EVALUATION OF DFID SUPPORT TO TRADE RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING

Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean

DRAFT
September 2004
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLCF</td>
<td>Business Linkages Challenge Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>Caribbean Community Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDA</td>
<td>Caribbean Export Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Communication and Partnership Strategy</td>
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<td>CRNM</td>
<td>Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>CARICOM Single Market and Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>CARICOM Trade Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DFIDC</td>
<td>DFID Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
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<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IF</td>
<td>Integrated Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
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<td>ITD</td>
<td>International Trade Department</td>
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<td>JBDC</td>
<td>Jamaica Business Development Centre</td>
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<td>JEA</td>
<td>Jamaica Exporters’ Association</td>
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<td>JTAT</td>
<td>Jamaica Trade and Adjustment Team</td>
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<td>JTCF</td>
<td>Jamaica Tourism Challenge Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOV</td>
<td>Means of verification</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSI</td>
<td>North-South Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVI</td>
<td>Objectively verifiable indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Policy and Resources Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPA</td>
<td>Regional Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>small and medium-size enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPR</td>
<td>Trade Policy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRCB</td>
<td>Trade-Related Capacity Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Executive Summary

Introduction
The present report represents one of five case studies prepared by the North-South Institute (NSI) as part of an evaluation of Trade-Related Capacity Building (TRCB) activities carried out between 1998 and 2004 by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). The case study for the Caribbean reflects a regional perspective, in contrast to the national focus of the other case studies, yet it encompasses some country-specific programmes that target specific trade development needs of countries. DFID’s regional TRCB projects in the Caribbean are mainly directed towards trade policies and the regulatory environment that support the regional and national development strategies through bilateral, regional and multilateral trade arrangements. At the same time, DFID’s TRCB national-level projects in the Caribbean target trade development, which focuses on export promotion, access to finance, market analysis and the development of business support services and institutions, thereby improving the capacity of the Caribbean countries to take advantage of new trade opportunities.

Our assessment covers the following projects, which are classified into regional and national categories and, within that classification, trade policy versus trade development sub-categories:

Regional Trade Policy Projects:
- Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)
- CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)

Regional Trade Development Projects:
- Business Linkages Challenge Fund (BLCF)

National Trade Development Projects:
- Cluster Competitiveness Programme (Jamaica)
- Tourism Challenge Fund (Jamaica)

The CRNM is the largest DFID project, yet DFID is but one of several funding agencies for the institution and its activities. While DFID’s budgetary commitments to the CSME have been much smaller than those to the CRNM, continued assistance would be vital to moving the CSME process forward in a number of high-priority areas. In both of these regional trade policy initiatives, our evaluation seeks to assess whether DFID has significantly influenced the capacity of the regional organisation and their constituencies to negotiate equitable trade rules, and whether the trade policy strategies and positions of the CRNM and CSME member governments have changed as a result of those initiatives.

The remaining and much smaller projects than those of the CRNM and CSME are directed either wholly or partly towards the creation of trade opportunities in the region. The Business Linkages Challenge Fund has been implemented through the Fund Managers of Deloitte and Touche, and the Caribbean Export Development Agency in the Eastern Caribbean. The two national TRCB projects – the Cluster Competitiveness
Programme and the Tourism Challenge Fund – have been completed and they provide useful lessons about DFID’s programmes in the region.

**DFID’s Caribbean Programme in Context**

DFID’s overall programme in the Caribbean aims to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty, consistent with the Millennium Development Goals as well as the goals of the White Papers on International Development and Globalisation, and DFID’s Middle Income Countries Strategy. DFID supports the growth and poverty reduction framework of CARICOM through activities that, in the context of TRCB, promote the region’s trade, competitiveness and economic integration. The enhancement of regional collaboration through the CSME and the CRNM is viewed as a means of strengthening the economies of the Caribbean, not only through the direct gains from trade liberalisation but through non-traditional channels.

Whether trade liberalisation helps or undermines the poor depends on whether pro-poor trade and other policies are in place and whether the reduction in trade barriers leads to higher economic growth rates. In the past, trade liberalisation by itself has not necessarily lowered inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, so pro-poor trade policies are an essential ingredient to DFID’s Caribbean programme. There is ample evidence that economic growth is positively associated with trade liberalisation, and there are clear guidelines on the types of compensatory and complementary measures that need to precede or parallel trade liberalisation. Compensatory mechanisms such as safety nets are often used during the adjustment periods immediately following liberalisation since they facilitate adjustment for a targeted segment of society without creating distortions in the economy, while complementary measures are initiatives designed to ensure that poor groups have access to new market opportunities arising from trade liberalisation.

Pro-poor trade policies, as envisioned by DFID, are those measures that reduce poverty through their distributional outcomes and may involve compensatory and complementary mechanisms that accompany trade liberalisation as part of a poverty alleviation trade strategy. In the context of trade negotiations, these measures refer to non-traditional channels of regional collaboration, and are the types of trade-related policies that are likely to have the greatest impact on poverty alleviation. They include collaborative measures in health, education and environmental standards, and other areas such as services and intellectual property, as well as issues related to investment and capital mobility that are important complements to trade arrangements.

To the extent that DFID is committed to the promotion of pro-poor trade policies, the Caribbean programme needs to be evaluated in terms of its actual qualitative and quantitative relevance to a poverty alleviation programme in the region. An understanding of the provisions of the proposed programme arrangement and DFID’s areas of support in the region can provide valuable lessons for DFID’s Caribbean office in terms of its future overall programme strategy for achieving sustainable reductions in poverty.

**Assessment Summary**

Each of DFID’s projects in the Caribbean has been assessed in terms of six evaluation criteria: relevance, performance, sustainability, overall impact, poverty impact, gender
Impact. Table S.1 summarises the individual project scores for the five projects assessed over the review period. The overall score for the three project-type categories are about the same, ranging from 2.0 for the national trade development projects to 2.4 for the regional trade policy projects on a scale of 1 to 4. But there is a divergence in scoring between the two national trade development projects.

At the strategic level, the objectives and priority areas of the projects are relevant to DFID’s strategic thrusts and the regional or national development strategies. But they are regarded as relevant rather than highly relevant because they did not address poverty explicitly, as envisaged in DFID’s overall strategic objectives, and instead assumed that an expansion in trade would be accompanied by reduced poverty and inequality levels in the region or the targeted countries. All projects were, however, found to be responsive to the national or regional priority areas, which had a broader scope than DFID. The performance and sustainability of the programme as a whole, but excluding the Jamaican Tourism Challenge Fund¹, was found to be partly effective and somewhat sustainable.

Impact ratings for the targeted objectives of the projects were generally moderate, with the exception of the Tourism Challenges Fund, as well as the Business Linkages Challenge Fund. The impact on poverty and gender issues were, however, only modest or negligible. The

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¹ The project was closed ahead of schedule because of its weak performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table S.1</th>
<th>Summary Project Evaluation Matrix</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Trade Policy Projects</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Trade Development Projects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CARICOM</strong></td>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Regional Trade Policy Projects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)</td>
<td>Regional Market Economy (CSME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Targeted Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Poverty Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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</table>

Note - Assessments are based on the following scoring criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Highly relevant</td>
<td>4 Highly effective</td>
<td>4 Very likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>3 Effective</td>
<td>3 Somewhat likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partly relevant</td>
<td>2 Partly effective</td>
<td>2 Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>1 Ineffective</td>
<td>1 Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>na Not applicable</td>
<td>na Not applicable</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table S.2</th>
<th>Summary Evaluation Results and Rating</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scale</strong></td>
<td><strong>Weight</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Targeted Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Poverty Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - Rating based on the following scale: 4 - highly successful; 3 - successful; 2 - partly successful; 1 - unsuccessful.
CSME project addressed the poverty issue through its attempt to lower income inequality among its member countries, while the Cluster Competitiveness Programme and the BLCF both addressed poverty and gender issues through various degrees of SME-targeted activities.

The overall rating of DFID’s Caribbean programme is summarised in Table S.2. The weighting scheme for the overall rating incorporates DFID’s overarching strategy to target the alleviation of poverty, and it therefore assigns twice the weight to the poverty impact assessment criteria than it does to the others. Based on this weighting scheme and the evaluation findings summarised under the six evaluation criteria in Table S.1, the overall programme score is considered to be partly successful.

**Programme Strengths and Opportunities**

The key strengths of DFID’s Caribbean programme are as follows:

- DFID’s focus on pro-poor trade and development activities provides a more direct channel through which to target its TRCB activities than is available to other donors with broad-based strategies.
- DFID’s flexible approach with respect to the use of its funds facilitates and supports activities that are normally not able to be supported by other donors with more rigid programmes.
- DFID has played a greater role than other donors in supporting strategic studies in the region, as well as raising the profile of regional institutions such as the CRNM.
- Equity issues at the regional level have been addressed through efforts to raise incomes in the lesser developed countries of the region, especially through DFID’s support of the CSME process. In particular, the implementation of mechanisms designed to offset possible polarisation of countries within the region could lower the incident of unequal distribution of benefits arising from regionalisation and ultimately help to alleviate income inequality in the region. Moreover, the development of instruments designed to redress inequalities could motivate the more resistant member countries to move forward with the CSME process.
- DFID’s engagement of non-government actors in project designs has ensured private sector participation in some of its programmes.
- Pro-poor trade policy focus provides DFID with an opportunity to develop niche trade policy and trade development contributions to the Caribbean region.

Key opportunities for DFID’s Caribbean programme are as follows:

- Despite DFID’s commitment to pro-poor trade policies, the regional TRCB projects in the Caribbean have lacked specific links to poverty reduction; rather the CRNM and CSME projects have been directed towards increasing demand for the region’s goods and services through improved market-access.
• The log-frame process has not been fully incorporated into the project design and implementation. While the standardisation of forms for setting, measuring, and evaluating project objectives provides a useful administrative mechanism, the coverage and details of these monitoring and evaluation forms have varied considerably across the projects reviewed in this report. For example, the quantitative performance measures of the CRNM’s work in relation to the goals, purposes and outputs were limited in their specificity, whereas such indicators are in fact available through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism. Monitoring and evaluation could be enhanced by developing logical frameworks in consultation with recipients of TRCB programmes.

• Stakeholder consultations remain an essential strategy to ensuring relevance, efficacy and sustainability of TRCB in the Caribbean, since the existence of six large multilateral donors and eight other bilateral donors in the region have given rise to a number of overlapping activities and interests in TRCB. While informal consultations are maintained with stakeholders and other donors, there remains a need to formalise and institutionalise the process.

• In the case of the CSME and CRNM projects, DFIDC has had little, if any, involvement in the project design and implementation of specific activities related to each of the projects. While this approach has the advantage of reducing the workload for the relatively small and overextended DFIDC staff, it has limited DFID’s ability to influence the funded projects and direct them towards DFID’s poverty reduction objectives for its TRCB programme.

• DFIDC has increasingly broadened its overall project portfolio while relying on a diminishing number of staff members in its regional Caribbean office. As a result, project officers handling TRCB are also handling other portfolios that absorb much of their time. Despite the dedication and enthusiasm of the staff members, there is a general lack of understanding of the channels through which TRCB can or cannot affect poverty in the region. This limitation, combined with the increasing tendency for the staff to handle multiple programme portfolios, may exacerbate the current lack of pro-poor trade policy focus of DFIDC’s programme for the region.

• Procedures for monitoring and evaluating programmes should be established with DFID’s offices when other agencies such as the Caribbean Export Development Agency are used to execute trade related capacity building programmes. Such a system would ensure cohesiveness in the management and evaluation of these programmes in DFID’s regional assistance programme.

• Trade related capacity building programmes with potential pro-poor linkages, such as the BLCF, will need front-end support for the poor to access the facilities if the activity is to successfully reach the poor. In large part, insufficient attention has been paid to the business needs of the poor, including the weakness of their administrative and financial capacity to meet the requirements of such programmes as that of the BCLF.
Lessons Learned

DFID’s focus on trade as a vehicle for poverty alleviation provides much of the impetus for the design and, ultimately, the evaluation of programme in the Caribbean. According to the DFID Caribbean office, the regionally-oriented office in Barbados focuses its efforts on areas where it can bring specific added value, whether from its specific approach or from its expertise. While trade policy support remains important to the region, pro-poor trade development activities need to be emphasised if the DFID Caribbean office is to develop a programme that is consistent with DFID’s overall strategy aimed at targeting poverty through trade and investment development. Much of the TRCB activities are focused on projects aimed at developing trade policy and negotiating capacity, through projects aimed at promoting trade are being developed in the Jamaica country office. There are nevertheless considerable untapped opportunities for the DFID Caribbean regional office to develop trade policy projects that pursue pro-poor trade reforms. DFID’s pro-poor policy orientation, for example, could be brought to bear on country programme designs to help mainstream trade issues into the poverty reduction strategies of governments.

