performed this role and it seems appropriate that flexibility in assuming leadership be retained. The lead agency is responsible for the proper dissemination of information in the otherwise disorderly environment which is likely to exist during or in the aftermath of the crisis. This is vital in order to ensure that the various activities supported by donors are consistent with agreed-upon policy principles, and are mutually supportive.

In addition to even-handedness towards the main parties in conflict, criteria guiding the selection of a leading agency or donor include:

- Commitment to the leadership role and willingness to take the corresponding risks, including the possible need to take decisions that may not be favourably interpreted by public opinion in the donor country.
- Knowledge of cultural, historic, ethnic and linguistic factors of the country or region.
- Previous track record of effective support in crisis situations.
- Capacity to mobilise qualified and experienced personnel promptly.
- Capacity to mobilise significant financial resources.

**Mechanisms for operational consultation**

Within the context of an agreed strategy, co-ordination at the operational level requires clearly defined headquarters-field relations and the delegation of sufficient administrative and financial authority for field personnel to be able to respond to changing circumstances. In some agencies, this may require greater decentralisation of responsibility as well as the availability of specially selected and trained field personnel.

The peace-building process must be complemented by initiatives targeted at the grassroots level. The mechanisms of co-ordination for relevant assistance therefore should be as decentralised as conditions permit, involving established national, regional and local capacities. At the local-level, the number of actors is normally more manageable than in the capital, so that a representative cross-section of the organisational interests at hand can meet regularly. This contributes to the effectiveness of co-ordination.

The importance of having a common information base and a shared assessment of the situation and its evolution cannot be overestimated. Many co-ordination problems arise from varying perceptions among actors, resulting in differing opinions as to the potential impact of assistance.

All parties should be encouraged to pool information regarding the evolving socio-political and security situation, and on progress made in the execution of the programmes and relevant actions taken by the government. Each actor should have at its disposal information on all relevant factors, including, the assistance provided by others, in order to make informed decisions. Information gathered in the field regarding programme impact, failures or inconsistencies must be transmitted to senior decision-makers at the field and headquarters’ levels.

Not all organisations and agencies involved can necessarily attend meetings of a co-ordinating entity. Where NGOs are present in significant numbers they should be encouraged to create co-ordinating structures of their own, which can represent them in larger co-ordination and information exchange mechanisms.
The large volume of resources mobilised for relief and rehabilitation makes it essential to establish an up-to-date, systematic means of tracking aid flows. In this context, there is an urgent need to develop common definitions of the related nomenclature, i.e. statements of intent, pledge, commitment, obligation and disbursement. Different understandings of the same terminology can lead to confusion in the field and in headquarters and hinder attempts to develop shared databases.

Earmarking resources for co-ordination

Co-ordination requires resources. United Nations agencies, which have general co-ordination mandates, cannot usually accommodate co-ordination requirements within their normal administrative budgets. Accordingly, they fall back on financing co-ordination work from project funds or from the proceeds of special appeals to the donor community. In a few cases, co-ordination costs have been covered under peacekeeping budgets voted by the General Assembly. The lack of predictability of these various methods for raising resources for co-ordination have often led to seriously underfunded situations, false economies and inefficiencies.

Partnerships and division of labour

UN agencies and other multilateral organisations are often called upon to assume a wide range of responsibilities, including co-ordination and leadership, in relation to international co-operation for relief and development assistance. This is based on an appreciation of the fact that co-ordination of external assistance is best exercised by a body perceived to be even-handed and at the same time able to embody the collective purpose of the international community. Where these organisations are not judged appropriate, other co-ordination mechanisms can be established, as noted above.

NGOs are significant actors in crisis and post-crisis situations. Their sheer number, diverse mandates and varying operational capacities make co-ordination essential to ensure the coherence of their combined efforts. In the absence of an effective NGO co-ordination mechanism, the mandates and fund-raising approaches of certain NGOs may skew their assistance away from effectively meeting priority needs as seen from a government, UN, or bilateral perspective. Donors relying on NGOs as channels for their assistance have a responsibility to ensure that the organisations they finance have the capability to undertake the tasks allocated to them, and conform to agreed policies, programmes and standards of behaviour.

The delivery of humanitarian assistance in the midst of violent conflict entails facing particularly difficult and dangerous conditions. NGOs are principal delivery vehicles, and UN specialised agencies are often heavily reliant upon them as implementing partners. As NGOs are often the first to initiate relief operations, they face particular challenges. The exceptionally difficult circumstances in which humanitarian operations are conducted to meet immediate life-saving objectives can detract from needs assessment and co-ordination efforts. This context must be kept in mind in evaluating the performance of NGOs.
## Box 5. Co-ordination of humanitarian assistance in Angola

Angola returned to civil war in October 1992, after only eighteen months of peace. The resumption of fighting, and resulting humanitarian crisis took most humanitarian agencies by surprise. Within a few years, about four million Angolans were in need of emergency relief. This number almost doubled over the course of 1993 and 1994. Heavy fighting took place throughout the country. The economy collapsed, agricultural activities ceased, commercial ties broke down, social services stopped and families were separated.

In March 1993, the Government, which no longer had access to most of the territory, asked the United Nations for help in confronting the mounting humanitarian crisis. Leading donors and NGOs called for a mechanism to co-ordinate humanitarian relief. This led to the establishment of the Unidade de Coordenacao para Assistencia Humanitaria (UCAH) by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).

### Co-ordination not operation

Established for the purpose of co-ordination, UCAH was not charged with the implementation of programmes. This allowed it to play a leading role in objectively assessing the humanitarian needs of the populations affected by war. In this function, UCAH could draw upon the experience of staff seconded to the unit by the principal UN agencies in Angola.

By defining the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies involved, UCAH created acceptable conditions for cooperation. UN agencies would concentrate on “macro-level” issues such as logistics or security while field-based NGOs would focus on “micro-level” issues such as the food distribution in villages and towns.

Politically neutral and operationally independent from the UN Verification Mission, UCAH could furthermore negotiate with both the Government and the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in order to identify the populations most in need of assistance and obtain safe access for relief supplies.

### Co-ordination in practice included the following elements

- **Information exchange** among bilateral donors, UN agencies and NGOs involved in emergency relief activities. This included weekly bulletins summarising main events related to the various ongoing humanitarian programmes; briefing notes on key cities and provinces; situation and needs assessment reports; and special reports on sectoral issues such as agriculture and nutrition.

- **Regular consultations** with bilateral donors and NGOs explored specific issues and programmes, needs assessment at field level and the co-ordination and mobilisation of resources. UCAH also assisted NGOs with communication and transport, and backed their fund-raising efforts by including them in the appeal process.

- **Joint needs assessments** were conducted with the Government or UNITA, as well as bilateral donors, UN agencies and national and international NGOs. It is noteworthy that UCAH was able to secure the co-operation of UNITA despite the sanctions imposed against the latter by the UN Security Council, following the resumption of hostilities.

- **Linking relief and long-term development** UCAH understood the need to frame relief actions in the context of longer term requirements of reconstruction and development. In February 1994, when the prospects for successful peace negotiations improved, UCAH highlighted the need for bilateral donors, UN agencies and NGOs to plan for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Priority programme areas included the reintegration of displaced people and former combatants and de-mining.

### Best practices identified

Donors and implementing agencies have an interest in co-operating to ensure that:

- The prerequisites for sound co-ordination are established and that adequate financial resources are provided for this purpose.

- To the extent possible, and wherever appropriate, the government is encouraged to lead the co-ordination process.

- Government agencies are provided with the necessary technical assistance to perform emergency management functions.

Efforts at co-ordination should concentrate on promoting coherent approaches to critical objectives. Whatever the mechanisms established, care must be taken that co-ordination does not inhibit rapid responses and innovation by individual donors. Within an agreed strategic framework individual actors should conduct their operations according to their own comparative advantages. Indifference or lack of support for the work of...
the co-ordinating entity may, however, undermine its effectiveness. Active support can be expressed in several ways, such as by:

- Freely subordinating “proprietary” or other interests in order to buttress consensus programmes and policies recommended by the co-ordinating entity.
- Streamlining regulations and simplifying procedures.
- Staying within the confines of the common strategy agreed among donors and recipients.
- Contributing to trust funds set up by the co-ordinating entity to advance agreed policies and programmes.
- Assisting in the collection of information so that comprehensive data may be assembled on current aid programmes.
- Offering to second staff to the co-ordinating entity and actively participating in co-ordination work.

In order to improve co-ordination of activities undertaken by NGOs, donors and NGO-funding partners (including UN agencies) should:

- Agree on common principles for funding specific kinds of operations, activities and costs, including items such as the funding of overhead and recurrent costs.
- Ensure transparency in funding NGO activities in order to avoid gaps and duplications between funding sources.
- Establish criteria for oversight and accountability of NGO-activities funded from public sources in accordance with agreed performance standards and basic humanitarian principles. The monitoring of performance should not only be confined to questions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness but should also include adherence to the common strategy agreed to by donors.
- Encourage and support the activities of local NGOs, strengthening their capacity for networking with international sister-agencies.
- NGOs and others delivering services in conflict and post-conflict situations need to have gender integrated staff, to ensure appropriate communication with, and delivery of services to, the target populations.

**Key orientations for donors**

All parties should support the co-ordinating entity, co-operate in its effort to collect and process information, and – whenever possible – rally to its calls for joint action.

Programme managers and operational staff in the field are the best-placed to observe and judge what actually works and to identify synergies or overlaps between different programmes. Field level co-ordination requires special mechanisms to agree upon the main rules of co-ordination and the means to translate them into practice.

NGOs are often bound by the principles of impartiality and independence in the delivery of assistance. Seemingly impartial interventions can contribute, however, to aggravating tensions and can undermine the general objectives and principles agreed upon by donors as a group. It is the special responsibility of donors to monitor the organisations whose programmes they finance to ensure that recommended policies are being observed. Unless funding governments are ready to insist upon, when necessary, adherence to a given policy, co-ordination may suffer.
Local NGOs and other entities of civil society – given their local knowledge and human resources – may have a comparative advantage in providing support in a number of fields. These may include community development, local-level dispute management, post-crisis social and economic rehabilitation and post-conflict reconciliation and, more generally, capacity-building for disaster management. Compared with their expatriate counterparts, they may also place more emphasis on the sustainability of assistance.

Local NGOs, whether independent or affiliated with an expatriate NGO, should be invited into operational and co-ordination mechanisms as full partners.

In the immediate post-crisis phase, there may be a period of uncertainty as to which agency should assume the co-ordination role or act as lead agency. Several organisations may be suitable and willing candidates. This signals the need for an authoritative mechanism under which the responsibility for co-ordination is assigned as early as possible, in order to minimise any potential institutional controversies. This may have to be complemented by mechanisms and procedures helping to move more rapidly to resolve differences of opinion.

Embassies are normally familiar with the various policy and funding issues, through their exposure to other in-country co-ordination networks, to World Bank-sponsored Consultative Group Meetings or Round Tables co-chaired by government and UNDP.
They should thus be well-positioned to bring their experience and insights to bear on the co-ordination process and to integrate bilateral activities in the overall programme. These in-country co-ordinating networks should also take account of the regional dimensions of the issues they address.

A degree of competition may develop in the field when implementing agencies vie with each other for resources and donor support. Donors need to be aware of such competition, as it can have a crippling effect on co-ordination and effectiveness. Transparency among the various funding sources of NGO activities can greatly enhance co-ordination efforts.

Sectoral committees or working groups responsible for the articulation of sector-specific policies and programmes can greatly facilitate the effectiveness of co-ordination efforts. If these committees cannot be established under the leadership of the host government, they should at least include its active participation. Donors and implementing agencies can then take part in these committees where they have a particular interest. It is also possible to assign leadership responsibilities for each committee to a specific donor agency.

The costs of co-ordination, in terms of financial resources and staff time, must be explicitly taken into account in the formulation of aid programmes and budgets. Failure to earmark sufficient resources can severely impair co-ordination efforts, ultimately resulting in duplication and other inefficiencies.
3 From humanitarian relief to development: some of the challenges

External assistance in conflict situations

External assistance in complex emergencies injects substantial resources in an environment of acute scarcity, where control of resources is an important objective for contending parties. Aid is often assumed to be a powerful lever for peace-building and reconciliation, but it can also be counter-productive, aggravating the competition between the parties in dispute, and raising the stakes in the struggle for political control. In situations of open conflict, the right to humanitarian assistance must be maintained. At the same time, donors should be aware that even if aid is intended to be impartial in scope and purpose it can often be perceived as being the reverse, mainly favouring one of the warring parties. Aid therefore does bring a risk of fuelling tension, either as an inadvertent by-product or due to manipulations by controlling distribution.

Although the need for impartiality is not in dispute where humanitarian matters are concerned, it can be very difficult to operationalise in conflict situations. In cases of outright violation of human rights, ethnic cleansing, genocide or other war crimes, even-handedness, within clearly articulated and respected humanitarian criteria, may be a better guide, though also difficult to put in practice. Even-handedness is achieved when the sum of external assistance is provided in such a manner that none of the parties to conflict is able to accrue politico-military advantage. This implies that external assistance is perceived by the warring parties as being provided in a balanced way.

Given the inevitable political context in which humanitarian aid is provided, experience has shown that aid agencies must guard, in particular, against the following situations:

- Warring parties may try to monopolise access to humanitarian resources, in particular food, to gain political strength through the control of such key resources. Alternatively, they may benefit indirectly from selling stolen aid supplies.

- Humanitarian aid may indirectly contribute to the continuation of conflict by allowing the belligerents, whether established governments or opposition movements, to evade or defer their responsibility to address the urgent needs of civilian populations and to seek political solutions to conflict.

- Programmes which result in more attention being given to returning refugees than to internally displaced persons and other groups affected by conflict can create tensions between these groups.

