FINAL REPORT

SEED II: EXPLORING THE AGRICULTURAL INITIATIVES’ INFLUENCE ON STABILITY IN SOMALIA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
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<td>CEWERU</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<td>JDO</td>
<td>Jubaland Development Organization (NGO)</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>LoA</td>
<td>Letter of Agreement</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>SEED</td>
<td>Sustainable Employment and Economic Development</td>
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<td>SNG</td>
<td>Somali National Government</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WOCCA</td>
<td>Women and Child Care Organization</td>
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DFID SOMALIA MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE SEED EVALUATION

DFID Somalia commissioned this report to obtain an independent verification of the significant results obtained through the Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme, in which we made an investment of £23m investment from 2011-2014. This has proved to be a valuable exercise. The report makes a number of salient recommendations which DFID Somalia will take into account for future economic development programming and will also have wider relevance for other DFID programmes in conflict states.

In addition to reviewing the programme in its own terms, we also asked the reviewers to explore the extent to which a primarily livelihoods focussed programme in Somalia, might also have additional effects in dissuading youth from joining militia groups and countering violent extremism (CVET).

The programme did not have an explicit CVET objective at the outset and had no indicators around extremism or stability in its logframe. However, there is a broader hypothesis that economic development projects with a focus on job creation could impact on broader stabilisation and statebuilding goals in conflict states, which we also wanted to test. Overall the report provides independent verification of some of the significant results achieved by the SEED programme, but finds little evidence of an effect on preventing radicalisation. The key lesson we draw from this is that objectives to counter violent extremism or terrorism are only likely to be achieved if they are explicitly designed in to programmes. Even then, there may be no guarantees of success.

Phil Evans
Head, DFID Somalia
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction
FAO, with the support of DFID, has implemented the Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme. SEED was extended to SEED II and its primary focus on employment and economic development was, in accordance with the Theory of Change (ToC), adjusted to be defined as reducing conflict and increasing stability in Lower and Middle Shabelle through the creation of employment. This report is an output of an evaluation of SEED II, which explored the effectiveness of the implemented activities, as well as reviewed the overall ToC underlying the adjusted programme. This evaluation focuses primarily on the stability component of the programme.

The report is logically structured in alignment with the ToC beginning with a description of the approach to the evaluation and the evaluation methodology. The analytical sections begin with the context and background of the specific regions of Somalia where the programme is implemented. The second part of the report discusses the implementation, activities, output and outcome of the programme. Finally, the report discusses the ToC logic before concluding and providing recommendations for future similar interventions.

Summary of the evaluation findings and conclusions
The evaluation was done using a mixed method approach. The evaluation team carried out a desk review and used quantitative and qualitative methods to understand the context for the intervention in Lower and Middle Shabelle. 450 beneficiaries out of 750 were selected randomly and interviewed and the survey team was deployed to the three districts assessed.

The survey team conducted various interviews in Nairobi, Mogadishu and targeted districts to better understand the specificity of the context, the approach to project implementation and the various community and stakeholder perceptions. The team conducted interviews with local beneficiaries and stakeholders. Taking into consideration clan and conflict dynamics the evaluation assessed the implementation of the SEED activities and the effect these may have had on fulfilling the aim of enhancing stability.

The key activities in the implementation of the programme have been: constructing sluice gates to improve irrigation, distribution of seeds and fertilizers, and the construction of storage facilities.

The evaluation also examines the importance of conflict and conflict dynamics in the targeted areas. The conflicts in Lower and Middle Shabelle are dynamic and continue to evolve. Most conflicts relate to resources and land disputes between clans, as well as historical disputes over the right to resources. These dynamics are analysed carefully in the report and show how important these factors are to consider when selecting beneficiaries and when analysing the logic of the programme within the context of existing conflicts and grievances.

The analysis section addresses the implementation of the programme by analysing the profile of the beneficiaries, the construction of the assets and the yield gains from the programme.

The last analysis chapter focuses on the ToC and analyses what drives recruitment to armed groups in the areas of the intervention. The analysis leverages other radicalization studies in Somalia and discusses the push factors (socioeconomic) and the pull factors (the seeking for meaning, ideology, revenge, prestige, etc.) and how these come into play in the areas of intervention.

The overall conclusions from the evaluation are:

- **Scale of intervention and beneficiary selection are crucial:** The project is designed with a dual objective of livelihood and stability. While the concept of the ToC - looking at the relationship between unemployment and recruitment – was found to be consistent with the aim of contributing to stability,
the scale of the project, the selection of beneficiaries and the selection of the locations for the infrastructures supported are equally important factors when designing a project aiming for an effect on both objectives. The aforementioned factors are seen to have not been completely taken into consideration in the design and implementation of this programme.

- **Promoting entrepreneurship or creating employment?:** When assessing the effectiveness of the programme for improving livelihoods, it was found that the beneficiaries of the sluice gates, seeds and fertilizer were already active farmers and, therefore, the project is not specifically an employment creation project, but rather a project aiming at increasing farming production. Moreover, none of the survey respondents reported that they had been involved in the cash for work activities to rehabilitate the irrigation canals. It is also worth noting that farmers would be better described as "small entrepreneurs" rather than "employees," as they have to deal with the management of risks related to investment, production, and marketing, which is entirely different from safe and stable standard employment. That said, the project has generated a significant increase in the level of income in two of the three districts, which is a positive livelihood effect.

- **No clear multiplier effect:** The project provided seeds and fertilizer for 250 individuals from one village per district. The perception is that, because of the targeting of 250 individuals in one village, the effect generated by the project would not translate beyond the direct beneficiaries and the villages in which they reside.

- **Absence of stability indicators:** With regards to stability, the programme may have contributed to reducing the appeal of joining armed groups, as was the logic of the ToC. Furthermore, some financial gains occurred from beneficiaries receiving seeds and fertilizer. The specific achievements in terms of enhanced stability are, however, hard to measure as the logical framework lacked stability related indicators. The lack of indicators may have contributed to a limited focus on stability in the beneficiary selection and monitoring processes by the implementing partners. This study found that the selection criteria for beneficiaries and justification of locations for the infrastructures were not clearly specified in a way that would be expected to contribute to the aim of enhancing stability.

- **Wrong beneficiary selection criteria (pro-poor or pro-stability?):** The pro-poor beneficiary selection criteria used by SEED II cannot alone generate a stability effect as, although being poor may be a contributing factor, on its own it is not enough to be a direct potential cause of instability. More selection criteria related to violence could have been set up to increase clarity and also possibly enhance the impact of the project with regards to stability. The average age of beneficiaries was also high, despite the fact that the project could have targeted young men, who are usually most likely to be or become the gun holders. Moreover, the criteria of 30% of women beneficiaries applied in the SEED II project was not clearly justified from a perspective of enhancing stability. The role of women in recruitment and joining armed groups in Somalia remains poorly understood, but most likely their role is more supportive and they are rarely direct fighters. The 30% women are as such not likely to contribute significantly to stability.

- **Lack of engagement with governance structures reduces sustainability of effects:** The potential of a livelihood project to generate sustainable stability strongly relies on the provision of protection and justice from the local and national authorities. Riverine farmers targeted by the SEED II project are mainly populated by Bantu minorities and the high financial potential of their farms is a key reason for their land being at the centre of various interests and conflicts. By supporting farmers to enhance their livelihoods without supporting the protection of their rights and their land puts the farmers at risk and makes the effects of the project very vulnerable to quick changes. Working with individuals alone rather than working in conjunction with institutions is not likely to contribute to sustainable solutions and a lack of engagement with authorities is similarly problematic from a perspective of finding long term solutions as well as structural peace dividends.

- **Limited understanding of the specifics of recruitment:** The concept of recruitment to armed groups should differentiate "individual recruitment" from "group recruitment" and both must be addressed simultaneously if the aim is to contribute to enhancing stability. The current SEED II project has only
addressed “individual recruitment” and only addressed the individual financial reasons for joining an armed group. This aspect remains the main motivation for individuals reported by the evaluation respondents to join an armed group, but, as discussed in the report, there are many other equally important factors at play, including the process of group recruitment. The recruitment toward Al Shabaab (AS) was reported to be mainly “group recruitment,” meaning that clan leaders will choose to align themselves to AS to get the protection that the government is failing to provide. This point is particularly true for minorities, but we should also consider that during conflict between any clan, the clan that is losing ground can also align itself to any other armed group to better challenge its opponents. This type of “group recruitment” is then primarily opportunistic and motivated by political reasons. Therefore, effective conflict resolution mechanisms with terms and conditions acceptable by all parties, especially by the losing side are crucial in contributing towards reducing politically oriented group recruitment and this could be addressed by innovative support at the institutional level to support stability.

**Recommendations**

Considering the above conclusions the evaluation team has the following general recommendations:

- Complement the logical framework with indicators of performance related to stability.
- Some factors of instability are clearly related to the failure of the government and lessons learnt should be taken from the success of AS notably in building a local perception of fairness of justice.
- Define very specific selection criteria for beneficiaries to be included in the project in order to select individuals with profiles that are truly at risk of being recruited by armed group.
- The context analysis needs to be very specific and conflict sensitivity can be considered in the project implementation to include medium and high risk profiles of beneficiaries to maintain inclusive local acceptance of the project.
- The concept of employment should be replaced by a concept of income generation with a clear target on how much should be generated per beneficiary to generate some stability.
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1. INTRODUCTION

As per the ToR and as explained in the Executive Summary, the main aim of this study is to provide evidence, which shows the ability of the SEED II programme to reduce conflict and/or increase stability in Somalia, specifically in Lower and Middle Shabelle. This study examines the design and implementation of the programme in order to carry out the assessment and provide recommendations.

The study was carried out on behalf of DFID with FAO as an indirect recipient. The research comprised a combination of methodologies including desk review, key informant interviews (KIIs), as well as qualitative and quantitative data collection in the field. As a part of the desk review the survey team has analysed FAO’s own monitoring data, as well. The tools used were approved by DFID and included beneficiary and community views on the relevance, implementation and impact of the Market Development Component’s agricultural interventions implemented by local NGO’s engaged by FAO.

The qualitative data was mainly collected from interviews with international organisations, government representatives, experts and local organisations working in the same line of work or the same geographical regions.

Findings from the research have been used to analyse and discuss the effectiveness of the SEED programme, as well as to test the ToC underpinning the programme. The ToC is built on the assumption that there is a causal link between the lack of livelihoods and unemployment and recruitment to violent groups. The logic of the ToC is that if employment opportunities are provided and livelihoods improve, this will have a direct effect on the reduction of conflict and recruitment to violent groups and will result in an overall increase in stability.

Please see below the specific evaluation questions used for the research as per the ToR and later adjusted and approved by DFID:

- Why are people attracted to join the programme?
- Who are (which type of people) joining the programme? Why?
- What other options are open to them?
- What do community leaders expect from the programme?
- What kind of income gains have been realised through the programme?
- What other benefits have been and continue to be realised through the programme?
- Have there been any disadvantages of the programme?
- Are people satisfied with the programme? Why?
- To what extent do Community Leaders feel the programme has reached an appropriate range of individuals in their community?
- Would individuals/ community leaders recommend the programme to others in their community? In other communities?
- What kinds of communities is the programme seen as suitable for?
- How do views vary on the programme across subsets of the population?
- How do views vary on AS across subsets of the population?
- Is there evidence to support the ToC’s rationale that these income-generating opportunities might divert people from joining militias?
- To that end – did people engaged in the programme actually generate income?
- How long is the improved income lasting for?
- To what extent are people motivated to join AS by financial incentives? What other motivating factors are mentioned?
- What are the key recommendations that result from the research findings?

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1 Further exploration into what else might contribute to their engagement and hence what other factors must be considered in a potential ToC aimed at reducing recruitment
2. **Approach to the Research**

➢ **Overall approach**

The study assessed the ToC by examining whether or not creating employment and livelihoods contributes to decreasing violence through reduced recruitment to armed groups, specifically through the SEED II project implemented by FAO.

For this purpose, the survey team followed the project implementation cycle as it was undertaken by FAO. In order to test the ToC, we measured the achievements made by FAO in relation to a project outcome and the outputs in light of the context analysis.

![SEED II Key steps of project implementation](image)

**Figure 1**

➢ **Context Analysis**

➢ **Understanding the conflict dynamics in the location of the project intervention (Middle and Lower Shabelle).**

As a first step, the survey team developed a detailed context analysis of the locations targeted by the project. This context analysis was critical to understanding the type of conflicts currently occurring in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. Following the logic of the ToC, there was an examination of recruitment to violent groups and how unemployment or poverty was related to the attraction to armed groups. Aside from the specifics of recruitment, it was also important to understand the relationship between the local economy and local conflict. In particular, to understand who are the different actors benefiting from the current violence or dominating the economic scene (dominant violent groups, warlords, militias etc.), and who are the “laisser pour compte” (i.e. minorities excluded socially and economically, abused). This lens was used to compare with the specific profile of the beneficiaries of the project.
Project conflict sensitivity: Understanding the selection of the beneficiaries with a view to the key outputs of the project and in light of the conflict sensitivity.

The key aspect of the implementation of the SEED II project from a conflict sensitivity point of view is the selection of the project beneficiaries – individuals, farm owners or suppliers. Given the overall focus of the project, it is key to analyse how this selection has influenced or been influenced by the local conflict. Obviously, the performance of the implementation of the project is key to initially determine its effect and, at a later stage, the contribution towards achieving the stated outcomes and impact.

Approach to testing the theory of change

The ToC to be tested identifies potential connections between unemployment as a driver of radicalisation and sustainable employment as a way to reduce conflict and increase stability.

![Diagram](image-url)
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

➢ Desk review

The evaluation has been conducted using as a first step a series of interviews in Nairobi with the FAO team and analysis of the desk review. Findings from the desk review were used to design the data collection tools and to propose a sampling methodology for all evaluation field work. Key findings of the desk review have been added to this report as a point of comparison with the data collected in the field.

➢ Field data collection

Axiom deployed field teams between 3rd September 2014 and 16th September 2014.

The field team was trained on the tools for the research in Mogadishu on Monday 1st September 2014.

Some delays occurred due to changed access in these locations, but Qoryoley was finally accessed by the team on 9th September and then Kurtunwarey on 13th September. Middle Shabelle was successfully accessed without any challenges on 3rd September. For security reasons, no cameras were deployed in Lower Shabelle. In the more secure area of Middle Shabelle, cameras were used for field data collection and evidence methodology. Based on the findings during the desk review, it was decided by the survey team to use a statistical power of 95% and 5% of level and interval of confidence per district (n: 150 x 3) i.e. 450 interviews with SEED II beneficiaries. The initial design of the sample was 254 respondents in total, but it quickly became evident for the evaluation team that the survey should focus on developing an understanding per district with the relevant statistical validity, as the context is very specific and relates directly to the effects of the project. Therefore, the numbers were increased to 150 per district in order to be able to provide robust findings and conclusions.

