MAKING WAVES: IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SITUATION ON OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE SPENDING AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE

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Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe

A study of recent developments in the EU institutions, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden

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ECDPM

Rapport 2017:01
till
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)
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Printed by Elanders Sverige AB
Stockholm 2017

Cover design by Julia Demchenko
Acknowledgements This report would not have been possible without the financial support from the Expert Group of Aid Studies (Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys) EBA in Sweden. The authors are grateful for time all those interviewed gave to this study at a time when they themselves were often under unprecedented pressure.

The authors sincerely thank our European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) colleagues Annabelle Laferrère for excellent research assistance throughout this study, Cecilia Gregersen who assisted with interpreting Danish and Swedish documents. We are also grateful for Florian Krätke's help and comments for this study. Thanks also go to the EBA Reference Group Members of this study Julie Heraud, Julia Benn, Lisa Hallstedt, Kristof Tamas, chaired by Gun-Britt Andersson for their helpful comments on the initial proposal and excellent detailed feedback on the first draft. Julia Benn and Valerie Gaveau of the OECD also gave additional comments on statistical aspects that were extremely useful and welcome. We would also like to acknowledge the constructive and helpful engagement from EBA Secretariat staff Per Trulsson and Sonja Daltung. This was a challenging study given the constantly evolving nature of the topic and data, and also the breadth of issues that arose. Yet all errors of course remain those of the authoring team.

N.B. The research for this study was completed by November 2016
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Preface

65 million people – a number equivalent to the population of France – are presently forcibly displaced worldwide, according to UNHCR. While the majority are refugees in the vicinity of the crises, in their own countries, or in neighboring countries, many have fled to Europe. Following such movements, the year 2015 became a particularly challenging year for European cooperation in the field of migration. At the end of that year the Swedish Migration Agency, Migrationsverket, could sum up the number of asylum seekers to more than 160,000 people, a figure twice the size of the previous year, and three times higher than in 2013.

As a consequence, in-donor refugee costs have increased dramatically in some European countries. This has lead to re-allocations in the national budget, including from the appropriation for development cooperation. In Sweden in-donor refugee costs reported as aid to the OECD/DAC exceeded 20 billion SEK in 2015 – which is more than four times the figure for a normal year such as 2013. Such re-allocations may seem natural as development and migration are closely related issues. Nevertheless it implies substantial cuts in the resources for long-term development aid.

In this report, Anna Knoll and Andrew Sherriff focus on the consequences of irregular migration and refugee flows on the volume and orientation of Official Development Assistance, ODA. It is based on five case-studies, of which Sweden is one and the EU is another. The other three are Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Since the subject matter of their study has been in constant change, it has been imperative to set a cutoff date for when to stop collecting empirical data. This date was set at July 2016. There is a lot to be said about development during the period studied.

The report clearly shows that the increased migration flows have impacted on the volume as well as on the orientation of aid, albeit not always in the ways one may have expected. For example, it is argued that even when excluding in-donor refugee costs ODA has actually increased in all the case studies from 2014 to 2015 (with the exception of Denmark).

Spotlight is put on a number of politically topical, and even pressing, issues. For example, how much of ODA can be re-allocated for in-donor refugee costs? What can actually be categorized as ODA? And what are the consequences for aid effectiveness when aid is used for migration purposes. Providing answers to questions such as these will be particularly important for future policy developments.
The authors observe that the more positive discourse on migration that had gained some recognition before the present sharp increase in migration was overshadowed by more protective concerns. The discourse has shifted towards how to contain overwhelming flows. In Europe aid has become an integral part of how to solve the irregular migration and refugee situation. Special attention has been given to “root causes”, that is, addressing the driving forces behind migration, such as violent conflict, violations of human rights, persecutions and other expressions of lack of human security and prospects for development. To address these issues of failed development the use of aid resources has been deemed legitimate.

Not only has the irregular migration and refugee situation instigated an increasing political interest in the root causes of migration, it has also led to an increased focus on cooperation with countries that are strategically important from a migration perspective. The new migration situation is likely to remain for some time. Its existence and magnitude has given rise to discussions about changes in ODA-definitions that to a larger extent would accommodate migration related expenses.

The authors highlight the lack of coherent and comparable statistics, and encourage the development of clear guidelines and agreed practices for migration-specific ODA spending. Without such a framework monitoring and reporting on migration related aspects of Agenda 2030 will become more difficult.

Concerns about aid effectiveness are brought forward in the report. There is a political pressure for quick action disbursement of budgeted funds, sometimes at the detriment of prudent procedures. This risks undermining the agreed aid effectiveness agenda and sound approaches towards working with fragile states. Many decisions on aid allocations appear to be taken much too quickly, without doing the requisite quality controls or taking due consideration to ownership in partner countries. The authors point towards the risk of establishing a pattern whereby aid resources are used ineffectively and ownership is bypassed.

Knoll and Sherriff’s synthesis study is relatively short. There is, however, a more extensive annex which in much greater detail accounts for the empirical data in each country case. I encourage the reader to make use of it as it is a rich source of information. It is my hope that this report will become an important contribution to the evolving literature on development and migration. The dramatically higher number of irregular migrants and refugees that we saw in 2015 may now be behind us, but the situation can quickly change. This report provides important insights from recent experiences and may help to prepare for such a situation, were it to occur again any time soon.
The authors’ work has been conducted in dialogue with a reference group chaired by Gun-Britt Andersson, member of the EBA. However, the authors are solely responsible for the content of the report.

Stockholm, January 2017

Lars Heikensten
Sammanfattning


Situationen har även medfört att både former och nivåer för bistånd och prioriteringar i europeisk utvecklingspolitik har genomgått snabba förändringar. Den här studien har genomförts av den europeiska stiftelsen ECDPM (European Centre for Development Policy Management) på uppdrag av den svenska Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) i syfte att undersöka hur europeiska givare har hanterat migrations- och flyktingsituationen. Den bygger på fem fallstudier om hur biståndet har utformats i Danmark, Europeiska unionens institutioner, Tyskland, Nederländerna och Sverige. I det här sammanfattande dokumentet analyseras de viktigaste faktorerna i utformningen av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet (ODA) under de senaste åren. Vidare undersöks hur användningen av offentligt utvecklingsbistånd kan komma att påverkas på medelång och lång sikt mot bakgrund av aktuella förändringar i, och överläggningar om, politiska ramverk, strategier, instrument, fördelningskriterier och programplaneringsmetoder. Studien avslutas med en reflektion över eventuella konsekvenser och framtida metoder.

Ökat stöd till flyktingar i länder i och utanför Europa

Trots att det politiska klimatet för utomeuropeiskt bistånd har försämrats i flera EU-medlemsstater ökade EU:s gemensamma offentliga utvecklingsbistånd fram till 2015.


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1 Offentligt utvecklingsbistånd från alla EU-medlemsstater och EU-institutioner. Offentligt utvecklingsbistånd som har överförts från EU-medlemsstater till EU-institutioner har inte räknats två gånger.
Ökningen beror till stor del på de omfattande flykting- och migrantströmmarna till Europa. Ytterligare medel för offentligt utvecklingsbistånd beviljades både för asylsökande i Europa och för bistånd utanför Europa som svar på den irreguljära migrationen och flyktingsituationen.

Trenderna i de nationella budgetarna pekar åt olika håll för 2016. Det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet har minskat i Nederländerna och Danmark, och ökat i Sverige och Tyskland.

Kostnaderna för att skydda asylsökande i europeiska länder, så kallade ”kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet” har ökat betydligt

- Dessa kostnader ökade från 3,3 miljarder euro 2014 till 8,6 miljarder 2015, eller uttryckt i procent av EU:s totala offentliga utvecklingsbistånd – från 5,6 procent 2014 till 12,5 procent 2015.
- I Sverige användes 33,8 procent av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet till flyktingar i Sverige. Nyanlända utgjorde därmed den största mottagargruppen för svenskt bistånd.
- Nederländerna rapporterade att över 22 procent av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet under 2015 gick till kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet.
- För Danmark var denna siffra 15,5 procent under 2015.
- Den kraftigaste ökningen stod Tyskland för med en ökning från cirka 1 procent 2014 till nästan 17 procent under 2015.
- Under 2016 väntas färre asylsökande. Trots att prognoserna pekar mot lägre kostnader utgör de fortfarande en avsevärd del av det totala offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet.

EU:s totala offentliga utvecklingsbistånd ökade mellan 2014 och 2015, även då kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet excluderas.

- Det betyder att ökningen av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet i Europa inte endast berodde på kostnaderna för flyktingmottagnings i det egna landet utan även på att extra medel för utvecklingsbistånd anslogs.
- För EU som helhet låg den betydande ökningen av kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet på 5,3 miljarder euro mellan 2014 och 2015 fortfarande lägre än den totala ökningen av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet på cirka 9 miljarder euro under samma period.
Det här gäller även de flesta av de länder som ingick i studien. Endast i Danmark minskade det totala offentliga utvecklingsbidraget från 2014 till 2015 när kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet exkluderas.

Fallstudierna visar att stora delar av de extra medlen används för att bemöta flyktingsituationen utanför Europa, särskilt i regionen kring Syrien.

När kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet inte inbegrips i statistiken ser förverkligandet av målet om 0,7 procent i offentligt utvecklingsbidrag/BNI inte likadant ut.

- Ett antal europeiska länder, däribland Danmark, Sverige och Nederländerna, nådde detta mål under 2015.
- Om kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet exkluderas faller siffran för Nederländerna dock under målet om 0,7 procent.
- EU-medlemmarna i OECD:s kommitté för utvecklingsbidrag (DAC) nådde tillsammans upp till ett offentligt utvecklingsbidrag på 0,47 procent av BNI för 2015, men om kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet exkluderas sjunker siffran till mer blygsamma 0,41 procent.

**Flexibilitet: ytterligare finansieringskällor, avvägningar och förutsägbarhet inom offentligt utvecklingsbidrag**

Ett ökat antal asylsökande och stigande kostnader, både för mottagandet i Europa under det första året och för flyktingar utanför Europa, har satt prov på kreativiteten i fråga om att mobilisera extra medel. Regeringarna i de studerade länderna har använt sig av olika strategier för att hantera kostnaderna. Och de olika strategierna är förenade med olika risker.

- Budgetrevideringar i Sverige och Danmark under 2015 och 2016 pekar på ett tydligt samband mellan asylmottagning och tillgängliga offentliga utvecklingsbidragsmedel för samarbeten i andra länder.
- 2015 använde Sverige sig av en flexibel budget för att hantera kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet som översteg målet om 1,0 procent i offentligt utvecklingsbidrag/BNI. Omfördelningar under 2016 ledde till en tillfällig minskning av det tillgängliga biståndet för externa samarbetsprogram 2016,
vilket medförde en risk att pågående program skulle behöva avslutas eller skjutas upp. En liknande situation uppstod i Danmark.2

• Även om detta inte nödvändigtvis behöver ha en negativ effekt på genomförandet av fleråriga strategiska mål, kan sådana minskningar sätta prov på både finansierings- och programplaneringsprocessernas flexibilitet och anpassningsförmåga.

• Vissa givare, som Nederländerna och Europeiska kommissionen, har försökt utveckla lämpliga skattemässiga lösningar för att undvika sådana kompromisser. Man har exempelvis utnyttjat framtida budgetflexibilitet och reserver, vilket i sin tur belastar framtida budgetar.

Tillgängligt humanitärt stöd har inte visat sig påverkas av sådana kompromisser. Länderna som ingår i fallstudier har som en del av sina åtaganden för offentligt utvecklings bistånd behållit eller utökat resurserna för humanitär hjälp och humanitär bistånd under de senaste åren – mycket för att hantera den syriska flyktingkrisen. Detta har även varit fallet vid budgetnedskärningar eller nödvändiga omfördelningar på grund av högre kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet, något som visat sig förekomma i Danmark och Sverige.

Vilka strategier som har använts beror till del på den enskilda givarens budgetsystem. I de fall där ramarna för det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet fastställs på förhand och där kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet dras av (t.ex. i Nederländerna, Sverige och Danmark) är förhållandet mellan kostnadsnivån för flyktingar i givarlandet och nuvarande eller framtida medel för utvecklingssamarbeten tydligare. Då det inte finns ett angivet utrymme i det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet för kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet, såsom i Tyskland, framträder förhållandet inte lika tydligt.

Inflödet av asylsökande och de därtill kopplade kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet är svåra att förutse och resulterar i en osäkerhet gällande tillgängliga ODA-medel. Så länge flyktingströmmarna till Europa är svåra att förutse eller beror på bräckliga politiska överenskommelser (t.ex. överenskommelsen mellan EU och Turkiet) kan detta inverka på möjligheten att förutse de tillgängliga resurserna i långsiktiga utvecklingssamarbetsbudgetar.

2 Både Danmark och Sverige skar ursprungligen i budgetanslagen för utvecklingssamarbeten på grund av de högre beräknade kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet. Dessa återfördes senare när de beräknade siffrorna visade sig vara lägre.
Nya skatteregler som syftar till att beakta svårörsägbarheten i migrationsströmmarna och de därmed förenade kostnaderna medför också risker och utmaningar. Europeiska stater och givare har försökt hitta lösningar som bättre skyddar pågående utvecklingssamarbeten och biståndsplaneringen, samtidigt som de tillgodosser krav från olika intressegrupper. Olika sätt att förhindra att utvecklingssamarbeta ansan slagen används till kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet, eller för att mildra dessa kostnaders effekter, har presenterats:

• Sverige har infört en gräns i ramverket där kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet får minska det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet med högst 30 procent.

• Vissa regeringar, till exempel i Nederländerna, har infört nya metoder för rapportering av kostnaderna för flyktingar i givarlandet i syfte att fördela dessa kostnader jämnare över åren och säkerställa ökad förutsägbarhet i det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet under ett visst budgetår.

• Andra förändringar och förslag syftar till att ge givarorganisationer större flexibilitet när det gäller fleraåriga budgetanslag och att upprätta överenskommelser på förhand om hantering av specifika budgetscenarior, som i Sveriges fall.

Flera andra förslag har även presenterats. Det civila samhället i Danmark har exempelvis föreslagit en garanti där 0,7 procent av BNI används till det "richta" offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet, exklusive kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet, och att ungefär 0,8 procent av BNI totalt ska spenderas på offentligt utvecklingsbistånd, inklusive kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet.

Flyktingströmmarna kan skapa en fortsatt osäkerhet kring det tillgängliga offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet. Detta kan försvåra fleraårig planering tillsammans med samarbetspartner, vilket utgör en av de bästa metoderna för hantering av utdragna kriser. Om det inträffar finns en risk att det påverkar uppfattningen att europeiska biståndsgivare är stabila och långsiktig partner och det kan eventuellt få negativa följder för kvaliteten i utvecklingssamarbetet.

Brist på samstämd rapportering av kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet

Eftersom kostnaderna för asylmottagningen i Europa kan leda till mindre tillgängliga medel för offentligt utvecklingsbistånd i utlandet granskas rapporteringen av sådana kostnader allt mer.
Anledningen till att kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet oftare rapporteras som offentligt utvecklings bistånd beror på att allt fler asylsökande är i behov av skydd i Europa. Men det beror även på givarnas ändrade rapporteringsmetoder. OECD:s riktlinjer för rapportering av kostnader för flyktingar i givarlandet är tvetydiga.


Olika metoder bland givare när det gäller vilka typer av asylsökande som omfattas och vilka kostnadsposter som ska ingå innebär i dagsläget att trovärdigheten i statistiken om offentligt utvecklings bistånd i frågasätts. Under 2017 vill OECD:s kommitté för utvecklings bistånd ta fram tydligare riktlinjer och skapa mer samstämmiga rapporteringsmetoder bland givarna i biståndskommittén. Det är inte alltid tydligt vilka kostnader som ska räknas som offentligt utvecklings bistånd. Arbetet med att skapa en samstämmighet syftar således till att tydligt fastställa vilka kostnader som faller under definitionen av offentligt utvecklings bistånd och vilka som hänför sig till integration av flyktingar eller administrativa kostnader för givarländernas interna politik och säkerhetspolitik.

Är geopolitiska prioriteringar styrande för det europeiska biståndet på kort sikt och efter de pågående förändringarna?

Förutom den aktuella omfördelningen (och i vissa fall omfördelningen) av utbetalningar till flyktingmottagande inom ramen för det offentliga utvecklings biståndet har migrationsläget lett till ett politiskt fokus på stärkt
utvecklingssamarbete och politiskt samarbete med länder av strategisk betydelse i ett migrationsperspektiv.

- Uppdelade uppgifter fram till 2014 från OECD:s kommitté för utvecklingsbistånd (OECD DAC) visar att det humanitära biståndet har omprioriterats till den syriska konflikten.
- Det är således tydligt att europeiska givare överlag stödjer insatser i konflikter som även har stora konsekvenser för invandringen till Europa.
- Biståndsuppgifter visar att EU-länderna ofta hör till de största bidragsgivarna i flera andra av de största kriserna där människor drivs på flykt, t.ex. kriserna i Yemen (där fördrivningen i det närmaste är lika omfattande som i Syrien) och i Colombia.
- Inom ramen för de knappa ODA-resurserna förefaller dock förändringar i antalet fördrivna personer i kriser som ligger "längre bort" hittills ha resulterat i mindre omfattande insatsfinansiering än vad som är fallet i den syriska flyktingkrisen.

Personer som intervjuats har uttryckt oro över att fördrivningsrelaterade utmaningar och migrationsfrågor som inte ger upphov till migrationsströmmar till Europa för närvarande inte väcker mycket intresse.

När det gäller långsiktigt utvecklingssamarbete visar en översyn av policydokument och strategier att migrationen spelar en allt större roll vid den geografiska fördelningen av det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet. Denna utveckling kommer troligen att fortsätta framöver. Vissa biståndsgivare har inbegripit migrationsrelaterade indikatorer i sina kriterier för anslagsfördelning. Exempel omfattar:

- EU:s förvaltningsfond för Afrika (EU Trust Fund for Africa) och EU:s plan för externa investeringar (European External Investment Plan), där man till följd av det politiska ramverket lagt ökad betoning på ursprungs- och mottagningsområden för flyktingar och på migrationsvägar till Europa. Migrationsaspekter har integrerats i förvaltningsfondens fördelningsindikatorer.
- Förslag om ytterligare biståndsfokusering på länder av migrationsmässig betydelse för EU finns upptagna i Danmarks utkast till utvecklingsstrategi.
- Sådana förändringar kan även noteras i Nederländerna, där den migrationsmässiga betydelsen kan komma att påverka urvalet av ytterligare prioriterade partnerländer.
• Tyskland diskuterar för närvarande omfattande investeringsplaner för Afrika, som ett led i hanteringen av eventuell framtida migration.

Fortsatt systematisk forskning kommer att krävas för att övervaka följderna av sådana utvecklingsriktningar.

**Programplanering inom ramen för flyktingsituationen och den irreguljära invandringen**

Personer som intervjuats har pekat på att **kortsiktiga politiska påtryckningar i hanteringen av flyktingkrisen redan i flera fall har försvagat givarorganisationernas biståndseffektivitet.** Uppgifter som inhämtats genom intervjuer visar att det finns en oro för att man i de nuvarande insatserna för att bemöta den irreguljära migrationen inte alltid i tillräcklig utsträckning och på ett systematiskt sätt tillämpar de principer som framhållits i diskussionerna om utvecklingseffektivitet (Development Effectiveness) och gott givarskap i instabila stater (Good Donorship in fragile states). I synnerhet påtryckningar från hög politisk nivå som rör genomförande och utbetalningar har haft negativ inverkan på

1. förhållandet till lokala partner i utvecklingsländerna
2. analysen och kvalitetskontrollen av utvecklingsutgifterna
3. utgångsläget för insatserna, som ibland förefaller spegla givarnas egna överväganden utan att i tillräcklig utsträckning ta hänsyn till andra situationsrelaterade faktorer.

Detta framgår särskilt tydligt när det gäller instrument som särskilt tagits fram, eller används igen, för att hantera migrations- och flyktingkrisen.

I vissa fall har utvecklingsaktörer som arbetar med snabbinsatsinstrument, såsom EU:s förvaltningsfond för Afrika eller Tysklands ”särskilda initiativ”, upplevt påtryckningar om att hantera strukturella utvecklingsproblem med hjälp av kortsiktiga utgifter och snabba och synliga utbetalningar av medel.

Om det inte handlar om enstaka händelser utan om en bredare trend finns det på sikt en risk att de lärdomar som dragits om hur man lägger grunden för mer framgångsrika internationella åtaganden alltmer kommer att undermineras.

Samtidigt som det är viktigt att ha flexibilitet i programmen i situationer som präglas av instabilitet och oförutsedda händelser tyder uppgifter från personer som intervjuats och bästa praxis från insatser i instabila och konfliktdrabbade stater på att sådana strukturella problem förtjänar ett mer långsiktigt perspektiv. Däri
inbegrips tillräckligt med tid för identifiering och anpassning av programförslag och involvering av partnerländer och lokala aktörer i arbetet.

**Att påverka EU:s praxis och debatt i fråga om migration och utveckling**

Den irreguljära migrationen och flyktingsituationen har gjort konkreta migrationsåtaganden till en mer prioriterad fråga i utvecklingssamarbetet i samtliga länder som ingår i fallstudierna och inom EU-institutionerna. Det finns nyanser och skillnader när det gäller inramningen och narrativet men:

- EU:s politiska debatt om migration och utveckling fokuseras nu alltmer på utmaningarna (t.ex. smuggling och hanteringen av irreguljär migration och fördrivning).
- Tidigare debatter om hur migrationens positiva effekter på utvecklingen i Europa kan maximeras tycks överallt ha förlovat sin politiska genomslagskraft, vilket får effekter på underlag för politiska val och programval.
- Personer som intervjuats har pekat på höga politiska förväntningar när det gäller att använda offentligt utvecklingsbistånd till att minska migrationsströmmarna. Några belägg för att det fastställda målet om att minska den irreguljära migrationen skulle ha resulterat i indikatorer för mätning av framsteg på teknisk nivå har dock inte påträffats i fallstudierna.
- På EU-nivå har man i princip infört **positiva och negativa incitament** (eller villkor) för ODA-medel i syfte att främja EU:s migrationsmål. I praktiken har de negativa villkoren ännu inte använts, även om det enligt personer som deltog i intervjun, förekommit fall där EU varit nära att bruka dem. I samtliga intervjuer, och från alla parters sida, ifrågasattes hur effektiv, praktiskt genomförbar och hållbar en sådan ansats är, i synnerhet i sin negativa form.

Den ändrade betoningen i policydokumenten, och i därav följande praxis, visar att endast utvalda delar av de europeiska migrations- och utvecklingsaktörernas dagordningsfrågor ger resultat i den nuvarande situationen.

Den politiska situationen har framförallt drivit utvecklingssamarbetet på migrationsområdet mot en ökad fokusering på flyktingar och fördrivning, stöd till arbetet mot smuggling och till gränsförvaltning, återsändande och återetablering samt hantering av ”grundorsaker” än en bred agenda för migrationsfrågor som bl.a. skulle inkludera stöd till rörlighet och underlättad migration, till t.ex. Europa.
**Migrationsspecifika trender inom offentligt utvecklingsbistånd**

Det finns för närvarande inte något ramverk för systematisk spårning av migrationsrelaterade utgifter inom offentligt utvecklingsbistånd. Till följd av avsaknaden av jämförbara rapporter om sådana offentliga utgifter i partnerländer, bl.a. användningen av ODA-medel, är det svårt att bedöma tydliga finansieringstrender.

- Användningen av offentligt utvecklingsbistånd när det gäller migration, fördrivning och utveckling är inte en ny företeelse, även om det ofta rört sig om tillfälliga insatser utan tydlig strategisk grund.

- Trots den förnyade uppmärksamheten kring migrationen visar en analys baserad på en sökning av migrationsrelaterade nyckelord i ODA-projekt, som rapporterats till OECD:s kommitté för utvecklingsbistånd mellan 2010 och 2014, att det inte skett några större upptagande trender eller förändringar i fallstudierna överlag när det gäller givares stöd till särskilda ”migrationsrelaterade” projekt. Detta beror troligtvis på en starkare fokusering på ”grundorsaksrelaterade” projekt som kanske inte direkt behandlar migrationsaspekter utan inriktas på hållbar utveckling i ett bredare perspektiv. Det är dessutom möjligt att det ökade fokuset på migrationsområdet först framträder fr.o.m. år 2015 och framåt.

- Översynar och utvärderingar har visat att givare tidigare tenderat att inriktta utvecklingsbistånd till migrationsområdet mer på säkerhetsrelaterade aspekter.

- Mot bakgrund av förändringarna i migrationsdebatten är det troligt att det kommer att förblī en utmaning, eller t.o.m. bli än svårare, att skapa en balanserad migrations- och utvecklingsstrategi.

Hittills har den stärkta inramningen av utvecklingssamarbetet och utgifterna för offentligt utvecklingsbistånd under ”hanteringen av grundorsakerna” inte nödvändigvis inneburit någon tydlig ändring av insatsernas tematiska inriktning.

- Enligt personer som intervjuats har existerande samarbete om sysselsättningsskapande arbete, styrning och stabilitet på arbetsmarknaden i viss utsträckning getts nya beteckningar i fallstudierna. Detta kan förändras beroende på de pågående strategiska diskussionerna om hur faktorer som spelar in när det gäller flykt och migrationsbeslut bättre kan beaktas i utvecklingssamarbetet.
En projektöversyn inom ramen för EU:s förvaltningsfond för Afrika, som syftar till att ta itu med migrationens grundorsaker, har visat att det inledande arbetet inom ramen för fonden tydligt inriktades på stabilitets- och sysselsättningsprojekt. I senare program har mer betoning lagts på stöd till migrationsförvaltning, i huvudsak avseende gränsförvaltning och samarbetspartners förmåga att hantera irreguljär migration och återvändande.

Användandet av medel för utvecklingssamarbete, inklusive offentligt utvecklingsbistånd, till insatser för återvändande och återetablering av asylsökande som ha fått avslag samt stöd till specifika delar av migrationsförvaltningen finns kvar i givarnas narrativa redogörelser och har förstärkts i den strategiska diskussionen i samtliga fallstudier. Detta har inverkan på användningen av ODA-medel inom migrationsområdet. Sådana projekts utvecklingsmässiga värde är beroende av projektens utgångspunkt samt de antaganden de bygger på och måste vara välgrundade ur ett utvecklings- och förvaltningsmässigt samt konfliktrelaterat perspektiv.

Ett av de mest progressiva inslagen i de pågående diskussionerna rör det konkreta arbete som nu görs för att närmare sammankoppla humanitära och utvecklingsrelaterade strategier i flyktningssituationer och för att granska hur arbetet kan förbättras i instabila situationer. Fallstudierna visar att aktörer genomför denna dagordning som diskuterats under lång tid men som inte tidigare fått genomslagskraft.

Långsiktiga konsekvenser samt förslag till ytterligare insatser

Det behövs nya sätt att utforma samarbetsprogram för migration och utveckling utifrån situationskännedom.

- Sådana arbetssätt håller på att växa fram, till exempel inom den del av EU:s förvaltningsfond som rör forskningsanläggningar och tekniska hjälpmedel och i Nederländernas utlysningar.
- Flera anställda arbetar med eller kommer i kontakt med migrationsrelaterade aspekter i politiskt känsliga sammanhang där bistånd kan få oönskade konsekvenser.
- Det är viktigt att genom incitament verka för att säkerställa att relevant kunskap integreras i programplaneringen och att en kultur av tillsyn, utvärdering och inlärning skapas.
Bättre rapporter om migrationsrelaterat utvecklings bistånd bör på sikt behandlas inom ramen för statistiken över OECD:s offentliga utvecklings bistånd eller det samlade offentliga stödet till hållbar utveckling (TOSSD3), diskussionerna kring Agenda 2030 och FN-initiativet Global Migration Compact.

- Utöver en harmonisering av rapporteringskraven för flyktingrelaterade kostnader i givarlandet skulle en kodex för migration framtagen av OECD:s kommitté för utvecklings bistånd vara värdefull för spåning av specifika ODA- utgifter som avser migrationsrelaterat tekniskt bistånd och stöd till migrationsförvaltning i partnerländer.

- I detta sammanhang bör man begränsa de risker som en integrering av migrationsområdet i ODA-statistiken eventuellt kan medföra, t.ex. att det blir mer legitmit att använda insatser som kraftigt avviker från det offentliga utvecklings biståndets ursprungliga syfte (såsom att minska den irreguljära migrationen på gränsförvaltningsområdet).

- Tydliga riktlinjer och överenskommna förfaranden för offentligt utvecklings bistånd som används för migration kan utarbetas. Det skulle vara värdefullt att bringa klarhet i och ha ett utbyte om vilka typer av program till stöd för förvaltningskapaciteten på migrationsområdet som kan anses vara motiverade enligt definitionen av offentligt utvecklings bistånd (ODA). Ökad öppenhet och insyn när det gäller det sätt på vilket givare stödjer agendan för migrationsfrågor kan även uppmuntra till utbyte och till goda och väl avvägda givarmetoder i arbetet mot en mer övergripande agenda.

- Detta kan även bidra till tillsynen av och rapporteringen om globala hållbara utvecklings mål med migrationsanknytning och till givarnas stöd till migrationsrelaterade målsättningar.

Mot bakgrund av de pågående strategiska diskussionerna om att på ett mer systematiskt sätt använda ODA-medel för att hantera migrationen, grundorsakerna och fördrivningen (i synnerhet från 2014 och framåt) vore det värdefullt att följa utgiftsutvecklingen för projekt med migrationsanknytning.

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3 Total Official Support to Sustainable Development.
Summary

Increasingly high numbers of refugees and migrants have come to Europe over the past five years seeking protection. The war in Syria, conflicts, poverty and turmoil in other parts of the Middle East and Africa have uprooted people, caused mass flight and facilitated human smuggling. Reception systems for migrants and asylum seekers have increasingly been under strain. European states have sought relief from this pressure by seeking solutions outside Europe and by cooperating with other non-European countries’ authorities.

As a result of this situation, the nature and levels of aid and European development policy priorities have undergone rapid changes. To investigate the response of European donors to the migration and refugee situation, this study has been initiated by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and commissioned by the Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA). It draws on five case studies of the aid responses by Denmark, the European Union institutions, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. The synthesis paper analyses the key aspects of ODA responses in recent years. It further explores how current changes and deliberations in terms of policy frameworks, strategies, instruments, allocation criteria and programming practices are likely to affect the use of ODA in the medium to longer term. It concludes by considering possible implications and future practices.

More aid for refugees in Europe and abroad

Despite an increasingly unfavourable political climate for overseas aid in a number of EU member states, the EU’s collective ODA has risen in volume up to 2015.

- Collective EU ODA increased from EUR 55 bn in 2012 to EUR 59 bn in 2014 and exceeded EUR 68 bn in 2015. From 2014 to 2015 ODA increases were recorded by all case studies.

- This increase is due in large part to the extensive flow of refugees and migrants towards Europe. Additional ODA finances were made available both for asylum seekers in Europe and for aid to be spent overseas in response to the irregular migration and refugee situation.

- For 2016 national budgets show differing trends, with ODA declining in the Netherlands and Denmark, and rising in Sweden and in Germany.

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*ODA of all EU member states and EU institutions. ODA funds that are ‘transferred’ by the EU member states to the EU institutions are not counted double.*
The costs for the protection of asylum seekers within European countries – ‘in-donor refugee’ costs – have risen significantly

- These costs increased from EUR 3.3 bn in 2014 to EUR 8.6 bn in 2015 or expressed as a share of total EU ODA from 5.6% in 2014 to 12.5% in 2015.
- Sweden spent 33.8% of its ODA on refugees at home in 2015, making these new arrivals the biggest group of recipients of Swedish development aid.
- The Netherlands reported that over 22% of its ODA went to in-donor refugee costs in 2015.
- For Denmark this figure was 15.5% in 2015.
- Germany saw the biggest jump, from about 1% in 2014 to almost 17% in 2015.
- In 2016, with fewer asylum seekers expected, the forecasted costs are lower but still make up a significant share of the ODA total.

Even when excluding in-donor refugee costs, total EU ODA increased from 2014 to 2015.

- This means that the rise in ODA in Europe was due not only to the costs for refugee reception ‘at home’ but also to additional resources for development assistance being made available.
- For the EU collectively, the significant growth of in-donor refugee costs by EUR 5.3 bn between 2014 and 2015 was still lower than the overall increase in ODA of about EUR 9 bn in the same period.
- This is also true of most of the individual country cases that formed part of this research. Only Denmark has seen total ODA decline from 2014 to 2015 when excluding in-donor refugee costs.
- The case studies reveal that much of the additional finance is used to respond to the refugee situation outside Europe, specifically in the Syrian region.

Attainment of the 0.7% ODA/GNI target looks different when excluding in-donor refugee costs from ODA statistics.

- A number of European countries, including Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands reached this objective in 2015.
- If in-donor refugee costs are excluded, the Netherlands’ rate however drops below the 0.7% target.
• EU DAC members together achieved a 0.47% ODA share of GNI in 2015 but without in-donor refugee costs the share is more modest at 0.41%.

Testing flexibility: sourcing additional finance, trade-offs and ODA predictability

The growing number of asylum seekers and rising costs, both for first-year reception within Europe and for refugees abroad, has demanded creativity in ‘sourcing’ additional finances. Governments of the countries studied have employed different strategies to match additional costs – each having its own risks.

• In Sweden and Denmark, the budget revisions in 2015 and 2016 showed a clear trade-off between hosting asylum seekers and the ODA funding available for cooperation abroad.

• In 2015 Sweden used budget flexibility to disburse above its 1.0% ODA/GNI target to cover in-donor refugee costs, but re-allocations in 2016 led to temporary reductions in aid available for external cooperation programmes in 2016, which meant that ongoing programmes risked being stopped or postponed. A similar situation ensued in Denmark.5

• While this need not negatively affect efforts to achieve multi-year strategic objectives, such reductions test the flexibility and responsiveness of financing and programming processes.

• To avoid such trade-offs some donors, such as the Netherlands and the European Commission, have sought adequate fiscal solutions in response, such as making use of future flexibility in budgets and tapping into reserves, thus putting a strain on future budgets.

Humanitarian funding has not been affected by such trade-offs – where they existed. All case study countries have kept or increased funding for humanitarian aid and relief in recent years as part of their ODA commitments – notably to tackle the Syrian refugee crisis. This has been the case even in contexts characterised by budget cuts or necessary re-allocations due to higher in-donor refugee costs, as seen in Denmark or Sweden.

5 Both Denmark and Sweden have originally cut appropriations for development cooperation budget lines due to the higher estimations in-donor refugee costs. These were later reinstated following a drop in forecasted numbers.
The strategies deployed are to some extent linked to specific budget systems of donors. In the cases where ODA frameworks are pre-defined and in-donor refugee costs are deducted (such as in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark), trade-offs between in-donor refugee costs and current or future resources development cooperation are more visible. Where there is no pre-defined contingent for ODA resources from which in-donor refugee costs are deducted, e.g. in Germany, such trade-offs do not emerge directly.

Inflows of asylum seekers and resulting in-donor refugee costs are hard to forecast and create uncertainty over available ODA resources. As long as refugee flows towards Europe are volatile or depend on fragile political agreements (such as the EU-Turkey deal), this can undermine the predictability of available resources for longer-term development cooperation budgets.

New fiscal arrangements seeking to take into account the unpredictable nature of migration flows and associated costs come with their own risks and challenges. European states and donors have sought solutions to how ongoing development cooperation and aid planning can be better protected – while balancing demands from different pressure groups. Various ways of protecting development cooperation budgets in financing in-donor costs or mitigating their impact have been introduced:

- Sweden has installed a cap of 30% in the reduction of its ODA framework for in-donor refugee costs.
- Some governments, such as the Netherlands, have changed their reporting methodology for in-donor refugee costs in order to even out the distribution of these costs over years and safeguard predictability for ODA in a given budget year.
- Other changes and suggestions relate to providing donor agencies with more flexibility within multi-year budget appropriations and agreeing beforehand on how to deal with specific budgetary scenarios, as in Sweden’s case.

Other proposals have also been made. Danish civil society has for instance proposed a guarantee that 0.7% of GNI is used for ‘narrow’ ODA excluding in-donor refugee costs and that overall about 0.8% of GNI is spent on ODA inclusive of in-donor refugee costs.

Refugee inflows could continue to create uncertainty over ODA funding available. This could make multi-year planning with partners, one of the best practices for dealing with protracted crises, more difficult. This may put the
external perception of European donors as stable long-term partners at risk, with potential negative implications for the quality of development cooperation.

*Lack of harmonisation in the reporting of in-donor refugee costs*

Since the costs for receiving asylum seekers in Europe may lead to less finance being available for ODA abroad, scrutiny on the reporting of such costs has increased.

- The large increase in reported in-donor costs as ODA is due to the rise in the number of asylum seekers in need of protection in Europe.
- But changes in donors’ reporting practices also play a role.
- OECD guidelines for reporting in-donor refugee costs are ambiguous.

There are a number of incentives for making full use of this ambiguity. Reporting these costs can for example bring donors closer to their ODA/GNI share target. Interviews conducted for this study further revealed that donors may be inclined to report these costs extensively to point up their actual efforts to protect refugees.

- Germany has for example recently changed its reporting methodology to include more cost items and to align with practices of other EU member states.
- The case of Denmark has shown that some European governments make maximum use of the room for manoeuvre in the OECD guidelines or may even go beyond them.

Currently, divergent practices across donors concerning types of asylum seekers covered and cost items included cast doubt on the credibility of these ODA statistics. The OECD DAC is aiming to clarify the guidelines so as to improve reporting consistency across DAC donors in 2017. The underlying rationale for what costs should qualify as ODA is not clear in all cases. Harmonisation efforts should thus aim to clearly establish which costs are indeed in line with the ODA definition and which relate to the integration of refugees or to administrative costs relating to donors’ internal and security policies.
Are geopolitical priorities guiding European aid in the short-term and beyond undergoing change?

Beyond the immediate re-balancing (and in some cases re-allocation) of ODA disbursements towards refugee hosting areas, the migration situation has led to a political focus on increasing development and political cooperation with countries that are strategically relevant from a migration perspective.

- Disaggregated OECD DAC data up to 2014 shows that a re-balancing of humanitarian aid towards the Syrian conflict has taken place.
- Overall, European donors are thus more visibly supporting actions in conflicts which also have strong migration implications for Europe.
- Aid data shows that EU states are often among the largest donors for other top-level displacement crises such as those of Yemen (on an almost comparable displacement scale as Syria) or Colombia.
- Yet, in a context of scarce ODA resources, changes in displacement figures in crises ‘further away’ seem hitherto to have resulted in weaker funding responses than in the case of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Interviewees voiced concern that displacement challenges and migration issues that do not generate flows towards Europe are currently not arousing much interest.

For longer-term development cooperation a review of policy documents and strategies shows that migration increasingly plays a stronger role for geographical ODA allocations. This will likely continue in the future. Some donors have included migration-related indicators in their funding allocation criteria. Examples include:

- The EU Trust Fund for Africa and the European External Investment Plan have a stronger focus on refugee producing or hosting areas and on migration routes towards Europe due to the political framework in which they are embedded. Migration aspects are integrated in the allocation indicators for the EUTF.
- Proposals to focus aid more strongly on countries relevant to Europe from a migration perspective have entered the Danish draft development strategy.
- Such changes are also taking place in the Netherlands where migration relevance may affect the choice of additional priority partner countries.
- Germany is discussing large investment plans for Africa, seen in part as a response to possible future migration.
Continued systematic research will be needed to monitor the implications of such trends.

*Programming in the context of the refugee and irregular migration situation*

Interviewees have noted that **short-term political pressures in response to the migration crisis have already undermined donor agencies’ own aid effectiveness in a number of instances.** Evidence gathered through interviews show that there is a concern that current responses to the irregular migration situation are not always sufficiently and systematically applying principles highlighted by discussions on Development Effectiveness or Good Donorship in fragile states. Specifically, high-level political pressure to implement and disburse has had negative consequences for the:

4. relationships with local partners in developing countries;
5. analysis and quality control of development spending;
6. starting point of interventions, which sometimes seem to reflect donors’ own considerations without sufficiently taking into account contextual factors.

This is particularly evident in instruments developed or re-deployed to specifically respond to the migrant and refugee crisis.

In some instances, development actors working with rapid-response instruments, such as the EU Africa Trust Fund or the German ‘special initiatives’, have experienced pressure towards short-term spending and rapid, visible disbursement of funds to address structural problems of development.

If these are not single occurrences but part of a wider trend, there is a long-term risk that what has been learned about creating a basis for more successful international engagement will be increasingly undermined.

While programmatic flexibility is important in contexts characterised by instability and unforeseen developments, interviewees and best practice established from engaging in fragile and conflict states suggest that such structural problems merit a longer-term perspective. This includes giving adequate time to the identification and refinement of programme proposals, while involving partner countries and local actors.
Changing European practices and discourse on migration & development

The irregular migration and refugee situation has pushed substantive engagement on migration up the priority ladder for development cooperation in all case study countries and in the EU institutions. There are nuances and differences in terms of the framing and narratives, but:

- The European political discourse on migration and development now concentrates more on the challenges (such as smuggling, addressing irregular migration and displacement).

- Previous debates on maximising the positive impact of migration on development in Europe overall appears to have lost political traction, with implications in terms of informing policy or programming choices.

- Interviewees have noted that political expectations for ODA spending to reduce migration flows are high. No evidence has however been found in the case studies to suggest that the set objective of reducing irregular migration has translated into indicators for measuring success at the technical level.

- At EU level the use of positive and negative incentives (or conditionality) in relation to ODA resources, aimed at furthering European goals on migration, has been introduced in principle. In practice, negative conditionality has not yet been deployed although – according to interviewees - there were instances in which the EU came close to doing so. Throughout the interviews, and from all sides, the effectiveness, practicability and viability of such an approach was questioned – especially in its negative form.

The changing emphasis in policy documents and resulting practices shows that only selective parts of European migration and development actors’ agendas are advanced in the current context.

The political situation has primarily nudged development cooperation in the migration area closer to a focus on refugees and displacement, support for addressing smuggling and border governance, return and reintegration, and addressing ‘root causes’, rather than a broader migration agenda including for example support for mobility and the facilitation of migration, e.g. towards Europe.

Migration-specific ODA trends

There is currently no framework for systematically tracking migration-related ODA expenditure. Due to the absence of comparable reporting on such public
expenditures in partner countries, including through the use of ODA, it is difficult to assess clear funding trends.

- Using ODA for migration, displacement and development purposes is not new to most European donors, though activities have often been ad hoc and without a clear strategic underpinning.

- Despite renewed attention to migration, an analysis of ODA projects reported to the OECD DAC from 2010 to 2014 – based on a search of migration-related keywords within those projects – shows that there have been no significant upward trends or changes across the case studies overall in donor support for specific ‘migration-related’ projects. Most likely this is due to a stronger focus on ‘root causes’ – projects which may not directly target migration aspects but focus on broader sustainable development. Moreover, a growing focus on migration may only become visible from 2015 onwards.

- Reviews and evaluations have shown that donors have tended in the past to focus development support regarding migration more strongly on the security aspects.

- Given the changing discourse on migration, achieving a balanced approach to migration and development will likely remain a challenge or become even more difficult.

As yet, the increased framing of development cooperation and ODA spending under the umbrella of ‘addressing root causes’ has not necessarily meant a visible shift in the thematic focus of activities.

- In the case studies, existing cooperation on employment generation, governance or resilience has to some extent been re-labelled, according to interviewees. This may change with strategic discussions ongoing as to how development cooperation can better engage with factors influencing flight and decisions to migrate.

- A review of projects under the EU Trust Fund for Africa aiming to address root causes shows that initial activities under the Fund were strongly focused on resilience and employment projects. More recent programmes are putting stronger emphasis on support for migration governance, mainly with regard to border governance and partner capacity for addressing irregular migration and return.

Using development cooperation funds, including ODA, to accompany return and reintegration efforts of failed asylum seekers and supporting specific aspects of migration governance continue to be part of donor narratives and have been
reinforced in strategic discussions in all case studies. This has implications for the use of ODA funding in the migration domain. The developmental value of such projects depends on their starting points and underlying assumptions, which need to be well informed from a development, governance and conflict perspective.

One of the most progressive part of current discussions is the concrete effort being made to link humanitarian and development approaches in refugee situations more closely and to determine how work in fragile contexts can be improved. The case studies show that actors are putting into practice this agenda, which has long been discussed but has lacked traction in the past.

**Longer-term implications and suggestions for further work**

New ways need to be sought to build programmes on contextual knowledge in designing migration and development cooperation programmes.

- Such approaches are emerging, for example, in the Research and Technical Facilities of the EU Trust Fund and as part of Dutch calls for proposals.
- More staff are working on or are associated with migration aspects in politically sensitive contexts where support can lead to unintended consequences.
- It is important to ensure that incentives point towards integrating relevant knowledge in programming and towards establishing a culture of monitoring, evaluation and learning.

Better reporting on migration-related development support should be addressed as part of OECD ODA or TOSSD\(^6\) statistics, discussions in the context of Agenda 2030 and the UN Global Migration Compact process in the longer term.