In an environment of long-standing enmity, it will often be necessary to negotiate with the parties to secure safe passage for humanitarian relief supplies. This may serve to convince the antagonists of the even-handedness of external aid interventions and ultimately enhance the ability of aid agencies to contribute to the resolution of the conflict. Conversely, offering payment to the parties in conflict to secure access to people in need of relief can directly contribute to reinforcing the power and legitimacy of the forces of violence. The process of negotiating access for relief deliveries can also result in high-levels of diversion and biasing of assistance away from those areas in greatest need.

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It is also essential to avoid creating dependencies among the recipients of aid. Short-term and long-term goals in relief operations can be contradictory; what makes good sense in terms of saving lives may in some circumstances make longer-term solutions harder to attain. Three examples will suffice:

- Free distribution of seeds and agricultural implements to farmers after a period of violent conflict may alleviate food shortages during the first few cropping seasons following the crisis. However, it can also produce a situation of dependency if it is continued and farmers take free distributions for granted reducing their savings and investment accordingly. Also, the free distribution of agricultural inputs to farmers cultivating on squatted land can contribute to legitimising their occupancy, sowing the seeds of future conflict when the rightful owners return. Thus, short-term considerations, such as the urgent need to “jump-start” agricultural production and the administrative burden involved in recovering the costs from beneficiaries can contradict the longer-term objectives of promoting self-reliance and reconciliation.

- The geographic concentration of people may, from a logistic point of view, facilitate the delivery of relief aid. But it may also foster dependency by distancing people from their normal means of livelihood and weaken social cohesion.

- Relief has a significant impact on local administrative institutions, which are often by-passed and weakened because of the alternative capacity of well-equipped NGOs. Reducing vulnerability and building capacity to cope depend on the evolution of competent local institutions. While heavy use of expatriate teams may be unavoidable at the start, the hand over to local institutions must be a priority.

Avoiding these pitfalls requires an intimate understanding of the local, national, regional and international dynamics of the conflict. External assistance must also be carefully monitored so as to identify counter-productive impacts and to harness political forces, groups and entities in support of peace and long-term reconciliation. In particular, the benefits derived by certain groups from conflict and its perpetuation (e.g. status, material gain, economic livelihood, political support, sense of individual and collective identity) need to be examined, and the political obstacles to conflict resolution identified (see Part I, Chapter 8, “Countering negative economic forces”).

The social impact of relief aid on different groups must also be examined. Men and women have different material and social needs, which can be considerably affected by violent conflict. Insecurity and forced displacement can result in a redistribution of access to, and control over, critical resources such as land, labour, tools and seeds. Social relations are often redefined, with new roles emerging for both men and women, and traditional values are often undermined. Relief and rehabilitation strategies that understand and respond to men and women’s differential vulnerability, and support their coping and survival strategies, can result in higher-impact, more cost-effective assistance.

Gender should be a prime consideration when distributing resources in the context of relief and development assistance. For example, distribution of food to men can undermine women’s roles in managing household food consumption, with lasting socio-economic consequences. As important providers of resources aid agencies themselves can often help develop new roles for men and women, where appropriate, and help establish new networks of social relations.

The search for solutions to questions of whether to distribute through community structures, to household heads or to individuals, should begin with an understanding of
the effect on gender relations. Gender analysis should identify men and women’s differing vulnerability to crises as well as their different capacities and coping strategies. It can also help identify unequal power relations underlying social organisation so that the findings can be applied to ensure that women are not further marginalised by relief interventions.

Giving women influence in decision-making and support for effective mechanisms for participation are key elements of a gender-aware approach. This will require staff with the appropriate training to establish the methodology of programme appraisal to identify gender-based vulnerabilities and responses. Early in the consultation process means should be sought to ensure that women are represented in the local institutions. Thorough consultation may not always be possible in periods of acute crisis. Therefore, mechanisms to give all actors a voice in decision-making processes should be set up as soon as possible.

**Lessons learned**

In crises, the media and public opinion in donor countries can generate strong pressures for a quick aid reaction, which result in a large-scale aid response. The humanitarian imperative of responding rapidly to the needs of the largest possible number of victims is often the only viable option, and public sympathy and the media can help mobilise the resources necessary to provide relief. Such situations, however, are not necessarily conducive to considered decisions on how best to intervene. Inexperienced NGOs may hinder the work of established actors, and media attention can distort assessments of priorities, affecting the formulation of assistance programmes.

Agencies and NGOs specialised in disaster relief have made significant contributions in many emergencies. They have concentrated on saving lives and relieving suffering, paying less attention to the longer-term needs of recipients. There is a real need to introduce longer-term planning at the early stages of a crisis in order to promote self-reliance and avoid dependency on continued external assistance. As NGOs are often the first on the scene, they may also be thrust into policy decision-making roles by default and their actions may set the course for later programmes. The policy gap which often exists at the beginning of a crisis cannot be ignored.

Relief aid unaccompanied by planning beyond immediate needs can also contribute to weakening the local administration. In crisis situations, local organisations, often already weak, can be totally overwhelmed where international relief agencies set up parallel systems to procure and distribute humanitarian aid. When relief agencies leave, there is an administrative vacuum that hinders the rehabilitation effort.

**Bridging relief and development**

For the purpose of analysis, the transition from emergency crisis to long-term development has often been described as a “continuum”. This does not, however, conform to actual situations which follow no set pattern, chronology or order. Emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance all co-exist in times of conflict and crisis, and they interact in innumerable ways. The challenge is to overcome the functional distinctions of the various agencies involved and to integrate, rather than merely co-ordinate, relief, rehabilitation and development objectives within the framework of a long-term strategy.
Periods of extended crisis offer opportunities for investments aimed at improving the capacity to cope with crisis, particularly among vulnerable groups. For example, building up emergency food and seed stocks at the community-level can contribute directly to limiting the risk of massive dislocation of people when disaster strikes, reducing the impact of humanitarian emergencies and the need for relief assistance. In practice, the recognised importance of disaster preparedness in sustainable development strategies is not matched by resource allocations, which are usually a small fraction of funds devoted to humanitarian assistance.

It is often possible to reconcile within the same activity short and long-term objectives and to address simultaneously the needs for relief, improved disaster preparedness and development. For example, a typical food-for-work project to rebuild community infrastructure can:

- Provide relief through the distribution of food rations (emergency).
- Provide legitimate employment opportunities and work skills, including to recently demobilised soldiers (emergency and rehabilitation).
- Rehabilitate a school building that has been destroyed (reconstruction).
- Help create the national capacity to administer similar projects in future emergencies (preparedness).
- Help ensure that primary education is not unduly interrupted (development).

Emergency aid can also make use of existing local markets and entrepreneurships for the delivery of relief supplies. Business networks are often active despite civil disorder, and can be used for the distribution of essential goods in rural areas and for bringing surplus crops from farm-gate to the market. Where rural commercial networks have vanished entirely, their re-establishment poses a major challenge, particularly in relief environments dominated by the free distribution of food and other goods.

A constructive way of linking humanitarian assistance and development-oriented interventions is the systematic mapping of existing social and productive assets of districts and regions affected by the crisis. Detailed baseline data, recording the results of rehabilitation activities carried out at the district level by official aid agencies, NGOs and private commercial operations is very useful. It can provide knowledge of the current situation, early warning signals indicating a need for preventive action, and help in assessing the impact of assistance. Sharing the results of such mapping among donors can be a useful tool for fund-raising and for operational co-ordination.

**Best practices identified**

**During the planning phase**

- All complex emergencies are different, and situation-specific strategies need to be developed for each crisis. A thorough understanding of local conditions is vital.
- Limit the scope and duration of emergency relief operations to the strict minimum, and plan the implementation of post-emergency operations at an early stage.
- Cease parallel relief and rehabilitation delivery systems as early as feasible.
Examine the risk that development and relief aid can prolong a crisis by creating large groups of dependent beneficiaries and by providing supplies used by protagonists in the conflict.

Towards beneficiaries and local institutions

- Support local capacities to take over the running of aid operations as soon as possible. Avoid over-funding local structures, creating expectations that may not be maintained. Introduce effective control procedures, through, for example, double signatures on cost recovery revenue accounts. Emphasise bottom-up support in strengthening local capacity.

- Consult beneficiaries and inform them in advance of important changes, such as the replacement of free food with food-for-work projects and cost recovery policies.

- Incorporate gender analysis into relief and rehabilitation programming as standard practice, paying attention to the specific needs for women, particularly in single-headed households, and wherever possible building on and supporting the distinct coping/survival strategies of men and women.

Towards partner agencies

- Agree on a code of conduct, in particular as regards contact and co-operation with factions in a civil conflict; strict impartiality is essential. Payments for “protection services” cannot be justified as they provide an incentive to factions to maintain insecurity and ransom humanitarian aid.

- Set up information exchange mechanisms between agencies in the field and at headquarters. Implement pooling arrangements in logistics to reduce costs and to limit the scope for misappropriation of aid by the parties in conflict.

Key orientations for donors

Conflict involves control of resources, and it must be recognised that the injection of resources into these situations inevitably means involvement in the conflict. This is an important factor not only for humanitarian assistance but also for development cooperation. Thus, the risk is not just that outside parties may be perceived as partial, but that their resources can be diverted and used by warring factions. In short, there is an undeniable political impact of relief assistance and longer-term development assistance in conflict situations.

The political impact of relief must be recognised explicitly. Development and relief assistance can confer power to local organisations involved in its distribution and challenge other economic and social structures. Food and other forms of aid can be misappropriated by combatants for commercial gain or for power-brokering purposes. Aid agencies may thus find themselves accused of taking sides (feeding the enemy), and indirectly contribute to prolonging the crisis. This must be addressed explicitly in crisis management programmes.

A careful analysis of the social context is critical where relief goods, notably food, are channelled through local community organisations. This can help minimise the risk of inequitable distributions and avoid reinforcing any existing patterns of exploitation. Special consideration should be given to the gender dimensions. This should take into account women’s needs and potentials in various sectors, develop projects in view of women’s roles in the household, society, and the economy, make projects and aid...
accessible to women, use gender-trained staff, and improve target-group orientation through participatory planning and flexible project design.

Independent agencies and NGOs should be encouraged to analyse the potential socio-political impacts of aid distribution, and to develop standards for their activities in post-conflict operations. These could be based on commonly agreed principles such as the Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements.

The transition from crisis to long-term development follows no set pattern or order. The distinction between emergency relief and long-term development aid is not always useful for planning support to countries in crisis. Institutional, budgetary and functional walls between relief assistance and rehabilitation can in fact produce contradictions, gaps and barriers to co-ordination. Integrating the planning of relief and development assistance within the context of long-term approaches aimed at fostering self-reliance is a major challenge.

The role of development assistance in preventing violent conflict, or mitigating its effect, should be examined systematically. In areas where the potential for violent civil conflict is high, assistance must focus on addressing the root causes of violence before it erupts. In this context, the concept of vulnerability is important in identifying the groups most at risk.

The identification of “dependency syndromes” is an essential exercise for national and international aid agencies. Careful assessment of needs, based on detailed knowledge of locally available resources is required for making proper judgements of the aid required, in terms of quantity as well as quality.

Avoiding market distortions, especially in the food production sector, is essential to counteract dependency on aid. Free distribution of food aid can do long-term damage to local food producers. It is important, therefore, to monitor the impact of food aid on the local supply and pricing mechanisms. At the onset of each crisis and in parallel with any relief operation, efforts must be made by donors to ensure protection and/or supply of development assets such as livestock, seeds and tools.

If local government is non-existent, other local structures or NGOs could be engaged. If they lack capacity, they can be trained by counterpart international NGOs. Care must be taken that salaries offered by aid agencies do not rob the local
administration of qualified staff. Addressing this question requires that explicit standards for local staff recruitment and remuneration for humanitarian relief programmes be accepted and applied by all donors.

Excessive reliance on international NGOs may serve to weaken or inhibit the development of effective national governance. It may also impede the development of problem-solving and self-governing capabilities within communities. International NGOs should be encouraged to form structured relationships with national and local NGOs — both those involving men and women — with the goal of helping to build the capacity of all segments of the population.
4 Foundations for peace-building: good governance and civil society

Basic principles

Peace-building involves both long-term preventive measures and more immediate responses before, during and after conflict. It depends upon and, at the same time, seeks to foster a spirit of tolerance and reconciliation. Broad acceptance throughout society of the legitimacy of the state and the credibility of the institutions of governance is a key aspect of forging such a civic spirit. When all people’s human rights are respected, when society is governed by the rule of law, and when ordinary men and women are involved in the political process, resort to violence to effect political change is obviously less likely. Efforts to support participation, democratisation and peace-building, through strengthened institutions of governance, are clearly interlinked.

In countries divided by inter-group conflict, certain elements of civil society may be able to play an important role in building bridges between polarised groups, promoting dialogue and reconciliation. Conditions of insecurity, sometimes aggravated by the exploitation of ethnic, religious and cultural differences, contribute to a climate of social distrust. However, socio-political conflict itself can also provide a stimulus for the emergence of new actors and institutions specifically dedicated to the cause of peace. These can include human rights networks, peace activist groups, and independent media organisations. Other stabilisation points or “voices of peace” can be found among community and religious leaders, traditional forms of authority, in trade unions and professional associations.

In the case of “failed states”, or in countries where certain areas are controlled by non-government or anti-government authorities, local level, non-state mechanisms may be the most effective means through which peace-building and conflict management can be animated. Even though not all elements of civil society necessarily work toward peace, the opportunities often exist, even in crises, for a society to develop and strengthen commonly-held values and goals. By identifying and supporting key actors and mechanisms dedicated to peace and reconciliation at the community level, and avoiding inadvertent support to “forces of war”, donors can make an effective contribution to peace-building.

Building-blocks for peace-building and reconciliation

Given their sensitive and complex nature, governance oriented assistance programmes need a strong base of political commitment in both donor and recipient countries over the long term. Assistance efforts should consistently emphasise the strengthening of partner-countries’ own capacities for good governance. Mechanisms to help strengthen political will for reform in partner countries often involve elements of policy dialogue and incentives. The DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and Good Governance, Development Co-operation Guidelines Series, OECD 1995, provide a sound framework for these efforts. In discussing the design of development co-operation programmes with partner countries, donors can, without proselytising or understating the complexities, consistently emphasise the need for good governance, the

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rule of law and respect for human rights, and the development of a strong civil society, as a basis for long-term stability.