All data were collected in Somali, but reported in English by the field team. The team of enumerators were trained in Somali on all the tools to be used for data collection prior to field deployment. Axiom has conducted various field data collection exercises in the Shabelle regions and has, therefore, utilised an already established network of enumerators to find the most suitable profile of enumerators to conduct the interviews with beneficiaries. The selection of enumerators was based on their understanding of the district where they would be deployed, their specific level of access to the specific communities, and their previous experience as enumerators.

The interviews with beneficiaries were structured as quantitative data collection forms enabling:

• Collection of extensive information on the profile of the beneficiaries including age, sex, clan, incomes, assets, livelihood.
• Information on household members to understand the household composition and the proportion of potential profiles at risk in order to also note indirect beneficiaries.
• Information on the receipt of inputs received by the SEED II project.
• Detailed understanding of the farming activities over the past few years. Some aspects of the ToC have been tested through perception questions reporting the level of agreement with specific sentences.
### Sampling

| Interview with beneficiaries | 450 beneficiaries were assessed, 150 per district. The selection was done through a random selection using RAND function of MS Excel.  
- **Qoryoley** – Face to face interview  
- **Kuntuwarey** – phone interview  
- **Jowhar** – face to face interview |

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<th>KII (context and conflict related)</th>
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| - Life & Peace Institute  
- CEWERU / SOYDEN NGO  
- Finnish Church Aid  
- Stabilisation Advisors to the British Government  
- FAO local partners i.e. COMCARE, Swiss Kalmo, JDO, WOCCA.  
- Other organisations working in the same area  
- Other international partners (WFP)  
- Community members |

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<th>KII (project related)</th>
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| Per district  
- Traders (2)  
- Elders (2)  
- District commissioner (1 when possible)  
- Project manager (1) |

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<th>Assessment of infrastructure</th>
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<td>No farms had crops as the team visited the field during the land preparation season</td>
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### Tools

- HH 0608 14.docx
- Non response forms.docx

### Data Analysis

- The quantitative data has been analysed through a dashboard run under MS Excel enabling the production of automatic analysis per pre-selected filters. The analysis has been filtered per district and per clan status (minorities or not) to understand the specific profiles of these sub groups, but also to better analyse the effects of the project compared to the clan dynamics of each district.

- The qualitative information has been collected using various sources through interviews in Nairobi, in Mogadishu and in the districts targeted by the project. Specific research questions, in particular the more sensitive ones and the context analysis, have been conducted by Somali researchers in the districts of the intervention. The key informant interviews per district were read by the team leader, who then highlighted the main points. These were discussed with the team and presented in the report. The qualitative research has provided the quotes used in the report shared by primarily key stakeholders. The qualitative data also helped steer and qualify the quantitative findings.

### Limits of the survey

- The survey was able to reach a sufficient level of confidence in the findings per district. The limit of the survey is that it is based on the level of knowledge of the respondents. Key information about past farming activities is at risk of not being accurate due to recall memory limitation and lack of detailed knowledge. Therefore, the findings on the farming activities will be taken with precaution and no major conclusions will be drawn from this specific section of the data set.
• Reports of lower levels of inputs received from the project compared to expectation were made in specific cases, but the evaluation methodology was not designed to further assess this difference and who could have benefitted from it. A deeper audit could be carried out to check the supporting documents related to the logistical chain and distribution. Combined with further field reporting from local knowledge, more information could be gathered on this sensitive matter.

• Some questions used in the questionnaires related to post-distribution monitoring, which is usually conducted a few weeks (four to six ideally) after the distribution. As the questions related to inputs received occurred more than a year after the distribution, accuracy of the information could be challenged even if consistency amongst the findings per district were noticed. Moreover, there is always a risk of respondents mixing up the origins of the goods they received from NGOs working with different partners. Locations where more than one organisation is operating are always at risk of respondents being confused between the various projects.

• The structure of the logical framework does not include elements of stability. The measurement of stability was not factored into most of the support documents and, therefore, all findings related to stability are based on the evaluation team’s findings without cross checking capacity with support documents from the implementing agencies. If conflict sensitivity was applied during specific phases of the project cycle, this was not documented.

• Key sensitive information related to any actors in the conflict or to malpractice related to project implementation can be under reported by the respondents, since some information can be viewed as being too sensitive (nobody mentioned the number of weapons owned, for example).

• The timing of the field data collection occurred during the land preparation period and, therefore, farms with crops were not visible for the field team.

• Some tools were designed to collect information at the store level where the farmers’ cooperative should be active. Unfortunately, while the information per farmer was available, the overall information on the cooperative was not made available and, therefore, some of the tools to collect specific data sets could not be used.
4. BACKGROUND OF THE SEED II PROGRAMME

In summary, the SEED II programme is a follow up on the programme from SEED I. SEED II consists of two components, but the focus of this evaluation is only on FAO’s work as lead partner for the implementation of the component looking at Market Development. The SEED II programme is implemented by FAO, who have sub-contracted three local NGOs to undertake the specific activities, selecting the beneficiaries and engaging stakeholders.

The Market Development component specifically focuses on developing economic opportunities and creating employment, with accompanying skills, amongst identified ‘vulnerable’ groups, namely youth and women. The component is composed of agricultural interventions focusing on the consolidation of the agricultural crop activities including the promotion of sustainable crop production in areas where irrigation systems have been improved. FAO are strengthening the canal rehabilitation by further equipping the irrigation systems with sluice gates and working to strengthen marketing and price setting opportunities for farmers by piloting storage and marketing components. Similar activities are implemented by numerous other organisations and are seen as an important and much needed engagement.

The overall aim of the intervention is to improve the livelihood resilience of target communities and beneficiaries while providing opportunities for income generation to 750 targeted vulnerable households in Lower and Middle Shabelle.

That said, the programme has an ambition beyond the specific market development through seeds, tools and cash for work, as reflected in the ToC. The idea is that by improving livelihoods, the programme will contribute to reducing the appeal to join violent groups. The logic is based on the assumption that violent groups pay individuals to join and that a part of the appeal to join these groups lies in the financial incentive combined with a lack of viable alternatives.
5. CONTEXT FOR THE INTERVENTION

➢ Context analysis per region

The Shabelle regions are defined by the presence of the Shabelle River enabling irrigation farming as a significant source of income, as well as access to the ocean and its fishing opportunities. Shabelle regions also surround the capital, Mogadishu, creating significant influence on the national dynamics in these regions. The Hawyie clan, strongly present and influential in Mogadishu, are similarly strongly present and influential in the Shabelle regions, though they were not the first inhabitants in most cases.

South of Lower Shabelle, Barawe has been a stronghold of the hard-line AS. However, AS was pushed out of Barawe in October 2014 as part of the ongoing AMISOM offensive. This point has not been captured in the survey, but highlights the importance of the Shabelle regions’ stability for the overall stability of Somalia.

The context analysis is aimed at understanding historical and traditional conflict in the Shabelle regions. The balance in the local conflicts related to clan, the competition for natural resources and political power are understood to be key elements on which the national conflict opposing SNG to AS builds its allegiance to one side or the other. However, it should be understood that the fluidity of the conflict dynamics induces regular changes in these alliances. In terms of stability, the unresolved conflict or the remaining tensions are the bridges linking local dynamics to the national conflict opposing SNG to AS and these conflicts will be explored in detail in the context analysis of this report.

figure 3
**Lower Shabelle**

UNDP estimated the population of Lower Shabelle to be approximately 850,000 in 2005, making it one of the most populous regions in the country. Livelihoods in the region are classified as agricultural, agro-pastoralist, pastoralist, fishing, and urban sedentary.

Well-armed and resourced farac ('new settler') communities tend to dominate the Asal ('original inhabitant') communities. Farac communities originated from Hawyie-Haber Gedir from central regions. These communities migrated to lower Shabelle in the 1970s and gained control of valuable resources, such as farmland.

**Main type of conflicts in Lower Shabelle:**

- **Political conflict over the control of local authority in the region.** These political conflicts are closely linked to clan dynamics. Moreover, the conflict over the control of the region is opposing the SNG to AS, which is significant, as Lower Shabelle has been a stronghold of AS.

- **Marginalisation and discrimination** have heightened inter-clan mistrust. “Non-armed and minority clan members are often forced to work on farms without pay, and to pay taxes on their properties. There are frequent reports of plans among marginalised groups to retaliate against the dominant clans”.

  It was further reported during informal interviewing that the AMISOM/SNG forces have been used in the name of the fight against AS when, in fact, the main objective has been to weaken the Digil-Byamal, who were reported to be more closely associated with AS.

- **Resource-based Conflict:** Clan conflicts are primarily based on competition over resources, such as land tenure, grazing rights, water, farmlands, livestock, and the distribution of humanitarian aid. A specific focus will be drawn here on the conflicts related to land. In the nineteenth century, Italian colonizers were controlling this part of Somalia. “According to Dir-Biyamal and Hawyie-Wacdaan communities, there was an agreement between the Dir-Biyamal and Italian settlers in 1907 where farmland was offered to the Italians to develop banana plantations. The Dir-Biyamal and the Hawyie-Wacdaan were to remain shareholders of the plantations and have their land returned when the contract expired”.

- **Criminal actions from individuals also fuel clan conflicts through revenge** or are motivated by revenge killings. These aspects are important, as crime committed by individuals will engage the responsibility of their whole clan and, therefore, the risk of escalation of conflict is higher than in a judiciary set up where the individual’s responsibility is prioritised.

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2 CEWERU. From the bottom-up. Perspectives through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ Mapping for the Central Regions of Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. February 2013.

3 CEWERU. From the bottom-up. Perspectives through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ Mapping for the Central Regions of Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. February 2013.
**Location of the SEED II project in lower Shabelle:**
The location of the SEED II project implemented in Lower Shabelle will be discussed further in the project review, but it can already be noted that the distribution sites of seeds and fertilisers were reported to be respectively in **Gorgal** (along the river in Qoryoley district) and **Bulo Mareer** (around 15 Kms South of the Shabelle river in an area extensively served by canal, in Merka district instead of Kuntunwarey). Bullo Marrer has been a particular stronghold of AS. French security forces intended to liberate a French hostage, in January 2013, as a result of which, the hostage and two other French soldiers were killed.

![Map of SEED II distribution points in Lower Shabelle](image)

**Qoryole district**
Known for its agricultural economy, Qoryole is mainly inhabited by Bantu-Jareer, Rahaweyn-Jiide, Rahaweyn-Tunii, Hawyiye, Dir-Biyamal, and Rahaweyn-Garre clans, which are considered to be native. Other groups in the district are Rahaweyn-Elay and Hawyie-Habar Gedir. The district is estimated to have roughly 50,000 plus inhabitants.

The main conflicts in the districts were reported to be around land ownership, clan conflicts and economic marginalisation. However, the dominant conflict in this district remains the land issue and the conflict resulting from the illegal occupation of farmlands and other properties by “alien clans”. Hawyie-Habar Gedir clan has been accused of grabbing the farm lands of local populations. Initial settlement of Hawyie-Habar Gedir was started by the government during the 1974 drought. These settlers were accepted and integrated into the communities. However, after the collapse of Somalia, their population has grown tremendously. They were reported to be engaged in land grabbing, taking over other people’s business, thereby perpetuating the source of conflict in the district.

The Hawyie-Habar Gedir is perceived to be originally from central region where the land is not as fertile as in Lower Shabelle. Hawyie-Habar Gedir is part of the Hawyie family, which is the main entity controlling Mogadishu. Hawyie-Habar Gedir control arms, business and the politics in Qoryole, while the original inhabitants of Qoryole are Bantu, Rahaweyn and Dir. It was reported that one of the popular approaches used by AS was to fairly redistribute lands, which resulted in a reduction in major conflicts. AS was, somehow, reported to practice fairness in dealing with ownership of land and disputed settlements. They managed to stop further grabbing of land belonging to smaller clans by major clans. In addition, where lands were taken away from people unfairly, they reclaimed and returned the land to the affected communities. This contributed to them getting support from these communities. This point was regularly confirmed during interviews.

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4 For simplification reasons, we will in this survey continue to mention Kuntunwarey as it was expected to fall in this location but also as the administrative border of the Somali districts can be approximated.
The current approach to federalism in Somalia has the potential to increase Hawyie status and presence in Middle and Lower Shabelle, which could further exacerbate clan conflicts in the Shabelle regions. Understanding the perception of the minorities could be an important point to consider in order to better anticipate conflict evolution. The conflict within the dominant group should also be constantly monitored.

As explained in the diagram below, the profile of the beneficiaries targeted by the SEED II project has focused on the group most reported to be involved in various conflicts. So, the beneficiaries targeting for the SEED II project, from a clan-focused point of view, seems to be coherent. However, in the section related to the project implementation we assessed the profile of individuals in order to better understand how the selection of individuals was linked to the ToC.
Qoryoley: Clan composition, SEED II beneficiaries and relations to conflicts

Figure 5

Source: CEWERU report on conflict in Middle Shabelle. + Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
**Kuntunwaarey district**

Kuntunwarey is mainly inhabited by Rahaweyn-Tuni, Rahaweyn-Jiide, Dir-Biyamal, Rahaweyn-Leysan, Hawiye, Jareer, Darod and other minorities. This district has been controlled by ‘alien clans’ since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. However, when AS took over, the situation changed and some local leaders were nominated. Several conflicts were reported and one in particular was triggered by an attempt by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to return local administration to the native communities via nomination. This happened during the time of Abdullahi Yussuf’s presidency. This attempt failed due to a lack of consensus, which led to several conflicts between local clans. Subsequently, Rahaweyn-Jiide fought Hawyie-Hawadle while the Rahaweyn-Garre and Hawyie-Habar Gedir were embroiled in leadership and land conflicts. During the AS period, Rahaweyn-Jiide vs. AS conflict erupted over the administrative control of the city. Other factors creating conflicts in the district are domination, forced taxation, forced marriages, cases of rape, land and property matters.

The key economic factors are agriculture, agro-pastoralism and pastoralism. Most of the different clans will participate in all three forms of economic activity, especially those who are considered native. Small businesses selling farm products and animal products exist to support some families, who may not have large areas of land or livestock. Some of the minorities like Jareer provide the requisite labour for farming, herding of animals, constructions services, and loading and offloading of goods. This district has always been ruled by “foreigners” and the locals are not united to take over the administration.

As described in the diagram below, in Kuntunwarey, the rationale of the clan representation of the beneficiaries selected to participate in the SEED II project is coherent with the purpose of the ToC. The profile of beneficiaries as individuals will be further assessed in the project review section.
Kuntunwarey: Clan composition, SEED II beneficiaries and relations to conflicts

Source: CEWERU report on conflict in Middle Shabelle. + Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
Middle Shabelle

Middle Shabelle is located on the north eastern side of Mogadishu and is closely linked to the dynamics in the capital. The region has an estimated population of 514,901 people (UNDP, 2005).