Staff level reductions in the Caribbean regional office have increased the risk that DFID-wide interest will de-emphasise trade-related objectives and the manner that they address poverty reduction in the region. This risk could easily be mitigated through greater use of consultants and contractors with expertise in trade-related capacity building targeted to poverty alleviation. This approach would provide DFID with the needed continuity over time for programme design, monitoring and evaluation without absorbing significant resources. It would also allow DFID officials greater time for coordinating their increasingly large portfolio of projects, coordinating activities with ITD headquarters staff and ensuring cohesiveness between ITD and the Caribbean office in trade-related capacity building programmes, as well as providing officials with the needed time to respond to information requirements from other government departments.

Project monitoring and evaluation remains an important function of the Caribbean regional office. These functions are likely to become increasingly important as each official’s portfolio increases and possibly greater reliance is placed on consultants and contractors. Of considerable use for the present evaluation have been the mid-term and final reports, specifically those providing details of the project goals and accomplishments. It is likely that future projects would benefit from formalising the mid-term and final project reports in such a way as to ensure their coverage of information encompasses so-called progress indicators for trade-related objectives and their effect on poverty alleviation either through pro-poor trade reforms or the development of trade activities that favour the poor. In this way, the DFID Caribbean office would continue to project its reputation of linking trade and poverty issues, a reputation that is widely acknowledged by stakeholders and others donors as providing DFID with a comparative advantage over other development agencies having a broader mandate.
I. Introduction

A. Overview

The present report represents one of five case studies prepared by the North-South Institute (NSI) as part of an evaluation of Trade-Related Capacity Building (TRCB) activities carried out between 1998 and 2004 by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). The assessment was commissioned by DFID’s International Trade Department (ITD). It draws on existing internal and external reports and interviews conducted with both those involved directly with the DFID-funded TRCB such as DFID programme managers, other executing agencies, primary beneficiaries, advisers and consultants delivering TRCB, and those indirectly involved, such as the broader community that includes national officials and academics, business associations, producer groups, and community organisations. It also draws on a consultation seminar convened at the end of the field work to discuss and validate the preliminary findings.

The case study for the Caribbean reflects a regional perspective, in contrast to the national focus of the other case studies, yet it encompasses some country-specific programmes that target trade development needs of specific countries. DFID’s regional TRCB projects in the Caribbean are mainly directed towards trade policies and the regulatory environment that support the regional and national development strategies through bilateral, regional and multilateral trade arrangements. These projects are intended to (a) support an open and rules-based international trading system, (b) promote equitable trade rules, (c) develop an effective position for the Caribbean countries, and (d) support the lowering of trade barriers in both domestic and foreign markets. In contrast, DFID’s TRCB national-level projects in the Caribbean have targeted trade development, which focuses on export promotion, access to finance, market analysis and the development of business support services and institutions, thereby improving the capacity of the Caribbean countries to take advantage of new trade opportunities (DFID, 2000, Ch.5).

Our assessment covers the following projects, which are classified into regional and national categories and, within that classification, trade policy versus trade development sub-categories:

*Regional Trade Policy Projects:*
- Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)
- CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)

*Regional Trade Development Projects:*
- Business Linkages Challenge Fund (BLCF)

*National Trade Development Projects:*
- Cluster Competitiveness Programme (Jamaica)
- Tourism Challenge Fund (Jamaica)

The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) is the largest DFID project, yet DFID is but one of several funding agencies for the institution and its activities. Donor coordination has therefore been a central consideration when assessing project efficacy,
and DFID has been working with other donors to identify mechanisms to optimise the coordination of various programmes, as well as monitor and evaluate those mechanisms. Our evaluation focuses on the lessons to be learned from the CRNM that could guide DFID’s approach to TRCB in other regions. While DFID’s budgetary commitments to the CSME have been much smaller than those to the CRNM, continued assistance would be vital to moving the CSME process forward in a number of high-priority areas. In both of these regional trade policy initiatives, our evaluation seeks to assess whether DFID has significantly influenced the capacity of the regional organisation and their constituencies to negotiate equitable trade rules, and whether the trade policy strategies and positions of the CRNM and CMSE member governments have changed as a result of those initiatives. These changes can be reflected in a number of ways, including reductions in trade barriers, development of new trade strategies incorporating important structural changes to trade taking place in the region, and the inclusion of trade policy considerations in national development strategies such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

The four remaining and much smaller projects than those of the CRNM and CSME are directed either wholly or partly towards the creation of trade opportunities for businesses in the region. The Business Linkages Challenge Fund has been implemented through the Fund Managers of Deloitte and Touche, and the Caribbean Export in the Eastern Caribbean. Eight grants were received by Caribbean enterprises up to Round Seven of the funding activities, and two of the activities being funded under the Business Linkages Challenge Fund are in the tourism sector. The two national TRCB projects – the Cluster Competitiveness Programme and the Tourism Challenge Fund – have been completed and they provide useful lessons about DFID’s programmes in the region. The Enterprise Development Caribbean project was only in existence for a short time in 1998, and was designed to facilitate matchmaking between Caribbean and UK small businesses as a means of ensuring continued employment in the region and generating new opportunities through bilateral trade links with the United Kingdom. There is little information about that project and we have therefore not provided any in-depth assessment about it.

B. Report Structure

The report is organised into four chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter II examines the region’s changing trade patterns and policies and donor activities. The first part of the chapter examines external sector indicators and regional and multilateral arrangements to identify changes in Caribbean trade policies and performance that have taken place over the period of assessment. External sector indicators are those measuring openness, competitiveness, protectionism and trade tax revenues, while indicators of regional and multilateral participation measure commitments levels and procedural involvement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round of negotiations, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, and the Cariforum/European Union (EU) round of negotiations aimed at moving from general African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) arrangements to a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA) with the EU.

We then examine donor activities in the region and how they have supported efforts to improve trade in various sectors and support structural adjustments taking place especially in the banana and sugar industries. Finally, we look at DFID’s activities from
the point of view of its programme and strategy for the region, its management structure, and the portfolio for the region as it relates to the TRCB in policy and development support to stakeholders.

Chapter III addresses DFID’s TRCB projects during the assessment period. While much attention is necessarily given to the larger projects supporting the region’s trade policies, we have also given the smaller development-oriented projects attention because of the lessons that can be learned from their design and implementation experience. Given the involvement of other donors in the CRNM and CSME, as well as the large number of external factors influencing the region’s changing trade conditions, it would be misleading to ascribe changes in trade patterns and the regulatory environment to DFID’s projects alone. Instead, DFID’s projects should be viewed as part of the broad-based support of various donors to the region’s TRCB, as reflected in the ability of the regional authorities to formulate coherent international trade policies that reflect the positions of member governments in economic policy reports, poverty reduction strategies, official press statements, and social and economic studies assessing the impact of trade reforms. Where possible, we have used evaluations of the regional trade policy strategies prepared by outside analysts, as well as interviews with officials on how they have been able to raise the profile of the region in bilateral and multilateral negotiating forums and broaden private sector participation in the process. Assessments of the projects rely on existing documentation and interviews with project managers and recipients of trade development support.

Chapter IV brings together the findings on DFID’s individual projects to examine issues of programme cohesiveness and effectiveness in achieving overall objectives. Some of the issues addressed include (a) the effects of the TRCB projects on the magnitude and pattern of the region’s trade, (b) the capacity of officials to manage trade policies and regulations, as well as to engage with foreign counterparts, and (c) the implications of the findings for prioritising and ranking TRCB activities in regional programmes, either through focused activities or government budgetary support. It also discusses DFID’s contribution in the region and the coherence between its overall TRCB programme and that of the region, its collaboration with other donors and regional authorities, and its contribution to trade development activities in specific industries or sectors. We conclude by drawing a number of implications about the assessment methodology and its findings for ongoing monitoring and evaluation activities.

Three annexes are included at the end of the report. The first presents the questionnaire used for the semi-structured interviews during the field work (Annex A); the second lists the persons and organisations interviewed during the field trip (Annex B); and the last contains the bibliography (Annex C).

The present report was prepared by Montague Lord and Clive Pegus following field work carried out over a two week period between 5 and 17 July 2004. The collaboration of the DFID office in Barbados is gratefully acknowledged, as is that of the interviewed individuals listed at the end of the report.
II. DFID’s ACTIVITIES AND THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

A. Key Socio-Economic Indicators

The small island states of the Caribbean are vulnerable to the transmission of international economic conditions because of the openness of their economies, their narrow resource base, and their reliance on preferential trade arrangements. Integrating their economies into the global market through their WTO commitments has further increased the vulnerability of small and inefficient producers that were once protected by import-substitution policies, and possibly marginalised their activities to the informal sector. Despite relatively high per capita incomes in most countries, poverty remains high in the Caribbean. Per capita income averages around $4,800 but ranges widely from a low of under $1,000 in Guyana to over $10,000 in Barbados. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line, i.e., the headcount index, is over 30 percent in six of the eleven countries in Table 2.1, while the poverty gap ranges between six and fifteen in six countries.2

The incidence of poverty is particularly high in agricultural-based households, according to the OECS Human Development Report (2002). Apart from the low levels of educational attainment and the larger household sizes, rural poverty is closely related to the focus on primary production in agriculture and fishing. Declining exports of bananas, coffee and staples directly impact on the livelihood of these households and often lead to food-based poverty. The result is a migration of young people to urban centres, which in turn contributes to rising levels of urban poverty.

The ability of the region’s countries to grow is, however, undermined by the low level of competitiveness of the private sector in the international market-place. Natural resources could provide the basis for a competitive advantage in traditional agricultural industries, as well as agro-industries, tourism and other service-based industries. Of equal importance to the region’s competitiveness are unit labour costs, the cost of and reliability of other inputs such as materials, power, transportation and communication. Unit labour costs are, in turn, directly influenced by labour productivity, local currency wage rates, and exchange rate-policies. Cross-country data are available for Jamaica

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2 The poverty gap measures the transfer needed to eliminate poverty and equals the aggregate income shortfall of the poor as a percent of aggregate consumption of the entire population.
(60/59) and Trinidad and Tobago (37/44), where the numbers in parenthesis refer to the macro and micro-competitive ranking of those countries out of 82 countries. Information for the other Caribbean countries is unavailable but, with the exception of Barbados, rankings are unlikely to be high. In those small island economies, infrastructure in the form of power, transport and communications tends to be expensive and labour costs high. Moreover the regulatory environment often creates administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to doing business in those countries, and has therefore hampered private sector development. Additionally, the legacy of protectionism and reliance on preferential trading arrangements has undermined the dynamism of the private sector. While these countries possess a great deal of natural beauty that could enhance tourism, increased competition among airlines and shipping companies has opened distant tourism destinations to more people and increased the tourism competition worldwide.

For the poor, these conditions mean that opportunities are not being created for them to enhance their well-being. Modest economic growth is unlikely to change labour force participation rates, especially if economic policies are not matched by pro-poor policies directed at improving their education and general welfare levels, and the extent to which meso-policies are successful in directing expenditures for priority sectors of the poor. The ability of trade to favourably impact on poverty levels is closely related to the ability of pro-poor trade strategies to shift the balance of policy emphasis from issues of market access and macro-reforms for trade to micro- and meso-level issues of supply capacity, as well as focusing on the delivery of capacity-building support at the export-oriented (and import-competing) enterprise level.

The enhancement of regional collaboration through the CSME and the CRNM is viewed as a means of strengthening the economies of the Caribbean, not only from the direct gains from trade liberalisation but through non-traditional channels. In the past, trade liberalisation by itself has been shown to give rise to greater inequality in Latin America (Berry, 1997). But whether trade liberalisation helps or undermines the poor depends on whether pro-poor trade policies are in place and whether the reduction in
trade barriers leads to higher economic growth rates. There is ample evidence that economic growth is positively associated with trade liberalisation.\(^3\)

There are also clear guidelines on the types of compensatory and complementary measures that need to precede or parallel trade liberalisation. Compensatory mechanisms such as safety nets are often used during the adjustment periods immediately following liberalisation, since they facilitate adjustment for a targeted segment of society without creating distortions in the economy. Complementary measures are initiatives designed to ensure that poor groups have access to new market opportunities arising from trade liberalisation. These measures include (i) developing market institutions to ensure that market signals in the form of prices are operational and not subject to distortions from subsidies or other types of artificial interventions; (b) reducing or eliminating bureaucratic and administrative obstacles to doing business; (c) encouraging the informal sector to enter the formal market by eliminating penalties or creating tax relief measures for informal businesses; (d) developing credit facilities for the poor through micro-financing or small and medium-size enterprise (SME) facilities; (e) establishing mechanisms for entry, operation and exit of micro-enterprise and SMEs; and (f) training workers for appropriate skills needed under the liberalised trade regime.

Pro-poor trade policies, as envisioned by DFID, are those measures that reduce poverty through the distributional outcomes of trade policies and are in line with compensatory and complementary mechanisms that accompany trade liberalisation as part of a poverty alleviation trade strategy. In the context of trade negotiations, these measures refer to non-traditional channels of regional collaboration, and are the types of trade-related policies that are likely to have the greatest impact on poverty alleviation. They include collaborative measures in health, education and environmental standards, and other areas such as services and intellectual property, as well as issues related to investment and capital mobility that are important complements to trade arrangements.