The various elements in a vigorous civil society do not necessarily set out to achieve a broad consensus. Yet the chances for a society to develop and strengthen commonly-held values and goals, and the ability and willingness of the individual to participate in mainstream society are vital components of peace-building and sustainable development. In the longer term, donors can contribute to this through, among other activities:

- Support to government institutions and other organisations, including the business community, which are able to establish or maintain social networks and associations enhancing participation in mainstream society, or who support or promote commonly shared values, such as cultural and athletic programmes.
- Support for access to information through education, and institutions such as citizens advice bureau’s, local media, etc.
- Support to local NGOs and community-based organisations to help them become more capable and responsive to their constituencies.

Although DAC Members usually rely to the maximum extent on measures of positive support, they may need to call upon persuasion and dialogue when working with some partner governments to promote constructive steps towards improved governance. Policy criteria focused on promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance should be integrated into a wider range of development assistance programmes in this area.

The most basic tenets of democratic practice require broad acceptance by the state and civil society. Democratisation is thus a complex, gradual, and participatory process whereby citizens, civil society, and the state create a set of norms, values, and institutions to mediate their relationships in a predictable, representative and fair manner. Development co-operation efforts in support of improved governance and participation must be framed over the long-term horizon, based on coherent strategies consistently applied by different donors and multilateral agencies. This requires effective co-ordination among all actors involved in the design and implementation of programmes.

Approaches to governance must be adapted to national circumstances. For example, when dealing with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states, the scope for constructive dialogue may be severely limited, and donors may have to restrict their assistance to non-governmental sectors committed to reform. In the case of countries in transition to democratic systems, support may concentrate on strengthening civil society actors and democratic political processes. Donors must also be careful to avoid precipitating political and economic instability through the sudden introduction of democratic institutions.

Respect for human rights

The fundamental freedoms that should be protected by the rule of law are essential for healthy relations between the state and civil society.

DAC Members must support the international principles contained in the UN Charter, and elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Vienna Declaration (1994). They must also comply with the provisions of the international and regional conventions to which they have adhered, such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) the Red Cross Conventions (Geneva 1949) in the field of humanitarian law, and
the Additional Protocols (1977) which aim to provide protection to persons not taking an active part in conflict and to the victims of conflicts, as well as the Convention on the Status of Refugees (Geneva 1951). More generally, internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms should be explicitly promoted and supported through development co-operation and humanitarian aid initiatives and policy dialogue.

Active non-governmental interest groups can be important vehicles for donor initiatives in support of human rights, by providing information in a given country and building a constituency for promoting human rights vis-à-vis governments and public opinion. Similarly, targeting groups who are close to or represent the victims of injustice and misuse of power can also be effective (e.g. women’s groups, farmer co-operatives). Channelling aid through international NGOs benefits from their influence, professionalism and neutrality, and local human rights groups may gain protection and enhanced capacity through association with international networks.

Donor assistance in this area should be used as part of a wider promotion of just and sustainable development, providing vulnerable and disadvantaged groups with knowledge about their human and legal rights, as well as the rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship. Efforts to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights must place emphasis on the institutions and processes which formulate and interpret law and social policy (legislatures and courts), as well as on those which implement and enforce them (government departments, police forces, military actors). Experience has shown these approaches work best when integrated into an overall strategy, rather than in isolation.

**Participatory processes**

Fostering popular participation in the governance agenda is essential to peace-building. Participation strengthens civil society and the economy by empowering individuals, communities, and organisations to negotiate with institutions and bureaucracies, thus allowing civil society to influence public policy and to provide a check on the power of government. Participation also aids in dealing with conflicting interests in a peaceful manner. It follows that the creation of a climate and the capacity for constructive interaction between civil society and government is a critical component for long-term peace-building.

Specific areas of donor support include:

- Providing specialised technical assistance and expertise in the field of decentralisation policy (introduction of decentralised planning and administration structures).
- Clarifying functional responsibilities between central and local levels of government. This includes support for the establishment of systems to allocate fiscal revenues and corresponding responsibilities.
- Strengthening organisational capacities of representative intermediary bodies, including regional parliaments and local councils.
- Strengthening the representation of marginalised groups in civil service posts.

Within the context of projects aimed at the provision of basic social services as education, health and infrastructure, donors can also play an important role in helping ensure that these services are made available to all segments of society, and especially marginalised groups.
Democratisation enables the population to articulate its needs and interests and to protect the rights and interests of marginalised groups, and the most vulnerable. A democratic system also provides mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, including the distribution of political and economic power, and mechanisms for transferring political control. By supporting and consolidating democratic institutions, which include political parties and representative institutions, donors can contribute to building peace and stability.

The following list draws on available experience, to suggest broad approaches towards strengthening democratisation with direct conflict prevention and peace-building objectives:

- Support for constitutional reforms, including provision of advice to governments on constitutional and legislative issues.
- Assistance to strengthen representative political institutions, including political parties.
- Support for legislative systems and electoral processes, including informing the electorate about their rights, election monitoring, analysis and reform of laws governing elections.
- Assistance for the organisation and monitoring of elections and referendums. This should contain a capacity building element so that a country may develop the pool of skills necessary to the organisation and monitoring of its electoral processes.
- Assistance for the organisation and monitoring of other democratic institutions (e.g. courts, legislative bodies and the executive branch).

**A democratic system also provides mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.**

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**Strengthening public institutions**

Public institutions are the means through which government implements policy. Partiality and corruption in the public institutions responsible for managing public resources and social services directly undermines the credibility of the state. This can encourage marginalised groups to resort to violent means to effect change.

A state which may appear to have considerable capacity may really be ill-equipped for its basic functions. State institutions may be non-representative, non-accountable and under the control of certain elite individuals or groups. Helping strengthen the ability of institutions to perform their core functions in a more effective and non-discriminatory manner can be an important part of peace-building.
Specific areas of donor activity can include:

- Support for the executive branch to help improve efficiency of the delivery of government services and promote transparency, sound management, and the eradication of corruption. Support should focus on institutions seriously committed to reform.

- Civil service reform focusing on improving impartiality of, and access to, public institutions, thus helping to eliminate discrimination and bias.

- Strengthening the control by civilian institutions over political and economic affairs, and the armed forces (including military budgets and expenditures).

**Strengthening systems of security and justice**

To be effective, justice systems, including security forces, must recognise and protect the rights of the individual and be accessible to all. They must be impartial and politically independent. Ineffective justice and security systems may encourage people to take the law into their own hands. As elements of security and justice systems can have an important role to play in conflict prevention, international assistance in these areas, can be very potent elements of conflict prevention and development strategies.

Successful support in these areas depends on the willingness of the recipient government to accept the need for, and recognise the value of, effective justice systems to overall good governance, social stability/harmony and good economic management. Dialogue with governments may be required to persuade them of the advantages of effective, internationally sanctioned norms of law and justice. Security and justice systems are basic responsibilities of the state and are at the core of a country’s sovereignty. Efforts should not undermine but rather strengthen respect for the state’s monopoly over the use of force within the rule of law.

In order to maximise the effectiveness of their assistance, donors must have a broad awareness of their agency’s and nation’s skills, experience and cultural background which may indicate how best to target development assistance. Donors should also draw upon the knowledge and expertise of a range of fields, including foreign affairs, defence and development co-operation.

A predictable and reliable legal system is an essential factor for democratisation, good governance and human rights. The absence of a fair justice system can trigger frustrations which impede peace-building and conflict prevention. A justice system perceived as unpredictable, inaccessible and arbitrary can trigger resistance within society, and confrontation and repression by the state. Hence all efforts to strengthen peace-building and conflict prevention capacity through development co-operation are conditioned to some extent by the legal environment in which they are undertaken. The maintenance of law and order must be matched by a commitment on the part of government to meeting citizens’ basic needs and safeguarding their basic rights.

Aid should be proactive in helping to develop and maintain mechanisms that honour basic human rights, improve non-discriminatory access to legal and judicial services, and facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes. Donors can help defuse tensions by providing support to measures that ensure all individuals, and groups within a society have access to legal remedies, informal decision-making processes and avenues of compromise.
While many traditional societies often maintain complex and effective codes of social conduct, they are not always able to meet the demands of an open society. However, the benefits and efficacy of existing traditional systems should not be overlooked. Donors should be open to local initiatives for strengthening such traditional structures as village courts and the roles of traditional leaders.

Assistance should be focused on:

- Formal law and justice institutions i.e. courts, ombudsmen, law reform commissions, civilian police forces, and prison/detention services.
- Communal, traditional law enforcement/dispute resolution structures and groups.
- Other agencies which operate in areas that have to face conditions of communal conflict i.e. resource management authorities.
- Facilitating access to legal systems for individuals and groups, especially those which are marginalised.

Given the complexity and sensitivity of many of the development issues in the law and justice sector, there is a need for flexibility when designing interventions. Aid agencies should investigate innovative projects which can approach the task through various types of support. These may include:

- Projects designed to create links between the formal and informal institutions operating in the areas of law and justice, to foster greater community acceptance and commitment to law and justice initiatives (complementing approaches to strengthen the formal institutions in isolation).
- Support for monitoring human rights abuses.
- Support for professional training for lawyers and policy-makers.
**Security sector reform**

Conditions of socio-political conflict can often contribute to increasing the power and independence of military and police forces vis-à-vis civilian authorities and the population*. Reforming security forces to improve accountability and professional conduct and strengthening civilian oversight, can play an important role in peace-building. Taking these efforts in parallel with activities designed to strengthen legal systems and civil society as a whole can help promote informed debate and wider participation in these processes.

Specific areas of international assistance include: a) the provision of training for civilian leaders in security matters including for monitoring the conduct, performance and cost-effectiveness of security forces; b) the establishment of independent ombudsman offices, civilian review boards and other forms of civil oversight of security forces; c) the provision of training for police and military forces focusing on their roles in a democratic society and their capacity to enforce standards of professional conduct; d) support for the reform of military education systems.

The extent to which these activities can be supported from development co-operation funds will depend upon Member states’ rules and procedures. Nonetheless, positive outcomes can be achieved through close co-ordination between development co-operation and other forms of assistance. Successful efforts towards security sector reform depend heavily on the existence of a justice system capable of investigating and punishing abuses and misconduct. Thus security and justice systems are intimately linked.

**Human rights training**

The role of the military is changing rapidly in many countries. Defence and security forces are increasingly being used in domestic policing operations and in disaster relief and prevention work. While some military forces may have received training in the basic principles of humanitarian law, few have received appropriate training in the broader principles of human rights. This training is critical for these groups to operate appropriately in domestic situations. As representatives of the international community, peacekeeping forces must be prepared for, and held to, the highest standards in this regard.

Culturally sensitive training in human rights can help assure appropriate relations with the civilian population in these situations. Such training needs to be tailored to country-specific situations, but also based on internationally accepted principles as elaborated in international human rights instruments. Given that it is widely acknowledged that women often bear the brunt of the consequences of conflict both domestically and in the wider social context, human rights training should particularly target gender specific concerns and issues.

In addition to the provision of training, logistical support for the supply of equipment may be needed, providing infrastructure to assist the target agency to carry out its functions. However, in the area of equipment supply, there can be particular sensitivities. The potential for misuse of assistance must be carefully considered. For instance, equipment for police, while entirely appropriate if properly used, has greater potential for significant misuse than equipment in most other areas.

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* This topic has been further developed since 1997, and more extensive information can be found in Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and Development”.

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Justice and dispute resolution systems must also integrate respect for and promotion of human rights as fundamental principles. Donors can contribute to strengthening institutions and training personnel who have a role in protecting human rights and managing conflict. Key candidates for human rights training are military, police, judges, legal and paralegal professionals and prison personnel. Other groups that would benefit from human rights training include community leaders and educators.

**Reinforcing civil society for peace-building and reconciliation**

The institutions of civil society play a vital function in representing different interest groups, but when they confront resistance or inadequate accommodation processes, heightened tensions, oppression and increased levels of violence can result. Support to civil society should maintain the objective of helping to reconcile group interests over the longer term. “Citizen diplomacy” at various levels can provide vital capacities for this reconciliation.

In regions of latent or manifest violence, actors within civil society may be inhibited from playing a peace-building role by intimidation and attack. Information and communication networks may be especially vulnerable. Group divisions may also be exacerbated, and special efforts may be required to help protect the human rights of people in minority situations. However, these same conditions may also generate the impetus for the emergence of new actors and institutions, such as human rights networks and peace activist groups. In certain circumstances this may also include the re-emergence of traditional forms of authority and techniques of conflict management and resolution.

While seeking to identify sources of peace-building strength in society, development agencies need to be alert to the risk that their support for particular social institutions and authorities can be misrepresented and misunderstood. Some traditional groups may be elitist and oppressive; some NGOs or other local groups may be instruments of contending factions. These alternative or supplementary peace-building agents should be subjected to the same scrutiny that the work of other “partner” institutions typically receive, and their most positive aspects built upon.

Specific areas for donor support fall into three broad areas: a) supporting some traditional institutions of authority; b) promoting dialogue and co-operation in divided societies; and c) supporting the freedom of, and access to, information for all members of society.

**Supporting some traditional institutions**

Traditional authorities and mechanisms often reflect systems and institutions developed over-time to help manage inter-group tensions and natural resource distribution. In some instances informal dispute resolution mechanisms and traditional authorities exercise considerable influence over national political leaders, even if this influence is not always visible.

Where the authority of a government is weak, traditional authority institutions often have a significant influence on communities and can be essential mechanisms for effective peace-building. There have, for instance, been many cases where traditional and informal peace-building mechanisms have reasserted themselves to the benefit of local communities following the collapse of state authority.