- Besides harmonisation of reporting standards for in-donor refugee costs, a specific OECD-DAC Code on Migration would be useful to track specific ODA expenditure on migration-related technical assistance and support to migration governance in partner countries.
- In this context, possible risks emerging from the inclusion of migration in ODA statistics – e.g. that actions straying far from the original purpose of ODA activities (such as in the area of border management to reduce irregular migration) could be further legitimised – should be mitigated.

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\(^6\) Total Official Support to Sustainable Development.
• Clear guidelines and agreed practices for migration-specific ODA spending could be developed. Clarity and exchange on which types of programmes supporting migration governance capacity can be justified under the ODA definition would be beneficial. More transparency regarding the way the migration agenda is supported by donors may also encourage exchange and good, balanced donor behaviour in pursuit of a comprehensive agenda.

• This can also assist monitoring and reporting on migration-related SDGs and the support that donors provide for migration-related objectives.

Given ongoing strategic discussions to utilise ODA more systematically to address migration, root causes and displacement (particularly from 2014 onwards), continued monitoring of how spending on migration-relevant projects develops would be worthwhile.
1 Introduction

Violent conflicts, inequality, terrorism, repressive regimes and chronic poverty have in recent years resulted in increasing numbers of refugees and migrants coming to Europe. In 2015, more than 1 million irregular migrants and refugees are estimated to have crossed into Europe (UNHCR, 2015). Worldwide displacement is at an all-time high, exceeding 60 million people for the first time. The situation in Syria has displaced an estimated 11 million Syrians since the civil war broke out in 2011, and has resulted in Syrians being the largest group of asylum seekers reaching European countries in recent years. Yet, the current flows towards Europe are mixed in nature with irregular migrants, displaced and trafficked individuals from countries as varied as Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan, the Gambia, Senegal and Nigeria arriving in Europe to find better opportunities for their lives. The routes as well as ‘roots’ of migration are not new and the increased flows can partly be explained by the growing human smuggling industry who have started to actively recruit new clients (Reitano & Tinti, 2015).

As a result, the increasing migration flows have cast Europe in a political crisis since 2011 (Reitano & Tinti, 2015). In 2015, over a million migrants and refugees entered the European Union, provoking security concerns and political disputes over how to best deal with the situation. Lack of solidarity and shared objectives in the context of rising numbers of immigrants has put severe pressure on the European project itself, partly explaining the rise of the issue as one of ‘the most important foreign policy issues for Europe’ in recent years (Jensen, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 2016).

Simultaneously, migration and its link to development processes is increasingly relevant at the global level. The complexity of migratory patterns and the often-positive impacts of such movements on development and the livelihoods of individuals, have contributed to acknowledging migration as ‘enabler for development’ (UN Secretary General, 2016, p.9) and firmly integrating the aim to ‘facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people’ in the post-2015 global development agenda (UN, 2015). The 71st UN General Assembly in 2016 has also begun the process of negotiating an agreement to better deal with large flows of migrants and the International Organisation for Migration has become a Related Organisation to the United Nations.

The emphasis on migration in EU development cooperation, as expressed in the 2014 Council Conclusions on Migration in EU development cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2014), provides scope for the EU to work towards the SDG vision and goals on migration. Yet, as part of the crisis mood Europe has been in, narratives on migration have changed and now more strongly highlight the
challenges rather than the opportunities of migration. The EU and its member states are increasingly under pressure to serve political shorter-term interests yet face more complex fragile situations demanding well-informed long-term engagement.

The EU and its member states have turned to external action ‘combining political, development and humanitarian assistance tools’ (European Commission, 2015b, p.12) to find solutions to the current challenges as part of a comprehensive approach. Changes in aid levels and instruments are again being considered to offer protection to arriving migrants within donor countries, to support refugees and hosting communities abroad and address external dimensions of migration. This is not entirely new: development cooperation and ODA have in the past been used in response to refugee and migration movements (Czaika & Mayer, 2008; Czaika, 2009; Lindstrom, 2003; Loescher, 1993).

Box 1. What is Official Development Assistance (ODA)?

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a concept that has been developed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to measure aid spending to developing countries. It has been first used in 1969 and is now the key measure used in assessing aid targets and performance. It is officially defined as ‘those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to multilateral institutions which are:

i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and

ii. each transaction of which:

iii. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries and its main objective; and

iv. is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). (OECD, undated).

OECD DAC Members have agreed on limits and rules on ODA that guides members in their reporting released in the form of ODA guidelines. The most recent revision of these guidelines took place at the beginning of 2016 (OECD, 2016g).

A number of EU member states have reported using increasing amounts of ODA to cover the cost of hosting refugees within Europe – at times leading to trade-offs with other international support. Some donors have increased their overall ODA allocations to support refugees and migrants. Changes to European ODA resources and underlying development strategies have sparked discussion on the impact of these changes, and raised concerns that ODA is becoming ‘securitised’ and diverted towards more narrow European migration interests. This has led the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to appeal that ‘resources for one area should
not come at the expense of another in addressing the migration and refugee crisis (The Local, 2015).

The current irregular migration and refugee situation presents a significant challenge for European donor agencies & development actors to do so, as the political mood is changing, budgets are stretched and the numbers of migrants and refugees remain high and volatile.

It is commonly held that to successfully address the current refugee and irregular migration situation, and to support the positive development impacts of migration or to foster sustainable development in line with the SDGs would require a range of policies and financing solutions beyond Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), not least in the area of migration policies (Hong & Knoll, 2016; Pelling, Sweden and the Migration Aspects of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2016).

While acknowledging that far greater policy efforts beyond development cooperation and the use of ODA are necessary, this study sets out to investigate in detail the response strategies to the irregular migration and refugee situation of selected European donors and its effects on ODA reporting and prioritising, in three stages:

- The short-term changes to budgetary allocations and ODA reporting, including for in-donor refugee costs, as well as development cooperation programming, and;
- their likely effect on donor strategies and practices over the medium-term (3-5 years) in terms of new policy frameworks, instruments, allocation criteria and other programming practices, and;
- possible implications over the longer term.

Case studies were conducted on Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands as well as the European Commission. This analysis will highlight opportunities and challenges arising from these response strategies.

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7 The focus of this study is on funding that qualifies as and is reported as ODA. The study however also includes analysis of donors’ development cooperation strategies, which may refer to funding beyond ODA. An increase of focus on areas that may not qualify as ODA as part of development cooperation strategies can also be of relevance for ODA if development cooperation resources are finite.

8 These countries have been selected based on a number of criteria related to refugee figures (asylum seekers, total and per capita) and aid developments (reporting of ODA in-donor costs, effect on aid budgets).
1.1 Methodological approach

The study was initiated by ECDPM and commissioned by EBA. The bulk of the research has been conducted from May 2016 to October 2016. The methodological approach consisted of desk research including literature review and OECD DAC and national budget ODA data analysis; 23 semi-structured telephone and personal interviews as well as a comparative review of the case studies. Interviewees were chosen based on their specific positions working on relevant aspects covered by the study. Relevant individuals were identified based on own contacts, suggestions from the reference group and from further suggestions provided by those contacted and asked for details of relevant colleagues within their administration or organisation. The study has also benefitted from a number of conversations with experts and EU and EU MS officials during conferences and meetings that took place outside the explicit research for this study. The cut-off date for the analysis of national budget developments has been July 2016. However, given that 2016 and 2017 budgets have adjusted, negotiated and passed after the cut-off date, these situations were monitored and in a number of cases taken into account, especially when they resulted in changes of trends.

From a methodological perspective, as with any research conducted during a short time frame on a topical issue, the study only provides a snapshot of a field that is changing fast and where not all strategic discussions are yet reflected in ODA programming decisions. In the scope of the study a limited amount of interviews have been conducted per country, including civil society, government officials and researchers/experts (See Annex 3). While attempts were made to conduct interviews with all relevant divisions in ministries or EU institutions, this was not always possible due to time and availability or lack of response of individuals contacted. This provides limitations for the range of stakeholders that could be interviewed working on the different issues touched upon. Nevertheless, notable consistency on a number of key aspects seem to indicate that there are indeed some trends that go beyond the individual and anecdotal level – yet would need to be further investigated in more detail in the future.

At the time of research, disaggregated data on ODA from the OECD-DAC has been available until 2014. Changes in longer-term strategic objectives in relation to the migration situation and resulting funding patterns may only become visible during the coming years. There is thus a continuous need to analyse data and monitor future developments.

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*For the list of interviews per case study see Annex III.*
1.2 Terminology on migration

The study refers to a number of terms and concepts in the area of migration and development cooperation. How phenomena, individuals and groups are referred to constructs meanings that can have political and policy implications. This is especially important in the current context in which migration terminology in Europe has at times been incorrectly used, reinterpreted, or overemphasized. Box 1 thus clarifies key terminology used in this study to give background on their definitions, meanings and possible diverging interpretations.

Box 2. Explanation of key migration and development terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrants, Refugees and Asylum seekers</th>
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<tr>
<td>A migrant is defined by the IOM as a person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from his/her habitual place of residence independent of legal status, the causes of movement, the length of stay or whether this movement is voluntary or not (IOM, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A refugee is a person who has a clearly defined right for protection 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.' This right is enshrined in the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. Other Conventions extend this definition (see e.g. the 1969 OAU Convention of the 1984 Cartagena Declarations; IOM, 2011). Diverging views exist about whether refugees are included in the category of migrants – as is the case in the definition by the IOM. UNHCR argues that the two categories are to be kept separate and that migrants are individuals that move for reasons other than for protection as refugees (see Carling, 2016; Pace and Severance, 2016; Carling, 2015; Sengupta, 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An asylum seeker is a person who seeks safety and awaits decision on the application for refugee status. The paper refers to asylum seekers in the context of EU donors reporting financing for the first year reception of arriving individuals as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Some donors report costs for asylum seekers prior to a decision on their status, other donors only for individuals for which asylum has been granted (i.e. for those with accepted refugee status). When referring to this practice in general, the paper uses the term asylum seekers, which however at times may also include those that have been successful in their application.</td>
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Irregular, regular and orderly migration

Though there is no universally accepted definition, irregular migration refers to ‘movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries’ (IOM, 2011). The IOM points out that ‘from the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country’ (IOM, 2011). Regular migration on the other hand respects those rules and laws and takes place through legal or ‘orderly’ ways. In the media and in policy documents, the terms ‘irregular migration’ and ‘illegal migration’ (Andersson,
are at times used interchangeably. It needs to be pointed out that irregular migrants can have migrated through regular channels but become ‘irregular’ over time, e.g. through overstaying their visa.

This paper uses the expression ‘irregular migration and refugee situation’, to describe the phenomenon of a large number of individuals, whether refugees or motivated by other reasons, arriving in Europe through irregular ways during the past years – most of which sought asylum. Referring to both a refugee and irregular migration situation aims to reflect that a number of arrivals will receive protection under the Refugee Convention or other legal instruments and that others will not have a rightful claim to stay. It is however acknowledged that refugees can also be classified as irregular migrants and – in the absence of regular migration possibilities – have often no other choice than participating in irregular migration to reach safe havens. The paper aimed to avoid the more negative term ‘migration crisis’ that has been widely used in the media to describe the situation. When referring to EU support to the humanitarian situation caused by the conflict in Syria or other conflicts leading to displacement, the shorter term ‘refugee situation’ is used.

The text also includes references to ‘migration management/governance’. This concept ‘encompasses numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management for cross-border migration’ (IOM, 2011). Within the context of the SDG framework there is renewed discussion on measuring effective migration governance that can contribute to ‘safe, orderly and regular migration’ (see for example Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016, IOM and Eurasylum, 2016). These concepts are not always clearly defined and various definitions and conceptualizations exist. The text uses the term to more broadly to refer to a variety of policies and actions to regulate, mediate and respond to the movement of people across borders. These activities usually concern a variety of thematic policy areas (see Hong and Knoll, 2016).

While there a number of crisis elements observable (e.g. a refugee crisis, political challenges, a humanitarian crisis in several places), the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon points out that it is not a crisis of numbers but of solidarity (Ban, 2016). Others note that we are not witnessing a ‘migration crisis’ but a political one. Alexander Betts (Director of the Refugee Study Center at Oxford University) for example argued in an interview that “It is not just a crisis of numbers, it’s a crisis of politics and a crisis of the failure of international cooperation” (Aljazeera, 2015). For a critique of the use of the word crisis in the current context, see also Heller et al. (2016).
2 Short-term responses

2.1 Increasing ODA and rising in-donor refugee costs

Partially motivated by humanitarian imperatives, partly by the objective to provide asylum seekers and host communities with access to basic services and livelihood opportunities and partly due to the interest of reducing migration flows, donors have had to take short-term measures to make additional ODA funding available. This has affected donors’ budgets in the short term.

With the unfolding irregular migration and refugee situation, EU member states’ collective ODA levels have risen – at least until 2015. Even though changes in ODA allocations differ markedly across EU member states, collective EU net ODA commitments and disbursements\textsuperscript{11} have increased continuously since 2011. Since 2012, EU collective ODA rose from EUR 55 257 mn to EUR 68 226 mn in 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2016). This corresponds to developments in the case studies, where net ODA disbursements have risen between 2010 and 2015 for each of the cases.\textsuperscript{12} Analysis of 2016 national budgets and future forecasts in the case studies however shows a more mixed picture, with Denmark undergoing strong cuts in available ODA resources in 2016 and the Netherlands forecasting reduced ODA figures for the coming years. Sweden on the other hand has increased sources available for ODA from 2015 to 2016 due growth in its GNI. Germany also plans to make more development cooperation resources available until 2019.\textsuperscript{13}

Another trend that has caught headlines in the context of the irregular migration and refugee situation in Europe is the significant increase of in-donor refugee costs reported under ODA due to the rising numbers of asylum seekers. Some EU member states, it seems, have increasingly made use of the ambiguity OECD DAC rule to report costs incurred during the first 12 months of hosting asylum seekers in donor countries as ODA. However, even excluding these in-donor refugee costs, EU DAC member states’ ODA has increased as illustrated in Figure 1. From 2014 to 2015, ODA rose in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden

\textsuperscript{11} EU collective ODA is calculated as sum of ODA from EU member states and the part of ODA provided by EU institutions that is not imputed to Member States. (Council of the European Union, 2016a)

\textsuperscript{12} Though not always continuously: The Netherlands, Sweden and the EC have had drops in disbursements in between 2010 and 2015.

\textsuperscript{13} While the Netherlands and Denmark designate a % of their estimated GNI for ODA resources (which includes development cooperation), Germany does not communicate a figure for an overall ODA framework in advance – the planned increase for the German development cooperation budget is thus only part of Germany’s ODA figures.
even if in-donor refugee costs are deducted. Denmark however has seen a declining ODA trend when excluding in-donor refugee costs.

Table 1. EU collective ODA, 2012-2015

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<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>EUR mn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU ODA</td>
<td>55 257</td>
<td>56 877</td>
<td>59 313</td>
<td>68 226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rise in reported in-donor refugee costs as ODA has sparked renewed criticism of donor reporting practices and whether these costs in fact reflect the spirit of ODA statistics. ODA disbursements would however surely not have risen as much if in-donor refugee costs were not part of the equation. The EU Council reports that EU countries have increased reported in-donor refugee costs from EUR 3,3 bn (5,6% of collective EU ODA) in 2014 to EUR 8,6 billion (or 12,5% of collective EU ODA) in 2015. For European collective ODA, while the surge in refugee costs amounted to EUR 5,3 bn from 2014 to 2015 total ODA increased by a

Figure 1. EU-DAC MS, ODA net disbursements (constant prices, USD mn), 2010-2015

Source: OECD Development Statistics; OECD (2016) tables and graphs

See footnote 1.

For EU countries that are members of the OECD DAC 13,1% of total net ODA was reported as being spent on refugees within Europe in 2015.

See footnote 1.
reported EUR 8.9 billion. As the EU Council highlights, ‘this means that in 2015 the EU increased both its support to refugees [within the EU] as well as its other development aid.” (Council of the European Union, 2016a, p.4)\(^\text{17}\)

The increased in-donor refugee costs also had an effect on the ODA/GNI share. EU DAC members achieved 0.47% in 2015 yet without in-donor refugee costs the share is more modest at 0.41% as illustrated in figure 2.

**Figure 2. EU DAC Member, ODA as % of GNI, 2010-2015**

The case studies reveal different budgetary practices and immediate response strategies to the increase in arriving refugees and the uncertainty over how refugee flows develop. These can be investigated from two different perspectives:

- Firstly, the short-term budgetary implications: how European countries have sourced funding in their national budgets in order to pay for refugee reception in their country and what decisions were taken in relation to raising additional ODA resources for countries outside the EU in response to the irregular migration and refugee situation.

- Second, how European countries have handled how and what to report as in-donor refugee costs.

\(^{17}\) For European OECD DAC member states collectively, taking into account inflation and exchange rate movements, ODA excluding in-donor refugee costs still increased by 3,6% from 2014 to 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2016a; OECD, 2016)
These are explored below in turn.

2.2 Short-term budgetary implications for ODA

Despite this rise in overall ODA up to 2015, concerns have been voiced about distributional effects and trade-offs caused by European donors’ choices in their immediate response to the refugee and irregular migration situation. Most prominently this concerns the rising in-donor refugee costs as part of donors’ ODA figures. In the context of the UN Global Migration Summit in September 2016, a worry has been that attention given to humanitarian issues and refugees, specifically in the context of the Syria crisis, would detract resources from longer-term development (AbuZayd, 2016). Others have pointed out that the global response to crises is highly uneven and that we risk forgotten displacement crises in other parts of the world (Chesnutt and Wilman, 2016; UN News Centre, 2015; Einsporn, 2014). These will be looked at in the following sections.

The case study countries highlight how some European member states have taken different approaches to financing the increased in-donor refugee costs. The high volumes of in-donor refugee costs in European countries can come at a cost to development cooperation budgets, long-term development aid and aid predictability, principally because such costs are hard to forecast and because they create trade-offs with sources available for aid projects in partner countries. The extent to which this happens partly depends on the budgeting systems of different donors and under which budgets these costs are planned and accounted for. Even if donors report large amounts for hosting refugees as ODA, they do not necessarily use their development budgets to source or fund them.

Germany, for instance, views in-donor refugee costs separately from its development cooperation budget and then calculates and reports ODA amounts afterwards. Thus the development cooperation budget is not automatically negatively impacted if in-donor costs rise. Such an arrangement may reduce the risk of tapping into the budget for development cooperation in order to pay for the refugee protection. Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark on the other hand deduct in-donor refugee costs from an amount for global development designated for ODA\(^{18}\), which also includes the resources available for their development

\(^{18}\) For Sweden such deductions are capped at 30% of the overall sources designated to ODA in a given year.
cooperation budgets. A rise in first year protection costs for refugees eligible as ODA, thus negatively impacts on available resources for other ODA activities.

In some cases, such as in Denmark or Sweden, there has been a clear trade-off between hosting refugees and the available funding for external cooperation. In Denmark, in combination with overall budget cuts, increasing refugee costs have reduced the ODA volume available for financing both bilateral and multilateral development assistance for 2015 and 2016. With the planned 2016 budget, commitments for bilateral long-term assistance to developing countries have initially dropped by 46% when compared to the previous year. Aid to the thematic areas such as natural resources, energy and climate change as well as research and information was initially cut by more than half.

Sweden similarly had to reassess priorities in initial budget proposals for 2016 - funding for multilateral organisations, especially development banks was put on hold. Funding allocated to global efforts for socially sustainable development, actions on human rights and democratisation was lowered by more than 20% from 2015 to 2016. At the same time funding for in-donor refugees and host communities abroad, especially in the Middle East, had been prioritised for which allocations were increased.

All case studies, the EU Institutions, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden kept or increased their humanitarian and relief funding during the past years, mainly to provide support to the Syrian refugee situation in the Middle East. Humanitarian budgets have thus largely been protected from above described trade-offs. In Sweden and Denmark this has come at the cost of aid for longer-term cooperation efforts. In Sweden, for example, initial budget reductions in 2016 included geographic reallocations towards additional efforts in the Middle East and North Africa at the cost of programmes such as human rights and democratisation or global support for sustainable development. In Denmark the decision was made to reduce longer-term cooperation in the context of budget cuts while protecting the levels of humanitarian assistance. There are in general no easy answers regarding prioritisation of scarce resources and donors had to balance competing demands. Box 1 explores geographical implications for humanitarian aid funding in the case studies and discusses the issue of ‘forgotten crisis’ noted above.

Other donors studied chose to make additional resources available by reducing future flexibility in the budget rather than at the cost of long-term development

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19 In the case of Sweden, about 1% of GNI is earmarked for ODA; in the case of Denmark it is set at 0.7% and for the Netherlands it varies between years.
20 All case study countries are also providing multi-annual humanitarian aid commitments, which is seen as a good practice by the OECD DAC.
funds. In the Netherlands additional funding to top up the humanitarian aid resources in 2015 and 2016 comes at the expense of future appropriations instead of reducing present appropriations for long-term cooperation in the budget. The European Commission also continuously raised its humanitarian aid budgets during the past years through making use of existing reserves, such as the Emergency Aid reserve or the Humanitarian Aid operational reserves. It also drew on funds previously not earmarked for ODA or development cooperation. To raise additional funding for longer-term cooperation it drew on reserves or flexibility margins. For the Madad Trust Fund, unused margins of the ENI have been made use of and for the EU Africa Trust Fund, reserves of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) were used. This has to large extent depleted flexibility mechanisms for the coming years. Without increasing financial envelopes or a raise of appropriations, there is an implicit assumption that in the current financial framework no other crisis will be forthcoming and that humanitarian funding needs will be lower than they have been in 2015/6.

21 The Madad Fund, which runs until 2019, finances the response to the Syrian crisis and supports refugee host countries in the region. It aims to accompany the humanitarian aid efforts with longer-term resilience needs of refugees and host communities
Box 3. Geographic implications for humanitarian funding in the context of the refugee and irregular migration situation?

Overall, the European donors studied have moved towards supporting humanitarian action in the conflicts and crises in its neighbourhood and seem to focus more strongly on those that are connected with population flows to Europe. OECD DAC ODA statistics, available until 2014, show for all cases studied a significant increase in the share of humanitarian aid commitments allocated the Middle East, specifically to address the Syrian refugee situation. In Denmark the share of humanitarian ODA commitments to the Middle East increased from 3.3% in 2010 to 23.2% in 2014. For Sweden it rose from 11% in 2010 to 21.1% in 2014. In Germany the share of humanitarian aid commitments to the Middle East increased from 5.5% to 46%, in the Netherlands from 9% to 28.6% over the same period. In Sweden, Germany, and the EU institutions this has in the past 3 years not negatively affected shares going to Africa – which are in most cases still high. Rather, in these three cases, a decline in the share for the America region as well as a drop in the share for South & Central Asia since 2010 accompanies the increasing share for the Middle East. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the shares of humanitarian funding commitments to Africa, more specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, have decreased since 2010. Analysis of national budgets for 2015 and 2016 in the case studies confirm that refugee challenges in the context of the Syrian crisis continue to be a top priority as concerns humanitarian assistance. Denmark has for example communicated that the increase in humanitarian funding in 2016, despite overall ODA cuts, are for the Syrian crisis and to benefit refugees in Europe’s neighbouring areas so to ‘avoid hunger and emergencies driving them into Europe’ (Development Today, 2016b). Germany’s budget allocation for transition support has increased strongly with increased geographic focus on the MENA region. Sweden however also used reinstatements to the development cooperation budget due to a lower number of asylum seekers in 2016 to allocate it to humanitarian organisations’ core budgets rather than tying it to specific crisis.

While aid efforts in the context of the Syria refugee situation are still underfunded (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 2016), UN organisations have pointed out that humanitarian funding is needed for Africa in order to deal with displacement situations such as those caused by recent instability such as in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or the Central African Republic (CAR). In August 2016, in its second allocation round for underfunded emergencies for 2016, UNOCHA has identified the African countries Chad, the DRC, CAR, Eritrea and refugees from Burundi and the DRC in Rwanda as ‘forgotten humanitarian emergencies’ where available resources are ‘critically low’.

A number of interviewees for this study suggested that the more distant refugee or displacement situations or those that do not affect Europe directly are currently of less political interest and are not prioritised from a funding perspective (Interviews Implementing Agencies; Interview EU official). In the Middle East, but outside the context of the Syrian refugee situation, Yemen has become one of the most urgent ‘forgotten displacement crisis’ (UN CERF, 2016). According to UN OCHA, currently more than 18.8 million people are in need of humanitarian protection assistance in Yemen, of which 10.3 million in acute need including 6.6 internally displaced in 2016 (UNOCHA, 2016a). In terms of number of people affected this compares to the situation in Syria (with 13.5 million in need of humanitarian assistance and another 5 million refugees in the region) (UNOCHA, 2016b). Although the EU Commission has increased humanitarian funding for

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22 In OECD statistics the Middle East forms a sub-region of the region Asia.
23 At the same time in most cases the share to South and Central Asia have declined making the Middle East the largest receiver of humanitarian aid within the Asia sub-region.
Yemen and provided EUR 120 million in 2015/16 (ECHO, 2016a), the funding response does not compare with the one for the Syrian crisis (ECHO, 2016b). Jean-Louis de Brouwer, the director for Europe, Eastern Neighbourhood and the Middle East of the EU’s DG ECHO noted in an interview that Yemen ‘remains a largely forgotten crisis (ECHO, 2016c). Similarly, the Resident Coordinator of UN OCHA in Yemen, Jamie McGoldrick, said in a BBC interview that ‘the world has turned a blind eye to what is happening in Yemen … right now we are so under-resourced for this crisis, it’s extraordinary.’ (BBC, 2016)

The case of Colombia may also illustrate that refugee and displacement situations ‘further away’ from Europe or not connected with refugee flows towards the European Union may receive less strong humanitarian aid reactions from European donors. UNHCR estimates from 2014 suggest that with 5.7 million IDPs, Colombia had become home to the ‘second-highest internally displaced population after Syria’ back in 2014. There have been strong rises of internal displacement every year between during the past years and DG ECHO’s listed the country on its forgotten crisis index (FCA) every year between 2007 and 2015. This could have justified an increased attention. Yet, humanitarian funding from EU institutions has remained stable between 2007 and 2014 while total international humanitarian to the country funding declined between 2009 and 2013 (Development Initiatives, 2015, p.62). The announcement of the EU Trust Fund to support the peace process in Colombia of December 2016 may however change this and also shows that such criticism may not be justified in all cases.

The study has found only few instances in which resources been directly diverted from on-going programmes, budgets or budget lines to re-direct or specifically target them for short-term migration responses. A case in point are Sweden’s contract renegotiations with partners as part of the initial 2016 reductions of Sweden’s thematic budget lines in order to re-allocate funds to the Syria response or use them for paying for refugee protection in Sweden (Interview Official, 2016; see Sweden case study).

The reductions in aid allocated to external cooperation, as noted in the case of Denmark and Sweden, do not necessarily negatively affect efforts towards multi-year strategic objectives and longer-term development cooperation, but test the

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24 According to OECD DAC CRS data DAC EU Member states and the EU Commission have committed EUR 307 million of humanitarian funding to Yemen in 2015 compared to EUR 715 million earmarked for Syria.

25 On the other hand the UN OCHA overview over humanitarian funding shows that the Syrian Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan and the Yemen response plan are both covered with funding by about 55%. (UN OCHA, 2016c).

26 “Forgotten Crisis are defined as severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest.” See DG ECHO Partners’ Website Helpdesk: http://dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/financing_decisions/dgecho_strategy/fca

27 International humanitarian funding increased again in 2014 (Development Initiatives, 2015). The funding landscape in Colombia however also points to the fact that there is no clear international division of labour based on proximity to conflict: EU’s DG ECHO has been the main humanitarian donor in Colombia funding 35-40% of total international humanitarian funding over the last few years followed by the US and Sweden (Sida, 2015).
flexibility and responsiveness of financing and programming processes. Danish and Swedish aid is governed by multi-year objectives and implemented in yearly appropriations, which leaves some flexibility to allocate appropriations within an overall planned predictable funding level. Within a medium-term budgetary framework, decreases in budget lines in a given year can still be followed by increases in later years. However, the Swedish Aid Agency, Sida, pointed out in mid-2016 that both the Africa and the Asia strategies would be underfunded against their objectives, if levels of asylum seekers continued to be as high as they were forecasted (Sida, 2016).

Both Denmark and Sweden have recently adjusted their forecasted number of refugees downwards – the high initial forecasts were a significant driver behind the initial cuts to development budgets. Funds for external development cooperation are in the process of being reinstated to the 2016 budgets, in the case of Sweden fully, and in the case of Denmark partly. This would mean that above described trade-offs could partly be avoided. In response to the UN’s appeal to not forget crises further away (see also Box 1), Sweden has suggested using the additional reinstated funding as part of the autumn 2016 budget amendment for core budget support to UN organisations so they can use funding where needs are greatest (Development Today, 2016b; Lövin and Andersson, 2016).

While this reinstating of funds is positive for these countries’ overall global development efforts, the rising in-donor refugee costs shows the extent to which planning for the ‘headline’ development cooperation budget has become fraught with uncertainty. As long as refugee flows towards Europe are volatile or depend on fragile political agreements, European development actors in a number of countries may face less predictable levels of available funding for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This puts pressure on aid planning and provides risks for donors’ external perception as stable and long-term partner with potential negative implications for the quality of development cooperation (see OECD, 2016f, p.17 for the case of Denmark; Bengtsson, 2016 for the case of Sweden). Yet, interviewees pointed out that such pressures could also be managed intelligently through more flexibility in budgets and planning practices that can deal with unforeseen events.28

28 For more details, see for example the case study on Sweden.
2.3 Reporting of in-donor refugee costs as ODA

Reporting in-donor refugee costs as ODA has been accepted practice among OECD donor countries since the late 1980’s yet it has been contested ever since (see Box 1). The concern in the current situation among a number of European development actors (including CSOs, Members of the EU Parliament and policy experts) is that reporting of these costs has led to an ‘inflation’ of reported ODA levels over the last 5 years (see Concord, 2016; European Parliament, Committee on Development, 2016; Massa, 2016). This is fundamentally a concern about the credibility and the principles underpinning the ODA definition as a means to transparently communicate donor funds that have ‘the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’ (OECD, 2008, p.1) (see Box 2).

In 2015, Denmark has reported 15.5% of its total ODA as in-donor refugee costs, Germany almost 17%, the Netherlands 22.8% and Sweden 33.8%. For Sweden, the level is so high that refugees in Sweden have now become the biggest group of recipients of Swedish development aid before bilateral support to partner countries, support to multilateral organisations and ODA to specific regions. In 2016, with fewer asylum seekers expected, the forecasted costs are lower but still make up significant shares of the budgets. Naturally, prior to the on-set of the refugee inflows in most EU countries these percentages were much lower. Sweden for example only reported 8.7% in 2010 and Germany recorded only less than 1% until 2014.

Table 2. In-donor refugee costs, as % of net ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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Box 3. The OECD DAC rule on reporting in-donor refugee costs as ODA

| The practice of reporting refugee costs in donor countries (“in donor refugee costs”) as ODA has been used since the creation of the 1988 OECD rule (OECD, 1988), which allows for these costs to be reported as ODA for the first 12 months of the refugees’ stay. This includes payments for refugees’ transport to the host country and temporary sustenance (food, shelter and training), as well as expenditures for voluntary resettlement of refugees in a developing country. The rule has been contested ever since it was created and it has become a contentious aspect of discussions on the modernisation of ODA (OECD, 2005; Hynes and Scott, 2013 and Anders, 2016b) as it is not clear whether protecting refugees in donor countries, though emerging from humanitarian motivations, primarily is for the economic benefit and welfare of developing countries or whether refugees, if integrated in the host community, benefit their host economy. Roodman points out that ‘the slippery slope from foreign and to domestic aid makes any decision on this category debatable’ (Roodman, 2015).

In 2001, a proposal to remove in-donor refugee costs from ODA figures was supported by Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, the UK and the US but rejected by Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Interestingly there seems to be no direct correlation between the use of the rule and the support for keeping or extending it, as some countries making wide use of it are advocating for its removal and others not reporting refugee costs as ODA voting to keep it (Collyer, 2015).

While higher numbers of asylum seekers increase in-donor refugee costs reported as part of ODA, there are stark differences across EU countries in how these costs are reported, for two reasons: First, reporting methods are closely tied to donor countries’ budgetary systems and are subject to estimation and different methodologies. This concerns for example different interpretations of the time frame when the 12 months period starts and ends and what methods are available to estimate them. Second, and partly consequently, donor countries interpret the OECD reporting directives differently concerning which cost items and categories of asylum seekers (e.g. those awaiting decision, those granted asylum or those rejected) are included (OECD, 2016e).

Some of these diverging practices have contributed to the wide variations in the average annual cost per asylum seeker. In the case studies these range from USD 31 933 in the Netherlands over USD 21 791 and USD 14 140 in Denmark and Sweden respectively to 8 908 in Germany in 2014.

The recent increase and changes in reported amounts is not only due to the rise of numbers of asylum seekers, but also due to changes in donors’ reporting practices. Some donors have recently taken decisions to change reporting methodologies, such as the Netherlands, in order to more accurately report costs

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30 The Netherlands has decided to change its timeframe of when costs are reported from 2016 onwards to report costs closer to when they occur (see Case Study Netherlands).
for refugees in the years they actually incur. For the Netherlands this means that whereas until 2016, 100% of the estimated costs per asylum seeker were declared in the year of first arrival, from 2017 onwards only 63% will be declared in the year of first arrival and 37% in the following year. Sweden has received recommendations to change the reporting methodology of in-donor refugee costs along similar lines from their National Audit Office. This would not change overall costs reported as ODA yet influence in which year they are reported.31

Most notable however is Germany, where the migration influx has led the government to review its ODA reporting practices in 2015 to more comprehensively reflect ODA eligible expenditure for refugees (previously not reported) in order to align with the practices of other EU OECD DAC members. Prior to 2015, Germany reported only basic substance costs and medical treatment yet included other ODA eligible expenditures for refugees such as basic education costs in its ODA reports after the review. This helps to explain the large jump in ODA reported by Germany as in-donor refugee costs between 2014 and 2015 as shown in table 2.

The wide variations in annual costs per refugee or asylum seeker are however only partly explained by divergent reporting practices. Some differences simply relate to housing and sustenance costs in a given place – and these also vary across countries. For instance, housing market prices and the choice of accommodation for hosting arrivals (e.g. decentralised vs. central housing) mean that the cost of housing asylum seekers diverges between countries (see Massa, 2016). In the Netherlands, civil society has raised concerns that central housing in large houses has led to high housing costs, while real estate owners profit from the crisis.32 In Sweden and Denmark, housing shortages have also led to source housing for refugees from private landlords and companies with risks of high costs (Crouch, 2015; International Federation for Housing and Planning, 2015). Such political national decisions on how to provide housing and services for refugees will be more difficult to influence, even in the context of harmonising reporting among OECD countries. Lastly, to some extent, the share of unaccompanied minors also explains the differences in average costs, as they require special and more costly protection.

The cases of Denmark and Sweden show that in practice some European governments currently intend to make maximum use of the room for manoeuvre in the OECD guidelines to report costs, and may even go beyond the rules, in part as the

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31 This in turn can have direct influences on development cooperation budgets and available donor resources for interventions in developing countries in a given year within systems that reserve a specific amount for ‘global development’ or ODA per year (as is the case in the Netherlands and in Sweden).

32 This concern is currently being examined by civil society and is not easy to prove due partly due to the lack of transparency in reported costs.
guidance leaves much room for interpretation. This can result in controversy, as in the case of the declaration of in-donor costs for an integration programme consisting of employment-related training and qualifying activities in Denmark, despite the OECD rule excluding activities serving integration in the host country labour market (Development Today, 2016a, Interview Civil Society). Civil Society in Sweden, interviewed in the context of this study, assumes that there may be similar issues with reporting of activities that would be outside the scope of the rule, and have started further investigations. Such cases have also been reported for European member states beyond the cases looked at in this study, such as Spain or Malta (Concord, 2015, p.6).

There are a number of incentives for making full use of the ambiguity of OECD guidelines. First, in-donor refugee costs can be a welcome opportunity to come closer to the UN target of 0.7% ODA/GNI, particularly relevant for Germany, the country studied that is currently farthest from attaining that target. Second, as with any international reporting it also fulfils a function of signalling a certain type of domestic effort (or absence thereof). Reporting in-donor costs in the international OECD DAC framework makes donors’ efforts (in the first year) of hosting refugees visible, showing part of the responsibilities donor countries share for global refugees. Removing in-donor refugee costs from ODA as previously advocated for by OECD statisticians (Hynes & Scott, 2013) and NGOs (see box 2) therefore does not seem politically expedient in the current context.

Divergent reporting practices have however cast doubt on the credibility of ODA statistics intended to provide a comparative picture of donor activities to the benefit of the poorest. The OECD DAC is currently working to clarify the guidelines to reduce the room for interpretation and improve the consistency of the reporting across members. This provides an opportunity to assess and better define the rationale of why certain cost items should or should not be included in a statistic to measure support focused on the economic development and welfare of developing countries. This work will be concluded in 2017, and may have an impact on the above-noted incentives. While establishing more clarity over the type of expenditures to include, aligning the categories of refugees included (e.g. successful or rejected; quota refugee) and to a certain extent harmonising the

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And to better single out those costs that are not part of the ODA reporting guidelines on in-donor refugee costs such as forced displacement or costs of integrating refugees in the labour market. (OECD, 2016c)
forecasting practices and methodologies used to calculate these costs\textsuperscript{34}, full harmonisation of average costs per refugee will not be possible.\textsuperscript{35}

European donors have sought to not only tap into reserves in the short-term, but set up new instruments to address the situation over the medium term. The next chapter will discuss these.

\textsuperscript{34} An audit in Sweden carried out by Riksrevisionen notes that the calculation used by the government for budgeting in-donor refugee costs contributes to uncertainty and may reduce effectiveness of ODA. (Bengtsson, 2016)

\textsuperscript{35} As explained in the text, prices for sustenance and housing costs across EU member states also explain differences in average costs. These are partly a result of legitimate national choices regarding how refugees are housed and how first year reception is organized.
3 Medium-term consequences

The un-regulated inflow of large numbers of refugee and migrants into the EU during the past years has catapulted migration up to the highest strategic level for European development cooperation. Migration as a thematic area in development cooperation has been elevated from a technical to a political theme, and as such is receiving much more attention. The short-term responses noted above reflect this.

Yet over the medium-term, the next section explores to what extent these responses are a break from the past. Do they entail substantive changes to the use of ODA in an attempt to address ‘root causes’ and respond to migration flows?

The following sections will discuss:

- the framing of policies on migration & development and underlying ‘theories of change’ for interventions in this area,
- evolving programming practices under pressure from the crisis;
- criteria used for geographic aid allocations
- specific focus areas within the migration theme of recent ODA commitments and disbursements

While it is beyond the scope of the paper to provide an exhaustive discussion of the approaches to migration and development, it will discuss the underlying assumptions, opportunities and challenges of a number of areas receiving renewed and prominent attention across the cases.

3.1 Policy discussions framing the response to the irregular migration and refugee situation

Until the early 2000s the external dimension of migration and the migration and development link was debated in Europe predominantly in terms of problems and challenges. Since then some of the “simplistic underlying assumptions, for example that development would be the remedy to stop unwanted migration” (Sørensen, 2015) had been largely discarded in the technical and policy dialogues on migration and development. The numerous analyses and lessons learned from practices (ECDPM

36 The concept of ‘theory of change’ is used here in a wide sense referring to ‘underlying assumptions about relationships between desired outcomes and the way proposed interventions are expected to bring them about’ (Aragon and Macedo, 2010, p. 89).
& ICMPD, 2013) have led to a more nuanced understanding of migration and development processes as well as how migration could be supported as enabler for development – at least at the policy level in the European Union (European Commission, 2013a), yet also in a number of the case studies (Interviews Policy Researchers, Interview EU Official, Interview Implementing Agency). Not least, this is shown in the integration of migration dimensions into the Sustainable Development Agenda (United Nations, 2015) to which the EC and some European member states actively contributed.

The EU and its member states are however revising their own medium-term development strategies and policies, partly in response to the irregular migration and refugee situation. There are differences in terms of the framing and narratives for engagement, which have emerged over the past years and which are being used to direct development policy and ODA in this area. At the level of the EU, the predominant narrative on migration in EU development cooperation has changed from one of ‘maximising the development impact of migration […] while minimising its negative impacts’ in 2013 (European Commission, 2013a) to one of ‘addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement’ (European Commission, 2016b). The European Commission has adopted a renewed approach through adopting a Migration Partnership Framework, which includes the use of ODA as an incentive for better cooperation on return and readmission and migration governance (European Commission, 2016b). As a result of these changing narratives, the work on the migration and development agenda set out in the 2013 EC Communication on ‘Maximising the benefits of Migration’ has lost relevance in the current approach (Interview EU Official, 2016; Interview Policy Researcher, 2016).

Both Denmark and Sweden are currently debating draft strategies for future development cooperation, both of which anchor migration and development as key pillars, thereby marking a departure from previous strategies. While Sweden’s draft text seems more cautious in aiming to direct ODA to reduce irregular migration flows, the Danish draft strategy is more explicit in this regard. The Netherlands has re-focused its migration and development approach to better respond to the migration situation and for example reframed engagement in the area of security and the rule of law under the migration logic through a new special fund to address

37 Furthermore different narratives exist within governments across different ministries and departments.
38 Migration Governance refers to a complex concept, which can involve a wide range of actors (individuals, governmental, non-governmental and private sector) that interact in the political management and governance of international migration flows. In this paper and in the context of development cooperation, migration governance refers mainly to donor activities that aim at influencing, governing and facilitating migration and mobility. This can include for example support to border governance as well as strengthening labour mobility systems. See Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016.
'root causes' of irregular migration and displacement. Germany focuses on displacement through its so-called special initiatives, while the broader migration and development agenda has not gained from the recent focus on refugees.

More generally across EU member states, there is shared support for the principle of making ODA flows to partner countries conditional upon cooperation on migration, particularly return and readmission – though EU and EU MS officials interviewed for this study doubt its practicability or effectiveness. Currently ODA acts as positive incentive and leverage, e.g. in the context of the EU Migration Compacts with selected priority countries that receive priority treatment when it comes to EU ODA and other development funding compared to other countries that have signed up to the Valetta agreement (Interview EU Official, 2016). The distribution of funding in the Horn of Africa window of the EU Trust Fund for Africa illustrates this. While Ethiopia, one of the Migration Compact countries, alone receives over EUR 119 mn, the other four countries benefitting from this window (Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Somalia) taken together receive EUR 152 mn.

The large migrant inflows have changed the European political discourse on migration and development by again concentrating on the challenges (such as smuggling, irregular migration and displacement) rather than the broader opportunities of migration for development. This focus on challenges becomes evident from the change in language in policy documents and is confirmed by officials and experts interviewed for this study. With the logic of using development cooperation to reduce flows of migrants and displaced persons having seen a revival during the current crisis, there are a number of approaches that receive prominent attentions across all studies.

In this context, a number of underlying assumptions regarding the relationship between migration and development are (re)gaining prominence and are already or

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39 The EU Council Conclusions on Migration of June 28, 2016 state that in order to 'prevent illegal migration and return [...] irregular migrants [...] effective incentives and adequate conditionality' should be used by the EU and its member states to agree on effective partnerships with third countries (Council of the European Union, 2016b, p.1)

40 The Valletta agreement consists of a Political Declaration and an Action Plan, which were both adopted by African and European states during the Valletta Summit of 11 November 2015. See Council of the European Union, 2015a and b)

41 This is based on the first 24 agreed projects and excludes the regional projects under the Horn of Africa Window of the EU TF, currently amounting to about EUR 59 mn, which also benefits those countries. It has to be noted, however that not all funding of the EU TF may count as ODA, yet all of the first 20 projects under this window have listed DAC codes for reporting funding.

42 The only exception here may be the attention paid to making use of the human resources and capabilities of refugees and to support their integration into the host countries labour market, which is part of a more positive agenda.
may more strongly in the future determine approaches to migration. These are worth examining in turn.

The use of ODA to address “root causes”

The logic of curbing migration inflows by addressing ‘root causes’ has re-appeared in the discourse at European Union level. Much of the narrative and framing of migration policies has evolved around this notion since 2014, carrying both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, it is helpful in so far as more financial resources are being programmed for development-oriented programmes in transit, origin and host countries and to support that no migrant and refugee is left behind. This could provide a real push for beneficial investment in regions that have struggled economically and politically in the past. On the other hand it risks diverting “successful structural programmes aiming at long-term effects [towards] short-term projects to prevent acute refugee movement” (Angenendt, Koch, & Meier, 2016) under a logic of migration control.

According to an interview for this study, the naivety with which ministers, including development, of some EU member states approach the issue is surprising. At the higher political level, the success of the newly set up development funds, such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa, seems to be measured with how successful ODA is in reducing the numbers of migrants travelling in the short-term. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that there has been a strong thematic change of activities under the ‘root cause’ framing or that such objectives translate into indicators for success at the technical level.

Many of the ‘new’ projects under the ‘root-cause’ language are in fact thematically similar to previous development approaches yet presented under a new narrative or ‘re-labelled’ rather than having undergone a substantive change. For the Denmark case study, an interviewee pointed out that existing engagements in countries such as Somalia or Mali previously communicated as having a focus on conflict, resilience and the livelihood of local communities are now framed as being about addressing the drivers of irregular migration.