To the extent that DFID is committed to the promotion of pro-poor trade policies, the Caribbean support programme for the CSME and CRNM needs to be evaluated in terms of its actual qualitative and quantitative relevance to a poverty alleviation programme in the region. An understanding of the provisions of the proposed CSME and CRNM

\(^3\) For evidence supporting the positive effects of openness on economic growth and poverty reduction, see Frankel and Roemer (1998), Edwards (1998) and Krueger (2000).
arrangement and DFID’s areas of support for the negotiating process can provide valuable lessons for DFID’s Caribbean office in terms of its future overall programme strategy for achieving sustainable reductions in poverty.

**B. DFID’s Programme in the Caribbean**

1. **Strategy**

DFID’s overall programme in the Caribbean aims to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty, consistent with the Millennium Development Goals and the goals of the White Papers on International Development and Globalisation (HMG, 1997 and 2000), and DFID’s Middle Income Countries Strategy (DFID, 2004). DFID supports the growth and poverty reduction framework of CARICOM through activities that include (a) developing and implementing national strategies for sustained poverty reduction, (b) moving the single regional market and economy forward, (c) strengthening and empowering key regional institutions, and (d) integrating external donor efforts within the frame of national strategies. These goals are being implemented by (a) improving aid effectiveness in partnership with Caribbean and multilateral institutions, (b) directing increased resources to strengthening the capability of regional institutions, and (c) focusing bilateral assistance on supporting effective delivery of national poverty strategies in Guyana and Jamaica. Of the three main areas in which this agenda is being implemented, the one dealing with TRCB is that which promotes the region’s trade, competitiveness and economic integration.

2. **Institutional Structure**

Following its establishment in 1997 as successor to the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), DFID began operations in the Caribbean through its Barbados office. In 2003 the DFID Caribbean (DFIDC) office underwent an organisational restructuring, with bilateral assistance for Guyana and Jamaica being moved to those countries and the Barbados office focusing its support on regional issues. Those regional issues addressed the needs of the poorer countries of the Anglophone Caribbean, covering the OECS in the Windward Islands, as well as Belize.

On trade policy support projects, DFID has worked through the CARICOM Secretariat on CSME issues, and with the Regional Negotiating Machinery on trade issues. It also

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4 The material presented in this section is largely drawn from DFID/Caribbean (2004).

5 The other two initiatives are (a) economic and fiscal management and public service delivery within the framework of poverty strategies, and (b) HIV/AIDS and violent crime.

6 The OECS member states are Anguilla, Commonwealth of Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Saint Lucia, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
has a special arrangement with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) for all its programme areas. The existence of six large multilateral donors and eight other bilateral donors in the region necessitates close coordination of programme activities among donors and recipient regional and national institutions. Within DFID, the Caribbean offices work closely with the International Trade Department, International Financial Institutions Department, European Union Department, Latin American Department, and the Overseas Territories Department.

### 3. Programme Financing

DFID’s regional programme in the Caribbean accounts for 38 percent of its total commitments in the area, the remaining 62 percent being directed to the country programmes for Guyana and Jamaica (Table 2.4). TRCB projects since 1998 have been predominantly policy related. Indeed, more than 70 percent of DFID’s programmes in the Caribbean have been directed towards trade policy activities, while less than 30 percent have been used for trade development activities aimed at helping the region to improve its supply-side responsiveness to market opportunities. Table 2.5 provides a breakdown of TRCB projects by those broad categories. Only two projects are presently operating: the CARICOM Trade Programme Phase 2 projects supporting CRNM activities, and the Business Linkages Challenge Fund, whose funding size is considerably smaller that that for the CARICOM project. Trade policy-directed TRCB activities have therefore come to represent the bulk of DFID financing in the Caribbean.

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7 The major multilateral donors are the European Union (EU), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization of American States (OAS), and United Nations (UN) organisations. The major bilateral donors are Canada, United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Taiwan, to a lesser extent, Finland, France, Germany and Norway.
In trade-policy TRCB for the CARICOM region, DFID is a relatively small contributor to overall donor commitments. Table 2.6 summarises the distribution of donor activities in trade-policy support projects.

In general, DFID contributes 1.7 percent of all donor-funding for policy-related activities in the region. If the EU funding were excluded for being broadly directed to ACP countries rather than the Caribbean region alone, DFID’s share would increase to nearly 3 percent.8 By contrast, DFID has been the major contributor to the CRNM’s programme activities. Figure 2.1 summarises the participation of donor commitments since 2000 to the CRNM’s programmes. DFID’s share represents nearly one-third of the total, followed by CIDA (22 percent), IADB (20 percent), the CDB (15 percent) and USAID (10 percent).

### Table 2.6
**Donor TRCB Assistance to CARICOM, by Type of Assistance (million US dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance Type</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in Trade Negotiations</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>96.00</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA (3 projects)</td>
<td>Region/OECS</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Tri &amp; Tob</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108.98</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Strengthening of Negotiating Team, Including CRNM</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-DFID (2)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK-DFID (1)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>OECs/Reg.</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Pending app.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB (3 projects)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Under dev.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Latin Am.</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-Related Regulations and Disciplines</td>
<td>IADB (5 projects)</td>
<td>Region/Sur</td>
<td>31.18</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>OECs/Reg.</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>OECs</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA/IADB/CARICOM</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 These figures include past and future commitments, even where they are still under consideration, and may therefore be misleading. However, they serve to point to the relative size of the commitment by DFID in the context of overall donor activities in trade-policy related activities.
## Evaluation of DFID Support to TRCB: Case Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance Type</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Beneficiary</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consultation with and Participation of Civil Society</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>36.47</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Pending app.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Latin Am.</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
<td>116.90</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Free Trade on Public Finance</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications and Transparency of Laws and Regs</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>28.68</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>On-going/prep.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA (3 projects)</td>
<td>OECS/Reg.</td>
<td>8.51</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2003-2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA/IDB Trade Fund</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA/OAS Trade Unit</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2002-onward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID (3)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID (4)</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Under dev.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Strengthening</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>43.31</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>129.48</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>38.99</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>24.98</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>18.71</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL TRCB</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>322.62</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) CARICOM Trade Project: Four-phase project, including a programme of technical studies related to key trade policy issues; call-down expertise for trade negotiations; communications strategy to help the CRNM develop close linkages with its partners and provision of information technology equipment.
(2) CRNM Trade Programme II Services: Programme to support the CRNM in the provision of effective trade negotiating services for CARICOM and Cariforum member-states.
(3) Study to consider how best to take the CSME forward.
(4) Technical support from a young professional based in CDB in developing a research programme directly related to CSME.

Source: CDB (2004)
III. PROJECT LEVEL ASSESSMENTS

A. Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) Assessment

1. Project Parameters

The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery was formally established in April 1997 as a specialised organisation of CARICOM to coordinate and facilitate CARICOM positions for international trade and economic negotiations. One of its strategic responsibilities is the development and execution of a cohesive and effective negotiating strategy for the CARICOM region in four separate negotiating theatres (a) the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA); (b) the WTO “Doha Round”; (c) negotiations with the European Union for a Regional Economic Partnership; and (d) bilateral agreements for CARICOM with Canada, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

1.1. Project Design

The CRNM’s work is organised in six programme areas: (a) building regional negotiating capacity through training and technical assistance; (b) formulation on the basis of consultations with stakeholders of regional negotiating positions; (c) representation in negotiating fora; (d) research and studies to provide informed advice to negotiating teams; (e) resource mobilisation, project implementation and technical assistance; and (f) general services and administration.

The CRNM has received considerable assistance from external donors, including DFID, USAID, CDB and the IDB. The largest external donor is DFID under its technical assistance programme called CARICOM Trade Programme (CTP), which was developed following consultations with regional governments, CARICOM and other donor agencies. The programme has so far been implemented in two phases: (a) an initial project of £1.38 million from 1999 to 2002 and the current 4-year project of £1.6 million extending from 2002/03 to 2006/07.

The primary objective of the CTP is to build CARICOM’s technical capacity in order to participate effectively in the global economic system and to address the key trade policy issues in external trade negotiations. A related objective of the project is to increase awareness about key trade policy issues in the region and to promote participation from CARICOM governments, private sector associations and NGOs in external trade negotiations.

In designing the CTP, DFID explicitly considered the following issues: (a) the need for the project design to be synchronised with support from other donors (USAID, CIDA, CDB and the IDB); (b) the importance of increasing awareness about key trade policy issues in the region and building up participation from all stakeholders including private sector associations and NGOs in the external negotiations; and (c) the need to build sustainable longer-term capacity in trade policy in the region.

The first phase of the project comprised the following five elements: (a) a programme of technical studies related to key trade policy issues; (b) call-down technical expertise for trade negotiations; (c) a strategy to help CRNM improve linkages with its CARICOM
partners; (d) formal and informal training activities; and (e) provision of essential IT equipment.

The second phase of CTP is designed to: (a) assist the further identification of inputs needed to implement the CRNM’s strategic plan (2002/03 to 2006/07); (b) fund the positions of Senior adviser, EU-ACP; Intellectual Property Rights/Agriculture Adviser, and Regional Director in Geneva to handle WTO issues; and (c) co-finance the newly established Services Programme with the CDB and USAID.

1.2. Project Management and Monitoring

Management and monitoring of all DFID inputs under CTP I were managed by a Project Management Agency, which was responsible for (a) preparing forward work plans; (b) specification and sourcing of inputs (local and international); (c) design of study tours; and (d) preparation of regular financial statements and progress reports as required by DFID. The CRNM worked alongside the Project Management Agency and was responsible for prioritising and scoping project activities and for establishing selection and administration arrangements for the Research Associate Programme.

Quarterly monitoring reports were prepared by the Project Management Agency, in conjunction with the CRNM, setting out activities undertaken and progress towards achieving project outputs. In addition to the external Project Management Agency, DFID had its own Project Officer who was required to participate in regular round-table consultations with CRNM and its donor partners to ensure effective coordination.

Under CTP II programme management has been transferred to the newly created position of Director, Projects and Partnerships of the CRNM, who oversees all aspects of the programme. He coordinates and submits the six-monthly work plans and progress reports to DFIDC. He is also responsible for convening six-monthly programme meetings in which all donor partners participate. This new management structure has allowed for greater coordination with other donor activity within CRNM and for more effective communication between the recipient and DFIDC on programme management and monitoring issues. In addition, a management and monitoring structure within the target recipient, as opposed to an external management agency, has the potential to be more responsive to changing local conditions. As discussed later in this Report, one major highlight about the DFID’s programmes that are managed within the target recipient is their flexibility.

Annual reviews are carried out by the DFIDC office with a view to assessing progress towards achieving the programme’s purpose, recommending design modifications if necessary, and determining requirements for further support. An output-to-purpose review was undertaken at the end of CTP I, and a similar review is scheduled for the midterm of CTP II in 2005.

2. Project Assessment Indicators

From the inception of the project, it was acknowledged by DFID officials that evaluating the project’s impact and measuring its success in terms of achievable objectives would be problematic because of the scope and nature of the problems being addressed. However, indicators and performance targets (both qualitative and quantitative) were devised for goal and purpose level objectives in the logical framework.
In both phases, logical frameworks were used as the basis of the quarterly reports of CTP I and the six-monthly reports of CTP II. The logical framework assessed the performance of the goals, purpose, outputs and activities of DFID’s funding to the CRNM by means of objectively verifiable indicators (OVI) and means of verification (MOV) based on quantitative indicators. While the methodology for assessment remained similar over the two phases of the CTP project, there are differences in terms of specificity of assessment indicators. In CTP I, the overall goal was effective participation by CARICOM countries in hemispheric, regional and multilateral trade fora, contributing to a reduction in poverty and vulnerability to poverty. The OVI for this goal was 80 percent of performance targets in CRNM negotiating strategy for FTAA, post-Lomé and WTO 2000 achieved by the end of negotiations. The MOV was the project completion report and minutes of trade negotiations. The purpose of the aid was to build the capacity of the CRNM. The OVI for this purpose was that the CRNM would have timely access to clear policy papers, supporting information and call down expertise for post Lomé and WTO negotiations; a revised CRNM negotiating strategy agreed with CARICOM partners by March 2001; and 90% of performance targeted for Communication and Partnership Strategy (CPS) key objectives achieved by March 2001. There were also OVIs and MOVs for the agreed outputs of the CTP I. The target date for the design and implementation of the CPS was July 1999 with the recruitment of the Communication Director by March 1999. By February 2001, eight studies and eight workshops on key issues for post-Lomé and WTO 2000 negotiations and CRNM Research Associate internships were to be completed.

