There is now widespread consensus that gender equality matters for development, economic growth and poverty reduction. In addition to the fulfilment of fundamental rights for women and girls, gender equality has recently been hailed as a ‘breakthrough’ strategy for achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets (UNDP, 2010). However, as has become apparent with the sluggish progress towards MDG targets, there remain significant obstacles to achieving equal outcomes for women and men on key economic and social indicators. Understanding the nature and extent of the obstacles to gender equality is therefore critical to designing effective policies to promote equality between men and women, and consequently, to improving development outcomes. One dimension of gender inequality that has been neglected is discriminatory social institutions. These social norms, laws and practices that restrict women’s and girls’ access to opportunities, resources and power are considered as the underlying drivers of gender inequality.

Social institutions have gained currency as a framework to explain what is stopping women and girls from achieving equal outcomes in areas such as education, employment, business, health and political participation (World Bank, 2011; Jones et al., 2010; OECD Development Centre, 2012). The OECD Development Centre’s innovative Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), launched in 2009, was the first attempt that has been made to capture, quantify and measure some of the social institutions that discriminate against women and girls. The SIGI aggregates the single variables describing discriminatory social institutions included in the Gender Institutions and Development (GID) database. The GID covers a total of 121 non-OECD countries and comprises 21 indicators on gender discrimination in social institutions in 2012 and 2009. Information on cultural and traditional practices that impact on women’s economic development is coded so as to measure the level of discrimination. Such a comprehensive overview of gender-related variables and the database’s specific focus on social institutions make the GID unique, providing a tool-box for a wide range of analytical queries and allowing case-by-case adaptation to specific research or policy questions, even if the country is not ranked in the SIGI.

This paper presents the SIGI’s experience in collecting and using gender indicators for policymaking. This paper is set out as follows: The second section introduces the SIGI; the third presents the development-relevance of the SIGI, while the fourth section discusses the SIGI’s role for policymaking. Finally, the fifth section presents the proposed modification for 2014, while the sixth concludes.

* The author convey special thanks to Francesca Francavilla and Keiko Nowacka. The chart included in this paper are based on OECD Development Centre (2012) and Cerise and Francavilla (2012).
1. What is the SIGI?

1.1. Why do discriminatory social institutions matter?

a. Definition of discriminatory social institutions

Measuring social institutions draws attention to the role of ‘culture’ or social relations in limiting or enabling individual or collective agency. North describes institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1990). Formal and informal laws can co-exist in different types of legal systems including civil or common law, customary law and religious laws. The ‘social’ aspect of social institutions refers to the way in which formal laws, informal laws, social norms and practices influence social relations and shape the decisions, choices and behaviours of groups, communities and individuals (Jütting et al., 2008).

Social institutions are not fixed, and there are often significant variations across countries, regions and communities. They are also in constant flux and change over time, albeit slowly. While social institutions in themselves are not inherently good or bad, we define discriminatory social institutions as those that restrict or exclude women and girls and consequently curtail their access to opportunities, resources and power which negatively impacts upon development outcomes. It is on these discriminatory social institutions that the SIGI is focused.

b. Role in defining gender norms and opportunities

Social institutions set the parameters of what decisions, choices or behaviours are deemed acceptable or unacceptable in a society and therefore play a key role in defining and influencing gender roles and relations. Through their influence on the unequal distribution of power between men and women in the private sphere of the family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, discriminatory social institutions constrain the opportunities of men. As shown in the next section, by determining opportunities and outcomes for women and girls, discriminatory social institutions subsequently influence development outcomes.

Social institutions exert their influence both directly and indirectly (Jütting and Morrison, 2005). Discriminatory formal and informal laws, social norms and practices can directly influence women’s social and economic role, for example by not allowing women to access bank loans, preventing women from owning land or restricting women’s ability to move freely in public space. An example of social institutions exerting indirect influence on women’s economic and social role is the social norm which ascribes greater social value to sons over daughters, and thus results in underinvestment in the health and education of girls.

