Lessons Learned Paper

Lessons Drawn from the Experience of Conducting an Evaluation Exercise concerning an

OECD DAC Evaluation of Donor Activities in Support of Conflict-Sensitive Development and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka

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An Assignment commissioned by the Donor Peace Support Group, Sri Lanka and the Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation Network, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

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Preface

This paper is an internal report to the OECD-DAC and to the participating donors in the Sri Lanka evaluation exercise. As such it is more explicit in describing events and the positions of different actors than might have been the case with a more open document. This is to help ensure that the experience is candidly recorded in order to help with the planning and execution of future such studies.

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Introduction

This paper is part of the requirement of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the pilot test of the OECD-DAC guidance on evaluating of donor activities in support of conflict-sensitive development (CSD) and conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) in Sri Lanka. The Lessons Learned report is intended to: *"summarise the lessons learned from the process of the evaluation for improving the DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. The report should have a maximum of 15 pages and an annex suggested tracked changes to the DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* (Working Document for application period)."

To gain a full picture of the process, the narrative presented here should be read along with the original and revised TOR, and the Inception Report. These are attached as Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

This evaluation forms part of a process of field testing draft guidance prepared by the OECD-DAC on how to evaluate Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB) activities. It is the first of four planned pilots[1].

The purposes of the evaluation in Sri Lanka would be to help DAC partners working in Sri Lanka in their efforts to support peacebuilding and to undertake conflict sensitive development work, while at the same collect evidence on the applicability of the draft DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities.

The overall objective will be to assess donor strategies in Sri Lanka since 2002. In particular, the evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, efficiency, coherence and coverage of donors activities, and try to identify and demonstrate results and impact (positive or negative) of these activities. Furthermore, it will aim to identify specific lessons for how donors can improve their approaches to provide more targeted and resource-effective assistance in conflict contexts.

The output is expected to be useful in terms of highlighting lessons and suggesting best practices, and findings will be used both by DAC partners working for and in Sri Lanka and those involved in program and policy development. In addition, the findings will be useful for DAC partners involved in developing the guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities to improve the final version of the guidance. (TOR, April 2008: see Annex 1)

Preparation

The preparation for the Sri Lanka pilot exercise was extensive. An Issues Paper was prepared in December 2007 that set the scene for the topics that the evaluation might cover. This Paper was very comprehensive (and frank) covering strategies, coordination, communication, human rights, risks, government involvement, management and timing.

The original TOR (April 2008) were based on this Issues paper and went through a number of revisions. An extensive set of possible evaluations questions was also developed. Initially, these amounted to a total of 92 questions (52 on peacebuilding and 39 on human rights). In the revised TOR, this list was reduced to 14. During the inception process, these questions were amalgamated into a final set that attempted to provide an achievable yet comprehensive list that reflected issues of importance to the concerned donors in Sri Lanka.

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[1] Others are planned for S.Sudan, D.R.Congo and Haiti

The Evaluation Team

The consultant team of four persons was identified in early 2008, with a view to starting the evaluation in July 2008. However due to contracting issues and to events in Sri Lanka, the evaluation was delayed until September. The final work plan for the pilot evaluation is set out in Figure 1.

The team comprised a useful mix of experience, with a balance in terms of gender (two men and two women), professional background (with expertise in socio-economic development, CPPB, governance and human rights), and knowledge of the Sri Lanka (one member had no previous experience, two had previous mission experience and the local consultant who was resident).

Figure 1. Work Plan : Sri Lanka Evaluation

Timing	Sep-08			Oct-08				Nov-08				Dec-08				Jan-09			total
week beginning	13	20	27	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26
Activity																			
Inception Period																			
Documentation																			
Set up meetings																			
Brief St. Committee																			
Inception mission																			
Inception Report write up																			
Comments and revision																			
Preparatory reading / studies																			
Main Mission																			
Meeting St. Committee																			
Intro Workshop																			
Data collection																			
Assessment																			
Debrief St. Comm																			
Presentation of findings workshop																			
Lesson learning workshop																			
Self- assessment																			
Main report drafting																			
Internal Review of draft																			
Circulation andComments																			
Finalisation																			
Lesson learning																			
Tentative allocation of days																			total
Nick Chapman				1	7	5			6	7	7	2	7	7				5	5	60
Debi Duncan				1	7		1		5	7	7		3					2	2	35
David Timberman				1	7		1		5	7	7		3					2	2	35
Kanaka Abeygunawardana																				80

Scope

The TOR expected the study to be broad enough to both fully test the OECD guidance and to be of value to a range of international actors in Sri Lanka. But the TOR recognised to some extent the competing demands of testing generic guidance for use in a range of evaluation settings and providing meaningful lessons for local actors on the ground who were attempting to improve their strategies and activities for future engagement.