In CTP II the goal is defined as enhanced terms of trade negotiations contributing to economic development and growth in CARICOM countries. “Enhanced terms of trade negotiations” is a more ambitious goal than “strengthened capacity to participate in trade negotiations”. The former refers to an outcome: that of more favourable market access. The latter refers to the process of negotiations. CRNM has undoubtedly contributed to the strengthening the capacity of the Caribbean to participate in trade negotiations through its Research Associate internship, its research documents and briefs to Governments, its College of Experts meetings to help define negotiating options for the region and its education and outreach programmes to the private sector and civil society. It is premature at this stage to make any pronouncements as to whether CTP II could contribute to enhanced terms of trade negotiations in a scenario where the issues affecting Caribbean economies involve the transition from preferential trading arrangements and protected domestic markets to a liberalized trading environment.

It should be noted here that while implicit in the notion of economic development and growth is the reduction of poverty and vulnerability to poverty, there is no specific reference to poverty reduction in the goal of CTP II as there was in CTP I. The OVI for the goal remained the same as in the case of CTP I. The purpose however was no longer described as building capacity but to provide effective trade negotiating services for CARICOM. In terms of output, the CRNM was required to complete three studies and three major policy briefings each year. In addition, organisational structure, increased staff and technical working groups were to be established by December 2002. Moreover, the CRNM had certain commitments for communication and dialogue with the private sector and civil society and for developing closer working relationships between CRNM and CARICOM governments.
The administration of quantitative measurement of the performance of the work of the CRNM in relation to the goals, purposes and outputs determined by agreements between DFID and CRNM is straightforward and presents little, if any, organisational or strategic challenge to the CRNM or the CARICOM governments. Its value however is limited and does not satisfactorily measure the strategic qualitative contribution of trade negotiations to economic development and growth or poverty reduction in CARICOM countries, which are the CTP’s goals. This methodology is also limited in measuring the organisational effectiveness and efficiency of the CRNM. In order to determine whether the high level strategic goals of DFID’s aid to CRNM are being attained one has to supplement the quantitative assessment indicators with qualitative measurements. The problem is that the logical frameworks do not adequately address qualitative measurement issues. They must be supplemented by consultations with relevant stakeholders. This has been the practice of DFID, unlike many other donor agencies, and it is recommended that this practice be continued.

2.1. Relevance

The relevance of the CTP project can be assessed by (a) the extent to which the project was demand driven; (b) the degree of collaboration with which the project was designed; (c) the project’s consistency with the strategic objectives of both CRNM and DFID; and (d) feedback received from stakeholders including government/regional agencies, private sector organisations, non-governmental organisations and other donor agencies.

The project was designed following discussions with regional governments, relevant stakeholders and other donor agencies. The consensus of persons interviewed is that DFID’s project with the CRNM is demand driven. The CARICOM governments acknowledged the need for institutional capacity-building in trade policy and external negotiations and created the CRNM as the lead co-ordination body for external trade negotiations. Prior to the initiation of the DFID project, the CRNM’s Technical Director took the initiative in 1998 to discuss a programme of DFID-funded technical assistance focusing on specific short-term technical inputs to build CRNM’s capacity to deliver its negotiating mandate.

As a follow-up to the initiative of the CRNM, the DFIDC office, supported by a consultant, undertook discussions with the main stakeholder groups and donor agencies with a view to clarify key issues and avoid duplication with other donor groups. DFID then developed detailed proposals for a DFID-financed technical assistance project designed to build trade negotiating capacity, promote awareness about key trade policy issues and encourage participation from private sector organisations and NGOs. The design process was therefore geared towards ensuring relevance of the DFID funded project.

The core objectives of the project are fully consistent with the policy objectives of both the CRNM and DFID. At the time of inception, the Secretary of State for International Development, through the 1997 White Paper, had given high priority to building the capacity of developing countries to participate effectively in the global economic system. There was general agreement among informants that the objectives of the CRNM, Caribbean governments and stakeholders were also taken into account in designing the project.
Unlike most other donor agencies, DFID has insisted on gathering stakeholders’ views about the management and performance of the project. In this way, there is regular feedback on the relevance of the project. The feedback which the consultants received from CRNM and stakeholders was that the DFID’s project for the CRNM was highly relevant and was a model for other donor agencies to follow.

2.2. Performance

Performance of DFID’s project for the CRNM could be assessed in terms of the extent to which the funds were used to achieve the targets and objectives identified in the logical framework as well as the effectiveness of the actual management of the project.

Budgetary allocations for the period to date have been used and applied to outputs agreed. This reflects positively on the CRNM’s capacity to manage properly and produce the outputs required of the project. The CRNM has engaged the requisite staff, completed technical studies, produced required briefing papers to governments, established technical working groups, organised regular workshops and reflection groups and have had requisite consultations with wider stakeholders.

The specific goals set by the logical framework for the project are (a) effective participation by CARICOM countries in hemispheric, regional and multilateral trade for a contributing to a reduction in poverty and vulnerability to poverty in the first phase; and (b) enhanced terms of trade negotiations contributing to economic development and growth in CARICOM countries in the second phase.

Our consultations found that these goals were ambitiously set to target not only the work of the CRNM, but also the entire regional negotiating structure that is led not by the CRNM but by various governments of the region. It must be noted that the CRNM’s role is not to lead the negotiations but rather to co-ordinate and support the negotiating process of regional governments. Individual governments, of course with inputs from the CRNM, have a large role to play in the actual negotiations. Thus, while the CRNM can facilitate effective participation by CARICOM countries in external trade negotiations, it cannot enforce such participation.

A related difficulty is that trade policy and negotiating capacity in most CARICOM countries is very weak and undeveloped. Moreover, regional policies on important trade issues are not yet developed. Thus, the environment within which the CRNM has to develop and execute a cohesive and effective negotiating strategy for the CARICOM region presents tremendous challenges for the CRNM.

The second issue raised was that the linkage between poverty reduction and the project was at best tenuous or spurious. Also, there was no guarantee that enhanced terms of trade negotiations would lead to economic development. Much depended on whether the capacity existed in the region to take advantage of improved market access. Moreover, within the Caribbean context, changes in the global trade rules would likely involve the loss of traditional trade preferences which in turn would have a negative impact on economic welfare within the region.

The point was also made to us that there are inherent weaknesses in an evaluation of the performance of one segment of a broader integrative programme of projects undertaken by the CRNM. CRNM has advocated the need for an assessment of its work on the basis
of its overall work programme, something which it claims could only be achieved with effective donor coordination. In our view, this proposition is a sensible and practical manner of evaluating trade related capacity building programmes.

With respect to the performance of the CRNM’s programme, the feedback received by us from discussions with relevant stakeholders and access to assessments undertaken by international donor agencies confirms that the CRNM is playing a very important and effective role in providing support for negotiations that are of considerable importance to the countries of the region and critical to their capacity to compete in the global economy. The general consensus is that the CRNM is very responsive, useful and accessible, and is producing very valuable work.

One non-governmental organisation, while recognising the useful work of the CRNM, strongly advocated that a greater effort could be made by the CRNM to engage them in a more meaningful manner in developing and implementing its work programme. In addition, the DFIDC in an internal memorandum made the useful observation that consumers in the Caribbean region lacked voice and that the consumer interest in trade reforms and international trade negotiations ought to be enhanced.

The weaknesses of the CRNM we perceived have stemmed from its newness, lack of legal personality and limited human resources of the organisation. The CRNM is a small organisation established with a full agenda focused on substantive economic and negotiating issues and building partnerships. A new organisation usually takes some time before it can achieve the desired level of organisational cohesiveness and institutional capacity. Despite its limited history it has already experienced a change of leadership which in a small organisation must have affected its progress.

In addition, current procedures for providing donor support are unusually cumbersome, with funding agreements being formally with the Government of Barbados on behalf of the CRNM. Multiple monitoring and reporting procedures for the different donors present challenges for a small organisation like CRNM. We encountered evidence of increasing communication among donors. We recommend that there is greater scope for the donors to harmonise their review and management arrangements.

2.3. Impact

Success and impact of the DFID’s project for the CRNM is measured in terms of the level of activity at the trade negotiating fora, the inclusiveness of the policy process, the research capacity engendered within the project and the institutional building impact.

DFID’s programme of support to the CRNM provides resources to assist in meeting the costs of (a) fees and travel expenses for the Senior Director who is also responsible for overseeing the region’s efforts in the ACP-EU negotiations; (b) fees and travel expenses for the WTO Director/Geneva representative; (c) fees and travel expenses for the Technical Adviser on Intellectual Property and Agriculture (SPS); and (d) call-down expertise.

It is difficult to measure the extent to which DFID’s inputs have impacted on the region’s performance in the trade negotiations at the WTO, FTAA and with the EU. However, stakeholders and the CRNM have agreed that DFID has played a key role in financing strategic studies and raising the profile of the CRNM in the region. The studies
have been done mainly by a combination of regional and international academics. Generally they are timely and informative. At times however the studies, though informative, lack the depth of analysis and relevance needed to guide the trade negotiators on negotiating options. However, studies done by consultants with experience in actual international trade negotiations tend to produce the more relevant perspectives and analyses.

According to the CRNM, DFID’s flexible approach with respect to the use of its funds facilitated participation by its experts at trade negotiations and its coverage of CRNM’s activities was more expansive than other donor agencies.

DFID’s funding of the CRNM professional training programme in the year 2000 was widely acknowledged as visionary and successful in building trade negotiation capacity. This programme was responsible for training a cadre of trade negotiation professionals and exposed them to a ten-month period of attachment at the CRNM and an international organisation as well as exposure to actual international trade negotiations. This internship programme has benefited the private sector in that most of the graduates are now employed with companies in the region in areas relating to market access and trade negotiations. In addition, the private sector as a group within individual countries and within the region is now taking a more active role in international trade negotiations with the active support of the CRNM.

2.4. Sustainability

The sustainability of the CTP’s project, that is, the ability to be sustained through national efforts, is inextricably linked with its relevance, performance and the ability of the regional governments to secure the necessary resources to support the project. The CTP project, though originally conceived to be of a temporary duration, has been extended because of its relevance and performance. Governments have recognised the need for coordination and harmonisation of external trade policies and the work of the CTP is widely acknowledged to be sustainable.

2.5. Poverty and Gender Linkages

The consensus of informants, with which we agree, is that the CTP does not lend itself to any direct linkage to poverty reduction and gender equity.

2.6. A Summing Up

The lessons learned about this project are as follows:

- Stakeholder consultations are an essential ingredient to ensuring relevance, success and impact, proper monitoring and evaluation and sustainability of trade related capacity building programmes;
- DFID’s flexible approach to the use of funds, unlike other donor agencies, enhances the relevance and appeal of the CTP;
- The logical frameworks should be developed in consultation with the recipient of trade related capacity building programmes and should be directly related to realistic goals;
Donor coordination and harmonisation are important ingredients in ensuring the success of trade related capacity building programmes;

Trade related capacity building programmes to target poverty reduction strategies and gender equity should be more directly focused.

**Box 2.1**

**CARICOM Trade Programme: Strengths and Opportunities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding size ensured important contribution to institutional capacity</td>
<td>Weak trade policy links to pro-poor policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flexibility of funding provided demonstration effect to other donors</td>
<td>Log-frame more closely related to programme components as integral part of project design and implementation process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of funding ensured coverage of activities otherwise not covered by other donors</td>
<td>Complement trade policy support with capacity development for trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged stakeholders in project design ensured private sector participation</td>
<td>Provide support to assessment methodologies and empirical analysis where CRNM may be deficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptive to donor coordination activities on an informal level</td>
<td>Ensure intern programme participants remain in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amenable to programme rather than project-specific approach adopted by other donors ensured RNM programme cohesion</td>
<td>Internship programme constrained by resource capacity of RNM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internship programme viewed as highly successful in capacity building</td>
<td>Internship programme constrained by resource capacity of RNM</td>
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</table>

**B. CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)**

**1. Project Parameters**

The CSME began with revisions to the Treaty of Chaguaramas at the 1989 Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and, since then, nine protocols have been developed to move the CSME process forward.\(^9\) The implementation process has, nevertheless, been slow and the Caribbean region has been unable to effectively respond to the rapidly changing institutional and regulatory arrangements in the global economy. Of particular concern has been the inability of the region to effectively integrate its regional and national interests and priorities in such areas as the international trade agendas that are consistent with the legal and regulatory position of member states. Considerable work remains to be completed before the legal and regulatory position of CARICOM member states are compatible with one another and the regional agenda. For instance, there are presently about 350 restrictions on the movements of capital, labour and goods that need to be removed and approximately 75 major pieces of legislation that need to be amended before the CSME can move forward. Moreover, the nine protocols remain at various stages of settlement. This situation has complicated external trade negotiations under the CRNM.