In the Netherlands, a new fund has been set up in the area of security and rule of law that explicitly aims to address irregular migration and displacement through engagement in this area. Its underlying ‘theory of change’ document, which forms the basis for engagement and gives the fund its strategic direction, however does not make an explicit link to reducing the drivers of migration or displacement. Interviewees confirmed that there has not been as of yet a strong strategic thinking
To an extent something similar is happening at the level of the EU. An analysis of the first 24 programmes of the EU Trust Fund Horn of Africa Window shows that most activities (13 out of the current 20) are focused on strengthening the resilience of communities through support to basic services (education, health, food and nutrition resilience) or livelihood trainings (education/training). The focus of the Sahel and Lake Chad window is to a large extent focused on economic opportunities as well as resilience and governance. The only thing that seems different is the specific targeting on locations that host large numbers of refugees or from where migrants originate as well as a number of projects focusing on border management and migration governance specifically. While the underlying political motive may be to reduce irregular movements, most of these projects are still developmental in nature and –at least thematically- could have also been part of the existing development funds on which the Trust Fund draws (Interview Official, 2016).

At the technical level, results framework indicators of the new initiatives or funds looked at are still related to sustainable development or resilience aspects rather than numbers of migrants departing. Nevertheless, the push to align with a logic that partly seems rooted in migration control– even if only at the rhetorical level – has left some civil society actors uncomfortable and to deliberations whether to apply for such funding or not – as for example in the case of the Netherlands (Interviews Civil Society).

There are various challenges with the concept of using ODA to ‘address the root causes’ of irregular migration. First, there is a lack of clarity whether it refers to dealing with deep-seated drivers of instability and underdevelopment or whether it seeks to influence (the management or reduction of) migration flows or both. This is compounded by the challenge that there are often inherent tensions between these objectives (see Carling and Talleraas, 2016). For the former, it is then debatable whether it really means a change from engaging in fragile situations or responding to structural development challenges in complex settings through humanitarian aid and development cooperation in general. Second, ODA may have a limited role in influencing all the multiple factors that influence a decision to migrate. Most migration decisions are complex, non-static and depend on multiple factors. Access to resources or, skills training or a gain in income may well empower individuals in taking a decision to leave to fulfil aspirations (de Haas, 2011; Carling and Talleraas, 2016). Most available evidence points towards aid not helping to reduce migration flows – at least not within the timespan meaningful for politicians (Clemens, 2016). Third, there are risks associated with immobility and
absence of opportunities to migrate. The possibility to migrate (including in its irregular form), e.g. to cushion the effects of changing climate conditions, or to have access to additional income, is an important strategy for resilience itself (Boswell, 2016; EUTF Research Facility, 2016). Addressing migration pressures by cutting off these opportunities may do more harm than good. Migration can be the most viable and desirable livelihood strategy for some individuals or communities. It is thus questionable whether the emphasis on European policies on seeking to reduce migratory pressures, including through ODA, is always desirable or whether simultaneously ODA should not increasingly play a role in supporting the creation of safe mobility opportunities.

In the case studies, the notion to address ‘root causes’ is usually viewed as an umbrella term. It includes a wide variety of context-specific activities rather than referring to clearly delineated areas. Most strong focus in reviewed policy documents however seems to be on youth employment, access to basic services both for refugees and host communities (not least to reduce ‘secondary movements’), peace and security, human rights, governance as well as resilience. Migration management, security and border governance and information campaigns, also fall under the activities under the ‘root cause’ framing – though these are departing from structural drivers that may motivate people to migrate. Given that such activities encompass very different fields and as there is no clear delineated reporting on activities targeting the drivers of displacement or irregular migration, it was not possible in the context of this study to detect changes in donor focus on specific thematic areas in OECD-DAC ODA data.43

Within the discourse on addressing ‘root causes’, donors had to balance a strong political pressure to come up with quick responses with a desire to test new approaches based on empirical research and existing evidence. Across the case studies interviewees noted that empirical research and the testing of assumptions underlying the ‘theory of change’ – at least as they relate to migration and migration aspirations - of new initiatives has fallen short so far. Frustrations have been noted during interviews about the extent to which existing knowledge on complexities of development and migration – which has continuously been integrated in the EC’s and also other EU member states’ policies and programming during the last decade – has lost relevance in the context of increasing political emphasis on migration.44 This is also due to the fact that many more actors that are

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43 A review of changes in the case studies concerning broad thematic focus of ODA support using the OECD Creditor Reporting System, remained inconclusive either because no strong thematic changes could be detected during the past years or because it was difficult to clearly relate them to the growing focus on ‘root causes’.

44 One expert noted that there has been an ‘overthrow’ of the acknowledgement of complexity’ (Comment, Migration Expert, October 2016).
not necessarily experts on the dynamics around migration and development are now required to contribute to addressing its dimensions. As a result, not in all cases will the assumptions underlying the connections made with mobility or migration in policy documents or programming decisions hold – at least not in the short to mid-term. Yet, in some cases donors also have started to build in learning mechanisms, which offer an opportunity to improve knowledge and practices over time in order to meaningfully integrate migration dynamics, existing knowledge and lessons learned in ODA programming of thematic activities.

One of the missing debates across the case studies is the issue of coherent actions to address the multiple factors that drive individuals to seek opportunities elsewhere, both with ODA and with other policies. The creation of jobs or the training of skills for young people and entrepreneurs, for example, may raise their aspirations without solving the fact that elites continue to control who can access and take part in economic life. Some donors in the case studies also aim to more strongly support national businesses that can be instrumental in creating investment and jobs in countries of origin. Others aim to encourage employment creation in top export sectors linking it to a trade agenda (such as in the Netherlands and Denmark). Yet, analysis on whether these sectors are those that youth are interested in and that can help them to gain more inclusive access, or whether in fact it supports existing systems of control and access seems lacking (Interview Policy Researcher). In isolation more projects for technical skills or job creation without sensitivity of how European actions, including support to governments to cooperate with Europe on migration, influences the political economy dynamics between elites and young people, may not solve the issues around migration.

Included in the aim to address ‘root causes’ are often also projects that in fact aim to support migration governance to establish conditions for ‘orderly’ migration. The EUTF Horn of Africa and West Africa windows combined spend about EUR 150 mn on objectives that fall under ‘Migration management’, with a strong focus on preventing irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking (see EC case study), including through support to border management. Across the case studies there is more emphasis on such migration governance for future cooperation with priority countries and institutions. Projects that may increasingly take place in an effort to reduce irregular migration flows can have unintended consequences. Evidence in existing literature for the Horn of Africa region points to the fact that many attempts to manage migration flows pushes migrants

45 Analysis is based on the first 30 projects for the Sahel and Lake Chad Window and the first 20 projects of the Horn of Africa Window of the EUTF.
underground. Moreover, there are cases in which the disruption of mobility patterns ‘undermine[s] people’s livelihoods and resilience forcing them to move in much worse conditions’ (Research and Evidence Facility Consortium, 2016, p.56). Informality at borders and weak controls have also allowed refugees in Africa to cross to safety thus facilitating protection. While migration and border governance is part of good governance of any country and can facilitate regular migration, incentivising partner governments to curb irregular migration towards Europe, including through the use of ODA and a more-for-more approach, is thus not without risks. This is reinforced by the final report of a 2013 EC Roundtable on border management in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, which points out that

“it is necessary to ensure that border management reform does not inadvertently create barriers where they did not previously exist: the formalisation of entry systems through promotion of integrated border management (IBM)\(^\text{46}\) may risk affecting existing positive dynamics related to informality at borders, and mitigation measures should be planned into IBM programmes.” (EC, ICMPD and EPRD, p.8)

Anecdotal evidence exists that some governments in West Africa have been forthcoming to reduce (irregular) migration even if it concerns ECOWAS citizens that enjoy free movement in the ECOWAS community – incentivised by larger funding prospects from the EU (Interview EU Official, 2016). In contexts where governance challenges and human rights violations persist, extremely careful and conflict-sensitive approaches need to be taken in order to not contribute or be associated with harmful practices towards migrants – even if unintended (Tinti and Westscott, 2016).

The predominant focus on ‘re-labelling’, ‘re-directing’ or ‘re-thinking’ ODA to reduce ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and displacement without assessing the relationship of these objectives with those of development cooperation and humanitarian funding and conflict prevention, may thus lead to ineffective approaches. At best, it does push development actors to focus on the deep-seated and structural barriers for individuals to create better livelihoods, including absence of pathways for safe migration\(^\text{47}\) and leads to innovation for safe and orderly

\(^{46}\) Integrated Border Management is a concept developed by the European Commission, which requires all relevant competences to work together within administrations and across borders in order to ensure the right balance between open but also secured and controlled borders. It was first applied in the West Balkans. See http://www.eap-ibm-capacitybuilding.eu/en/about/ibm

\(^{47}\) Migrants make use of their capability for migration regardless of authorization. In the absence of safe pathways, their journeys become unprotected and more harmful.
migration in the future (Clemens, 2016). At worst it cuts off avenues for livelihood support for individuals, risks the marginalisation of groups and provides to instability in the long-term— a shift away from achieving migration targets under the SDGs.

Positive and negative incentives through ODA

As noted above, the EU Council Conclusions of European Foreign Ministers of Summer 2016 have introduced, in principle, the use of positive and negative incentives (or conditionality) of ODA to entice countries to cooperate with the EU in the area of return, readmission and migration governance. This to some extent subordinates development cooperation under the EU’s migration objectives. Such policy developments are curious when considering that one of the key principles for EU development cooperation, Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), legally requires the EU to take into account development objectives in the policies affecting developing countries. EU development actors have long resisted the possibilities for such negative conditionality – yet their influence is shrinking. The 2013 EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development points out that “the informal and formal use of ‘negative’ migration-related conditionality to development cooperation […] stands in contradiction to PCD commitments, as it subordinates development assistance measures to migration policy priorities.” (European Commission, 2013b, p.144). Yet, within the 2015 EU PCD report, this understanding of PCD has been turned on its head with an increasing emphasis on coherent action (including through EU development cooperation) to promote migration objectives. The 2015 report notes that “home affairs issues need to be embedded in the EU’s overall external relations, including development cooperation [with an aim] […] to promote readmission and return process of irregular migrants […].” (European Commission, 2015c, p.88). Throughout the interviews, and from all sides, such an approach was however questioned for its practicability and viability – especially in its negative form.

First, examples where negative aid conditionality has been applied in the past, have shown that such approaches are not effective in achieving better cooperation on return and readmission. The German example of using negative conditionality with Vietnam in 1994, and the decision by the Dutch government to halt aid to Ghana in December 2012 both did not lead to desired outcomes for either side. In the Dutch context such sanctions have been described as ‘not helpful’ due to their

48 Policy Coherence for Development is enshrined in Article 208 of the EU Lisbon Treaty.
potential to damage relations with countries while showing no strong impact (Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, 2015).

Second, applying conditionality negatively may also not always be an available option as it can undermine donors’ own interests. For example, in the Dutch context there has been reluctance to use admission of skilled migrants as negative conditionality in the case of India due to it being ‘harmful to the [Dutch] business sector’ (Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, 2015).

The third issue relates to the proportionality of such measures and how to operationalize them in practice. It may be a practical challenge to define what the precise expectations from countries are and how ‘better cooperation’ would be defined. Would it be for example linked to the number of returnees and what would an adequate level be to justify ending ODA programmes? There is also an issue whether it would be proportional to cut ODA to achieve return and readmission objectives.

Even positive incentives and the ‘more for more’ that receives wider application have been questioned as it assumes that enough leverage through ODA exists and other EU external tools exist (Interview Policy Researchers, Interviews Officials). For some countries, such as Nigeria, ODA alone may not be a strong incentive given that it only makes a small part of the national budget (USD 2.4 bn in 201449) and is dwarfed by remittances that migrants send back (USD 20.8 bn in 2015; see World Bank, 2016).50 Research carried out by Castillejo (2016) on the EUTF points out that interviewed EU officials are sceptical about additional funding alone being able to buy political influence in countries like Ethiopia and Sudan (p.6). In other cases where cooperation has been forthcoming, e.g. to address smuggling as is the case in Niger, questions remain whether these actions are sustainable, and whether the political economy situation of the region aligns with EU interests in reducing irregular migrant flows (Tinti and Westscott, 2016).

How ODA can be used to better to accompany return and reintegration

The question what role development cooperation, including ODA, should play in the (forced) return and reintegration of failed asylum seekers has received increased attention in all cases looked at either at the strategic level (e.g. Denmark and

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49 See World Bank data on net aid flows received (current USD): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD
50 However, the ‘more for more’ leverage the EU is trying to achieve includes incentives beyond ODA and interviews with EU officials confirm that incentives in the context of the ‘Migration Compacts’ or the Valletta Agenda has also drawn interest from African countries (Interview EU Official, November 2016).
Sweden), through suggestions to increase resources dedicated this particular area (Netherlands) or through pressure to integrate it in on-going return and reintegration programmes of highly-skilled returnees (Germany). Given the EU’s interest to sustainably return failed asylum seekers and migrants in transit, supporting their reintegration is likely becoming a more and more integrated part of development engagement in the future. Moreover, as part of the tense negotiations during the Valletta Summit, African states emphasized the importance of reintegration support.

EU development funding has been used for reintegration efforts in the past (Garcia Andrade & Martin, 2015; Te Wildt et al., 2015). As long as such support is concerned with systemic development issues, there are good reasons for an increased role of ODA and development actors. Return is often part of a difficult process of socioeconomic reintegration, especially for vulnerable groups. Yet, the issue of using development cooperation and ODA for return and for specific reintegration packages also raises questions. The value of a number of programmes that are ODA eligible, specifically Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programmes (AVRR) for failed asylum seekers, can also be challenged from a sustainable development perspective. Van Houte and Davids (2014) point out that such programmes often respond to the security needs of destination countries rather than having development and peacebuilding objectives in countries of origin. As such these would be more a matter of security and home affairs budgets. A 2015 review of EU development cooperation funded projects in the area of voluntary return and reintegration seems to confirm this for a number of projects that focused on individual failed asylum seekers from the EU to their country of origin (Te Wildt et al., 2015).

Despite some successes, constraints and challenges exist when using development aid to support better reintegration and sustainability of return. Especially, schemes such as assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes (AVRR) from Europe seem to have a weaker track-record as regards the impact on sustainable development or on capacity building for local reintegration systems.  

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51 Not all of development cooperation efforts in the area of return, readmission and reintegration may qualify as ODA. Yet, even if activities are not ODA reportable, they could use up resources otherwise available for ODA eligible projects.

52 The Valletta Action Plan for example includes the provision of ‘comprehensive and developmental packages for safe return and reintegration whereby a partner country commits to cooperate closely with the EU on return and readmission, notably on identification and travel documentation, and receives support for the individual reintegration of its own nationals, visa facilitation and tailor-made package of support, including on other policy areas’ (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

53 The OECD allows the reporting of costs as ODA for voluntary return of failed asylum seekers to countries that are ODA-eligible. Costs for forced return is excluded.
First, focusing on communities and countries of origin has implications for allocation that would need to be reconciled with the efforts to focus on those most in need. In the case of Afghanistan for instance, research found that returnee households are not necessarily among the worst-off or most vulnerable within communities. Support for reintegration should thus be built on defining vulnerable communities and households locally and adopt a systemic approach to reintegration (Kuschminder et al., 2014). Te Wildt et al. (2016) note that higher developmental impact can be “expected from projects supporting groups of migrants faced with specific and well-understood socio-economic vulnerabilities” (p. 10) rather than support to returnees without a clear vulnerability based assessment, which typically includes failed asylum seekers and irregular migrants in Europe. While of course it is legitimate to include in assistance those that are not part of the most vulnerable groups, such choices should be made in awareness rather than being (unintended) consequence of European return and reintegration policies.

Second, some EU member states have reportedly exercised pressure or voiced preferences for EU development cooperation efforts to provide support only to specific groups of returnees (e.g. those returning from EU countries voluntarily) even if part of more systemic reintegration measures. Requests for EU Commission assistance to only support returnees from Europe but not those from other countries have also existed in the past (Interview EU Official). Such considerations of distinguishing groups may stem from the concern of creating incentives to migrate or additional ‘pull-factors’. However, such approaches can create tensions in communities and between groups and can undermine the holistic approaches and ‘good donorship’ principles that should guide development actors’ work. Successful return often depends on systemic changes and is based on similar factors important for the economic and social development of communities of origin. Beyond assisting returnees, the role that ODA can most likely

Wildt et al., 2015; Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 2012; Koser & Kuschminder, 2015; European Commission, 2014b).

Although there is consensus that Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programmes (AVRR) are essential to provide support to returnees, there are questions around whether this is really about strengthening development and whether these programmes should be financed through aid or are better suited to be funded by a different government priority and for ODA to focus on systemic conditions that can enable return.

See for example the Evaluation of the Region of Origin Initiative by DANIDA in Afghanistan pointing to similar challenges (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, 2012, p.90).

The EU has committed to the ‘do no harm’ principle as a cornerstone of its development cooperation (see for example the EU agenda on Policy Coherence for Development and the 2007 Humanitarian Consensus. It has also endorsed the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in 2003, which include for example the importance of needs-based assistance, and has championed the 2011 New Deal for engagement in fragile states, which aims to ensure that interventions are conflict-sensitive.
Third, European reintegration schemes have in the past often overlapped in a given country and created parallel structures, for example for skills training, rather than reinforcing existing public mechanisms structurally and sustainably (Andrade et al., 2015). The review of European projects concluded that about a third of the reviewed project made (or had the potential of making) a positive impact on local capacity development, while the rest underperformed on building sustainable structures for reintegration. Successful projects usually relied extensively on experienced local partners and generated high levels of ownership during implementation (Te Wildt et al., 2015).

Fourth, available information at the level of the EU (Te Wildt et al., 2015) shows that there is also often an absence of assessing sustainability of return in development projects that aim to empower returnees and foster better reintegration. This is partly due to the absence of a conceptualisation of what sustainability means in the context of return and reintegration and consequently a lack of indicators and data to assess this dimension. The impression the study of EU projects gains is that ‘great shares of returnees remained in fragile situations’ (Te Wildt et al., 2015, p.73). Commonly, some projects equated sustainability with the absence of re-migration. At least in situations where options for sustainable return and reintegration continued to be absent, re-migration (e.g. in a safe form to areas where livelihoods prospects or job opportunities are better) may be considered a ‘sustainable solution’ for the concerned individuals from a development perspective (Te Wildt et al., 2015).

The OECD DAC excludes forced return resettlement costs from ODA eligibility. Nevertheless interviewees in the case studies indicated that there is more political pressure on development ministries to support return and reintegration of irregular migrants from Europe – mainly as a complement to agendas of interior ministries. At the OECD there are currently no harmonised criteria for determining which type of migration management or return and reintegration related development cooperation interventions are in fact development-oriented. A discussion and more clarity on what type of return or reintegration activities development cooperation and ODA should fund and what best practices exist so to not compromise the overall sustainability and effectiveness of the aid spent would be helpful. In-depth reflection at the UN, the EU or OECD level could be useful.

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57 See Koser and Kuschminder (2015) for an overview of comparative research on Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes.
58 See also the concern about ‘trapped populations’ highlighted earlier in the study. The IOM thus includes the option of legal re-migration as part of ‘sustainable return and reintegration’ (IOM, 2015, p.19).
in order to exchange lessons-learned and create a shared understanding over which activities can best support economic development and the welfare of developing countries and thus maximise reaching the objectives inherent in ODA spending.

**Stronger links between humanitarian and development approaches**

Despite a more negative rhetoric on migration due to the ‘crisis’ overall, the current refugee and irregular migration situation has pushed forward the agenda of linking humanitarian and development approaches in the context of refugee situations. Interviewees across the case studies confirmed that the current refugee and irregular migration situation has been a key factor in this. It has also highlighted the need to focus more strongly on resilience of refugees and host communities from a long-term perspective as part of humanitarian or transition efforts. This is necessary as many of the challenges and questions around protracted refugee situations are developmental in nature with humanitarian elements, rather than the other way around (Harild, 2016). Especially in protracted refugee situations, socio-economic aspects such as access to education and health, infrastructure for refugees and host communities need to form part of the assistance. In their absence, there is a risk of ‘lost generations’ with little opportunities to build capacities they can utilise later, whether they decide to stay, move on or return. In the past however, humanitarian actors by and large addressed displacement and refugee situations with little involvement from the development field.

Even though approaches to bring humanitarian and development actors closer together have been discussed for decades, current developments can be described as a ‘game changer’ as finally concrete efforts are put into realising this agenda. Humanitarian actors in some of the case studies have already over time moved away from the short-term humanitarian approach to more strategic longer-term approaches in the context of protracted refugee situations. Interviewees have pointed that now increasingly development actors are becoming part of the picture. There are increasing endeavours to establish greater coherence and view refugee situation as a long-term development issue by accompanying humanitarian efforts with concrete development programmes and political dialogue in host countries. The EC has adopted a Communication on Forced Displacement and Development (European Commission, 2016a) towards this effect. Denmark and Sweden are discussing joint humanitarian and development strategies, the Netherlands is leading one of the EU Regional Development and Protection Programmes for the Horn of Africa with aim to make this link. Germany is also increasingly combining its humanitarian and transitional funding with longer-term projects, such as in Jordan (Interviews Implementing Agency, 2016). At the international level, the
World Bank Group is calling for a longer-term development approach to supporting refugees and their hosts beyond humanitarian efforts (World Bank Group, 2016).

Increased coordination between the two fields bears fruit on the ground. In Denmark, interviewees pointed out that there is greater awareness and joint efforts ‘right down to the desk-level’ resulting in DANIDA’s humanitarian actors designing new approaches together with embassy staff in countries like Uganda and Tanzania, where a new policy dialogue with the government is at early stages. The new approaches – building on the concepts also developed by the Solutions Alliance (Solutions Alliance, 2016) – take solutions for refugee and host nations as starting point. For Germany, while previously cash-for-work programmes targeting refugees have been ad-hoc, these are now integrated into programmes for longer-term economic development. Development approaches, such as cooperation for permanent waste management structures in Lebanon for example are combined with cash-for-work programmes in this sector. Overall, development actors seem more inclined to move forward with this agenda.

Yet, there often still exist disincentives of institutional or financial nature that prohibit rather than motivate joint approaches and cooperation between the two fields (Mowjee, Garrasi, & Poole, 2015). At the European level, these relate amongst others to a lack of common understanding, different timeframes and methods, diverging tools and funding modalities as well as high transaction costs to bring different approaches together (Medinilla and Herrero-Cangas, forthcoming). Experiences with the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) in the context of the Syria crisis – a good example of bringing the humanitarian and development approaches under one overarching framework – has shown that it can still be difficult in practice to work jointly. Humanitarian assistance has largely focused on refugees while development activities were predominantly targeted at local communities rather than benefitting refugee and host communities jointly (Mowjee, Garrasi, & Poole, 2015, p.33). Moreover, the longer-term resilience component of the plan, has been more strongly underfunded than the provisions for basic humanitarian services to refugees (3RP, 2016).

Nevertheless, due to the emphasis in Europe on refugees and displacement, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the UN Global Summit on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, there are real opportunities to move this agenda forward and to remove such barriers. Donor agencies can capitalise on this momentum to integrate innovative approaches in their strategies and to adapt new
ways of working in combining development approaches to forced displacement situations.59

### 3.2 ODA programming practices under duress

The ‘crisis mode’ in which the EU and its member states have had to respond to the situation ‘has led to increased pressures to react and to generate short-term fixes’ (Hertog, 2016). This included the rapid establishment of new instruments or reframing of existing instruments, initiatives and tools to signal a response to drivers of irregular migration and displacement. Interviewees have expressed a number of doubts about such responses.

Many rapid-response instruments, such as the EU Africa Trust Fund or the German ‘special initiatives’, have structural implications for the use of ODA60 in the mid- to long-term. They span several years (the Trust Fund up until 2020), and also address issues that require longer-term engagement. Some of these instruments may well be renewed due to the realisation that the challenges and opportunities around migration are ‘here to stay’.

The study finds that in a number of instances such new instruments or initiatives have been under pressure towards short-term spending and rapid, visible impact of funds to address long-term structural problems of development (Interviews with Officials and Implementing Agencies). While programmatic flexibility is important in contexts characterised by instability and unforeseen developments, several interviewees have argued this is not valid for all of these projects. Some, e.g. those addressing structural challenges, would merit a longer-term perspective. Moreover it was argued that adequate time should be given to the identification and refinement of programme proposals. Such concerns are not new in the field of migration and development. The evaluation of the AENEAS and the Thematic Programme for Migration and Asylum points out that a significant number of projects in the past have been built on poor needs and country assessments and resulting unsatisfactory logical frameworks. Moreover, at times there has been a limited understanding of the link between migration and local development or political changes on the ground (Picard and Tonegutti, 2014).

59 For more information, see World Bank Group, 2016.
60 Some of the observed structural differences in terms of thematic coordination or use of ODA for specific migration aspects will be discussed below in Section 3.
In Denmark and Sweden, such pressures seem to have existed to a lesser extent or have not been uncovered from the interviews. Box 3 provides a practical example of how the Trust Fund and special initiatives operated in their initial stages.

**Box 4. Increase in flexibility and rapid responses: the EUTF and the German special initiative**

The timeframe for taking programming decisions under the EU Trust Fund have been short since its aim is to provide a ‘swift and flexible instrument’ that can ‘deliver immediate and concrete results’. Just over a month after the Valletta Summit in November 2015, during which the EUTF was formally announced, the Operational Committee approved the first pipeline of programmes. As of August 2016, even though for about EUR 1 bn decisions have already been taken in the Operational Committees and Action Documents exist, for not even half of the EUR 1 bn have contracts been signed. Delays may be due to disagreements on what activities EU member states, as implementing partners, want to fund and what can be funded with development funds in accordance to financial regulations that govern the funds under the EU TF. For other programmes political pressure has lead to rapid contracting, identification and disbursement. For the ‘Better Migration Management’ Programme’ in the Horn of Africa, as part of the Khartoum Process, for example, contracting took place in March 2016 and identification until mid-2016 (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). In some projects under the EU Trust Fund it seems that the question asked by donors was not about what would be the most sensible approach and aspects to include in a programme, but rather when money can be disbursed so that there is something visible to show (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

Similarly, Germany’s special initiatives focusing on refugees and migration, through which most of the additional ODA that was made available by the government in the past two years has been channelled, are usually rapidly disbursed. Only recently has the time frame for spending resources under these titles been raised from 1 to 2 years. While flexibility is valuable, the sustainability of impact or a focus on cooperation with local partners may not receive strongest priority in all cases (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

Short-term pressures in response to the migration crisis have already undermined or strongly stretched donor agencies’ own respect for principles of aid effectiveness, according to interviewees, though donors and implementing agencies often do their best to balance competing requirements. Examples in the context of addressing irregular migration and displacement, were most frequently given where the pressure to implement and disburse has had negative consequences both for the relationships with local partners and for analysis and quality control.61

On the former, the political pressure for quick action62 and for having visible projects to show as part of the Valletta agenda has reduced the time available for

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61 While this may likely not be the case for all projects or programs that respond the irregular migration and displacement situation and can also be the case for donor projects in other areas, examples from the interviews do raise concerns if the aim is to engage in such complex environments effectively.

62 Such preferences for speedy contract negotiations and implementations may not always come from donors alone. Developing countries themselves prefer faster delivery and disbursements and the EU has often been
coordinating with and involving partner countries and local actors in the formulation and implementation of activities – something for which the EU TF has for example already been criticised for (Dutch Government, 2016). This may in part be because recruitment for EUTF country component managers - tasked with coordinating the implementation locally - has been slow to get off the ground. As a result, for a number of projects EU headquarters in Brussels has largely driven the programming, identification and formulation (Interviews Officials and Implementing Agencies). However, high-level dialogues and partnerships driven by donor headquarters cannot be equated with successful partnerships at the level of project implementation.

On the latter, a number of interviewees highlighted examples where the usual caution and the requirement to analyse local traction, institutional capabilities and political economy dynamics or consult with partners relevant for local implementation have been overly relaxed. Some interviewees from implementing agencies noted less time for quality control. For some of the cases, interviewees indicated that the pressure to respond fast and in certain visible or politically defined areas has certainly not helped to strengthen discussions on how to better integrate ‘politically smart responses’ or work to reconcile different aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda– principles that seem to have lost traction within some ministries already before (Interviews Officials and Implementing Agencies). On the other hand, at the European level, given the high political interest and the link of development aid to other political and security interests there has been strong scrutiny that the political frameworks for engagement, e.g. as part of the Migration compacts, are in place, before signing off on projects (Interview EEAS official, 2016).

It is questionable whether all projects under the EUTF necessitate the emergency character inherent in the set up of the fund. Some of the areas the EUTF and also other initiatives of the case studies address may require much longer-term engagement strategies, which the political pressure for quick-wins may hinder rather than enable. (Interview EU Official, 2016). In other contexts, a mix of more “quick-win”, fast and flexible funding arrangements, that can be criticized for slow procedures (Prizzon, 2016; Hauck et al., 2015) yet these need to be balanced with other principles for effective engagement.

This is however not necessarily new as the 11th EDF programming has also had examples of driven largely by Brussels HQ (Herrero et al., 2015)

It has to be noted that the bilateral nature of negotiations of Europe with African countries as a follow-up and during Valletta is not strongly valued by all African institutions such as the African Union or the Regional Economic Communities (InterviewsOfficials, 2016).

According to experts, development assistance in the context of conflict affected and fragile situations, national and international actors should look to deliver and monitor impact against timeframes more in the realm of 15-25 years.” (Mowjee, Garrasi, & Poole, 2015)
complement continuous long-term engagement, is indeed required as discussed above in the context of bringing humanitarian and development actors closer together. Yet, politically driven engagement in the area of migration with the aim to produce visible results should not come at the costs of aid quality and considerations about effectiveness. Principles that have been learned from decades of engagement in fragile or conflict-affected states or through the development effectiveness agenda, currently being discussed in the context of the Agenda 2030, can provide useful guidance (see Box 4).

The tighter knit between migration, security and development in European Union policies, which will become more relevant in the future (Interview EEAS, 2016), brings to the fore also more clearly areas where interests and values may not point in the same direction in a given context. Building a good understanding on how to best engage in such complex settings is key. One example is the European interest to intercept human smuggling in the Sahel. This has led to cooperation with countries such Mali or Niger incentivising central governments to show a stronger response towards the effect of reducing irregular flows, including through aid packages. The human smuggling business provides income and livelihoods for different tribes and locals operating along different smuggling routes. Local authorities are not always impartial in this trade. The closing of one or more of these routes – if possible at all - may be effective in the short-term in reducing flows, but it will most certainly have implications for the distribution of political power and resources with likely impacts on political (in)stability (Tinti and Reitano, 2016; Kohl, 2016). Engagement in such complex situations requires conflict-sensitive approaches. An option is to reconcile different interests (reducing irregular migration) and values (providing livelihoods, improvement of governance, stability etc.) by tackling those challenges simultaneously both through dialogue, targeted pressures and through development cooperation (Interview EEAS Official, 2016).

Another example is the focus on better governing irregular migration and border management, such as in the Better Migration Management project implemented under the Khartoum Process, which provide an opportunity to incentivise the creation of pathways for better coordination concerning migration governance and protection of migrants between actors. This is especially important in politically fragmented systems, such as Somalia, where effective migration governance would require actors to work together closely. Proper design of such partnerships requires time for analysis of interests, dialogue and trust-building. A challenge of engagement in this area under the EU TF so far has been strong time

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66 See Mohamud and Knoll, forthcoming
pressure, time-consuming coordination efforts as well as staff capacity and expertise (Interviews Implementing Agencies, 2016).

An opportunity that has emerged from the migration response however within the EU internally has been a much stronger focus on coordination at least at the level of the EU Commission between different Directorate Generals (DEVCO, HOME, ECHO, EEAS and NEAR) as well as between the EU Commission on EU Member States. Interviewees see this is largely as a positive development as it allows a frank exchange of views and fosters understanding of different approaches valuable for the future. At the level of EU Member states such coordination may not always be as systematic between ministries, yet as the example of rapprochements between humanitarian and development actors show also has had positive effects. Such coordination is however also demanding due to the sheer number of actors that are now involved in the response to migration.

Interviewees also pointed out that coordination between donors and cooperation between EU member states, despite the efforts of the new EU Trust Fund to this effect, could still be strengthened (Interview Policy Expert, Interview Official). The renewed focus on migration and refugees seem to not have led to better harmonisation of donor strategies or coordination between European member states in this area beyond those initiatives at the European level.

Box 5. State fragility, conflict and good aid principles

A large number of refugees and irregular migrants have come from fragile and conflict affected states and areas where political settlements are not stable. In recent years the donor community in partnership with those from fragile and conflict states have undertaken a number of initiatives and learning to improve international responses. In 2007 a set of Principles for Good international Engagement in Fragile States and Situations were adopted by the OECD high level forum including by representatives from the EU, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. While these have been somewhat superseded with and been integrated in the New Deal and the specific Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Goals, the original 2007 OECD principles do provide useful guidance based on a decade of learning on what constitutes a basis for more successful international engagement. These principles were as follows:

- Take context as the starting point
- Ensure all activities do no harm
- Focus on state-building as the central objective
- Prioritise prevention
- Recognise the links between, political, security and development objectives
- Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
- Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
- Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors
- Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
- Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”)
There are on-going discussions relating to similar aspects that aim to ‘update’ the development effectiveness agenda and reconcile the Busan Principles for development effectiveness (such as results, transparency and mutual accountability, democratic ownership, and inclusive development partnerships)\(^67\) with new concepts such as the New Deal, the post-2015 ‘leave no one behind’ agenda, and new ideas of ‘politically smart’ development, such as Doing Development Differently (DDD). (ODI CAPE, 2016). The November 2016 EU Commission Communication on a new European Consensus on Development reaffirms the EU and its Member States’ commitment to the Busan principles and refers to a number of above principles, such as grounding programs in quality analysis of the country context (European Commission, 2016d).

However, it would seem from some of the evidence gathered through interviews and presented in this study that there is a concern that current responses to the refugee and irregular migration situation are not always sufficiently and systematically following such principles or concepts.\(^68\) A number of interviewees stressed that the starting point of interventions have often been the donors’ own considerations. If alignment to partner countries’ strategies and priorities have been competing with priority of domestic donor development priorities in European development cooperation already before (European Commission, 2016d. p.11), the irregular migration and refugee situation seems to have put even more pressure on balancing competing requirements.

Even if central partner governments requested certain interventions, a reasoned consideration of the ‘context’ seems to have been secondary in a number of cases as pointed out by interviewees for this study. Though activities vary, the actual building of state capacity and state society relations may have not always been a central or the primary consideration of the political drive for projects, specifically those that focus on addressing and reducing smuggling and irregular migration flows. Aligning with local priorities has in some cases taken place (e.g. some partner governments requested specific interventions that are funded as part of the EUTF or in light of a ‘more for more’ arrangement) yet in other instances they have been mingled with or superseded by donor priorities on addressing irregular migration. While coordination at the level of HQ, specifically in the EU Commission, has improved (Interview EU Official, 2016), coordination locally does not always seem sufficient (Interview EU MS Official, 2016). Concerning the EUTF for Africa, Castillejo (2016) points out that ‘the undeniably strong emphasis on European decision making and implementation seems far removed from aid-effectiveness principles of ownership, partnership and alignment’ (p.14).

On pockets of exclusions, there is the risk that with growing emphasis on addressing the irregular migration phenomenon, those countries and regions generating irregular migrants will acquire more resources, those fragile or conflict states further afield from Europe are less on the radar of European donors.

\(^67\) See 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011).

\(^68\) These concerns are not the result of a systematic investigation of new projects so should not be overstated but these concerns do emerge from several interviews
3.3 Changing trends in geographic priorities and allocation criteria for long-term ODA

Beyond the immediate rebalancing of ODA disbursement towards countries hosting and generating refugees, the migration situation has led to a politically-informed focus on increasing cooperation with countries through longer-term ODA that are strategically relevant from a migration perspective. Indicators related to migration will therefore likely play a stronger role in determining geographic ODA allocations in future.

How this is done varies between the case study countries. Denmark’s current draft development cooperation strategy proposes to base the focus of aid allocations on migration patterns (e.g. countries hosting large numbers of refugees and IDPs) and on activities in geographic areas that may help limit migration flows to the EU, including secondary movements of refugees. For the European Commission, the clearest example of changing allocation criteria is the Trust Fund, which draws heavily on the 11th European Development Fund reserves (EUR 1bn). Unlike the EDF’s allocations, originally made on a broad set of indicators (including population, GNI per capital, economic vulnerability, governance (Herrero et al, 2015)), EUTF allocations are based on fragility and development indices but also on migration indicators such as ‘number of irregular entries in the EU’, ‘number of displaced’, ‘caseload of refugees and IDPs’, ‘opening and progress on High Level Dialogues with EU’ (European Commission, 2015a; European Commission, 2016c). The number of irregular migrants towards Europe seemed to have been the predominant indicator to select priority countries for the so-called EU migration compacts (Interview EU Official, 2016). The Netherlands has recently announced that its selection criteria for new countries as part of its bilateral priority country list will also include whether a country is relevant for addressing root causes of migration (Ploumen, 2016).

Interviewees indicated no such shift in priority countries and specific allocation criteria under discussion in Sweden or Germany. Yet for the Germany, the special initiatives that have received stronger top up over the past years have a focus on countries that are relevant for address refugee and irregular migration situations. This additional ODA is regionally concentrated towards neighbourhood countries, North and West Africa as well as the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Reprioritisation based on such indicators of migration does not necessarily mean ODA going to the poorest countries and regions or reaching those most in need is diverted. Indeed, the regions and people most in need of support often include refugees and displaced and selection criteria for priority partner countries,
such in the case of the Netherlands, may still focus on the poorest countries. Yet, there could be instances where irregular migrants depart from areas that are not the poorest. What is of potential concern, given that the EU collectively is a significant donor, is the fact that this trend may reinforce the risk of ‘forgotten crises’ and geographically selective responses to the needs of refugees and displaced worldwide, of which the UN has already warned. Several interviewees pointed out that situations that are significant from a migration, displacement of trafficking perspective, such as Thailand or Colombia, are currently of not of strong interest to European donors’ efforts on migration (see also Box 1).

3.4 Trends in the objectives of specific interventions

For most EU donors, using ODA to support refugees, migration and development is not new. Balancing which dimensions of migration to prioritise through projects and activities however remains challenging even in cases where a comprehensive policy on how development cooperation can support migration and mobility exists.69

What areas donor countries choose to focus on can be revealing. For instance, the EU Court of Auditors noted that until 2014, most of the European Commission spending in the area of external migration through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Thematic Programme Migration and Asylum and the ENPI concentrated in the area of prevention and detection of irregular migration. There has thus in the past been a bias towards cooperation with a focus on security and border management, as compared to support to regional mobility, or management of effective migration governance that reflects economic situations of partner countries (European Court of Auditors, 2016). Also in the Netherlands, financial priority in the past has been not balanced since about half of the budget for the migration and development programme went towards sustainable return and reintegration. In Germany, comprehensive work on migration and development exists, though it has in the past not received a very high priority and was also often dominated by security-related policy priorities (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013).

However, most donors do not systematically track migration-related spending and available data is often not ‘sufficiently meaningful to draw aggregated results’ (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, 2016). There exists no comprehensive comparable overview of spending on migration-relevant projects 69 The Netherlands, Germany and the EC for example have built up policy agendas on migration and development over the past decade that have included a variety of activities (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013)
(neither in the ODA statistics or on spending more broadly) beyond individual information provided by donors themselves. For the sake of analysis, this study has assessed the presence and frequency of migration-related keywords in donor-reported project-level OECD DAC data in order to assess whether there have been marked changes in the priority areas of cooperation within the migration topic.\(^7\) Annex 2 details how migration-relevant projects and ODA spending was identified.

Despite renewed attention to the topic of migration, this analysis of ODA projects from 2010 to 2014 shows that there have been no significant changes in donors’ support towards specific areas within the topic of migration. There is no clear upward trend for amounts committed or disbursed on ‘migration-relevant’ projects identified through the key word search. Most likely this is due to the fact that countries have focussed on ‘addressing root causes’ as noted above, a concept which promotes ODA commitments and disbursements for projects that not necessarily directly target migration or migration governance but rather relate to sustainable development more broadly.

However, the data shows that in Germany and the European Commission, relatively more emphasis has been put on migration over time between 2010 and 2014. Both have increased the share of ODA committed and disbursed for projects that explicitly include migration relevant terms in their titles or descriptions. Sweden has seen a rise in total ODA funds disbursed to projects including migration-relevant key words, yet not as a share of total ODA. In the Netherlands no clear upward trend can be detected and for Denmark there has even been a drop in the share of ODA for ‘migration-relevant’ activities identified through the keyword search. Given on-going strategic discussions to utilise ODA more systematically to address migration, root causes and displacement (particularly from 2013 onwards) it will be worth monitoring how spending on migration-relevant projects develops after 2014.

For all case studies the projects including the keyword ‘refugee’ has received on average the highest frequency among the ‘migration-relevant’ projects identified in the analysis. Other keywords that appeared most frequently were ‘migration’, ‘return’, ‘reintegration’ and ‘displacement’. In the case of Germany also ‘border security’. Less frequent on average were projects including the words ‘diaspora’, ‘remittances’, ‘mobility’, ‘smuggling’ or ‘trafficking’. Interviewees confirmed that with the current crisis the pre-dominant focus continues to be on refugees and displacement, rather than migration more broadly.

\(^7\) For full methodology see Annex I. For overview over the results see Annex II
To date, it seems that existing thematic programmes on ‘migration and development’ more broadly that some donors had established for a long time have actually not strongly benefitted or been more strongly resourced in response to the migration situation, relative to the overall mobilisation of funds during the past years. For example, the existing EC thematic programme on Migration and Asylum under the Development Cooperation Instrument with focus on ‘strengthening the capacities of developing country authorities and civil society organisations to address migration challenges’ has not seen an increase in appropriations from 2014 to 2015. While it has been raised by about 15 million for the 2016 appropriations by bringing forward available funding for this programme, it is still a relatively small amount compared to the overall EU response to the current situation. At the EU level this may change in the future with this thematic line having seen an increase in the 2017 budget of about EUR 400 mn. In the Netherlands, the Migration and Development (M&D) fund has a relatively small budget which though it has been topped up in 2015 but the government suggested that 2/3 of the existing budget be used for sustainable return and reintegration (Dijkhoff, Koenders and Ploumen, 2015). Rather, the responses we have seen have been carried out by newly set-up instruments, such as the EU Trust Fund, through special initiatives through linking existing programmes such as employment and job creation or security, rule of law and governance with migration. An implication of this is that the design of new interventions aiming to address migration dimensions are led by services and units that may not have had prior experience with the topic of migration and development. Progressively acquired knowledge and experience by services in charge of longer-established M&D programmes through years of experimentation and learning – in cases where they exist - may thus not benefit such new programmes (Interview Expert, 2016).

It is therefore fair to say that the current ‘crisis’ has only advanced selective parts of European migration and development actors’ agendas linked to Agenda 2030. According to interviewees, the political situation has nudged development cooperation primarily towards a stronger focus on refugees and displacement as

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71 This programme decreased from available EUR 384 mn under the 2007-2013 Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) to a total of available EUR 357 mn for the 2014-2020 MFF.
72 The original envisaged indicative financial allocation for 2016 was at EUR 45 mn (European Commission, 2014).
73 Den Hertog (2016b) points out that the migration and development nexus is a priority under this thematic programme, ‘including the emphasis on the interests of third countries and their development” (p.6).
74 For the cases Germany, the Netherlands and the EU institutions, interviewees have also pointed out that thematic areas were more strongly asked to integrate migration dimensions or make their programmes ‘migration relevant’.
75 A number of interviewees for this study across the cases study countries and the EC have pointed out that the SDG agenda is not the defining priority-setter for development cooperation, but that political interests on migration have stronger influence the future cooperation strategies.
well as their ‘root causes’ rather than a broader migration agenda that includes the support to mobility and facilitation of migration, the reduction of transaction costs and new trans-national education and mobility schemes, including towards Europe.76

For development actors trying to adopt a more comprehensive approach beyond the agenda on ‘root causes’, the recent focus on refugees has risked hijacking approaches to migration and development more broadly. In the case of Germany, for example the BMZ funded ‘Migration for Development’ Programme implemented by GIZ, had to negotiate to keep its existing philosophy of focusing on bringing development benefits through (re-) migration, rather than being re-directed towards minimizing the risks of returning unsuccessful asylum seekers.

Yet, to adequately support a global and forward looking agenda on migration, mobility and development, notably the realisation the migration relevant targets of the SDGs, donors will need to go beyond the current focus on ‘root causes of irregular migration and displacement’ and provide support for a world that continues to be mobile. This requires innovation and the support for the development of institutions and systems that can deal both with shocks such as displacement crisis as well as regular and safe mobility in a balanced way.