The TOR also appreciated the need to further define the scope of the exercise as the work progressed. For example, it was for this reason that it was agreed that the entire

evaluation team (rather than just the team leader as originally envisaged) participate in the inception mission. This was in order to discuss expectations amongst the donor community and reach agreement on the final scope of the study so that those who in the end were funding the work would receive a product relevant to their needs.

Inception

The inception mission was also a valuable step in the process because it allowed the whole evaluation team to meet and develop a shared understanding of the task and work on an agreed approach. Vitally, too, it helped to sensitise, as well as engender interest and cooperation from a wide range of partners, some of whom had been somewhat reluctant to participate.

Several key changes were proposed and agreed during the inception. These were captured in the revised TOR and the Inception Report (See Annex 2 and 3):
- Expanded scope to encompass conflict sensitive development approaches explicitly.
- Limit documentary evidence mainly to published material, available in the public domain or provided to the team by the donors.
- Focus on three areas of donor intervention: <u>conflict sensitive development</u>, <u>peacebuilding</u>, and <u>good governance and human rights</u>.

Risks

During the inception mission a set of risks were listed and mitigation measures proposed. Some of these risks drew on those raised in the original TOR:

1. Integrity and independence – addressed in the 3rd column of Table 1
2. Poor timing: mounting the evaluation during a difficult operating environment, leading to lack of access due to confidentiality
3. Sensitivity to findings – donors will review main report, raise concerns and ask for revisions. The team would address these to the extent that it may not compromise the quality of evidence
4. Misuse of findings in political discourse – this will require careful handling of any sensitive findings by the report owners during dissemination.

Table 1. Risk Management Measures

Risk	Mitigation measure	Steps to protect our independence and professional integrity…	Results after fieldwork
Government may prevent or object to the work	Engage Government at appropriate levels. The fact that this is not an evaluation of the Peace process in Sri Lanka or of the behaviour of the GoSL would be highlighted. The MPI is supportive but careful handling of others required – esp. Peace Secretariat	Will emphasise the independent nature of the team and OECD-DAC sponsorship. The report will not require Govt endorsement of conclusions.	Did not get GoSL cooperation as anticipated to contribute to a joint evaluation exercise. Only limited contact during fieldwork including meetings with MoNB and MoPI. No contact with Peace Secretariat. GoSL role in the end was largely administrative
Sensitivity over examining current	Retrospective focus: will look at the period 2002-2007	Will draw lessons that will seek to inform current and future	Meta evaluation looked only at completed projects. A third (6 of 17) of strategies are

donor activities and plans		donor plans and programmes in SL	current, the rest were completed. Some of the current strategies were sensitive and this limited the analysis
Cannot include evidence from certain donors approaches due to confidentiality around their work	Will not explore the peace process, political/ diplomatic interventions (Track 1), security interventions or Track 2 mediation efforts (non official mediation)	Will need to use supplementary evidence from a wide range of sources, some of which will not be published. Will still need to refer to specific donor strategies and activities in order to ground our findings	Given access to more confidential material of projects than had been expected, but still some key actors were unable to share strategy docs (UK, Germany, Norway, Canada). Evidence base is quite good for the area of study
	Will only use published or publicly available material[2] (strategies / project evaluations). Confidential material will not be requested		Evidence from confidential material is used in the report to support findings. DPs will have to decide how to handle the report in the best way
	Will not rank or compare donors directly, and will focus on types of approach rather than specific donors		The report does contain tables comparing donor approaches, but there is no ranking of best or worst. The approaches are grouped.
Study is over-ambitious, unmanageable in the time frame	The study, while aiming to be inclusive, will be selective – using a limited number of strategies and interventions to provide evidence that allow different donor approaches to be compared.	Will aim to uncover a rich body of material for the selected areas including: published materials, interviews of past and present key informants, meetings with groups of implementing actors (NGOs govt, offices, Local groups).	With a sample of 17 strategies from 10 donors and 28 programme and project evaluations the sample is quite large. Nevertheless, there is a question of how representative the set of published (and internal) material is.
	Will focus on work areas and themes as explained in inception report, and the above limitations will help reduce the scope.		The scope albeit reduced from the original TOR was still very challenging in the time frame. Around 90 interviews conducted mainly in Colombo, with no field visits possible.
	No primary data will be collected.		
	The four person evaluation team will manage their time and allocate tasks in an optimal way.		