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\(^9\) The protocols address: the institutional arrangements and procedures for critical decision making in CARICOM; the rights of establishment, provision of services and movement of capital in the community; industrial policy; trade policy; agricultural policy; transport policy; disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors; competition policy, subsidies and dumping; disputes settlement.
1.1. Project Design

In recognition of the challenges facing the CSME, DFID provided £153,000 for a study to assess the region’s support needs on the CSME. The objective of the study was to help identify the priority areas for action for the CSME within the region in light of the changing external environment. Of the total committed amount, £52,585 were allocated in fiscal year 2002/03 fiscal year, and £100,182 were allocated in fiscal year 2003/04. The study was conducted by a team headed by Havelock Brewster, which submitted its report to the Caribbean Community Secretariat (CCS) in June 2003 (Brewster et al., 2003).

The team were charged with three main tasks: (a) indicate short and medium-term priority areas for the implementation of the CSME to bring it into operation; (b) review national and regional institutional arrangements for each priority area and the capacity and mechanisms available to implement the CSME; and (c) make recommendations for moving forward the process of implementing the CSME in the short, medium and long run in the context of the external environment, and other relevant integration experiences such as the European Union. The results were to provide a roadmap for implementing the CSME by December 2005.

1.2. Project Management

The study was designed as a technical assistance project for the CCS. It was initially limited to only a few weeks, but recognition of the complexity of the work eventually led to its extension well beyond the time originally planned for the study. In the case of harmonisation of legislation, for example, it was estimated that some 400 instruments would be affected, a task that was undermined by the lack of a comprehensive listing of the instruments that would need to be changed in each jurisdiction.

The complexity of the analysis limited the ability of the study to draw up of an action agenda that included quantitatively precise and credible estimates of the resources needed. Additionally, parallel studies by the CCS and external consultants necessitated adjustments to the Brewster team study so that it complemented rather than duplicated with others, including those undertaken under the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

The study appears to have been conducted independently of any direction or management by the DFIDC office. Project monitoring was therefore not undertaken by the DFIDC office.

2. Project Assessment Indicators

2.1. Relevance

DFID’s support of the CSME met a relatively high test of relevance since it provided informed analysis and direction in an area that is central to the regional needs of the Caribbean countries in moving forward in the international trade negotiations through the CRNM. DFID was aware of the considerable sensitivity within the CARICOM institutions to donor involvement in the determination of the Community’s priorities. As pointed out in the Brewster et al study (2003), “It was recognised that the Caribbean Community, like any other inter-government organisation, would have sensitive or
classified information to which donor agencies would not automatically have access. They should not therefore get involved in situations where confidentiality may be pre-empted, including, for example, the funding of established positions where there is a possibility of the loyalty of incumbents being called into question.” Possible lack of knowledge of confidential material by DFID therefore limited its ability to develop substantive project assessment indicators beyond what are considered output indicators. Additionally, implementation of the CSME has been viewed as a precursor to the effective operation of the CRNM before the WTO Doha negotiations and United States (FTA and bilateral) and the European Community (ACP-EU) negotiations. Support of the process is therefore seen as highly relevant.

2.2. Performance
The ability of DFID and other donors to target areas where there are deficiencies in the Community is closely related to the coordination of that support among donor agencies so as to avoid overlapping or competitive activities within the CSME process. At the same time, DFID should have been able to ensure that its funding was used effectively and that the objectives of the funding for the Brewster team study conformed to its priorities and timetable. We were not aware of any performance reviews by the DFIDC office for the present study. It would have been useful to assess whether the outcomes of the study matched the desired funding objective, and how support for the study provided a coordinated response to the needs of the CCS in light of the CCS’s own work and that of other donors such as the CDB.

2.3. Impact
The study found that the CCS had taken a number of important decisions on the CSME, including preparatory work at the national and regional levels covering diagnostic and informational studies and the drafting of legal instruments and donor assistance project proposals. Not all of the decisions had been implemented, according to the study, though there had been more progress on issues involving the movement of goods. But much of the work in that area pre-dated the CSME mandate.

2.4. Sustainability
The study contributed in a sustainable way to operationalising the CSME.

2.5. Poverty and Gender Linkages
While regionalisation policies are not generally linked to pro-poor policies, in the Caribbean context the existence of divergent levels of development among CARICOM member states raises issues related to the distribution of benefits between the most developed and least developed member countries. This issue has been addressed in a recent paper by Jason Jackson (2004), as well as by the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (2001). The implementation of mechanisms designed to offset possible polarisation of countries within the region could lower the incidence of unequal distribution of benefits arising from regionalisation and ultimately help to alleviate income inequality in the region. The development of instruments designed to redress inequalities could also motivate the more resistant member countries to move forward with the CSME.
2.6. A Summing Up

- The study provided a timely intervention in identifying steps needed to implement CSME.
- The study was well-received by stakeholders as an important contribution to the CSME process.
- Assessment of the Brewster et al (2002) study could provide guidelines for future support to the CSME process.
- Guidelines for performance review on implementation support could adopt the indicators used by Trade Policy Review (TPR)-based benchmarks.
- The study provided support to assessment methodologies and empirical analysis where the CCS may be deficient.
- There are opportunities to ameliorate distributional inequalities among member countries through pro-poor policies supporting activities and instruments designed to reduce and eliminate inequalities between the less developed and more developed CARICOM member countries that could arise from regionalism in the Caribbean context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timely intervention in supporting steps needed to implement CSME</td>
<td>Adopt measures based on Trade Policy Review (TPR) benchmarks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewster et al (2003) study was well-received by stakeholders as an important contribution to the CSME process</td>
<td>Assessment of Brewster et al (2002) study could provide guidelines for future support to CSME.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In allocation of aid, DFID was sensitive to authority of Community in determining its own priorities</td>
<td>Performance review should be provided for such studies to ensure that outcomes are consistent with funding objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities to ameliorate concerns over distributional inequalities among member countries.</td>
<td>Pro-poor policies could be implemented through supporting activities and instruments designed to reduce and eliminate inequalities resulting from regionalism in the Caribbean context.</td>
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</table>

C. Business Linkages Challenge Fund (BLCF)

1. Project Parameters

The BLCF is a global programme designed by DFID to promote private sector growth and poverty reduction in certain selected countries in Africa and the Caribbean. It was launched in 2001 and runs until 2005. It takes the form of a competitive cost-sharing grant scheme which encourages and supports the formation of business linkages by enterprises in developing countries with each other and/or with international partners. The linkages must involve an investment of resources by all members of the linkage –
skills, technology, information, facilities, supplies and access to markets. The linkages, in turn, must bring enhanced competitiveness and generate clear benefits for the poor.

1.1. Project Design

Bidding is competitive and grants are allocated according to the degree to which bids meet BLCF criteria and objectives. Funding comes from DFID. The BLCF offers grants of between £50,000 and £1,000,000 for each successful applicant.

Countries of Operation - The Caribbean countries which benefit from the BLCF are not restricted to Commonwealth countries and include Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent in the Caribbean. These countries have been identified by DFID as the poorer of the Caribbean countries. The participation of the selected Caribbean countries in the BLCF commenced with the second funding round in 2001.

1.2. Project Management and Monitoring

The eligibility criteria include (a) linkages that have at least one privately owned, for-profit, enterprise registered in one of the target countries including the United Kingdom; and (b) satisfactory financial records including at least three years of unqualified audited accounts.

Linkages Eligible for Funding - Eligible linkages will (a) involve or facilitate links between two or more enterprises, (b) increase the competitiveness and viability of participating enterprises so as to enhance employment opportunities and increase exports or domestic sales, (c) contribute to creating improved livelihoods and opportunities for poor people, (d) share the linkage costs between the BLCF and the participating entities, with bidder contribution being at least equal to the BLCF grant, (e) be sustainable after the BLCF grant has been utilised, (f) be innovative, (g) avoid negative impact on non-participating local businesses and avoid social or environmental damage, (h) be compatible with DFID policy in the country in question, and (i) have a maximum duration of three years.

Eligible Costs - Grants are given to cover costs associated with the development and implementation of the linkage - for example, fees for transfer and use of related skills, costs of linkage establishment, costs of travel and accommodation, costs of licensing, royalties, franchising, training course fees and secondment costs, brochures and related promotion costs, costs for quality and standards.

Management - The Fund is managed globally by Deloitte Emerging Markets. Within the Caribbean, Deloitte Emerging Markets has an agency agreement with Caribbean Export Development Agency to promote and administer the application process in respect of the Windward Islands, Haiti and Dominican Republic. Deloitte & Touche local offices have responsibility for Jamaica and Belize.

During our field work we encountered evidence of inadequate communication between Deloitte and Touche local offices and the DFID offices in the Caribbean on issues relating to the management of the BCLF. Care should be taken to ensure that whenever external agencies are engaged to manage DFID’s trade capacity building programmes, there are procedures to ensure that DFID’s offices in the Caribbean be kept adequately informed.
**Application Process** - The BLCF application process operates on a six-monthly cycle with two bidding and funding rounds each year. Bids for BLCF grants are submitted, appraised and accepted/rejected according to set timetables and using official BLCF forms.

The first step is for applicants to fill in a BLCF Enquiry Form and send it to their local BLCF office. Second, after discussions with BLCF management, applicants may submit a "Concept Note". Based on a competitive and independent evaluation they may then be invited to complete a full application.

In the Concept Note, applicants are required to provide basic information about their organisation, the proposed linkage, consortium members, objectives of the linkage, the service/product or outcome proposed, the time scale and the management as well as details of key results expected, costs and funding requirements. They have to show that the linkage is innovative, commercially viable, and will continue to function after the grant has been utilised.

Concept Notes are assessed by the BLCF independent Assessment Panel in London against the eligibility criteria set out above. Those selected to proceed to the second stage must complete even more detailed Application forms, including a financial budget with all the project costs and financial sources. A full breakdown of the project’s budget on an annual basis, including costs of administration, monitoring and evaluation is required. The evaluation of Applications is carried out by technical experts and the independent Assessment Panel.

**Caribbean profile** - Within the Caribbean region, 137 enquiry forms were received by Caribbean Export Development Agency in respect of Rounds 2 to 7. A total of eight grants have been made in the total sum of £1.836 million for Caribbean applicants. The total global grant disbursement for all Rounds is £16 million. The projects funded in the Caribbean include:

- an organic cocoa project for premium organic chocolate production linking a growers’ association representing 6,000 cocoa farmers in Dominican Republic with a large European chocolate processor with the goal of producing high quality “fair trade organic” chocolate for European markets;
- an organic herb production system which provides a linkage between a company in Saint Lucia that produces herbal drinks and remedies and local farmer groups to increase the local content of herbal products produced in Saint Lucia;
- a project which provides a linkage between an Information Technology training company and other IT partners to develop ICT training and professional certification for disadvantaged groups in Jamaican society;
- a linkage between Green & Blacks, a specialist UK chocolate company, and a cocoa growing cooperative of 800 cocoa farmers in Belize to expand cocoa production by Maya communities in Belize to reach commercially viable volumes;
- a linkage to establish an Arts Management Company, Saint Lucia Arts and Festival Company to manage a series of performing and visual arts festivals and mobilise investment to erect a permanent venue;
• a linkage to expand organic pineapple farming and processing involving 60 farmers on an Amerindian reservation in collaboration with a French marketing partner;
• a linkage between a range of distributors in Haiti and Proctor and Gamble to develop commercial marketing systems for a water purification product aimed at low income groups; and
• a linkage between the Jamaica Hotel and Tourism Association and a range of local tourism companies to collectively market smaller scale tourism companies and encourage tourists to look beyond the all-inclusive resorts so that the benefits of tourism have a broader impact on the local economy.

Monitoring and evaluation - According to Fund Managers, Deloitte Emerging Markets, their approach has been to minimise the transaction costs for the private sector of engaging with the BLCF, keeping the application process simple and accessible, while seeking to limit the amount of time spent on uncompetitive applications.

Monitoring and evaluation of the BLCF has focused on budget tracking and monitoring project activities, with an increasing emphasis on project impact as projects mature. The local offices in the Caribbean report to Deloitte Emerging Markets who in turn do their own evaluation. Deloitte Emerging Markets has begun a programme of ‘case studies’ in which each grantee reports its performance against impact indicators in its initial application.

DFID’s Caribbean offices (both regional and country) have no identified role in the monitoring and evaluation of BLCF’s projects in the region, or even the programme as a whole. They even appear to have limited access to information about the projects and the programme’s overall management in the region.

2. Project Assessment Indicators

2.1. Relevance

Conceptually, the Business Linkages Challenge Fund has a high degree of relevance to needs of the region and to DFID’s overall strategy for the Caribbean because of its direct linkage to pro-poor policies, its focus on competitiveness and sustainability of applicants and its emphasis on developing new market opportunities.

There is need for greater communication between the Fund Managers and stakeholders with respect to the design, management and monitoring of the Fund. The Deloitte representatives in the Caribbean (in the Caribbean Export Development Agency) have suggested a number of changes if the Fund is to be more responsive to the needs of the region’s private sector. Caribbean businesses do not easily identify with pro-poor programmes; require prompt access to and disbursement of financing; and are uncomfortable with application procedures that are seen to be too bureaucratic.