76 Projects that support mobility and migration, e.g. in Africa exist and have also been part of European development cooperation in the past and continue to exist yet with less stronger financial emphasis than compared to other areas (see for example the EUTF that does so far put stronger focus on addressing irregular migration and smuggling than on legal mobility). See also Clemens, 2016.
4 Considerations for future practices

Short-term responses to weather the ‘crisis’ as well as medium-term adjustments to adapt the policies and practices of donors to the irregular migration and refugee situation are currently still unfolding. Development actors in the EU and its member states are however increasingly aware of the fact that the crisis – or at least the irregular migration situation - is ‘here to stay’. The following section takes a longer-term aid effectiveness perspective, in looking at the implications of short- and medium-term adjustments as a response to the refugee and irregular migration situation on:

- Strategies to ensure the predictability of budgetary allocations to development cooperation
- Informing M&D programming under pressure with research & analysis
- ODA reporting standards, particularly with regards to in-donor refugee costs

Ideas and suggestions are provided for each of the above.

Ensuring aid predictability amid budgetary constraints

Case study countries have had to rapidly make use of the flexibility available in their budgets to cover increasing in-donor refugee costs. How they have done so and how solutions have been discussed and can apply depend a lot on how the different budget systems are set-up. Some have sought to agree on budget allocation rules at the national level to provide a structural solution to the sudden increase in such costs, in part to protect ODA allocated for external cooperation, as for example Sweden has done.

However, alternative fiscal arrangements to protect budgetary allocations for external cooperation come with their own risks and challenges. In the Netherlands, existing budget lines and running development cooperation programmes have to date been protected from cuts despite significantly rising costs for first year reception of asylum seekers. To achieve this, the government decided to cover additional unforeseen costs for asylum seekers in the Netherlands by bringing funds forward from future ODA budgets. This effectively reduces the forecasted rise in ODA due to estimated GNI growth between 2016 and 2020. In addition, underspent amounts and available end-of-year margins from other budget lines across the government have been used. While negative effects on development cooperation budgets have so far been averted, potential risks for aid predictability
and negative impacts on long-term structural development cooperation are postponed to the future.

Furthermore, in the current political climate finding systemic or structured solutions to better protect development cooperation budgets from being affected by rising in-donor refugee costs is likely to be challenging. In the cases looked at, only Sweden limited the possible trade-off with external development cooperation efforts by introducing a cap to in-donor refugee costs ‘sourced’ from the ODA framework to a maximum of 30%. This is still high compared to the levels of in-donor refugee costs as part of ODA before 2013, yet it provides some safeguard – especially in a context in which the option to divert as much as 60% of ODA to cover in-donor refugee costs was on the table. The Netherlands are not discussing such an option and a change of sourcing funds for the first year protection needs of refugees from other ministries’ budgets seems unlikely with the current cabinet and also in the future as most political parties seem satisfied with the current arrangement. In Denmark this is similar: the current political agreement is that DAC-able costs should be declared and sourced from the designated ODA resources.

Alternative approaches for protecting development cooperation budgets in financing in-donor costs have been proposed. In the case of Denmark, civil society has suggested to guaranteeing that 0.7% of GNI is used for ‘narrow’ ODA excluding in-donor refugee costs and overall spend 0.8% of GNI on ODA inclusive of in-donor refugee costs (Interview Civil Society, 2016). Development agencies and ministries also realise that they may need to increase their level of preparedness to deal with uncertain funding situations in case flow of asylum seekers increase. This can include allowing flexibility through governments giving multi-year rather than single year appropriations to donor agencies, which they can use more flexibly, or planning in advance for different scenarios how to handle changing budget conditions – as highlighted in the case of Sweden.

Incorporating research and analysis into rapid programming for migration & development

The nature of the current situation and the level of attention as well as political pressure it is receiving means that the scope for adequately informing the design and implementation of cooperation programmes on migration and development or so-called ‘root causes’ of irregular migration can be compromised. Given the complexity of such programmes, it is important that new ways are sought to build on contextual knowledge before approving programme proposals and for being prepared to quickly adapt.
On the one hand several interviewees have pointed out that there is a wealth of existing knowledge, evidence and lessons learned from past relevant programmes in the area of migration, which is not sufficiently utilised or build upon. There are thus doubts whether currently sufficient openings exist for evidence to play a strong role for decision-making in a context of politicised agendas (Interviews Policy Researchers, 2016). On the other hand, policy-makers interviewed still feel they lack an evidence-base that serves their policy-needs, specifically with regards to how to respond to drivers of irregular migration or fast changing dynamics. This gap can in partly be met by investing in short-term research that can rapidly respond to real-time policy questions (Boswell, 2016, p.23). Yet, simultaneously, the political and organisational conditions need to be favourable towards research uptake and a successful exchange between research results and policy and programming.

New approaches are emerging that pair research and analysis more closely with programming, such as the EU Trust Fund Research Facility for the Horn of Africa. Yet, this facility was still being set up during at the time the first 20 TF Horn of Africa projects were approved, and will therefore only be able to provide input at later stages. Future programs should make use of this facility as well as other locally generated knowledge. Another good example is the pairing of research institutes with practitioner organisations as part of a Dutch call for proposals on mixed migration flows (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, 2016).

More generally, beyond better tracking migration-related expenditure noted further below, increased emphasis could be put on monitoring and evaluation development projects that focus on migration aspects. In the field of migration and development in general there has been a lack of an ‘evaluation culture’ (Chappell and Laczko, 2011) and this is not different for the EU and its member states (ICMPD and ECDPM, 2013). There could be usefully more emphasis on evaluations of development interventions with focus on migration aspects. Such evaluations should go beyond the individual project objectives but place them in the context of the wider implications such as the migration related goals of Agenda 2030.77 This however requires migration and migration&development related interventions to have a clearer defined strategic objective against which they can be measured, which has not always been the case in the past (European Court of Auditors, 2016).

77 The EU DG DEVCO commissioned study on the results and impact of EU development cooperation funded projects in the area of voluntary return and reintegration (Te Wildt et al., 2015) is an example of assessing cooperation on migration in a broader context.
Lastly, at least in the case of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, additional questions have been raised about how this new instrument changes accountability and oversight and governance structures of large sums of European ODA (Hertog, 2016; Hauck et al., 2015). Early experience in the first year of the new Fund being in operation seems to suggest that relatively little guidance has been instilled from the Strategic Board, that African partners have been insufficiently included in the decision-making in the various stages of decision-making, and that there is a strong concern over lack of oversight by the European Parliament (Castillejo, 2016, pp.10).

Towards more accurate and transparent reporting of migration-related ODA and an aid agenda in support of migration

On-going discussions at OECD DAC level, to be concluded in 2017, will hopefully clarify reporting standards for in-donor refugee costs, and improve the consistency of reporting across DAC donors. Countries that have recently changed their reporting practices on in-donor refugee costs, may be more inclined to actively engage in the discussion on standardised reporting at the OECD taking place in 2017. Finding methods to report in-donor costs of asylum seeker protection in the year in which they incur rather than reporting and sourcing all costs to the year of first arrival may be a further way to balance pressures on development budgets in a given year.

Nevertheless, efforts for more consistency should go hand in hand with more transparency of the in-donor refugee costs as well as other migration-related ODA expenditures. Beyond the technical discussions on harmonising ODA reporting of in-donor refugee costs, it could be worthwhile to create a platform for policy discussions and the exchange of government practices at European level to discuss and potentially reduce the big gaps in the average costs per asylum seeker.

While efforts are being made to improve the transparency of reporting, such as in Sweden and the Netherlands, this should be encouraged more systematically and more detailed reporting of these costs could be part of the annual OECD DAC questionnaire\(^78\). More transparency may also help to inform discussions on how to achieve efficient use of resources for refugee protection within donor countries, such as in the case of housing in the Netherlands.

\(^78\) The research of the study has led to another observation in relation to in-donor refugee costs reporting. In some cases, such as in the Netherlands, projects that do not seem to relate to in-donor refugee costs are reported under the DAC code for this cost item. For example a project on ‘circular migration and brain gain: Supporting migrant entrepreneurs’ or diaspora support has been reported under purpose Code 93010
An important consideration at this time is whether to include better guidelines for reporting in-donor refugee costs under a wider reporting framework of financial efforts for sustainable development, known as TOSSD (Total Official Support to Sustainable Development), currently under discussion at the OECD. This would ensure that donor efforts for global refugee protection continue to be recorded; yet removes the risk of diluting the ODA definition and would bring them closer to their original purpose (Hynes & Scott, 2013). The inclusion of in-donor costs in a wider measure may bring up the question of expanding the timeframe for eligible costs beyond 12-months, which has already been proposed for the ODA measure (OECD, 2016d; Anders, 2016a). If in-donor refugee costs were to be recorded in a separate measure such as TOSSD rather than counting as ODA, some donors potentially move further away from reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI goal to which they have pledged as part of the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA).

Lastly, migration related expenditure in developing partner countries is expected to rise. Yet, there is no clarity over these expenditures. it would be beneficial to have a better reporting system of tracking ODA (or TOSSD) support related to migration. On the one hand this fulfills an important transparency function, which could also be linked to monitoring and reporting on the migration related SDGs and the support that donors provide for migration-related objectives. Transparency in the way the migration agenda is supported may also encourage exchange and good and balanced donor behaviour for a comprehensive agenda.

At the level of the OECD, this could include adding a specific OECD-DAC Code on Migration, which would be useful to track specific ODA expenditure on migration related technical assistance or the support to migration governance. In addition, as migration has become a cross-cutting theme, which is increasingly integrated in thematic programmes, an additional marker could be introduced as already exists for ‘gender’ and ‘aid for trade’. Simultaneously a platform to explore and discuss criteria and good practices to ensure that migration projects are primarily development-oriented could accompany this process.79

Such discussions could link to the global level and also be part of European contributions to the UN Global Compact to be negotiated during the next years. A discussion on the cornerstones of ‘aid in support of migration’ and the financial as well as policy commitments supporting the agenda could be useful. Yet, the EU may be in a difficult spot and currently less credible at the global level due to the

79 A similar suggestion has been made by the European Court of Auditors (2016) specifically to the EU Commission to develop a better system to trace migration related development expenditures in the absence of an OECD wide system.
internal struggle for a coherent response based on solidarity. Yet, to show willingness to go beyond the focus on ‘root causes’ and to rally support for better governing migration flows worldwide, including through the use of ODA, could create positive impact.
5 Conclusion and way forward

This paper set out to investigate the implications of recent reactions through the use of ODA to the refugee and irregular migration situation by drawing on five case studies: the European Commission, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. In many ways, reactions have been diverse depending on political and institutional contexts and budgetary systems within these case studies. While not being a full comparative study of the ODA situation within Europe and limited to a number of countries, this study aims to draw out a number of developments and implications for ODA practices that have relevance across EU member states.

Collectively, the EU has made additional finances available to respond to the irregular migration and refugee situation internally and externally during the past years until 2015 - despite the skyrocketing costs for refugee protection within donor countries. Most of the immediate additional ODA has been directed towards refugee hosting and –generating countries, not surprisingly to provide support to the Syrian refugee situation, particularly in European Neighbourhood. All case study countries have kept or increased funding for humanitarian aid and relief up to 2015 and have made efforts to more strongly combine long-term development aid with humanitarian funding. This brings opportunities for ODA to support agendas that are inclusive of refugees and migrants and advances parts of the ‘leave no one behind’ principle of Agenda 2030.

Yet, even beyond this, the situation has led to a politically driven focus on increasing cooperation for long-term development aid with countries that are strategically relevant from a migration perspective – either as part of new allocation criteria, criteria for priority partner countries or through resourcing new funds and special initiatives that focus more strongly on migration relevant regions. This could mean that indicators related to migration will likely play a stronger role in determining geographic parts of ODA allocations in future. The risk of ‘forgotten crises’ in the short to mid-term, that are outside the current EU spotlight would thus need to be taken seriously.

Despite the overall increase in ODA, the case studies have revealed a nuanced picture. In some cases, there has been a clear trade-off between hosting refugees within the EU and available funding for external longer-term cooperation. Facing pressures of such cuts to their external budgets, some donors have had to make difficult choices on where to prioritise ODA both geographically and thematically. Others reduced flexibility in future budgets in order to safeguard current sources

80 This is at times explicitly related to a migration relevance concerning irregular flows towards Europe, other times it is less specific.
available externally. Though in one case, Sweden, an agreement has been reached to 'protect' the development cooperation budget from high-rising in-donor refugee costs through a maximum cap, the unpredictable nature of the costs for refugee protection in donor countries may put development cooperation budgets under pressure and test their flexibility also in the future. This risks being at the cost of predictable development funding, which is an important quality aspect of development cooperation and relates to the effectiveness of aid.

Development agencies and ministries also realise that they need to increase their level of preparedness to deal with uncertain funding situations due to uncertain in-donor costs for refugee protection. This can include allowing flexibility through governments giving multi-year rather than single year appropriations to donor agencies, which they can then use more flexibly, or planning in advance for different scenarios how to handle changing budget conditions. As regards the reporting and estimating of in-donor refugee costs, budgeting for costs when they actually incur rather than in the year of arrivals of asylum seekers could help to avoid large implications on development cooperation budgets in a year of high number of arrivals of asylum seekers.

There exist indications that short-term pressures in response to the migration crisis have already undermined donor agencies' own aid effectiveness practices. Pressures to implement and disburse have in some instances had negative consequences both for the relationships with local partners and for analysis and quality control. This can particularly be seen with instruments and initiatives developed or re-deployed to specifically respond to the migrant and refugee crisis. The pressure for short-term spending and rapid, visible disbursement of funds to address structural problems of development may need some rebalancing towards allowing the necessary time for analysis, quality-control and trust-building with partners, at least for those programmes where the 'crisis' character may be less prevalent. The recent decision by European donors to in principle employ ODA conditionally upon cooperation on return and readmission, if implemented in its negative form, could risk subjecting aid objectives to those of migration control which in turn could make aid less effective in what it is set out to achieve.

While politically the rhetoric and stated objectives of using ODA in the context of the irregular migration and refugee situation may not always be sophisticated, there are opportunities for development actors to render the 'crisis' into an opportunity by ensuring that lessons learned, analysis and local knowledge are meaningfully integrated in programming and implementation processes. While the pressure for short-term fixes at time has reduced the scope for adequately informing design and implementation of cooperation programmes, new mechanisms and initiatives are being tested to build a better understanding of the
issues around development cooperation, migration and displacement and integrate them into programming cycles.

Using ODA to support refugees, migration and development is not entirely new to most EU donors. Balancing which dimensions of migration to prioritise through projects and activities however has in the past remained challenging even in cases where a comprehensive policy how development cooperation support migration and mobility exists. This balance seems to have further come under pressure. Tracing patterns on ODA spending on migration relevant projects is however difficult due to the absence of clear standardised reporting guidelines.

While the irregular migration and refugee situation has pushed migration up the priority ladder for development cooperation, the European political discourse on migration and development now concentrates more on the challenges (such as smuggling, irregular migration and displacement) rather than the broader opportunities of migration for development. Previous debates on maximising the positive impact of migration on development more broadly in Europe overall appears to have lost relevance in terms of informing policy or programming choices among the new emphasis on addressing ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and development.

Yet, due to the absence of comparable reporting of ODA spending on migration related expenditures, it is difficult to assess trends on migration-related spending over the past years. At present, however, practitioners see ‘root causes’ logic more as an umbrella term, and projects and results frameworks have not necessarily seen substantive thematic changes as a result. To some extent, activities under this umbrella constitute a re-labelling of development cooperation in the areas of employment, governance, resilience, livelihoods, etc. with a specific geographic focus and inclusive of migrants and refugees. Yet there are growing strategic considerations and increased prominence of migration aspects in European development cooperation – not least through the emphasis on addressing ‘root causes’ of displacement, irregular migration or both. It is likely that parts of future cooperation will be designed around factors that are identified as driving and influencing migration decisions and that these will influence programming decisions in countries that are relevant from a migration perspective.

Beyond a general focus of cooperation under the umbrella of addressing ‘root causes of displacement and irregular migration’, the use of ODA for specific migration aspects such as to accompany voluntary return and reintegration efforts of failed asylum seekers or to support migration governance abroad will in the future most likely be reinforced. Testing and critically examining underlying assumptions of such support will be important to design support that is well-informed from a development, governance and conflict perspective. The refugee
crisis has also led to furthering progressive discussions on linking more strongly humanitarian and development approaches in the context of refugee situations. While such discussions are not new, there are now increased concrete efforts by development actors to address forced displacement. These more integrated approaches will need anchoring in institutional and incentive set-ups of donors so to take this important agenda forward.

In order to monitor better the donors’ activities in a field that has gained political and strategic prominence during the past years, this paper has suggested to introduce reporting codes in the OECD DAC system, that can capture both migration-specific spending, such as technical cooperation on and support to migration governance (e.g. through a specific OECD DAC code) as well as activities that indirectly benefit and address migrants and refugees, such as resilience programmes for host and refugee communities (e.g. through introducing markers as exist already for other cross-cutting issues, such as aid for trade or gender). Moreover, strengthened monitoring and evaluation systems for such expenditure and projects would merit more attention.

Such a discussion on better reporting should also be linked to broader discussions among European donors as well as at the global level on how ODA should best support – in a balanced way - the migration-relevant dimensions of the SDGs and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda that aims at improving migration governance and reducing the costs of migration.

Lastly, the narrative around the focus on ‘addressing root causes of displacement’ and irregular migration has been dominated by the role of ODA and other financial flows. In the context of protecting refugees within Europe and addressing root causes of secondary movement, the argument has emerged that it is much less costly and consequently better ‘value for money’ to use resources to support refugee hosting communities in developing countries instead. While such financial support is necessary, this argument deflects from discussion on fair responsibility sharing in global refugee situations that includes wider support in the form of resettlement or other migration opportunities to alleviate pressure on host communities coping with large influx of migrants. Moreover, working towards better policies overall to foster sustainable development, to help youth in developing countries access political and economic systems, to foster peace and security globally, and to not create long-term harm through the current interest in regulating flows towards Europe, would need to be part of the discussion much more than is the case currently.
References


promoting-integrated-border-management-ibm-latin-america-and-sub-saharan-africa


Annex 1: Methodology for determining migration-relevant projects and ODA from OECD CRS data

The analysis considered all ODA reported commitments and disbursements to projects between 2010 and 2014 as reported in the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The data was retrieved from:

A word search was conducted for the following key-terms related to migration and displacement:

- Refugee
- Displace(ment)
- Migration
- Migrant
- Diaspora
- Remittance
- Smuggling
- Trafficking
- Mobility
- Return
- Reintegration
- Border management
- Border security
- Root cause
- Scholarship
- Border management
- Border security
- Root cause
- Scholarship

It was furthermore indicated whether projects refer to in-donor refugee costs. These were removed from the list of projects analysed.

Manual filtering was done to clean for possible false positives of unrelated projects. Manual filtering was done for projects containing the keyword ‘migration’ (e.g. false positives for bird migration’ or ‘data migration’), ‘trafficking’ (‘drug trafficking’) ‘root causes’, and ‘reintegration’ (‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ projects in a non-migration context).

Further manual filtering was done to clarify the focus of specific projects where multiple projects were identified (e.g. an IOM implemented return and reintegration project should be counted for ‘return’ and ‘reintegration’ but not for ‘migration’) A final spot-check was conducted for relevant projects not picked up due to the project description being in a different language.

Subsequently, summary tables of migration-relevant projects and ODA totals were produced per year for each of the case study countries, alongside calculations of the share of migration-relevant projects and ODA of total projects/ODA. This allowed for both frequency and ODA-level analysis to assess whether an overall trend emerges from the data.

As at times several of these key-words appear in a given project, the frequency and calculated ODA per key-word add up to more than 100% of the
total number of projects or total committed or disbursed ODA for any given year.

This analysis may not capture all migration relevant projects as: 1) the purpose of the project is not always clearly described in the data entered into CRS, and 2) some migration-relevant projects may not refer to key terms listed above (e.g. those with a focus on specific root causes, those in a different language and those migration-related projects that do not use migration-related terms in the description).

Furthermore, the data analysis detected some inconsistencies are present in the coding of migration-related projects, e.g. AVR projects were differently coded across the case studies (some using OECD DAC Code 15130; others reporting it under the ‘in-donor refugee cost’ category.

From a methodological point of view one needs to be cautious to derive strong conclusions based on text searches compared to statistical classifications based on purpose codes as more strongly depends on the quality of descriptive information which varies across cases.
## Annex 2: Comparative overview of ODA data for case study countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DATA POINT</th>
<th>UNIT / METADATA</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA profile</td>
<td>Total committed ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>1.760.0</td>
<td>2.122.0</td>
<td>2.033.5</td>
<td>2.044.8</td>
<td>2.070.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which ODA humanitarian aid</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>165.3</td>
<td>200.7</td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>191.9</td>
<td>264.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>121.3</td>
<td>151.2</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>256.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net disbursed ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>3.036.6</td>
<td>2.932.3</td>
<td>2.839.1</td>
<td>2.948.8</td>
<td>3.008.3</td>
<td>3.027.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which ODA humanitarian aid</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>173.0</td>
<td>184.1</td>
<td>180.6</td>
<td>240.6</td>
<td>272.0</td>
<td>351.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>157.7</td>
<td>121.3</td>
<td>151.2</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>256.3</td>
<td>468.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>5.39%</td>
<td>4.14%</td>
<td>5.32%</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
<td>15.47%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total gross disbursed ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA as a share of GNI</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration &amp; ODA</td>
<td>Gross disbursements to migration relevant projects</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
<td>3.19%</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>2.779</td>
<td>2.376</td>
<td>2.163</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>1.480</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of migration-relevant projects</strong></td>
<td><strong>Number of migration-relevant projects receiving ODA disbursements</strong></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of migration-relevant projects</strong></td>
<td><strong>Migration-relevant projects as a share of total projects</strong></td>
<td>2.41%</td>
<td>2.64%</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
<td>2.98%</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest frequency keyword</strong></td>
<td><strong>Most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</strong></td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second highest frequency keyword</strong></td>
<td><strong>Second most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</strong></td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Displacement / migration</td>
<td>Scholarship</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Third highest frequency keyword</strong></td>
<td><strong>Third most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</strong></td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Reintegration</td>
<td>Border management</td>
<td>Displace / return / reintegration</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

<p>| <strong>ODA profile</strong> | <strong>Total committed ODA USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | 14.309.0 | 19.951.1 | 26.007.7 | 25.107.7 | 25.107.7 | 18.506.3 | n/a |
| <strong>...of which humanitarian aid USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | 1.728.6 | 1.760.7 | 2.012.9 | 2.080.6 | 1.842.4 | n/a |
| <strong>...of which in-donor refugee costs USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| <strong>Total net disbursed ODA USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | 13.380.3 | 17.190.4 | 18.434.8 | 16.073.0 | 16.451.1 | 16.373.6 |
| <strong>...of which humanitarian aid USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | n/a | 1.708.0 | 1.735.1 | 1.858.5 | 2.272.2 | 1.988.5 |
| <strong>...of which in-donor refugee costs USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</strong> | n/a | n/a | n/a | 18.4 | 28.1 | n/a |
| <strong>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total ODA</strong> | USD mlns, constant 2014 prices | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.1% | 0.2% | n/a |
| <strong>ODA as a share of GNI</strong> | Net disbursements at current prices as a share of GNI | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration &amp; ODA</th>
<th>ODA to migration-relevant projects</th>
<th>Gross disbursements, USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</th>
<th>537.5</th>
<th>593.0</th>
<th>637.6</th>
<th>1,036.2</th>
<th>1,280.8</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of migration-relevant ODA</td>
<td>Gross disbursements to migration-relevant projects as a share of total ODA</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.08%</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>6.32%</td>
<td>7.83%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects total</td>
<td>Total number of projects receiving ODA disbursements</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.679</td>
<td>17.215</td>
<td>17.921</td>
<td>17.603</td>
<td>17.049</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migration-relevant projects</td>
<td>Number of migration-relevant projects receiving ODA disbursements</td>
<td></td>
<td>765</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of migration-relevant projects</td>
<td>Migration-relevant projects as a share of total projects</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.33%</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>4.53%</td>
<td>5.19%</td>
<td>5.71%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest frequency keyword (in # projects)</td>
<td>Most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second highest frequency keyword</td>
<td>Second-most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third highest frequency keyword</td>
<td>Third most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>Total committed ODA</th>
<th>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</th>
<th>11.991.7</th>
<th>12.589.6</th>
<th>13.141.0</th>
<th>14.330.3</th>
<th>17.960.3</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…of which humanitarian aid</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>409.0</td>
<td>430.3</td>
<td>401.1</td>
<td>608.0</td>
<td>1.024.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>171.4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net disbursed ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>13.386.3</td>
<td>14.179.4</td>
<td>13.877.4</td>
<td>14.476.9</td>
<td>16.566.2</td>
<td>20.854.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…of which humanitarian aid</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
<td>345.2</td>
<td>427.9</td>
<td>421.2</td>
<td>591.7</td>
<td>874.4</td>
<td>922.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Migration & ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>86,7 86,6 81,4 141,2 171,4 3.510,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total ODA</td>
<td>0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 1,0% 1,0% 16,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA as a share of GNI</td>
<td>Net disbursements at current prices as a share of GNI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ODA profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total committed ODA</td>
<td>6.313,4 3.979,9 5.142,7 3.341,7 3.968,0 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which humanitarian aid</td>
<td>128,6 166,4 188,3 185,9 381,4 n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net disbursed ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which humanitarian aid</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total ODA</td>
<td>USD mlns, constant 2014 prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA as a share of GNI</td>
<td>Net disbursements at current prices as a share of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration &amp; ODA</td>
<td>ODA to migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of migration-relevant ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of projects total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest frequency keyword (in # projects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second highest frequency keyword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Highest frequency keyword</td>
<td>Third most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWEDEN</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA profile</td>
<td>Total committed ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...of which humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total net disbursed ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...of which humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...of which in-donor refugee costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-donor refugee costs as a share of total ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migration &amp; ODA</strong></td>
<td>ODA as a share of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net disbursements at current prices as a share of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWEDEN</strong></td>
<td>Migration-related projects receiving ODA disbursements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share of migration-relevant projects as a share of total projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Frequency Keyword (in # projects)</td>
<td>Most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second highest frequency keyword</td>
<td>Second most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third highest frequency keyword</td>
<td>Third most frequent migration-related keyword in migration-relevant projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3: List of interviews

Due to the sensitivities of the research and to ensure that full frank insight was given and as laid out in our original proposal to EBA for the methodology for this research, ECDPM guaranteed that interviewees would not be identified by name or specific function.

Overview of interviews conducted (July-September 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Researcher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany

Interview Implementing Agency, July 2016
Interview Implementing Agency, July 2016
Interview Implementing Agency, July 2016 (2 individuals)
Conversation Policy Researcher, July 2016
Interview Official, October 2016
Interview Official, December 2016

Denmark

Interview Official/Implementing Agency (DANIDA), July 2016
Interview Official, August 2016
Interview Policy Researcher, August 2016
Interview Policy Researcher, August 2016
Interview Civil Society, July 2016 (2 individuals)
Netherlands
Interview Official, July 2016
Interview Official, October 2016
Interview Official, December 2016
Interview Policy Researcher, July 2016
Interview Civil Society, July 2016 (2 individuals)

Sweden
Interview Official, July 2016
Interview Implementing Agency, October 2016
Interview Civil Society, August 2016 (2 individuals)
Interview Policy Researcher, July 2016

European Union
Interview EU Official, Commission, September 2016
Interview EU Official, EEAS, November 2016
Interview EU Official, EU Parliament, December 2016

Other
Conversation UNDP, July 2016
Conversation African Union Officials, September 2016
Annex 4: Case Study Denmark

Denmark has seen significant changes to its cooperation efforts and aid budget during the past years as a result of two coinciding developments in a context of economic austerity. Since 2013 the rising numbers of asylum seekers have led to increasing costs for reception within Denmark which has been reflected in Denmark’s ODA figures on in-donor refugee costs. In June 2015 a new government took power, which promised to lower Denmark’s ODA to 0.7% of its GNI as part of its political campaign and made this a reality in the 2016 budget. Together these developments led to significant cuts as well as enormous reallocation in the development cooperation budget as well as a stronger future strategic focus on combining Denmark’s ‘interests’ with its development cooperation activities abroad. There has been a shift to focus ODA more strongly on causes of migration towards Europe so to prevent the pressures on future movement – this however comes at the same time as resources to multilateral organisations and bilateral strategies are being cut.

I. Overall Danish aid developments during the past years 2010-2015

Danish ODA has overall risen since 2006, with a slight drop between 2010 and 2012. From 2014 to 2015 ODA net disbursements increased from DKK 16,874 mn to DKK 17,254 mn. Measured in USD constant prices, Danish ODA has remained fairly stable during the past years at around USD 3 bn. There was a small increase from 2014 to 2015 of USD 3 bn to USD 3,037 bn – a rise of 0.8% in real terms. This increase was largely due to a strong increase in in-donor refugee costs reported as part of Denmark’s ODA. Excluding in-donor refugee costs, Denmark’s ODA has decreased by 6.8% from 2014 to 2015.81 From a longer-term perspective, Danish ODA levels without in-donor refugee costs in 2015 are roughly at the same level than they were in 2009.

81 Based on USD taking into account inflation and exchange rate (OECD, 2016b)
Table 1. Denmark ODA Developments, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA commitments, mn DKK</th>
<th>ODA net disbursements, mn DKK</th>
<th>In-donor refugee costs, mn DKK</th>
<th>ODA net disbursements, USD bn, constant prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13000</td>
<td>16142</td>
<td>838,1</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15180</td>
<td>15712</td>
<td>649,8</td>
<td>2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14766</td>
<td>15590</td>
<td>830,1</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15273</td>
<td>16443</td>
<td>909,5</td>
<td>2,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>16565</td>
<td>16874</td>
<td>1439,8</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17693*</td>
<td>17254</td>
<td>2669,8</td>
<td>3,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, *

Denmark has experienced a sharp increase in the number of asylum seekers from 2013 onward. From 2014 to 2015, the Ministry for Immigration and Integration reported an increase from 14,792 in 2014 to 21,316 applications for asylum in 2015, mainly from Syria, Iran, Afghanistan and Eritrea (Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, 2016). With this increase,
the share in total ODA of in-donor refugee costs almost doubled, from 8.5% in 2014 to 15.5% in 2015. Over the 5-year period from 2010-2015 the share has tripled. As shown below in the 2016 budget overview, the Danish government allocates an estimated 30% of total ODA to in-donor refugee costs in 2016, expecting about 25,000 asylum seekers. Within Denmark there have been concerns not only about the high levels of in-donor refugee costs reported as ODA but also about the type of expenses the government included in the first year reception costs (Interview Civil Society, 2016) as further explored in Box 1.

Table 2. Denmark In-donor refugee costs as % of total net ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>15.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC data

Denmark has in the past years been among the few European countries to reach the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment, and has scored high on the Commitment to Development Index, which notes that ‘the quality of Denmark’s aid programs is among the best’ (Center for Global Development, 2015). Even excluding in-donor refugee costs, Denmark’s ODA reaches just over 0.7% in 2015. For 2016 this is estimated to be about 0.5% of GNI according to the budget plans.

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82 These figures are based on net disbursements and actual reported donor refugee costs to OECD-DAC. These shares may deviate if commitment figures are taken as basis.
II. Budgetary implications

There have been significant changes in the 2015 and 2016 development cooperation budgets due to the high costs for asylum seekers and refugees in Denmark itself. The initial 2015 budget proposal for ODA amounted to 16 893 mn Danish Krona (DKK) (Danish Ministry of Finance 2015a, p.50) but later increased to a total DKK 17 693 mn in the 2015 Financial Act passed by Parliament in December 2014, driven by higher in-donor refugee costs (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2015b, p.48). In addition, funds meant for developing countries (under §6.3) were reallocated and the original budget proposal of DKK 13 931 was reduced to DKK 12 261 in the adopted budget.

The initial 2016 budget proposal introduced heavy cuts as the newly elected government realised its promise to reduce Danish ODA spending to 0.7% of GNI.

83 This results from an overall shift in priority of the current government towards other expenditures benefitting Denmark.
the final budget act to DKK 4.4 bn (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2015c, p.44). Both overall budget cuts as well as increased refugee costs have reduced ODA funds available to developing countries – both bilaterally as well as through multilateral organisations. Table 3 summarises the transition from 2015 to 2016.

Table 3. The committed ODA funds in the 2015 and 2016 Budget as stated in the respective Budget Acts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>2015 (mn DKK)</th>
<th>2016 (mn DKK)</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Assistance to developing countries (§6.3) (commitments)</td>
<td>12,261.2</td>
<td>8,074.8</td>
<td>-34.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>-396.4</td>
<td>-661.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Assistance</td>
<td>5,385.9</td>
<td>2,893.9</td>
<td>-46.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>1,103.0</td>
<td>758.0</td>
<td>-31.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resources, Energy and climate change</td>
<td>652.0</td>
<td>301.0</td>
<td>-53.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Information</td>
<td>371.0</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>-55.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral assistance to UN</td>
<td>1,429.1</td>
<td>944.6</td>
<td>-33.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral assistance to other organisations</td>
<td>1,941.6</td>
<td>1,848.5</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>1,775.0</td>
<td>1,825.0</td>
<td>+2.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative costs</td>
<td>771.3</td>
<td>754.9</td>
<td>-2.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Financed EU assistance</td>
<td>1,044.1</td>
<td>1,352.6</td>
<td>+29.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>+5.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs</td>
<td>3,476.5</td>
<td>4,436.9</td>
<td>+27.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>118.0</td>
<td>135.5</td>
<td>+14.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ODA Budget</td>
<td>17,693.0</td>
<td>14,777.7</td>
<td>-16.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See Danish Ministry of Finance 2015b (§6 Udenrigsministeriet) and Danish Ministry of Finance, 2015c. Actual disbursed funds as reported to OECD may differ as changes in budgets occur throughout the year.*
Commitments for bilateral assistance to developing countries were cut by 46%, with major reduction of support to natural resources, energy and climate change as well as research and information. Assistance to CSOs and multilateral assistance to the UN were cut by approximately one third. On the other hand, the level of humanitarian assistance has seen a slight increase due to the crisis in Syria, the conflict with ISIL and the resulting refugee flows (Danish Government, 2015). In mid-2016, the government revised downward the estimated numbers of refugees coming to Denmark (Development Today, 2016b). This means that instead of the 30% of ODA for refugee reception costs, it is estimated that Denmark will spend around 20% of its ODA for receiving refugees within Denmark – this according to Concord still makes Denmark ‘the largest recipient of Danish aid’ (Concord, 2016, p.37). It also led to announcements to transfer of DKK 525 mn extra for humanitarian aid in 2016. This would mean an increase of humanitarian aid to a record level of DKK 2.35 bn for 2016 - mainly directed to benefit refugees in Europe’s neighbouring areas (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) so to ‘avoid hunger and emergencies driving them into Europe’ (Development Today, 2016b).

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85 EU funds are covered by the seven-year EU budget or Intergovernmental Agreement (EDF) so there is no scope for a reduction. The scope for increase is only through EU Trust Funds.

86 Concord (2016) points out that ‘all Danish CSOs that had framework agreements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw those agreements cut by 27%’ (p.37).

87 The overview further states that it is the highest amount that the Danish Government has devoted in the finance act to humanitarian efforts.
This marks an on-going trend of sector allocable aid\textsuperscript{88} in Denmark being reduced to free up funds particularly to go towards in-donor refugee costs and humanitarian aid. ODA committed to sector-allocable funds has decreased from 78\% of total ODA in 2010 to 66\% in 2014 as shown in Figure 4, while the share of in-donor refugee costs and humanitarian aid have increased.

One should however be cautious in interpreting changes in budget allocations one year to the next. The Government of Denmark prepares multi-annual allocations that are disbursed over several years; committed allocations can therefore vary within determined bounds. The budget for African countries for example has been disproportionately low in 2016, yet allocations and commitments in the 2014 & 2015 budgets have been larger in order to disburse funds in the subsequent years (Interview Civil Society, 2016). This allows for year-on-year of funding to reflect new priorities yet within the planning of a medium-term fiscal framework.

Interviewees pointed out that cuts to uncommitted funds have taken place in all possible areas. Some are concerned about the perceived lack of strategic or systematic thinking behind the cuts, especially on how they relate to future strategic objectives (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

\textsuperscript{88} Sector allocable aid is a subset of ODA regularly used in analyses on aid flows to developing countries. It is different from Country Programmable Aid (CPA) in that it excludes general budget support, actions related to debt, humanitarian aid and internal transactions in the donor country, while it includes for instance imputed student costs and aid from local governments. Depending on donors reporting, sector allocable aid can be considered a more appropriate proxy of CPA than ODA.
In an effort to increase predictability in humanitarian funding, Denmark has reported multi-annual humanitarian aid commitments up until 2018 (OECD, 2016a). Nevertheless, the refugee situation has led to calls for further overall funding predictability (Interviews, Concord, 2016, p.37). Unpredictable levels of in-donor refugee costs will however likely mean further uncertainty in the future resources available for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. This puts pressure on development programmes and aid planning with potential negative implications for the quality of Denmark’s development cooperation (OECD, 2016b, p.17). Denmark is currently not discussing a cap on the amount spent on in-donor refugee costs as part of the designated ODA resources. The current political agreement is that DAC-able costs should be declared and sourced from the designated ODA resources. Interviewees suggested that it may however be possible to ensure more predictability by committing to use the 0.7% of GNI metric for ‘narrow’ ODA purposes (e.g. aid excluding in-donor refugee costs) and overall spend.
approximately 0.8% of Denmark’s GNI on ODA inclusive of in-donor refugee costs.  

Box 1. Denmark’s reporting of in-donor refugee costs

Denmark reports relatively high average costs per asylum seeker compared to other OECD DAC members. With USD 21,791 average annual cost (2014 estimate) per refugee, it ranks fifth after the Netherlands, Belgium, Iceland and Switzerland. Denmark includes the cost of both granted and rejected asylum seekers in this estimate and includes costs for the 12 months from the time an asylum application has been filed.

Denmark reports the following items for refugee support in their ODA expenditures:

- Asylum centres and sustenance (incl. administrative costs)
- Amounts for processing applications and other public services, incl. police
- Assessed amount that covers subsistence costs for quota refugees and unaccompanied children and their general introduction to Denmark.

It has controversially been alleged that the cost of an integration programme consisting of Danish language education and employment related training as well as qualifying activities were declared as in-donor refugee costs for (DKK 220 mn in 2015; potentially DKK 340 mn in 2016 for similar activities.) (Development Today, 2016a). OECD rules state that activities serving integration in the host country should not be counted as ODA, and the OECD has reportedly contacted the Danish government seeking clarification (Frandsen, 2016a). The following breakdown of costs for 2015 has been published to clarify what costs are spent on (Frandsen, 2016b):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Asylum expenses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation of accommodation centers</td>
<td>DKK 548.2 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash services/ Food</td>
<td>DKK 221.9 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>DKK 802.2 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Board</td>
<td>DKK 37.3 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>DKK 23.4 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>DKK 165.3 mn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons with temporary residence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport of refugees to Denmark</td>
<td>DKK 22 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash IFB with integration program</td>
<td>DKK 385.1 mn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89 Concord (2016) also argues for a guarantee of a minimum of 0.7% ODA without in-donor refugee costs (p.37). This may be a feasible suggestion as different political parties are open to raise ODA to 0.8% according to interviewees.
These allegations have led to political discussions on reporting practices. The government maintains that reporting practices have not changed over the years and that the OECD DAC rules are ambiguous, while civil society actors stress that the government is deliberately including costs that are not ODA (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

**Budget priorities: Increased focus on refugees and migration, including through EU**

For Denmark the migration and refugee crisis received high priority. The government made available financial commitments of DKK 750 mn as of January 2016 in order to assist affected regions and to ‘prevent migration’ (Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU, 2016).

Some of these funds were channelled through the EU facilities and instruments. Beyond Denmark’s ODA contributions to the EU, e.g. through the EDF, in direct support for the refugee and irregular migration situation, it has contributed EUR 6 mn (about DKK 44 mn) to the EU Trust Fund for Africa North Africa window, specifically in the area of migration, and is also involved in the RDDP for the Horn of Africa. For the crisis in Syria, Denmark has also channelled EUR 10 mn to the EU Madad Fund (European Commission, 2016).

With regards to the EU-Turkey agreement, Denmark has advanced and fully financed payments, without an overall increase in ODA.

Interviewees pointed out that this indicates that reallocations from other areas must have taken place. The agreement will be financed over four years – as such it is difficult to trace where resources would otherwise have been spent.

Unspent allocations to other countries or thematic budget lines are usually drawn from to finance such unforeseen expenditures (instead of being (re-)committed or spent on humanitarian aid) rather than to directly divert funds from other programs (Interview Civil Society, 2016).
III. Overall strategic shifts in Danish development cooperation

Changing geographic allocations and priority countries

“Support to the areas hosting refugees and internally displaced people – and a strong effort to prevent migration through long-term development”

Beyond the budgetary implications, Denmark is currently revising its development cooperation strategy to integrate the Agenda 2030, but also partly to respond to migration challenges. The 2016 Finance Act states that development cooperation should be focused ‘where poverty is significant, where Denmark has strategic interest and where it is best placed to make a difference’ (Danish Ministry of Finance, 2015c). Denmark’s shift to a more interest-driven approach has been accelerated by the need to show the relevance of development cooperation in reducing migration flows to the EU. Reinforcing an on-going trend90, Denmark is cutting its priority partner countries from 21 to 14, with the intention to phase out development cooperation with Bolivia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Nepal, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in coming years.

Priority countries are mostly LDCs and fall into two categories as defined by the Ministry itself (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016):

- Poor, fragile countries and regions with fragility: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, Sahel and Horn of Africa91
- Poor stable countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, Tanzania, Uganda

OECD data shows that the share of Danish ODA commitments to the regions Africa, Asia and Latin America has not changed significantly when looking over the whole period from 2010 to 2014, yet there has been an increase for Africa from 2013 to 2014 as shown in Figure 5. Looking within these regions, the Middle East has increased its share within the Asia region

90 In 2011 for example, the phasing out of assistance to partner countries such as Vietnam, Bhutan, Nicaragua and Bolivia was already under way. The current further reduction may have taken place irrespective of the refugee and migration situation (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011)
91 South Sudan was originally being discussed as priority country (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016) but has been dropped amidst the latest turmoil. (Globalnyt, 2016)
and South of the Sahara has increased its share within Africa during the past 5 years as shown in Table 4.

**Figure 5. ODA commitments per region as share of total ODA to developing countries**

![Diagram showing ODA commitments per region as share of total ODA to developing countries]

**Source:** OECD DAC Development Statistics

**Table 4. ODA Commitments to Africa and Asia, as share of total to respective region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>2,0%</td>
<td>2,8%</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
<td>1,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>92,0%</td>
<td>86,7%</td>
<td>89,1%</td>
<td>87,6%</td>
<td>96,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional projects</td>
<td>6,0%</td>
<td>10,5%</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
<td>2,2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>19,8%</td>
<td>23,0%</td>
<td>17,9%</td>
<td>17,0%</td>
<td>12,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>65,5%</td>
<td>55,0%</td>
<td>60,6%</td>
<td>54,9%</td>
<td>49,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>13,3%</td>
<td>21,2%</td>
<td>16,8%</td>
<td>28,0%</td>
<td>35,6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** shares calculated based on OECD DAC CRS data

Interviewees have noted that they expect that re-allocations will take place in future from southern Africa to North Africa and the Middle East in response to the migration situation. The share of humanitarian funding going to the Middle East has increased from 3,3% to 23,2% during the last 10 years (from 11,7% to 22,7% when taking disbursement figures) and North of Sahara – only receiving a very small share - did not see an increase. Europe, including
Turkey, has seen a rise from 0.1% in 2011 to 2% in 2014. Over the same 5-year period, humanitarian aid to the South of Sahara has declined.

For sector allocable aid, the Middle East has also seen a rise from 2.5% to 5.5% between 2010 and 2014 (in disbursements a continuous rise from 3.2% to 7.2%) while no large changes can be detected in the shares for North of Sahara and South of Sahara Africa. It would be too early to conclude that the past years represent a structural trend, particularly given the fact that the refugee crisis necessitated larger humanitarian efforts. Yet, the migration situation has led to strategic deliberations, which may well influence geographic allocations in the future.

**Table 5. Humanitarian aid commitments per region, as share of total humanitarian aid, 2010-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

**Table 6. Sector-allocable aid commitments per region, as share of total sector-allocable aid, 2010-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92 % do not necessarily add up to 100% because Africa Regional; Asia Regional, Oceania and developing countries unspecified not included.
The new Danish draft strategy paper for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance

Policy changes are currently being discussed based on a draft strategy for Danish Development and Humanitarian Assistance presented in June 2016, to be finalised in Autumn 2016. This white paper takes its starting point in the SDGs, listing a number of goals Denmark actively wishes to contribute to (Goals 5, 7, 13, 16 and 17), and proposes a combined strategy for both Humanitarian Assistance as well as longer-term Development cooperation. Migration is one of four strategic pillars of the strategy.