Social institutions operate and exert influence at micro, meso and macro levels. For example, social institutions regarding women’s status in the family (Discriminatory Family Code) play out at a household level (micro) in behaviours and attitudes, such as unequal financial decision-making power between men and women; at a community level in specific beliefs or sanctioned practices (meso), such as discrimination against widows; and at a country level in terms of broader social norms or laws which allow discrimination (macro), such as discriminatory laws in relation to inheritance.
1.2. The SIGI

a. Concept

The 2012 SIGI is composed of five sub-indices which each represent a distinct dimension of discrimination against women. This section sets out the theoretical justification for the SIGI sub-indices, explaining what each sub-index aims to capture and why this is development and policy-relevant.

**Discriminatory family code**

Discriminatory family code is intended to capture social institutions that limit and restrict women’s decision-making power and status in the household and the family. It includes discriminatory formal and informal laws in relation to marriage, household headship, parental authority, divorce and inheritance.

The lack of women and girls’ decision-making power and status in the family not only influences their own development but also the development of their families and children. For example, the discriminatory practice of early marriage of girls serves to limit their access to education and therefore also has an impact on their employment opportunities (UNICEF, 2005). Marrying young, particularly with large age gaps between spouses, can also lead to high rates of adolescent fertility, higher rates of infant mortality, poor maternal health and increased vulnerability to HIV (Bruce and Clark, 2004; UNFPA, 2004, UNICEF, 2006).

**Restricted physical integrity**

The second dimension, restricted physical integrity, is intended to capture social institutions that limit and restrict women and girls’ control over their bodies. This includes formal and informal laws, norms and practices that fail to protect women’s physical integrity or which serve to normalise, justify and excuse practices that impinge upon women’s physical integrity.

Women and girls’ restricted control over their bodies has negative consequences for development and economic growth. The threat of violence in the home, school, workplace and community not only causes long-term physical and psychological damage but also increases the vulnerability of women and girls to poverty (World Bank, 2006; UNIFEM, 2010). Gender-based violence is connected to critical social and economic development issues such as poverty, lack of education, child mortality, child malnutrition, maternal ill-health and HIV (Heise et al., 1999: World Health Organisation, 2005; UNICEF, 2006; Sethuraman, 2008; Jones et al., 2010).

**Son bias**

The third dimension, son bias, is intended to capture unequal intra-household investments in the care, nurture and resources allocated to sons and daughters. It includes those formal and informal laws, social norms and practices which lead sons and daughters to be treated unequally, such as female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, limited access to food and education for girls, and the discriminatory allocation of paid and unpaid work in the household (UNFPA, 2007).

Son bias can have a range of negative implications for development outcomes. A major consequence of social norms and practices that devalue daughters is the under-investment in girls’ education by their families (Jones et al., 2010). Son bias leads to gendered differences in primary and secondary enrolment, attendance and completion rates: for example, in South Asia, boys on average spend 2.5 years more in school than girls (UNICEF 2006).
**Restricted resources and entitlements**

The fourth dimension, restricted resources and entitlements, is intended to capture women’s restricted access to, control of, and entitlement over economic and natural resources. This includes discriminatory laws which deny women access to land, property and credit; discriminatory customary practices in the allocation or purchase of land, natural resources and other property; and negative attitudes towards women’s entrepreneurship.

Discrimination in access or entitlement to and control over economic resources has several negative development implications. It is well documented that improving access to economic resources is critical to increasing women’s economic participation, equality and empowerment which in turn positively influences the well-being and resources of their families and communities (UNICEF, 2006; FAO, 2011).

**Restricted civil liberties**

The restricted civil liberties sub-index is intended to capture restrictions in women’s access to, participation and voice in the public and social spheres. It encompasses laws, practices or social norms which restrict the mobility of girls and women and limit their access to public space, which deny women the right to vote and participate politically, women’s ability to travel or apply for a passport without a male family member, as well as obstacles to women’s freedom to associate.

Limitations on women and girls’ participation and influence in the public sphere have significant implications for their social and economic opportunities. For instance, laws or social norms which confine women and girls to the home negatively impact on their ability to access schooling or to take up employment outside the home. The broader exclusion of women and girls from public, social, political and economic spaces through discriminatory perceptions regarding their roles in society perpetuates inequality in education, health, and other areas for both women and girls and their families (Jones et al., 2010).