Evaluation Space

An important concept in the context of undertaking evaluations is the idea that evaluators can operate within a neutral space where evaluated actors agree to share information on the understanding that the analysis contributes to a improved learning or to greater accountability, or both. While all evaluation work occurs to some extent within a socio-political milieu that can lead to biases and misuse of results, it seems that the potential for misuse can be especially high in a conflict setting. The Sri Lanka pilot test was strongly affected by the available space to allow the evaluation team to raise topics, access material and meet interlocutors in an atmosphere largely characterised as one of mistrust and sensitivity between the GoSL and donors. While some peer reviewers felt that the exercise would be too constrained by local pressures that it would not be worth conducting, the team took the view that even with the constraints imposed, the potential learning was still strong enough to merit proceeding. Moreover, the donor group commissioning the work also felt the task was worthwhile.

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[2] This would therefore exclude the 'new' donors operating in SL in recent years such as China, Iran, Pakistan. In any case the team would be unable to include this group for reasons of time and resources.

1. Informing versus involving Government

Since this was not an exercise commissioned by the Government but was essentially aimed at studying donor views and experiences, it was not absolutely necessary to have a technical input or an official approval from government or to share analysis or results with them, although this would have no doubt added useful perspectives to the evaluation. The inception mission served as the point at which the role of government could be discussed and the possible scope of their involvement negotiated. The donor community felt that the Government did not need to approve the evaluation, since the work was launched by the OECD DAC and co-managed by the local donor group and the OECD, and the subject matter concentrated on the approaches and achievements of the donors themselves. However, in the interests of openness and seeking opportunities for joint evaluation (in adherence to Paris declaration principles), it was felt that the nature of the evaluation should be discussed with relevant Government agencies that had an interest in evaluation: especially the Ministry of Plan Implementation (MPI) which is responsible for monitoring and evaluating government national development programmes.

During the inception mission, a meeting with MPI led to a surprising level of interest in the exercise. At a meeting with the team, a Director General of this Ministry suggested that the work should be presented as a methodological task – emphasising the testing of guidelines, and that there might be involvement of evaluation staff from his ministry and from other ministries in the interest of joint evaluation practice. They advised also that the evaluation should be presented under the flag of the OECD-DAC, which was considered to have a more neutral profile to the Govt of Sri Lanka than individual donors.

However, subsequently the team found that during the main mission the MPI became rather more cautious of being associated with the evaluation, and did not wish to be seen as the 'line ministry' responsible for the mission. Instead, the mission's clearance and supervision was handled in the normal way by the External Resources Dept. (ERD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the office responsible for coordinating all foreign assistance). The ERD approved the visas required by the international members of the consultant team, but this Department were not in a position to provide technical support of the subject matter. Thus, while the members of the mission had visas to work in Sri Lanka, no official clearance was obtained to conduct the exercise although the MPI were informed about the work. This did not prevent the team from conducting a limited number of interviews with Government and ex-Government officials[3].

In general, given the current context in Sri Lanka (with a Government at war against the LTTE in the north and east) there was great sensitivity surrounding contact with the Government. This situation had a strong effect on the range of interlocutors that could be interviewed, and this limited the team's appreciation of some important perspectives about donor strategies and programmes.

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[3] With (i) the Secretary, Ministry of Plan and Implementation, (ii) a Special Adviser to the Ministry of Nation Building, (iii) a former Secretary to the Prime Minister (and also Director General of the 3R Programme), and (iv) the Chief Secretary Northern Province.