The main economy of the region is farming (riverine and rain fed), pastoralism, fishery and trade. The riverine farming benefits from a river higher than the farms making the risk of floods high, but also enabling irrigation, which can be done without an irrigation pump.

The region is mainly populated by Hawyie-Abgal and the highly influential position of Hawyie-Abgal in Mogadishu supports a strong position of Hawyie-Abgal in Middle Shabelle.

Since 2009, there have been at least eight regional administrations or “mini-states” created, primarily based on traditional clan territory, including Shabeelaha Dhexe (Middle Shabelle Shabelle State), Ex-Banadir State, Jjinwebi, Banoadirland, Hamer iyo Hamr daye State, Wargaadhi State, Hi iyo Maanyo, and Abweyn State.

Type of conflicts in the region:

Complex inter and intra-clan violence in the region is deeply rooted in traditional causes of conflicts, such as resource scarcity (e.g. agricultural land usage, water and grazing rights) resulting in violent clashes and political conflict among the sub-clans over both political and territorial control. Sharing of water and grazing land was common practice among the Somali clans until a drought when the majority clan was given the precedence to water its animals first.

- **AS versus the Somali government**
  The conflict between AS and the TFG is the same as at national level. However, the specificity of the local dynamics in Middle Shabelle creates a different approach for the TFG and AS to build on existing local conflicts to gain local allegiances and support.

- **Clan conflicts**
  The clan conflict is important in Middle Shabelle with major focus on Hawyie-Abgal sub clans. Every type of conflict described below can be read with a clan perspective (political control, farmers versus pastoralist, and others). The “clan” conflict in Middle Shabelle is mainly an opposition between the Bantu-Shiddle and the Hawyie-Abgaal (especially the Mohamed Muse sub clan). One of the key aspects in this conflict is the challenge the Bantu are facing in getting equal rights and legitimacy, as per Somali clan members. In Lower Shabelle, Bantu were reported as ex-slaves and, therefore, were perceived to have fewer entitlements, such as land ownership.
• Farmers versus pastoralists
Farmers are mainly from the Bantu community and few are from the Abgal sub clans. Pastoralists are mainly from the Hawyie-Abgal sub-clans, the Hawyie-Hawadle and the Hawyie-Galjecel sub-clans. Disagreement leading to conflict between farmers and pastoralists are common during negotiations over access to water and extension of farms into grazing area.

• Access to land
The farm land is very productive and, therefore, controlling access to these farms is a key point of the conflict in the region. “The region is very productive and this farming land has been the centre of conflict for many years”.

• Political control of the region
  • The Hawyie-Warsangeli clan gained a lot of wealth and power during the last 20 years of civil war through the control of warlords such as Mohamed Dhere.
  • Hawyie-Agoonyar are historical inhabitants of Jowhar district and have a high level of influence in the SNG with two former presidents (Sheik Sharif and Ali Mahdi) and also have a higher number of members of parliament from the Hawyie-Galmah and the Hawyie-Agoonyar clans. The Hawyie-Agoonyar remain strong rivals of the Warsangeli for regional control.
  • Hawyie-Galmah includes the Celi, Matan, Abdulle, and the Yusuf (Mohamed Muse) sub-clans. The clan is the majority in Warsheikh and Balcad Districts and also present in Jowhar and Cadale Districts. The Mohamed Muse (Yusuf, Galmah) clan believes that they must control Jowhar District and have historically contested the position of Middle Shabelle governor with the Hawyie-Agoonyar. Historically, this was accepted; however, the power dynamics of the last 20 years have led other clans to disagree with this.
  • Hawyie-Daud clan controlled the district of Balcad through the power of the warlord Musse Sudu.

• Ad hoc conflicts
In these districts there exists ad hoc conflict precipitated by rogue youth, who may start a fight without the consent of clan elders. The majority of conflicts in these districts are triggered by these rogue youths erecting illegal roadblocks for the collection of taxes from road users, whereby failure to comply and pay the demands often leads to the death of travellers generating further revenge and clan conflicts. Some of these incidences caused conflict between Hawyie-Galjecel vs. Hawyie-Jejele or Hawyie-Mobleen vs. Hawyie-Warsengeli.

Local authority
SNG: The political leaders who control Balcad were appointed by the TFG and residents are satisfied with the appointed leaders, feeling that the local administration is well balanced. However, the district lacks basic institutions and services, such as a professional police force, the military, judicial services, and offices for the local administration. The current police force is composed of clan militias.

“The local administration depends on volunteer police force, who may become a potential security threat due to lack of salaries, food ration and support, making them renge on the public with no revenues collected from people who are trapped in poverty”.

The clan elders remain a traditional local authority, which is also closely interlinked with the SNG authority. The armed groups are clan based militias, which is important to note for the understanding of the relevance of local clan conflict dynamics.

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7 CEWERU. From the bottom-up. Perspectives through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ Mapping for the Central Regions of Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. February 2013.
8 CEWERU. From the bottom-up. Perspectives through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ Mapping for the Central Regions of Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. February 2013
AS: AS imposed a strong authority over the clan and annihilated all clan conflicts in the area under their authority. AS addressed some of the issues in order to resolve local conflicts and provide protection and justice to minorities. For example, they invited the Yabar community to settle in Gololey village after they had been previously expelled by Daud. However, the clan conflicts were not solved during AS control, but were rather on standby. “Elders interviewed all confirmed that there is likelihood that the conflict will recur immediately AS are liberated from the area”⁹.

“In Middle Shabelle the majority of the Al Shabaab are not from the region, but are from the Rahaweyn clan and are primarily from Bay and Bakool regions. Once Al Shabaab is defeated most of the local Al Shabaab leaders will leave as most of them are not from Middle Shabelle”.

Balad district
Balad is in Middle Shabelle located 36km northeast of Mogadishu. The government re-gained control of Balad at the end of June 2012. Balad is inhabited mainly by Hawyie-Abgal and Riverine Jareer communities. Other clans that live in the Region include Hawyie-Galjecel, Hawyie-Hawadle, Hawyie-Mobleen and other small tribes of Arab origin.

The conflict in this district is mainly intra Hawyie-Abgal and sometimes Hawyie-Abgal vs. Jareer (Reer shabelle). Land and farms are the key drivers of conflict in this district. There are also frequent clashes between government soldiers. An example of intra-Abgal conflict was reported and described as an armed militia loyal to the district commissioner (Osman Hadaole) initiating an attack on a police convoy. The commissioner was reacting to his own dismissal by the regional governor from his position. The clashes between government departments often lead to anxiety and displacement of vulnerable populations. The causes could be clan driven, dismissal of relatives from government jobs, and clashes over cash collected from roadblocks.

In this district there was less intra clan fighting between Hawyie-Abgal during the AS administrative period. However, when AS lost control of the area, intra-clan conflicts resumed. Access to water, land, grazing rights, failure to pay blood money, thefts and rape are among the triggers of these conflicts.

Jowhar district
Johwar is one of the districts in Middle Shabelle affected by floods. An estimated 12,000 households are displaced in times of flooding, which affects an estimated 8,000 hectares of farmland. People are also displaced as a result of clan conflicts. Key drivers of conflict in Johwar are revenge attacks, destruction of properties, and most prominently land disputes. Generally, there is a perception and suspicion between major (Hawyie-Abgal) and minor clans like Bantu-Shiddle. Minor clans feel that major clans like Hawyie-Abgal are backed and favoured by the federal government in terms of arbitration, employment, and resource allocations. This often manifests itself in the form of subjugation of elders from minority clans, intra-military fighting, erections of illegal roadblocks by military personnel and robberies by soldiers on local populations because of unpaid salaries.

⁹ CEWERU. From the bottom-up. Perspectives through Conflict Analysis and Key Political Actors’ Mapping for the Central Regions of Hiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle. February 2013
It is noticeable that the SEED II programme targeted Shiddle group while no conflicts were reported in this clan group. The key conflict between Warsengeni and Agoonyar is remarkable as this group is strongly involved in the political dynamics of the region, is closely associated to the TFG in Mogadishu but is also reported to be part of AS emphasizing a certain political opportunism. Resource based conflicts are mainly from the Abgal/Wacbuudhan sub clan.

It should be noted that some AS elements were reported to be from Rahaweyn clan and not originally from the region.

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10 Source: CEWERU report on conflict in Middle Shabelle. + Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
Focus on Al Shabaab

Clan dynamics and Al-Shabaab

As described above, a key conflict is between the asal (‘original inhabitant’) and the farac (‘new settler’), which can also be interpreted with a clan angle that will be described below. The political power is directly associated with the military power of the groups (militia’s capacity) and their wealth. Due to the power dynamics between clans, it is common for minority clans to attempt to associate themselves with specific powerful groups in order to protect their interests and assets.

The interaction between AS and the clan is complex and potentially opportunistic. It varies by location and specific clans. In some locations, AS builds its strength based on the clan structure and some clans seek collaboration with AS to get revenge against other clans, in other locations AS defies the clan system. These differences reflect some of the divisions within AS which will be explored further in the study.

The concept of radicalisation and the concept of recruitment as discussed previously in this report are likely to be different depending on the interest of the individual or group that is being recruited. A simplification of the AS structure could point out two dominating aims in AS, which also relate to the subject of clan. One is led by Sheikh Mukhtar Robow aka Abu Mansur with a nationalistic approach the other is led by Sheikh Moktar Ali Zubeyr aka Godane (replaced on 06/09/2014 by Ahmed Umar, a.k.a. "Abu Ubaidah" also from the Dir/Isaaq clan.) and is most likely to have a close alliance and association with Al Qaeda. The Robow clan approach induces group recruitment based on politics and power while the Godane approach often focuses on the individual and more ideological recruitment.

In Lower Shabelle, the Dir-Byiamal clan associated itself with AS a few years ago and has since changed to SNG. In clan recruitment, youth have no choice and this type of recruitment is driven by the strategic consideration of elders motivated by strengthening their position in various conflicts. In this case, it is likely that individual radicalisation is not a key element of recruitment, but it is possible that it may happen later in the process. The driver of the specific conflicts in Lower Shabelle actually comes from a conflict over the irrigation farms opposing the Dir-Byiamal to the Hawyie-Haber Gedir and is as such key in the area of FAO intervention.

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11 It is important to note as also extensively covered in the literature that AS also engages with these power dynamics, and routinely aligns with specific clan for strategic and tactical gains. AS is also highly diverse in terms of clan composition. (note; Most recent ICG report (no 99); Menkhaus (2014), Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate; Life and Peace Institute (2014), Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia, and (d) Hansen, (2014), An In-depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions.

12 From Rahaweyn-Leysan clan.
13 From Issack-Arab clan.
Joining any clan-based armed group will be based on the clan affiliation at birth or through marriage, which is actually based on strong exclusion factors. In clear opposition to this, AS is the only entity where anyone can join; there is no exclusion factor. This point is very important as this lack of restriction for recruitment defines one of the key strengths for AS compared to all others armed groups, included the SFG ones, which are based directly or indirectly on clan balance.

During the onset of AS, the group was positioned to challenge the clan domination and therefore AS was pro Rahaweyn, pro Bantu and against Hawyie in the Shabelle regions. However, this scenario is less common now. It was explained that as every clan intended to have enough representatives in parliament to advance the clan interest, the same approach applies to AS where, for political reasons, each clan would have an interest to have some representatives within this group. Currently, it is rumoured that the majority of the members of AS are Hawyie-Murursade followed by Hawyie-Habar Gedir. In Middle Shabelle, some Hawyie-Abgal clan members may support AS while others support the government. For example, during the takeover of Balcad from AS by the government and AMISOM, the Hawyie-Wacbuudhan clan helped the government, while Jowhar sub clans willingly avoided the takeover of the district by the government by collaborating with AS.

Based on this analysis, the survey team focused, as part of this study, on understanding who are the direct and indirect beneficiaries of the FAO SEED II project. The study assessed whether targeting the poor and minorities created stability and whether growth has been reached. Understanding why specific individuals joined armed groups was done through qualitative interviews to define the profile of the group at risk of joining armed groups, we then compared these profiles to the profile of the beneficiaries of the SEED II project.

A note on contemporary Al Shabaab

AS has recently lost financial income, troops and significant territorial control as a result of the recent offensive by AMISOM during the early part of 2014, which resulted in the fall of Kismayo, the attack and death of Godane and
five other senior members or allies of the movement in early September 2014, as well as the loss of Barrawe. As a consequence thereof, they are changing their tactics, both in South Central Somalia and in the wider region.

Political scientist Ken Menkhaus undertook a Conflict Analysis for UNSOM in February 2014, and he wrote that AS no longer aspires to be, nor is capable of being, a mass movement. He continued by saying that essentially AS is now an unrestrained and extremely violent “spoiler” whose goals are to block any progress by the SNG, demoralize the Somali public and drive foreign peacekeepers and aid agencies out of Somalia. That said, it is important to take into consideration that whilst being an extremely violent group, their ideological core maintains their religious and nationalistic objective, which involves re-shaping society. Despite currently being on the back foot and having had to change tactics, AS’s ideological core remains the same.

These developments will have substantial implications for actors like FAO in places such as Lower and Middle Shabelle. Menkhaus further explains that AS is now more heavily reliant on coercion and intimidation to raise funds and enlist fighters. Following this point, it should be noted that AS’s presence and influence is widespread even in locations where AS is not the authority in charge. For FAO to tailor its activities to reduce appeal for recruitment a careful analysis of which factors are determinant for the youth is crucial.

In addition to the above, the significance of the gain of territories made by AMISOM should be understood without the traditional exaggeration from the communication department. Towns taken by AMISOM from AS do change AS’s position from a local authority to a guerrilla group aimed at destabilising the new authority and using terrorist tactics. This is exactly the situation currently affecting Mogadishu. AS presence in Mogadishu cannot be denied and the meaning of stability and conflict dynamics are more difficult to comprehend in a context where one of the actors is “invisible” and where its immediate objective is to destabilise and undermine the current local authority, without having the capacity to take over.

Therefore, the way SNG can establish its authority and legitimacy in these towns is by providing justice and protection for all. This acts as a crucial factor in influencing the local support from specific local groups to AS. Each entity believed to be unfairly treated by the SNG would at least expect another group to take over. So far, the AMISOM advances remain a military push, but not a comprehensive “control” of territory and they provide very limited service delivery due to access problems. As such, SNG’s ability to perform fairly in these newly gained towns along with the ability to avoid terrorist attacks will determine the level of support the SNG will gain in and around these localities. Controlling urban areas will be done only with clan support.

What will be the next step for AS remains to be seen, but if it continues to suffer losses it is likely that it could break the group and it will take on different forms. The recently released report by Crisis Group (No99 released 26th of June 2014) draws similar conclusions. Crisis Group points to the need for a political solution to the conflict in order to put an end to the violence. The Nairobi based researcher, Matt Bryden’s analysis on “the reinvention of Al-Shabaab” published in February 2014 also points to the need for service delivery by the government to limit the space in which AS continues to operate.