The irregular migration and refugee situation has influenced the white paper in three respects: First, it proposes shifts in the geographic focus of aid allocations based on migration patterns. Danish aid should in the future be focused on countries hosting large numbers of refugees and IDPs as well as towards geographic areas that will help to ‘limit the migration flows towards the EU’. Future partner countries should be relevant from the perspective of Danish migration interests.93 This also implies a focus on secondary movements by emphasising displacement and refugees in the selection of Danish partner countries. The government further argues that: (i) supporting refugees in the region and vicinity of their country of origin is cheaper than hosting refugees in Denmark, and; ii) this approach can help foster development & reconstruction in post-conflict countries by enabling refugees in the region to return to their countries (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

Second, migration is a stand-alone topic in the white paper in contrast to previous Danish aid strategy documents (Interview Official, 2016). Migration and displacement are now clearly integrated and reflected in the draft document in a bid to address what is seen as ‘the 21st century’s largest global challenge’ (Jensen, Fra bistand til investeringer: Samarbejdet med den private

93 Interviewees pointed out that in contrast to past strategies, the new draft is more explicitly interest driven.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>27.5%</th>
<th>25.0%</th>
<th>30.5%</th>
<th>29.3%</th>
<th>19.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data
However, interviewees suggest that the stronger or clearer focus seems to be on issues of displacement, refugees and protection rather than strengthening migration and mobility systems more broadly (Interviews Official, Civil Society).

**Box 2. Migration in Denmark’s development cooperation strategies in the past**

The migration and development nexus had been introduced in Danish development cooperation in 2002 through a decision to *“enhance the nexus between aid and refugee policies within the overall policy priority of poverty reduction”* (Sørensen, 2015). The 2004-2008 development strategy does not refer to migration but instead puts refugees and protection as one of the key priorities. This translated into engagement on humanitarian assistance and supporting regions of origins, which was not specifically defined as interventions on migration.94 References to migration and development subsequently appeared in a number of strategic documents. Conceptually, migration was regarded on the one hand as engine for development. On the other hand, the negative aspects of migration, such as the death toll of irregular migrants or the brain drain issue, demanded a better approach to manage migration.

The development strategy 2008 – 2012 *“A world for all”* (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007) introduced Migration and Development as one of its three priority areas – mainly directed at large migrant populations from Somalia and Afghanistan, including projects for diaspora support. In 2012 migration then disappeared again from the strategy document governing Danish development cooperation in the period 2012—2016 and was not considered a political priority for development cooperation. Moreover, the Action Plan for Policy Coherence for Development adopted only 4 out of the 5 EU PCD priorities leaving out migration as only thematic area (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

Lastly, the whitepaper tries to connect its strategic priorities, and links some to migration. This includes for instance how to do deal with poor people and refugees in MICs, how to combine a focus on the private sector and Danish companies investments in priority countries to provide employment for youth through investing in growth so to reduce migration pressures, as well as how to better combine humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in refugee contexts. The latter has been an on-going trend of close cooperation between humanitarian and development actors on which Denmark is building further and which it has applied to the response to the Syrian crisis (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).95

At the same time, the whitepaper puts less emphasis on the multilateral agenda, demonstrated also by the reduction of core and non-core allocations

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94 This has been operationalized through Denmark’s Regions of Origin Initiative – an answer to support solutions to the world’s refugee challenges besides funding for UNHCR.

95 For example, the planning documents for the response to the Syria crisis reflect a number of priorities, particularly the focus on vulnerability, protection, linking emergency and longer-term approaches and the promotion of innovation.
to UNDP by 22% and 32% respectively in 2015, with further reductions in view as Denmark considered shifting more core resources to multilateral thematic funding windows in 2017 (OECD, 2016b).96 Overall, compared to previous strategies, the draft is more explicitly driven by Danish interests.97 The strategy however does not clearly assess whether its ambitions can be matched with available resources (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016).98 Given the breadth of the present draft, it remains unclear where limited resources will in fact be concentrated. Interviewees expect significant changes to take place with a strong emphasis on reducing migration flows.

Experts, researchers and NGOs have remarked that the strategy set out in the whitepaper will negatively affect Denmark’s progressive aid policy and practice, concerns that were echoed during interviews. Sources note that, first, the current irregular migration and refugee situation has exacerbated the risk that Denmark will in the future follow a more ‘short-sighted domestic affairs oriented agenda about stopping migration and radicalisation that in fact detracts from solving global problems in the long-term’ (Cordsen, 2016). Second, the budget cuts raise concerns that Danish aid will face administrative and capacity challenges in implementing the strategy and may face skill shortages to effectively deliver. Interviewees noted that decreased humanitarian assistance capacity may negatively affect support to refugees. In the past, the lack of humanitarian specialists in Afghanistan for example potentially contributed to “Denmark [not making optimal use] of its Regions of Origin Initiative funding to promote a solutions-based approach to managing the return of Afghan refugees” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Lastly, the new strategy and funding could risk negatively affecting Denmark’s partnerships with developing countries and multilateral organisations in the long-term (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016; OECD, 2016b). This is partly linked to the extent to which Danish aid will be used conditional on cooperation on return and readmission.

96 The OECD Peer Review notes that such reductions to multilateral core funding ‘runs counter to the recommendation of Denmark’s 2013 analysis of its multilateral cooperation, which was to increase support to key partners’ (OECD, 2016b, p.17).

97 This is not to say that ‘self-interest’ has not played a role in Denmark’s development cooperation before – but yet has not featured as explicitly in a strategy document. Interviewees pointed out that while the previous strategy had poverty reduction as the overarching objection, it has now become one of four pillars with the others including elements of Danish interests.

98 This may also reflect the differences in views between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Finance on the reduction in overseas development cooperation.
Approach to migration in Danish development cooperation: Strategy and Implementation

Even though Danish development cooperation has actively engaged on refugees, displacement, migration and development for some time, the topic was not a strategic priority in past years as noted in Box 2. The draft strategy establishes a clear link between migration and the SDG agenda (specifically with Goal 1, 8 and 16) to which Denmark aims to contribute. The aim is to intensify efforts on migration, both through the EU as well as through mainstreaming migration more in Denmark’s bilateral development cooperation to support better migration management in partner countries, to address underlying causes and to strengthen the link between Migration and Development (see also Danish Government, 2016 p.5).

As noted above, priorities and objectives in these areas appear to a large extent influenced by Denmark’s migration interests - introducing a number of risks and opportunities.

First, a strong focus is on return, readmission and reintegration. The approach is embedded in the EU agenda to adopt migration compacts with a number of countries linking different external action instruments to pressure for better cooperation on return and readmission. Moreover, development cooperation should also help to resolve the specific challenges that partner countries face in this regard. This includes the explicit capacity support to national authorities in relation to handling migration, such as the handling of entry and exit and the issuance of identification documents as well as combatting smuggling. This emphasis on training and capacity building for migration governance and border capacity on migration is not totally new, yet for the first time it is explicitly included in the strategy for Development Cooperation and will be part of DANIDA’s new efforts. Strengthened protection of refugees and migrants en route and counselling along transit routes will be an element in this effort as well.

Second, there is a stronger focus on specific ‘root causes’ of migration. This means that Denmark will systematically integrate migration in its activities on fragility, growth and employment initiatives in priority countries. The identified root causes spans a number of areas, including resilience for climate change and environmental degradation and building stable and fair societies as

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99 So far this engagement may have not been counted as ODA in all cases and such engagement may also not be ODA eligible in all cases. Yet even if not ODA eligible, such activities are to be financed from the development cooperation budget which is based on a 0.7% GDP ODA forecast. An increased pressure to finance such activities thus leads to trade-offs for ODA projects in other areas.
well as counter-radicalisation measures. A particular focus is education and employment for children and youth including a push for investments in sustainable growth and job creation. This is not only meant to reduce the pressures for migration towards Europe but also help build more conducive environments for sustainable reintegration of returnees and IDPs. Engagement on youth education and jobs are vital for them to ‘contribute to their home countries rather than seeking a new life in Europe’. Currently, the Danish government is discussing whether more expenses connected to migration management should be covered by the development cooperation budget. Previously DANIDA did not cover much of the expenses on repatriation, return and reintegration (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

It is also important to note that despite the emerging rhetoric on aiming to reduce migration flows, Danish development cooperation does in practice integrate indicators in relation of numbers of arrival or return in their results framework (Interview Official, 2016).

Third, the on-going work on integrating of migration and refugee issues in broader and more closely linked efforts between development and humanitarian actors both strategically, operational and financially will increase. Denmark’s Regions of Origin Initiative has in the past aimed to bring together humanitarian and development actors, yet the current situation has led to development actors showing increased interest to deal with forced displacement and migration. Despite the negative overall rhetoric, the new approach has brought positive outcomes, as a Danish official puts it: “A crisis is never so bad unless it’s good for something. The new strategy in Denmark has placed at the forefront the need for much greater coherence between development cooperation and humanitarian action” (Interview Official, 2016). Concrete examples of a more joint approach of Denmark together with multilateral partners can be found in Danish cooperation with Uganda and Tanzania. The stronger focus by development actors on refugee hosting countries and areas is largely positive, as there are untapped development opportunities. For Denmark it is also seen as an approach to ‘reduce secondary movement’ towards Europe.

Fourth, as part of the Danish development cooperation’s stronger focus on readmission issues in the future, Denmark aligns with the EU approach to return and readmission including the use of development cooperation for positive and negative incentives to pressure countries to meet commitments (Interview Official, 2016). This is explicitly anchored in the new strategy text. In the past Denmark’s overall position seems to have been that conditionality is not the right approach to development cooperation (Interview Civil Society, 2016).
This has turned around. In principle Denmark now adopts negative conditionality of its development cooperation and does not rule out a retreat from countries with which no progress on the readmission issue is achieved (Interview, Researcher). In practice, however, a positive incentive or ‘more for more’ is favoured including assistance to countries willing to host a large number of refugees (Interview Official, 2016). The turn to conditioning development cooperation in the new draft development strategy also needs to be understood in the context of migration having become a politicised nationalist issue in Denmark. Much communication on migration and inflows of migrants is directed at the Danish electorate, which has led to a need to show strength. Having available resources that can be used as leverage with third countries makes development cooperation an attractive arena.

Apart from the positive development of bringing development and humanitarian approaches together in situations of protracted displacement, the overall language of the whitepaper may limit the engagement of Danish aid to a narrower agenda with a strong focus on reducing migration. Interviewees pointed out that it does not fully draw on Danish research on the linkages between migration and development. In combination with the cuts and the reprioritisation of aid resources, there are thus concerns that the missing understanding of complexities will mean that aid resources will be deployed in a way that prioritise short-term interests over longer-term development objectives.

The new strategy however also provides an opportunity to inform development cooperation practices in the area of migration with new evidence and to test new approaches. The more nuanced and context-sensitive understandings of the relation between migration and development processes may thus be re-introduced and acted upon at the technical level – despite changing political rhetoric and possible pressures to instrumentalise development cooperation.

In practice, the integration of migration into Danish Development cooperation has to date remained limited with stronger focus on displacement through humanitarian aid - even in periods where migration received stronger strategic focus. The engagement has mostly been reduced to protection of refugees, yet with a growing focus over time to think more long-term about

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100 The priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2017 favors an approach at the level of the EU that closely links results achieved on the readmission agenda with funds distributed under the EU Trust Fund to Africa to which Denmark seeks to contributes. It states that “African countries that comply with their obligations to take back their own nationals are rewarded, while pressure on the countries that do not comply with their obligations is increased”. (Danish Government, 2016, p.5)
protracted refugee situations. Moreover traditional poverty-oriented sector policies were also at times framed under the logic of ‘addressing root causes’ (ECDPM, ICMPD, 2013).101

A systematic look at key words used in aid project descriptions reported to the OECD-DAC CRS data between 2010 and 2014 confirms that there are on average more Danish development projects that contain the words ‘refugee’, ‘displacement’ or ‘return’ than there are for other relevant key words of the migration and development nexus.102 The share of ODA for ‘migration-relevant’ projects identified through the keyword search of total ODA has however declined between 2010 and 2014 and total ODA allocated to these projects has also not risen. In the absence of a better classification system it is difficult to trace ‘migration-relevant’ ODA and for which purposes these are spent, yet next to the focus on refugees, it is projects containing the words ‘displace(ment)’, ‘return’ or ‘reintegration’ that have received most total funding commitments during the period looked in question.

Attempts to mainstream migration into DANIDA’s on-going program activities have not always been successful – even if the migration dimension has been relevant to a partner country (Sørensen, 2015). However, DANIDA’s hesitance to engage with migration issues beyond the ‘root causes’ rhetoric has “enabled Danida to guard a development budget under pressure from being tapped into by the ministry of internal affairs” (Sørensen, 2015). “Focusing on root causes of migration” was in the past tactically used terminology instead of the guiding policy for long-term development cooperation (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016). This incoherence between policy and practice allowed Danida staff to protect aid budgets from being used for migration control purposes. On the other hand, it also meant missed opportunities for meaningful integration of migration dimensions for development processes in partner countries where relevant (Sørensen, 2015).

It is currently not clear to what extent the renewed attention for the ‘root causes of migration’ will affect cooperation on migration with partner countries or whether development and poverty reduction objectives will be compromised by migration control objectives. Interviewees for this study

101 A language on ‘root causes’ was adopted despite the conclusion of a government commissioned study in 2001 that noted that ‘poverty reduction is not in itself a migration reducing strategy’ and that there is no direct link between aid and migration control’ (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013)

102 This is based on a systematic search of key words in the OECD-DAC CRS database for 2010-2014; projects containing relevant key words have been counted. Key words with zero hits have been excluded from this graph, for Denmark, these were: ‘remittances’, ‘mobility’, ‘root causes/ migration’; For full methodology see Annex I.
noted that beyond changes in geographic allocations, it is to be expected that the work of technical experts in partner countries engaged on areas communicated as ‘root causes’ may not strongly be influenced by migration interests and that the complexities are well-known at the programme implementation level. ‘Addressing root causes’ may again be more about changing the narrative of engagement in specific areas of thematic cooperation. Previously, the Danish Foreign Minister may have talked about engagement in Somalia or Mali by focusing on conflict and livelihood challenges of local communities, while now the same engagement is communicated as being about reducing migration drivers (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

With regards to new migration-related initiatives and activities, it is again too early to tell how the whitepaper will translate into specific engagement on migration, where mainstreaming migration will focus and which new areas beyond existing cooperation on refugees and migration will receive more resources. Yet, overall more development cooperation engagement and resources are to be expected in the area of return, reintegration support for failed asylum seekers and return refugees, more engagement on migration governance capacity, and a continuation of the protection agenda in specific countries that have migration relevance for Europe (Interview Official, 2016; Interview Civil Society, 2016).

References


Frandsen, K. (2016b, April 20). *Regeringen mistænkes for at snyde med udlandsbistanden.* Retrieved September 12, 2016 from Altinget:


Annex 5: Case Study Germany

I. Overall German ODA developments during the past years 2010-2015

German ODA commitments and disbursements have risen considerably since 2012 (measured in constant prices USD). Germany’s ODA spend has increased by EUR 6 bn from 2010 to 2015. The most significant increase was from 2014 to 2015, where ODA disbursements rose by EUR 3.5 bn, mainly due to a rise in in-donor refugee costs as well as an increase of resources to specifically address the irregular migration and refugee situation.

Figure 1. Germany ODA Developments 2006-2015, in million EUR

Source: graph based on OECD DAC Development Statistics
Table 1. ODA commitments and disbursements, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA commitments, mn</td>
<td>12 472</td>
<td>14 159</td>
<td>12 868</td>
<td>15 101</td>
<td>18 747</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>9 804</td>
<td>10 136</td>
<td>10 067</td>
<td>10 717</td>
<td>12 486</td>
<td>16 028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA net disbursements, mn EUR</td>
<td>13 866</td>
<td>14 179</td>
<td>13 877</td>
<td>14 477</td>
<td>16 566</td>
<td>20 855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs, mn EUR</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2 698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC Development Statistics

Germany has until recently been modest in declaring eligible in-donor refugee costs as ODA, as shown in Table 2. In 2015, Germany has aligned reporting practices with those of other EU member states to make use of the OECD DAC reporting rule in the context of rising numbers of asylum seekers. The government may see this as a welcome opportunity to come closer to the 0.7% ODA/GNI target. Germany also wants to signal clearly that it takes responsibility for global refugees by reporting costs visibly in the international OECD DAC framework (Riedel, 2016, Interview Official 2016).¹⁰³

Box 1. In-donor Refugee Costs in Germany

Up and until 2014 Germany only reported standard benefits granted to asylum seekers who stay in Germany on a temporary basis, e.g. sustenance costs (living, food) and basic medical treatment (following the German Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz). Germany reviewed its ODA reporting procedure for 2015, to better include ODA eligible expenditures for refugees previously not reported, in order to align practices with other EU member states within the OECD reporting framework (Interview Official, 2016). Costs for basic education are now also included (German Federal Parliament, 2016a). Germany used to start the 12-month eligible period from the moment an asylum status has been granted. In 2015 this has been changed to include the time from when an application is filed (OECD, 2016c). Average costs per asylum seeker per year in 2014 amounted to USD 8,908, which is close to the average for European member states.

¹⁰³ One interviewee noted that considerations of Germany ‘hiding its light under a bushel’ if it were not to declare first year protection costs declared by other EU donors in the internationally comparable OECD-DAC ODA statistics, have played a role in the decision to revise the reporting practices (Interview Official, 2016).
The government noted that it will orient itself more strongly on other donors’ reporting practice in the future and will report in-donor refugee costs according to OECD DAC rules (German Federal Parliament, 2016a). The change in the reporting methodology and the alignment to what other EU donors are reporting has also been motivated by the fact that ODA statistics aim to be comparable across countries (Interview Official, 2016). As a result of new reporting practices (see Box 1) and increase in number of refugees, Germany’s reported in-donor refugee costs reached almost 17% of total ODA in 2015 – compared to only 1% the in 2014. Due to the high amount of asylum seekers and refugees, Germany is one of the biggest reporters of total in-donor refugee costs with EUR 2.6 bn. Yet, even when deducting in-donor refugee costs, Germany has seen a rise of approximately EUR 1 bn in reported ODA from 2014 to 2015 as shown in Figure 1.

Table 2. Germany in-donor refugee costs, as percentage of net ODA, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs (as % of net ODA)</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on OECD Statistics

For a large part due to including the increasing levels of in-donor refugee costs in its ODA statistics, Germany ODA amounted to 0.52% of GNI in 2015. Yet, when taking out those costs, the ODA/GNI share remains just above 0.4% (see Figure 2).
It is difficult to provide forecasts for ODA levels in the Germany as contrary to Sweden and Denmark, there is no specific commitment to reserve a given percentage of GNI for ODA activities. Rather, several budgets and cost items form what is reported to the OECD DAC as ODA, and these do not fall under one specific development cooperation budgetary framework (see Box 2). For 2016, in-donor refugee costs may remain high as the government has topped up the budgets of the communes and regions significantly for 2016 so to be able to meet the reception costs (Martens, 2015). For the coming years it is expected that (excluding in-donor costs) ODA will remain at around 0.4% of GNI despite planned increases in the total amount for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation overall. This can be ascribed to estimations that the German economy will remain strong and the GNI will grow as well.
Box 2. Where do German ODA reported funds come from?

German ODA spending originates from several sources and budgets. The Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) contributes the largest share (54% in 2013 and 50.7% in 2014) to resources reported as ODA. To a large extent, this money is channelled through Kreditbank für Wiederaufbau (KfW), GIZ as well as NGOs and multilateral organisations. The KfW complements the resources received from the BMZ with own sources generated through the market (the latter made up about 13% of the ODA reported funds in 2013 and rose to 21.5% in 2014). ODA reportable flows to the EU constitute a share of 12% of ODA reported funds. Foreign Office contributes around 10% of total ODA, mainly allocated to humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention. The German Bundesländer also play a role in that they report ODA expenditures such as scholarships as well as in-donor refugee reception costs (around 6% in 2013/14). The rest is covered by other ministries or government organisations (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015a).

II. Budgetary implications

The higher spending on refugees within Germany has not led to an overall reduction of development cooperation or humanitarian assistance budget lines during 2015 or 2016. Rather, as noted above, ODA reportable resources have increased to provide additional support abroad for the refugee and irregular migration situation. The Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development stressed that ‘higher spending to support refugees in Germany will not stand in the way of our goal of helping refugees in the crisis region around Syria and giving them a better outlook for the future through school lessons, vocational training and work’ (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016a).

Additional funds for development cooperation and humanitarian assistance

In June 2015 Angela Merkel announced an additional EUR 8.3 bn committed between 2016 to 2019 to ‘fight’ drivers of displacement, stating that addressing the causes of displacement requires a long-term approach (German Federal Parliament, 2015a). The officially communicated rationale behind these commitments is that regional stability reduces migration flows (German Federal Parliament, 2016b). In addition to this, again as part of addressing root causes of displacement, the 2017 draft budget plan expects to raise the budgets of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) by a further EUR 2.8 bn up to 2020.
For the BMZ, this means a budgetary increase of EUR 893 mn from 2015 to 2016 so that its budget reaches a planned EUR 7.4 bn in 2016 (German Federal Parliament, 2015b).

The draft budget plan for 2017 had originally foreseen that from 2017 onwards the BMZ budget will reach close to EUR 8 bn per year. This is higher than previous budgets for Germany’s ministry for development cooperation due to larger funding needs in the context of fragility in partner countries and the aim to address migration drivers (German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2016). Table 3 gives an overview over the financial planning 2017-2020 according to the draft budget in comparison to previous budget plans. In November 2016, the Bundestag (the German Federal Parliament) discussed and passed the budget with a decision to increase the planned amount to reach a total of EUR 8.5bn in 2017.104 Compared to 2016 this means an increase of more than EUR 1.1 bn.

Table 3. BMZ budget – Financial planning 2017-2020 according to draft budget of July 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>actual</td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget BMZ</td>
<td>6 514</td>
<td>7 407</td>
<td>7 987</td>
<td>7 924</td>
<td>7 925</td>
<td>7 926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change compared to previous budget plan (2016-2019)</td>
<td>+ 424,8</td>
<td>+ 394,2</td>
<td>+ 395,2</td>
<td>+ 396,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed budget</td>
<td>8 500105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2016

The current refugee crisis in the Middle East and in parts of Africa have been clearly identified as focus areas for the development cooperation allocations, with a focus on avoiding displacement, creating opportunities in countries of origin and host communities as well as reintegrating refugees (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015b). All are areas

104 This increase can be seen in connection with the refugee and irregular migration situation. As German Development Minister Müller noted: “Through this 2017 budget, the German Parliament is sending a clear signal that international crises cannot be resolved without contributions from development policy. We have already demonstrated that development policy can make a quick impact. Through our cash-for-work programme, we have already created 40,000 jobs in the context of the Syrian crisis”. (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016b).

105 See German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016b. At the time of research the final detailed budget for 2017 was not yet published.
for which the current German government has already committed an increasing share of its ODA budget (German Federal Parliament, 2016a).

The budget lines for humanitarian aid, administered by the Foreign Office (Titelgruppe 03, Einzelplan 05) have almost doubled from EUR 495 mn in 2015 to EUR 982 mn in 2016. Over the past years, commitments in humanitarian aid have seen an increase in the share of total ODA.

Figure 3. Breakdown of ODA commitments by broad purpose category, 2010-2014

![Figure 3](image)

Source: OECD CRS Data

Changing priorities within the BMZ budget?

Within the BMZ budget, the most significant two titles for bilateral cooperation are technical development cooperation (TZ) as well as financial cooperation (FZ).106 Both have decreased slightly when comparing the 2014 budgeted level with the 2016 budget.

106 These two lines are carried out to the largest extents by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) respectively.
On the other hand increases in funding within BMZ has been allocated to so-called ‘special initiatives’ (German term). As part of its response to the refugee and irregular migration situation, BMZ introduced two special initiatives in 2014. The initiative ‘Fluchtwursachen bekämpfen - Flüchtlinge reintegrieren’ contributes to reducing the drivers of displacement and attenuating its negative effects (while also providing long-term solutions). Another initiative focuses on migration and refugees in the MENA region specifically. A third special initiative exists that focuses on reducing global hunger titled ‘Eine Welt ohne Hunger’.

Additional financing has thus benefitted allocations for these special initiatives, which include spending for the stabilisation of North Africa and the Middle East as well as the to address the causes of the refugee and mixed-migration situation across the world. All three ‘special initiative’ titles have either more than doubled or even tripled between 2014 and 2016 as shown in table 4. Moreover, the budget for transition support, which provides support to the reintegrations of refugees and to host societies, has seen a 7-fold increase for 2016.

According to an Official interviewed for this study, for 2017 there will be further increases for the special initiatives ‘Eine Welt ohne Hunger’ as well as ‘Fluchtwursachen bekämpfen – Flüchtlinge integrieren’ to EUR 245 mn and EUR 345 mn respectively. The title Technical Cooperation (TZ) will remain at EUR 1.2 bn while Financial Cooperation (FZ) will increase to EUR 1.9 bn.

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107 These special initiatives are thematic programmes through which the Minister sets priorities in the current legislative period.
108 There are a number of other thematic priority initiatives of the government including on food security and the crisis of the Middle East.
109 This initiative is in the BMZ budget since the 2014 budget plans.
110 According to an Official interviewed for this study, this trend will continue in 2017. While
Table 5. Changes in budgeted amounts for relevant titles in BMZ budget, 2014 to 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BMZ Budget Title (in million EUR)</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>% change 2014 to 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial cooperation (FZ) – Title-group 01 (Titles 86611 + 89611)</td>
<td>1 553</td>
<td>1 512</td>
<td>1 308</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation (TZ) – Title 89603</td>
<td>1 269</td>
<td>1 167</td>
<td>1 188</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Initiative ‘Eine Welt ohne Hunger’ – Title 89631</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>+214%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Initiative ‘Fluchtursachen bekämpfen – Flüchtlinge integrieren’ – Title 89632</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>+330%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special initiative Stabilisierung und Entwicklung Nordafrika-Nahost – Title 89633</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+250%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition assistance (ÜH) 114 Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende übergangshilfe – Title 68706</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>+716%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2014 and 2016, allocations for multilateral cooperation have also seen an increase – mainly in contributions to the UN, and to promote environmental and climate protection as well as support to multilateral development banks.

These increases in allocations reflect two trends in ODA budget allocation and implementation channels. First, the amount of resources that are allocated through tendering processes and open competition have starkly increased. While the TZ and FZ allocations are allocated mainly to GIZ (TZ) and KfW (FZ) for implementation, the special initiatives are awarded through open tenders. These special initiatives are also intended to be spent much faster.

111 The draft budget plan had originally foreseen EUR 1 560 mn for this title, yet it was reduced during the parliamentary discussions on the 2016 budget.
112 The draft budget plan had originally foreseen EUR 1 328 mn for this title, yet it was reduced during the parliamentary discussions on the 2016 budget.
113 The draft budget plan had originally foreseen EUR 110 mn for this title and it was raised during parliamentary discussions of the 2016 budget.
114 One of the objectives of the transition assistance is to support the (re-)integration of refugees and displaced in countries of destination or of origin. A specific focus is on the generation of employment and income-generating activities as well as strengthening peaceful conflict resolution capacities and social cohesion. In the 2016 budget the title has been renamed to ‘Crisis Management and Reconstruction, Infrastructure’.
115 The draft budget plan had originally foreseen EUR 220 mn for this title, it was raised during the parliamentary discussions on the 2016 budget.
Only recently has the time-frame for spending resources under these titles been raised from 1 to 2 years (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

Second, with these special initiatives, the regional focus seems to be shifting towards the MENA region as well as the Horn of Africa. Since 2014, the special initiatives have been strongly resourced. They put the focus more strongly on the neighbourhood and African countries, possibly precipitating a trend of reducing shares of ODA allocated to Asia and Latin America (German Federal Parliament, 2016b). In addition, according to an interviewee there also have been recent decreases in bilateral allocations for Latin American and Asian countries as high as 20%. Naturally, those regions that are currently in the focus due to the refugee and irregular migration situation experience a strong increase in resources (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). An official interviewed remarked that in the 2017 budget a geographic emphasis on North and sub-Saharan Africa is visible as a consequence of migration developments. Political interest for countries that are outside the scope of the current or potential future migration situation towards Europe is lower. Colombia is an example, where German cooperation has been supporting the peace process for 10 years and where retreating could have negative effects meaning that hard fought-for progress could be lost – including for the migration-development-security nexus (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Interviewees noted a clear risk that regions not currently in the spotlight could be left behind.

As of now, OECD DAC data from 2010 to 2014 does not reflect such an overarching trend in the ODA commitments at large. For Asia and Africa the respective allocated shares have remained fairly stable within the last couple of years. Yet, within the Africa region, countries North of the Sahara have gained about 10 percentage points in the total share of committed ODA during the last 4 years, while South of Sahara Africa has lost about 15 percentage points during the same period. Within the Asia region, the Middle East has gained in relative importance since 2010, while Far East Asia has been allocated a lower share over ODA since 2010.

116 It has to be noted here that BMZ budget data is not equal to Germany’s ODA figures as activities of other ministries are also declared as ODA. See Box 2. An Official interviewed for this study compared Germany’s development cooperation with a large and heavy ‘tanker’: short-term maneuvers are difficult and changes will take some time to be visible.
Figure 4. ODA commitments per region as share of total ODA to developing countries

![Graph showing ODA commitments per region](image)

Source: OECD DAC Development Statistics

Table 6. ODA commitments to Africa and Asia, as share of total commitments to respective region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara, Total</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara, Total</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, regional</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

The stronger focus on the Middle East region overall is most clearly reflected in the large increase in the share humanitarian funding for this region from 5.5% in 2010 to 46% in 2014. This is not surprising as Germany has supported Syria and its neighbouring countries with EUR 1.6 bn since 2012, out of which EUR 867 mn are for humanitarian aid, stability and civil conflict prevention and another EUR 776 mn for transition and longer-term development
cooperation. Sector-allocable ODA for the Middle East has however not strongly increased as share of total sector-allocable ODA during the past years until 2014.

Despite the stated intention to focus on development-led and long-term approaches to the refugee situation in the Syria region, beyond the humanitarian aid, longer-term sector allocable aid to the Middle East seem to not yet have gained in relative importance. Yet, in total figures (both in commitments and in disbursements it has increased from 2013 to 2014 according to OECD DAC CRS data). Implementing agencies and the UN organisations active in the region have pointed out in the past that while humanitarian assistance has been forthcoming to deal with the refugee situation, longer-term development and transitional funding has been lagging behind.117

Germany has also increased its support to Turkey, among others by participating in the EUR 3 billion EU Turkey Facility and increasing the development cooperation allocation to Turkey. The increase in funding available for humanitarian aid and development projects has also translated into a slight increase in the share of German ODA going to the Europe region in 2014.

For North East, South & Central Asia the share of sector-allocable aid has however not declined significantly until 2014 and the same is true for the America region. More structural trends towards geographic re-prioritisation and an increased ODA share for migration relevant countries in the neighbourhood may – if at all – only be visible in the future OECD DAC figures.

117 The longer-term resilience component of the Regional Response Plan to the Syria crisis is for example more strongly underfunded than the provision of basic humanitarian services to refugees (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, 2016)
**Table 7. Humanitarian aid commitments, as share of total humanitarian aid, 2010-2014**\(^{118}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>38,2%</td>
<td>33,7%</td>
<td>39,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>3,2%</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>8,0%</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>21,1%</td>
<td>58,1%</td>
<td>37,4%</td>
<td>25,7%</td>
<td>31,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>11,2%</td>
<td>7,3%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>2,5%</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>61,4%</td>
<td>25,8%</td>
<td>54,4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>52,0%</td>
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<td>8,4%</td>
<td>5,3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
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<td>0,5%</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

**Table 8. Sector-allocable ODA commitments per region, as share of total sector-allocable aid, 2010-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>26,2%</td>
<td>23,5%</td>
<td>26,7%</td>
<td>29,4%</td>
<td>29,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>6,6%</td>
<td>5,0%</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
<td>8,4%</td>
<td>10,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>17,1%</td>
<td>16,1%</td>
<td>16,0%</td>
<td>17,5%</td>
<td>14,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
<td>13,2%</td>
<td>11,8%</td>
<td>14,4%</td>
<td>15,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>35,7%</td>
<td>38,8%</td>
<td>42,1%</td>
<td>37,5%</td>
<td>36,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
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<td>14,2%</td>
<td>14,5%</td>
<td>12,4%</td>
<td>12,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>15,5%</td>
<td>19,0%</td>
<td>20,3%</td>
<td>18,7%</td>
<td>18,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3,6%</td>
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<td>4,8%</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
<td>4,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>10,6%</td>
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<td>8,4%</td>
<td>7,6%</td>
<td>8,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

\(^{118}\) No data available for North of Sahara 2010. Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100% because Africa Regional; Asia Regional, Oceania and developing countries unspecified not included
III. Underlying strategic changes and influence of the irregular migration and refugee situation on programming

The principal driver for the budgetary measures and ODA developments summarized in the previous section seem to have been the increasing levels of conflict and fragility, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood and the high levels of forced displacement connected to the latter (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). In the words of the Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, the nature of German development cooperation in the context of addressing the irregular migration and refugee situation has changed: in addition to technical assistance, it has also become more political by supporting “security-, peace and economic policy” (Schmickler, 2015). According to interviewees, migration, security and resilience may have been more influential in determining choices on how to allocate ODA than concurrent discussions on how Germany will support the Agenda 2030 (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016; Conversation Policy Researcher, 2016).

The strategic focus of Germany’s ODA is still to fight poverty, concentrating on the poorest countries particularly in Africa. Germany has had a solid policy basis for its engagement in fragile situations for a number of years, though actual allocation criteria and ODA flows have not always catered to these policy objectives (OECD, 2015a). Overall, since Germany’s development cooperation budgets have not been cut, existing priorities have been retained, including for example also climate issues for which about 28% of German bilateral support in 2015 has been spent (OECD, 2015a).

There have nevertheless been a number of reorientations in the wake of the irregular migration and refugee situation.

Reframing cooperation: A stronger focus on addressing root causes of displacement and irregular migration - challenges and opportunities

In addressing displacement and migration, the German government sees development cooperation mainly as a tool for addressing the structural root causes of displacement and irregular migration. This has not only led to creating special initiatives but also to reframing and reallocating parts of development cooperation to specifically focus on drivers of migration or migration governance. Refugee- and mixed-migration related work is playing an increasingly large role at both the BMZ and GIZ (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).
Within this work, addressing structural root causes is regarded as context-specific and not limited to a number of clearly delineated interventions. It includes interventions such as education for children, vocational training and jobs for refugees as well as non-refugee youth and adults, building of basic infrastructure (water, health, living), support to address trauma as well as prevention and management of resource conflicts and of man-made or natural catastrophes (German Federal Parliament, 2016b). A component of the Special Initiative on addressing root causes of displacement and strengthen reintegration aims to improve the living conditions of refugees through securing basic services through humanitarian aid to strengthen a more peaceful co-existence in host communities, e.g. through better drinking water supply, cash for work, education for refugee children, and through providing assistance for resilience in host communities and for individuals.

Equally, supporting voluntary return and reintegration is part of the German support scheme both for returnees from Germany as well as from third countries. Future activities are for example also planned for reintegration of refugees in Northern Mali. The rationale for this type of support to countries hosting large numbers of refugees is also in Germany’s self-interest, as it aims to reduce the number of people travelling onwards to file for asylum in Europe.

Not all stakeholders are favourable towards such reframing of German development cooperation to address ‘root causes’ of displacement and migration driven by political pressures (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Interviewees pointed out that development actors were initially defensive, fearing that their work would be ‘instrumentalised’ for narrower political migration objectives instead of comprehensively addressing the migration, refugee and development nexus.119

A discussion on the notion of using development cooperation to ‘reduce migration’ took place within the government and with development actors has led to a nuancing of the language used. In the eyes of development actors, it is an important step forward for politicians to have developed a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of aid and migration. The focus on ‘fighting the root causes of displacement’ or ‘reducing migration’ has been replaced by the aim to ‘reduce root causes of displacement and migration pressures’ – a small difference in terminology which nonetheless communicates a greater

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119 The argument that was brought forward stressed that development cooperation and ODA has in the past contributed significantly to reduce the drivers of displacement and flight and that without aid the picture would be even more drastic – a counterfactual however hard to prove or put into numbers. (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016)
awareness of underlying issues as well as limits and possibilities of development cooperation.

Beyond the special initiatives, a number of ‘standard’ development cooperation projects have recently been reframed under the ‘root cause’ logic. While at times this remains more of a rhetorical shift or a simple ‘add-on’ than substance, there also have been some qualitative and structural changes for cooperation practices. This has brought both opportunities and challenges for the use of ODA in this area.

Notably, there has been a push towards mainstreaming migration aspects into several thematic cooperation areas. All sectors at GIZ have been called to look into how they can contribute to the refugee and irregular migration challenges through programming in their particular sector, while migration and displacement have formally been included in the Good Governance and Security and Reconstruction thematic areas. Work is underway to mainstream migration and displacement in sectors relating to the economy and employment (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). This is an opportunity to ensure that migrants and refugees are not left behind by operationalizing coherence between programmes and interventions in partner countries (Swiss Development Cooperation, German Development Cooperation, 2015). It does however constitute a more demanding coordination effort due to the sheer number of additional actors involved in migration area. Migration and refugee experts are concerned and frustrated that including these topics in some sectors is a box-ticking exercise.

Furthermore, a programmatic reorientation towards, as well as an intensification of, migration-relevant projects is taking place in German development cooperation. Some funds have been re-allocated from broader peace and security objectives towards migration aspects, as has for example been the case concerning cooperation with the African Union. In other instances, ongoing activities have received more attention. For example, approaches offering opportunities for potential migrants to remain in their country of origin by creating livelihoods ‘at home’, as well as strategies to adapt livestock herding to drought periods as part of addressing environmental drivers of migration are receiving more attention and scaling up of these is explored more intensively. Other initiatives include psychological support for refugees or a focus on education and training. These activities are not new, but

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148 Capacity building on the issue of migration is part of this and training sessions on migration and development for GIZ and Swiss Development Cooperation development practitioners took place for example in autumn 2015.
have seen an increase in importance and interest over the past years (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

Lastly, the irregular migration and refugee situation has provided a strong push to align transitional emergency support with specific long-term cooperation. In the support provided to Jordan, for example, cooperation now focusses on structural barriers for refugee integration beyond the ad-hoc emergency support already provided. While Jordan has in the past hosted refugees, and German cooperation with Jordan has engaged on employment before, current efforts are aimed at integrating refugees into the labour market as a structural solution, not only for new arrivals but also longer-term refugees in Jordan. Syrian female refugees are being educated as plumbers, filling a gap in the local labour market. Cash-for-work programmes targeting refugees in Lebanon have previously been ad-hoc, but are now being integrated into programmes for longer-term economic development. To address both the refugee situation and pressure to improve basic services, waster-management cash-for-work programmes targeting refugees are combined with cooperation to develop more permanent waste management structures.

Political pressure to respond to the migrant and refugee crisis has in such ways created possibilities to innovate, break up silos and focus on longer-term opportunities for refugees and their host communities. While some existing programmes have been ‘reframed’ and put under the umbrella term of addressing ‘root causes’ without substantially changing the contents and direction of the programme, the irregular migration and refugee situation has pushed German cooperation to try new interventions in contexts affected large migrant flows, and to improve the combination of emergency and transition support with classical development cooperation.

Yet, these changes also throw up a number of challenges for development practice. The crisis has brought pressures to show effectiveness and responsiveness to a variety of situations. ODA resources have had to be used more flexibly – not least through the special initiatives focusing on displacement and migration as well as the increased funding for transition support. While flexibility is important in contexts characterized by instability and unforeseen developments, an immense challenge has been the simultaneous strong pressure towards short-term spending and rapid visible impact of longer-term cooperation. According to interviewees for this study, the

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121 The same logic can also be observed in the compact with Jordan negotiated by the EU.
122 Yet, there are still existing challenges regarding the strategic and whole of government approach of Germany’s support to transitions as well as coordination and division of labour between the AA and the BMZ. (OECD, 2015b; German Federal Parliament, 2015c)
long-term thinking and planning as well as a focus on long-term partnerships ‘has suffered from these developments’. In some instances, this has already had negative consequences both for relationships with local partners as well as for analysis and quality control of programming (and the planning for programme sustainability) and identification (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

Interviewees raised questions about the ‘partnerships’ principle currently pushed by the EU and a number of member states in the context of the EU Migration Compacts, pointing out that ‘partnership’ has a different connotation in development cooperation programming. For development actors, a partnership approach emphasises long-term planning, co-design and close relationships and coordination throughout the project cycle, as well as a joint vision. Interviewees have argued that this seems hard to reconcile with the current pressure for identifying projects, the short timelines for analysing situations and building partnerships on the ground. Partnership by the EU refers to buy-in at the national level to cooperation and collaboration with the EU, which may in fact put pressure on partnerships of development actors on the ground (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Simultaneously, all interviewees for the German case study voiced reservations and viewed critically the deployment of conditionality in connection with readmission and return.

A push for implementing a comprehensive agenda on migration and development?

An analysis of German ODA-funded projects over the past years shows that emphasis on migration has increased from 2010 to 2014 both in terms of total number of projects including migration relevant key words as well as of the share of “migration-relevant” ODA.123 However, for both commitments and disbursements a slight drop occurred in the number of migration relevant projects as share of total number of ODA projects from 2013 to 2014. Excluding the high number of scholarships projects, migration-relevant projects most commonly include the key words ‘refugee’, ‘displacement’, ‘return’, and ‘border security’.

Projects including the words ‘refugee’, ‘displacement’ and ‘migration have increased in numbers, whereas projects including the terms ‘diaspora’, ‘remittances’, ‘return’ or ‘reintegration’ have remained fairly stable over time.

123 Based on analysis of OECD DAC CRS data according to migration relevant key words. For methodology see Annex I.
Germany’s development cooperation, specifically through GIZ, have engaged on broader migration and development issues since a number of years (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013) using the slogan “Using the potential of migration and minimizing its risks”. Since its inception in 2006, the GIZ thematic area on Migration and Development has for example developed instruments and concepts to promote the potential of migration, both through advising on mainstreaming migration in German development cooperation as well as through targeted M&D programmes, e.g. on diaspora, remittances or triple-win labour migration programmes. Overall, the work on broader migration and development has however never been a high priority in the overall context of German development cooperation. ‘Strengthening the potential of migration’ has always received less attention and strategies were often dominated by security-related policy priorities (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013).

As a result of the current irregular migration and refugee situation even more attention seems to be paid to ‘minimizing the risks of migration’ (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). The political pressure has led to an increased focus on displacement, irregular migration and the challenging aspects of migration rather than pushing forward a broader migration governance and migration and development agenda, which focuses on maximizing the benefits of migration. As a result a number of GIZ programs have come under pressure as illustrated in Box 3.

This particular focus on displacement and refugees may have a knock-on effect to broader policy processes in Germany, where the implementation of the SDGs is currently being discussed. Migration in the Agenda 2030 and SDGs goes beyond refugees and the reduction of drivers of displacement or the focus on ‘root causes’ – several interviewees working on the M&D nexus were skeptical whether the current increased focus on displacement and refugees and irregular migration really means a positive push for using ODA for a more comprehensive migration and development agenda and migration governance as part of the Agenda2030 (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).
Box 3. Changes in the Programme ‘Migration for Development’

The ‘Migration for Development’ programme (implemented by GIZ/CIM mandated by the BMZ) running since 2006 (tbc) – has supported highly qualified return migrants that want to reintegrate and benefit the development of their origin country. Programme activities include strengthening alumni networks and helping candidates with employment services in countries of origin. The programme also focussed on diaspora and the mobilization of skills and knowledge to the benefit of partner countries of origin.

It was at first unclear how the programme would be affected by the large increase in the number of refugees in Germany – major decisions affecting the programmes’ direction are often taken by the office of the Minister to support political agendas. This includes ad-hoc decisions such as new target countries. After strategic consultations with the Office of the Minister, the programme continues largely as before with only small re-allocations. Its competencies have however been expanded and the programme now includes the provision of new services targeted towards refugees. Programe managers however had to defend the existing philosophy of focusing on bringing development benefits through migration, rather than minimizing the risks of returning unsuccessful asylum seekers.

The individual components of the programme were adjusted as follows:

- **Migration policy consulting services** – this is focused on coordination and coherence of policy areas in migration governance with focus on the Westbalkan, MENA region and potentially Afghanistan. New is that there will also be consultancy within Germany as concerns return of failed asylum seekers.

- **Development-oriented Return** – The number of accompanied highly-qualified return migrants was reduced from envisaged 500 to about 450 in order to free resources for other activities. This activity takes place in about 25 countries and due to the refugee and migration situation the West Balkan countries have been added. Bolivia on the other hand has been taken off.\(^{124}\)

- **Support Diaspora organisations** – Germany does not support activities of diaspora within Germany itself but projects of diaspora organisations in origin countries. The aim is to support short-term exchanges of expertise and knowledge transfer.

- **Support of Start up of Migrants** as well as Business consulting for successful asylum seekers. The latter area is still in the inception phase and directions change so it is too early to tell what the focus will be. The idea is to support start ups and post-conflict activities in countries of origin. Syrians in Germany would be the largest target group but there is no possibility for return currently. Another idea is to act in countries of transit rather than from Germany.