1.3. Methodology

Fig.1 The composition of the 2012 SIGI

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Source: Cerise et al., (2012)
The SIGI and its sub-indices scores range between 0-1 where 0 represents low discrimination and 1 represents high discrimination. The 2012 SIGI is composed of five sub-indices which each are made up of 14 variables that are selected on the basis of their conceptual relevance, whether it provides distinct information, data quality and coverage (Fig. 1). The statistical association and correspondence of the variables in each sub-index is then tested to ensure the variables belong to a distinct dimension of discrimination against women. The SIGI sub-indices are then constructed by aggregating the variables using polychoric Principal Component Analysis (PCA). This method is used to extract the common information of the variables corresponding to a sub-index and allows aggregating continuous and categorical variables, as well as categorical variables having different number of categories.

The SIGI score is an un-weighted average of a non-linear function of the sub-indices. Equal weights are given for the sub-indices, as there is no reason for valuing one of the dimensions more or less than the other: discriminatory family code does not appear to be more important than restricted physical integrity. The non-linear function arises because of the assumption that gender inequality and discrimination corresponds to deprivation experienced by the affected women, and that deprivation increases more than proportionally when inequality and discrimination increases. Thus, high inequality and discrimination is penalised in every dimension. The non-linearity also means that the SIGI does not allow for total compensation among sub-indices, but permits partial compensation. Partial compensation implies that high inequality in one dimension (Son Bias, for example) can be only partially compensated with low inequality on another dimension (Physical Integrity, for example).

\[
SIGI = \frac{1}{5} \text{Family Code}^2 + \frac{1}{5} \text{Son bias}^2 + \frac{1}{5} \text{Physical Integrity}^2
\]
\[
+ \frac{1}{5} \text{Resources and Entitlements}^2 + \frac{1}{5} \text{Civil Liberties}^2
\]

a. Added value regarding existing indicators

While other indices such as the UNDP gender-specific measures (GEM: Gender Empowerment Measure, GDI: Gender Development Index, GII: Gender Inequality Index) and the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) measure gender inequality in terms of outcomes such as education attainment or labour market participation, the SIGI focuses on inequality in opportunities. Measuring discriminatory social institutions as underlying drivers of gender inequality provides additional insight into gender inequality for development policy makers and practitioners. One striking observation, for example, is that while Europe and Central Asia show lower levels of discrimination in the family compared to other regions due to equal laws and low rates of early marriage, the region shows higher levels of son bias, in comparison to other regions. This prevalence of son bias in the region is not necessarily captured in other indices such as the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index where Europe and Central Asia perform relatively well on indicators such as the gender gaps in education and employment.

To assess whether the SIGI provides any additional information compared to other gender measures, we test the statistical association between the SIGI and the GDI, GEM, GII and GGG, respectively, using the Kendall tau b (McGillivray and White, 1992). The Kendall tau b test reveals that the SIGI is not redundant and provides additional information. Secondly, the SIGI is correlated with the well-known gender-specific measures. These results suggest that while the SIGI measures a similar phenomenon to the other gender indices, it provides additional information on gender inequality not captured by the other gender indices.
b. SIGI results

As a composite index, the SIGI provides powerful and interpretable tools to compare the level of underlying discrimination against women across non-OECD countries, allowing cross-country, regional and sub-regional analyses. The score and ranking of each country is also complemented with detailed country notes which set and describe how social institutions discriminate against women with country-specific information. This is critical for policymakers to understand the country-specific situation. Moreover, it provides examples from promising initiatives to address discriminatory social institutions in other countries.