It is of the utmost importance for any project working in conflict affected areas in Somalia with the aim to contribute to stability to carefully integrate conflict sensitivity in project implementation. This will be done by examining how a project impacts conflict dynamics and how the context impacts project design and implementation. The key actors of the projects, the direct beneficiaries, the indirect beneficiaries and the profile of the non-beneficiaries of the project should be understood from a detailed context analysis. Precautions should be taken to measure how the project interacts with the local conflicts dynamics (diversion, frustration, etc.) to assess the short and long term contribution to stability. This should lead to informed designing of the project to reach the intended results at least by answering the following: where to work, what to do and what to consider in order to increase stability.
6. PROJECT PERFORMANCE

► Implementation through local NGOs

As for any international organisation working in Somalia, FAO has identified local NGOs to implement their activities, namely Comcare, Swisso Kalmo (sub-contracting RAJO NGO, who selected the beneficiaries) and JDO.14 WOCCA was later contracted to monitor the construction of the stores. These organisations are based in Nairobi on a part-time basis and offer a good interface given the fact that FAO does not have staff in the areas of implementation.

The challenge with this type of implementation is the loss of oversight and the high sensitivity to the partners having the right profile and, as such, access in the local communities. If the partner does not have the right profile, selection of contractors as well as beneficiaries easily becomes a factor influencing the likelihood of success of the programme.

In the SEED II case, the NGOs selected are well known international humanitarian organisations and local NGOs and are as such considered by FAO as a good option. Unfortunately, the profiles of the organisations are not strong in all the areas of implementation and some NGOs will have to subcontract or rely on others to implement their work effectively. Ability to reach the very specific objective of the project within the local conflict dynamics and local competition of resources (in which the aid distribution is included), is a complex, sensitive and risky exercise. The very specific profile of individuals representing the organisation and their ability to negotiate the selection process is then key, but rarely measured in the selection of partners while it is crucial for the implementation of complex and ambitious projects.

► Project’s focus is on individuals

The project is articulated as a support to individuals to enhance stability, and is not based on support to infrastructure or institutions. To that end, the performance of the project is critically dependent on selecting the right individuals to generate the expected effect. This section will focus on understanding the profile of the beneficiaries of the SEED II project.

Profile of beneficiaries of the project

See annex “profile of beneficiaries” for more details.

Johwar

The average age of the respondents (head of household and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) was 37.6 years old. This age is seen to be too high to include individuals at risk of being recruited by armed groups. Our understanding of youth is up to 30 years old. Therefore, further analysis of the profile of the HH members has been done to understand who the HH members actually benefiting indirectly from the project are.

The proportion of households with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents only 28% of the cases while this group could potentially represent the higher proportion of the individuals at risk.

All respondents are living along the river and belong to the Shiddle Clan.

The average annual household income is of 534 USD. Given that HHs have an average of 5.73 members, the average annual income per member is 93.1 USD.

14 WOCCA NGO was reported to focus on the monitoring of the construction of the stores in Middle Shabelle.
Most of the HHs participating in the interviews were living on less than 0.4 USD per day per person. While the definition of poor can always be contested and the farmers do not necessarily receive money for all their production, the group interviewed is believed to be particularly poor.

97% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 3% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 75% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 1.4 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 2.4 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned.

### Qoryoley

The average age of the respondents (head of HH and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) is 41 years old.

The proportion of HHs with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents 42% of respondents.

The average annual HH income is of 930 USD. Given that HHs have an average of 6.38 members, the average annual income per member is 93.1 USD.

44% of respondents reported to live with 0.2-0.4 USD per day per HH member.

94% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 2% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 76% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 1.7 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 3.3 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned.

### Kuntunwarey

The average age of the respondents (head of HH and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) is 36 years old.

The proportion of HHs with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents 35% of the cases.

The average annual HH income is 1,039 USD. Given that HHs have an average of 4.87 members, the average annual income per member is 213.3 USD.

34% of respondents reported to live with 0.4-0.6 USD per day per HH member.

97% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 4% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 47% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 0.9 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 3.4 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned.
### FAO Selection Criteria

FAO has designed a pro-poor approach targeting the beneficiaries according to the following criteria:

#### Selection Criteria of the Beneficiaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Proposal document(^\text{15}) the section criteria indicated page 22.</th>
<th>Source: LOA between FAO and the NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Vulnerable youth and youth at risk (drop-outs, ex-pirates, ex-militants and ex-combatants);</td>
<td>- Should be residents of the local village/district, who are members to one of the farmers’ organisations that have been earlier assessed within the district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women groups;</td>
<td>- Should be residents of the designated local village/district and should have access to land. Internally Displaced People (IDPs) shall not be considered eligible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women headed households;</td>
<td>- Being the most vulnerable groups, comprising poor farmers in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Internally displaced persons; and</td>
<td>- Should be willing to receive the agricultural inputs from the FO as per the laid down guidelines of the FO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Out of school youth.</td>
<td>- Women headed HHs should be considered if they have land to practice farming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- At least 30% total direct beneficiaries should be women or women headed HHs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference of selection criteria between the project document and the FAO LOA with implementing partners showed that the selection criteria related to stability have been dropped out during the course of the project.

#### Conclusion on the Profile of Beneficiaries:

The selection profile for the FAO project is confirmed as beneficiaries being farmers, with access to farming land and being poor. However, how these criteria are linked to stabilisation is not clear. A review of the age and gender group of the HH members by respondents shows that a fairly low proportion of the group “male youth” are in the beneficiary group despite being the most at risk for recruitment.

It is noticeable that in Lower Shabelle, the clan regularly involved in conflicts was targeted by SEED II. In Middle Shabelle, the Shiddle were exclusively targeted by SEED II, but were not reported to be active actors of local conflict. The relationship between clan involvement in conflict and beneficiary selection for SEED II is, therefore, inconsistent as previously described in the context and illustrated in the diagram explaining clan distribution and conflict between clans who are and are not beneficiaries of the programme.

The beneficiaries in Middle Shabelle are poorer than in Lower Shabelle and have lower access to land (2.2 Taab in Middle Shabelle compared to 3.0-3.4 in Lower Shabelle). The graph showing the average annual incomes per HH members also indicates much higher poverty is in Middle Shabelle. See annex on beneficiaries profile for more details.

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\(^{15}\) Sustainable Employment and Economic Development – Phase II”; OSRO/SOM/203/UK,
Selection of location of infrastructures

Perception on the selection of the infrastructures

The respondents reported that the selection of the farms and the location of the rain storage have not generated any tension. Respondents also think that the location of the grain storage is fair.

As indicated on Figure 9, the key remark to be made on the selection of the farm is that the targeted villages are along the river where the sluice gates have been installed. Targeted farms have reported to use an average of 2.4 Taab. However, the farming activities in Johwar are visible up to 10 km from the river. Therefore, some irrigation canals might be serving farms far from the river (this is unconfirmed), which is a positive point.

Source of the graph above: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
Remarks on the locations of villages targeted for seed and fertilizer distribution:

In Johwar, while the sluice gates are widespread along the river in many villages, only one village, “Bacadley,” (250 HH beneficiaries) has benefited from seed and fertilizer distribution. While the sluice gates benefited many villages, the seeds and fertilizer distribution only benefited a single village, which indicates the selection was not particularly focused on a specific group at risk and inputs were diluted between different geographic areas.

In Qoryoley, seeds and fertiliser have been distributed in Gorgaal village, which is located along the Shabelle River.

In Kuntunwarey, the seeds have been distributed in Bulo Marrer village, which is located around 15 kilometres south of the Shabelle River and farms in this location are benefiting from two different canals connected to the river. These canals are called “Fornaale” from Qoryoley, which is 15 kilometres from the river and “Birimo Suguntaale” from Janaale, which is 37 kilometres east. However, the location of Bulo Marrer village falls, according to standard Shape files for Somali administrative borders, under Merka district and not Kuntunwarey district.

Source: Google Earth, FAO list of geo referenced infrastructures and Axiom geo referenced photos taken on the field.
Project performance

Activities
The reception of inputs remained a bit complex to understand as the FAO call centre showed some discrepancies. This potentially highlights some level of distribution lower than expected, which is confirmed here. However, further distributions were reported to occur in 2014 and the way to combine these two distributions was not very clear, as some respondents reported to have received inputs during the two seasons.

Verification of the list of beneficiaries:
The survey team randomly selected 150 beneficiaries to be interviewed in each of the three districts. The field team was instructed to interview specific selected beneficiaries. In cases of absence, an absence form was filled in and verification of the existence of the absentee was conducted. In Johwar, there were only a few absent from the list and all those that were absent were reported to be known from the community. There were no cases of unknown beneficiaries which indicated that the FAO list of beneficiaries provided to the survey team was very accurate.

Cash for work
The SEED II project has employed some people for the rehabilitation of the irrigation canals. While these activities have been mentioned in some of the discussion, none of the respondents selected within the list of the recipients of seeds and fertilizer participated in the cash for work activities.

Distribution of inputs
The understanding is that the beneficiaries were supposed to receive 20 Kg of maize seeds, 8Kg of sesame seeds and 100 Kg of urea (fertilizer) during 2013. While some of these distributions happened in 2013, others happened in 2014.
Conclusions drawn from the reception of farming inputs should take into consideration that field interviews occurred a long time after the distribution, which, consequently, contributes to a decrease in the quality of information collected. Furthermore, there is a risk that these beneficiaries could mix their answers between what they received from FAO SEED II project and what they could have received from other projects. However, in 2013, which was also a year affected by floods in Middle Shabelle, it was reported that there was a very low level of items distributed and that no urea had been provided with only 18.5% of respondents reporting to have received 10 kg of sesame seeds (instead of 8Kg) and 52.2% of respondents reporting to have received 20kg of maize seeds.

In 2014, 91.7% of respondents reported to have received 100Kg of urea, 61.8% have received 8Kg of sesame seeds and 63.1% 20Kg of maize seeds. Some respondents reported to have received some inputs for the two consecutive years and this point has been confirmed during discussions with the field team leader.

In Qoryoley, and as planned, no distribution was reported to occur in 2014.

In 2013, 99.3% of respondents reported to have received 20Kg of maize seeds, 94% reported to have received 8Kg of sesame seeds and 95.3% reported to have received 100Kg of urea. Minor errors can occur in this type of data collection, which could justify some variation, but the figures are overall coherent with the idea that the beneficiaries received what they were supposed to get from FAO implementing partners.

In Qoryoley, and as planned, no distribution was reported to occur in 2014.

In 2014, 99.4% of respondents reported to have received 20Kg of maize seeds, and 8Kg of sesame seeds. However, only 3.9% reported to have received 100Kg of urea. In Kuntunwarey, no distribution was reported in 2014.
The level of inputs reported to be received by respondents is coherent with expectations in Lower Shabelle (with the exception of urea in Kuntunwarey), although the level of inputs distributed in Middle Shabelle is significantly different from expectations. This aspect was initially identified in the desk review and the data analysis of the results from the FAO call centre. A comment from the field team to interpret this data mentioned that there is usually no issue of diversion to AS in AS controlled areas, as they closely monitor the project implementation and the risk related to diversion would then be too high.

Unfortunately, the survey was not designed to understand where the missing items are and who would potentially benefit from them going missing. Such a survey would generate a different level of risk and would require an approach not compatible with the methodology used during the current survey.
The survey team found that the sluice gates built on the field are at the expected locations. Comparison between the FAO reported coordinates of the sluices gates and the GPS enabled photos taken by the survey team through a GIS system confirmed the coherence of the location. However, as shown below, some sluices gates are not functioning or are already damaged. It might just be an issue of maintenance and that metallic equipment is being used in such a humid environment, which results in quick rust deterioration, as shown below.

*figure 15c* Floods

*figure 15d*: Mechanism to close and open the sluice gate is damaged, it is believed that the rust constantly increases the force needed to open and close the sluice gate, until its breaks.

*figure 15e* Unfinished work.

*figure 15f* Machine digging a canal.
**Construction of storage**

The construction of the three storage units was found where expected. However, one of the storage units is still under construction.

![Figure 16a](image1)

![Figure 16b](image2)

Observation and visits to the store showed that while beneficiaries have been trained to work as a cooperative, the overall organisation of the store is still used by individual farmers rather than by one single cooperative. So far, taking into consideration that the infrastructure is still very recent, there is no information from all inputs inside the store whilst each farmers knows what belongs to him/her.

From visual observations, the structure of the building appears to be good, clean and adequately spacious. This store will contribute to a decrease in the level of harvest losses, as farmers were previously using underground storage, which was extremely vulnerable to flash floods.

![Figure 16c](image3)

![Figure 16d](image4)

The above photographs show storage under construction in Bacadley town. As for the farming inputs distribution, there are major time issues in delivering the project.
7. Outputs

**Somali seasonal calendar**
*Source:* Axiom interviews with beneficiaries.

It should be noted that interviews planned to be conducted with the cooperative did not work, as the information was available by individual farmers and not at the cooperative level. This suggests that the cooperatives are not functioning yet as an entity, perhaps due to their very recent introduction.

*figure 17*

*Seasonal Calendar for a typical year. Source: FEWS NET Somalia*
Focus on the number of people involved in farming per season

This analysis is aimed at measuring employment creation/improvement by understanding whether beneficiaries were active farmers or not before the SEED II project and whether the project has increased their ability to work even during other seasons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Johwar</th>
<th>Qoryoley</th>
<th>Kuntunwarey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Proportion of respondent reporting cultivation specific crops" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Proportion of respondent reporting cultivation specific crops" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Proportion of respondent reporting cultivation specific crops" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maize crop has been reported to be cultivated only during the gu season while sesame crop has been reported to be cultivated only during the deyr season.

**DISTRIBUTION OF SEEDS BY FAO PARTNER REPORTED IN 2013 AND 2014.**

Cultivation of maize crops was reported to occur in gu season with an increase from 52% in 2012 (maize and cowpea was reported as 45%) to 84% in 2013 (maize and cowpea was reported as 11%) and 89% in 2014 (maize and cowpea was reported as 11%). Maize and cowpea are cultivated by all farmers during the gu season.

Sesame crops were reported in deyr season only with 99% in 2012, 100% in 2013 and 0% in 2014.

Maize crop was reported to be cultivated by 59% of respondents in 2012 (cowpea and maize was reported as 11%), 70% (gu) in 2013 and 74% (gu) and 46% (deyr) in 2014.

Sesame crop was reported to be cultivated by 72% of respondents in 2012, 72% in 2013 and 46% in 2014. It seems that 28% of beneficiaries for Qoryoley district are not actively involved in farming.

Maize crop was reported in gu and deyr with around 12% during deyr seasons and around 43%-44% during gu respectively in 2012 and 2013 with a significant increase of 99% during gu 2014. It should however be noted that no culture occurred during deyr 2014.