Donor activities in support of traditional peace-building initiatives should seek to build on those traditional authority institutions which include community elders, religious leaders, and tribal councils, that contribute to the process of peace-building and reconciliation.
reconciliation in a significant and constructive way.

Supporting the development of the political space within which indigenous groups can work out their own solutions to problems is especially difficult. It requires a long-term commitment to traditional conflict management institutions and processes; a thorough understanding of, and sensitivity to, cultural factors relevant to conflict prevention and resolution; and a willingness to build a relationship of trust with local partners, based on significant and long-term involvement in the country.

**Promoting dialogue and co-operation in divided societies**

**Inter-community relations**

In divided societies, efforts to foster inter-community relations, including trade, information exchanges, and dialogue can play an important role in defusing inter-community tensions, breaking down long-standing social barriers, and fostering tolerance and understanding. The building of social networks of trust not only contributes to social reconstruction, but also to the building of the social capital that can help prevent recurring outbreaks of violent conflict in the future.

Specific areas of donor support include programmes to support intercultural understanding, to promote multilingualism and cultural expression by minorities and indigenous people, and to promote the identification of shared heritage, values and goals across different social groups. Such assistance should primarily focus on nurturing social or institutional networks and organisations that can act as stabilising points in society.

In both conflict-prone and war-torn societies, donors can undertake activities with explicit reconciliatory objectives, which seek to build links between competing groups. This can include:

- Within standard relief and rehabilitation work, incorporating measures to facilitate the reconciliation of conflicting groups in a society. For example: programmes which focus on reintegrating potentially destabilising elements (e.g. ex-combatants, youth) within wider social and economic life.
- Programmes which focus on providing support to, or distributing resources through “stabilising points” (e.g. multi-ethnic committees, women’s organisations) within communities as a means of strengthening trust.

Important target groups for such activities include farmers co-operatives, youth associations, and other goal or issue-oriented associations with multicultural memberships.

Women can play special roles as bridging partners in dialogue, peace negotiations, reconstruction and rehabilitation strategies and contribute their special experience and perceptions to peace-building and reconciliation efforts (see Part I, Chapter V, “Women as peacemakers”). In many instances, women’s organisations can help in preventing and ending hostilities by acting as informal negotiators, lobby groups, campaigners and demonstrators. Women often have less inhibition and more legitimacy than militarised men in protesting against violent conflict and pushing for peace.

As agreed in the Platform for Action at the Beijing Women’s Conference (1995), women should be assured equal opportunities to participate in peace fora and activities. Agencies also need to focus on developing efficient strategies and approaches to empower and encourage them to play more assertive roles in shaping a peaceful and viable future for their country through exercises in confidence-building, leadership, negotiation skills, etc.
Donors can also provide assistance to local and national advocacy groups and networks or religious organisations, working towards inter-group peace by supporting the establishment of forums of discussion and concertation, to encourage discussions between members of communities in conflict.

The rationale for these approaches rests on the argument that the constructive relations built at the personal or professional level can eventually be reflected at broader societal levels thus resulting in a multiplier effect. The regional potentials of cultural networking and the socio-cultural and psychological impact of cultural work provide further strong arguments for these approaches.

**Mediation and negotiation**

By strengthening skills for effective arbitration, mediation, negotiation and reconciliation, development agencies can help to increase the chances that conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies will be accepted as appropriate and legitimate by the actors themselves.

Training for effective arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and reconciliation efforts builds and cultivates the skills necessary for participation in the restructuring of the society, economy, and political institutions. Such training should target groups and individuals, particularly women, in positions to play critical roles in the transition to a more just and equitable future.

Development projects aiming at addressing such concrete issues as land or water management, health and transportation can also provide important avenues for inter-community co-operation. By bringing together technical specialists from communities in conflict to open up dialogue on mutual interests, they can be instrumental in fostering a shared sense of identity, and facilitating the identification of common approaches towards joint solutions to socio-economic challenges and constraints. Beyond their concrete development impact these projects have a broader confidence-building impact on society, enable different groups to better identify common goals, and also facilitate effective participatory development processes.

Development agencies can also strengthen development initiatives designed explicitly to facilitate discussion and dialogue between members of communities in conflict.

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**Box 10. The role of women in the transition process in Sierra Leone**

In 1994 women in Sierra Leone began defining their agenda for the Beijing Conference. It was during this process that they identified the need to organise in support of the peace process, and take an active role in Sierra Leone’s transition to democracy.

Women’s groups in Freetown began mobilising support and demanding peace. They saw democratic elections as a vehicle for resolving the drawn-out conflict in their country. They worked to bring the rebels to the negotiating table and to establish dialogue. Village women went into rural areas singing songs and calling on rebels to lay down their arms. In one instance a planned meeting was discovered by the military, and the women who had gone to meet the rebels were massacred in the cross-fire.

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Training should target groups and individuals, particularly women, in positions to play critical roles in the transition to a more just and equitable future.
conflict. These types of projects encourage constructive contact between individuals and community-based organisations within conflict-prone regions in order to break down long-standing social barriers, and to create a favourable peace-building environment. Such projects should often involve the most vulnerable groups, such as children and mothers, from opposing sides of a conflict.

Through support for education, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, development agencies have a crucial, if sensitive, role to play in furthering non-violent solutions to intergroup conflict and breaking the cycle of intergroup hostility and conflict along ethnic, cultural and sectarian lines. This can range from support for the development of non-partisan curricula and textbooks, to help cultivate and disseminate shared values such as tolerance and pluralism, to specific assistance for “peace education” initiatives, designed to help create a better understanding of the origins and history of societal relations and promote inter-group co-operation and reconciliation. The considerable development co-operation resources currently allocated to the field of education in many countries should place donors in a good position to play a central role in these areas.

The effect that disrupted schooling can have on children who witness brutality and the breakdown of social and moral structures can increase societal instability. This can inhibit learning processes on how to deal with disputes without resorting to violence, and how to co-exist peacefully with other religions and ethnic groups, thus reinforcing the conflictual history of inter-group relations.

Supporting the freedom of, and access to, information

The importance of a free press for encouraging democratic tendencies and respect for human and civil rights is well recognised. Conversely, the dissemination of distorted or biased information can fuel tensions in politically and socially unstable environments. The media and information providers have a unique capacity to reach and influence populations in conflict-prone conditions and a crucial role to play in the promotion of dialogue in divided societies. Controlled media have been used on many occasions to exacerbate communal hatred, disseminate propaganda, and distort events to bolster the position of one side. During periods of crisis, simple access to free, fair and complete information can contribute significantly to easing tensions.

Local tensions and localised communal violence are often as much the result of misinformation and misunderstanding as of real conflicting interests. Local channels of communication and access to information on events in the wider society can help prevent these from escalating towards violence. Media reporting which is fair (including

Box 11. Developing the capacity for peace-building and reconciliation in South Africa

During the apartheid era in Southern Africa when state-state co-operation was not possible, development agencies funded a broad range of non-governmental projects which sought explicitly to develop the capacity of exiled and anti-apartheid South Africans to negotiate a peaceful transition, and to participate fully in a post-apartheid South Africa.

This included: leadership training workshops for labour leaders, as well as for women leaders specifically; training in broad management and organisational skills; the organisation of a wide network of respected committees to monitor political activity and help contain potential violence; and efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and institutional capacity of national civil movements.

In the post-apartheid era, internationally-supported training and exchange programmes for public officials and community leaders play a continuing role in developing their capacity to represent and negotiate constituents’ interests in the political arena, while fostering a better understanding of the structures and processes of political institutions. Examples are not limited to South Africa. Similar work has been undertaken in South Asia, Central America and elsewhere – often under programmes for good governance and institutional strengthening.
all views), accurate (reporting context, not just events) and complete (reporting processes and objectives that underlie stated positions), can be crucial to defuse conflict potentials.

In its social education role, unbiased coverage by the media can address many social issues of concern to the target audience, and in the process it can help to reduce tensions and build trust across society. Important information is often related to health, literacy and numeracy, farming, and the environment. In areas of conflict, this can also be extended to include issues such as landmine awareness, war trauma, the Geneva Conventions on the treatments of prisoners, the wounded and civilians, and tracing missing persons, as well as peace accords and demobilisation processes. Independent media may provide a “voice” for the disadvantaged, as well as watchdog mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of leaders. In a peace-building context, it may also ensure that each side to a dispute is allowed to hear the other’s position, thereby opening lines of communication where few might otherwise exist.

In supporting the media’s capacity as a means to inform the actions of social and political actors, donors must consider the identity of the target audience and their cultural traditions, before considering the choice of the media and scheduling of broadcasts. These are particularly important in conflict zones where there are unlikely to be any support activities on the ground to facilitate understanding and reinforce messages. Involving the community in the design, planning and delivery of activities strengthens ownership and commitment.

Specific areas of donor support include:

- Helping establish or revise appropriate laws on the independence and freedom of the media (e.g. slander laws).
- Training for local editorial staff in reporting on conflicts, to help develop high quality, accurate coverage.
- The establishment/maintenance of autonomous (or independent) national and local media institutions (including community-level or rural radio broadcasts) and their commitment to high professional and ethical standards, through technical and financial support.
- Local coverage of events by the international media in circumstances where it would otherwise not be financially viable.
- Projects and programmes which assist state actors to understand and support the role of the media in a democratic society, and which provide material, financial, and legal assistance to the media to pursue the same goal.

In countries in which access to information is limited or restricted, or where the state or partisan groups controls overall information content, it may be necessary to identify and support informal information and communication channels. In these situations donors, working with the international media, may also help empower otherwise oppressed local media.

Support to the media to provide channels of communication between opposing perspectives must be an on-going process: training for local journalists and producers needs follow-up support, particularly in the difficult circumstances of conflict; technical support for independent media should be tied to training, both editorial, technical and managerial, for higher quality programming. The focus of interventions should not be geared solely to front-line journalists, but also to news editors, managers, and where circumstances permit, political authorities, who may have ultimate control over information flows.
Training and staffing of media should be gender balanced. Special support toward the inclusion of women in broadcast media could provide women with a more public forum in which they can develop their skills as commentators and experts on current issues, and increase their visibility and influence for wider political roles. Their media presence provides both a “voice” for women in the country and an increased opportunity to address issues of importance to women.

Key orientations for donors

Donors need to contribute to the development of those institutions and processes within the state and civil society which will stimulate and sustain democratisation. Support for governance involves, inter alia, increasing a state’s capacity to develop and maintain representative, responsive, and fair political institutions. Facilitating the transition to more democratic systems of government may require donors to respond to requests for assistance in planning, conducting, and monitoring elections. It may also require capacity development within civil society itself to articulate interests through non-violent channels, and to use or develop the mechanisms necessary to pursue those interests in the public arena.

Development agencies have particular skills and networks in developing countries that may be harnessed in these circumstances, but this work also demands effective working relationships with other types of actors – such as political and military actors within the country as well as diplomats, international financial institutions, and peacekeeping contingents.

In order to encourage participation in peace-building and conflict prevention, it is first necessary to identify those aspects of both state and society which may effectively contribute to, or obstruct, these efforts. Development co-operation should work to reinforce the constructive elements, while moderating the negative impacts and circumnavigating obstacles. Specifically, it must avoid over-centralising assistance to strengthen government institutions, if it risks making them less dependent on local groups and structures and thus less interested in establishing dialogue and co-operation.
The strengthening of public institutions must be suited to the political, economic, social, cultural, and historical context within which it is undertaken. Institutional-strengthening may draw on the examples and experiences of donor countries, among others, but ultimately, the institutions adopted in a given country may be very different in form, if not in function.

More specifically, DAC Members should continue to support efforts to:

- Ensure that all government institutions and bodies function in a transparent, accountable and accessible manner to the benefit of all members of society, especially minorities, the marginalised, and the vulnerable.
- Encourage vigorous community consultation and participation in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy.
- Ensure provision of affordable, effective, and accessible services and facilities, and their equitable distribution to all affected communities.
- Ensure that government interacts with members of the public, organisations and interest groups in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and non-sectarian manner.
- Facilitate the empowerment and education the public, including women, and organisations in government processes, policies and projects.
- Ensure that the officials and staff of government institutions are representative of communities served.
- Involve the staff of government institutions at all levels of planning and decision-making processes.
- Ensure that existing and new government officials and staff are trained or re-trained in the administrative, communication and other skills necessary to fulfil the above objectives.

In extreme cases, where governments, or elements within them, are particularly resistant to supporting these key elements of conflict prevention and peace-building, donors may have to consider the judicious use of direct incentives and/or disincentives in their funding allocations. Such approaches, despite their limitations, may in some cases provide an effective stimulus for recipients to strengthen the underpinnings of peace-building and conflict prevention in their national development programmes.

Support for dispute resolution must focus primarily on helping build-up sustainable local capacities. Donors can only provide a nurturing or facilitating role, and must be as open and flexible as possible to the needs and priorities expressed from within the society itself so that solutions will be durable.

Development interventions in support of dialogue and negotiation must avoid seeking to impose externally generated solutions. They must constantly discipline themselves to help create the space within which the parties to a conflict may themselves explore solutions, and work together to build peace and good governance.

Assistance must be sustained over the medium to long-term, otherwise individuals and groups brought together to deal with an immediate crisis may return to “business-as-usual” before the underlying problems have been fully addressed.

All assistance aimed at supporting indigenous mechanisms of dispute resolution – whether traditional authorities, or moderate groups – need to be developed in light of the best possible understanding of the political, social and economic dynamics that underlie the conflict.
Donors recognise that assistance efforts which seek to strengthen or support the institutions of civil society may not in themselves prevent or reduce conflict in the short-term. Rather, donors should support peace-building and reconciliation at the community-level over the long term, parallel to their efforts to strengthen the peace-building elements of good governance.
5 Supporting post-conflict recovery: operational priorities

Overview

The objective of post-conflict reconstruction is not to return to pre-crisis conditions but to lay the foundations for peace and sustainable development. When civil authority has broken down, the first priority is to restore legitimate state administration, regarded by its citizens as serving all groups and able to allay the tensions that inevitably persist in the post-conflict period.