2. Donor involvement

At the time of the inception mission, there was varying interest in the pilot evaluation amongst the donor coordinating group. The process up to that point had been quite delayed, and some principle actors from the donor steering group involved with the work had since left Sri Lanka. This had led to a somewhat reduced level of interest or focus on the pilot evaluation. In this regard, it seemed that closer communication between the Paris-based OECD DAC network and their counterparts within the donor group in Sri Lanka would have helped in ensuring better understanding and support for the process.

Nevertheless, once the team were on the ground and with the support of the donor coordination facilitator, donors contacted during the inception were generally very supportive of the exercise. It was evident that the original TOR were felt to be difficult to achieve in terms of scope and sensitivity by most donors, and as such the recommendation was for the scope to be narrowed if there was to be sufficient buy-in and confidence from the donors' side.

Within the donor group, there were different levels of engagement expressed during the inception phase. Some were unwilling to have their strategies (explicit or implicit) assessed or results reported on, but were still keen to be involved in the process, to discuss results and lessons and to comment on the report. For two others (Netherlands, Australia) they were in principle happy to have their activities included, but would first need to obtain internal clearance. The remainder stated that would be prepared to be included in the evaluation.

Some donor positions changed during the main mission:
~ Japan having initially indicated a willingness to be part of the study, later withdrew their involvement.
~ Australia offered greater co-operation and shared its strategy (in the form of a regional framework) and several evaluations.
~ Germany had not been met during the inception and was reluctant when contacted in the main mission to share strategy papers[4].
~ The Netherlands, having been reluctant before, subsequently did fully share strategy documents and even offered to share in-house files with the team, but requested first sight of the report.

The decision to exclude Track 1 activities on peace negotiations, as well as aspects of diplomatic engagement, the security sector and some donors' internal analysis was an important decision that led to agreement by most donors to support the evaluation, even though this would prevent important areas in the history of CPPB work from being assessed. To include these aspects would not only have alienated most donors but might also have under the political circumstances at the time led the GoSL to prevent or obstruct the evaluation. Interestingly as well, Track 1 activities are not covered in the existing draft OECD DAC evaluation guidance, and this may need to be addressed in the future.

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[4] Some supporting documents were shared by both the Embassy and GTZ. Because of Germany's wish to retain a flexible position in Sri Lanka, no formal strategy was prepared.

Finally, it was very helpful to stress the neutral nature of the work (coming under the OECD DAC umbrella rather than under the flag of one or other donor directly), and to underscore the objective of testing guidelines, and by concentrating more on past practices rather than ongoing initiatives

3. Involvement of other actors (NGOs, academics and others)

The limited sample of ten interviewees from civil society and academia were generally supportive of the evaluation, though some were cautious over discussing their views too openly, and of being quoted. Several well-established and independent figures such as S.Bastian and J. Uyangoda were prepared to meet and share their views. Most of the contributors were met informally (over meals or at neutral venues) and made their comments off-record. As such their views were not quoted directly in the report, but their analysis and contextual information were valuable. Published material produced by these authors was used and attributed.

Main Mission

Logistics

The main mission took place from 10-29th November, as per the work plan. The team were able to follow the agreed timetable, however there were difficulties over arranging visas for one team member which resulted in a late arrival. The mission sponsors (the World Bank) observed the required protocols for requesting visas, but it was not straightforward. The experience points to the need to plan well in advance in order to obtain the necessary clearances and letters especially where consular procedures may be slow.

The team operated from an office in the World Bank country office, and had the use of their phone and email facilities. Appointments were made by the team as well by the donor facilitator, and support staff in the Bank office. A introductory letter with a summary of the TOR prepared by the WB office provided help in getting appointments with senior officials. The local coordinator of the team played a valuable role in arranging documents and meetings, but it was important that she also took part in all team meetings and attended some of the interviews in order to bring a local perspective to the team's analysis.

Sample

The sample of strategies and evaluations was elicited by interviewing all donors who were willing to be included in the evaluation and requesting documentation. While a balance was sought between multilateral organisations, European, North American and Asian donors, and between those working on socio-economic development, on CPPB and on governance, the eventual sample was not necessarily well balanced in terms say of equal spend between these categories or of representation by donor. The aim was to obtain as broad a range of donors and interventions as possible rather than to make a narrower or more purposively chosen sample.