Sesame crop was reported for 93% of respondents during deyr 2012, 99% during deyr 2013, 0% during deyr 2014.

In Kuntunwarey, it is remarkable to note that maize and cowpea are cultivated during gu (75% in 2012, 75% in 2013, 99% in 2014) and 25% during the deyr seasons of 2012 and 2013. However, nothing was reported for the deyr 2014. Globally, the key findings on this analysis is that 2014 deyr and gu which were passed at the time of data collection did not show major improvements compared to previous year so the number of people “at work” has not increased.
There was a slight increase in the yield and the weight of the harvest reported per season per respondent while the area of cultivation has remained fairly stable. Boosting incomes could increase the yield, could increase the benefit for farmers (lower financial investment) and could also increase the proportion of the harvest sold. Whilst reviewing the price of selling a harvest it was interesting to note some significant differences, which directly linked yield to income. The average minimum price of selling maize in Middle Shabelle (Johwar) is constant at around 500 USD/metric tonne (different season and year), while in Lower Shabelle (Qoryoley and Kuntunwarey) the price is above 750 USD\textsuperscript{16}. It is not clear why such a difference occurs, but the transformation of harvest into money is totally dependent on access to the market and the local economy. An explanation provided by the field team leader is that in Middle Shabelle the main market to be used by farmers is Johwar rather than Mogadishu. The state of the road, the control of Balad (on the way to Mogadishu) by Abgal traders in Johwar, and the low level of consideration for Bantu in this area, could impact access to market and the price of selling for the target group. Further research may be needed to better understand this point.

\textit{Nb} : Input distribution occurred in March & April 2013 for maize and October & November 2013 Sesame. The timing of the distribution is coherent with the seasonal calendar. See \textit{seasonal calendar page 39}.

\textsuperscript{16} See annex on yield for more details.
Income production

The graph above on the left shows the evolution of income reported per year per district. The graph on the right focuses on the proportional increase of income reported per year and district. While incomes have progressively increased each year, a peak of this increase in 2013 stands out in Qoryoley (+48%) and Kuntuwarey (+60%) but not in Johwar (+27%), which is the period of the SEED II distribution of seeds and fertilizer. The proportion of harvest sold is the same between the three districts and, therefore, did not influence the level of income generated. The key point of these graphs is to show that beneficiaries were reporting a constant and regular increase of incomes every year since 2010. In Lower Shabelle (Qoryoley and Kuntuwarey districts) this increase has grown further during the implementation of the SEED II project. However, this increase of income is not so significant in Middle Shabelle given that more inputs (seeds, fertilizer, sluice gates, storage) from SEED II were provided in this location.

The annex on yield provides more details showing that the poverty level of the beneficiaries from Middle Shabelle is higher than in Lower Shabelle. In Lower Shabelle, the number of taab under cultivation is always a bit lower than in Middle Shabelle and the yield is also slightly lower. More importantly, the price of selling the harvest is lower in Middle Shabelle than in Lower Shabelle.

Specific evolution of perception

Based on various perception questions, the years of 2012 and 2011 were reported to be particularly bad in terms of yield and level of income. The situation started to improve for most respondents in 2012 and reached a normal situation for all in 2013 and 2014. The level of conflict affecting the respondent’s HHs was reported to evolve from medium in 2010, 2011 and 2012 to low in 2013 and 2014, showing a perception that the situation became better in 2013.

The relations with traders were also reported to improve for some respondents in 2012 to reach all respondents in 2013 and 2014. This point can most probably be attributed to the project dynamics.
Answers to specific questions of the ToR

1. How long is the improved income lasting for?
The key elements for sustainability are the store, which will decrease the level of losses of the harvest stored. However, this particular store only benefits the farmers living close by. The seeds distributed were supposed to be a one-off; they have been used and, therefore, for the next season the farmers would need to invest in these seeds (estimated value of 20kg of maize seeds, 8kg of sesame seeds) and this slightly decreases their benefit. As explained previously in the report, the farmers are not employees, they are small entrepreneurs and their income is exposed to various risks, such as market fluctuations, floods, pests, etc. If these elements are favourable, their income might remain or increase, but if one of these elements deteriorates then the level of income can also decrease. Given the high risk of flooding, this activity along the farm is believed to be particularly risky, which is very different from having employment that might provide some financial security.

2. What kind of income gains have been realised through the programme?
   - Increased income for farmers
     The income increase for the farmers reported in the interviews with beneficiaries was significant. However, the role of the project in this increase is not clear. With the distribution of the free inputs, the benefit of the farmers did increase.
   - Increased relationship between traders and farmers
     Relations between traders and farmers were also reported to increase in 2013 and 2014. This point is important as traders and farmers are from different clans and different livelihoods, making the positive exchange between the two an interesting element of stability in an area where clan conflicts are numerous.
   - Increased taxation by local authorities
     Taxation by local authorities was mentioned numerous times as a positive output of the increased local production from the project. How the taxation will then create stability and protect the most vulnerable is not clear yet.
   - Farmers organised as a cooperative
     The concept of the cooperative has been mentioned by elders and FAO implementing partners, but the setup of the cooperative is still very new and farmers are mainly working as individuals. The newly built store is storing the individual’s harvest rather than that of the cooperative.

3. What other benefits have been and continue to be realised through the programme?
   “Improvement between the farmers and traders, and also improvement of the security of the area by everyone encouraged in farming and trade”\(^\text{17}\).

4. Have there been any disadvantages of the programme?
Land is a sensitive subject and part of the causes of conflict in the area. Tensions related to the project were reported in some instances, but not systemically. The project was reported to have “created and contributed to some level of conflicts within the community and between the communities because of land. The reason is the interest in land and especially farming land went high”\(^\text{18}\). As reported by an elder in Johwar, Halgan, the project has “created some conflicts on land but we managed to solve them as this kind of conflicts is common in our areas”.

FAO has withdrawn from Lower Shabelle to refocus its activity in Middle Shabelle. The stability purpose of the project was then not possible in Lower Shabelle and this point emphasizes that the approach to stability cannot

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\(^\text{17}\) KII. Jowhar. Community elder. Halgan
\(^\text{18}\) KII. Johwar. Businesswoman.
work in all contexts and some pre-existing conditions are required. If this project is, among many targets, expected to reduce youth attraction towards armed groups and towards AS, the key elements of infrastructures have been relocated out of areas controlled by AS.

5. **Are people satisfied with the programme? Why?**

People expressed satisfaction with the project. Most often beneficiaries were happy to receive items for free. The approach has not generated major tension on the ground, so overall there is no reason not to be satisfied. Moreover, all respondents expressed satisfaction with the quality of seeds and fertiliser received. The delay in delivering the seeds, fertilizer and all infrastructures has, surprisingly, not generated any comments from people on the ground.

6. **To what extent do community leaders feel the programme has reached an appropriate range of individuals in their community?**

Community leaders reported that the project targeted the right people, but not enough of them. As the community leaders were involved in the sensitive aspects of the selection process, they supported the idea that the appropriate farms and beneficiaries had been targeted. The key point to consider is that the stability logic through supporting farming activities is coherent in theory, but there has not been enough thought either on the more specific targeting of farms and beneficiaries, or on how many people should be reached to generate enough stability. A detailed context analysis and a detailed review of the triggers of the conflict could have determined different selection criteria, but also should have determined a specific number of youth understood to be at risk of being recruited.

7. **How do views vary on the programme across subsets of the population?**

The views remain very much the same across the subsets of the population, as the project is for many of them considered as a seeds and infrastructures project rather than a sensitive stability one.

The income generation is much higher for the better off beneficiaries while the poorer (Middle Shabelle) received more support. The link between the inputs provided and a significant income increase is not evident.
Monitoring the project

Choice of indicators
An efficient monitoring system would link needs identified, feasibility survey and risk management to a specific approach to project implementation (targeting, type of inputs and levels of engagement of local actors). The project is actually designed as a livelihood project with a ToC focusing on stability. However, the project has no indicator related to stability.

The number of working days and the increase in harvest yield are part of the logic of the project, which uses livelihoods as a proxy indicator for stability. The report “Conflict analysis in South Central Somalia. Survey methodology report by IIDA (The Women Development Organization) March 2013” was a useful literature review, but did not provide enough specific information on the conflict dynamics and how their evolution would have been measured. The report included suggestions of how to work in a conflict sensitive way, but there has been no evidence found yet of how these recommendations were taken on board. Moreover, the timing of this report seems somewhat late in light of the timeframe of the project implementation. It should be noted that the essential part of conflict sensitive project implementation in Somalia is related to the selection process of targeted beneficiaries, targeted locations, suppliers, and so on and addressing these selections in the most appropriate manner is time consuming, challenging and risky.

Definition of employment
Farming activities can be defined by the concept of small entrepreneurs whereby labour and money are invested in the farms until the sale of the harvest occurs and the farmers then get a return on their investment. If the harvest fails, then farmers receive no income. This is in contrast with being employed, which offers some security in terms of the level of income. The level of risk and stress to protect the investment is, therefore, high. The definition of employment as a link to stability is not weighted with the level of income produced compared to the needs of the HHs and the ability to get sufficient protection for assets and investment in a peaceful manner. The minimum amount of income to be generated and the sustainability of this income generation should be defined to understand from which level the project starts to have an effect. Getting employment is one thing, but generating enough money is another issue, and the ToC has not taken this into account. While the ToC could be correct, the understanding of the minimum trigger for it to work has not been considered.

Stability measurement
Defining clearly what stability is would help to develop an understanding of how to measure it. Should it be a perception of safety or wellbeing by beneficiaries, or a measurement of conflict in the targeted areas, or a measurement of the number of people in crisis in certain locations? The definition of indicators of stability is complex and FAO has developed a check list of conflict sensitivity considerations related to project implementation in Somalia.

It is not known to the evaluation team to what extent this check list has been used, it is structured as a check list and is, therefore, at risk of over simplifying the dynamics to be addressed in the targeted area. Very specific context analysis, risk matrix, definition of the profile of people at risk per area would have provided better information to appreciate the context sensitivity and also to prepare the selection of impact indicators.
8. THEORY OF CHANGE

After having discussed the effectiveness and implementation of the project (input, activity and output level of the ToC), the following section will attempt to explain the connections between the conflict-affected areas, highly politicised context for the activities and the overall logic of the intervention, which is to reduce conflict/increase stability in the areas of intervention through market development.

This is seen as the outcome and impact level of the project. Below is a copy of the actual theory of change as described in the programme document including the impact and outcome statements this ToC, which only partly incorporates the adjusted objective around stability. The ToC includes all of the SEED II work, whereas this evaluation is only addressing the projects delivered in Lower and Middle Shabelle. As such not all outputs, outcome or impacts are relevant for this evaluation.

The FAO proposal states: the overall objective of the SEED programme is to improve economic and employment prospects for sustainable economic growth focusing on women and young people in conflict-affected communities of Somaliland, Puntland and south central Somalia. The proposal also states that the achievement of the overall objective will be measured against the following outcome: improved economic and employment prospects targeting youth and women in conflict-affected communities.

Following the overall objective, the document goes in to detail in describing the 4 output areas. The section of the document discussing output states: ‘It is important to underline that the SEED programme is not in essence a peace building programme. However, the focus of the programme on enhancing economic opportunities and
raising incomes for households and communities is designed to contribute to local stability and conflict prevention through economic development. Further, the projects will develop specific efforts towards conflict sensitivity demand that specific steps are taken to enhance inter and intra-group relations in the hope that this will lead to cohesion at that level and also act as a building block towards national peace and stability.’

At the end of the proposal document, there is a summarised logical framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Impact Indicator</th>
<th>Target by the end of Phase II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to improved stability through economic growth and sustainable employment</td>
<td>Long term jobs created (by sector, sex, age group and location)</td>
<td>5,910 jobs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the end of the proposal document, there is a summarised logical framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Outcome Indicator</th>
<th>Target by the end of Phase II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved economic and employment prospects targeting youth and women in conflict affected communities.</td>
<td>Job equivalents (disaggregated by sector, location, age group and sex)</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional hectares irrigated (disaggregated by region and crop)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage increase in incomes of fishmongers</td>
<td>USD 30 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage increase in maize crop productivity and incomes per hectare</td>
<td>2.2 tonnes per ha at USD 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of new businesses created</td>
<td>320 businesses created</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluation team found that the adaptation of the ToC towards a focus on enhancing stability was accepted and followed by stakeholders only to a limited extent. The documents supporting the implementation such as the logical framework, indicator selection and clear articulation of objectives are missing and this has contributed to confusion amongst implementing partners and managers.

To analyse the ToC and the possible contribution to stability, it is necessary to examine the assumptions underpinning the logic. Starting with the definitions, drawing upon experience from other programmes and their logic and, finally, discussing the approach to implementation with the overall aim of enhancing stability in mind.

![figure 21](image)
Key definitions in the ToC

Employment

Some definitions of employment

**Paid employment jobs** are those jobs where the incumbents hold explicit (written or oral) employment contracts which give them a basic remuneration. This is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the enterprise for which they work. Persons in these jobs are typically remunerated by wages and salaries, but may be paid by commission from sales, by piece-rates, bonuses or in-kind payments.

**Self-employment jobs** are those jobs where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits (or the potential for profits) derived from the goods or services produced (where own consumption is considered to be part of the profits). The incumbents make the operational decisions affecting the enterprises, or delegate such decision while retaining responsibility. (In this context "enterprise" includes one-person operations.)

The understanding of employment and the different types of employment will be reviewed in this ToC as, on the one hand, some workers were employed as daily workers for cash for work activities, while, on the other hand, FAO has considered working as farmers to be in self-employment.

The differences between the two concepts are important and the survey reviewed the concepts of **livelihood related risks**, **financial stability**, the **level of incomes**, the **duration of employment**, the **sustainability of the employment**, and the relation with the employees or the relation with the business community to understand if and from which level employment contributes to stability.

Radicalisation and recruitment

Some definitions of radicalisation

Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalisation as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims. Some authors refer to 'violent radicalisation' in order to emphasise the violent outcome and distinguish the process from non-violent forms of radical thinking.

This study follows the above definition of radicalisation. As such, the focus is on the use of violence in relation to the wider conflict. In order to be able to analyse the programme’s contribution to increasing stability through improving livelihoods, assuming that improved livelihoods reduces the appeal to join violent movements, there has been an examination of the process of recruitment specifically.

First, a few broader reflections; in South Central Somalia, the recruitment process is not unique in comparison to recruitment elsewhere and there is an essential difference between **individual and collective recruitment**.

**Individual recruitment** is an individual process and a choice, while **collective recruitment** occurs when a whole group and often a sub clan in this case join AS (or other violent groups). The collective recruitment is, therefore, a political decision by clan elders imposed on all clan members, often related to revenge against other clans.