Figure 2 presents the SIGI scores by region, as well as best and worst performers. Latin America and the Caribbean is the highest performing region in the 2012 SIGI rankings. This is explained by several positive changes over the last few decades. The top performing country in the region is Argentina, while the lowest ranking is Nicaragua. East Asia and the Pacific is the second best-performing region in the overall SIGI. With the exceptions of Laos and Papua New Guinea, early marriage is declining and inheritance rights are equal for men and women. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the third highest performing region, followed by South Asia. In both, son preference is an important concern. The Middle East and North Africa is the second lowest ranking region, ranked above Sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco is the highest ranked country, following changes in its family law and recognition of sexual harassment in the workplace, for example. Finally, Sub-Saharan Africa shows the poorest performance, with nine out of 10 bottom-ranking countries. It is worth indicating the heterogeneity within the region: South Africa is ranked in the top 10, thanks to particular efforts to remove discrimination against women under the dual legal system.
While a composite indicator gives a full picture of gender inequality in social institutions and provides simple comparisons to illustrate complex issues, it is policy-relevant to look at the sub-index level in order to understand the degree of discrimination faced by women in each of the dimensions and to establish targets. The 2012 SIGI results show that there are significant regional differences across the sub-indices (Fig. 3). For instance, Latin America and the Caribbean shows a strong performance across all sub-indices of the SIGI due to decreasing prevalence of early marriage, improving women’s political participation and significant progress on laws to address violence against women, although enforcement remains a challenge.

The SIGI data shows regional differences in the dimension of Son Bias. South Asia shows the highest level of discrimination in this area, followed by Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and the Pacific. Similar regional differences can be observed for the Restricted Physical Integrity sub-index. Sub-Saharan Africa shows the highest level of discrimination in this area, followed by the Middle East and North Africa. Despite progress across both regions in laws to address violence against women, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 countries remain without laws to address domestic violence. The lack of legal protection is compounded by widespread attitudes that normalise domestic violence - over 75% of women in Guinea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali agree that domestic violence is justified in some circumstances. The Middle East and North Africa region shows the highest level of discrimination for the Restricted Civil Liberties sub-index. This can be attributed to restrictions on women’s access to public space and low levels of women’s participation in the political sphere. In Yemen for example, women cannot leave the house without permission of their husband or male guardian, and a woman is unable to obtain a personal identity card or passport without the consent of her guardian.
2. Development-relevance for MDGs and gender equality in outcomes

Applying the SIGI can illuminate the relationship between discriminatory social institutions and development outcomes, particularly those related to gender equality. Understanding the connections between discrimination against women and development is critical for the design of effective policies and the allocation of donor resources that target the drivers of gender inequality. Too often, policies and programmes fail to tackle the deeply embedded social norms and practices that continue to undermine progress towards gender equality. Discriminatory social institutions affect not only female well-being but also gender inequality and development outcomes through their impact on household behaviour and public life. Here, we share a few examples of how discriminatory social institutions relate to women’s employment outcomes, educational attainment, health outcomes and governance. These examples show how the SIGI may be a critical tool for policymaking and the post-2015 agenda.

2.1. Gender inequality in social institutions and labour outcomes

The “feminisation of bad quality jobs” means that in addition to lower access to the labour market, it is more difficult for women to find good jobs in the formal sector (INED, 2000). This could be explained by lower access to education and training, higher job interruption related to maternity and child rearing, as well as discriminatory social institutions (Luci et al., 2012). Indeed, discriminatory social institutions which undermine women’s position in the family may mean that women are less able to negotiate paid work with caring responsibilities. Violence against women has also been found to be another social institution negatively associated with female employment (Kimerling et al., 2009; Alexander, 2011). Similarly, restrictions on women’s access to public space, such as laws stipulating that husbands have the sole authority to choose the family’s place of residence, as well as limitations on women’s access to economic resources, including land and credit, both negatively influence women’s employment opportunities.

Discriminatory social institutions often reflect social norms that reinforce stereotypes of women as inferior, less able or less deserving of quality jobs. Thus, in countries with higher gender discrimination, higher inequality in labour outcomes can be expected. This conclusion is critical, not only for women, but also for the national economy, since several studies have found that expanding women’s access to quality employment opportunities is important for economic growth and development (Klasen and Lamanna, 2009; Cerise et al., 2012).