2.2. Performance, Impact and Sustainability

These observations draw from the fact that only a small percentage of BLCF funds granted have actually been received by Caribbean applicants. The requirement for matching funds and unqualified audited accounts from the applicant turned out to be a major challenge for Caribbean companies. In addition, had greater feedback on the
assessment of applications been given to the local offices they could have provided better guidance to prospective applicants.

CEDA came to realise that applicants needed considerable front end engagement and support, to help them through the application process. It is argued that this role is more suited to a public sector organisation rather than a private sector organisation.

Some attempt should have been made by the Fund Managers to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of the Fund having regard to eligibility criteria. From the Caribbean perspective, there is need for improved communication between the Fund Managers and DFID’s offices in the region in terms of the management of the fund.

2.3. Poverty and Gender Linkages

CEDA agreed that the requirements of the Fund constituted an important learning curve. Initially, emphasis was placed on poverty linkages of the project. However, it turned out that many of the projects with poverty linkages lacked sustainability. CEDA made proposals for a separate Caribbean Fund immediately after Round Two (which was the first round in which the Caribbean participated). This proposal was not found to be feasible.

2.4. A Summing Up

The major lessons from the project are as follows:

- Where external agencies are used to execute trade related capacity building programmes, there should be procedures for adequate communication with local DFID’s offices with respect to the management and evaluation of such programmes to ensure cohesiveness within the regional assistance programme;
- Where trade related capacity building programmes have pro-poor linkages, cognisance should be taken of the requirement for adequate front-end support for the poor to access such facilities;
- Insufficient attention seems to have been paid to the business needs of the poor, in particular the weakness of their administrative and financial capacity to meet the requirements of the BCLF;
- Greater feedback from the Independent Assessment Panel to the local offices would have helped them to provide the kind of front-end support to prospective applicants that was required in the circumstances.

### Box 2.3
**Business Linkages Challenge Fund: Strengths and Opportunities**

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<th>Strengths</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focuses on supply-side trade capacity building of SMEs</td>
<td>DFID’s Policy Division management of Deloitte could consult with DFIDC re. project monitoring and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits the poor by linking commercial enterprises to small farmers and micro-enterprises.</td>
<td>Deloitte Fund management offices in Jamaica and Belize should improve their outreach; Deloitte’s Barbados office unaware of programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for selection of projects include magnitude of direct impact on poverty</td>
<td>Caribbean Exports in Eastern Caribbean could promote programme more aggressively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotes management disciplines of micro-enterprises through monitoring process</td>
<td>The programme needs to be revamped in light of the mid-term review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on developing new market opportunities</td>
<td>Caribbean has received small share of BLCF disbursements to date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on sustainability of beneficiary companies</td>
<td>Promotion of the programme in the region should be renewed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. Cluster Competitiveness Programme

1. Project Parameters

Jamaica has a low international competitiveness ranking. Out of 79 countries Jamaica ranked 60th in 2002 in terms of its macroeconomic indicators, while in terms of microeconomic indicators it was 59th down from 40th in the previous year (World Economic Forum, 2003). The macroeconomic indicators cover (a) openness to international trade and finance; (b) the government’s budget and regulation; (c) development of financial markets; (d) quality of infrastructure; (e) quality of technology; (f) quality of business management; (g) labour market flexibility; and (h) quality of judicial and political institutions. The microeconomic indicators measure the current level of productivity. Among the negative factors influencing Jamaica’s macro and micro-rankings have been a high interest rate, the exchange rate appreciation during the 1990s, rising crime rates, strong labour unions that have pushed wage hikes above productivity improvements, high tax rates, and the high cost and inadequacies of utilities.

In recent years that has been a widespread application of a business-based model designed to improve the competitiveness of industries through the creation of industrial clusters. These clusters consist of a set of industries related through buyer-supplier and supplier-buyer relationships, or by common technologies, common buyers or distribution channels, or common labour pools. In Jamaica three industry clusters were selected as models for the Government of Jamaica (GOJ), namely, agribusiness, tourism and entertainment and culture, with the aim of increasing the competitiveness of those selected clusters. DFIDC allocated £572,000 between 2002/03 and 2003/04 to the project from its UK/ Jamaica development programme. Funding was also provided by USAID and the Government of Jamaica (GOJ), and additional funding was to be collected from private sector participants during the programme period.

1.1. Project Design

The project has aimed to improve Jamaica’s international competitiveness as a means of achieving sustained poverty reduction by (a) directly facilitating an increase in the competitiveness and productivity of the three industrial clusters and at least sixty SMEs; and (b) facilitating improvements in the enabling environment for enterprise development by assisting the private sector in prioritising and articulating their policy level demands to government and other stakeholders (DFID, 2001c). The purpose of the project specifically targeted sustainable increases in the competitiveness of the selected industrial clusters.

There were four major components to the project: (a) build a national competitiveness mindset by facilitating development of a shared vision and strategy at the cluster and national level by promoting wide private-public sector dialogue and preparing a national competitiveness benchmarking report; (b) strengthen competitive clusters by working with three or more clusters to enhance their competitiveness strategies at the intra- and inter-firm levels as well as their analyses of their current and relative market position; (c) enhance service provision by supporting local and regional capacity to provide strategic cluster competitiveness services on a sustainable basis; and (d) improve the enabling environment for business by helping stakeholders to be more effective in their advocacy for an enhanced strategic environment.
The expected outputs from the project were as follows: (a) actively involve key government and private sector stakeholders in the cluster competitiveness approach; (b) work with the three selected clusters and sixty SMEs to enhance their competitiveness; (c) enhance capacity to support cluster competitiveness work at the local and regional levels; and (d) redirect business priorities towards more competitive activities.

1.2. Project Management and Monitoring

The Jamaica Exporters’ Association (JEA) has led the project and co-ordinates the different stakeholders. JEA is a nonprofit private sector organisation dedicated to the promotion of Jamaica’s export growth and its sustainable development. On the GOJ’s side, a new Task Force under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Affairs named the Jamaica Trade and Adjustment Team (JTAT) was created in February 2001. Its task was to assess the adequacy of industrial strategies and institutions and develop a new trade policy in light of the recent trade agreements. A new trade policy was subsequently developed to promote export diversification through the facilitation of market penetration, import substitution, and increased capital flows from overseas assets. Funding by the European Union supported JTAT’s drafting of a trade adjustment project that identified a range of initiatives to facilitate private sector adjustment and competitiveness for which donor funding is to be sought.

The JCCP has been implemented by the JEA with the help of a Cluster Competitiveness Project Coordinator. OnTheFrontier, an international consultancy team, has acted as Project Manager and has led the technical assistance and operational management. The JEA’s Project Coordinator was to create a Competitiveness Unit within the JEA/PSOJ with the responsibility for day-to-day implementation and management of the programme.

The project has involved collaboration with a wider group of stakeholders, including government agencies, the Jamaica Business Development Centre (JBDC), labour unions, training, research and academic institutions, and other private sector organisations. Regular meetings of the Cluster Steering Committee were held to facilitate the coordinated representation of cluster interests.

2. Project Assessment Indicators

Two DFID reviews were conducted over the project cycle, one at the midpoint of the project and another one at the end. The mid-term review found that participating cluster firms valued the help received as a means of increasing cooperation and enhancing their competitiveness in a global economy. The Prime Minister supported the programme. Two shortcomings were (a) the lack of cash contributions from participating firms and (b) inability to establish a permanent cluster development resource, that is, a local Competitiveness Unit to serve Jamaican SMEs.

The mid-term review underscored the need to accelerate knowledge transfer to cluster firms. It also suggested that the JEA and the JCCP Management Board take a greater lead in developing a business plan for a Competitiveness Unit. The unit would be established as an autonomous unit outside the public sector.
2.1. Relevance

Jamaica has suffered from a lack of competitiveness at both the macro and micro levels. Improvements in the macroeconomic environment, however, need to accompany those at the micro-level through the cluster development programme. Otherwise, conditions surrounding businesses related to exchange rate competitiveness, the legal and regulatory environment, infrastructural conditions and costs, and taxation policies will not be conducive to industry-level growth.

The worldwide growth of industry and regional clusters and business networks has been impressive, and the Jamaican cluster development project is another example of this. The inventory of clusters by the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness at Harvard Business School currently details 169 clusters in developing countries and 664 in industrialised countries. Yet little, if any, attempt has been made so far to gather systematic information about the policies and practices of these clusters, especially for those that have been developed independently of USAID support. Lack of conformity about the design, objectives, methodology, and even definition of clusters have all contributed to the difficulty of systematising information about them, especially quantitative information about competitiveness programme costs and outcomes.

Supporting economic policies from national and local governments are an integral part of all competitiveness programmes. Developing countries that have until recently adopted inward-looking import substitution regimes have had to implement so-called first-generation reforms of macroeconomic and sector policies as their cluster policy components. In contrast, countries that have adopted outward-oriented and private sector led economic growth strategies have enabled the operation of market signals, and instead implemented policies to remove administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to private sector activities. In these countries, the cluster policy components have been second-generation reforms aimed at eliminating obstacles in their regulatory and institutional environments inhibiting private sector activities.

2.2. Performance

The project review found that objectives set out by the competitiveness initiative during the first two years of DFID’s involvement had been met: (a) key government and private sector stakeholders were actively involved in the cluster competitiveness approach and supported its continued expansion; (b) two clusters had been organised and over 120 SMEs were working effectively to enhance their competitiveness; and (c) priority changes were being achieved in the business enabling environment. The reviews recommended that the third target cluster on entertainment be folded into the tourism cluster to deepen staff work in agriculture and increase their efforts to promote knowledge transfer.

2.3. Impact

The mid-term review noted the need to collate more accurate and detailed information regarding the number of firms by type and workers in each extended cluster and the number of workers directly employed in participating cluster firms. One of the difficulties of assessing clusters is the long gestation period needed for them to significantly influence competitiveness in a meaningful and measurable manner. Indeed it has been suggested 20 to 30 years is likely to be an appropriate gestation period for
clusters to have an impact on competitiveness. Unfortunately there are no worldwide programmes that have been in existence long enough to provide measurable indicators. Nevertheless, there are benchmarks used for both microeconomic and macroeconomic rankings of competitiveness of countries world-wide and these benchmarks should be used at the industry-level in Jamaica in order to assess the fundamental impact of the industry-level clusters. The link between these benchmarks and cluster effectiveness, however, remains tenuous.

2.4. Sustainability

The mid-term report proposed the extension of the JCCP to further its capacity and ensure its sustainability. It also suggested the need for an extension that ensured donor harmonisation on the competitiveness initiative.

In June 2004 DFIDC officials recommended that DFID commit a further £600,000 over two years from August 2004 to July 2006 for the next stage of the competitiveness initiative. It found that in its pilot phase the JCCP had proven to be a highly effectively way of improving firm-level growth, and that Jamaica needed institutions to maintain efforts to improve competitiveness at the firm and national levels. The evidence cited for the effectiveness of the pilot project, however, rested principally on the enthusiasm of businesses and government officials towards the project, rather than any concrete performance indicators.

2.5. Poverty and Gender Linkages

The project has been designed to support DFID’s objectives set out in the first and second White Papers and the target strategy paper Halving World Poverty by 2015. According to the project paper (DFID, 2001), “DFID recognise[s] the need to collaborate with Government, the private sector, civil society and other international development partners in order to reduce poverty. DFID is committed to working to manage globalisation in the interests of poor people by minimising its negative impacts and maximising the opportunities it presents through the promotion of enterprise and economic diversification to boost economic growth. This is necessary to achieve a sustained reduction in absolute poverty levels as well as lessen vulnerability to poverty.” It is however not clear from the project paper how the project specifically targets poverty alleviation through the suggested pro-poor policies, other than by targeting exports of participating SMEs that could impact on poverty through employment generation of low income groups.

Cluster designs directed towards poverty alleviation have tended to focus on micro- and small-scale enterprises that have generally operated in the informal sectors of developing countries. These types of clusters have tended to succeed when combined with clusters of transnational corporations; without them, they have only been able to compete locally under import-substitution policies because of their high cost structures. An example of this situation is where the weakness of SMEs and micro-enterprise activity in the informal sector of an economy has been a major impediment to the development of private sector development efforts (Lord, 2003).