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20 Steven & Neumann, 2009:10
Implementing a stability programme through a humanitarian intervention

In interviews with FAO it was evident that the aspect of the ToC concentrating on the link between employment and stability was not in focus. The target group was identified in terms of ‘vulnerability’ from a humanitarian perspective rather than from a stability perspective. It is worth mentioning that the project management documents such as the log frame did not include stability indicators and data has not been collected in this area. So, the overall ability of the evaluation team to test the ToC is limited.

The adapted focus of the programme was articulated as a staged process where the first step was to enhance employment opportunities and the second step was to contribute to stability. It appeared through interviews undertaken as a part of the evaluation that the adapted design was not adapted through a consensus decision reached between key stakeholders and that the adjustments were poorly integrated into the implementation process. The evaluation team found that the implementers, to a large degree, did not adapt their approach from previous iterations of the programme.

The evaluation team firmly believes that the second step focussing on stability can only be achieved through a very specific targeting of beneficiaries and analysis of the conflict dynamics in the intervention areas.

Key ‘push’ factors contributing to increased vulnerability to recruitment

All radicalisation research shows that recruitment and radicalisation legitimise the use of violence as a means to obtain political aims and that radicalisation is an entirely individual process. There are numerous factors, both structural and individual, that can contribute to the process, as well as a series of choices made by the individual. USAID have a CVE policy that talks about ‘push’ factors stressing the socio economic factors contributing to an environment that can make it difficult for the individual to be resistant to recruitment. Simultaneously, there is also often a series of pull factors, such as charismatic leaders, revenge seeking, identity, power, sense of belonging and so on that attract individuals to such groups. As such, the push factors alone are never enough to drive radicalization without being combined with specifically individually appealing pull factors. In summation, radicalisation is a highly individual and extremely complex process. The below table illustrates this point with some examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Push Factors</th>
<th>Pull Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment and poverty</td>
<td>Access to material resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan marginalisation</td>
<td>Access to weapon and protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and political marginalisation</td>
<td>Belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad (or no) governance</td>
<td>Order and strong governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM human rights violations and violence</td>
<td>Revenge seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endemic corruption and impunity of certain groups</td>
<td>Self-esteem/person empowerment (hero for defending country and religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth frustrations</td>
<td>Religious justification (victory or paradise)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Translating this to the SEED II project stresses that the project only seeks to address one aspect of a complex process. Key factors of how SEED II might be addressing push factors are explored below.
Education
The level of education reported during KIIs was seen to be very low in the targeted areas and, therefore, people were reported to be more easily vulnerable to various influences. Moreover, in many places religious education is the only available source of information and learning. It is often reported that Madrassas are supported by external forces, such as Saudi Arabia and others, who wish to influence the religious direction of Somalia. It has not been possible to verify the degree to which this is happening. Often, the Diaspora and local communities are also contributing to building religious institutions including Madrassas and as such it may not always be an ideological religious support.

The relationship between education and recruitment continues to be ambiguous; on the one hand, education (both secular and religious) can equip students to build up resilience to reject simple interpretations or a single direction of understanding; at the same time, the space of education often provides a grooming ground for influencing, where key individuals can be identified and trained without being discovered easily. As such, education and learning institutions remain crucial to the process of education and informing youth in whatever direction one might wish.

Poverty
During the interviews with beneficiaries of the project, the survey team identified an average HH size of 5.6 and an average income of 881 USD/year per HH. This information does factor in that farmers will consume part of their production and that the monetisation of their work generates an average of 0.43 USD/per person per day.

Perception of the main risk on the farmer income generation capacity
Flooding: The main risk expressed by SEED II beneficiaries is related to flooding. This threat is believed to be the most complicated to mitigate and floods carry the potential to destroy the whole harvest at once. The risk of losing the whole harvest is, therefore, very high for the farmers. If increased incomes and livelihood through improving farming activities is the objective, they still remain very vulnerable to unpreventable floods and, thus, the approach is perceived to be highly precarious.

Access to pasture for pastoralists was also reported as a significant risk for farmer respondents. This is believed to point to conflict during drought where livestock is moving along the river and through the farms.

Moreover, when respondent beneficiaries of the project were asked about their coping mechanism, almost all (90%) reported that a member of their HH would “join an armed group?” in case of difficulty to produce enough income. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.

In terms of individual recruitment, the issue of financial incentives and poverty is often mentioned as a key factor. In the ToC there is an assumed link between livelihoods and recruitment. Other work in the same area shows that it is worth noting that the payment could take various forms including:

a) Receiving a specific pay;

b) Receiving payments-in-kind (i.e. food, clothes, weapon and so on rather than money);

c) Membership in the group can allow them to loot, and;

d) Their membership in the group can allow them to embezzle money from the group.

The direct pay is likely to be the most relevant in this case, but other similar payment models could be present. Recent studies points towards an element of forced recruitment, as well.

As discussed above, poverty is often a key factor contributing to recruitment, in particular when the individual is being promised financial gains. However, poverty alone is rarely a reason for joining.
Specifically, in the study in Johwar, 95% of respondents reported that they strongly agree with the statement “Economic opportunism drives some people to join militant’s armed groups.” They further explained in 84% of the cases their responses by “incomes generation” and in 12% by some answer referring the joining of militants armed group as “the only solution”, which is believed to be an important point, as it will considered as the last resort solution when all others avenues and options have failed. This point further reinforces that the failure of other solutions paved the way toward recruitment by armed groups. 1% explained their responses because “elders are always the decision maker for the clan” and another 1% justified their responses for “ideology reasons”.

While it is clearly reported that income generation is a key factor of stability, the level of income needed to reach this stability is not known. While an increase in income was observed for respondents, a peak was visible only in Qoryoley and Kuntunwarey. However, the income generating activities for farmers remain particularly vulnerable to flooding.

**Marginalisation factor**

The programme aims to work with poor and vulnerable groups, who in the intervention logic are perceived to be at risk of joining different violent entities or developing violence as part of social adaption to their environment. The primary beneficiaries of the FAO project are meant to be poor, women (30% of the target group) and youth.

The research indicates that it is worth looking into this assumption further and exploring who are the socially excluded in the Somali Society and how that relates to vulnerability and risk of recruitment.

- **The youth** are excluded from the political spheres as these are predominantly controlled by elders. This is applied at the Xheer\(^{21}\) level and the SFG level, which is also composed on the basis of the clan balance (4.5 rule). Moreover, youth are composing the clan militia led by clan elders. This situation is rarely a choice, but more a social obligation to protect the interest of the clan.

- **Women** are also politically excluded as the clan system focuses on male elders accessing power and the Xheer attributes a lower “value” to women in cases of compensating the victim. As a more general point, the role of women in conflict is poorly researched.

- **Minorities** in specific areas are clan members, who belong to un-powerful clans or are Bantu (non-Somali) with low political power, not to be confused with demographically small groups. In light of this, it is worth noting that a clan can be dominant in one area, but representatives of the same clans can be part of the minorities in other areas. Moreover, these balances are changing over time and with a highly mobile population.

**Governance Gap**

Another factor often referred to as a contributing factor to thriving violent groups is ‘the governance gap’. The assumption is that these organisations enforcing strong, violent and undemocratic governance systems thrive in the absence of a functioning state, which provides governance and services to its people.

The study showed in Johwar that only 61% of the respondents of interviews with FAO beneficiaries reported the “government” as their main local authority and when asked about their alternative local authority, 52% mentioned the “clan elders”. These figures are important to understand that stability will work if local authority is first recognized and respected by all, but also if this local authority is able to protect the population without discrimination. AS was almost never mentioned as a local authority or an alternative local authority. A single local

\(^{21}\) Somali customary law influenced by pastoralism, clan balance and Islam.
authority providing equitable protection and justice for all is in a better position to achieve stability than a set of various local authorities with discriminatory approaches.

The level of trust expressed by respondents is quite mixed in a similar manner between all potential local authorities. NB: In Jowhar, the district commissioner is Mohamed Amin Osman Abdulle from Shidde Clan and Sagaale Sub-clan. In Balad, the district commissioner is Mohamud Mohamed from Abgal clan and Reer Mataan sub-clan, while the Governor of Middle Shabelle is Ali Abdullahi Hussein from Abgal clan and Harti Abgal-Warsangeli sub-clan.

Moreover, clan conflicts are numerous in the area, as expressed by respondents interviewed with FAO beneficiaries and represent the main type of conflict reported since 2010 in Qoryoley.

Politics (power, protection): the failure of the local authority to protect respondents’ interests is understood as lack of protection and, therefore, joining an armed group would become an alternative solution. The formal government authority and the clan elders do not benefit from a maximum level of trust from the population. The respondents, thus, expressed a low level of trust in these entities to defend their interests.

It is not clear why only 54% answered that they “strongly agree” with the statement “Traditionally, youth have no choice, they must follow the clan leaders” as almost all respondents explained their responses by a statement referring to the fact that “elders are always the decision makers”.

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In Johwar, only 29% strongly agreed with the statement “Local authority is believed to be fair in handling the local conflicts”. 46% further expressed issues related to “corruption” and 51% pointed to the problem of “lack of transparency”. As described in other sections, the failure to have a unique and fair local authority is believed to be part of the pre-conditions for instability.

In Johwar, 89% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement “Clan minorities and Bantu remain vulnerable to abuses from dominant clans,” explaining their response as “because of vulnerable land,” while 8% mentioned that they have “no power to defend their interest”. The term “vulnerable land” was explained as having fertile land while not being armed.

In Johwar, only 11% of respondents “strongly agreed” with the statement “Many youth are joining armed group for ideological reasons”. When asked to explain their answer, 66% mentioned “politics,” which most probably includes the concept of ideology. This point is critical, because if the youth are joining armed groups for political reasons, then this would highlight the need to work on institutions to provide more political space for youth, as well as minorities. 26% of respondents explained their responses by mentioning “incomes”, 5% mentioned “protection”, and 3% mentioned “access to trade”. Access to trade was explained to us as being able to do business in a free manner if the person is known and accepted by a specific armed group.

➢ On-going conflicts

In Johwar, 95% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, “Access to land is a determinant driver of conflict in your district”. 60% explained their answer by citing the “inheritance of land” and 36% by the “limited access to farming land”. The limited access to fertile farming land can also be understood as part of the competition for local resources.

In Johwar, while only 31% strongly agree with the statement, “Access to water or pasture is a determinant driver of conflict in your district.” 55% of respondents explained that this sentence was valid only during “drought” and 42% explained their response by mentioning “access to pasture during drought”. The conflict between pastoralists and farmers occurred during the drought when the livestock comes along the river and passes through the farms.
While the following statement has to be seen in the unique and specific context of Somalia, **AS controlled areas are reported to be “stable”**, the stability might not be under the conditions of what the international community is expecting. Nevertheless, the level of conflict in AS controlled hovers around zero. The high degree of fear imposed by AS ensures that no one dares to challenge their authority. This situation is in stark contrast with the government controlled areas where the competition for power is constant and unstable. Moreover, like in Mogadishu where AS is not a local authority, AS acts as an arbitrator of destabilisation.

It was further reported during various KII that AS was seen to be fair in addressing some issues, notably the land issue, which is of particular interest in our survey.

**Failed Justice, failed protection**

What makes AS controlled areas unique in Somalia is the approach AS takes to justice, focusing on an “**individual responsibility**” with immediate violent effects, while the Xheer focuses on a “**collective responsibility**” mostly entailing financial compensation. The AS “style” is, hence, stability through deterrence at the individual level.

Rule of Law and the practice of justice are very poor and heavily contested in Somalia. Even in the areas where the legal framework exists, there is no legal process. The police do not have the capacity to gather evidence and investigate matters and there is no functioning judiciary that can take up cases and follow legal process. In the AS controlled areas, the justice system is very tough and in accordance with hard-line interpretations of Sharia law as a legal system. Punishments are brutal and the justice system works largely because it is based on fear. In the absence of an alternative legal system there is likely to remain an attraction to a force like AS, which is, even if unnecessarily brutal, seen to be providing some kind of ‘fairness’.

It is believed that stability is not reached through reducing AS’s influence, but rather by addressing the key conflicts, the weakness of local authority, and poor and unclear management structures in the targeted areas. AS as a local authority can be weakened, but will remain a destabilising actor through its guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Therefore, stabilisation is not foreseen to be reached as long as AS uses terrorist techniques and the government authority remains a source of dissension. Internal competition and all clan based conflict related to competition for local resources (corruption, land, and so forth) would need to be addressed in a manner acceptable by all parties involved in the conflict. A key point of this conversation also remains the definition of stability and an inclusive decision making process thereof.

This point is perhaps the most important and sensitive of the whole survey. The international community approach to support the government of Somalia since the ‘90s has always failed. The leadership supported has never worked and internal conflict and corruption have continued to occur. There is not a single temporary Somali government, since the ‘90s, which has succeeded and these failures provide an ideal space for AS to build their legitimacy, as they are perceived to perform better as a local authority, especially for minorities, who usually do not receive
protection or access to justice from the most powerful clans. Lessons learnt from past experience could lead to some thinking on how to fight terrorism and how to support a government in Somalia.

➢ Is employment the key to stability?

Respondents interviewed reported not to have worked on the cash-for-work activities and were only the recipients of the farming inputs. So, the concept of employment for farmers can be challenging, as farmers are entrepreneurs rather than employees and these farmers were active prior to FAO intervention, so there is no creation of employment, but rather a reinforcement of an existing professional activity. Moreover, the respondents were not in need of employment to be busy or to get social status related to a specific position. Respondents were concerned about the level of income generated and the amount of income generated will be a key element of influence on stability.

➢ Should women represent 30% of beneficiaries?

The ToC will get its power based on a proper targeting process. It is important to emphasize that the ToC did not mention specific selection criteria to identify the individual the most at "risk" to join armed groups.

Respondents of the survey expressed that 93% of women are at risk of joining an armed group. In interpretation of the data, it was explained to us that women would not be the gun holder, but would join armed groups for income reasons through marriage to a member of the armed group.

As explained in previous sections of this report, the average age of the target group should be defined along with many other social elements contributing to the potential risk to joining an armed group.

![Figure 25a](image1)

![Figure 25b](image2)

![Figure 25c](image3)

Research and reports done in Somalia on other occasions by the research team indicate that women are rarely recruited into the violent groups as fighters. Rather, it is more often the case that they either volunteer or are requested by the clan to marry fighters.
8. **What kind of communities is the programme seen as suitable for?**

The answer to this question depends on the specific approach the project is intending to have towards stability. The closer the project would be to targeting the core group responsible for instability, the more effective the programme would be. However, its design, selection process, duration, type and quantity of inputs provided, and monitoring would then need to be different.

One quote exemplifies what the majority of the respondents reported. "[The projects] have contributed to stability in the areas, because it created job opportunities, incomes sources and livelihood had improved and those are the major causes of instability, but when those are created and improved, then everyone will be focused and the conflict interest will be reduced."  