Not in all cases can an approach that fosters mobility and aims to strengthen the positive benefits of migration be applied to the refugee context. GIZ had for example looked into making use of their existing triple-win labour

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\(^{124}\) There have been very little candidates for Bolivia in the previous year, which was the main reason for taking it off the programme (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016)
mobility scheme in the context of the refugee situation, but has found it challenging to adapt the scheme. One reason is that refugee countries of origin have not been able to meet the determined criteria (in terms of skills and educational levels) in order to qualify for such a scheme. GIZ instead aims to provide information and consultation services to inform migrants about risks and possibilities for migration and education with the aim to stop irregular migration and risky journeys through information (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). The focus is on countries such as Kosovo, Morocco, Tunisia and potentially Afghanistan and Ethiopia (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). For individuals from countries in the West Balkan, this information campaign can advise on newly created possibilities to migrate to Germany in case a job offer exists and can be verified.

Whether there will be opportunities to further develop the migration and development agenda in German development cooperation beyond the strong refugee focus in the current context is uncertain. There is potential that over the mid- to long-term investment into migration and development beyond the current crisis is a large potential for development in partner countries and for achieving the targets of Agenda 2030.

References


Annex 6: Case Study Sweden

I. Overall Swedish ODA developments during the past years 2010-2015

With its ODA resources being tied to the 1% of GNI target\textsuperscript{125}, Sweden is one of the most generous ODA donors amongst the OECD DAC. This target is referred to as the development cooperation framework\textsuperscript{126}, within which the aid budget (expenditure area 7 of Sweden’s budget) is embedded. The development cooperation framework also covers costs for items such as in-donor refugee reception in Sweden and funding towards EU cooperation. Sida has the financial oversight on most of the remaining aid budget, as illustrated by Figure 1\textsuperscript{127}.

Figure 1. Sweden’s development cooperation framework

\textsuperscript{125} Sweden’s aid budget thus depends on the respective GNI forecasts for the following year.
\textsuperscript{126} In Swedish referred to as ‘Biståndsram’
\textsuperscript{127} Part of this money, though administered by Sida financially is decided and followed-up upon by government offices.
Swedish net ODA increased steadily from 2012, with a large increase from SEK 42.7 bn in 2014 to SEK 59.7 bn in 2015. This corresponds to a rise from USD 6.2 bn in 2014 to USD 8.5 bn in 2015 in constant prices – a 36.8% increase in real terms.128

Budget negotiations for 2015129 did not seem to be strongly influenced by the refugee or migration situation, beyond the fact that forecasted costs for asylum seekers within Sweden were integrated in the amount budgeted (Interview Official, 2016). Initial ODA commitments reached SEK 40.4 bn. Yet, actual ODA disbursements in 2015 were much higher at an estimated SEK 59 bn130 as a result of the large unexpected increase in asylum applications in summer 2015131.

Sweden is one of the European countries currently receiving most asylum applications (both in total and in relation to its population) and has seen sharp increases from 2014 to 2015. In 2015 overall, Sweden has received approximately 156 000 asylum seekers (Eurostat, 2016). Accordingly the total costs for reception of refugees and asylum seekers within Sweden were much higher than anticipated and amounted to SEK 20.2 bn in 2015132. In-donor refugee costs in Sweden have already started to rise during the years prior to 2014 (see figure 2) yet increased significantly from 2014 onwards.

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128 This has been one of the largest increases among OECD DAC donors from 2014 to 2015. (See OECD 2015 detailed summary)
129 The Annual budget for the following year is usually presented in in August or September and agreed at the end of December. There are occasions for revisions throughout the year.
130 There is however a discrepancy between the reports of OECD DAC and the figures Openaid Sweden reports: SEK 54 bn (USD 6.4bn) of actual ODA outcome for 2015. (Peterson, 2016)
131 The costs for the reception of asylum seekers are calculated based on forecasts by the 'Migration Board' and revised 4-5 times per year.
132 The envisaged figure in the 2015 budget bill foreseen for in-donor refugees was SEK 8.4 bn, later revised upwards to SEK 8.89 bn. Actual refugee costs were then much higher. Other reasons for the higher than planned ODA disbursements include advanced payments to UN organisations and a contribution to the Green Climate Fund (OECD, 2016a)
Figure 2. Sweden, ODA developments 2006-2015, in million SEK

Table 1. Sweden ODA developments, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>30867</td>
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<td>33957</td>
<td>29290</td>
<td>37209</td>
<td>40445*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA net disbursements, mn SEK</td>
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<td>36360</td>
<td>35468</td>
<td>37954</td>
<td>42756</td>
<td>59780</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs. mn SEK</td>
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<td>3173</td>
<td>3863</td>
<td>4593</td>
<td>7514</td>
<td>20201</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA net disbursements, USD mn, constant prices</td>
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<td>5493</td>
<td>5303</td>
<td>5617</td>
<td>6233</td>
<td>8527</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


From 2014 to 2015 in-donor refugee costs almost tripled\(^{133}\), so that refugees in Sweden are now the biggest group of ‘recipients’ of Swedish development aid, before core support to multilateral organisations and support to partner

\(^{133}\) In 2014 to 2015, Sweden saw the largest per-capita inflow of asylum seekers ever recorded in an OECD country. (OECD, Working together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and their children in Sweden).
countries. While in 2010 only 8.7% of Sweden’s ODA was spent on reception of refugees in Sweden, in 2015 this increased to 33.8% of total ODA. However, as can be seen from Figure 3, even excluding in-donor refugee costs, there was still an increase of ODA from 2014 to 2015 by about 12.3%.135

Table 2. Sweden: In-donor refugee costs136

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs (as % of net ODA)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increased ODA disbursements of 2015 raised the ODA/GNI ratio to 1.4%. Figure 3 illustrates again that the stark rise in ODA during the past years is mainly due to an increase in in-donor refugee costs. When one excludes these costs, Sweden spends about 0.93% of its GNI on development assistance in 2015, which is still well above the 0.7% target.

Figure 3. Sweden ODA/GNI ratio including and excluding in-donor refugee costs.

Source: own calculations based on OECD Statistics

134 The high share of in-donor refugee costs of Sweden’s ODA also explain the relatively low share of country programmable aid. Source: Open aid Sweden: www.openaid.se. ONE (2016) points out that ‘in-donor refugee costs [in Sweden] were […] higher than the total aid spent in LDCs or in sub-Saharan Africa’ (p.88).
135 This corresponds to a rise of 9.9%, when taking exchange rate and inflation into account (see OECD, 2016c).
136 These figures are based on net disbursements and actual reported donor refugee costs to OECD-DAC.
In late 2015, in order to mitigate the impact of the inflow of refugees on Swedish aid flows to developing countries, the government agreed to cap refugee costs at 30% of the ODA framework for 2016. This came after initial proposals by the Ministry of Finance to reallocate as much as 60% of the development cooperation framework (amounting to SEK 25 bn or USD 3 bn) to cover rising costs for refugees (Delling, 2015). For some experts, this cap is still too high – yet it also marked a success of Swedish CSOs that had protested the initial plan (Concord, 2016, p.57). While the first year reception costs in 2015 surpass 30%, previous years' levels were way below the agreed 30% cap. Box 1 summarises how Sweden calculates its in-donor refugee costs and the challenges faced regarding transparency.

**Box 1. In-donor refugee costs**

Sweden includes both asylum seekers and resettled quota refugees, and costs for both granted and rejected asylum seekers –are counted. Costs included relate to sustenance, transport, medical treatment, basic education and language training. The calculation reflects average costs per asylum seeker per day, the share of asylum seekers from ODA eligible countries and the number of new asylum seekers as well as the average number of days spent in reception. For asylum seekers granted residence, the average annual ODA-eligible cost per refugee was USD 14,140 in 2014. For those rejected it was a bit lower at USD 11,924 (OECD, 2016b).

The government has argued that the costs have risen so sharply not only because of the high number of refugees but also because arrivals in Sweden have a high proportion of unaccompanied minors (the numbers of unaccompanied minors doubled since 2006). Their accommodation and needs are significantly more expensive than is the case for other asylum seekers. Controversies have also emerged due the private housing sector allegedly ramping up profits through raising prices for asylum accommodation (Crouch, 2015).

At present, some of the in-donor refugee costs as part of the development cooperation framework can only be traced at an aggregate level and not for specific cost items. The public is thus not sufficiently able to monitor decisions concerning refugee costs. The OECD DAC peer review recommended that Sweden should better monitor in-donor refugee costs and more clearly explain how they are calculated. Sweden has since made considerable efforts on improving transparency around these costs (OECD, 2016a). Yet, additional transparency on platforms such as Openaid.se would be useful (Ostling, 2016).

**II. Budgetary implications**

The irregular migration and refugee situation has had effects on the levels of Swedish aid available for multilateral assistance and assistance to partner countries. In light of the inflow of refugees and resulting financial constraints, priorities had to be reassessed in the 2016 budget (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2016a).
Following the 1% ODA/GNI commitment, the 2016 draft budget bill foresaw SEK 43.3 bn for Sweden’s Development cooperation framework overall. This is an increase by nearly SEK 3 bn compared to 2015 driven by an increase in Sweden’s GNI in 2016 (Government of Sweden, 2015b). The government had previously announced that these increases will benefit the aid budget and that higher appropriations will go towards strengthening commitment in the Middle East (by SEK 335 mn) including for the situation in Syria, more funding for climate activities, additional resources for humanitarian assistance as well as an increases in allocations for a number of country strategies (a planned increase of 45% compared to 2015) (Government of Sweden, 2015a). The original 2016 Budget Bill agreed at the end of 2015 also included over SEK 8.1 bn for in-donor refugee costs – 19% of Sweden’s total ODA development cooperation framework (Government of Sweden, 2015b).

The Swedish budget system includes opportunities for amendments throughout the year. For the 2016 budget, an amendment (Government of Sweden, 2016a) had been agreed in June 2016, which shifted SEK 4.1 bn within the development cooperation framework from the aid budget administered by Sida to cover increased in-donor refugee costs, specifically remuneration and housing costs financed through the ‘Migration Facility’. This meant that about 28% of the ODA (or about SEK 12.2bn) were foreseen for refugees in Sweden. Whereas the ‘core’ aid budget (comprised of aid and related costs managed by Sida or the Swedish government) usually comprises approximately 75% of the overall development cooperation framework, the amendment reduced this share to less than 65% in 2016 as shown in figure 4 (Daltung & Pettersson, 2016). As a result some of the intended increases in appropriations were not realised, and Sida’s long-term development cooperation in certain areas has been at risk to be significantly affected (Sida, 2016a).

137 These ordinarily take place twice per year.
138 A second change in appropriations include an increase of close to SEK 42 mn to cover administrative costs of Sida due to exchange rate risks.
139 Sida communicated that overall its budget was slightly lower than the 2015 one, yet compared with the original 2016 government budget at the beginning of the year, the cuts to Sida’s budget have been quite substantive amounting to almost SEK 1.8bn.
Reductions in Sida’s appropriations for 2016 as part of the June amended 2016 budget have been spread across budget lines in order to mitigate negative effects in terms of predictability and attaining programme objectives set out in multi-year strategies. While allocations to humanitarian aid, civil society and global efforts for human security have remained untouched (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2015; Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2016b), most other budget lines were cut. Contributions to multilateral organizations, especially multilateral development banks, were decreased the most, with payments being postponed in order to cushion the effect on other programmes, followed by reductions in assistance through geographic strategies and thematic strategies (Interview Official and Implementing Agency, 2016).
Box 2. Consequences for health funding: Reductions for the Global Fund

The initial decision by the Swedish government to cut 2016 contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria by 35% (as a consequence of the irregular migration and refugee situation) was met with strong negative reactions. Instead of the originally pledged SEK 2.5 bn for the 2014-2016 period, Sweden pledged to contribute SEK 2.2 bn.

At the beginning of 2016, a network of NGOs and civil societies sparked a public debate in Sweden by criticising the cuts in a public letter (Bistandsdebatten, 2016). The decision to reduce Global Fund contributions was seen as a retreat from Sweden's longstanding leadership role in the area of health development assistance in the context of Agenda 2030, with potentially negative consequences for humanitarian and long-term development (Andersson et al., 2016). The government responded that despite these reallocations, overall aid funding is higher than the previous period and that health assistance continues to be a priority with a focus on Sexual and Reproductive Rights – Sweden remains a reliable funder for UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNDP and UNICEF (Svenska Dagbladet, 2016). With the latest budget amendment for 2016 which reinstates funding (see below) the support for the Global Fund against HIV/AIDS will take place as previously planned (Lövin & Andersson, 2016).

The Annex to this case study summarises the effects of funds reallocated due to the June budget amendment in detail. Contributions to multilateral organisations, global efforts for socially sustainable development (-22%), specific actions on human rights and democratisation (-21%), global efforts for economically sustainable development (-19%), and research cooperation (-18%) decreased the most from 2015 to 2016 appropriations. Aid to Middle East and North Africa increased by 42% and the aid to the rest of Africa slightly declined by 3% from 2015 to 2016. Middle East and North Africa cooperation saw an increase in the context of the irregular migration and refugee situation of 42%, as does Humanitarian Aid (+6%) and the geographic envelope for Asia (+7%).
Box 3. Examples of effects of 2016 Spring Budget Amendments on development cooperation headings\(^{140}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas negatively affected (cuts)</th>
<th>Positive (raise)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Global Efforts for socially sustainable development</td>
<td>• Aid to Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specific actions on human rights and democratisation</td>
<td>• Humanitarian Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Global efforts for economically sustainable development</td>
<td>• Geographic envelope for Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Research and cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Geographic Africa (except North)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such reductions do not necessarily mean that multi-year strategies governing Swedish Aid are negatively affected. The geographic cooperation strategies specify funding levels covering the entire strategy periods based on an indicative multi-annual financial envelope. This allows for flexible annual allocations\(^ {141}\) - a lower allocation in a given year can be followed by an increase in the following so that overall the levels of funding and strategy objectives can still be achieved (Interview Official, 2016).

Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the most recent changes may negatively affect Swedish aid effectiveness if levels of in-donor refugee costs remain high\(^ {142}\). Sida has pointed out that if these lower funding appropriations continue they would lead to underfunding of strategic objectives (Sida, 2016c). After the cuts in the first half of 2016, the Africa and Asia geographic strategies were for example underfunded in relation to the strategy objectives (Sida, 2016a).\(^ {143}\)

Yet, the situation changed again with the 2016 autumn amending budget, which proposes to reinstate SEK 6.4 bn to the aid budget due to the fact that the forecast for the number of asylum seekers has decreased since the previous amendment. (Utrikesdepartementet, 2016). This is remarkable as it would bring back the share of in-donor refugee costs as part of ODA back to about

\(^{140}\) See Annex 1 for full details.
\(^{141}\) For more information on the steering and decision-making on Swedish aid, see EBA, 2016.
\(^{142}\) This is the current assumption for the 2017-2019 Sida budget. (Sida, 2016)
\(^{143}\) Sida’s Director of the Africa department, Torbjörn Pettersson noted in an interview that there is a worry of ‘having to renegotiate agreements and postpone projects in Africa’. (Goarant, 2015)
13.5% - the level of 2014. Although the number of incoming migrants is difficult to predict, the July 2016 forecast of the Swedish Migration Agency on numbers of refugees have been revised downwards by almost 50% for 2016: 34,500 people compared to the originally predicted 60,000. In October 2016 this forecast has been further reduced to 29,000 (The Local, 2016).

Apart from reinstating previous cuts, the focus is on addressing refugee and irregular migration situations. A large part of these funds (SEK 1.6bn) will go to humanitarian organisations (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and others) core budgets rather than being tied to a particular situation, as well as to Sida’s humanitarian funding). These organisations have recently pointed out that they require humanitarian funding as much for Africa as for the crisis in the Middle East and that the Syria refugee crisis has led to some ‘forgotten regions’ in terms of funding (Interview Official, 2016). SEK 900mn are specifically reserved to address some of the longer-term development issues underlying forced migration in fragile states, which also includes support on gender equality, SRHR, the environment and civil society. The rest (SEK 3.9bn) goes toward the restoration of the previous downsizing of appropriations, which means that Sida can resume planning to implement the multi-annual strategies with partner countries and that the support for the World Bank and the African Development Bank (Government of Sweden, 2016b).

These are positive developments for Sweden’s aid efforts. While allocations to the ‘core’ aid budget seem to be restored, the resulting volatility has led to further concerns about predictability of aid and sustainable long-term engagement with partners, in which Sweden has a “strong reputation to protect” (OECD, 2016a). The assumptions underlying the budget allocations, i.e. the forecasted asylum and refugee flows to Sweden, are fraught with uncertainty. The uncertainty emerging from the difficulty to forecast asylum seekers is not new and has long caused challenges to budget assistance activities, yet the current calculation method seems to lead to additional difficulties for predicting what is left for aid operations. Rather than counting all costs in the year of first arrival, they could be spread over the years when they incur, which could help to protect aid budgets from pressure in a given

144 Another interviewee pointed out that it is mostly the crisis in Yemen and in Northern Nigeria that is being forgotten by the current focus on the Middle East (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).
145 As one interviewee puts it, “some conflicts, such as South Sudan, risk being forgotten. Globally, African conflicts are receiving less funding and attention than the Middle East for clear strategic interests.” (Interview Official, 2016)
146 However, it can be criticised from moral standpoint of resulting from a more restrictive refugee policy and debatable deals with third countries. (Molin, 2016)
year (Bengtsson, 2016). The Netherlands have instated a similar reform to their method recently (see Netherlands case study).

The recent changes to the budget test the limits of the flexibility of Swedish aid. For the thematic strategies, the cuts to annual appropriations have led to short-term changes, which, even if reinstated impede planning efforts. A recent review by the National Audit Office points out that between 2010-2016 the government’s readiness for predictability of long-term aid activities have been low (Bengtsson, 2016). This can also affect the perception of Sweden as a stable, long-term partner. In response, and to be able to intelligibly manage uncertainty and risks (including in country operations), Sida has called for more collective appropriations and a higher degree of freedom to decide allocations within larger appropriations in a given year.147 This may provide the ability to better manage uncertain situations and predictable long-term planning.148 Another possibility is to plan better for future potential impacts in case numbers of asylum seekers rise such as integrating impact assessments, scenario building that plan how changing budget conditions could be handled (Bengtsson, 2016).

Additional factors could further compound challenges to attaining ambitions stated in geographical and thematic strategies. The rise in number of conflicts and fragile situations and the increasing number of dimensions deserving of attention mean that operations are becoming more labour- and coordination intensive – this is set to increase further as part of the integrated Agenda 2030. Meanwhile, resources for programmes and missions are in fact getting smaller – not least due to the high and unpredictable in-donor refugee costs.

III. Trends in aid allocations 2010-2014 related to the refugee and irregular migration situation

The Swedish government has made available more than SEK 1.3 bn for Syria and the neighbouring states since 2011 as part of humanitarian assistance, partly through earmarking funds for core support to humanitarian organisations, as well as channelling funds through humanitarian agencies,

147 According to one interviewee, such uncertainty and risks can be managed in intelligent ways since aid actors often have to deal with unforeseen events, specifically in country programmes that operate in fragile situations. Increased flexibility would also be warranted given the fact that the government is putting stronger focus on operating in conflict and fragile situations, where risks are higher and unforeseen developments more frequent.

148 However, at the same time this can result in less government oversight. (Peterson, 2016)
particularly for Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (Swedish Embassy to Syria, 2016). This assistance is mainly to provide access to basic services such as food, water, shelter and education. Other long-term development has been channelled to Lebanon and Jordan under Sweden’s MENA strategy.

Moreover, Sweden has committed SEK 28 mn (EUR 3 mn) to the EU Madad Fund for Syria and the same amount to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

No clear trends as a result of the changing allocations can be derived from looking at OECD DAC commitment data (in constant prices) over the past years beyond those noted above – rising in-donor refugee costs come at the cost of sector allocable aid rather than humanitarian aid (see Table 3). Overall humanitarian aid remained stable also in the 2016 budget as highlighted above. Until 2014 OECD DAC data does not show a notable effect on changing allocations in thematic sub-sectors that could be assigned as a result of the migration inflows. Within the Social Sector slightly more attention has been paid to the Government and Civil Society sector comparing 2013 with 2014 but also commitments to this category remained fairly stable when taking a longer-period of time perspective (Source: OECD CRS data).

Table 4. ODA commitments: sector allocable, humanitarian aid and administrative costs, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sector allocable</td>
<td>64,8%</td>
<td>53,2%</td>
<td>61,5%</td>
<td>60,4%</td>
<td>52,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>11,9%</td>
<td>16,6%</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
<td>11,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Administrative costs</td>
<td>7,8%</td>
<td>7,8%</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
<td>6,5%</td>
<td>5,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated/Unspecified</td>
<td>2,3%</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographically, there also haven’t been large shifts in the share of committed allocations to different regions until 2014 as shown in Figure 5. This is true when looking at allocations within the regions. For example there has been so far no rise in the share of allocations for North Africa within Africa or the Middle East within Asia until 2014. In total numbers an increase for the Middle East is however visible. A larger share for these regions may only be visible in future figures – if at all.

149 The increase by about 15% to the category ‘Developing countries unspecified’ can be explained with the rising in-donor refugee costs included in this category.
Table 5. ODA Commitments to Africa and Asia, constant prices, as share of total to respective region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa regional</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia, Total</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia, Total</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, Total</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS Data

Humanitarian aid disbursements vary from commitment figures between 2010 and 2014. Humanitarian aid disbursements to the Middle East have risen while the committed shares for this region of the total humanitarian aid committed...
declined (see Tables 4 and 5). This may reflect decisions taken for additional support after the commitments were made especially for the Syrian refugee crisis. Together with the rise in total humanitarian funding, there has been also a rise between 2010 and 2014 in sector-allocable longer-term development cooperation to the Middle East region (both for commitments and disbursements, both as a share of total sector-allocable aid and in total numbers), though not as large as the rise in humanitarian funding and with a slight drop occurring between 2013 and 2014. It will be worthwhile monitoring these figures as the decision to increase funding for the MENA region and for Syria as part of the newly adopted regional strategies may be detectable only in future ODA figures.

### Table 6. Humanitarian aid disbursements, as share of total humanitarian aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>45,2%</td>
<td>57,4%</td>
<td>52,6%</td>
<td>47,2%</td>
<td>52,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>43,2%</td>
<td>53,3%</td>
<td>51,4%</td>
<td>46,1%</td>
<td>50,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>13,4%</td>
<td>5,6%</td>
<td>5,3%</td>
<td>3,7%</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>35,1%</td>
<td>30,3%</td>
<td>29,9%</td>
<td>38,4%</td>
<td>34,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>4,3%</td>
<td>4,9%</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>19,4%</td>
<td>13,2%</td>
<td>9,8%</td>
<td>11,3%</td>
<td>10,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
<td>12,0%</td>
<td>15,7%</td>
<td>19,1%</td>
<td>21,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

150 The percentages do not necessarily add up to 100% because resources to ‘Africa Regional’; ‘Asia Regional’, ‘Oceania’ and ‘developing countries unspecified’ have not been included.
### Table 7. Humanitarian aid commitments, as share of total humanitarian aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

### Table 8. Sector-allocable aid commitments, as share of total humanitarian aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC CRS data

Since the refugee and irregular migration situation has started in 2011, commitments and disbursements to projects that specifically focus on migration (i.e. have migration relevant words in their descriptions) have grown slightly. Analysis of projects in the OECD DAC CSR database from 2010 to 2014 shows that more funds were disbursed to projects that contain...
migration-relevant key words in 2014. However, as a share of total ODA, there has not been a consistent change in the level of ODA to such ‘migration-relevant’ projects over this period.

Overall, the number of committed projects in Swedish development cooperation containing migration relevant keywords increased from 2010 to 2014 from 38 in 2010 to 377 in 2014. In the Swedish case this rise is mainly due to a large increase in reported scholarship programmes for students (scholarship programmes seem to be listed for each individual awarded scholarship from 2013 onwards). Without the scholarship programmes, there has not been a stark rise. Besides scholarships, the key-word ‘refugee’ shows high prevalence in all years from 2010 to 2014. Other words that receive high frequency in the list of ‘migration-relevant’ projects are ‘return’, ‘migration’, ‘displacement’ and ‘trafficking’.

There may be an increasing engagement on projects directly targeting migration or refugees in the future. Beyond the budgetary measures, the irregular migration and refugee situation has pushed on-going discussions on how to more strategically integrate a migration dimension in Sweden’s development cooperation abroad. The next section will look at how this debate has been influenced by current events.

IV. Strategic shifts in Swedish development cooperation

Influence of migration issues in the new overarching development strategy

Sweden has been active in promoting a positive global migration and development agenda in fora such as the GFMD, in the Rio+20 agenda as well as in the context of the post-2015 negotiations (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013). A key objective of Sweden has been to strengthen global collaboration with the aim of promoting positive development effects of migration on development, the MDGs and the SDGs in the future. Policy coherence for development is an underlying principle, (OECD, 2014) and therefore various

151 See Annex I for methodology.
152 For disbursed projects there is also an overall increase in the number of migration relevant projects from 92 in 2010 to 449 in 2014.
153 In January 2013 Sweden acted as the Chair of the GFMD for 18 month under the topic ‘Unlocking the Potential of Migration for Inclusive Development’.
policy areas are involved in supporting the overall M&D agenda, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice. So while Sweden’s engagement on migration and development is not new, the current crisis has contributed to the topic becoming much more integrated in other policy areas.

Sweden is currently discussing a draft text of a new aid policy framework, which provides the framework for future thematic and geographic multi-year strategies. The current discussed draft will replace the 2014 framework and is to be agreed towards the end of 2016. Agenda 2030 will be much more prominent in the new strategy, as will migration and development and greater emphasis on the need to address fragility and build resilience. These developments may coincide with migratory movements but are not only motivated by the migration discussions within Sweden or the EU (Interview Official, 2016). It is clear that in a global context of increased fragility, longer-term aid and humanitarian assistance have a role to play to address these situations.

Another aspect to note is that the new draft strategy identifies the development effectiveness agenda and its principles, specifically national ownership, joint programming and donor coordination as well as using partner countries’ own systems (Concord 2016, p. 57). In a context in which these principles seem under pressure due to the unpredictability of costs for refugee reception in donor countries or are not high on the agenda in other donors155, this is a vital commitment.

The current discussions on increasing the contribution of Sweden’s development cooperation to the three components of Sweden’s PCD framework for migration156 (circular migration, remittances and protection and durable solutions for refugees) started in 2014 (Interview Government Official, 2016)157. An assessment of Swedish PCD practices highlighted the need for development actors to better take into account migration issues in their work on development, humanitarian assistance and poverty reduction in order support the overall objective of improving migration’s contribution to global development (Government of Sweden, 2014a). A cross-government working group on migration and development developed further guidance on

154 Civil Society points out that the draft text is generally welcomed (Concord, 2016, p.57).
155 see for example the Netherlands case study, where one official interviewee pointed out that these principles sadly do not play a large role in the daily work of development cooperation.
156 The PCD approach is anchored in the government bill “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development”.
157 There have however been previous discussions on integration migration more closely in Swedish development cooperation. In 2010, for example an internal document was drafted by Sida, which however never left the shelf (Interview Official, 2016).
how migration and development can be better integrated in Swedish development cooperation and other relevant ministries and agencies.

As a result, there are clear differences between the 2014 Aid Policy Framework (Government of Sweden, 2014b) and the new draft 2016 Aid Policy Framework. The 2014 document notes six sub-objectives of Swedish Aid Policy, which each have a number of results attached to it. Migration only appears as a specific result (one among 30) under sub-objective 2158 related to supporting ‘greater capacity to tackle the opportunities and challenges brought about by migration and mobility’ in partner countries. The three central aspects captured under this result are the positive force of remittances, circular migration to counter brain drain, support to diaspora to act as bridge for trade and investment as well as making use of expertise of returning migrants. The framing of Swedish aid in relation to migration is that it ‘must help to strengthen the capacity of low and middle-income countries and of individuals to benefit from the opportunities of migration and handle the challenges that migration and mobility bring with them.’ (Government of Sweden, 2014b).

The draft 2016 aid framework refers to Agenda 2030 and SDG 10.7 to ‘facilitate orderly, safe and responsible migration and mobility’ and elevates migration & development as one of the targets. Migration is noted as something positive overall yet, with challenges for development and individuals that need to be addressed. The overarching themes running through the text are the need for Swedish aid to help increase the development impact of migration, and providing alternatives for forced migration.

The draft strategy does not explicitly note the aim to prevent or to stop irregular migration, nor does it mention the need to address root causes of (irregular) migration, but instead focuses on poverty and fragility. Migration becomes a challenge if it is forced and involuntary, otherwise it is seen as a positive dynamic - the current irregular migration and refugee situation has not changed this narrative (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Yet, Civil Society interviewed for this study noted a slight change in language, as there now seems to be more emphasis on preventing and limiting involuntary migration as well as irregular migration (the latter not as objective but mentioned in the narrative and background analysis to the strategy).

Swedish development cooperation implicitly has a role to play in providing alternatives for migration, or in building environments allowing for increased

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158 Sub-Goal 2: Better opportunities for people living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth and obtain a good education.
opportunities and conducive environments to repatriate to. This includes the use of aid to reduce the risk of humanitarian crises by contributing to (i) strengthening and protecting human rights and livelihoods, including access to basic services, (ii) putting a stronger focus on conflict resolution and disaster risk reduction (iii) preventing and managing environmental and climate related threats.

The draft policy document furthermore includes a strong human rights dimension (e.g. human rights protection as well as equal access to the right to seek asylum) and integrates Sweden’s overall focus on children and gender mainstreaming. Government officials have pointed out that the work on such drivers are tasks that development cooperation have been addressing all along, even it has not been specifically labelled as such (Interview Officials, 2016).

A new development (described as a ‘game changer’ by one interviewee (Interview Official, 2016)) is the stronger integration of Swedish development assistance with humanitarian aid in the context of fragile situations and refugee flows. This was introduced as a result of international developments, learning from refugee situations in poorer host countries as well as priorities influenced by the current Swedish Development minister (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016). The draft Aid framework points out that development cooperation in situations of forced migration can help reduce the risk of future humanitarian crises and the need for humanitarian assistance.

The document notes that supporting SDG 10.7 is the task of several policy areas. Swedish aid can help to create conditions for those wanting to migrate to do so in a safe and orderly way and for migrants to positively contribute to development. Following the Agenda 2030 objectives, this also includes the support to host countries’ capacities to manage migration comprehensively throughout the whole cycle from emigration to return. Sweden’s objective is to strengthen the impact and avenues of legal migration based on the realisation that people do move, but when they do so in an irregular way, their contribution to development is smaller. Swedish development cooperation is furthermore seen to act catalytically to support a lowering of the costs for remittances through improving financial literacy, data collection, and provision of financial services.

There is no explicitly noted tendency towards using Swedish development cooperation in a more targeted way towards countries of origins of refugees coming to Europe (Interview Official, 2016; Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).
Government policies on migration and Sida’s work have in the past not been closely linked. This may partly be explained by Sida aiming to avoid being subsumed by discussions on irregular migration or being instrumentalised for migration objectives (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016). Discussions on the draft strategy have already started a reflection process on how to better incorporate migration in Sweden’s development cooperation and the work of Sida. (Pelling, Sweden and the Migration Aspects of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2016). Sida so far had no official mandate to work on migration, though it integrated migration and development perspectives into some projects with partner countries on an ad-hoc basis under its geographic or thematic strategies (ECDPM & ICMPD, 2013; Sida, 2016d).159

Steps are currently taken by the government to provide Sida with a clear mandate to work more systematically on migration and development.160 This may be influenced by the rising costs for migrants and refugees. The original 2016 Government Letter of Appropriation for Sida did not have specific requests for Sida to focus on Migration and Development. The subsequent amended Appropriation Letter of March 2016 instructed Sida to analyse to what extent SIDA consider migration aspects across its initiatives. Sida’s report notes that Swedish development aid has only interacted with migration policy to a limited degree. More clarity on strategic approaches in the context of migration exists within Sida’s humanitarian unit dealing with refugee situations (Sida, 2016b). The OECD CSR data presented above, which shows a stronger focus on refugees as compared other migration aspects, further supports this.

Sida further indicates that the starting point for cooperation on migration would be development benefits of partner countries. Development cooperation would likely mainstream and integrate relevant migration issues in Sida’s poverty analysis. A number of focus areas of relevance to the future include:

- strengthening the links between long-term development cooperation and humanitarian work concerning migration and displacement

159 Sweden’s development aid does not have a separate budget or sector specifically on migration and development aspects.

160 At the time of finalizing the research for this paper, this guidance was however not yet clear (Interview Implementing Agency, October 2016).
- integrating migration, employment and freedom of movement, working conditions for migrants into the work of regional economic integration
- putting a stronger focus on the relationship between environment, climate and migration
- supporting diaspora as development actors
- offering financial services (e.g. micro-insurance) for poor and marginalised groups to enhance the effect of remittances, and to support resilience in protracted refugee situations
- integrating more strongly gender equality and a child right perspective into issues relating to labor migration and displacement

The government supports this avenue for Sida’s work, and migration will have a stronger impact on how Sida analyses and shows results in the future (Interview Official, 2016). The government is working on further guidance on how to best incorporate migration in Sida’s future cooperation and will include the topic again in the letter of appropriation for next year (Interview Official, 2016). It is too early to tell whether and how the new guidelines will impact implementation and where the focus in terms of resource allocation will lie. A strong emphasis will be on having a holistic and context-sensitive understanding before engaging as support to migration governance or migration aspects in challenging contexts can also entail risks for sustainable development (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

The focus and framing of Swedish development cooperation efforts on migration seem less influenced by narrower migration interests though this pressure exists

There has been resistance within the government to link development cooperation to migration interests through conditionality so far, such as ensuring cooperation on return and readmission (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016; Interview Official, 2016). While discussions within the EU on the conditionality of external action tools have led some opposition parties to propose similar ideas for the new strategic aid framework, the prevailing view in Sida seems to be that this is a very short-sighted way of conceiving of development cooperation in relation to migration (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016; Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Yet, though there are doubts about this approach and Sweden seems to have been marginalised in the EU discussions with its position on the conditionality aspect, it also has not been able to influence the EU Council Conclusions to the effect of excluding negative aid conditionality (Interview Civil Society, 2016).
Pressure meanwhile is rising within government to find quick solutions to increasingly complex and costly problems. Swedish policy on migration and development and potentially also the use of ODA may thus be increasingly under pressure, particularly as the challenges of returning unsuccessful asylum seekers have not yet fully materialised (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016; Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

References


Annex to case study Sweden: Government international aid framework appropriations (Area 7; 1:1), 2015 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1:1 Total Aid activities</td>
<td>27498702</td>
<td>27285067</td>
<td>30221856</td>
<td>26152858</td>
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<td>-5%</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>2777500</td>
<td>2797703</td>
<td>2957500</td>
<td>2957500</td>
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<td>6%</td>
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<td>Information and communication</td>
<td>91471</td>
<td>91471</td>
<td>127471</td>
<td>108350</td>
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<td>18%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Support through Swedish Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>1625128</td>
<td>1620419</td>
<td>1625128</td>
<td>1625128</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>Asia</td>
<td>1370000</td>
<td>1362500</td>
<td>1730000</td>
<td>1465500</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Latin America</td>
<td>510000</td>
<td>510000</td>
<td>600000</td>
<td>510000</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4818579</td>
<td>4663149</td>
<td>5171579</td>
<td>4650939</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Actions on Human rights and democratisation</td>
<td>809603</td>
<td>809603</td>
<td>752603</td>
<td>639713</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Global efforts for the environment and climate in terms of sustainable development</td>
<td>699500</td>
<td>699500</td>
<td>784500</td>
<td>666825</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global efforts for socially sustainable</td>
<td>1132000</td>
<td>1044000</td>
<td>887400</td>
<td>887400</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

161 (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2014). Comparing funding levels for budget lines from one year to the next only provides a snapshot of the situation. It has to be taken into account that projects tend to run over several years and that funding in one year may be lower as a result of many projects having started in the previous year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global efforts to economically sustainable development</td>
<td>599724</td>
<td>563710</td>
<td>591224</td>
<td>487540</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>735000</td>
<td>710000</td>
<td>1070000</td>
<td>1044000</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>+42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform cooperation with Eastern Europe, Western Balkan and Turkey</td>
<td>1041760</td>
<td>1041760</td>
<td>1161760</td>
<td>987496</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global efforts for Human Security</td>
<td>180000</td>
<td>180000</td>
<td>200000</td>
<td>200000</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development and exchanges</td>
<td>453000</td>
<td>453000</td>
<td>478000</td>
<td>406300</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral development banks, funds and debt amortization</td>
<td>2929150</td>
<td>2881150</td>
<td>3037610</td>
<td>1813123</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral and international organisations</td>
<td>6641545</td>
<td>6607825</td>
<td>7624897</td>
<td>6483282</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research cooperation</td>
<td>785879</td>
<td>785879</td>
<td>765879</td>
<td>645247</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategically targeted subsidies</td>
<td>298863</td>
<td>375398</td>
<td>499705</td>
<td>574515</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7: Case Study Netherlands

I. Overall Dutch ODA developments during the past years 2010-2015

Dutch total ODA disbursements stayed relatively stable between 2006 and 2014. Disbursements increased slightly from 2013 to 2014 (from EUR 4.1 bn to EUR 4.2 bn) and have then risen starkly to EUR 5.2 bn in 2015. As will be discussed below this is to a large extent due to the irregular migration and refugee situation. Until 2014, the increasing total volume did however not keep pace with economic growth and when measured as a percentage of GNI, it continuously decreased between 2010-2014 reaching a low of 0.64% in 2014. In 2015 the ODA/GNI quotient rose again to 0.76% so that the Netherlands fulfilled the ODA goal of 0.7% of its GNI as one of few OECD DAC members.

Figure 1. Netherlands ODA Developments 2006-2015, in million EUR

Source: based on OECD DAC Development Statistics
Table 1. ODA commitments and disbursements, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA commitments, mn EUR</td>
<td>5484</td>
<td>4312</td>
<td>5262</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA net disbursements, mn EUR</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>4563</td>
<td>4297</td>
<td>4094</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>5240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs, mn EUR</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA net disbursements, mn USD, constant prices</td>
<td>6610</td>
<td>6271</td>
<td>5824</td>
<td>5474</td>
<td>5573</td>
<td>6932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC Development Statistics

To a large extent the increase in ODA from 2014 to 2015 can be ascribed to the increase in costs spent for refugee reception within the Netherlands. Without these costs, the ODA/GNI ratio stands at about 0.6% in 2015 (see Figure 2). The Netherlands did not report large amounts of in-donor refugee costs as ODA in 2006 and 2007 (see Figure 1). Between 2010 and 2013 in-donor refugee costs declared as ODA was in the range of EUR 250 mn to 350 mn. During the past years in-donor refugee costs have risen significantly. From 2013 to 2014 in-donor refugee costs more than doubled and in 2015 are registered at the a level of EUR 1.2 bn – 22,8% of the total net ODA as shown in table 1. Yet, despite this large increase in the share of in-donor reception costs as part of the ODA budget, ODA without in-donor refugee costs has still risen in absolute terms from 2014 to 2015 as is shown in Figure 2.

Table 2. Netherlands In-donor refugee costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-donor refugee costs (as % of net ODA)</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>7,6</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>6,9</td>
<td>16,8</td>
<td>22,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. Budgetary implications

Development budget saved or problems delayed? – The case of rising in-donor refugee costs

The increasing numbers of asylum seekers and the rising costs for their reception in the Netherlands has put strong pressure on the Dutch development aid (ODA) budget. The Dutch funding available for ODA normally has a fixed ceiling per year, which is linked to Dutch GNI and GNI growth.\footnote{The current political agreement foresees ODA expenditures at the level of 0.7% of GNI diminished by EUR 750 mn per year and from 2017 by EUR 1 bn per year (see Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2016)} From this three main components are financed and have to be balanced against each other (Interview Official, 2016):

i. ODA expenditures for development cooperation (administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation).

ii. in-donor refugee costs (administered by the Ministry of Security and Justice)

iii. ODA expenditures as part of international finance to developing countries
For the 2015 budget, the number of asylum seekers had to be revised upwards several times\textsuperscript{163}: from an estimated 18,000 to 34,400 in June 2015 (Ploumen, 2015, p.23) and then to 40,000 asylum seekers in September 2015 (Tweede Kamer, 2015). Another upward revision came in November 2015 to a total of 58,000 asylum seekers for 2015 (Dutch Government, 2015). This has led to rising first-year reception costs, which as noted above is usually paid fully from the development cooperation (ODA) framework.

Despite almost one quarter of total Dutch ODA being spent on asylum seekers in the Netherlands in 2015, existing budget lines and running development cooperation programmes have to date been protected from strong reductions following a Parliamentary motion of September 2015 (Slob & Samson, 2015). To avoid large trade-offs between the main areas covered by the Dutch ODA framework, the government decided to cover additional unforeseen costs for asylum seekers in the Netherlands, by making use of existing flexibility in the overall Dutch budget such as carryovers from future ODA budgets.\textsuperscript{164} In addition, in 2014 and 2015 the cabinet decided to top up the ODA framework by EUR 375 mn and EUR 350 mn respectively (Adviesraad Internationale Fragstukken, 2016).

In 2015, additional unforeseen costs amounted to EUR 889 mn\textsuperscript{165}. The following gives an overview over how additional costs and pressure on ODA emerging from the irregular migration and refugee situation have been covered for the 2015 budget:

- EUR 345 mn were brought forward from future ODA budgets 2016-2020 making use of the expected raise in future development budgets due to GDP growth. Another EUR 104 mn were taken from GDP growth in 2015 (Ploumen, 2015a):

\textsuperscript{163} The fluctuations in asylum inflows make it difficult to plan and budget corresponding costs.

\textsuperscript{164} Already in 2014 the Ministry of Finance has granted a top up of the ‘ODA framework’ from the general Dutch budget due to the increase in asylum seekers. This avoided large trade-offs between the three main areas of expenditures of the ODA framework.

\textsuperscript{165} This is calculated based on the additional EUR 400 mn from the June 2015 budget revisions; additional EUR 139 mn from the August upward revisions and additional costs of EUR 350 mn documented in the November 2015 revisions. (see Dutch Parliament, 2016b, p.1)
<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional asylum first</td>
<td>+345</td>
<td>-104</td>
<td>-66</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>-69</td>
<td>-71</td>
<td>-73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year reception costs covered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through estimated GDP</td>
<td>+104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>growth, in mn EUR</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- An additional EUR 55 mn were covered through shifting resources forward from the planned 2020 development cooperation budget (EUR 31mn) and from the 2014 end of year margin of the International Trade and Development cooperation budget (EUR 24mn) (Ploumen, 2015b, p.23).

- Another EUR 35 mn were shifted from within the 2015 development cooperation budget, taken from resources available due to lower depletion of the Dutch Good Growth Fund in 2015 (Ploumen, 2015b, p.16).

- The latest upward revision, requiring another EUR 350 mn extra, was covered through shifting underspent amounts from budget lines across the government (Dutch Parliament, 2016c, p. 2).

The estimated figures for arriving asylum seekers in 2016 also had to be revised upwards. The Ministry of Security and Justice initially estimated 26 000 asylum applications but later revised it upwards to the 2015 level of 58 000 expected asylum seekers (Dutch Government, 2015). This again led to additional costs above those originally envisaged and planned for in the ODA framework. These additional costs to date have been covered through available resources from the asylum reserve (Dutch Government, 2016a, p.6). For 2017, a preliminary figure of 42 000 refugees is expected.166 Estimated in-donor refugee costs as part of the ODA framework are expected to decrease from the EUR 1,2 bn in 2015 to EUR 713 mn in 2016 and then slightly increase to EUR 900 mn in 2017 (HGIS, 2016 p.50).

To date, the largest part necessary to cover the additional in-donor refugee costs in 2015 and 2016 has thus been taken from the potential growth of future development budgets until 2020 as well as from unused funds in the Dutch general budget. Some have described the budgetary measures that have taken place as ‘smart political budgetary tricks’ (Interview Civil Society, 2016)

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166 However, with changing situations the 2017 number of asylum seekers is difficult to estimate and is likely to also be subject to several revisions.
with negative implications for flexibility and space for growth of future
development cooperation budgets.

As a result of these budgetary measures, as well as political choices as part
of the coalition agreement, total Dutch ODA will not grow but reduce in the
future. The carryovers from future planned ODA budgets or already making
use of estimated future ODA increases due to GNI growth means that these
funds cannot be used for new development cooperation projects. There will
also be a reduced percentage of Dutch ODA as share of its GNI in the coming
years. The total amount for the development cooperation budget (gross
ODA) will decrease from EUR 5245.5 mn in 2015 to a forecasted EUR 4887.9
mn in 2016 and foreseen EUR 4010.2 mn in 2017, EUR 3560 mn in 2018 and
EUR 3461.2 mn in 2019 (HGIS, 2016, p.38). The corresponding ODA/GNI
ratios for the coming years are estimated to reach 0.69% in 2016, 0.56% in
2017, 0.49% in 2018; 0.46% in 2019 and 0.44% including in-donor refugee
costs – well below the 0.7% target (Dutch Government, 2016c; HGIS, 2016;
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2016). This means that in the coming
years about 1/5 of the spent ODA will be spent on in-donor refugee costs (an
estimated 14.5 and 22.4% for 2016 and 2017 respectively).\textsuperscript{167}

With the space for future growth in the development cooperation budget
depleted to a large extent, there may be less flexibility in the budget for ODA
in the future. External shocks to the ODA budget, which are possible in a
context in which the refugee and irregular migration situation may remain
volatile, may then be more difficult to manage without further negative impact
on ODA. While up until now development cooperation programmes have
been protected, the risks for aid predictability and negative impacts on long-
term structural development cooperation have been shifted towards the
future.