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10 For a recent review of non-USAID programmes on international competitiveness using the cluster based approach, see Lord (2003), available at www.montaguelord.com
2.6. A Summing Up

- The cluster competitiveness programme successfully enhanced competitiveness by reducing costs and building capacity through firm cooperation.
- So-called ‘second generation’ economic reforms should not be overlooked in the development of the competitiveness programme.
- There is a further need to built institutional capability through the Competitiveness Unit with staff who would be trained in the development and promotion of business relationships across related enterprise activities.
- A variety of loan and technical assistance instruments, such as grants, are successful in working directly with the private sector, especially in cluster-related activities.
- There is a need for further development of strategic alliances between public and private sectors.
- The project has attracted interest in the use of clusters in other industries, and new entrants into existing ones.
- There is a question about sustainability because the benefits of competitiveness projects, and clusters in particular, are not immediately evident.
- Sustainability can be enhanced by multiple and government-private sector funding, as well as having multiple companies within a cluster.
- Caution must be exercised to prevent private or public sector participants from perceiving that one party has too much influence on the other.
- It is generally difficult to measure success of failure of clusters using benchmarks and indicators related to competitiveness, but benchmarks should be developed for project monitoring and evaluation based on the same benchmarks used to rank the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successfully enhanced competitiveness by reducing costs and building capacity through firm cooperation</td>
<td>So-called ‘second generation’ economic reforms should not be overlooked in the development of competitiveness programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built institutional capability through Competitiveness Unit with trained staff</td>
<td>A variety of loan and technical assistance instruments, such as grants, are successful in working directly with the private sector, especially in cluster-related activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed strategic alliance between public and private sectors</td>
<td>Successful programmes go beyond policy support to promote the production of high value goods and services, and clusters could be an effective element in this strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracted interest in use of clusters in other industries, and new entrants into ones</td>
<td>Need for sustainability of projects because benefits of competitiveness projects, and clusters in particular, are not immediately evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability ensured by multiple and government-private sector funding, as well as companies within cluster</td>
<td>Caution must be exercised to prevent private or public sector participants from perceiving that one party has too much influence on the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difficult to measure success of failure of clusters using benchmarks and indicators related to competitiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
competitiveness of Jamaica relative to other countries.

- Ultimately, a successful programme will go beyond policy support to promote the production of high value goods or services, and clusters could be an effective element in this strategy.

E. Tourism Challenge Fund

1. Project Parameters

The Jamaica Tourism Challenge Fund (JTCF) was established in September 2001 with a project budget of £595,000. Its aim was to develop a mechanism with the objective of stimulating profitable partnerships between private sector organisations, for-profit and non-profit. The intention was that such partnerships should increase the capacity of the tourism sector to provide more income generating and employment opportunities for poor people. The ultimate goal was to enhance the positive impact of the tourism sector in Jamaica on poor people by promoting links between larger businesses in the industry and micro and small-scale enterprises.

The expected outputs were increased participation of local communities and poor people in the tourism sector; enhanced skills, confidence and motivation to improve the competitiveness of local products and services; and increased volume and quality of local goods and services consumed by the tourist sector without detrimental impact on the environment.

1.1. Project Design

The Fund was set up to provide grant funding, in a competitive and transparent manner, against clearly defined criteria. The Fund was developed following design work carried out by independent consultants and extensive consultations with private sector organisations engaged in the tourism industry as well as with the Government of Jamaica. It sought to address many of the problems identified in the Government of Jamaica’s draft Master Plan for Sustainable Tourism. It also sought to support DFID’s policy objectives of promoting access of poor people to work opportunities and markets. It was intended that the Fund would be reviewed by DFIDC after the first year of operation and there would be an independent output to purpose review after two years.

1.2. Project Management and Monitoring

The Fund is managed by a Fund Manager (Development Options) which was appointed following competitive tender. A local Assessment Panel was established to assist in selecting project concept notes to be supported by the Fund. A JTCF grant to any single project was intended to be between £5,000 and £50,000. Application rounds were to be arranged on a six-monthly cycle. Each round involved two stages: the submission of a brief PCN by the applicant and if approved by both the Fund Manager and the Independent Assessment Panel, a full project proposal. This would then be appraised by both the Fund Manager and the Assessment Panel.
2. Project Assessment Indicators

2.1. Performance

The Fund attracted 35 enquiries of which 15 were considered not eligible or opted not to pursue an application. As many as 18 PCNs were then submitted but only 6 were approved for application. Four applications were submitted and two approved for funding one of which was conditional. One project (a literary festival) was funded to the tune of £47,621.

2.2. Impact

An output-to-purpose review was undertaken by DIFDC officials, the Fund Managers and the Jamaican Ministry of Tourism in July 2003, 22 months after the commencement of the project. The review process consisted of a triangulation of data from: (a) review of JTCF documentation at Development Options (b) presentation and key findings by the Fund Managers and the Independent Assessment Panel and (c) discussions with the Minister of State in the Ministry of Industry and Tourism, the Government’s Tourism Product Development Company, one successful and three unsuccessful applicants and one potential private sector partner.

2.3. Sustainability

The Review Team identified challenges in the design, procedures and implementation of the Fund. It accepted that a number of key design assumptions were invalid. In particular, the private sector was largely unwilling to invest time to develop projects; they wanted someone else to present ready made projects for them. In this regard, the level of public education required to attract qualified projects and bidders had been underestimated. In addition, there was less than anticipated up-front investment from bidders. Moreover, the emphasis on a private-sector led approach might have overlooked opportunities for government agencies to facilitate the process.

With respect to the procedures, it was recognised that they were too complicated for the targeted applicants. In addition, there was need for greater clarity as to what projects could or could not be supported. Also, greater and more widespread and targeted marketing and promotion were needed at start-up and on an ongoing basis. It was suggested that Fund Managers should have taken a more proactive role in (a) identifying suitable partners and projects (b) matching partners and (c) providing project development support. Moreover, the matching funds requirement was a particular challenge for poor applicants.

In addition, the tourism sector in Jamaica faced difficult challenges from the commencement of the Fund arising from certain national and international events. In mid-2001 there was widespread civil unrest in Jamaica which was quickly followed by the events of September 11 and serious flooding in November of that year which led to a significant decline in visitor arrivals and the tourism sector. The Fund was re-launched in 2003 and did not attract the desired response. It was therefore decided to close the Fund at the end of 2003.
2.4. A Summing Up

We acknowledge that the objectives of this Fund were very relevant to the pro poor policies of DFID and the goals of the Government of Jamaica. Its performance was unsuccessful and its impact negligible. The big lesson to be learnt from this project is poor people are often uneducated in business administration/development and not empowered to independently take the necessary action to develop project proposals that conform to the guidelines and procedures which were developed for businesses. There must be greater engagement and assistance to develop their ideas into business proposals. In addition, the requirement to provide matching funds is beyond the means of the average poor person in Jamaica as well as the rest of the Caribbean. Also, the business culture is such that big successful companies are not generally amenable to forming linkages with the poor unless there is some intermediation by either a government agency or an industry association.

**Box 2.5  
Tourism Challenge Fund: Strengths and Opportunities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-poor project directed at Jamaican people involved in tourism</td>
<td>Only one (tenuous) project was accepted out of 35 inquiries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attracts community groups to the fund and encourages seeking of partnerships with well-established for-profit entities</td>
<td>Some of the initial design assumptions were invalid: matching funds not forthcoming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potentially large impact on Jamaican services sector</td>
<td>Government agencies were not invited to facilitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extend project to sub-regional tourism strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consider incorporating mechanism(s) to address natural and man-made shocks to sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-poor projects require simplified procedures and guidelines, as well as public-education support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater marketing and promotion required at start-up and on-going basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need to improve monitoring and recurrent review process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Application and bidding process should be streamlined and evaluation process more comprehensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. REGIONAL PROGRAMME ASSESSMENT

A. Summary Project Evaluation Results and Programme Rating

This section summarises the evaluation findings of the DFID Caribbean offices’ projects during the period under review. For regional trade policy projects, they include the CRNM, and the CSME; for regional trade development projects, they include the BLCF; and for national trade development projects, they include the Cluster Competitiveness Programme and the Tourism Challenge Fund, both located in Jamaica. Each of these projects has been assessed in terms of six evaluation criteria: relevance, performance, sustainability, overall impact, poverty impact, gender impact. In this section, we provide a quantitatively based scoring for the individual projects and derive an overall programme rating.

Table 4.1 summarises the individual project scores for the five projects assessed over the review period. The overall score for the three project-type categories are about the same, ranging from 2.0 for the national trade development projects to 2.4 for the regional trade policy projects on a scale of 1 to 4. But there is a divergence in the scoring of the national trade development projects.

At the strategic level, the objectives and priority areas of the projects are relevant to DFID’s strategic thrusts and the regional or national development strategies. But they are regarded as relevant rather than highly relevant because they did not address poverty explicitly, as envisaged in DFID’s overall strategic objectives, and instead assumed that an expansion in trade would be accompanied by reduced poverty and inequality levels in the region or the targeted countries. All projects were, however, found to be responsive to the national or regional priority areas, which typically had a broader scope than that of

Table 4.1
Summary Project Evaluation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Trade Policy Projects</th>
<th>National Trade Development Projects</th>
<th>Regional Trade Development Projects</th>
<th>All Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM)</td>
<td>CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)</td>
<td>Average: Regional Trade Policy Projects</td>
<td>Cluster Competitiveness Programme (Jamaica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Targeted Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note - Assessments are based on the following scoring criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Highly relevant</td>
<td>Highly effective</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Highly relevant</td>
<td>Highly effective</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partly relevant</td>
<td>Partly effective</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partly relevant</td>
<td>Partly effective</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>na applicable</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>na applicable</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DFID.

The performance and sustainability of the programme as a whole was found to be partly effective and uncertain as to its sustainability. Among projects, however, it was the lack of sustainability of the Jamaican Tourism Challenge Fund that caused a low overall rating for the programme’s sustainability. Without that project, the programme scored a somewhat-sustainable rating.

Impact ratings for the targeted objectives of the projects were generally moderate, with the exception of the Tourism Challenges Fund, as well as the Business Linkages Challenge Fund which performed poorly in this respect. The impact on poverty and gender issues were, however, only modest or negligible. The CSME project addressed the poverty issue through its attempt to lower income inequality among its member countries, while the Cluster Competitiveness Programme and the BLCF both addressed poverty and to a lesser extent gender issues through various degrees of SME-targeted activities.

The overall rating of DFID’s Caribbean programme is summarised in Table 4.2. The weighting scheme for the overall rating incorporates DFID’s overarching strategy to target the alleviation of poverty, and it therefore assigns twice the weight to the poverty impact assessment criteria than it does to the others. Based on this weighting scheme and the evaluation findings summarised under the six evaluation criteria in Table 4.1, the overall programme score is considered to be partly successful.

B. Programme Strengths and Opportunities

The key strengths of DFID’s Caribbean programme are as follows:

- DFID’s focus on pro-poor trade development activities provides a more direct channel through which to target its TRCB activities than is available to other donors with broad-based strategies.
- DFID’s flexible approach with respect to the use of its funds facilitates and supports activities that are normally not able to be supported by other donors with more rigid programmes.
- DFID has played a greater role than other donors in supporting strategic studies in the region, as well as raising the profile of regional institutions such as the CRNM.
• Equity issues at the regional level have been addressed through efforts to raise incomes in the lesser developed countries of the region, especially through DFID’s support of the CSME process. In particular, the implementation of mechanisms designed to offset possible polarisation of countries within the region could lower the incident of unequal distribution of benefits arising from regionalisation and ultimately help to alleviate income inequality in the region. Moreover, the development of instruments designed to redress inequalities could motivate the more resistant member countries to move forward with the CSME process.

• DFID’s engagement of non-government actors in project designs has ensured private sector participation in its programmes.

• A pro-poor trade policy focus provides DFID with an opportunity to develop niche trade policy and trade development contributions to the Caribbean region.

Key opportunities for DFID’s Caribbean programme are as follows:

• Despite DFID’s commitment to pro-poor trade policies, the regional TRCB projects in the Caribbean have lacked specific support to poverty reduction strategies, largely because projects such as that for the CRNM and CSME are directed towards improving the demand for the region’s goods and services through securing improved market access.

• The log-frame process has not been fully incorporated into the project design and implementation process. While the standardisation of forms for setting, measuring, and evaluating project objectives provides a useful administrative mechanism, the coverage and details of these monitoring and evaluation forms have varied considerably across the projects reviewed in this report. For example, the quantitative performance measures of the CRNM’s work in relation to the goals, purposes and outputs were limited in their specificity, whereas such

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 4.1</th>
<th>Overall TRCB Programme: Strengths and Opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td><strong>Opportunities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted pro-poor strategy provides focus to programme design.</td>
<td>Integrate regional strategy into overall pro-poor trade strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of fund use and disbursements; ability to fund scoping studies.</td>
<td>Strengthen monitoring and evaluation and standardise these activities across projects and the overall programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good at engaging civil society at project design stage.</td>
<td>Formalise stakeholder consultations to ensure programme complementarity and avoid overlapping projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-poor trade policies a natural niche for programme design.</td>
<td>Provide greater input into project design of regional projects in the areas of the CRNM and CSME.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Streamline staff activities to ensure focused activities in TRCB targeted to poverty alleviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt monitoring standards such as Trade Policy Review indicators for CRNM project evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target projects that strengthen link between trade, growth and poverty alleviation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide front-end support for the poor to access facilities such as those under the BLCF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
indicators are in fact available through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism. This process could be enhanced by developing logical frameworks in consultation with recipients of TRCB programmes.