9. **What do community leaders expect from the programme?**

The community leaders interviewed have a good understanding of the concept of stability. Most of the elders mentioned the link between livelihood and stability, while some elders mentioned exclusively the project as a livelihood or farming focused one.

Elders remain the key players in the selection of the individuals for the project, as they work closely with FAO’s implementation partners. This important role is a source of control for these elders, who can then influence the design and targeting of the project.

10. **Why are people attracted to join the programme?**

All respondents reported that they joined the programme for reasons other than social or security issues. The reasons mentioned here refer to income and livelihood, which is coherent with the fact that the project targets farmers and provides farming inputs. Therefore, the perception is that this is an income-generation project.

During KII it was reported that people were attracted to join the project “because of the free farms inputs, training and encouragement of farmer’s cooperative system.”

As the selection of the farmers focused on criteria of vulnerability exclusively (see section on selection of beneficiaries), then the reasons mentioned in relation to the attraction to join the programme have no connection with the overall concept of the ToC.

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11. **What other options are open to them?**

Beneficiaries were farmers before joining the programme and their livelihoods had been supported. People who were not farmers were not supported. The other “options” to increase incomes in case of inability for these farmers to live or live well enough from their livelihood is strongly expressed as “to join armed groups”. The survey team asked FAO beneficiaries on the coping mechanisms they would use in case of difficulties. It is interesting to note that charcoal production was not considered (maybe because the farming area does not have enough trees left) and livestock raiding was not considered either, which is to be expected of a non-pastoralist group.

However, “migration to other locations” and “joining an armed group” were both consistently reported as options to consider as a coping mechanism.

**Question:** What does it mean to join an armed group as a Bantu in Somalia?

Bantu are not represented in the Somali armed forces. The set-up of roads by youth as a livelihood alternative has been reported during KII, but as an alternative for Hawyie youth in the Shabelle regions. As described in the section on AS, it is the only armed group accepting members without clan restriction, and, therefore, the only one to be accepting the Bantu.
**9. CONCLUSION**

**Project performance:** During the visit to the project sites by the Axiom team, all the beneficiaries planned to be interviewed were known by the community and, therefore, the list of beneficiaries provided by FAO was very accurate. Some significant delays occurred in the implementation of SEED II and it is to be noted that some of the activities were still underway; for example, one of the stores was still under construction. The sluice gates visited were found where they were expected to be, so the location was also accurate. While most of the sluice gates were working, some were already not functional and the maintenance of these sluices gates will be a determinate factor to their longevity.

There are concerns over the level of seeds and fertilizer received by beneficiaries and the information is a bit unclear between what respondents received in 2013 and in 2014, respectively. This point requires spending more time verifying the content of the distribution lists, but this is not the focus of this evaluation.

None of the respondents interviewed by the survey team participated in the SEED II cash-for-work activities.

The issues, major or minor, mentioned in the project implementation, have affected the outcomes of the project, and have, therefore, decreased the measurement of the effects of the ToC.

**Rationale of supporting livelihoods to reach stability:** The key elements driving youth towards armed groups are often related to income generation, but this factor is often combined with the goal of achieving protection or more political influence. SEED II primarily focuses on income generation as a contributing factor. That said, the effects of the income generating activities are highly dependent on reaching the specific individuals at risk of being recruited by an armed group. The extent to which the project is effective, thus, remains to be seen in the selection criteria and process. The current selection of youth seems to be mainly based on livelihood vulnerability, but not specifically on youth at risk of being involved in armed groups. This seems to be largely due to the dual objective of the project and the formulation, which does not include a performance indicator related to stability.

**Employment vs. risky entrepreneurship:** The generation of employment does not fit very well with farmers, who are more in the small entrepreneur category, and the data pointed to the fact that the interest of the target group is more on income generation than employment. This point does not affect the logic of the ToC, but rather addresses some semantic issues. The target group has increased its income during the period of the project, but the project is not a creation of employment or creation of income for a group having neither of these to start with. The key conclusion is to consider at what point income generation becomes effective in terms of contributing to enhancing stability and reducing the appeal of recruitment as per the ToC. The level of income needed would then need to be considered.

It should be highlighted further that risk associated with income generation for farming activities exposed to flood risks, land grabbing, conflict with pastoralist during the drought should be clearly determined. The higher the risks, the more likely the individuals are to seek support to protect their assets. The risks mentioned are directly linked to the failure of the local authority to operate as expected, which can result in individuals looking for alternative sources of protection that can be found in violent groups, such as AS.

**Specific targeting:** The specific profile of the target group shows an average age of the direct beneficiaries as being fairly high, even though the programme’s intention is to reach young men, who are most at risk of joining armed groups. The profile of the FAO target group is usually concentrated by village, meaning that this is more of a selection of village approach rather than an individual-based approach, which is not coherent with the concept of
“individuals” at risk of joining armed groups. However, the villages targeted provided profiles within the minorities group (perceived to be the group at risk) and within farming livelihood group (able to benefit of the project) consistent with the ToC. The selection criteria could have been more specific to reach individuals at risk.

**A pro-poor approach**: The pro-poor targeting does not necessarily make sense, as being poor on its own is not a sufficient pre-condition for susceptibility to recruitment by an armed group. Other factors, such as age, gender, level of involvement in specific incidents, level of social frustration (education, income, access to political space, perception of unfair treatment in a conflict resolution), religion and social factors (family ties, perceived future, national identity and, appetite for adventure and so on) could be considered to reach the most vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. The social exclusion factors in terms of political power of certain clans along with the real capacity to join armed group could have been included in the selection process.

**A more detailed understanding of the context for the intervention and all the numerous factors influencing recruitment and thereby the ToC is required**. There is a need to understand in more detail the ToC, to be very specific on the context dynamics, to define and select individuals rather than villages and to define a target of the level of income to be generated to create enough effect on stability. Furthermore, a detailed understanding of the local dynamics would highlight the need to work alongside a ToC involving some changes at the institutional level. The failure of the local authority to protect all in an indiscriminate manner should be addressed before anything else, as this is the first point in generating social exclusion and frustration, but also a reason for the minorities to seek power and protection from armed groups. A ToC working at the institutional level would decrease the recruitment by armed groups of group or clan, rather than individuals. This would require a different engagement by FAO that largely avoids dealing with any authorities.

### 10. Recommendations

In order to improve the efficiency of the TOC, we recommend the follow points.

- **Complement the logical framework with indicators of performance related to stability.** This approach will impose a constant reminder of stability as the ultimate objective of the project and will oblige measurement of the stability effect of the project. Additionally, it will clarify what is understood by stability. The changes of indicators will induce a review of the monitoring strategy and will impose regular assessment of stability and context evolution in the targeted areas.

- **Some factors of instability are clearly related to the failure of the government and lessons learnt should be taken from the success of AS notably in building a local perception of fairness of justice.** AS becomes a factor of instability when a location is lost from their control, but areas under their control are reported to be “stable”. The current ToC mainly works with individuals foreseen to be at risk of being recruited and this approach could be complemented by innovation at the institutional level. Farmers from minorities believing that their farms could be taken away from them will maintain an opportunity to join an armed group to secure the protection that the government is failing to provide to them. Working at the institutional level would also make it possible to address “group recruitment,” given that groups will align themselves to an armed group for political motivation.
- **Define very specific selection criteria for beneficiaries** to be included in the project in order to select individuals with profiles that are truly at risk of being recruited by armed group. Following this idea, the focus on women should be better justified, as the evaluation has not been able to identify a justification for this criterion as part of a stability strategy. Also, if youth are the main focus, then the median age of beneficiaries should also be coherent with this strategy.

- **The context analysis needs to be very specific** and conflict sensitivity can be considered in the project implementation to include medium and high risk profiles of beneficiaries to maintain inclusive local acceptance of the project. Such an analysis would need to list all local conflicts and the profile of actors of the conflict to justify selection process.

- **The concept of employment should be replaced by a concept of income generation with a clear target on how much should be generated per beneficiary to generate some stability.** Attraction towards armed groups can occur for income generation reasons, but the concept of working for an income or being at work to generate stability is not relevant here. The concept of creating employment did not occur in this project, as beneficiaries were all active farmers prior the SEED II project. Such project should aim at increasing incomes rather than generating employment;
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Logical framework

Current measures of economic growth

Below is an initial analysis of FAO’s updated logical framework on aspects concerning South Somalia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Disaggregation</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional long term jobs created (by sector, sex, age group and location)</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>3,011 3,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job equivalents (by sector, location, age group and sex)</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>22,165</td>
<td>6,500 7,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage increase in maize crop productivity and income per hectare.</td>
<td>Crop</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2.2/ha @$150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goal: To contribute to improved stability through economic growth and sustainable employment

Outcome: Improved economic and employment prospects targeting youth and women in conflict affected communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestone 2 (Oct. 12-Mar. 14)</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
<th>Cumul 01.14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30.03.13</td>
<td>31.08.13</td>
<td>01.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific means of verification will be asked from FAO for all indicators to understand how the figures related to achievement were reached.

The low achievement is attributed to the factors mentioned above. The increase in the number of jobs created above will have a direct proportional increase in the job equivalents. With most infrastructural activities to be completed by June 2014, there is high likelihood of the achievement of the set milestones.

The achievement of the milestone was as a result of the distribution of high quality seeds by the SEED II programme in South Central Somalia. With the planned construction of sluice gates to increase the water management, this achievement is anticipated to be surpassed during the second harvest in gu season.

Evolution of yield, harvest and income will be measured during the interviews with beneficiaries. How this situation has increased perception of livelihood security will be asked during interviews with beneficiaries looking at access to storage, markets, relations with traders (negotiation, decision on the type of seeds to be used). See template of interview with beneficiaries.

OUTPUT 1. Direct support for livelihoods and employment opportunities

Direct support for livelihoods and employment opportunities

| Total no. of days direct employment (Man days) | SC | |
| Additional land cultivated as result of irrigated rehabilitated canal (SC) (Crop) | Region | SC | 0 | 3,000 Ha | 0 | 600 | 1,500 |
| Number of HHs benefitting from the land cultivation using CfW (SC) | Region | SC | 0 | 3,000 HH. | 0 | – | – |

Remark: This indicator remains at zero for South Somalia.

FAO would need to provide means of verification for the figure of 3,000 Ha. There will be an assessment the average size of land under cultivation by farmers during the interview with beneficiaries.

This data only includes the area planted with the maize and sesame seeds distributed. More data is expected from the implementing partners once the contract is finalized and sluice gates are installed.

This has so far not been realized due to the late start of the interventions in the South Central as the start-up of activities were hampered by insecurity.

The term of reference indicated 750 HH. There will be verification of whether the cash for work reached more than 750 HH in South Somalia.
Review of the data provided by FAO on its call centre

For initial analysis, the survey team drew on the data collected and provided by FAO. FAO has established a call centre, aiming at calling beneficiaries to verify delivery of the programme. The approach to sampling used by FAO will be explored further to better interpret the validity and limits of the findings.

Content of the database provided by the call centre (324 beneficiaries called (from a list of 750 beneficiaries), COMCARE Jowhar: 149, GREDO Afgoye: 111, SWISSO KALMO Qoryoley : 64) showed the following.

15% of the respondents called by FAO call centre reported not to have received any seeds. This information is crucial as what happened to the 15% not received can significantly impact on the local conflict dynamism. FAO will be asked on actions taken following the analysis of the call centre.

Amongst the beneficiaries reported to have received seeds, not all have received maize and sesame seeds. In Johwar, some beneficiaries (19) reported to have received sorghum seeds instead of maize and sesame seeds.
Maize seeds – 20Kg

| Quantity of maize seeds reported to be received from COMCARE in Johwar district. Source: FAO call center database. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 Kg | 7 Kg | 8 Kg | 9 Kg | 10 Kg | 12 Kg | 15 Kg | 20 Kg | 25 Kg | 40 Kg |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 17 | 8 | 1 | 35 | 2 | 1 |

Sesame seeds – 8 Kg

| Quantity of sesame seeds reported to be received from COMCARE in Johwar district. Source: FAO call center database. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 Kg | 5 Kg | 8 Kg | 9 Kg | 10 Kg | 20 Kg |
| 1 | 1 | 37 | 1 | 37 | 1 |

| Quantity of sesame seeds reported to be received from Gredo in Afgoye district. Source: FAO call center database. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Kg | 4 Kg | 6 Kg | 7 Kg | 8 Kg | 9 Kg | 10 Kg | 15 Kg | 20 Kg | 25 Kg |
| 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 28 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

| Quantity of sesame seeds reported to be received from Swiss Kalmo in Qoryoley district. Source: FAO call center database. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 Kg | 9 Kg | 10 Kg |
| 35 | 1 | 8 |

In red are the number of cases reporting specific quantities received.

The items distributed were supposed to be 20 Kg of maize seeds, 8Kg of sesame seeds and 100 Kg of UREA. The data from the call centre is not representative of the sample so interpretation of the results should not be too ambitious, however, the variation of quantity reported to be received is significant.

Figure 30
Profile of beneficiaries of the project

**JOHWAR**

### Age group

The average age of the respondent (head of HH and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) is **38 years old**. The accuracy of the age reported is believed to be +/- five years, as FAO’s comprehensive list of beneficiaries also shows a peak of responses for age of beneficiaries with the multiplier of five. This age is seen to be too high to include individuals at risk of being recruited by armed groups. Our understanding of youth is up to 30 years old. So, further analysis of the profile of the HH members has been done to understand who are the HH members actually benefiting indirectly of the project. *Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.*

The proportion of HH with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents on 28% of the cases. *Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.*

All respondents are living along the river and belong to the Shiddle Clan.

### Livelihood

**Main livelihood expressed. Two first respondents**

- Farmer: 104
- Firewood selling: 6
- Grass selling: 26
- Milk selling: 11
- Remittance: 5

**Second livelihood expressed. Two first respondents**

- Farmer: 15
- Firewood selling: 7
- Grass selling: 4
- Milk selling: 8
- Remittance: 5

*Male ■ Female*
Each HH member was asked to mention their two main sources of livelihood. The main source of livelihood cited by the respondents was “farmer” while the main second major source of livelihood was “grass selling”. This point is important as the sale of grass contributes towards the reduction of tension between farmers and pastoralists. From a stability point of view, this aspect is important to consider. *Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.*

#### Level of incomes

The average annual HH income is of **$534 USD**. Given that HHs have an average of 5.73 members, the average annual income per member is **$93.1 USD**.

Most of the HHs participating in interviews were living on less than 0.4 USD per day per person. While the definition of poor can always be contested and while the farmers do not necessarily monetize all their production, the group interviewed is believed to be particularly poor. *Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.*

#### Assets

Most of the HHs participating in interviews were living on less than 0.4 USD per day per person. While the definition of poor can always be contested and while the farmers do not necessarily monetize all their production, the group interviewed is believed to be particularly poor. *Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.*
97% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 3% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 75% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 1.4 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 2.4 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.