Examining the relationship between the 2012 SIGI, its sub-indices and indicators with women’s employment outcomes shows that discriminatory social institutions hinder women’s economic empowerment: the higher the SIGI score (higher gender discrimination), the lower the female labour market participation (in absolute and relative terms), the higher the gender labour segregation and the higher the women’s share in low paid and poor quality jobs (Luci et al., 2012). This means that social institutions related to gender inequality are additional barriers to women’s economic empowerment, not only because of their impact on education, but also by lowering females’ status in the public and private spheres. Hence, improving women’s access to economic opportunities implies improving their access to inputs (education, health, etc.), as well as addressing social norms.
a. The double dividend of women’s empowerment on education

Figure 4: Lower discrimination is correlated with lower gender gap in education and higher educational attainment

Source: OECD Development Centre (2012); GID (OECD, 2012) and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011).
Note: The model control for GDP and standards determinant of gender gap in education. See OECD Development Centre (2012) for detailed information.

Education is a cornerstone of the MDG framework, recognising that investing in human capital is a gateway to poverty reduction and development. Discriminatory social institutions can negatively influence educational attainment in several ways. Firstly, discriminatory practices such as early marriage or sexual harassment can lead girls to leave their studies early. Secondly, son preference can manifest itself in parents prioritising the education of boys over girls. Finally, discrimination against women in the family and household limits their ability to make choices to safeguard the health, education and welfare of their children, thereby having a negative inter-generational effect on educational attainment.

Examining the relationship between the SIGI 2012, its sub-indices and indicators and educational attainment shows a strong correlation between the two. With respect to the gender gap in education, countries with higher levels of discrimination are those with a greater gender gap in secondary school enrolment rates. Looking at primary school completion rates, discrimination in the family appears to be a particularly pertinent dimension of discrimination against women linked to poor primary school completion rates. This indicates that where women have greater status and power in the family, children are more likely to complete primary school. As shown by Figure 4, the benefits of changing discriminatory social institutions are two-fold: first, in closing the gender gap in education and second, in improving education outcomes overall (Cerise et al., 2012).

2.2. Improving the female situation and child health outcomes

Improving child health outcomes is also a cornerstone of the current MDGs framework. While many countries are on-track to meet the targets of this goal, UNICEF (2012) estimates that 19,000 children under age five were dying every day in 2011. Several studies have demonstrated the link between aspects of women’s empowerment and child health and mortality (Hossain et al., 2007; Allendorf, 2007; Bhagowalia et al., 2012). As such, it can be expected that discriminatory social institutions are related to child mortality (Cerise and Francavilla (2012)).
To understand which dimensions of discrimination against women are linked with child mortality, the relationship between infant mortality rates and the SIGI and its sub-indices are analysed. A linear regression model is used, controlling for the fertility rate, country income level and urbanisation. When all sub-indices are included in the model, the Restricted Physical Integrity sub-index is found to be a positive and significant determinant. This indicates that countries with high levels of restrictions on women’s physical integrity also have high levels of infant mortality. Countries with high levels of restrictions on women’s physical integrity have an average infant mortality rate of more than three times the rate for countries with low levels of restrictions (Fig. 5).

2.3. Promoting gender equality and better governance

Discriminatory social institutions do not only influence household behaviour, they also influence the women’s place in public and political life. Assuming that women and men have equal skills, restricted access to opportunities, power and resources implies that efficient women will be excluded from the public and political sphere, in favour of less efficient men. This implies negative effects on the country’s governance (Branisa et al. 2010). Moreover, some studies show that women are less corrupt, less egoistic, more risk-averse and more prone to follow rules than men what have positive impact on governance (World Bank, 2001; Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). Given their community-oriented socialization, women are more likely to take productive decisions that benefit to the social group (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2001). Therefore, the higher the rates of women in the political sphere, the more rule oriented and responsive the political system (Branisa et al. 2010). Moreover, women’s collective action has played a major role in increasing the quality of political systems (Waylen, 1993; Tripp, 2001).