Interviewing and triangulation

Interviews followed a mixed pattern: sometimes one-on-one but often with two or more team members conducting a joint interview. The number of interviewees per donor varied from 4-6 respondents per donor, covering different time periods or themes. This was sufficient to capture the story around strategies, but was mostly insufficient to triangulate views around individual projects. There were certainly gaps in coverage, especially around the earlier years (from 2000-2005) where it was not possible to reach key informants who had since left Sri Lanka[5]. Access to senior donor representatives (country directors, heads of aid, ambassadors) was fairly good. But the limited access to interlocutors outside of the capital Colombo, within government, and with other civil society actors limited the range of views captured.

DAC evaluation criteria

A further change to the scope of the work was made during main mission: this was to concentrate the evaluation on only four of the seven DAC evaluation criteria, i.e. *relevance*, *effectiveness* and *coherence / coordination*. *Impact, sustainability* and *efficiency* were given less attention. Evidence for impact and sustainability were found to be very limited given the relatively short time frame of most interventions and the lack of impact assessment surveys or studies in the documentation. Efficiency was not explored again because there was limited information available on the relative costs and results of different kinds of intervention. More might have be done on these three areas, if there had been additional data collected and analysed as part of or leading up to the evaluation, but in the Sri Lanka case there were no resources set aside for this level of effort.

Conflict analysis

In most evaluation exercises in a fragile state setting, it is regarded as best practice by CPPB specialists to underpin the study with a conflict analysis so that the evaluation findings can be interpreted against a sound understanding of what has caused the conflict. In the case of this Sri Lanka pilot, the team felt that because of the nature and timeframe of the study as well as the existence of two well-founded conflict analyses (in 2001 and 2005), there was no justification for preparing a further separate analysis. Rather the existing analyses were used as the basis for understanding the causes of conflict.

The exercise also sought to compare donor approaches at strategy and project level, including whether these approaches either undertook or overlooked their own conflict analysis. In the case of the project and programme evaluations, in most cases no separate, detailed conflict analysis was done as part of these studies, and it would seem to be unrealistic to expect them to have done so given the scope and duration of these studies. For the country strategies, there would seem to be a stronger case (given the multi-year period and scale of planned investment for such strategies) for conducting a conflict analysis as part of the preparatory work, even though few of those examined actually did.

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[5] Although valuable information relating to earlier years was obtained from the 10 telephone interviews and 1 video conference with interviewees who were no longer in Sri Lanka.

Theories of Change

Considerable interest was placed in the TOR on assessing different theories of change in the sample of donor strategies and interventions. The Guidance offers a list of possible theories, and the report tried to identify where these had been used. The results of the analysis perhaps yielded less than had been expected. Few donors used explicit theories in their documentation, so that the team had to interpret what lay behind donors' intentions. The finding that the underlying causal logic was often weak or undeveloped is disappointing and while it may reflect the poor level of intervention planning, it may also reflect the lack of time the team had to unravel more carefully how a particular donor developed their ideas into a plausible and complete chain of thinking[6]. Perhaps studying a smaller sample in a more thorough manner would be preferable in future pilots of this kind.

Report preparation / structure

The structure of the report was built around the three main themes (relevance, effectiveness and donor coordination) and within these, the main questions identified in the TOR were used to sub-divide chapters. This allowed a systematic link to be drawn between the TOR and the report.

Within these chapters, the evidence was drawn from the three thematic areas: peacebuilding, governance and human rights and conflict-sensitive development. This allowed team members to assemble evidence in their specific areas of responsibility against each of the evaluation questions. The aimed also was to refer to the OECD guidance (especially chapter 3.3 on conducting the evaluation) to help answer and analyse the material. Some sections of the guidance were more useful than others – such as those around identifying theories of change and using evaluation criteria (though these had been captured in the evaluation questions). Comments on the guidance are attached in Annex 5.

Potential Impact of the Evaluation

In terms of the possible impact of the evaluation work on the conflict itself, our sense is that this will be minimal as the field work was limited mainly to donors with a limited number of interviews with implementing partners (who were mainly NGOs) and other officials. There was peripheral exposure to the parties in the conflict – only three central government persons were contacted.