It seems that uncertainty for the development cooperation budget will
remain as no systematic or structured solution has been agreed upon that
would better protect the development cooperation budget from in-donor
refugee costs in a more systematic manner as had been suggested by a motion
of the cabinet (Slob & Samson, 2015) and proposed by Dutch civil society.
With elections nearing, the current Dutch government is not discussing a cap
on in-donor refugee costs as part of the ODA budget as has been the case in
Sweden. Interviewees pointed out that a change of sourcing in-donor refugee
costs solely from the amount foreseen for ODA seems unlikely both in the

\textsuperscript{167} Calculations based on information in HGIS, 2016. However, estimates of inflows of refugees are
not reliable and can change quickly.
current cabinet as well as in the future (Interview Official, Interview Civil Society, 2016). As in the other case studies, with increased uncertainty for the funding levels of development cooperation abroad and the depletion of flexibility, aid predictability for partner countries and organisations is under pressure and partly dependent upon on how the inflow of asylum seekers to the Netherlands develops.

The sourcing of protection of refugees for their first year in the Netherlands from the resources foreseen as ODA in line with OECD DAC reporting practices, has also raised questions about oversight, scrutiny, efficient use and transparency of how this money is being spent (Interview Civil Society, 2016). The oversight of ODA for the reception of refugees within the Netherlands does not lie with the Ministry Trade and Development Cooperation but with the Ministry of Security and Justice. While this in itself is not a problem, NGOs have been concerned that agencies using these funds may have less incentive to use them efficiently (Interview Civil Society, 2016). It goes beyond this study to make an assessment on the latter, yet as highlighted in Box 1, there is room for improvement on the transparency and reporting of in-donor refugee costs.

**Box 1. In-donor refugee costs in 2015**

In comparison with other OECD DAC countries, the Netherlands reports, with USD 31933, the highest average annual cost per refugee. UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers are both included before and after a decision is taken independent of whether asylum is granted or rejected. The eligible 12-month period starts from the moment of first registration and may include costs for rejected and granted asylum seekers as long as they stay in a shelter. The estimate of in-donor refugee costs is based on the estimated numbers of refugees (disaggregated for minors and adults as minors incur higher costs) coming to the Netherlands, the average period of stay as well as a cost price reported by the Centrall Organ asielzoekers (COA) (Dutch Government, 2016c; OECD DAC Secretariat, 2016).

The government refers to the costs estimated by COA per person as an explanation for the high average costs (Dutch Government, 2016c, p.25). Moreover, according to the government the price level as well as the quality of services plays a role, which may differ across countries. Two interviewees for this study point out that in the Netherlands reception often takes place in Central Housing and in big centres, and it requires renting from real estate owners that can make large buildings available. A number of civil society organisations are currently investigating the reason for the high housing costs and whether private real estate owners can make large profits through renting their property (Interview, Civil Society).

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168 The Netherlands will hold elections in 2017 and in the election programs currently written it appears that most parties are satisfied with the current arrangement of the development cooperation budget covering all in-donor refugee reception costs for the first 12 months.

169 See [www.coa.nl](http://www.coa.nl) for background information on COA.
The Netherlands does not declare costs emerging in the context of forced return as ODA, neither are costs for economic and societal integration included as this would not be in line with OECD DAC rules. Voluntary return (IOM Netherlands, 2016)\(^{170}\), on the other hand is included in the ODA budget and reached EUR 4.3 mn in 2015. Until 2016, 100% of the refugee reception costs were declared as ODA in the year of first registration. This will change from 2016 onwards, so that 63% will be declared in the year of arrival and 37% in the following year (2017) due to the fact that a share of refugee inflow takes place at the end of the year with reception costs effectively being occurred in the year after arrival (Dutch Government, 2016c, p.25). This will not change total reception costs that can be declared as ODA but it smoothens the distributions over years and may thus contribute to less disruptions on ODA budgets. This is a conscious attempt to safeguard predictability for ODA in a given year, especially when there are large inflows such as has been the case in 2015 (Interview Dutch Official).\(^{171}\)

In 2015, most of the spending for asylum seekers within the Netherlands (EUR 1.2 bn) has been to COA en NIDOS, organisations which provide food, housing, transport and medical care for asylum seekers. Currently there is no detailed breakdown in the budget of the Ministry of Security and Justice administering these costs but costs are published as deduction from the ODA budget administered by the Ministry of Trade and Development cooperation. The cabinet plans to make the costs for first year reception of asylum seekers more transparent. From 2017 onward, the Ministry of Security and Justice will publish in more detail which parts of the costs for reception of asylum seekers are covered by ODA funds (Ploumen, 2016b).

Adjustments in the 2015 and 2016 development budget to respond to the refugee and irregular migration situation externally

More humanitarian and emergency aid allocations for the refugee situation

During the past years, the share of humanitarian aid commitments of total Dutch ODA commitments has increased over time and in 2014 amounted to 9.6% of total ODA according to OECD data. The share of aid allocated to sectors declined over the past years, mostly due to the rising share for in-donor refugee costs as shown in Figure 3.

\(^{170}\) This follows the procedure of the REAN rules.

\(^{171}\) This is based on the assumption that large disruptions due to large inflows of asylum seekers are not taking place every year. If such large inflows continue over several years having this model may not change annual figures of in-donor refugee costs compared to reporting 100% of costs in the year of arrival.
Figure 3. Thematic allocations as share of total ODA commitments (total all sectors), 2010-2014

Clearly, the humanitarian crisis in Syria and in Iraq and the resulting refugee situation influenced Dutch budget allocations during the past years. Compared to 2014 for humanitarian and relief spending of EUR 329 mn, the 2015 humanitarian and emergency aid budget allocations increased significantly reaching EUR 535 mn\(^{172}\) (or about 10% of Dutch ODA) (Ploumen, 2016a).

Dutch Emergency assistance takes place through humanitarian funding under budget article 4.1. as well as through a special Relief Fund under article 4.4 of the development cooperation budget. The original 2015 development cooperation budget had foreseen EUR 205 mn for Dutch humanitarian help under budget article 4.1 and EUR 170 mn for the Relief Fund under article 4.4 – a total of EUR 375 mn. In September 2015 the cabinet informed of the decision to raise the regular humanitarian budget by EUR 110 mn to support Syrian Refugees in the region (Ploumen & Dijkhoff, 2015) as well as add EUR 43 mn to the Relief Fund raising it to EUR 213 mn for the year. Whereas in 2014 about EUR 62 mn was allocated to the Syria region and Iraq, in 2015, this was EUR 199.8 mn – an increase of 222% (Ploumen, 2016a).

\(^{172}\) Including EUR 3 mn, which are not ODA eligible.
The additional funding to top up the humanitarian aid resources in 2015 has been at the cost of future flexibility rather than of longer-term development cooperation funds. The extra EUR 110 mn made available for emergency assistance in Syria has been taken from future GDP growth of ODA budget of 2016 (EUR 50 mn) and 2020 (EUR 60 mn) (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b). The additional funds used to increase the allocation to the Relief Fund in 2015 have been taken from future allocations as part of the fund’s multi-year budget: The Relief Fund spans over several years with a total of EUR 570 mn and is flexibly spent over the entire cabinet period. The overspent of EUR 43 mn in 2015 is at the costs of available funds for the Relief Fund in 2016 and in 2017 (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015b, p.2).

For 2016 it is foreseen that EUR 200mn will be spent from the Relief Fund – EUR 50 mn higher level than originally envisaged\textsuperscript{173}. To cover this top up resources originally envisaged for 2017 have been brought forward effectively reducing amounts available in the future. The available amount for 2017 now only amounts to EUR 57 mn (Dutch Parliament, 2016b)\textsuperscript{174}, if no extra resources are added.

As per time of writing, the planned resources for humanitarian aid in 2016 amounted to EUR 406 mn – more than EUR 100mn less than the previous year. This lower amount is to be explained with the fact that 2015 has seen one-time extra emergency support through freed resources as noted above\textsuperscript{175}.

On top of this, the 2016 the cabinet decided to make available an extra amount of EUR 260 mn\textsuperscript{176} for the reception of refugees in the Syria region (Dutch Government, 2016a). This shows that also for 2016, the refugee situation in Syria and the region receives a strong focus of Dutch emergency aid. These extra funds will be used for support in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq to focus on investments in employment, education, basic services and infrastructure. The extra EUR 260 mn are on top of EUR 50 mn per year in 2016 and 2017, which are already included in the budgets for the region. These funds will be added to the budget of Foreign Trade and Development

\textsuperscript{173} This amount is had also been increased from an initial allocation of EUR 150 mn.

\textsuperscript{174} This is compared to spending in the previous years a lower amount: EUR 100 mn in 2014; EUR 213 mn in 2015; EUR 200 mn in 2016.

\textsuperscript{175} Despite the decline in total resources for the humanitarian aid allocation from 2015 to 2016, the amount foreseen for multilateral organisations and the UN slightly increases from EUR 219 mn in 2015 to a planned EUR 230 mn in 2016. However, funding for acute and chronic crises in countries is with EUR 127,2 mn is lower than the 2015 level of EUR 301,9 mn (Ploumen, 2016a).

\textsuperscript{176} This is a
Cooperation, according to the Voorjaarsnota 2016 (Dutch Ministry of Finance, 2016). From these EUR 260 mn:

- The share of NL on the Turkey Refugee Facility Phase I is about EUR 94 mn.
- Iraq funding facility from UNDP for reconstruction – EUR 20 mn
- Jordan Response Plan – EUR 60 mn
- Lebanese Crisis Response Plan - EUR 86 mn

Some interviewees were concerned that this drastic rise in humanitarian spending will come at the costs of some of the Dutch spearhead long-term development cooperation programmes, such as water, food security or sexual health and reproduction (Interview Civil Society, 2016). While on-going programmes have not been affected as noted above, additional funding has been used to finance growing humanitarian needs and in-donor refugee costs (Interview Official, 2016) rather than topping these longer-term programmes. The effect may thus be that relative weights are changed rather than funding for programmes having been reduced. As the data presented above shows, ODA allocated to sectors declined as a share of total ODA as well as in total figures (disbursements and commitments, constant prices) between 2010 and 2014, while humanitarian aid increased both in total as well as in share of total ODA.

In conclusion, extra funds for humanitarian and emergency help to address the irregular migration and refugee situation in third countries have been sourced in a similar fashion than the additional costs for reception of asylum seekers in the Netherlands have been covered: either through making use of future growth in the ODA budget due to the GNI margin or in the case of the Relief Fund through bringing future allocations forward. Again, this may reduce the flexibility for the budget during the next years.

Overall, some interviewees noted that there is a trend towards much more short-term, emergency and quick impact funding in the context of the refugee and irregular migration situation to the detriment of longer-term development projects (Interview Civil Society, 2016, Interview Policy Researcher, 2016). It is however too early to tell whether these dynamics are structural or in response to exceptional circumstances of increased refugee and irregular migrant flows.
In addition, according to one interviewee, due to the extra pressure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has increased its expenditure rates to almost 100% spending for its for a number of budget lines – specifically those involved in addressing irregular migration and refugee situations. The past expenditure rates were at times around 45% with unspent money being used to reduce the Dutch debt burden. In the current situation, most of the budgeted amount is being used up. Another Official pointed out that certainly pressures on ODA has grown and competition for scarce resources has grown (Interview Official, 2016).

**Changes in geographic focus?**

A number of interviewees noted that with budget changes occurring in 2015 and 2016 and beyond more focus is being put towards North African countries, the Middle East as well as Turkey. The stronger focus on these regions is partly already visible in available data until 2014 – especially for humanitarian aid as further investigated below. This section looks at whether geographic allocation changes can already be detected until 2014 using OECD DAC data.

A very high percentage of Dutch reported ODA is country unspecific, making it difficult to assess the geographic allocation. There thus needs to be caution in drawing strong conclusions. OECD DAC data until 2014 shows that during the past years, Dutch country and region specific ODA commitments were predominantly focused on Sub-Sahara Africa, yet with a declining figure from 2013 to 2014. The share to Asia overall, has not seen a strong change (see Figure 4).
When looking more closely at trends within these regions, for the Sub-regions in Africa no strong change is visible with South of Sahara receiving most of the funding as can be seen from the figures in Table 6. A change however is visible within the Asia region. Here, ODA commitment shares have shifted from South & Central Asia (a share of close to 70% of ODA to Asia in 2010 was reduced to 42.7% in 2014) to the Middle East (from a share of 21.6% in 2010 to 47% of ODA to Asia in 2014) as shown in Table 7.

Table 6. ODA Commitments to Sub-regions in Africa, as share of total to Africa, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara, Total</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara, Total</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, regional</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Development Statistics
Table 7. ODA Commitments to Sub-regions in Asia, as share of total to Asia, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia, Total</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia, Total</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, Total</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia, regional</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Development Statistics

The stronger humanitarian efforts in the context of the Syrian crisis already show in OECD disaggregated data available up to 2014. There has been an increase in the share of humanitarian aid to the Middle East region rising from a 9% share in 2010 to 28.6% in 2014 (see Table 3). This seems to come predominantly at the cost of humanitarian aid to South& Central Asia as well as America over the years 2010 to 2014.

Table 3. Humanitarian Aid commitments, as share of total Humanitarian Aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS Data

For ODA allocated to sectors there has been a rise in the share committed to Africa between 2010 and 2014, which dropped again in 2014. Looking at disbursement figures, however the share remained relatively stable for Africa including in the African sub-regions. While no large changes are detected overall when looking at disbursement or commitment data, ODA disbursed to
Asia has declined from 2010 to 2014 mainly due to declines for the Far East Asia and South & Central Asia regions. The America region has also seen a decline. For the Middle East on the other hand shares have increased, though not making up a large percentage of overall commitments to sectors.

Table 4. Sector-allocable aid commitments, as share of total sector allocable aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10,4%</td>
<td>14,5%</td>
<td>35,2%</td>
<td>41,0%</td>
<td>19,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0,1%</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>9,6%</td>
<td>13,8%</td>
<td>33,6%</td>
<td>39,3%</td>
<td>18,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>3,9%</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>7,6%</td>
<td>7,9%</td>
<td>5,9%</td>
<td>12,5%</td>
<td>11,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td>0,2%</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>1,2%</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>4,7%</td>
<td>6,4%</td>
<td>3,7%</td>
<td>8,1%</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1,4%</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>1,5%</td>
<td>2,4%</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>0,5%</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
<td>0,9%</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS Data
Table 5. Sector-allocable aid disbursements, as share of total sector allocable aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD CRS Data

An Increase in ODA to address ‘migration, displacement and its root causes’

The irregular migration and refugee situation has shifted the focus of parts of Dutch longer-term aid – at least rhetorically. Migration and its root causes are receiving more attention as topics in Dutch development cooperation and are communicated as such. For example, a number of specific Funds through which projects are tendered have taken up the focus on displacement, irregular migration and ‘root causes’ as well as focus on specific regions and countries relevant for Europe in this regard. Yet, as will be further explored below ‘reframing’ of on-going or planned programmes also takes place with adjustments being made to language rather than – as of now - resulting in large changes to where funds are being allocated thematically. This section will look more closely on financial resources made available to respond to the situation in the longer-term as part of the 2015 and 2016 budget.

In Summer 2015 a decision was made to make extra resources available for North Africa: EUR 50 mn are currently programmed for extra investments in North Africa where the migration and youth unemployment challenges are

177 More focus on migration issues may also occur in bilateral cooperation of the Netherlands, e.g. in Ethiopia and as part of the EU Compacts – yet it is beyond the scope of this paper to review all those.
large and where the economic perspectives of young people need to be improved.

- EUR 25 mn for Local employment in Africa for Development (LEAD)
- EUR 25 mn Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF)

Together this is expected to lead to 46,000 new jobs. The first projects of the LEAD programme started in January 2016.

This is interesting against the background of the share Dutch ODA being spent on economic infrastructure and services, especially on business support and services as well as improving business and investment climate having increased during the past years. According to OECD DAC CRS data, ODA to economic infrastructure and services as share of total sector-allocable aid was 38% in 2014 whereas the average from 2010-2013 was 13.6%. The increase for economic infrastructure also led to a reduced share in the production sectors and the multi-sector/cross-cutting category.178

The most explicit focus on addressing forced displacement and irregular migration has been through a new tender for the Addressing the Root Causes Fund (ARC), running from 2016 to 2021 with an envelope of EUR 125 mn launched in 2016. Since a strategic re-orientation of objectives, at least at the level of framing, in the wake of the irregular migration and refugee situation and towards addressing the drivers of migration can be seen, this fund will be further explored below.

Specifically for direct cooperation on Migration and Development, the Netherlands has a separate budget line managed by the Migration and Development Group in the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Budget line 5.3.) (Interview Civil Society, 2016). In the past it has however been relatively small with about EUR 9 mn yearly. In 2015 more funding has been allocated to this budget line following a cabinet decision to invest extra money in to the facilitation of return of unsuccessful asylum seekers and migrants from the Netherlands. The original 2015 budget had foreseen EUR 9 mn for the budget line Migration and Development (5.3), the actual spent was higher (Dutch Parliament, 2016b) after extra funds for the area of sustainable return were added (Dijkhoff, 2015). With these extra resources available, the ministry reported that a number of extra activities have been carried out, such as individual support to

178 The ODA share to Social Infrastructure and Services in 2014 was 48,1% compared remained stable compared to an average of 45,7% from 2010-2013.
failed asylum seekers, protection in the Horn of Africa and support to governance of refugees and asylum (Dutch Parliament, 2016b, p.22).

In 2016, the budget line 5.3 Migration and Development has not increased compared to the 2014 and 2015 levels (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015, p.48). Despite the stronger emphasis on migration and refugees, this has mainly taken place through more emergency assistance and making funding available to address ‘root causes’ already described above rather than increasing the structural programmes for migration and development carried out by NGOs or International Organisations.

The Netherlands has channelled, compared to many other EU MS, a relatively large amount through the EU Emergency Trust Fund to address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement in Africa (EUTF). It currently contributes EUR 15 mn. This has partly been a strategy to receive a voting right and influence the programming of the total of EUR 1,8 bn of the EUTF (Ploumen, 2015). Some of these funds going to specific projects are not new efforts but were already envisaged by the Netherlands independently of the EUTF (Interview Civil Society, 2016). The funding comes from the development cooperation budget (Interview EU MEP, 2016). The breakdown of the EUR 15 mn is as follows:

- EUR 3 mn: Regional Development and Protection Programme Horn of Africa: focus vocational training and increasing employment opportunities for both refugees and host communities in Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya
- EUR 9 mn: Food Security in Ethiopia to address fragility and ensure better access to basic services
- EUR 3 mn: Better perspectives for youth in the Sahel region through employment opportunities and stability as well as anti-radicalisation activities.

Changes to thematic focus areas?

An important question is whether the emphasis on ‘root causes’ of irregular migration has changed thematic allocations of Dutch ODA so far. Looking back on OECD DAC data until 2014, there is no clear overall change in the

\[179\] In an answer to a parliamentary question, Ms. Ploumen notes that being part of the EUTF “is a chance to put own touches to the broader program, such as a strong commitment to youth employment and comprehensive partnerships in migration field”.

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thematic allocations when looking at the broader ODA purpose categories as shown in Figure 5 – at least not from 2012 onwards.

**Figure 5. Breakdown of ODA disbursements by broad purpose category, 2010-2014**

![Graph showing breakdown of ODA disbursements](image)

Source: OECD CRS Data

Changes in allocations can only be detected within certain sectors. For example, OECD DAC commitment and disbursement data\textsuperscript{180} shows that over time within the category of ‘Government & Civil Society’ (which belongs to the ODA purpose category ‘Social Infrastructure and Services’), increasing focus has been put on ‘Conflict Prevention and Resolution’, ‘Peace and Security’ at the cost of support to the sector ‘Government and Civil Society’. Under the sector ‘Economic Infrastructure’, a much stronger emphasis has been put on support to business during the past years. This corresponds with information given by an interviewee who pointed out that the Netherlands has in the past increasingly used its ODA in two directions: First, it has combined aid with the trade agenda and for supporting business and second, it has increased funding towards security assistance (Interview Policy Researcher, 2016). These developments may however not be directly related to the irregular migration and refugee situation but could play a role in the future. It may not be surprising that no clear trends of thematic nature related to the refugee and irregular migration situation are visible until 2014, as the push to increasingly use development cooperation to address the ‘root causes’ only entered the political debates when migrant flows increased from 2014 and 2015 onwards. It will have to be further monitored whether the irregular

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\textsuperscript{180} Figures based on calculations using the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System
migration and refugee situation has an impact on thematic allocations and purpose categories defined by the OECD DAC, including in the sub-sectors of these categories from 2014 onward and if so, in what way.

Underlying a change in thematic allocations of ODA will usually be shifts of longer-term strategies and deliberations that influence Dutch cooperation. To what extent in what way the irregular migration and refugee situation has influenced strategic deliberations of relevance for the future of Dutch cooperation will thus be explored in the following section.

III. Strategic policy shifts in Dutch development cooperation and the use of ODA to respond to the irregular migration and refugee situation

In the context of the renewed challenges and attention to irregular migration and smuggling towards Europe, strategic priorities for parts of Dutch development cooperation seem to be undergoing change. The Netherlands is in particular putting a strong emphasis on *addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement* through aligning its development cooperation efforts in the future. This seems to affect both the way the funding for the Migration & Development budget is being used (though this only a small part of overall efforts) as well as the role that a variety of other cooperation areas play to this effect.

The refugee and irregular migration situation also has had an impact on how the Netherland will choose priority countries in the future and thus potentially on geographic allocations. In September 2016, the Foreign Ministry has announced that the future list of Dutch priority countries will include new countries which will be selected based on whether the country is relevant from a migration and ‘root causes’ perspective beyond criteria related to poverty (the country should be from one of the poorest), Dutch added-value and regional concentration (Ploumen, 2016c). The following section will explore which other strategic re-orientation has taken place in the context of the refugee and migration situation.

**Strategic shift towards addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displacement through ODA**

As with other donors no clear guidelines exist that would shed light on what addressing the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and displacement precisely
means for development cooperation or to what extent it differs from how development cooperation previously operated. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that ‘root causes’ related to peace and security aspects are tackled by the Stability Fund, the Reconstruction tender, the Human Rights Fund, the Funding Leadership Opportunities for Women (FLOW) Fund and by the Women on the Frontline Fund as part of the Action Plan to realise UN Resolution 1325. Moreover, the Local Employment in Africa for Development (LEAD) Fund is listed as covering the more socio-economic perspective of root causes of irregular migration (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). The Good Growth Fund (DGGF) for Business equally aims to contribute to providing jobs in migrant-sending regions that would help alleviate pressures to migrate. Since the objectives of these different funds vary and cover a whole spectrum of activities, ‘root causes’ is used more as an umbrella term for a range of potential drivers of migration that are specified for particular geographic region based on the understanding that no ‘one size fits all’ and that a variety of funds and tools should be used.

Thus, existing thematic funds are put under a new narrative and are presented as responding to some of the drivers of irregular migration and displacement, whereas before - though including similar activities – such connections were not necessarily made. One interviewee noted that the ministry is just at the beginning of discussions on how to change engagement in order to address ‘root causes’ and that so far the focus was on showing some quick wins – partly through reframing existing engagement and focusing them geographically on areas of relevance from a migration perspective (Interview Official, 2016).

Nevertheless, the Netherlands has specified a number of areas of engagement in policy documents, which may become more important in the future. These can influence the thematic, geographic and beneficiary focus of cooperation through ODA and beyond. An important area is the lack of economic perspectives with a focus of directing trade and economic cooperation agenda to support youth in countries of origins. This is also seen as a counter-radicalisation measure, which in itself can contribute to reduce the numbers of displaced people. Under this falls the additional support to North Africa through the LEAD and the DGGF funds.

181 A new position has been created in October 2016 within the Migration and Development Division in the Department for Stability and Humanitarian Aid to coordinate efforts on addressing ‘root causes’ of migration in the future.
A second strategic priority is the support to protection in the region, with emphasis on the Syrian region and the Horn of Africa so to avoid secondary movement of refugees towards Europe, as is communicated in several policy documents (Dutch Government, 2016b). The objective is to improve services and perspectives for refugees and host communities such as education, health care and employment. Beyond the humanitarian imperative, this factor also explains the strong support to emergency and longer-term funding to neighbouring countries noted in the previous section. The government makes a direct link with in-donor refugee costs when suggesting that stronger support for protection in host regions could be funded in the long-term by “savings arising from reductions in the number of migrants travelling to the EU and requesting asylum here” (Ploumen and Dijkhoff, 2015). The Netherlands also puts a focus on innovating emergency help and more closely linking humanitarian and development approaches.

The third area relates to addressing instability and conflict through focusing on activities under the spearhead programme Security and the Rule of Law. In this area a change in language towards addressing migration specific issues can be observed most strongly. The State Secretary for Security and Justice and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation highlighted that efforts to promote peace, security and the rule of law through using the instruments available should be redoubled (Ploumen and Dijkhoff, 2015). The main fund for this is the Addressing the Root Causes Fund (ARC) already presented above. It is led by the Stability and Law Programme of the Department for Stability and Humanitarian Aid and has only recently been reframed in the context of addressing irregular migration (Interviews Officials, 2016).

The engagement of the ARC fund focuses on improving human security, functioning rule of law, inclusive political processes, legitimate and capable governments and equal access to employment opportunities and basic services. Its predecessor fund the ‘Reconstruction Tender’, focused on similar objectives as those above. It aimed at addressing the causes of instability so to create the conditions for more security and the rule of law as groundwork for effective poverty reduction and global peace. Yet, it did not explicitly aim at addressing irregular (secondary) migration, as is the case with the ARC fund next to a focus on the roots of armed conflict and instability.

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182 For the Policy framework of the ARC Fund on which information in this paragraph is based see Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (2016).
183 The ARC Fund follows the five objectives of the Dutch policy priority on Security and the Rule of Law.
Interestingly, the Theory of Change on Security and Rule of Law in fragile countries developed in 2015, which provides the underlying strategic basis for the ARC Fund, hardly mentions irregular migration. The ARC fund thus introduces a different connotation by reframing cooperation in the light of the current migration situation and selects as target countries those that have a strong migration link to Europe, either as countries of origin or as reception and transit countries next to those emerging from conflict. Focus is strongly on irregular migration from MENA and the Horn of Africa, which in the view of civil society characterizes both a geographic as well as a thematic shift (Interview Civil Society, 2016). Though the overarching goal of the Fund is partly to reduce primary and secondary drivers of irregular migration from countries such as Ethiopia, Jordan and Lebanon, the direct objectives and target activities predominantly relate to stability, human security, resilience, responsive governments, employment and access to basic services for migrants, refugees, displaced people and citizens. Interviewees confirmed that the new framing could be seen to a large extent as a re-labelling of familiar activities. Conceptually it seems that the Stability and Rule of Law division of the Ministry took ownership on conceptualising the fund under the general political pressure for development cooperation to address migration. Yet, interviewees noted that there has been little input of migration experts from within or outside on how the proposed actions relate to migration flows (Interviews Officials, Interview Policy Researcher, 2016).

A number of civil society organisations were initially doubtful whether to apply for funding under the ARC tender. Interviewees noted that not all identify with the language, framing and objectives of the Fund as concerns irregular migration. Within civil society networks red lines were discussed in a context in which many organisations felt that they are not only confronted with a reduced funding environment but also with more pressure to support an agenda geared at reducing migration flows. There are still doubts how to engage with an agenda aimed at reducing irregular migration by civil society actors. This is not only due to perception that there often is no immediate link between livelihood programmes and (irregular) migration decisions but also

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184 It does mention that vulnerable groups including refugees, displaced persons and host communities should be supported to enhance their resilience in situations of protracted crisis but does not link this to addressing ‘root causes’ of irregular migration.

185 The Netherlands reduced funding for Civil Society Actors (Ravelo, 2015)

186 The call asks for Theories of change that contribute to achieving the main goal of the ARC fund that is to address the root causes of armed conflict or instability and irregular migration as well as specifically selected country goals that at least partly identify drivers of irregular migration.
because other factors outside the influence sphere of NGOs are driving decisions to migrate (Interview Civil Society, 2016).

As noted, with EUR 15 mn the Netherlands is one of the larger contributors to the *EUTF for Africa* among the EU Member States. At the same time, the Dutch Cabinet does not consider the EU Commission’s call for EU member states to match Commission funding as realistic. Instead, it is argued, the EU should make extra resources available for the country specific Migration Compacts developed. For this reason, there has been some reluctance to agree to topping up the Trust Fund with further EUR 500 mn from the EDF reserves. The Dutch government also aims to influence the EU Commission to make ODA financial commitments more ‘migration relevant’ in the context of the Migration Compacts. For the Netherlands, this means a stronger focus on migration management and a coupling of cooperation with the area of reintegration as well as the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration without losing sight of longer-term sustainable development objectives (Dutch Government, 2016b). These examples show that Dutch development cooperation overall is undergoing change in its rhetoric, its strategic underlying objectives and possibly increasingly in substance in the future as a consequence of the irregular migration and refugee situation. The following section will analyse more closely changes and strategic discussions in the area of ODA that specifically focuses on migration, its governance and its links to development.

**Changing priorities in the approach to cooperation on Migration and Development?**

The Netherlands has engaged on issues related to migration governance, trafficking, displacement, refugees and return and reintegration in the past. An analysis of projects in the OECD DAC CRS database from 2010 to 2014 shows that there has not been a clear upward trend in terms of how much the Netherlands has committed or spent on development cooperation projects that specifically include migration relevant terms in their titles or descriptions. From 2010 to 2012, the total amount committed as well as disbursed to such projects increased continuously. An increase is also observed in the share of these projects of total ODA. From 2013 to 2014,

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187 See Methodology for this analysis in Annex I and full data in Annex II.
188 Or projects implemented by an organisation that focuses on refugees or migrants such as UNHCR, IOM, etc.
however, the share of ODA committed to such projects has declined from 3.3% of total ODA to 2.0%. The number of projects has also decreased. Although this may not all capture all ODA that is relevant for migration governance and may be an imperfect proxy for migration related spending, it contrasts starkly with commitments to trade-related activities, which amounted to almost 28% of commitments to developing countries (OECD, 2016). For 2015, no data is yet available at the disaggregated level that could provide information about more recent trends in a context of increased attention to the issues around migration and displacement.

By far, the main focus of Dutch ODA commitments in this area between 2010 and 2014 has been on refugees. This is followed by projects that include the more generic term ‘migration’ as well as ‘return’ and ‘reintegration’. This holds true both when looked at in terms of number of projects as well as total amount committed to projects that include these key words. The terms ‘smuggling’, ‘mobility’, ‘border security’, ‘border management’ or ‘displace’ receive almost no attention. Projects that contain the word ‘remittances and ‘trafficking’ receive between EUR 0.7 and 0.9 mn in commitments and projects including ‘diaspora’ about EUR 5.3 mn over the time period looked at.

Next to integrating migration in relevant partner countries strategies (Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2014), development cooperation with direct focus on migration and development has since 2008 been carried out under a specific budget line as noted above (Ploumen L, 2014). In the context of growing challenges due to the displacement and irregular migration situation, the Dutch government adopted a renewed policy approach to migration and development in 2014.

The new policy has narrowed the scope of the work on migration development focusing it more strongly on Dutch interests and on areas where needs are greatest. Secondly, more emphasis has been put on increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and in the future to scale-up those ones that prove to be most successful (Ploumen, 2014). The priority fields have been reduced from previously 6 to 4 strategic areas:

189 A number of broad activities in 6 priority areas have been carried out under this budget line. Strengthening Migration and Development as part of migration dialogues; Fostering Institutional development in the area of migration management; Supporting of circular migration and brain gain; Supporting stronger involvement of migration organisations; Strengthening the relation between remittances and development; Supporting sustainable return and reintegration.

190 In this context stronger efforts for monitoring and evaluation are also mentioned.
i. *reception in the region*, which includes integration and reduction of
tension between refugees and host communities;

ii. *support to migration management* with a strong focus on developing
effective systems to fight human smuggling, trafficking and
exploitation, processing asylum requests as well as general migration
governance and border management in North and West Africa, Horn of
Africa\(^{191}\) and the Middle East. Examples also include the improvement
of migration data collection in a number of countries (Dijkhoff,
Koenders and Ploumen, 2015).

iii. Support to *diaspora* organisations to strengthen ‘brain gain’ and
development in countries of origin, with focus on countries such as
Somalia, Angola and Afghanistan. This also includes start up capital and
capacity building for entrepreneurs wanting to start a business in their
country of origin as well as activities targeted at lowering remittances
costs.

iv. Supporting *voluntary return and reintegration* of failed asylum seekers
from the Netherlands is a priority. Three channels are pursued: a)
innovation in the area of return policy; b) cooperation with IOM and
NGOs and c) projects arising from the ‘more for more’ principle in the
area of migration cooperation. For the latter, programmes for “South-
South” return are also financed under this area, such as a pilot project
with Morocco to return 1009 African migrants stranded in Morocco on
their way to Europe.

Within the work on Migration and Development, a clear financial priority has
in the past been on the area of supporting return and reintegration. The
evaluation of Dutch cooperation on migration and development in 2012
pointed out that about half of the budget for migration and development went
towards sustainable return and reintegration, despite the fact that the
development impact of such support is not always proven (see Frouws and
Grimmius, 2012; Knapen and Leers, 2012). More recently, the government
suggested using EUR 10 mn from the EUR 15 mn M&D budget in 2015 to be
spent on sustainable return and reintegration (Dijkhoff, Koenders, &
Ploumen, 2015). Support to circular migration, though a potential powerful

\(^{191}\) As part of the ‘more for more’ to cooperate on return the Netherlands are supporting Somalia on
counter-terrorism strategies.
tool has been dropped from the agenda and seems to be further away in the current political climate (Vice Versa, 2015).

Even though the positive aspects of migration for development are acknowledged in Dutch policy documents, interviewees pointed out that the facilitation of mobility and migration are not always strongly translated into practice (Interview Civil Society, 2016; Interview Official, 2016). Legal migration is a sensitive area if it is towards the EU, so there is no discussion on facilitation of migration. This is different for mobility in a South-South context, which is for example currently discussed as part of the objectives to find increased opportunities for potential migrants from African countries so to reduce the need to move towards Europe (Interview Official, 2016). Migration governance and cooperation with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities has gained in prominence recently in the context of the government devising its future strategic cooperation with these regional organisations within which migration could more prominently feature.

There has also been a natural progression of bringing together humanitarian funding and longer-term cooperation in the context of the migration situation. But this agenda has been on-going for some time in the context of the EU Regional Development and Protection Programme, which the Netherlands leads for the Horn of Africa. With the current priority focus on migration and refugee issues this approach receives more energy and attention.

In conclusion, overall in specific ODA spending on migration and in strategic deliberations there has been a shift towards a focus on protection of refugees in the region where they are displaced, a focus on irregular migration and smuggling as well as on return and reintegration. With the focus narrowed to specific actions in 2014 and the recent attention to refugees and irregular migrants, only parts of a comprehensive agenda on migration and development seem to be pursued through Dutch ODA.

Towards aid conditionality?

A longer-term strategic decision also concerns the conditionality of ODA to incentivise cooperation on return and readmission. The Dutch government supports positive and negative conditionality external action instruments including development cooperation at the EU level as part of the new EU Partnership Framework (Dutch Government, 2016b). The Netherlands has
trialed negative conditionality of ODA to achieve migration related objectives on readmission in the past with Ghana, however without success.

Different positions exist within the government with regards to making use of such ODA conditionality - specifically between the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interview Official, 2016). The overall Dutch position has favoured conditionality in principle noting that ‘in cases where cooperation proves difficult, the EU will have to ensure there are consequences for the country concerned. The concept of ‘more for more’ already enjoys wide support in Europe, but the EU must also not shrink from adopting a ‘less for less’ approach when cooperation remains unsatisfactory.’ (Ploumen and Dijkhoff, 2015). In practice, the emphasis lies on dialogue, partnership and an emphasis on positive incentives rather than negative pressures (Interview Official, 2016), especially because the Netherlands has gained experience with the effectiveness of conditionality through their strategic country approach to migration. The Dutch Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs notes however that negative conditionality can worsen the relations with a country of origin and that incentives in the area of migration policies may be more fruitful (Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs, 2015).

In summary, there have been a number of changes during the past years relevant for ODA spending with strategic deliberations still on-going how to make Dutch development cooperation more relevant for addressing population movement and its underlying causes. Concerning longer-term development cooperation, there is increasing emphasis on utilizing a range of available instruments in the context of partnership frameworks and to redirect attention to specific ‘root causes’ with the geographic focus on the Horn of Africa and the Middle East and Maghreb countries as well as Turkey. In the short term, additional ODA funding has been made available; especially to increase humanitarian aid and cover costs emerging from protection of asylum seekers within the Netherlands. Yet, until 2014 no clear change in geographic prioritisation beyond humanitarian aid can be detected in OECD DAC data. Migration relevance has however become one of the indicators the Dutch government will use to select priority countries in the future and new instruments target countries relevant from a migration perspective.

The attention being paid to the migration agenda within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also means that many thematic departments are under pressure to integrate a migration dimension in its development cooperation. This takes place in a context in which future ODA levels are under threat not least due to the political situation characterised by far right candidates that do not see a strong value in development cooperation. To some extent this has led
to ‘re-packaging’ existing work in thematic areas (such as economic growth, job creation or security and the rule of law) under the umbrella of migration and displacement with an emphasis on ‘addressing root causes’. More substantively, in the future development cooperation and ODA is likely to be increasingly pushed towards addressing factors identified as influencing migration drivers and towards a stronger geographic focus on (prospective) migrants, displaced individuals and host societies of relevance for Europe.

More attention in the future will be paid also on migration governance, particularly return and reintegration, protection in the region and addressing irregular migration through support to border governance. In the past the Netherlands engagement on migration has narrowed to become more focused and more aligned with Dutch migration interests. A larger migration and development agenda that includes active support to mobility regimes seems of lesser focus. The Dutch government seems to be working towards a vision where people stay in their place, where protection takes place in the region and where migration and mobility is predominantly valued if it takes place within regions (such as Africa) but only to a very limited extent towards Europe (researchers, students, highly-skilled).

References


Annex 8: Case Study EU and European Commission

The EU has seen major budgetary response to the irregular migration and refugee situation. This has resulted in a partial reconfiguration of the EU funding landscape including funding for development cooperation by setting up new EU Trust Funds that respond to aspects of the refugee and irregular migration situation. At the same time the narrative concerning the external dimension of European Union’s migration policy, which includes its response through development cooperation and ODA, has adopted a more narrow focus on contributing to the reduction of migrant flows towards Europe. A more positive migration and development agenda that is focused on maximising the potential of migration globally seems to loose relevance although development projects to that effect still co-exist with those that increasingly aim to tackle the migration-security-development nexus and reduce irregular migration flows.

I. Overall EU ODA developments during the past years 2010-2015

During the past years collective EU Net ODA\(^{192}\) has increased continuously. Since 2012, it rose from EUR 55.257 bn to EUR 68.226 bn in 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2016).

Table 1. Collective EU Net ODA disbursements, 2012-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EUR mn</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>as % of GNI</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
<td>0,43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>in EUR mn</td>
<td>55,257</td>
<td>56,877</td>
<td>59,313</td>
<td>68,226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OECD data indicates a significant growth in reporting for in-donor refugee costs among EU member states. The EU Council reports that EU countries have increased reported in-donor refugee costs from EUR 3.3 bn (5,6% of collective EU ODA) in 2014 to EUR 8.6 bn (or 12,5% of collective EU ODA) in 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2016).

\(^{192}\) EU collective ODA is calculated as sum of ODA from EU member states and the part of ODA provided by EU institutions that is not imputed to Member States. (Council of the EU, 2016)
For OECD DAC EU donors\textsuperscript{193} the shares increased from 5.8% of total net ODA to 13.1% of total net ODA.\textsuperscript{194} Due to the large inflow of refugees into Europe since 2013, the ODA expenditures on in-donor refugee costs reported by DAC EU donors contrast starkly with those of non-EU DAC members, which have not recorded a rise in in-donor refugee expenses as part of their ODA (OECD, 2016).

For European collective ODA (Council of the European Union, 2016), while the increase in refugee costs amounted to EUR 5.3 bn between 2014 and 2015, total ODA increased by a reported EUR 8.9 bn. As the EU Council highlights, ‘\textit{this means that in 2015 the EU increased both its support to refugees [within the EU] as well as its other development aid}.’\textsuperscript{195}

**The EU institutions**

For the EU institutions, which includes ODA committed and spent by the European Commission as well as the European Investment Bank, net disbursements have risen since 2013 and reached almost EUR 12.5 bn in 2015, which is at similar level than in 2011. When comparing ODA net disbursements in constant prices\textsuperscript{196}, ODA of EU institutions declined by -0.5% from 2014 to 2015.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{193} These are 19 EU countries that are part of the OECD DAC.

\textsuperscript{194} The OECD DAC statistics only report collective in-donor refugee costs of OECD DAC EU members in USD. In constant prices, DAC EU members spent USD 4.37 bn on refugees in their countries, in 2015 this rose to USD 9.59 bn.

\textsuperscript{195} For European OECD DAC member states collectively, taking into account inflation and exchange rate movements, ODA excluding in-donor refugee costs still increased by 3.6% from 2014 to 2015 (Council of the EU, 2016; OECD, 2016)

\textsuperscript{196} At 2014 USD prices and exchange rates.

\textsuperscript{197} When looking at gross-ODA, ODA of EU institutions rose by 1.6% in the same period. (OECD, 2016)
Figure 1. EU Institutions ODA Commitments and Net Disbursements, 2006-2015, in million Euro

Table 2. EU institutions, ODA commitments and disbursements, 2010-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ODA commitments, mn EUR</th>
<th>ODA net disbursements, mn EUR</th>
<th>in-donor refugee costs, mn EUR</th>
<th>ODA net disbursements, mn USD, constant prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10650</td>
<td>9624</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14742</td>
<td>12507</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>19354</td>
<td>13599</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>18962</td>
<td>12020</td>
<td>18,42</td>
<td>16073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>13971</td>
<td>12399</td>
<td>28,11</td>
<td>16451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>12484</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>16374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC Development Statistics

Geographic and thematic allocations of EU institutions

The EU institutions give a large share of their ODA to developing countries within Europe. Between 2010 and 2014, the share of ODA committed to
Europe increased from 21.6% to 34%. During the same time period the share for Africa declined from 31.3% to 26.3% with the largest reduction-taking place from 2013 to 2014 (from 33.9% to 26.3%). The ODA share for Asia remained stable when comparing the 2014 and 2010 shares at a level of about 20% (yet from 2001-2013 Asia received only an average of 14.2%). The increase in share for Europe is explained almost exclusively with higher amounts committed to Turkey, which in 2014 made 52.2% of all aid going to European developing countries as compared to 29.3% in 2010.

Figure 2. Geographical allocation, ODA commitments 2010-2014

Within the Africa region, it seems that the priority given to countries North of the Sahara as well as regional activities have increased at the cost of countries South of the Sahara. The share of ODA for North of Sahara Africa has doubled from 20.8% in 2010 to 41.1% in 2014, whereas the share for South of Sahara has declined from 77.4% in 2010 to 46.7% in 2014. Within Asia, allocations to the Middle East have gained in importance and in 2014 increased to a share of 43% of the ODA going to the region (see Table 3).

198 In total numbers this meant a doubling of support from USD 3089.9 mn in 2010 to USD 6297.27 mn in 2014 (2014 constant prices)
The increase in allocations to the Middle East emerges from the higher amount spent on humanitarian aid rather than from an increase in longer-term development aid allocated to sectors as is shown in Table 4. Humanitarian aid commitments to the Middle East rose from a 7.2% share to a 31.8% share of total Humanitarian Aid commitments in 2014.
Table 5. Sector-allocable ODA commitments per region, as share of total sector-allocable aid, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>30,8%</td>
<td>32,3%</td>
<td>35,5%</td>
<td>32,1%</td>
<td>25,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Sahara</td>
<td>8,3%</td>
<td>9,7%</td>
<td>15,2%</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
<td>12,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Sahara</td>
<td>21,8%</td>
<td>21,6%</td>
<td>19,4%</td>
<td>23,9%</td>
<td>9,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
<td>7,0%</td>
<td>6,6%</td>
<td>6,4%</td>
<td>5,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>20,5%</td>
<td>14,2%</td>
<td>11,9%</td>
<td>13,9%</td>
<td>18,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East Asia</td>
<td>3,9%</td>
<td>1,1%</td>
<td>0,8%</td>
<td>2,7%</td>
<td>2,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>8,1%</td>
<td>7,4%</td>
<td>7,6%</td>
<td>6,3%</td>
<td>9,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>7,2%</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
<td>3,0%</td>
<td>4,4%</td>
<td>6,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>26,0%</td>
<td>36,0%</td>
<td>37,5%</td>
<td>37,2%</td>
<td>39,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculation based on OECD CRS data

II. Budgetary response of the EU Commission – Reallocations in the 2015 and 2016 budgets

The EU institutions have reacted to the refugee and irregular migration situation with a major budgetary response, which at least partially results in a reconfiguration of the EU funding landscape including funding for development cooperation and ODA (Hertog, 2016a). Externally, the EU has made available a total of EUR 6.2 bn to address the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 and 2016 (European Commission, 2016f) mainly through the use of through fast-track procedures199. Underlying the changes, which included the setting up of EU Trust Funds, the EU-Turkey Facility, increasing humanitarian aid200 as well as the announcement for the European Investment Plan (European Commission, 2016j), has been the search for more flexibility to quickly react to a situation interpreted as emergency (Den Hertog, 2016a).