Past systems and institutions may have contributed to creating economic and social inequities, and to fuelling conflict. Post-conflict situations provide special opportunities for political, economic and administrative reform. Critical areas for action include: land tenure and administration, judicial practice, and internal security systems (see Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and development”).

Whatever the phase of the conflict, donors should work to foster internal consensus on a set of appropriate policies and programmes that reflect the economic, social and cultural environment of the country concerned. National and local authorities or groups, including representatives of the parties in conflict, should participate in the formulation of programmes, paving the way for national ownership of the development process.

From the outset of a political dialogue on such critical issues as governance and participation, all groups, including the marginalised, should be encouraged to express themselves. Freedom of association and the encouragement of political parties need to be included in the political agenda. Public participation in the process of political reconstruction requires that the civil and human rights of the participants be respected.

From an operational standpoint, priority areas of support for post-conflict reconstruction include: restoring internal security and the rule of law, legitimising state institutions, establishing the basis for broadly-based economic growth, and improving food security and social services. This may require reforming security forces and legal systems or helping establish completely new structures where the former are viewed as illegitimate by society.

Other priority areas more uniquely related to the special needs of countries recovering from violent conflict, including reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilising former combatants and removing the threat of land mines, often a sine qua non for the normalisation of economic activities, are then discussed in more detail.

Restoring a working capacity for economic management

Critical issues and priority needs

Countries in crisis or recovering from violent conflict urgently need to mobilise domestic and external financial resources for economic reconstruction in the face of exceptional constraints. Often critically short of expertise in macroeconomic management, newly established authorities also have to wrestle with the competing demands of peace-building and economic stabilisation. The need to preserve peace and
stability, rehabilitate essential infrastructure, reform public institutions, jump-start the economy, and create employment opportunities places heavy demands on budgetary resources. At the same time, the need for a stable, balanced economy and the restoration of private investors’ confidence requires that inflationary pressures be contained.

The formulation of a sound – if rudimentary – macroeconomic framework for reconstruction is thus a priority. The objective should be to provide a realistic assessment of the cost of reconstruction and peace-building activities and ensure consistency with the resources likely to be available as well as the country’s absorptive capacity. This would contribute to reducing the risk of inconsistencies between the political agreements reached in the course of peace negotiations and the financial resources available to implement them, thus fostering economic stabilisation. Formulated as a joint effort involving existing or emerging authorities and the principal parties involved in the peace process, this macroeconomic framework would also be instrumental in ensuring proper use of the assistance provided by official and non-governmental organisations.

During the immediate post-conflict phase, the focus of a government’s economic policies should be to ensure that the priority expenditure required for peace-building and reconstruction (including payments to demobilised soldiers, rehabilitation of war-damaged infrastructure, and the provision of basic social services) are programmed in a manner consistent with the need to return to a stable macroeconomic environment (appropriate budgetary and monetary policies, normalisation of financial relations with creditors, including international financial institutions (IFIs)).

It is also essential that these public expenditures are clearly accounted for within a budget consistent with i) an available external budgetary and project support in line with the country’s debt servicing capacity (taking into account that donor funding is likely to taper off over time); and ii) domestic financing that is non-inflationary and does not pre-empt the capital needs of the emerging private sector.

Recommendations

The mobilisation and allocation of resources for post-conflict recovery can be greatly facilitated by the early preparation by the government concerned and the lead agency of a Macroeconomic Reconstruction Framework for organising technical assistance and financial support, in consultation with other relevant institutions and agencies. This document could be similar to the policy framework paper that is produced for low-income countries which receive financial support from the IMF. However, it would have to be less comprehensive and placed within a shorter time horizon. In preparing assistance programmes for crisis countries, all concerned donors and implementing agencies should thus concentrate on:

- Engaging the principal parties in discussion on a broad economic policy framework to guide the formulation of reconstruction efforts as early as possible in the course of peace negotiations.

- Initiating comprehensive training and technical assistance programmes to develop the necessary capacity for economic policy-making and the management of public finances, especially in budget formulation and public expenditure.
Priority areas of support

Restoring internal security and the rule of law

The security of the individual and respect for basic human rights is the cornerstone of political and economic stabilization. Rebuilding credible institutions is vital at the central level as well as at the local and community levels, as they will have a determining influence on the entire reconstruction effort, ranging from the restoration of productive sectors of the economy, the return of capital, to the collection and disposal of weapons. Within their rules and procedures, and in concert with other forms of assistance, development co-operation should strive towards these broad goals.

Many aspects of the rule of law may need to be assisted in order for the overall system to become effective. They include: i) training of police, lawyers and judges and ii) capacity building in the resolution of civil disputes, including those relating to property rights and access to land.

Legitimising state institutions

Peace agreements may place national elections at the top of the political agenda. More generally, political institutions must again be seen as legitimate and competent. Elections are important mechanisms for establishing political legitimacy, but they do not
create or sustain democracy in themselves. Democratisation must be understood in the broader context of changing relations both within the government and civil society.

**Fostering the re-emergence of civil society**

One of the most debilitating legacies of violent conflict is the polarisation of social relations. Conditions of insecurity contribute to the creation of lasting social distrust. Rebuilding bridges of communication between social groups and promoting participation in political life are essential requirements for social reconciliation.

**Improving food security and social services**

Improving food security is basic to any systematic prevention strategy and to linking relief with disaster preparedness and sustainable development. This includes work to improve agricultural productivity, access to markets and distribution systems and market-based measures to stabilise farm-gate prices. The restoration of basic services in health, education, water supply and increased life opportunities for women and children are also essential priorities.

**Building administrative capacity**

Whatever the urgency of addressing other needs, the development of technical and administrative capacity within the principal departments of government cannot be postponed without jeopardising the sustainability of the reconstruction process. Where the shortage of skilled manpower is a critical constraint, it may be necessary for donors to make staff available to the government on a short-term secondment basis. As demonstrated in various UN-sponsored programmes, it is also possible to mobilise members of the exiled diaspora through special incentive programmes.

**Reintegrating uprooted populations**

**Relevant principles and priority needs**

The forcible displacement of people is a clear indicator of conflict in society, of social insecurity, and of the inability of a government to protect its citizens. Conversely, the establishment of the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil peace and security help to encourage the successful return, with dignity, and reintegration of refugees, internally displaced persons, and demobilised former combatants.

The presence of large numbers of refugees creates economic and social burdens for host neighbouring countries that can be politically destabilising. The safe and orderly return of refugees to their country of origin, where conditions allow, can be important to maintaining political stability in the region.

Reintegration is often the first major step towards national reconciliation. It must take place within a legal framework that includes guarantees for returning *bona fide* refugees and ex-combatants. Displaced people also need to be convinced that they will not be victimised when they return. The needs of uprooted populations must be addressed explicitly as part of peace negotiations to ensure that reintegration and demobilisation strategies are part of the formal agreement. The responsibility of states for protecting their citizens, whether returning refugees and other war-affected groups, is a crucial consideration.

In addition to restoring basic security, reintegration priorities include access to water and sanitation; agricultural inputs including credit to improve food production; transport and communications infrastructure; and social services such as health and education, as well as assistance in the field of legal and civil documentation. In this connection it
is very important that recurrent costs related to public services such as salaries for teachers and health workers positions created under the reintegration phase be clearly accounted for when considering budgets for public expenditure, both at national and local levels. The resolution of disputes related to land-holding must be addressed as early as possible.

The process of reintegration cannot be initiated on a large scale until areas of return have been identified as safe or low-risk. Emergency mine surveys, mine clearance and awareness activities are a high priority in this context. Moreover, it is also recognised that the repatriation can be sustained only if timely and effectively consolidated by wider development oriented efforts. Operational linkages have to be established from the outset between returnee aid and development.

**Area-based rehabilitation and reintegration schemes**

Area-based rehabilitation and reintegration programmes have been developed to facilitate the reintegration of uprooted population. Implemented at the community-level, in specific districts and provinces, these programmes focus on reinforcing the capacity of receiving communities to integrate new residents. Combining emergency relief and development approaches contributes to the alleviation of war-induced economic devastation and helps promote social reconciliation at the local level.

Programmes are community-driven and deal with priorities determined locally with the involvement of civil society, including local NGOs, trade unions and private enterprise. They promote local self government and contribute to activating the self-help potential of communities. This allows implementation to integrate activities ranging from the provision of basic social services to legal assistance in the areas of civil documentation, land titling, and the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. Such programmes have been implemented in a number of war-torn countries in Central America, Asia and Africa.

**Key elements of programme design**

**Geographical area focus:** The selection of specific geographical areas for programme implementation allows the programme to avoid making artificial distinctions among population segments and to address the needs of displaced persons, refugees, demobilised former combatants and other victims of war, without discrimination. The programmes also promote the participation of vulnerable populations in local development initiatives ensuring an appropriate balance between the interests of the most active and organised local groups and those of lesser means. This can provide concrete support to broader policies of promoting the consolidation of the peace process and social solidarity. This is essential to avoid creating new inequities and tensions at the community level, and to foster reconciliation at the community level. Areas selected for programme implementation are identified as those where the peace process is most fragile, and social exclusion most acute, or where large numbers of displaced persons are to resettle.

**Launching the reconciliation process:** The programmes are intended to offer a powerful incentive for the initiation of a genuine reconciliation process (see Part I, Chapter 5, “Peace processes, justice and reconciliation”). They provide financial resources and technical support to the various segments of the population groups who – regardless of their political affiliation and social position – are willing to work together. While nurturing community participation and local decision-making is a time-consuming process entailing long negotiations, the response of the communities involved has generally been positive.
Decentralised management: Programme planning and management are the responsibility of representatives of the local civil society brought together for this purpose. They are responsible for formulating and developing high priority investment plans, identifying sources of finance and establishing the financial mechanisms for cost recovery. This allows the revitalisation of local social and economic structures in a way compatible with local history, tradition and culture.

Linkages between local initiatives and national policies: Another central objective of these programmes is to establish close linkages between local-level institutions and their counterparts at provincial and national levels, in order to ensure consistency of approaches. The long-term sustainability of the infrastructure and administrative systems developed at the local level hinges on their integration within national-level systems. In certain cases, institution-building carried out as part of an area-based rehabilitation scheme has created opportunities for more general reforms, with some of the systems of governance developed at the local level being subsequently used on a larger scale.

Integrated approaches to social and economic rehabilitation: The social fabric in target areas cannot be restored without revitalising economic activity and rebuilding basic infrastructure damaged by war. In part this can be done with the help of labour-intensive public works projects (including food-for-work projects). The benefits of peace and reconciliation become more tangible with the provision of social services and the rebuilding of community assets. Improved welfare, new employment and training opportunities help to create an environment in which individuals feel they have a stake in sustaining the peace process. For men and women living in a post-war zone, the transition from the status of victim to beneficiary to full participant is essential for sustainable development.

Key programme components

A variety of distinct activities can be carried out simultaneously under integrated management:

Human rights: This includes the establishment and/or strengthening of mechanisms, to protect human and civil rights and restore confidence in the legal system and the access of citizens to courts of justice. This is an important part of efforts to combat social exclusion and foster the participation of marginalised groups in social and economic life.

Health: This includes the establishment of local health systems in line with a view to decentralising health services and primary health care. Health care is not limited to prevention and treatment, but is expanded to incorporate social and community wellbeing. The effectiveness of activities in this field requires the collaboration of the state, the community and local NGOs.

Education: This includes the development of local education systems to bring the management of educational infrastructures and services in line with accepted principles of co-existence among different communities and respect for cultural differences.

Production systems: This includes assistance to farmers with the provision of inputs and in the area of marketing, the establishment of local economic development agencies, financial and/or technical assistance to help entrepreneurs.

Physical infrastructure: This includes programmes to rehabilitate roads, irrigation systems, drinking water supplies, schools, health centres, basic housing, sewers and latrines. These are generally carried out by local NGOs, local small- and medium-size enterprises, co-operatives and community groups.
**Environmental rehabilitation:** This includes the establishment of local land-use planning mechanisms, to identify and evaluate alternative agricultural practices and patterns of land use and the implementation of community-based programmes to rehabilitate watersheds and protect ecologically fragile zones.

**Some lessons learned**

To be successful, post-conflict reconstruction depends heavily on the participation of returning refugees and displaced persons, as they often represent factions opposed to the government during the conflict. Assistance in the post-conflict phase should take this into account.

The conduct of the warring parties during the conflict, and, in particular combatants’ behaviour towards civilians, shape the prospects for reconciliation and for a durable peace. Setting up mechanisms for the public exposition of human rights violations and/or the prosecution of individuals accused of war crimes including rape, may be an integral part of a viable process of national reconciliation. The social, psychological and physical impact of extreme violence must be taken into account in reintegration programmes.

In certain cases, parties in conflict deliberately target civilian populations for violent abuse, as part of political strategy. As a result, the situation of internally displaced persons can be far more precarious than that of refugees, who have benefited from international protection and basic subsistence. Also, the needs of returning displaced people cannot be assumed to be greater than those of local populations who have stayed behind throughout the period of turmoil. In these situations, efforts to meet the needs of returnees must also respond to those of the local community.

Although it cannot be assumed that returnees will want to settle back in their area of origin or return to their former line of activity, studies of post-repatriation problems point to the critical importance of access to land for cultivation and the value of support systems that kinship provides in the first reintegration phase. Among returning refugees, only few have the opportunity to put to good use new skills acquired while in exile, and most return to agriculture.

Experience from many refugee repatriation and reintegration programmes show that the bulk of aid resources available tend to be spent on the repatriation operation. Less attention and resources have been devoted to the reintegration effort. There is, however, increasing awareness that the reintegration of returning refugees is the more complex part of the process, and more demanding in terms of resources. It is also important to synchronise reintegration programmes with the return of the refugees and to avoid a prolonged hiatus between repatriation and support for reintegration.