The impact of the report is another question, and this will depend on the final content and how it is disseminated. Some donors have recognised that even though the report may remain confidential, if it is shared with a range of donor stakeholders, it is more than likely eventually to reach the Government and the wider public. The handling of the report is therefore something for the report commissioners to tackle very carefully. An executive summary has been prepared that contains very few references to specific actors (whether donors or others) with the intention that this can be shared widely. The main report is to be revised and then either released if the donor group are

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[6] The OECD Guidance also notes that theories of change in CPPB work are often implicit and untested, and that it is especially important for evaluators to assess them.

satisfied that it does not contain sensitive statements, or else retained by the OECD DAC and made available on request.

Conclusion

A key concern of peer reviewers was whether the pilot evaluation in Sri Lanka was compromised too much by accepting the strictures of some donors and by not consulting with enough local voices on different sides – so that the sample would too limited to be of value in testing the guidance.

Our sense is that each of the pilots foreseen for this testing work will face constraints of one form or another that will limit the validity of the findings, but that hopefully taken together they will provide a broad set of tested experiences to be useful to improving the OECD DAC Guidance.

In Sri Lanka, the complex political context, the current sensitivity of the Govt. to donor led exercises around peacebuilding , and the security restrictions of travel outside Colombo, has limited the range of parties that could be interviewed. But the sample of strategies (10), and evaluations (around 30) do represent in the end a varied yet balanced and certainly rich set of approaches against which the evaluation principles in the Guidance can be examined and lessons drawn.

Lessons

1. An **inception mission** is vital to sensitise the potential stakeholders, and to refine the TOR and above all to negotiate a space in which the evaluation can be conducted.

2. In a hot conflict setting and where a government is not interested in measuring peacebuilding efforts, **limits have to be placed** on what stakeholders (and reviewers) can expect from an evaluation: the availability of evidence and the usability of the findings may be constrained. Holding workshops or other public meetings is not likely to be productive, and much of the evidence must be gleaned from documents and one-to-one interviews.

3. Conducting a complex multi-donor evaluation in a country with a disinterested or even un-cooperative government partner will likely face delays and require **patience and determination** to complete, as well as **sound management support arrangements** provided by a donor committed to the process.

4. **Flexibility with the TOR** is necessary in order to allow them to be adapted to local conditions and the interests of the local donor partners, who may have more interest in obtaining useful lessons for future work in the country than in improving generic guidance.

5. **Close coordination with the local donor group** helps build confidence and cooperation. Donors who at the beginning appear sceptical, are more likely to share documents once they have discussed the nature of the evaluation directly

with the team, and have gained agreement over their having a role in approving / reviewing the draft report. Also close coordination between the Paris-based OECD network members and their in-country counterparts would help build support for the process.

6. **Government can send mixed signals**: on the one hand at a technical level there may be genuine interest in evaluation methods and building local expertise, but this can be outweighed by strong political sensitivities over donor led evaluations in a setting where the government is party the conflict.

7. **Local experts and agencies** can provide valuable opinions and contextual analysis, provided their confidentially is respected and they are not quoted directly.

8. However, having access to **interlocutors based only in the capital city**, and largely within the donor community, limits the range of evaluation evidence about donor behaviour. This may be an unrealistic goal if the country situation prevents such access (to opposition groups or other conflict actors), and provided all those concerned with the evaluation recognise this limitation, the evaluation may still provide valuable lessons within its own constraints.

9. If the evaluation is commissioned and carefully reviewed by the local donor community, and is conducted in a careful and honest manner by an independent team, then the process in terms of protecting confidential sources should be **sufficiently sensitive to meet ethical standards**. However, this may not be fully known until some months after the report is released and has been in circulation.

10. Having the exercise **hosted by a suitably resourced donor** (such as the World Bank) can facilitate the conduct of meetings, telephone interviews and team work. A **donor facilitator position** can provide valuable connections, guidance and reference material on a neutral basis.

11. A **mixed team of evaluators with complementary skills** (including expertise in conflict, development, governance and in the country setting) can provide a balanced team that leads to a more rounded evaluation analysis.