Using the Kaufmann et al. (2008) Governance Indicators, the SIGI and its subindices, Branisa et al. (2010) show that higher levels of gender inequality, especially in civil liberties, are associated with lower levels of voice and accountability, as well as rule of law. Hence promoting gender equality may be a tool to improve governance, which in turns has a great impact on development (World Bank, 2001).
3. **The SIGI’s role for policymaking**

3.1. *Making the invisible visible at the international level*

The first lessons learned from the SIGI experiences in collecting data on gender discrimination in social institutions is showing that is possible to measure social institutions and quantify qualitative aspects of gender inequality. This lesson allows designing policy at the international level as well as at the national level. The SIGI sub-indices shed light on deeply entrenched social norms and practices, such as violence against women and discrimination in the family, which are fundamental barriers to women’s empowerment yet often overlooked. While the SIGI attempts to capture these ‘hidden’ dimensions of gender inequality, one limitation for measuring discriminatory social institutions is the availability, coverage and quality of data. At the international level, including discriminatory social institutions such as violence against women, son bias or women’s access to resources in the post-2015 development agenda would not only mean that these important indicators of gender inequality are tracked, but that there is commitment to statistical capacity building to improve the data sources in these areas.

3.2. *Having a more tangible direct impact on policymaking at the national level*

At the national level, it highlights the necessity to collect data on country-specific aspects of discriminatory social institutions. In partnership with the Austrian Development Agency and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), the OECD Development Centre is currently developing a SIGI for Uganda. This on-going project is a pilot for a wider project: ‘Tackling the underlying drivers of gender inequality in Uganda and Eastern Africa’. It provides an in-depth study of discrimination against women in Uganda through the application of the SIGI to the national and sub-national contexts; cross-country comparisons of discrimination against women for Eastern and Southern Africa in the 2014 SIGI; policy dialogue across Eastern Africa on effective policies to address discrimination against women; and technical exchanges on the collection of data on discrimination against women in Eastern and Southern African countries. The project hopes to spread to other Eastern African countries to inspire dialogue amongst policymakers and statisticians on gender indicators on discriminatory social institutions.

The first element of this project investigates how a Uganda-specific SIGI could be developed that both expands on the indicators in each of the SIGI domains so as to capture dimensions of discriminatory social institutions that are relevant to Uganda, and allows for comparison of performance on these indicators across different parts of Uganda. More specifically, the SIGI for Uganda would allow for comparison across the ten clusters/regions, each with their own cultural and traditional norms and practices, which UBOS uses as the basis for design and analysis of its standard household surveys and for certain SIGI indicators to be embedded into national strategies for gender equality and national development plans.

The indicators used in the standard SIGI are taken from existing data sources, including existing surveys. However, given that these are multi-country surveys, their data can only provide limited insight into those issues and specificities unique to Uganda, in particular at the sub-national level. For this reason, the in-depth study will thus include a specially designed household survey that will collect additional indicators that relate to the five SIGI domains. Several of these indicators involve aspects which have not previously been explored in past surveys. The survey will thus be preceded by a set of focus groups discussions. The findings from these discussions will not be used as the basis for scoring of indicators as focus groups do not produce findings that are sufficiently reliable and representative of the population. However, they will be used to help UBOS and its partners in...
framing the relevant questions in a way that uses terminology which will be understood by respondents and that will capture the relevant social institutions and practices.

3.3. **Measuring improvement: policies can change discriminatory social institutions**

Detailed information from other countries or regions through the SIGI may help policymakers by presenting a concrete illustration of how improvements have been implemented. The SIGI shows that countries have made promising progress in tackling discriminatory social institutions in some areas. For countries scored in the 2012 SIGI, the average prevalence of early marriage across countries has decreased to 17% in 2012 from 21% in 2009; the number of countries with specific legislation to combat domestic violence has more than doubled from 21 in 2009 to 53 in 2012; 29 countries have quotas to promote women’s political participation at both the national and sub-national levels.

Despite positive steps, pervasive and persistent social institutions continue to limit women’s and girls’ horizons in all regions ranked in the 2012 SIGI: 86 out of 121 countries have discriminatory inheritance laws or practices; women’s reproductive autonomy is restricted: on average, 1 in 5 women has an unmet need for family planning. Despite the introduction of laws to combat violence against women, attitudes that normalise such violence persist. On average, for the countries scored in the SIGI, around 1 in 2 women believes domestic violence is justified in certain circumstances.

As shown previously, the low score in the SIGI and its sub-indices for Latin America and the Caribbean may be explained by promising initiatives. For example, in 2007, Venezuela enacted a law prohibiting rape, spousal rape, domestic violence and sexual harassment which not only includes punishment and prosecution, but also requires that the authorities implement a programme to raise awareness and change attitudes. Following the law, Special Courts for Violence against women were created, which led to a steep increase in recorded complaints of violence against women in the country.