QORYOLEY

- Age group

The average age of the respondent (head of HH and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) is **41 years old**. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
The proportion of HH with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents only 42% of the cases. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.

Livelihood

Main livelihood expressed. Two first respondents

Second livelihood expressed. Two first respondents

Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.

Level of incomes

The average annual HH income is of $930 \text{ USD}$. Given that HHs have an average of 6.38 members, the average annual income per member is $93.1 \text{ USD}$. 
94% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 2% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 76% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 1.7 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 3.3 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries. Three districts.
The average age of the respondent (head of HH and name of FAO list of beneficiaries) is 36 years old. \textit{Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.}

The proportion of HH with at least one male from 15 to 30 years old represents on 35% of the cases. \textit{Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.}
Level of incomes

The average annual HH income is of **1,039 USD**. Given that HHs have an average of 4.87 members, the average annual income per member is **213.3 USD**.

Assets

97% of respondents reported to own some riverine land, which correlates with the project targeting. Only 4% reported to have an irrigation pump, which also correlates with project targeting, as the river is actually higher than the farms. 47% of respondents reported to have a goat and they own an average of 0.9 animals. For the irrigation land, the average size of land owned is 3.4 Taab. Respondents have not reported the number of firearms owned. Source: Axiom interview with beneficiaries.
Strict average of the number of assets owned (sum assets / nb of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camels [#]</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows [#]</td>
<td>0,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep [#]</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation pumps [#]</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverine land in Taab [#]</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rain fed land in Taab [#]</td>
<td>0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms [#]</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*figure 48*
Yield

**JOHWAR**

Sum Taab cultivated reported by respondent

**QORYOLEY**

Sum Taab cultivated reported by respondent

**KUNTUNWAREY**

Sum Taab cultivated reported by respondent

Average - [Taab under cultivation]

Average - [Nb of Kg produced per year]

---

figure 49
Figure 50
Percentage of selling is globally the same per district and per type of crops. The proportion of harvest sold is high meaning that the crop is orientated to generate cash.

**Percentage of harvest sold**

![Graph showing percentage of harvest sold for different districts and crops](image)

**Price variation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Cow pea and maize</th>
<th>Cow pea</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GLOBAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Min/Max price of selling in USD - Cow pea and Maize</td>
<td>2.237 251.66</td>
<td>1046 124.46</td>
<td>1150 192.66</td>
<td>946 93.76</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min/Max price of selling in USD - Cow pea</td>
<td>1.370 94.21</td>
<td>1281 128.11</td>
<td>1569 182.51</td>
<td>1492 154.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[DEYR - 2012] [GU - 2012] [DEYR - 2013] [GU - 2013] [DEYR - 2014] [GU - 2014]</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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**JOHWAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cow pea and maize</th>
<th>Cow pea</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Min/Max price of selling in USD - Cow pea and Maize</td>
<td>658 501</td>
<td>776 641</td>
<td>929 797</td>
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<td>[DEYR - 2012] [GU - 2012] [DEYR - 2013] [GU - 2013] [DEYR - 2014] [GU - 2014]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min/Max price of selling in USD - Cow pea</td>
<td>735 440</td>
<td>807 513</td>
<td>976 631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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**QORYOLEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Cow pea</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Min/Max price of selling in USD - Cow pea and Maize</td>
<td>558 409</td>
<td>776 467</td>
<td>929 576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**KUNTWNWAREY**

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<th>Cow pea and maize</th>
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<th>Sesame</th>
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<tr>
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<td>[DEYR - 2012] [GU - 2012] [DEYR - 2013] [GU - 2013] [DEYR - 2014] [GU - 2014]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is remarkable that the average minimum price of selling maize in Middle Shabelle (Johwar) is constant and around 500 USD/MT while is Lower Shabelle (Qoryoley and Kuntunwarey) the same price is above 750 USD.
## Conflict reported

### Annex Conflicts reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Qoryoley</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Habar Gedir (Hawiye) vs. Garre (Digil/ Rahanweyn)</td>
<td>Access to resources</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Qoryoley</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Jareer (Somali Bantu) vs. Jodow (Rahanweyn)</td>
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<td>Resolved</td>
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**Peace Initiatives: Lower Shabelle**

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Qoryoley</td>
<td>Jiide &amp; Garre</td>
<td>Pasture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Qoryoley</td>
<td>Jiide &amp; Haber/Gedir</td>
<td>Land</td>
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</table>

**Kurtunwarey**

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Kurtunwaarey</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Habar Gedir, Abgal &amp; Sheikhal (Hawiye) vs. Jodow (Rahanweyn)</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Kurtunwaarey</td>
<td>Inter-Clan Jiide (Rahanweyn) vs. Habar Gedir (Hawiye)</td>
<td>Access to resources</td>
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</table>

**Middle Shabelle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor 1</th>
<th>Actor 2</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Remark</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Galjecel</td>
<td>Jejele</td>
<td>Road block</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobleen</td>
<td>Warsangeli</td>
<td>Road block</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciise</td>
<td>Daud</td>
<td>Farmland ownership and sub clans land tenure</td>
<td>Conflict over 3 centuries old and claims over 87 dead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict parties</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Matan – Daud (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td>Balcad</td>
<td>Resource conflict over grazing land and charcoal production</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isse Rati – Daud (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td>Madog and Hess</td>
<td>Dispute over boundaries with the “new” Run-Nigod (created by Siad Barre) district</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsangali – M. Musse (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td>Eastern part of the Jowhar District</td>
<td>Political dispute over regional control of Jowhar</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan Pair</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawadle – Agoonyar (Abgal sub clan)</td>
<td>Hiraan-Middle Shabelle border area</td>
<td>Dispute over pasture and farmland</td>
<td>Not resolved but also not very frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agoonyar – Warsengeli (Abgal sub clan)</td>
<td>Eastern part of Jowhar district</td>
<td>Power struggle in middle Shabelle region</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celi – Cabdale Carone (Abgal sub clan)</td>
<td>Burdhere, Cadale district</td>
<td>Animal theft, revenge killings, dispute over grazing lands</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agoonyar – Warsengeli (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td>Adab Yabaal neighbouring Hiran region</td>
<td>Animal theft, revenge killings, political control of the region</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celi-Reer Matan (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td>Balcad</td>
<td>The control of Mungab village</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabale-Abdulle Galmah (Abgal sub-clans)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resource conflict over grazing land and charcoal production</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daud-Yabar (Abgal sub clan)</td>
<td>Eastern part of the Jowhar District</td>
<td>Land dispute</td>
<td>Not resolved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Term of reference

SEED II Evaluation: Exploring the Market Development Component’s Agricultural Initiatives’ Impact on reducing Conflict/Increasing Stability in Middle and Lower Shabelle

1. Objective:
The objective of this study is to assess the extent of DFID’s Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) Programme’s effectiveness in delivering material benefits to the target programme beneficiaries. More specifically, the study will carry out an investigation among beneficiaries of SEED II programme’s agricultural interventions under the Market Development component in addressing Middle and Lower Shabelle, South Central Somalia.

2. Recipient of this Work
The direct recipient of the study is DFID. Indirect recipients include FAO Somalia which is the implementing partner of SEED phase II’s Market Development Component.

3. Scope of Work
This research aims to provide evidence on the impact of the Market Development component of the SEED programme on reducing conflict and/or increasing stability in Somalia, specifically in Middle and Lower Shabelle. The research will collect recipient and community views on the relevance and implementation of the Market Development Component’s agricultural interventions. The study will have as a backdrop, the ToC for this work which identifies potential connections between unemployment as a driver of radicalisation and sustainable employment as a way to reduce conflict and increase stability. In terms of questions, the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and impact of the Market Development Component’s agricultural interventions are of interest. More specific questions include:

- Why are people attracted to join the programme?
- What other options are open to them?
- What do community leaders expect from the programme?
- What kind of income gains have been realised through the programme?
- What other benefits have been and continue to be realised through the programme?
- Have there been any disadvantages of the programme?
- Are people satisfied with the programme? Why?
- To what extent do Community Leaders feel the programme has reached an appropriate range of individuals in their community?
- Would individuals/ community leaders recommend the programme to others in their community? In other communities?
- What kinds of communities is the programme seen as suitable for?
- How do views vary across subsets of the population?
- Is there evidence to support the ToC’s rationale that these income-generating opportunities might divert people from joining militias?

Key elements of the work include:
• Developing un-structured or semi-structured interview protocols to evaluate the questions identified
• Develop a safe and reliable approach to being able to identify and interview programme beneficiaries and community leaders (this may involve bringing people to Mogadishu rather than interviewing them in their own locality).
• Collect views and experiences of the component’s beneficiaries (individual recipients and community leaders?)
• Use data obtained to deepen understanding of causal relationships and reflect on/ refine the ToC;
• Highlight recommendations on how to engage target beneficiaries during project design, improve the programme, and potential for scale up.

4. Methodology
The methodology will be defined in the proposal to conduct this work and will address the following:

• Undertake a review of documentation to understand SEED II’s interventions in Middle and Lower Shabelle and where and how the programme is operating;
• Develop a robust approach to sampling;
• Development of research instruments to meet the objectives of analysing the views, experiences and perceptions of the beneficiaries of the SEED II Market Development Component’s agricultural interventions. Use of qualitative methods with individual interviews and possibly focus groups is expected but the consultant is encouraged to propose alternative and innovative approaches;
• Development of field work implementation plan with details of all field activities during the research. The work plan should specify appropriate location and timing for field data collection, where interviewers will be obtained from, how translation will be undertaken;
• Execution of study and all related data collection exercises, data processing, analysis and reporting in line with this terms of reference;
• Production of a study report on the agricultural intervention’s impact outlining findings and related key recommendations.

Whilst undertaking the study, the consultants will be responsible for bringing to DFID’s attention any additional opportunities that would add value to the study or any potential shortcomings to the analysis.

For sampling and analysis purposes, it will be important to take account of the type of locality people come from including:

• Communities where AS is there by force;
• Communities that are sympathetic to AS; Communities where the Government is in control;
• Those with alternative local administrations.

Gender of participants is also relevant and it would also be relevant to identify respondents’ clan although this cannot be asked directly. The programme includes representatives of two clan’s i.e. ‘riverine’ - former owners of the land who now feel marginalised and ‘pastoralists’ - who have moved into the area over the last 25 years. A proxy for clan could be the length of time the family has been in the area (those longer than 25 years most likely to be riverine and those more recent most likely to be pastoralists); the number of livestock people have may also be relevant.
It seems possible that we could get information along the above lines for all those in the programme, enabling us to create a useful sampling frame from which we could then select an appropriate number (perhaps between 50 and 100 people to interview/ engage in focus group discussions). FAO who administer the programme and have data on around 750 beneficiaries will be able to assist with the sampling process.

5. **Timeframe**
This study will commence as soon as possible following the issue and acceptance by the consultant of DFID’s contract. The contract will issue from DFID as soon as possible during the week commencing late March 2014. It will be important that the consultant has the ability and resources to ensure that the timing for the delivery of the final report to DFID is not delayed beyond 25 April 2014.

6. **Co-ordination and Implementation**
The contract will be with DFID Somalia. The consultants will report to the DFID Somalia Private Sector Adviser, Adhan Haji. The adviser will be available to discuss the approach before and during the consultancy.

The consultants will interview between 50 – 100 project beneficiaries as a sample of the targeted 750 household in South Central Somalia (specifically Lower and Middle Shabelle). All interviews will be conducted in Mogadishu.

The consultants will be responsible for their own travel arrangements and coordinate their accommodation and logistics while in Mogadishu. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Annex 1 of the ToRs) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property. The consultants will also liaise and coordinate closely with FAO Somalia, the SEED II implementing partner.

Consultants should take account of ethical considerations in proposals for undertaking this study (refer to Annex 2).

DFID Somalia will seek to convene a Governance body to oversee this study including representatives from DFID Somalia and DFID HQ and an external expert.

7. **Deliverables**
- Detailed assignment implementation plan – 5 days after arrival in Mogadishu;
- An interim report of progress - 2 weeks after commencement of the research;
- A presentation to DFID Somalia summarising the final report – 3 weeks after commencement of the research
- A final report of findings - 4 weeks after commencement of the research;

8. **Background**
Ever since the outbreak of the civil war, which led to the ousting of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, various degrees of conflict and the lack of a central government have affected Somalia.

Conflicts and civil strife caused significant damage to the agricultural infrastructure and a general under-utilisation of the agricultural potential, especially in South Central Somalia where most of the valuable agricultural resources are located. This situation has resulted in an even greater vulnerability of large sections of the population due to food insecurity. The prevailing arid to semi-arid climate aggravates the situation. The great variability of
precipitation over years, typically associated with arid to semi-arid climates, is a major problem for farming communities as traditional methods of coping were destroyed during the war.

Over the years, adverse climatic conditions and/or insecurity related incidents rendered farming communities vulnerable or destitute, again and again. To mitigate the situation and to enable farmers who often have no resources left for planting the new crop, international agencies in partnership with local implementing non-governmental organizations are involved in relief and rehabilitation activities targeting vulnerable rural households. The purpose of these interventions is to support a sustainable recovery of farming based livelihood systems from crisis situations.

DFID is funding a four year (2010/11 – 2013/14) Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme which aims to improve local stability, enhance productive sectors through diversification of income sources and productive opportunities, improve production and productivity of assets for raising incomes, and encourage greater market participation opportunities, resulting in increased economic growth and sustainable employment.

The SEED II programme comprises of two components. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead partner for the implementation of SEED Component 1 (Market Development), which focuses on developing economic opportunities and creating employment, with accompanying skills, among youth and women. The World Bank is the lead partner on SEED Component 2 (investment climate and regulatory framework), which supports the investment climate and regulatory framework in Somaliland to increase investment and growth in Somaliland and operates a challenge fund.

More specifically, SEED II market development component’s agricultural interventions focus on consolidation of the agricultural crop activities including the promotion of sustainable crop production in areas where irrigation systems have been improved in the Lower and Middle Shabelle region in South Central Somalia. In promoting sustainable crop production in South Central, DFID in partnership with FAO are building on the canal rehabilitation through further equipping the irrigation systems with sluice gates to improve the efficiency, manageability and sustainability, strengthening cultivation systems through improving access to inputs and strengthening marketing and price setting/taking opportunities for farmers by piloting a farmer storage and marketing component. The interventions are aimed at improving the livelihood resilience of target communities/beneficiaries while providing opportunities for income generation to 750 targeted vulnerable households in Lower and Middle Shabelle in South Central Somalia.

AS is particularly active in this area and is encouraging young people to join the militia. While the agricultural activities under SEED in this area provides a means to employment, this study aims to produce evidence linked to the question of whether unemployment is a driver of radicalisation of youth and that employment takes away the motivation to join militias and the cost advantage of doing so.

9. Key documents to be provided

a) FAO’s Sustainable Employment and Economic Development Programme (SEED) Programme Memorandum;