**Actors and partnerships**

Within its mandate which also includes protection, work on the reintegration of refugees is normally initiated by UNHCR in the context of its repatriation operations, and the launching of quick impact projects designed to assist the receiving communities in coping with the arrival of the returnees. As a rule, national and international NGOs are associated with these operations, as implementing partners in the UNHCR programmes.

In many situations, initial reintegration assistance leads on to more broadly designed programmes, such as the area-based rehabilitation and reintegration programmes sponsored by UNDP and UNOPS, which provide a decentralised management structure for the various technical activities carried out by other specialised UN agencies, local government agencies or by NGOs.
Best practices identified

In advance of repatriation, an early assessment should be made to ascertain whether access roads, farm land and areas of return sites are free from land mines, and where necessary to allocate resources for mine awareness and mine clearance programmes.

The reintegration of displaced people, and especially area-based schemes, need to be based on an intimate knowledge of needs in order to establish the nature and scale of the effort in a realistic manner. This will entail a full analysis of the political, economic, social conditions, the state of the infrastructure, and of the security environment in the immediate post-conflict period, which should be carried out at the earliest stage, before humanitarian assistance is phased out.

Assistance should not be targeted at particular groups of beneficiaries. To contribute effectively to social reconciliation, the assistance must be seen to bring benefits to the entire population in areas where uprooted populations are to resettle, irrespective of whether people have been externally or internally displaced, have participated in the conflict as combatants, or remained at home during the conflict. Programmes should be as decentralised as possible and focus on promoting: co-operation within and between communities affected by conflict; and on the local identification of priority needs as well as means to address them.

Key orientations for donors

The magnitude of resources required for the organised repatriation of refugees can sometimes overshadow the considerable needs and difficulties that follow with the reintegration of both refugees and internally displaced people. Recognised to be a complex and extended process, reintegration demands substantial preparation and support alongside that for the initial repatriation or movement.

As the UN agencies primarily involved in the reintegration effort rely on voluntary donor contributions, it is important that funds are pledged for this purpose well ahead of the repatriation operation, so that these agencies can put in place the administrative institutions needed to carry out the longer-term reintegration effort. A hiatus in the delivery of assistance following return may seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of the programme.

Strategic operational linkages between initial reintegration aid and more development oriented projects should be established at the earliest stage of the operation. The earliest establishment of these linkages will ensure a smooth phase out of humanitarian assistance.

Demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants

Relevant principles and issues

The successful demobilisation and reinsertion of former combatants in civilian life is a key to political stability and to rebuilding war-torn societies (see Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and development”). In post-conflict situations, it is often a high priority for governments, which call for international assistance with various aspects of demobilisation programmes.

Where demobilisation has been poorly conducted, unpaid or undisciplined troops may turn to banditry, preying on villagers and road traffic, or even re-mobilise to form insurgencies challenging the established regime. Apart from its impact on political
Following years of unrest and violent conflict in the Northern part of the country, negotiations between the government of Mali and leaders of the Tuareg rebellion led to the conclusion of a peace agreement (“Pacte National”) in 1992. The process of reconciliation and demobilisation was, however, short-lived. The government of Mali faced severe difficulties in managing the agreed demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and delivering the promised economic assistance to the North.

Elements of the Tuareg movement broke away from the central co-ordinating body of the Pacte National and many Tuareg ex-combatants, who had been integrated in the national army, reverted to armed rebellion. Sporadic fighting broke out between government forces and militias, banditry and smuggling intensified, and the security situation deteriorated to the point that many development programmes could not be implemented in the North of Mali. The widespread availability of arms, which undermined demobilisation efforts, clearly contributed to the deterioration of security conditions.

In October 1993, the President of Mali set a precedent by asking the UN Secretary General for assistance in collecting and controlling illicit small arms. An Advisory Mission sent to Mali to assess the situation concluded that the security situation in Mali, by undermining the implementation of agreed programmes for demobilisation, re-integration, and the return of refugees, blocked economic and social development in Mali. The Mission thus proposed a “security first” approach to address the problem of insecurity. This called for the provision of external assistance for capacity-building programmes for police and other internal security forces; strengthening border controls and others measures. The Government embraced this approach, and prepared an emergency rehabilitation programme within the framework of the Pacte National. This included plans for a new and reinforced security system and for civil and administrative rehabilitation alongside demobilisation and development projects.

The UNDP agreed to support this approach, provided that the security plan be validated and monitored by UN experts, and provided support for an emergency rehabilitation and peace-building programme. In March 1996, in an event of great significance, ex-combatants from the militias and Tuareg gathered in Timbuktu to hand in their armaments, which were then burned under UN inspection. Besides allowing the disposal of large quantities of light weapons, this “Flame of Peace” (“Flamme de la Paix”) had great political and symbolic significance in the peace-building process.

The Government established a National Commission to coordinate efforts to tackle the proliferation of licit and illicit light weapons. A code of conduct for civil-military relations was also developed in a process involving representatives of the military, the police, civilian authorities, parliament and various sections of civil society as well as UN experts. Among other things, this has provided guidance to reinforce guarantees on the appropriate use of security assistance. Despite this progress, The post-conflict peace-building process remains fragile with a continuing availability of small arms and poor internal security.
Needs and areas of co-operation

As a rule, mobilisation begins with the assembly of former combatants in special camps (cantonment), where they surrender their weapons and uniforms and await final discharge. The period of cantonment, often supervised by United Nations military observers, serves the essential security objective of accounting for combatants and their weapons and of building confidence between the warring parties that they will uphold the terms of a negotiated peace agreement.

The needs of cantoned troops, which include food, water, shelter, sanitation, elementary health care and other basic necessities may be relatively easy to meet. However, the government, which is often already in arrears in paying soldiers’ salaries, may require assistance to meet associated costs.

Although every attempt is made to keep the period of cantonment as short as possible to reduce the risk of disorder, the political context within which demobilisation takes place is highly unpredictable. The actual duration of cantonment can therefore be difficult to estimate in advance. If the cantonment period is extended, the requirements of encamped soldiers, who are often joined by their families, can increase significantly, with the provision of further facilities including recreation and sports.

The cantonment period however also provides an opportunity to determine the exact number of combatants to be demobilised and to conduct detailed surveys of their skills, social status, intentions, and expectations. This greatly assists the formulation of reintegration programmes. It is also possible to give former combatants and their dependants a first orientation of what to expect in civilian life, including occupational counselling and vocational training.

The actual discharge of former combatants usually depends on the successful completion of other parts of the peace accords. On leaving cantonment areas, former combatants are usually dispersed and transported to their home districts. Upon arrival, they should be acquainted with representatives of the local government and any NGOs involved in the area.
In 1992 the government of Uganda announced the demobilisation and reintegration into civil society of some 50,000 soldiers. For this purpose, the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board was founded. In Ethiopia, following several decades of armed conflict, as well as natural climatic disasters, the government was confronted with the challenge of providing assistance to 3.5 million uprooted people. This included former soldiers and their dependants; internally displaced persons and returning refugees. Demobilised former combatants were considered a potential risk to security, given their military skills and lawless attitudes acquired over many years of war experience. A long-term programme initiated by the government of Ethiopia supported the reintegration of ex-combatants.

In Uganda, the overall objective is to reintegrate veterans by creating employment opportunities in their communities of origin. This is achieved by establishing self-sustaining small Ugandan enterprises in the road maintenance sector. The provision of employment opportunities of this kind is intended to foster the social reintegration of veterans and facilitate their acceptance in the community. The programme also aims to develop new skills among veterans and their dependants.

In Ethiopia, a major goal is to create income-generating activities and employment in co-operation with NGOs and local and regional administrative departments. This is supported by establishing an “open fund” to help NGOs, local associations and grassroots self-help groups to engage in reintegration initiatives. Various types of interventions are used including food-for-work, cash-for-work, and the provision of agricultural inputs and training. The project also aimed to reinforce local economic structures destroyed by the war.

Lessons learned

In Uganda, the strategy of helping to integrate veterans into local societies by employing them in the sector of road rehabilitation and maintenance turned out to be a promising approach, although the participation rate of veterans remained below 50%. In Ethiopia project results indicated that the reintegration of the ex-combatants, through the provision of short-term employment opportunities, offered a chance for understanding and reconciliation.

Some general lessons can be drawn from this experience:

- Issuing a non-transferable discharge certificate: ensures that veterans have access to their benefits; and reduces the risk of targeting errors. The continuous provision of information to beneficiaries about opportunities, constraints, and procedures significantly enhances reintegration.
- Veterans and their spouses should participate in the design of support packages. Donations in kind should correspond to their specific needs; cash support should not be handed out in one lump sum but in instalments, with part of the allowance going directly to women.
- Access to land and credit is vital for the reintegration of the different groups in the society. Small-scale credit schemes are important, but must be complemented by professional counselling in order to ensure effective utilisation of the funds made available.
- Central co-ordination through a temporary agency, balanced by decentralising implementation authority to the communities, makes for a powerful institutional arrangement. Field offices enable i) beneficiaries to have easier access to programme benefits and ii) the government to make the programme more responsive to local needs.

Initial reinsertion assistance usually consists of allowances to assist veterans with the basic necessities of life – shelter, medical care, food, clothing – over a period ranging from several months to two years. This may take the form of cash payments, vouchers and in-kind transfers; another important function of transitional assistance is to reduce the burden that veterans and their dependants place on the communities that receive them. The make-up of the reinsertion package should take account of the local cultural environment and modes of subsistence.

While financial payments may provide the greatest flexibility at least cost, the choice of mechanism for delivering reinsertion and reintegration assistance depends on local conditions, including the existence of local bank offices. When support is provided in the form of cash payments these are usually better spread over several instalments, with an option of advances for investment purposes, rather than disbursed as lump sums.
It is essential that such assistance not be perceived as an indefinite entitlement. Termination dates should be communicated clearly to the soldiers at the time of demobilisation. Special provisions should be made, however, for long-term assistance to severely-handicapped former combatants.

While reintegration support is usually focused on former combatants, it should always be kept in mind that there are other groups facing serious problems of reintegration into traditional villages and families following conflict. These often include unmarried mothers, victims of rape or girls who have resorted to prostitution in order to survive. In traditional societies these victims face particularly difficult problems in being accepted if they return. In some societies families may reject their unmarried daughters. Reintegration in these types of situations must involve counselling for both the victims and their families and communities, as well as training in child care, nutrition, and basic education.

Some lessons learned

Former combatants often feel that they deserve special attention, as they have made personal sacrifices and borne the brunt of war. Their capacity to disrupt the peace warrants paying special attention to their needs. Political circumstances, therefore may dictate providing disproportionate assistance to former combatants. Resolving the competing demands dilemma requires pragmatism and considered political judgement.

At the same time, ex-soldiers from the lower ranks of the army or rebel forces, constitute a socially vulnerable group sharing many of the characteristics of other populations uprooted by conflict. Enrolled at an early age, many have low levels of education, few marketable civilian skills and little or no experience in the labour market. Many suffer from physical and psychological handicaps. Resentment against former combatants held responsible for war-time destruction is also a handicap to their reinsertion in civilian society.

The reintegration of former combatants in civilian life usually occurs under conditions of economic stagnation, with employment opportunities scarce and the scope for entrepreneurial ventures limited. Given poor economic prospects, the risk of demobilised soldiers being drawn to criminal pursuits is high. Severance payments only provide short term relief and must be supplemented with broader programmes in support of economic reconstruction. Over the long term, only the resumption of economic growth provides a basis for economic and social reintegration.

Experience has shown that severance payments alone cannot achieve a smooth reintegration of ex-combatants in civilian life. Targeted assistance in the fields of vocational training, skills certification and job search are also required. In order to minimise social polarisation, reintegration programmes should furthermore focus on the communities in which former soldiers are reintegrated, as part of broader programmes designed to assist all war-affected populations.

Over the long term, only the resumption of economic growth provides a basis for economic and social reintegration.
Institutional arrangements

Designing demobilisation programmes requires close co-operation between the many actors involved, at the earliest possible stage. The military must identify the number and rank of combatants to be demobilised and agree with the government on a package of demobilisation benefits. Donors must agree with the government on how the demobilisation is to be carried out and the amount of support they are able to provide. NGOs, which often play an important role in the implementation of these programmes, must also be involved in the planning process. The expectations of demobilised soldiers and the views of the communities to which they will be returning must also be reflected in the programmes.

The establishment of a mixed civilian, quasi-governmental commission has proved to be a good mechanism for guiding the overall demobilisation/reintegration process and for co-ordination within the donor community. Former combatants also need a special organisation to represent them and protect their rights. The primary objective must, however, be to assist veterans, not to create an elaborate administrative structure.

Another critical component of any demobilisation/reintegration scheme is the capacity to monitor and evaluate the programme, to allow adjustments to make them as effective as possible for the beneficiaries.

Where demobilisation occurs as part of a peace process supervised by the United Nations, a peacekeeping operation may be responsible for co-ordinating assistance among donors. In other cases, it is desirable to appoint a lead bilateral or multilateral agency further purpose.

Alongside demobilisation programmes, it is important to develop arrangements to reduce the level of arms in society, and to manage the destruction of “surplus” weapons. Moreover it is also often a priority to strengthen institutional capacity to control borders, not least in order to limit illicit arms flows both inwards and towards other regions of tension or conflict.

Best practices identified

Reinsertion/reintegration is a family affair: any assistance provided should not be aimed at the soldier alone but should also include dependents. Programmes that do not take into account the fact that many former-combatants must provide for numerous

Donors must agree with the government on how the demobilisation is to be carried out and the amount of support they are able to provide.

Cash for a gun?

In most situations where the disarming of regular soldiers or guerrilla forces has been agreed to, proposals are frequently made suggesting that weapons not handed in when soldiers are demobilised might be collected by offering cash compensation to individuals against each surrendered weapon.