The success of East Asia and the Pacific in achieving the second highest regional ranking in the SIGI is related to the implementation of programmes tackling discrimination against women and girls in social norms in a number of its countries. For example, the “Care for Girls” programme in China between 2003 and 2005 aimed to reduce the imbalanced sex-ratio by public awareness campaigns, supporting girl-only families and strengthening data systems. The programme contributed to a reduction in the sex-ratio at birth in 2005.

Improvements of the female situation through political change were observed in less performing regions as well. The ‘Safe Age of Marriage’ programme in Yemen funded by USAID sought to raise awareness of the social and health consequences of early marriage at the community level in two districts. The programme concentrated on building community support for keeping girls in school as an alternative to early marriage and on securing support from religious leaders. The programme included working with girls aged 9 to 15, who developed and performed school plays and produced school magazines to raise awareness of the risks associated with early marriage, and awarding prizes to “model families” who delayed their daughters’ marriages and supported their completion of secondary education.

Even in SSA there were considerable inroads in political change. The IMAGE (Intervention with Micro-finance for AIDS and Gender Equity) programme in South Africa provides micro-finance plus participatory training on gender, violence and HIV to poor rural women. Initial evaluation shows a 55% reduction in domestic violence.
These examples emphasised by the SIGI show to what extent policymakers may change discriminatory social institutions in order to promote gender equality, along with economic development and poverty reduction. By measuring the invisible, the SIGI provides evidence not only on the level of discrimination, but also on the improvement and/or deterioration generated over time.

4. **Modifications for 2014 and beyond**

4.1. **Inclusion of OECD countries**

In 2012, the criteria for countries to be included in the SIGI were that they were non-OECD countries; had a population of more than 1 million; and had a complete set of data for all variables (missing data for variables were not estimated). However, it is critical to define a universal goal, targeted by a universal index on discriminatory social institutions, at the international level. This is a first reason to cover OECD countries in the SIGI.

Why expand the SIGI to OECD countries? While the SIGI has received considerable attention from policymakers, the media and the public, users frequently question the exclusion of OECD countries. Moreover the limited coverage restricts the usability of the index in research. We are therefore convinced that the usefulness and authority of the index would be strengthened if it also covers OECD countries. While the variables included in the SIGI have been selected with a focus on issues that are typically most pressing and relevant in non-OECD countries, many of the concepts are still of high relevance to OECD countries as well (e.g. violence against women, workplace rights related to maternity leave, family roles, etc.). For example, there is still a huge concern in Europe on gender-based violence: in Norway and Finland 27% and 30% of women declared having been victims of physical violence by an intimate male partner, in 2003 and 1997 respectively (World Bank, 2010). Social institutions in general (norms, culture, laws and practices) are also critical for understanding questions of gender equality in OECD countries. Since discriminatory social institutions are a universal phenomenon, policymaking needs a universal index.

In addition to the conceptual relevance of extending the SIGI to OECD countries, doing so will benefit the OECD. Indeed, the OECD plays a leading role in constructing innovative measures for assessing societal progress, going beyond typical economic and financial indicators where measures of gender equality have gained increasing prominence. An index measuring social institutions and how it affects gender equality, including in OECD countries, would build on and expand the visibility of these initiatives. Moreover, if it is deemed necessary to go beyond the existing variables for a meaningful measure of social institutions and gender equality in OECD countries, and the relevant data is already available from existing OECD work and from partners. The Development Centre previously made attempts to measure SIGI variables in OECD countries for the 2009 SIGI. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), together with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), built the Women’s Economic Opportunity Index, which applied the SIGI scoring scheme for several variables to many OECD countries (restrictive access to credit and property ownership rights; restrictive civil liberties, such as freedom of movement and political voice; existence of laws protecting women against violence; and reproductive integrity). Finally, the OECD is increasingly working on issues of mutual interest to both OECD and non-OECD countries and expanding the geographical coverage of its work. Gender equality is an important issue of such mutual, global interest where a broader perspective and geographical coverage would greatly enrich the work and position of the organisation.
Nevertheless, including OECD countries in SIGI rankings requires caution. This exercise faces challenges regarding comparison and meaning requirements. On one hand, our aim is to guarantee comparisons over space and time keeping the same framework and the same variables for OECD and non-OECD countries. On the other hand, using the same set of indicators across the world questions their meaning and validity: are those indicators equally relevant and meaningful in all countries in the world? For example, access to land ownership is less pertinent in industrialized countries than in agricultural ones. Is it useful to include indicators where gender gaps have either vanished or even reversed in OECD-countries? For instance, inheritance rights are equal in almost European OECD countries. Working closely with a panel of experts and advisers, instead of expanding SIGI rankings to OECD countries, the OECD Development Centre decided to include them in the GID database and collect only SIGI variables that are pertinent for OECD countries. Hence country profiles for the OECD countries will be available, as well as quantitative and qualitative data.