- Stakeholder consultations remain essential to ensuring relevance, efficacy and sustainability of TRCB in the Caribbean, since the existence of six large multilateral donors and eight other bilateral donors in the region have given rise to a number of overlapping activities and interests in TRCB. While informal consultations are maintained with stakeholders and other donors, there remains a need to formalise and institutionalise the process.

- In the case of the CSME and CRNM projects, DFID has had little, if any, involvement in the project design and implementation of specific activities related to each of the projects. While this approach has the advantage of reducing the workload for the relatively small and overextended DFIDC staff, it has limited DFID’s ability to influence the funded projects and direct them towards the agency’s poverty reduction objectives of its TRCB programme.

- DFIDC has increasingly broadened its overall project portfolio while relying on a diminishing number of staff members in its regional Caribbean office. As a result, project officers handling TRCB are also handling other portfolios that absorb much of their time. Despite the dedication and enthusiasm of the staff members, there is a general lack of understanding of the channels through which TRCB can or cannot affect poverty in the region. This limitation, combined with the increasing tendency for the staff to handle multiple programme portfolios, may exacerbate the current lack of pro-poor trade policy focus of DFIDC’s programme for the region.

- Monitoring of projects related to the CRNM and CSME process could adopt well-known benchmarks such as those focusing on TPR-based benchmarks like incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade as part of the performance review process.

- Procedures for monitoring and evaluating programmes should be established with DFID’s offices when other agencies such as the CEDA are used to execute trade related capacity building programmes. Such a system would ensure cohesiveness in the management and evaluation of these programmes in DFID’s regional assistance programme.

- Trade related capacity building programmes with potential pro-poor linkages, such as the BLCF, will need front-end support for the poor to access the facilities if the programme is to successfully reach the poor. In large part, insufficient attention has been paid to the business needs of the poor, including the weakness of their administrative and financial capacity to meet the requirements of such programmes as that of the BCLF.

C. Lessons Learned

DFID’s focus on trade as a vehicle for poverty alleviation provides much of the impetus for the design and, ultimately, the evaluation of its programme in the Caribbean. The link
between trade and poverty alleviation was set out in the White Papers on International Development (HMG, 1997 and 2000). In both of the White Papers, trade and investment are a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty alleviation; additional targeting of poverty alleviation is needed to ensure that the benefits of trade and investment reach the poor. The fourth Policy and Resources Plan (PARP) of the International Trade Department (ITD), written at the end of 2000, clearly defined the objective and manner by which DFID’s trade-related objectives would be pursued: “to promote greater participation in international trade by poor people and countries, and to increase the benefits and minimise the costs of international trade to the poor”. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are illustrative of the manner by which pro-poor trade reforms could be implemented in developing countries (Pedley, 2003).

According to the DFID Caribbean office, the regionally-oriented office in Barbados focuses its efforts on areas where it can bring specific added value, whether from its particular approach or from its expertise (DFID, 2004). While trade policy support remains important to the region, pro-poor trade development activities need to be emphasised if the DFID Caribbean office is to develop a programme that is consistent with DFID’s overall strategy aimed at targeting poverty through trade and investment development. As indicated earlier, much of TRCB is focused on projects aimed at developing trade policy and negotiating capacity, though projects aimed at promoting trade are being developed in the Jamaica country office. There are nevertheless considerable untapped opportunities for the DFID Caribbean regional office to develop trade policy projects that pursue pro-poor trade reforms. DFID’s pro-poor policy orientation, for example, could be brought to bear on country programme designs to help mainstream trade issues into the poverty reduction strategies of governments.

Staff level reductions in the Caribbean regional office have increased the risk that DFID-wide interest will de-emphasise trade-related objectives and the manner that they address poverty reduction in the region. This risk could easily be mitigated through greater use of consultants and contractors with expertise in trade-related capacity building targeted to poverty alleviation. For example, a recent review of DFID’s contribution to trade policy by Pedley (2003) notes that trade consultants were used on a call-down basis to provide country programming assistance in Asia. A similar approach is used by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with so-called staff consultants, who are provided long-term contracts but are used on an as-needed basis. This approach would provide DFID with the needed continuity over time for programme design, monitoring and evaluation without absorbing significant resources. It would also allow DFID officials greater time for coordinating their increasingly large portfolio of projects, coordinating activities with ITD headquarters staff and ensuring cohesiveness between ITD and the Caribbean office in trade-related capacity building programmes, as well as providing officials with the needed time to respond to information requests from other government departments.

Project monitoring and evaluation remains an important function of the Caribbean regional office. These functions are likely to become increasingly important as the portfolio of officials increases and possibly greater reliance is placed on consultants and contractors. Use of a logical framework for project management has encouraged the monitoring and evaluation process, especially as it relates to the quantification of outcomes in a time-bound framework. While the standardisation of forms for setting,
measuring, and evaluating programme objectives provides a useful administrative mechanism, the coverage and details of these monitoring and evaluation forms have varied considerably among the projects undertaken during the present evaluation period. This situation was illustrated in the CRNM project discussed in Chapter 3 where the value of quantitative measurement of the performance of the CRNM work in relation to the goals, purposes and outputs was found to be limited. Instead it was recommended that the logical frameworks be supplemented by consultations with relevant stakeholders, a practice that, unlike other donors, has been followed by DFID elsewhere.

Of considerable use for the present evaluation have been the mid-term and final reports, specifically those providing details of the project goals and accomplishments. It is likely that future projects would benefit from formalising the mid-term and final project reports in such a way as to ensure their coverage of information that encompassed so-called progress indicators for trade-related objectives and their effect on poverty alleviation either through pro-poor trade reforms or the development of trade activities that favour the poor. In this way, the DFID Caribbean office would continue to project its reputation of linking trade and poverty issues, and thereby targeting its programmes to a well-defined strategy, a reputation that is widely acknowledged by stakeholders and others donors as providing DFID with a comparative advantage over other development agencies having a broader mandate.
Annex A: Questionnaire

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR CARIBBEAN REGION CASE STUDY ON TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING (TRCB) ACTIVITIES

This set of questions aims to evaluate donor assistance on trade-related capacity building (TRCB) in the Caribbean region, as part of an assessment of DFID’s activities being conducted by the North-South Institute. The questionnaire is divided into two parts:

I. INSTITUTIONAL TRCB ACTIVITIES

Relationship to TRCB

1. Describe your organisation’s involvement in TRCB.
   ❖ Is your organisation a donor or stakeholder?
   ❖ For stakeholders:
     ➢ Describe the mandate of your institution.
     ➢ What constituency do you represent?
   ❖ How does it participate in the following activities in the Caribbean:
     ➢ Programmes to support international trade negotiations.
     ➢ Programmes to support development of supply and export capacity.
   ❖ How have support for (a) trade policy and (b) supply and export capacity development changed in the last five years?
   ❖ What is the relative importance of (a) and (b) in TRCB?
   ❖ Does the institution play a leading role in the following activities?
     ➢ Design of trade policies among stakeholders
     ➢ Capacity building for officials and stakeholders
     ➢ Integrating gender equality in TRCB
     ➢ Linking TRCB and poverty reduction
     ➢ Other Activities (specify)
   ❖ Do you participate in any DFID TRCB programmes (CRNM, CSME, Business Linkages Challenge Fund)

2. What is the institutional structure of TRCB activities in the organisation?

3. What documents exist on the organisation’s policies and activities in TRCB?

4. What is the relative weight of TRCB support given to the following activities (sum of items 1-3 should sum to 100%)?
   ▪ Support for participation in negotiations and accession to multilateral/regional/bilateral agreements (% of total);
   ▪ Support implementation of trade agreements (% of total);
Strengthen responsiveness to economic opportunities for trade through trade-related growth projects that improve economic policies and institutions, transfer technology, reduce dependence on primary, unprocessed products (% of total)

Links to Stakeholders / Other Donor

5. For donors, what steps are taken to ensure donor coordination on TRCB?

6. For stakeholders, how is local participation of business people and civil society organisations promoted in TRCB activities?

Programme-Specific TRCB Activities

7. What is the institution’s involvement in the following programmes:
   o Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) Assessment
   o CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)
   o Business Linkages Challenge Fund
   o Enterprise Development Caribbean
   o Cluster Competitiveness Programme (Jamaica)
   o Tourism Challenge Fund (Jamaica)

8. For the programme(s) in (12), describe the following:
   1. Project design, rationale, context and classification
   2. Project management: used of internal resources, advisors, and contractors for project management and implementation
   3. Degree of collaboration with government, private sector, and other donors or stakeholders
   4. Key Stakeholders: primary versus secondary beneficiaries
   5. Linkages to poverty alleviation and gender issues

9. Has the institution undertaken an evaluation of the particular programme(s)?

10. If so, what has been the methodology used?
    ______ Methodology for assessing relevance
    ______ Methodology for assessing efficacy
    ______ Methodology for assessing sustainability
    ______ Methodology for assessing institutional development.

11. If so, has there been an evaluation in terms of the following:
    ______ Poverty
    ______ Gender issues
    ______ Environment
    ______ Integrated Framework

12. If so, have the results of the evaluations been used to modify the institution’s TRCB activities?

13. If so, are the evaluations made available to the public? How and where?
Relationship with DFID

14. How does the institution coordinate its programme activities with DFID?

15. Are TRCB activities carried out jointly between your institution and DFID? If so, what is the mechanism?

16. How would you generally describe your perception of DFID’s TRCB activities in the programme:
   _____ Inadequate
   _____ Limited usefulness, compared with your institution
   _____ Actively engaged in the TRCB process
   _____ Leadership role in TRCB activities

17. What areas of improvement would you suggest for your institution’s TRCB activities with DFID (if any)?

TRCB and Poverty Reduction

18. How does the institution approach the link between trade and poverty reduction?

19. Is there an internal consensus in the institution on the linkage mechanism between trade and poverty reduction?

20. Does the institution have a pro-poor focus in its trade-related projects?

21. How would you describe the depth of TRCB involvement in poverty reduction issues?
   _____ Minimal
   _____ Limited support
   _____ On-going support
   _____ Leadership role in supporting integrate approach

TRCB and Gender Equality

22. How does the institution address gender equality objectives in TRCB?
Annex B: List of Interviews

1. **Cherianne Clarke**  
   Programme Officer  
   DFID

2. **Jane Armstrong**  
   Caribbean Project Director  
   DFID Caribbean (DFIDC)

3. **Sarah Dunn**  
   PSD Adviser  
   DFID Caribbean (DFIDC)

4. **Weyinmi Omamuli**  
   Economist  
   DFID Caribbean (DFIDC)

5. **Gordon Saggers**  
   Economist  
   DFID (Jamaica)

6. **Mark James**  
   Economist  
   DFID (Jamaica)

7. **Deryck Brown**  
   Director  
   Technical Co-operation and Partnerships  
   Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

8. **Tania Wilson**  
   Trade Analyst  
   Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

9. **Malcom Spence**  
   Technical Adviser, Intellectual Property & Agriculture (SPS)  
   Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery

10. **Brian Kelly**  
    Economic Adviser  
    Delegation of the European Commission in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean

11. **Kati Tanninen**  
    Young Expert  
    Delegation of the European Commission in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean
12. Patricia Khan  
   Trade Adviser  
   CARANA

12. Ayana Young-Marshall  
   Deputy Trade Director  
   CARANA

13. Bronwen Alsop  
   Civil Society Outreach Programme Manager  
   CARANA

14. Mansfield Blackwood  
   Senior Technical Specialist  
   USAID

15. Michelle Hustler-Small  
   Trade Officer  
   Barbados Coalition of Service Industries

16. Karis Grosvenor  
   Secretariat Administrator  
   Barbados Coalition of Service Industries

17. Tonika Sealy  
   Trade Officer  
   Barbados Coalition of Service Industries

18. Ruall Harris  
   Executive Director  
   Barbados Chamber of Commerce & Industry

19. Andrew Satney  
   Senior Programme Officer  
   OECS Secretariat

20. Brian Louisy  
   Executive Director  
   St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce Industry and Agriculture

21. Carol M. Lynch  
   Trade Consultant  
   Barbados Private Sector Trade Team
22. Natalie de Caires  
   Trade Consultant  
   Barbados Private Sector Trade Team

23. Joanne Pindera  
   Senior Development Officer  
   Canadian International Development Agency

24. Roderick Sanatan  
   Director (Ag.)  
   Centre for International Services  
   University of the West Indies

25. Christopher Sinckler  
   Executive Coordinator  
   Caribbean Policy Development Centre

26. Lisa Callender  
   Senior Export Business Adviser/Regional Branch Manager BLCF (South)  
   Caribbean Export Development Agency

27. Taiana Mora Ramis  
   Executive Director (Ag)  
   Caribbean Export Development Agency

28. Sonja Singh-Andrews  
   Manager, Trade Institutional Capacity Project  
   Ministry of Trade and Industry  
   Trinidad and Tobago
Annex C: Bibliography


DFID (2003d), “Review of DFID’s Support to the CRNM and DFID Consideration of Broader Support to Trade Reform in the Region”. Barbados.