Arms buy-back schemes of this kind have been tried in various situations. Experience shows that they are seldom workable nation-wide or on a large scale. In the first place it is virtually impossible to set a generally applicable “market price” for weapons, or one that is likely to satisfy all former soldiers and arms holders. The price of a weapon is relative and contingent on too many factors, from its possible use by an individual for criminal purposes to the systematic sale and smuggling of arms across a border, to an insurrectionist movement in a neighbouring country. Buy-back schemes create a demand for weapons which may be overwhelmed by an increased supply which is a legacy of the conflict. Broader efforts, reflecting local culture, are needed to encourage voluntary disarmament as security increases.

Offering cash for weapons has worked well in more confined settings, where there is strong popular support for such actions, or where a non-governmental organisation or a church can administer the scheme in relative isolation from wider influences affecting the will of individuals to dispose of or to hold on to their weapons.
dependants will fall short of former soldiers needs and may delay their reintegration into society.

Reinsertion-reintegration is also a community affair: the more support veterans receive from community groups, the greater the chance of their rapid reintegration. Since extended families are an important support to newly demobilised soldiers, veterans should be encouraged to take up residence in communities where family members reside. It is, however, desirable to survey communities, during the planning phase and on a sampling basis, to ascertain their attitudes and capacity to assist veterans. Where possible, efforts should be undertaken to sensitise community leaders to the challenges facing veterans and their families, and inform them of roles that local communities can play in easing the transition to civilian life. Area-based rehabilitation programmes can provide a way to assist communities that absorb a substantial number of ex-soldiers.

Programmes must take into account the needs of vulnerable groups. The disabled, the chronically ill, child soldiers, and women require special attention. Female combatants and the wives of veterans often face considerable social and economic hardship and may need targeted assistance.

**Key orientations for donors**

Highly political as they are, demobilisation programmes are susceptible to delays and modifications. Soldiers may have to remain in assembly areas much longer than anticipated. Where the conflict has ended without a clear victor, political pressures to alter benefit packages and eligibility criteria are particularly strong. Despite such constraints, early planning of demobilisation programmes can help them to be responsive to political developments and avoid delays in implementing the peace process.

Provisions for the implementation of demobilisation programmes should be explicitly included in peace accords. The planning of demobilisation and reintegration should begin well before troops enter assembly areas and make allowance for unexpected events and delays. The availability of quick disbursing funds that can be applied flexibly is also essential.

As far as possible, programme design should be based on surveys of the skill profile and employment aspirations of soldiers; these should be matched with work and training opportunities in the communities to which they are to return. The scope for adapting ongoing programmes to meet the needs of ex-combatants should also be explored.

Governments emerging from long periods of civil strife may be eager to consolidate their power, reward loyal followers, and enhance their support by promising benefits they cannot deliver. Unfulfilled promises to ex-combatants risk generating social discontent. Donors should assist governments in shaping programmes that are realisable and financially viable.
The clearing of land mines

Relevant principles and issues

Few consequences of conflict in recent decades have been more traumatic than the maiming and death caused by land mines, often planted purposely in a random fashion (see Part I, Chapter 3, “Security and development”). The great majority of victims are innocent civilians in pursuit of their livelihoods. Though weapons of war, land mines continue to constitute a threat long after the armed conflict has abated.

The prevalent and unpredictable security threat posed by remaining mines is a major obstacle to the resumption of normal life and economic, social and political development. The human suffering caused by land mines has become a matter of rising concern to the international community in the last decade. In facing the aftermath of a series of civil wars, humanitarian agencies are confronted with two critical challenges:

- In the short run, major resources are required to attend to casualties needing medical care and physical rehabilitation.
- Over the long term, the task of identifying and removing the land mines over the whole territory affected will require considerable efforts and resources, probably extending over decades and diverting scarce resources which could otherwise be devoted to reconstruction and development.

The critical issue has been defined and debated in international fora: whether the military utility of land mines, in particular anti-personnel mines, outweighs the unintended injury to civilian populations that invariably follows. Negotiations have so far fallen short of a final conclusion on the scope of application, on transfer and verification issues, as well as on various technical and economic points related to production and use.

A growing number of countries now hold that the case for banning the production, trade and use of land mines is incontrovertible. The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly called for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines, and the Secretary-General has made a strong plea for introducing a total ban on the use of such mines. On a parallel track, the Ottawa Process aims for an international agreement to ban anti-personnel mines.

Needs and areas of co-operation

In conflict and post-conflict situations, the clearing of land mines is frequently an immediate priority. De-mining and awareness of the mine threat are directly related to emergency activities, because of the urgent need to save lives, to provide surface access to relief distribution points and to ensure the safe movement and reintegration of displaced people.

Mine clearance is also linked to the transition from emergency relief to development and to the progressive normalisation of all aspects of national life.
There is a primary need to establish the extent of the land mine problem in the country concerned, through emergency surveys to provide basic information on the scope of the problem. Subsequently, detailed surveys are necessary to establishing the location of mine-fields and mined road stretches and priorities for mine clearance operations. The physical characteristics of these areas and mine density are important for assessing the possible use of different techniques in clearing the mines. Another priority need is the training of national de-mining personnel. Whatever technology is eventually applied in the de-mining operations, there must be a corps of trained personnel in manual de-mining and a cadre of supervisors with on-the-job experience. In most cases it is possible to recruit trainees from the ranks of the military, and where demobilisation programmes are under way, de-mining can provide employment to ex-soldiers. Women and children, as agriculturists and fuel gatherers, are particularly vulnerable to mines and should be targeted for mine-awareness training programmes. In addition to increased security, such training can provide both economic opportunities and empowerment for women, often the traditional teachers in society.

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Preliminary surveys of the extent of the mine problem and the training of national de-mining personnel are frequently started during peace-keeping operations. As far as mine clearance is concerned, a cardinal point of peace-keeping missions has been that de-mining is the responsibility of national agencies and personnel. Beyond reporting the existence of mine-fields, foreign contingents will normally not themselves engage in the marking of mine perimeters or in removing mines. Peace-keeping contingents can, however, readily provide instructors and establish temporary centres to train personnel in the basic theory and practice of land mine removal.

The selection and training of supervisors has to be done with care, as managers and de-mining leaders play a key operational role. Supervisory experience on the job is essential, and special arrangements have to be made for peace-keeping units to provide operational settings and opportunities for nationals to acquire job experience. In general NGOs specialised in mine clearance have been able to mount training and de-mining programmes with speed and efficiency. However, though readily engaging in actual operations, NGOs are usually not in a position to conduct activities on a scale commensurate with the magnitude of the problem.

Mines are extremely cheap to manufacture and plant but difficult and subsequently expensive to identify and remove. The production cost of an average mine, around US$10-$20, compares with the direct and indirect removal costs of US$300-$1 000 per mine. It is estimated that the cost of clearing all mines world-wide could range from at least US$33 billion to US$85 billion.

In the meantime, the problem is still growing as land mines continue to be laid faster than they are being removed. It is estimated that, on average more than 2 million mines are being laid each year while clearing operations remove about 100 000.

Women and children, as agriculturists and fuel gatherers, are particularly vulnerable to mines and should be targeted for mine-awareness training programmes.

Freeing an entire country of mines is invariably a costly effort, and usually no firm target date can be set for reaching that goal.
When de-mining operations are launched, the principal needs that arise are, firstly, how to provide a long-term institutional base for all mine-related activities, and secondly, how to fund de-mining operations in the long run. Freeing an entire country of mines is invariably a costly effort, and usually no firm target date can be set for reaching that goal.

Some lessons learned

International assistance has focused on creating an indigenous capacity for mine removal, using manual techniques, which is often labour-intensive and slow in producing results. In part, this is because faster military technologies of mine clearance, appropriate for opening breaches in enemy defences, have not yet been adapted for civilian requirements, and further trials are necessary to establish the field conditions under which such technologies can be used to advantage.

Understandably, with daily reports of victims of injuries and fatalities from land mines, there is considerable pressure on all concerned to act with urgency. As a result, the institutional aspects of de-mining operations, which are key to making them sustainable, are too often neglected or delayed.

Pressures to begin de-mining programmes quickly increase the risks of inadequate preparation. If the scale of the problem is not properly assessed, and the location of mine concentrations not well identified in advance, the choices of mine-clearing technology may be inappropriate. More attention needs to be paid to productivity and cost effectiveness in de-mining work. The time-consuming manual prodding of land, square metre by square metre, can be supplemented by other techniques where mine density is low and where topographic conditions permit.

Over time, and once a national capability for mine removal has been created, the social and economic dimensions of de-mining demand increasing attention. The humanitarian objectives of mine-clearance are intimately linked with development, affecting transportation, agricultural production, as well as the health and social sectors. Political dimensions arise with issues of land use and the selection of beneficiary communities. It is therefore essential for the mechanisms set up for processing and approving de-mining requests to include a transparent system for assessing priorities.

Partnerships and actors

Humanitarian NGOs and agencies have been in the forefront in confronting the problems created by land mines. Early on, Red Cross associations and NGOs took up the physical rehabilitation of disabled land mine victims. Establishing orthopaedic centres and workshops for the manufacture of artificial limbs, they have made a significant contribution to national health care in many countries. These activities have
led several NGOs to expand the scope of their work and to specialise also in preventive
mine-awareness programmes, mine-field marking and mine clearance.

Within the United Nations system, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)
has been named the focal point for mine-clearance work. It has played a lead role in
organising de-mining programmes, and in following up on training activities launched
as part of peace-keeping operations. DHA has staffed up a special De-mining Unit and
opened a trust fund designed to secure resources for the early start-up of de-mining
operations which might otherwise be delayed. DHA is also building up in-house
capacity to provide advice on all land mine-related issues and, in particular, on the
choice of de-mining technologies, as determined by the various factors influencing cost-
effectiveness and productivity.

A peculiar feature of external co-operation in the field of de-mining is the contribution
made by the defence establishments of several donor countries. This is usually a legacy
of earlier involvement in peace-keeping operations; contributing countries continue to
second military personnel to meet the technical assistance needs of national mine-clearing
agencies, drawing in part on their defence budgets for this purpose.

From their various vantage points, UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP)
and UNICEF all have a direct interest in mine removal, financially supporting mine-
awareness and mine clearing programmes. The United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has developed expertise in promoting mine-
awareness. As a rule UNDP along with UNOPS are called on to assist at the institution-
building stage, providing general management inputs for the conduct of de-mining
operations, and ensuring that the resources devoted to land-mine removal also serve
social and economic goals effectively.

The UNDP complements DHA by providing continuity to de-mining operations
beyond the emergency phase. As it has limited funds from core resources at its disposal
for de-mining, UNDP needs to pool funding from several donors, through trust funds
or cost-sharing arrangements. Even where bilateral donors prefer to make their support
available in kind, UNDP plays a general co-ordinating role and structures contributions
so that these are mutually supportive.

**Best practices identified**

In particular, donors have an interest in supporting:

- The conduct of early detailed mine prevalence surveys to determine the scale of
  future operations and to assess the potential of different de-mining techniques.
- The launching of immediate de-mining operations, having recourse to specialised
  NGOs, providing them with the means of equipping and deploying de-miners.
- The creation of an indigenous capacity for mine clearance; as rapidly as possible.
- The governments’ efforts in making institutional arrangements for the long term,
  integrating information and verification systems, mine-awareness activities, mine-
  field marking and mine clearance operations.
- The implementation of the government’s de-mining strategy, including policy
  regimes designed to ensure that it is consistent with national plans for social and
  economic development, as well as with the humanitarian intent.
- The efforts of non-governmental organisations in caring for the victims of land
  mines, including post-trauma rehabilitation and training for productive
  occupations.
Key orientations for donors

Where mines have been deployed on a large scale, the cure is costly and time consuming. Long-term commitments on the part of donors are necessary to assist affected countries in freeing their land from mines.

The ways of channelling financial contributions to the de-mining effort include:

i) making cash donations to the DHA-managed Voluntary Trust Fund of the Secretary-General for Assistance in Mine Clearance;

ii) helping establish a UN stand-by capacity to provide rapid survey missions, trainers, managers and de-mining equipment; and

iii) contributing to trust funds or cost-sharing arrangements designed to finance individual national de-mining operations.

Tests indicate that the application of new technologies may have considerable potential. An intensified research effort designed to refine current methods of detection and render mine removal more effective could significantly speed up de-mining operations, with immeasurable benefits in terms of economic and social costs.
Regional approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building

Principles and approaches

The rise in intra-state violence in recent years has not only exacerbated socio-economic, environmental, and developmental problems, it has also raised the risks of regional instability. Refugee flows highlight the need for comprehensive regional perspectives and responses to transborder ethnic nationalism, environmental degradation and resource scarcity. The growing focus on internal conflict should not obscure the fact that inter-state tensions persist in most regions, calling for better responses by the international community (see Part I, Chapter 4, “Supporting regional co-operation and consultation”).

Conflict prevention often requires addressing both sub-state and regional issues. A key challenge for external efforts to assist lies in the fact that the state has been traditionally seen as the exclusive expression of political unity and guardian of national security. Most international organisations and bilateral agencies are organised to programme their assistance efforts at the level of the state. They are often constrained in effectively addressing the regional dimensions of conflict, both with respect to their causes and their consequences.

Sensitivity to outside involvement is heightened in situations of violent conflict, with post-colonial governments having special reasons for resisting any form of assistance on the part of the international community which might appear to question their sovereignty and territorial integrity as independent states. This can act as a serious impediment to effective early engagement in conflict prevention by the UN and other non-regional actors. It is perhaps the most compelling justification for working to strengthen regional approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building.

The fact that internal conflicts generally produce instability at the regional level means that effective strategies to proactively engage conflict situations will require a co-ordinated regional approach based on a commitment to agreed principles. Development of such a set of common principles is an essential first step. These principles should affirm the commitment of member states to existing norms and standards defined by the UN and international law, and draw upon existing regional instruments.