4.2. **Time use as an indicator of discriminatory social institutions**

The OECD Development Centre plans to launch a new line of research on time use as an indicator of discriminatory social norms. This additional indicator would capture the unequal burden of unpaid care between men and women and make visible the invisible double female workload. This new line of research contributes to the debate regarding time poverty as a deficit of spare time.

In couples, as income and education increase, female and male time uses converge, mainly driven by a decline in hours devoted to housework by women, rather than an increase in hours among men. However, overall differences persist among the well-off and educated: for most couples around the world, women contribute more than 60% of the time devoted to housework and care, irrespective of their employment status, income or education levels. While gender disparities in time allocation may be explained by socio-demographic and economic factors, half to two-thirds of the difference remains unexplained (Berniell and Sánchez-Páramo 2011). The inclusion of time use data in the GID database assumes that this persistent unexplained intrahousehold division of labour may be explained by persistent discriminatory social institutions.

We then propose to include the female to male ratio of time devoted to housework and of total working hours, including both paid and unpaid work.

5. **Conclusion**

There are a number of major implications to the measurement of discriminatory social institutions: the SIGI draws attention to aspects of gender inequality that are often invisible, yet powerful drivers of economic and social outcomes for women and girls. As such, discriminatory social institutions should be measured not only because they provide information on critical and often overlooked dimensions of gender inequality, but also because they matter for development outcomes.

Given the gaps in quality, comparability and coverage of data, greater statistical capacity building on discriminatory social institutions and gender equality is needed. High quality data with comprehensive coverage will ensure that decision-makers have the information they need to design policies and allocate resources in a manner that effectively promotes gender equality and consequently improves development outcomes. In particular, there is a need to improve sub-national data on discriminatory social institutions in order to provide deeper insight into how they play out in the context of regional differences.
References


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1 It is worth indicating that missing data are not produced. Therefore, only countries having information for all the variables included in the SIGI are ranked. Countries non-ranking in the SIGI are included in the GID.

2 Here [http://my.genderindex.org/](http://my.genderindex.org/), you can build your own index using different weights if you consider that some dimensions matter more.

3 For further information on the technical construction of the SIGI please see Cerise et al., (2012) and Branisa et al., (2009).

4 Country notes are available on the SIGI website [http://my.genderindex.org/](http://my.genderindex.org/).

5 Latin America and the Caribbean includes: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; and Venezuela.

6 East Asia and the Pacific includes: Cambodia; China; Chinese Taipei; Fiji; Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China; Indonesia; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; People’s Democratic Republic of Lao; Malaysia; Mongolia; Myanmar; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Timor-Leste; and Viet Nam.

7 Europe and Central Asia includes: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Republic of Moldova; Russian Federation; Serbia; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; and Uzbekistan.

8 Europe and Central Asia includes: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Republic of Moldova; Russian Federation; Serbia; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; and Uzbekistan.

9 Middle East and North Africa includes: Algeria; Bahrain; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Morocco; Palestinian Authority; Oman; Saudi Arabia; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; and Yemen.

10 Sub-Saharan Africa includes: Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo; The Democratic Republic of the Congo; Côte d’Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; Sudan; Swaziland; United Republic of Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.