For the EU Commission, under pressure to support the delivery of solutions to the refugee inflows, putting money behind decisions has also been a way of showing that ‘migration flows are being managed’ by the EU institutions (Den Hertog, 2016a). At the same time, despite swiftly reacting to

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199 Not all of the external funding will be reportable as ODA.
200 This is next to the strong efforts to increase spending to tackle migration issues internally, e.g. through higher allocations for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and the Internal Stability Fund.
political priorities regarding migration, the budgetary answer has also led to the EU budget being ‘stretched almost to its limits in terms of flexibility’ as almost all flexibility tools have already been applied (Mijs & Schout, 2015).

The lack of flexibility in the way forward has raised some questions about the functioning of the budget until 2020 since the adjustments that have been made so far have not increased overall MFF ceilings (European Parliament, 2016c). It will thus be difficult to deal with another crisis during the period of the current MFF or to raise substantive additional amounts of money as has been the case during the past few years. Overall, the irregular migration and refugee situation has revealed that the EU budget may need increased levels of flexibility to adequately respond (Núñez Ferrer, 2016).

To get a good overview over the rapid budgetary response to the irregular migration and refugee situation involving the drawing on various ODA-relevant funds and the creation of new funding mechanisms or coordination structures has been difficult – even for EU officials themselves (den Hertog, 2016b, p.31).201

EU Budget Heading 4, which is the relevant heading for ODA spending of the EU budget (see Box 1), has increased in total commitment appropriations during the past years reaching over EUR 9 bn in 2016. The proposed draft 2017 budget increased the allowed expenditure for Heading 4 by 2.9% to EUR 9.43 bn (European Commission, 2016d, p.14). This increase is ascribed to additional payments that are made available through reducing the margins in order to honour pledges made to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The draft budget 2017 thus already exhausted expenditure ceilings for commitments for Heading 4 as well as proposing a full mobilisation of the flexibility instrument under Heading 3. The final 2017 budget agreed raises Heading 4 again to commitment appropriations of over EUR 10 bn as shown in Table 6. The migration situation had a strong influence on the decision to increase this heading again by 1 bn as is outlined by the EU Commission Amending letter to the draft 2017 budget (European Commission, 2016k). Most of the additional funds are foreseen for activities in the context of the EU’s Partnership Framework for migration and partly to be channelled through special instruments created to address root causes of irregular migration and displacement or protection in the region as further analysed below. Having exhausted expenditure ceilings and flexibility instruments the Commission

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201 This is despite valued efforts by the EU Commission DG DEVCO to provide updated information in the form of timely info-sheets and overview tables.
proposed to mobilise the Contingency Margin\textsuperscript{222} as a last resort measure that will be offset through making use of unallocated margins of Heading 2 Sustainable Growth: Natural Resources and Heading 5: Administration (European Commission, 2016l).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heading 4 Global Europe</td>
<td>8 325 000 000</td>
<td>8 710 900 000</td>
<td>9 167 000 000</td>
<td>10 162 000 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own compilation based on EU Budget documents 2014-2017

This additional funding under Heading 4 in the 2017 budget mobilised through the contingency margin is allocated to the European Neighbourhood Instrument (EUR 250 mn) in order to support countries of the Southern Neighbourhood implementing the future migration compacts (specifically Lebanon and Jordan) but also to strengthen the partnership with Tunisia and to stabilise Libya (European Commission, 2016k); the DCI budget lines on Migration and Asylum (EUR 400mn); the DCI geographic line Cooperation with Asia (EUR 100mn) as well as the Provisioning of the European Sustainable Development Fund (EUR 250mn) for the European External Investment Plan (European Commission, 2016k and 2016l).

\textsuperscript{222} The EU Contingency Margin is laid out by Article 13 (1) and defined as last resort instrument to react to unforeseen circumstances. It needs to be fully offset against margins for current or future financial years so that overall financial ceilings of the EU budget remain the same in a given Multiannual Financial Framework.
Box 1. ODA and the EU Multi-Annual Framework

The maximum annual amounts that the EU Commission can spend in different political fields ('headings') is determined as part of the multiannual financial framework, which covers a period over five years (European Commission, 2014). The current Multi Financial Framework Agreement runs from 2014 to 2020. Within this framework, annual budgets determine the annual appropriations for the different budget lines including appropriations for commitments as well as spending. Of the budgets lines managed by the EU Commission, ODA is included under the EU budget Heading 4, 'Global Europe', which comprises of a number of instruments – yet not all of which have a 100% ODA requirement 203. The European Development Fund (EDF), which finances development cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is not included in the EU budget, yet comprises of about one-third of EC ODA. 204 The European Investment Bank contributes other ODA reported funds. Moreover, the Emergency Aid Reserve (EAR) worth EUR 2.2 bn over the course of the MFF, is a flexibility instrument that allows for a rapid response for unforeseen events. It has been tapped into for increased humanitarian funding as further explained below. Within heading 4 of the EU budget, the Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA), the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) are the most relevant instruments for ODA spending. Changes within Heading 4 concerning these instruments, as well as in the use of the EDF and the newly set-up tools to respond to the migration crisis externally give insights over changing priorities for ODA in the context of the irregular migration and refugee situation.

The budgetary responses of the EU institutions includes (i) redeployment of existing funds, i.e. shifting of funds across budget lines and (ii) mobilisation of funds from special flexibility provisions and instruments, such as existing margins (Global and Contingency Margins) or the Emergency Aid Reserve (Mijs & Schout, 2015). The re-deployments and re-organisation of funds have taken place under the European Agenda on Migration, which since May 2015 guides the EU response to the refugee and irregular migration situation. 205

The following sections explores in more depth, how funds relevant for ODA spending by the EU Commission have been shifted, re-deployed or re-labelled and for what additionally raised funding has been deployed. An overview over short-term measures for humanitarian aid, the Madad Fund, the Turkey Facility and the EU Trust Fund for Africa will be summarised below.

203 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace for example does not have to be DAC-able.
204 Spending under the EDF should be ODA DAC-able to a large extent. (Bond, 2012)
205 In 2015, two draft amending budgets were presented to make use of flexibility within the 2015 General Budget. This was followed by an amendment to the 2016 General Budget. (European Commission, 2015a; European Commission, 2015b; European Commission, 2015c)
in order to identify the objectives these funds support and where they have been taken from.

**Developments in humanitarian aid**

As a share of total ODA, humanitarian aid commitments by the European Institutions have not increased during the past 5 years and stayed at around 8-9% from 2011-2014. In total figures, however, EC humanitarian aid budgets have continuously been raised since 2014, predominantly in order to respond to the refugee and irregular migration situation.

**Table 7. EU institutions, humanitarian aid commitment appropriations**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid, EUR mn</td>
<td>911,3</td>
<td>919,7</td>
<td>1 099,7</td>
<td>1 108,8</td>
<td>945,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of total Heading IV</td>
<td>11,0%</td>
<td>10,6%</td>
<td>12,0%</td>
<td>12,1%</td>
<td>10,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculation based on EU budget documents

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206 Total humanitarian funding committed by EU institutions in constant prices increased between 2010 and 2013 and dropped from 2013 to 2014.
The increased in humanitarian aid has in the past two years not been at the direct cost of longer-term development cooperation. In 2015, the Commission increased humanitarian aid appropriations by EUR 200 mn through requesting the transfer of at total of EUR 190 mn in commitment appropriations from the Emergency Aid reserve (EAR) to provide immediate humanitarian aid to countries hosting displaced persons fleeing from Syrian conflict\(^{207}\). EUR 10 mn extra commitment appropriations were made available from the Humanitarian Aid operational reserve.

Concerning payment appropriations, additional EUR 70 mn were made available through re-deployments:

- EUR 55.7 mn of appropriations were re-deployed from other EU budget lines outside heading 4, i.e. from the EU Solidarity Fund, various budget lines in heading 2 and 3 as well as unused appropriations from the Food and Feed programme.
- Additional EUR 14.3 mn was transferred from the Emergency Aid Reserve to the 2015 budget to make payments.

These payments were allocated to the delivery of rapid, effective and needs-based humanitarian aid and food aid for Syrian refugees (European Commission, 2015b).

The amendment letter for the 2016 budget requested an extra EUR 300 mn more for humanitarian commitment appropriation budget for the refugee situation compared to original draft budget. This is financed through augmenting humanitarian Aid by EUR 150 mn with additional funds and transferring another of EUR 150 mn from the Emergency Aid reserve (European Commission, 2015c). For payment appropriations an additional EUR 405 mn were requested.\(^{208}\) These funds will be used to meet the most urgent basic needs in terms of food, health, water, sanitation, hygiene, protection and other basic services for Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the neighbouring countries (Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) and the Western Balkans (Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as well as for people inside Syria and Iraq.

Since in 2015 and 2016 extra funds for commitments were made available, the draft for the 2017 humanitarian aid budget line foresees a reduction of

\(^{207}\) DEC 32/2015 and DEC 28/2015 (European Commission, 2015b)

\(^{208}\) These were needed in order to be able to pay EUR 155 mn, the amount outstanding for 2016 payments emerging from the EUR 175 mn increase in commitment appropriations in 2015 as well as to pay the EUR 300 mn commitment appropriations in 2016.
about 15% compared to 2016 levels but notes that the Emergency Reserve could be evoked for unforeseen needs at a later stage. Yet, with much of the reserve having been used already, there have been calls for increasing the Reserve envelope so to keep flexibility in responding rapidly to unforeseen events (European Parliament, 2016a). The European Parliament had asked for EUR 300 mn additional funds for commitment appropriations in 2017 compared to the draft budget put forward by the EU Council (Interview MEP), yet this did not materialise in the final budget which kept the level as originally proposed and as shown in table 7 above.209

The Madad Fund

The Madad Fund, which runs until 2019, finances the response to the Syrian crisis and supports refugee host countries in the region. It aims to accompany the humanitarian aid efforts with longer-term resilience needs of refugees and host communities. With this fund, the EU puts money behind its plan to more strongly adopt a developmental approach to protracted refugee situations (European Commission, 2016b). As of September 2016, the Madad Fund reached an overall total volume of EUR 763 million with about EUR 640 mn from the EU Commission and the rest from its member states.210

Through redeployments, the Madad Fund draws partly on existing EU budgets for development cooperation in order to more strongly focus on refugee protection, provide basic services, education and livelihoods/resilience. Yet, it also draws on reserves and uses existing flexibility margins for increased funding.

Sources come from the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI, EUR 381mn), which in September 2015 was reinforced by EUR 300 mn for this purpose. Other amounts have been made available from the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA; EUR 243 mn), and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI; 16 mn).

In order to reinforce the ENI in the 2015 budget, the EU Commission made use of existing margins under the expenditure ceilings of heading 4 for an amount of EUR 300 mn. This meant that the existing commitment appropriation margin of EUR 338 mn reduced to EUR 38 mn. In the 2016,

209 According to sources obtained by an interviewee, ECHO has voiced disappointment about this outcome in the EU DEVE Committee.
budget an amendment increased the level for payment appropriations of the ENI by EUR 210 mn order to cover 70% of the reinforced commitment appropriations of 2015. These additional payments are used for large-scale grant projects channelled via the Madad Fund to build confidence, security and the prevention and settlement of conflicts in Mediterranean countries (European Commission, 2015c).

The 2017 budget includes increased appropriations to meet the pledge for Lebanon and Jordan made at the UN London conference at the beginning of 2016. To honour all pledges and meet needs, the Commission “proposes some reorientation of funds within and between instruments, as well as the full use of the expenditure ceiling of ‘Global Europe’ (Heading 4) (European Commission, 2016d, p.9). The first amending letter to the draft 2017 budget by the Commission as noted above increased the ENI by another EUR 250 mn, part of which may also be channelled through the Madad Fund (European Commission, 2016k).

The Madad Fund is also involved in implementing the EU-Turkey agreement under the Turkey Facility as explained in Box 2. ODA funding for projects under the Turkey Facility and the Madad Fund may thus be one and the same and not additional.

**Box 2. The Turkey Facility**

The EU has launched the Turkey Facility to deliver efficient and complementary support to Syrian and other refugees and host communities in close cooperation with Turkish authorities. It focuses on humanitarian assistance, education, migration management, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic support for host communities and refugees. As the Facility is one of the commitments of the EU made to Turkey in the context of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (European Commission, 2016g), the progressive delivery of this assistance is conditional on the implementation by Turkey of its commitments.

The Facility has a budget of EUR 3 bn for 2016-2017. This is made up of EUR 1 bn from the EU budget, and EUR 2 bn from the EU Member States, according to their share in EU GNI (Germany: 21.4%; Netherlands: 4.7%; Sweden: 3.1%; Denmark: 1.9%).

The Facility is a coordination mechanism that coordinates financing from different EU funds: The DCI, IPA II, ENI, IcSP, humanitarian aid, CFSP, Guarantee Fund partly through making use of flexibility instruments and redeployments. So far the EU has pledged 1bn from 2016 to 2017. EUR 250 mn comes from the 2016 budget:

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211 This has raised questions how the EC will be able to safeguard spending in accordance with existing EU funding regulations in a context in which the Turkish Authorities. (den Hertog, 2016a)
EUR 165 mn from humanitarian budget;
EUR 85 mn from DCI, IPA II, ENI, IcSP

From the EU 2017 budget EUR 750 mn are planned, which are taken from the existing margins of Heading IV. (European Commission, 2016d).

Some of the funds will be implemented through the MADAD fund, thus some projects may be reported both under the Madad Fund and for the Turkey Facility, though it is in fact the same funding (e.g. humanitarian aid implemented by the World Food Programme). The existence of these extra structures makes it more challenging to track spending and commitment appropriations and to assess whether promised funds are additional or simply “re-routed”.

While EU Member States have been cautious in providing large funding towards the EU Trust Fund for Africa (explored below), they have been forthcoming to put money into the Turkey Agreement (Interview EU Official, 2016). At the date of research EU Member States contributed EUR 2bn. This reflects the political priority to establish a deal which helps managing flows of refugees close to Europe.

Concerns have been expressed that the ‘Advisory Role’ that the government of Turkey has may provide conflicts with the neutrality of humanitarian funding channelled through the Facility (Interview EU Official; see also den Hertog, 2016b, p.30).

The EU Trust Fund for Africa

The EUTF for Africa was set up at a record speed and formally adopted at the Valletta Summit, held in November 2015 with the specific aim to foster stability and address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration. It runs until 2020. ‘Grave concerns’ have been voiced that the EU Africa Trust Fund would channel ODA funding away from long-term development objectives towards more narrow EU migration and security objectives framed under ‘addressing the root causes’ of migration (European Parliament, 2016b).

However, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with leveraging funding through a new Trust Fund that focuses on the situations of refugees, the drivers of displacement and resilience as well supports capacities for migration governance (Carbone & Furness, 2016). Existing research and past years’ global as well as EU policy discussions, e.g. in the context of the post-2015 agenda as well as at the EU level, have amply demonstrated that migration and development processes are inextricably linked. There exist thus good rationales for applying a development lens to migration issues and for incorporating it more strongly in development cooperation.

Nevertheless, the concern that ODA could be instrumentalised to support EU’s security and migration interests at the cost of longer-term structural development objectives benefitting the poorest is worth examining. Especially
because the political rhetoric under which development cooperation is increasingly framed renders it a tool serving the EU interests of reducing the number of irregular migrants and refugees coming to Europe. Castillejo (2016), basing her observations on insights gained through interviews, points out that “positions on African migration and the EUTF are [often] driven by the prime minister’s office, the foreign ministry and the ministry of interior, which want the fund to have a strong focus on security and conditionality” (pp.6). But even EU development ministers have at times a simplistic understanding, as one interviewed Official for this study noted: The pressure, even from some EU development ministers, to contribute to the reduction of migrant flows through ODA is strong – albeit this being based on a naïve view about the interconnections between ODA spending, development and migration (Interview EU Official, 2016).

As a development instrument, the EU TF for Africa predominantly draws on EU instruments that have the requirements to fund ODA eligible requirements either fully or ‘to the greatest extent possible’ (allowing for margins of 5-10% for non-ODA activities). This requirement is still valid even if funds are transferred to the EU TF. Yet, not all funds allocated to the EU Trust Fund have a strict ODA requirement, such as the DG Home budget (EUR 20mn) or the contribution of the Instrument for Stability and Peace212. The EUTF can thus also fund activities that may not be eligible for ODA reporting. When reporting to the OECD-DAC, the EU Commission thus reports the % of funds that are ODA compatible per Trust Fund project (Interview EU Official, 2016).

To fill the EUTF, the EC has massively drawn from the reserve of the 11th EDF213 (EUR 1 bn from funds pre-earmarked to the Performance Based Mechanism), the 11th EDF Regional Indicative Programmes (West Africa, Central Africa and Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean) and National Indicative Programmes (Horn of Africa, South Sudan) (all together EUR 395 mn). The Development Cooperation Instrument214, adds another EUR 125 mn, the European Neighbourhood Instrument215 EUR 200 mn, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace EUR 10 mn, the humanitarian aid and disaster preparedness EUR 50 mn and the DG Home budget line EUR

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212 Though in practice the IcSP funds ODA activities it is not formally bound by this requirement.
213 The EDF has the requirement to be ODA eligible ‘to the greatest extent possible. In practice this has been interpreted as meaning that not less than 90% of the EDF should be spent on ODA eligible activities.
214 Under the DCI, thematic activities should be to 90% ODA ‘dacable’ and geographic activities 100% OECD ‘dacable’.
215 The ENI usually corresponds to 95% ODA.
Currently additional funding of EUR 500mn from the 11th EDF reserve for the EU Trust Fund is in planning, which reduces the reserve from an original EUR 2 bn to EUR 500 mn. The 2017 EU budget top up of commitment appropriations for the Development Cooperation Instrument using the EU’s Contingency Margin as noted above may also be channelled through the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Since the largest sum filling the Trust Fund is taken from the reserves and is thus ‘additional’ money it is difficult to say where the money would have been spent otherwise. Yet one could argue that the thematic focus of the EU Trust Fund, which is partly about strengthening migration governance, particularly in the area of addressing irregular migration and smuggling (but also beyond), does not solely address ‘root causes’ of displacement and irregular migration but is also concerned with the consequences.

The EUTF for Africa finances a wide range of objectives, which relate to promoting ‘resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and addressing human rights abuses’. The overall EU Trust Fund objectives do in principle not deviate strongly from the type of activities that the EU’s other development instruments could, and in practice do, also fund. In addition, no 'migration containment' logic has been included in the indicators of the results framework (European Commission, 2016c). Activities take place in the following areas:

1. Economic programmes, with a focus on employment creation, particularly for youth and women, and the reintegration of returnees;
2. Resilience projects, geared to improving food security and to providing services for local communities and refugees;
3. Migration management, including fight against irregular migration and smuggling, return, readmission, international protection and legal migration;
4. Governance and security, including interventions in the fields of rule of law, security and development, border management and conflict-prevention systems.
Assessing where funding is concentrated according to these areas is complex as a number of projects serve several Trust Fund objectives. It is not possible to single out a clear primary focus for all projects.\footnote{Often each TF project covers several dimensions and objectives and many of the project descriptions list several EU TF objectives as relevant. In order to better classify the projects, the primary objectives and focus areas were identified based on key words that build on the EU Trust Fund Strategy. These were compared to the project description and the specific objectives as stated in the ‘Action Fiches’ describing the projects. In some cases a primary focus emerged from the specific objectives and activities according to which the project was then classified. Where a primary objective did not emerge clearly, the project was classified as serving two Trust Fund Objectives.}

An analysis of the first 24 programmes adopted by the EU TF that for the Horn of Africa Window shows that most activities (13 out of the 24 worth EUR 232 mn) are primarily focused on strengthening the resilience of communities through support to basic services (education, health, food and nutrition resilience) or livelihood trainings (education/training) under trust fund objective 2 (TFO2). Even though the underlying motive may be a prevention of irregular primary movements and accompanying return, these projects are developmental in nature and –thematical- could have also been part of the existing development funds on which the Trust Fund draws. One project exclusively targets greater economic and employment opportunities (TFO1), yet many of the projects focusing on livelihood and resilience also include strengthening of employment opportunities. Two projects have been classified as serving both equally (TFO1/2). Three projects focus on improved migration management (TFO3), out of which one (EUR 10 mn) is focused on improving legal mobility, one on effective return and readmission (EUR 50 mn) and another one (EUR 40 mn) on preventing irregular migration and smuggling through capacity building for border management. Another three have their prime focus on improving governance and conflict prevention (TFO4), with strong focus on conflict prevention and peace building. The Research Facility of EUR 4,1 mn is a crosscutting project (TFO5).\footnote{The EU Commission has presented a breakdown for the Horn of Africa (first 20 projects) based on different categories. It reports that 69% of the funding is directed towards migration and displacement (including service delivery for displaced, returnees and host communities) and 31% of the funding targeted at peace-building and conflict prevention activities (European Commission, 2016h).}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Trust Fund Objective</th>
<th>Funding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFO1 - Economic and employment opportunities</td>
<td>EUR 19,84 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO2 - Resilience and basic services</td>
<td>EUR 232,6 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO3 - Migration management</td>
<td>EUR 100 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO4 - Improved governance and conflict prevention</td>
<td>EUR 21,3 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO5 - Cross-cutting</td>
<td>EUR 4,1 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO1/2</td>
<td>EUR 30,5 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO2/4</td>
<td>EUR 28 mn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on EUTF Project Fiches

The first agreed 36 projects of the Sahel and Lake Chad Window focus more strongly on economic and employment opportunities. Eleven projects worth EUR 158 mn have a primary focus on economic and employment opportunities (TFO1).\(^\text{218}\) While TFO1 receives strongest focus the other three objectives receive around EUR 100 mn or 20% of the overall assigned funding.

6 Projects together worth just over EUR 60 mn engage in activities focusing both on TFO1 together with a second EU TF Objective: ‘TFO1 and TFO2’ (EUR 29,7 mn); ‘TFO1 and TFO3’ (EUR 6 mn) or ‘TF1 and TF4’ (EUR 25 mn).

In the Sahel and Lake Chad window, six projects worth EUR 95 mn (about 18%) have a primary focus on improved migration management (TFO3), which includes two projects in Niger for strengthening local capacities for

\(^{218}\) This does not exclude that activities also have positive impact on the other objectives of the EU Trust Fund.
better governing migration and gathering data, one on increasing protection of migrant children in Mauritania, another one on combatting human trafficking and preventing irregular migration in Nigeria, strengthening institutional and legal frameworks for border management in Burkina Faso and strengthening management of border areas in Mali. Table 8 provides a full overview.

**Table 9. EU Trust Fund Sahel window, allocation per objective (first 36 projects)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Trust Fund Objective</th>
<th>Funding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFO1 - Economic and employment opportunities</td>
<td>EUR 158,48 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO2 - Resilience and basic services</td>
<td>EUR 105,72 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO3 - Migration management</td>
<td>EUR 95 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO4 - Improved governance and conflict prevention</td>
<td>EUR 104,6 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO5 - Cross-cutting</td>
<td>EUR 5 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO1/2</td>
<td>EUR 29,7 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO1/3</td>
<td>EUR 6 mn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO1/4</td>
<td>EUR 25 mn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own calculations based on EUTF Project Fiches

This analysis shows that to a large extent the framing of the EU Trust Fund as being about migration has served political purposes rather than influencing the focus very strongly thematically. Though including a number of projects focusing specifically on border governance and migration management, the first projects programmed under the EU TF are not primarily about migration governance or control; neither does it seem to have led to a full ‘securitisation’ of development funding so far. Rather, thematic activities on resilience, basic
services, economic development and governance are now ‘labelled’ and communicated under the umbrella of addressing root causes of irregular migration and displacement. To some extent the setting up of the EU Trust Fund for Africa is thus symbolic providing a public message that action is being taken and that resources are being put behind a political agenda, while underneath development actors to a certain extent protect their work.  

Those projects that do focus more on migration management are mainly geared towards capacity building for border governance, addressing irregular migration and smuggling with only small amounts of funding awarded to strengthening or facilitating labour mobility. An EU official interviewed for this study pointed out that projects in the pipeline to be announced in December 2016 will balance the focus of the EUTF more strongly towards migration management with specific focus on return and reintegration and addressing and reducing irregular migration through support to border governance and migration management (Interview EU Official, 2016). Also beyond the EU TF more emphasis is put on development cooperation to accompany return and reintroduction of returnees, such as a new planned programme of EUR 91 mn for support of returnees in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan taken from the Asia Regional Indicative Programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument and the Multi-indicative Programme for Afghanistan (Interview MEP, December 2016). As regards the use of ODA for such projects, this can raise concerns, as especially programs with a strong security or border protection focus may be in conflict with the ODA definition (Interview OECD DAC Expert). A number of EU officials have admitted that “some EUTF projects are stretching the definition of ODA” (as quoted in Castillejo, p.8 and p.15).

Despite still a strong thematic focus on resilience, employment and basic needs – at least for the initial projects - the EU TF introduces a number of different practices for ODA and programming that mark a clear departure from previous ways of doing things. First, the EU Trust Fund deviates from the allocation principles of the existing instruments in that it uses migration

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219 As Carbone and Furness (2016) point out, although there exist aid projects by the Commission that have security rather than development objectives, there has been a ‘general trend of progress towards coherence across the EU’s external policies rather than purposeful securitization of development aid’. (Carbone & Furness, 2016; Furness & Gänzle, 2016)

220 The EU Commission notes that it is careful that selected programs that use ODA dedicated EU funding are spent on activities that lie within the ODA guidelines (Interview EU Official, 2016). For activities under the EU Trust Fund, not 100% of activities may need to be ODA eligible, since the EUTF also draws on some money from non-ODA funds such as DG Home budget. Most of the funding however, including from the EU MS looked at is drawn from development cooperation or ODA designated budgets.
relevant indicators for determining the allocation of funds. Not only are a number of migration relevant countries targeted by the EU TF, but allocations aim to predominantly target geographic areas within countries that are of concern from a migration perspective, either because they host a large number of refugees and migrants, or because they have been identified as areas of irregular emigration towards Europe (European Commission, 2016a; European Commission, 2015d). While it is not in all cases clear how such new allocation criteria may be reconciled with focusing aid on the poorest, this approach of identifying regions that are migrant prone also leads to different discussions with partner countries. In some countries, areas where most migrants leave from were not covered by development projects because partner governments have hitherto not prioritised them. In Ethiopia, for example, negotiations had to take place with the government to focus Trust Fund projects on these geographic areas (Interview EU Official, 2016). Circumventing partner government priorities could be problematic for ownership, yet if “used carefully, it can allow the trust fund’s projects to bypass exclusionary policies and reach marginalised migrant and refugee populations” (Castillejo, 2016, p.20).

Second, the EUTF is an emergency instrument, which allows for flexibility, rapid programming and disbursement and faster procedures, such as procurement possibilities. Yet, combined with political pressure to show quick-impact, this has led to rapid action and the aim to quickly disburse funding in some cases. This includes projects where the ‘emergency’ character may be less relevant. The EU TF has introduced a mode of quick, short-term and development-oriented programming, which is not always commensurate with the nature of issues it aims to address, as pointed out by one interviewee (Interview EU Official, 2016). This is for example the case for projects in the area of governance, capacity building and resilience, which may particularly require longer-term engagement strategies, dialogue and the building up of trust locally. The political pressure currently seems to hinder the latter rather than enable this. Concerns exist among stakeholders that this mode of working further leads to undermining principles of aid effectiveness towards which the European Commission has made strong progress in the past.

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221 These are used next to fragility and human development indicators.
222 The governance set-up of the EUTF also changes management practices as compared to those of the EDF Fund. For example has it shifted power away from EU MS and the Parliament towards the EU Commission (Hauck, Knoll & Cangas, 2015). This has contributed, as some argue to an accountability gap. (den Hertog, 2016a)
One interviewee admitted that the first set of approved projects under the EU TF may have been too rushed (Interview EU Official, 2016), another observed that some of the usual quality procedures and the critical assessment have been overly relaxed. While coordination has increased at the level of EU HQ on the topic of migration, the pressure for quick action has also lead to a lack of time for sufficiently coordinating with and involving partner countries and local actors in the formulation and implementation of activities – an aspect the EU TF has been criticised for (Dutch Government, 2016; Castillejo, 2016). The lack of time for quality control and assessments and trust building with partners in the context of EU TF projects has also been noted at the level of implementing agencies (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). In this context, it needs to be borne in mind that the current emphasis by the EC and European donors on High Level Dialogues, political frameworks and related partnerships with migration relevant countries cannot necessarily be equated with local partnerships at the implementation level (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016; see also Knoll and de Weijer, 2016). The latter are however important in order to ground interventions in local knowledge, policy agendas and to support their sustainability.

Some of the first projects have included migration as an ‘add-on’ rather than having been built on a deeper understanding of drivers of displacement and migration (Interview EU Official, 2016). Some of the early ‘Action Fiches’ that describe planned activities only superficially note that the proposed actions will ‘address the root causes of irregular migration’. Yet at the same time this may have also allowed development actors to protect work from influence by EU member states or EU Services interested in migration control objectives, which deviate from developmental purposes. As noted above for the following projects there may be more emphasis on migration governance and on applying migration lenses more structurally in the proposed actions. This can however pose the simultaneous “risk of development funds being used for purposes that do not easily fit” the ODA definition – especially in the context of increased focus on border management as noted above. More positively, opportunities exist to build in more evidence on migration and development dynamics into future programmatic

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223 The need to act fast can also explain why some of the first projects do not strongly focus on migration governance but include development projects that – at least in some cases – may have already been designed (Interview MS official, 2016; Castillejo, 2016).

224 On the other hand, despite the pressure for fast action, some EU member states have also voiced concerns about heavy procedures slowing down agreement on projects in the EUTF Operational Committees. African officials consulted in the context of this study, have equally pointed to slowness in the operationalization of the EUTF. Not all EU Member states however share this concern (Castillejo, 2016, p.11).
decisions with the establishment of Technical and Research Facilities accompanying the EU Trust Fund windows. In the way forward monitoring and analysis on further developments will be important.

Third, the EU Commission implements the EU TF together with EU Member States, who can designate national implementing agencies to carry out activities. According to some interviewees the at times missing implementing capacity of EU member states or the political nature of their priorities has led to a slow down in contracting agreed projects (Interview EU Official, 2016; Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Even though almost 1 billion has been agreed, not even half of the 1 billion has been contracted as of mid-2016 (Interview EU Official, 2016). In other cases, within consortia this may have contributed to imbalances between partners as concerns the implementation and follow-up of projects. An aspect that has negatively influenced relations with African institutions has been discontent of the choice to implement EUTF projects mainly through European agencies.

Fourth, the political framing and language of the EU Trust Fund, the underlying interests of some EU member states for it to help reduce migration flows and the adoption of the more-for-more (and possible less-for-less) principle can also have unintended consequences. Interviewees pointed out that activities that support capacities for border governance to address smuggling and irregular migration within Africa could potentially reinforce challenges regarding the treatment of (irregular) migrants. Anecdotal evidence exists that some governments in West Africa have been forthcoming to reduce (irregular) migration even if it concerns ECOWAS citizens that enjoy free movement – incentivised by larger funding prospects from the EU (Interview EU Official, 2016). While migration and border governance is part of good governance of any country and can facilitate regular migration, incentivising partner governments to curb irregular migration towards Europe, including through the use of ODA and a more-for-more approach, is not without risks. As the 2013 EC Roundtable on border management in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, points out:

225 The EU Research Facility for the Horn of Africa has not been running at the time the first 20 projects have been approved. The Technical Facility for the Sahel is per time of writing not yet contracted, however.
“it is necessary to ensure that border management reform does not inadvertently create barriers where they did not previously exist: the formalisation of entry systems through promotion of integrated border management (IBM)\textsuperscript{226} may risk affecting existing positive dynamics related to informality at borders, and mitigation measures should be planned into IBM programmes.” (EC, ICMPD and EPRD, p.8)

Moreover, in contexts where governance challenges and human rights violations persist, extremely careful approaches need to be taken in order to not contribute or be associated with harmful practices harming migrants – even if unintended. African and European Civil Society have criticised the EU approach in West Africa arguing that it contributes to violations of migrants’ rights (African Civil Society group, 2016). (see also Box 3)

Box 3. The EU Trust Fund Horn of Africa ‘Better Migration Management Programme’

| The Better Migration Management Project is a EUR 40 mn project taking place under the Khartoum process and focusing on building capacity for border governance in the Horn of Africa. A consortium of EU implementing agencies led by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) implements the programme. Since 8 countries part of the Khartoum process are involved, the different components per country are not very large and will be around EUR 5 mn per country. This may also be an example where not all activities entirely comply or stretch the ODA definition (Interview OECD ODA expert, 2016).

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with supporting border governance from a development perspective, including through ODA funds, as it is part of good governance of any country, can help facilitate legal migration as well as address challenges caused by smuggling and trafficking. The EU has supported capacity building in the area of border governance before. Yet, while not many of the EUTF for Africa focus specifically on border governance, this programme has been described as ‘a prime example of hijacking of the development agenda by the political one’ (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). For this reason not all of the funding may comply with the ODA definition of having economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective (Interview OECD, 2016).

Political interests of involved EU member states emerged strongly in the inception discussions and the identification which activities to finance, including proposals that were political in nature rather than technically sound or viable from a political economy perspective of the region (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016). Yet, implementing agencies, not all with strong experience or capacity in this sensitive area of engagement, also had put down a number of principles, under which cooperation must take place, including ‘do no harm’, ‘ownership’, a holistic approach, the fostering ‘human rights’ etc. Activities have been identified in mid-2016 and are to be financed in the area of capacity building, including human

\textsuperscript{226} Integrated Border Management is a concept developed by the European Commission, which requires all relevant competences to work together within administrations and across borders in order to ensure the right balance between open but also secured and controlled borders. It was first applied in the West Balkans. See http://www.eap-ibm-capacitybuilding.eu/en/about/ibm
rights training as well as equipment, support in the identification of trafficking victims etc. contextualised for each involved country.

Yet, the time-spans to ensure all these quality aspects has been very short due to a strong pressure to start to disburse funds and show impact. This has meant that usual procedures and quality control may have not been possible to the full extent. In the initial stages, partner governments also did not have strong opportunities to be part of the programme design. Instead, the programme design has been more ad-hoc and influenced by discussions in HQ rather than through engagement with partners. This may compromise the necessary building of trust and ownership at a later stage. Such challenges are compounded by the difficulty of finding the right authorities within partner governments that can oversee implementation. According to one interviewee, such quick approaches are frustrating because it takes years to design such programmes well (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016).

However, this project also shows that despite political pressure and interest that may hinder a comprehensive approach and is biased strongly towards EU interests rather than that of the region, a re-balancing can take place at the level of implementation. The Khartoum process as such is not strongly owned by the region. One of the reasons is that it puts focus on those migration routes towards Europe while ignoring the routes to the Middle East and south towards South Africa.227 The implementing consortium however argued that for the project to be relevant for and owned by the region, all concerned routes would need to be part of a comprehensive approach.

The programme has also come under fire in the media, due to its engagement with governments known for human rights violations such as Sudan and Eritrea. This exemplifies the dilemmas for donors when engaging with governments that inhibit governance challenges. Recent reports of government officials cracking down on irregular migrants in Sudan that have been connected to EU engagement show the sensitivity of such engagement. Even if EU funded activities aim to improve human rights of migrants and refugees, the training of border guards or police that are later involved in human rights violations or torture does not shine a good light on EU engagement.

Human rights and conflict-sensitive analysis thus needs to form strong parts of such engagement and time should be given to allow for these. This is especially important since implementing actors may also be new to those dynamics and not all have specifically strong expertise of engaging on border governance, and related migration issues or an awareness of potential unintended consequences (Interview Implementing Agency, 2016; Interview EU Official, 2016).

A number of interviews raised the question whether the mix of different objectives that are pursued with the EUTF sets the fund up to fail in any of these. As summarised by one interviewee, “the EUTF now seems to be the worst of both worlds: On the one hand the objectives is to have good quality programming, on the other hand the objective is to use the funding in exchange for

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227 Interviewees pointed out that Ethiopia is not interest to only focus on one route and Kenya is not interested in the northern route except of that it fears a re-routing of migration flows south in case the northern route more strongly controlled.
improving migration cooperation and incentives – but now it is neither of those” (Interview Official EU Member State, 2016).228

The EUTF creates opportunities to flexibly respond to development issues in the context of migration, displacement. However, it seems that more emphasis needs to be put on ensuring that qualitative aspects of ODA programming are not undermined and that for programmes that focus on migration management and are paid with development funds the ODA guidelines are respected and not overly stretched.

The European External Investment Plan

Beyond the EU TF for Africa, the EU has announced in September 2016 to establish the European External Investment Plan (European Commission, 2016j), which will be implemented through the European Fund for Sustainable Development. The main objective is to deploy a range of innovative financing instruments to leverage private sector to help addressing the root causes of migration in the longer-term by boosting investments in Africa and the European Neighbourhood. It will draw EUR 3.35 bn with the aim to leverage EUR 44 bn of investments overall229.

From the EUR 3.35 bn, about EUR 2.6 bn will be taken from EDF RIPs or NIPs as well as the DCI by refocusing existing blending instruments (European Commission, 2016j; Interview EEAS Official). This funding is also to be seen under the new Partnership Framework, and the Migration Compacts which in principle can apply conditionality to achieve better cooperation on return, readmission and migration management of partner countries. Some NGOs have been critical of the plan due to this link arguing that the Commission should ‘separate its investment plan from European migration control policies that promote short-term foreign policy objectives’ (Alonso, 2016). At the time of research the legal basis of the European Fund for Sustainable Development is being drafted, which will be based on the establishment of an ESDF Guarantee and an EFSD

228 Moreover, the governance set up of the EUTF for Africa may not be conducive to injecting higher strategic questions to the use of the fund (Castillejo, 2016)

229 In an interview, EU Commissioner Mimica pointed out that it could reach EUR 88 bn if EU MS match the contribution of the EU Commission (Euractiv, 2016).
III. A change in the migration narrative and ODA focus on migration aspects in practice?

A more politicised discourse

The emergence of the EU Trust Fund has been part of a broader change in narrative at the European level and within the European Commission on migration and development, which influences the longer-term set-up of EU development policy and practice as well as how ODA is spent on migration issues beyond the new instruments.

In 2002, the EC published its first Communication on Migration and Development, which viewed development as a means of controlling migration (European Commission, 2002). Over time a more progressive understanding of the links between development and migration was developed resulting in the 2013 Communication ‘Maximising the development impact of migration’ followed by 2014 Council Conclusions on Migration in EU development cooperation (Council of the European Union, 2014). This development has been described as a ‘step-change’ in the EU discourse and as ‘marking an important shift in emphasis of the political dialogue’ on migration and development – even if it has not always been implemented in a balanced way. It departed from the rights of migrants and based EU engagement on important migration trends that influence and are influenced by development processes. (King & Collyer, 2016)

Yet, overall, the global policy agenda on migration and development that DG DEVCO has worked on prior to the ‘crisis’ is not a strong priority anymore. It has been adapted through a more focused approach on addressing the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration and leveraging EU ODA for cooperation on return and readmission through High Level Dialogues and Migration Compacts. The rationale to stem migration flows through development cooperation has become stronger within Europe as reflected in the changing policy documents also of the European Commission. The political focus has also come together with a certain ‘naivety’ and a belief at the political level that quickly implemented development funds can lead to quick reductions in flows of migrants (Interview EU Official, 2016).

The political momentum has led to better coordination between all involved EU Commission services (DEVCO, HOME, EEAS, ECHO, NEAR), which is taking place systematically several times per week at different levels. With the EU Member States, coordination equally takes place.
frequently (Interview EU Official, 2016). This has been a break from the past in which a silo approach was much more common (Interview EU Official, 2016) and marks a new way of working which can be seen as something positive emerging from the ‘crisis’ situation. While many more actors are involved in making decisions on the use of ODA in the context of the migration situation or aim to influence it, this new way of working also provides the space for exchange and for development actors, DG DEVCO, to express disagreements and defend its principles.

Although as a result work has become more practical and pragmatic than has been the case before, it does not mean that decisions always depart from development logic. This can be seen with the approach lined out in the most recent EU Communication on new Partnership Approaches (European Commission, 2016i), which has been drafted at the highest level in the Commission (Interview EU Official, 2016). It suggests using ODA as both negative and positive incentive for readmission and returning cooperation of partner countries initially rejected by DG DEVCO.

Changes in ODA spending on migration aspects?

The EU has been criticised in the past for not adopting a balanced approach to ODA spending on migration (European Court of Auditors, 2016). Yet, it is difficult to assess clear trends as regards spending on migration and to detect changes in the EU emphasis as of 2014. An analysis of “migration-relevant” spending230 as part of ODA projects by European institutions between 2010 and 2014 based on the OECD CRS data shows that total number of projects that contain migration-relevant key words has increased for disbursement data but not for projects committed. As share of all projects a slight increase between 2010 and 2014 can be detected.

Compared to the other case studies the EU has a clearer trend when it comes to the amount disbursed to such “migration-relevant” projects, as there has been a significant rise during the past 5 years. This may well be due to the refugee and irregular migration situation as the largest increase took place between 2012 and 2013.231 This is also reflected in the share of such migration relevant funding as part of total ODA disbursements. On average the words

230 Based on a number of migration relevant key-words. For full methodology and caveats see Annex II.
231 At the same time, DG DEVCO has paid increasing attention to migration issues as part of its agenda on ‘maximising the development impacts of migration’.
‘refugee’, ‘migration’ and ‘displacement’ receive strongest priority and have not changed over the years.

Most funding for migration relevant long-term development cooperation is channelled through EU geographic instruments such as the new EU Trust Funds as well as through geographic cooperation under the EDF, the ENI and DCI. The Development Cooperation Instrument thematic budget line for the area of migration and asylum with focus on ‘strengthening the capacities of developing country authorities and civil society organisations to address migration challenges’ has not been the strongest part of the EC response to date. Its available funding is relatively small compared other ODA flows currently mobilised. Yet, appropriations from 2015 to 2016 have increased by more than EUR 15 mn by bringing forward available funding for this programme.

| Table 10. Commitment appropriations, GPGC Programme Migration and Asylum, 2014-2016 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Migration and asylum, total in EUR mn | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
| Migration and asylum, total in EUR mn | 46,3 | 41,6 | 57,3 | 405,0 |
| as % of Heading 4 - Global Public Goods and Challenges Programme | 7,1% | 6,9% | 8,6% | - |

Source: Kamaras et al. (2016); 2017 value from 2017 EU Budget

The 2017 budget changes this situation and assigns a much greater role to the thematic migration and asylum programme in the response to the refugee and irregular migration situation. The draft budget presented by the Commission had originally foreseen commitment appropriations of about EUR 48 mn for this programme – lower than the 57 mn of 2016. The position of the European Parliament was to increase this budget line slightly up by EUR 15 mn to EUR 63 mn. Yet, the real change came with the EU Commission amendment letter to the 2017 draft budget (European Commission, 2016k), which suggested reinforcing the thematic programme migration and asylum with EUR 400 mn

232 Den Hertog (2016a) points out that under this thematic line, the focus is on the migration and development nexus and ‘importance [is] attached to a development perspective […] including the emphasis on the interests of third countries’ (p. 6).

233 This programme decreased from available EUR 384 mn under the 2007-2013 MFF to a total of available EUR 357 mn for the 2014-2020 MFF.

234 The original envisaged indicative financial allocation for 2016 was at EUR 45 mn (European Commission, 2013).
in commitment appropriations\textsuperscript{235}. The rationale put forward is to have available funding for the EU’s priority countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia under the EU Migration Partnership Framework, i.e. to fund parts of the Migration Compacts. The agreement as in the final adopted 2017 budget allocates almost EUR 405 mn to this programme.

The current EU response may not result in more meaningful mainstreaming of migration in on-going thematic EC programmes\textsuperscript{236} in different sectors according to one EU official interviewed. However, to a certain extent it has and will influence the direction of programming in the EC’s thematic and geographic instruments. For example, it will be obligatory in the up-coming mid-term-review leading up to the EC National Indicative Programmes for 2018-2020 to consider specifically the areas climate change, security and migration for actions.

While in countries that are currently not interesting for Europe from a migration perspective, including Latin America and many countries in Asia for example, it seems likely that in many African countries part of Valletta or the Khartoum and Rabat processes a change in sector towards stronger focus on migration-related issues will occur (Interview EU Official, 2016). The strong geographic focus on Africa and the Neighbourhood has also resulted in less attention and interest to migration issues in other continents, which translates into a de facto de-prioritisation financially.

References


\textsuperscript{235} As explained above, this additional funding is resourced through making use of the Contingency Margin to be offset from unused expenditure margins of budget lines under Heading 2 and 5.

\textsuperscript{236} According to one interviewee for this study, mainstreaming of migration often results in a ‘ticking-the-box’ exercise, as it would require concrete expertise on the subject matters of migration by EU officials dealing with other thematic programmes, which is often not lacking.


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