The end of the Cold War has allowed the UN to reassert its Charter in promoting the use of regional organisations and arrangements as the preferred level of response for the preventive engagement and management of regional conflicts and post-conflict transitions. Parallel to this has been the growth of institutional initiatives and mandate reforms by various regional organisations, reflecting the evolution of regional frameworks for security dialogue and co-operation. The Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have, in particular, demonstrated a renewed determination to try to deal with internal conflicts and democratic development.
Regional dimensions of conflict

Intra-state conflict and regional instability

Many serious inter-group tensions and structural inequalities – which, combined with the lack of effective political mechanisms, can generate violent internal strife – might be effectively addressed by initiatives at a regional level. Political participation, decentralisation and power-sharing arrangements, constitutional and legal guarantees, and reform of the role of the military are all crucial issues which have regional dimension. In the economic sphere, long-term reconstruction will be better secured with concrete steps towards greater regional integration of markets. In addition, the harmonisation of human rights norms and practices (particularly as regards minority rights) among governments at the regional-level can contribute greatly to stability and decrease the possibility of external support for insurgents.

The issues at stake in a protracted internal conflict will often be of greater salience and significance to a country’s immediate neighbours than to the broader international community. Regional actors will often, though not always, have both an immediate interest and a more nuanced appreciation of the options available for effective external contributions. The international community has learned from experience that multilateral preventive engagement in an internal conflict may often be best mediated through the relevant regional organisation or group.

Regional approaches (whether they are ad hoc plurilateral contact groups or regional organisations) have an advantage in that they can often accommodate sovereignty issues effectively by engaging state authorities in a process that is at once supra-state and localised. A government that is a member of a regional organisation may well feel less threatened by a regional process of engagement co-ordinated by that organisation, than by intervention by non-regional actors. Such regional approaches also allow for the participation of regional middle-powers in facilitating dialogue. This follows the so-called “South-South approach” whereby neighbours co-operate and assist in support of peace-building, rebuilding and the implementation of reforms. However, it must also be recognised that the impartiality of regional organisations and neighbouring countries is sometimes in question. In cases where there are regional power struggles or
hegemonic fears, wider international institutions may be more appropriate channels for international response and support.

Peace-building and conflict prevention processes must be self-sustaining once external donor support has ended or reverted to regular development programming. This raises the important issue of ownership of peace programmes, their origins in local/regional approaches to conflict prevention and management, and the continuing role of local/regional organisations in programme creation and delivery. By rooting conflict prevention and peace-building programmes in regional approaches, donors are more likely to effectively ensure their long-term viability and compatibility with regional norms. Protagonists would be inclined to put a greater emphasis on continuing participation in a process which is the product of their own interests and concerns.

**Impact of refugee populations on host countries**

Aside from their regional political impacts, large scale refugee movements have a major social and economic impact on host countries. From the moment of their arrival, the needs of refugees compete with those of nationals for scarce resources and assets, be they land, water, wood for fuel, housing or food. Their presence inevitably places a heavy burden on local amenities, forcing host country authorities to divert energies and resources from their own development effort.

In many respects, major refugee flows are thus an added impediment to development in the host country. The direct and indirect impacts may be felt long after the refugees have returned to their country of origin. For example, the damage caused by a sudden and unexpected influx of impoverished people is often devastating to the environment. The problems caused by the consumption of wood for fuel and shelter, in areas that are already ecologically fragile, are particularly serious.

The impact of refugees on hosting areas is not entirely negative, however, as their presence often helps generate economic activities, such as trade, employment and income opportunities, which can benefit host populations. On balance though, such benefits seldom outweigh the negative impacts of a large-scale refugee presence over extended periods.

When refugees are from the same cultural and linguistic group as the host population, there is often widespread sympathy for their situation. Where such bonds are weak, friction and resentment more easily arise. A common source of discontent among the local populace, especially the poor, arises when refugees receive attention and services not available to the local host community. Aid agencies should attempt to promote equal treatment for those in hosting areas, especially in such fields as education and medical services.

The heavy price that host countries, themselves often among the least developed, have to pay in providing asylum to refugees is increasingly recognised. Whilst donor response has so far been uneven, there is now greater concern that the international community must help mitigate the negative effects of refugee presence, especially when it is protracted.

In most cases asylum extended by the host country does not imply that the presence of refugees comes without political strains which affect relations between the countries of the region. The consideration of problems of asylum and repatriation is accordingly an eminently regional concern that can often only be resolved within a regional political framework.
Best practices identified
Regional mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace-building

Principles of regional security should be built on the main components of human security, including the rule of law, social justice, equitable and sustainable development, protection of fundamental human rights, democratic development, and inter-group dialogue and reconciliation. Donors should endeavour to help regional organisations to uphold established international principles and commitments. In concert with this human security orientation, donors should encourage regional organisations to develop comprehensive frameworks for the promotion of conflict prevention and peace-building and orient their support for capacity-building to help regional organisations act as a bridge between the international community and the states of the region. The availability of financial and technical means often determine the activities that regional organisations can undertake. Specific areas of donor support should include providing technical expertise to strengthen communications and logistical capacities.

Development agencies should also consider support in regions in which there are as yet few effective arrangements for regional conflict prevention and peace-building, such as Northeast Asia and South Asia. Emerging regional arrangements, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), focusing on trade and economic co-operation issues, could be encouraged to address specific aspects of regional and sub-regional security (e.g. minority rights, shared resources, and military confidence-building).

Donor agencies can also provide much-needed financial and technical support for regional/local NGOs which are engaged in the development of common regional
approaches to conflict and security. Particular attention should be given to improving the capacity of national and local women’s organisations to form regional links supporting dialogue and reconciliation. Supported by the donor community, regional organisations should also be encouraged to systematise co-operation with regional and local NGOs.

**Regional management of shared natural resources**

Increased competition over access to shared natural resources, such as land and water, can encourage powerful groups to seize control of increasingly scarce resources, forcing marginal or vulnerable groups to migrate to less habitable, often ecologically sensitive areas. This process can in turn reinforce environmental strain and raise the potential for social tension. Under certain circumstances, scarcities of renewable resources, such as cropland, forests or water can produce civil disputes at the community or national level and raise transborder suspicions and tensions.

To address the problems associated with the management of regionally shared natural resources, joint management in some form of Resource Management Regime (RMR) is often necessary. RMRs vary to fit the geographic region to which they are applied. They can encourage long-term management through co-operative approaches involving all stakeholders and thus reduce the potential for conflict. Generally, the better a RMR is in recognising major stakeholders, the better equipped it is to resolve conflict between parties.

While taking realistic account of the respective interests and bargaining strength of the parties, a strong RMR uses ideas and scientific understanding to shape the development of issues and options. It plays an entrepreneurial role by using its negotiating skill to influence the ways in which issues are approached and “contracts” defined for the benefit of all parties. It can act in the name of these parties to devise effective ways of bringing resources and expertise into agreed solutions. RMRs help national policy-makers better understand where to intervene to improve outcomes, gather relevant data and make those data available, and strengthen the methodology and theories that help policy-makers understand development problems.

Most importantly, resource management must increasingly be informed by sound evidence on changes in the quality and quantity of resources available. Sharing research between stakeholders can often diminish tension and promote the idea of a common problem with a solution lying in co-operation instead of conflict.

Specific areas of donor support can include:

- The transfer of knowledge and expertise, including in the fields of policy-making, planning and institutionalised decision-making.
- The transfer of technology.
- Capacity development in the environment.
- Facilitation, mediation and co-ordination.
Key orientations for donors

Neighbouring countries may often have both strong motivation and special capability to help carry out successful peace-building and reconstruction programmes. The ability to provide appropriate technical assistance and training, share experience on transitions and reform, and familiarity with regional issues and communities all argue for greater involvement of other regional countries, wherever they are also able to act even-handedly.

The absence of an effective dialogue process between state and sub-state actors is a difficult issue for states and donor agencies to address, yet it is perhaps the central issue for effective preventive engagement. Regional and local non-governmental and community-based organisations, including women’s peace groups, can offer promising opportunities in this regard. Donor agencies and regional organisations should identify key regional NGOs which can act as co-ordinating contact points for the delivery of peace-building assistance by local NGOs in the field. An integrated regional approach to conflict could thus be two-pronged in nature: working with regional organisations and groups at the supra-state level, tied to regional/local NGOs at the sub-state level.

Donors should encourage initiatives aimed at fostering greater regional economic co-operation and integration, which would not only help to expand local economic gains but also foster mutual trust and co-operation. Encouraging “South-South” co-operation on specific functional issues in specific sectors could be pursued as a means of building regional dialogue and the mutual, integrative perception of shared interests.

Sub-regional bodies which are formed to address functional issues such as trade or resource management can sometimes provide a basis for beginning to address issues of regional tension or conflict. These more indirect means of supporting conflict prevention and peace-building can offer promising avenues, especially where these efforts are sustained over the long-term. Donors should also support the creation of interstate decision-making mechanisms which specifically include dispute resolution machinery.

Natural resource stocks and flows are rarely confined within natural boundaries, and recent experience has shown the need to “unbundle” exclusive administrative control from territorially distinct state institutions. Donors should encourage and facilitate the establishment of Resource Management Regimes to formalise webs of bilateral relations connecting neighbouring states. For an RMR to work, it must have the ability to implement a management plan, thus it requires technical and operational support to give it credibility among the partner states.

Regional approaches to military and security sector reform should, wherever possible, draw upon the expertise of other regional partners in such areas as demobilisation and reintegration. This may take the form of intra-regional exchanges of military and police officers to share lessons on enhancing their professionalism and strengthening civilian control.

While supporting their potential, it is necessary to recognise the limits of many regional organisations in the developing world. Many are financially-constrained and under-resourced institutions with little institutional or administrative capacity to deliver comprehensive and integrated mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace-building. Ad hoc regional arrangements can also be an effective avenue for conflict prevention. This assumes that the ultimate goal in advocating regional approaches is the prevention of conflict, not institution-building per se. The most effective instrument for addressing the conflict should be supported, whether it be a formal intergovernmental organisation, NGO, ad hoc grouping, or some other alternative arrangement.
As the resources of the Mekong are increasingly harnessed to promote the economic goals of the riparian states – which include Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and China – the potential for differences and conflicting interests to arise poses challenges for the maintenance of stability in the region. The considerable imbalance in size and power among the states creates some concern among the smaller countries that they will be dominated by the larger powers. Combined with an uneven enthusiasm for rapid exploitation of the region’s resources, there is a potential for tensions, in a region torn by war for much of this century.

The evolving political and economic situation in the Mekong basin requires new and flexible approaches to resource management. These approaches should include strategies for ensuring that resource development is mutually beneficial and that effective mechanisms exist for inter-country dispute resolution.

The Mekong River Commission is well placed to ensure that the Mekong River is utilised in an equitable and sustainable manner. The structure of this organisation and the commitment to co-operation that underpins it gives the Commission the potential to assume considerable practical importance and moral authority in the management of regional affairs in Southeast Asia.

Even as the tensions diminish between states, the potential for conflicts to be generated between interest groups over environmental issues and resource usage and distribution may increase. These new axes of conflict include:

- Ethnic tension arising from patterns of resource use, i.e. between shifting cultivators and other resource users.
- Inter-regional tensions particularly created by income disparities and conflicting resource demands between regions within a country, often exacerbated by access or the lack thereof to river resources.
- Social divisions often arising in the absence of well-defined resource tenure.
- Challenges to mainstream interests arising from democratisation and socio-political liberalisation, i.e. the emergence of new NGOs/interest groups, which often have cross-border linkages.

These new axes of tension and insecurity suggest the need for innovative approaches to promoting co-operation, conflict resolution and peace within the Mekong region and beyond. An exclusive focus on nation states may not be the most effective approach, at least in certain arenas of conflict.

The imperatives of co-ordination, information exchange and lead donor/agency roles all apply equally in regional approaches as well as national situations. Coordination can greatly help regional organisations or groups determine the priorities for programme delivery, and could develop (with selected NGOs, IFIs, and bilateral donor agencies) the general orientations for ensuring that assistance is effective in both conflict prevention and peace-building as well as in developmental terms. This vital donor co-ordination will often require some subordination or pooling of objectives at the national level in favour of co-operative regional ones. In some instances, regional development banks could act as co-ordinating bodies for integrated regional approaches, and also initiate programmes to support the development of regional capacity-building. In addition, donors could encourage the sharing of expertise and lessons learned, not only between states and non-governmental groups within one region, but also between different regional organisations.
The OECD Development Assistance Committee adopts policy guidance for Members in the conduct of their development co-operation programmes. These guidelines reflect the views and experience of the Members and benefit from input by multilateral institutions and individual experts, including experts from developing countries.

**Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation**

Approved by the DAC High Level Meeting of 1996, *Shaping the 21st Century* sets forth strategic orientations for development co-operation into the 21st century. The report recalls the importance of development for people everywhere and the impressive record of human progress during the past 50 years. It suggests a set of basic goals based on UN Conference outcomes – for economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability – as a vision for the future, and proposes strategies for attaining that vision through partnership in support of self-help efforts, improved co-ordination and consistent policies. These goals, and the partnership approach, have since been widely adopted in the international development system.

In this context, DAC Members have developed a series of guidelines for attaining the ambitious goals set out in *Shaping the 21st Century*.

**The DAC Guidelines (2001):**

- Poverty Reduction
- Strategies for Sustainable Development: Guidance for Development Co-operation
- Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development
- Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

**Previously Published DAC Guidelines**

- DAC Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation
- Support of Private Sector Development
- Participatory Development and Good Governance
- Donor Assistance to Capacity Development in Environment
- Guidelines on Aid and Environment:
  - No. 1: Good Practices for Environmental Impact Assessment of Development Projects
  - No. 2: Good Practices for Country Environmental Surveys and Strategies
  - No. 3: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Developing Countries
  - No. 4: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global Environmental Problems
  - No. 5: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Chemicals Management
  - No. 6: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Pest and Pesticide Management
  - No. 7: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Disaster Mitigation
  - No. 8: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global and Regional Aspects of the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment
  - No. 9: Guidelines for Aid Agencies for Improved Conservation and Sustainable Use of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Wetlands

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