Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
Synthesising Report 2007-2013

Report 3/2014
**Note on layout and language**

The layout of the document conforms to guidelines for accessibility and ease of reading, which require Arial font and left (not full) justification of the text.
Preface

Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative was launched in 2007 with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions resulting from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). Up to three billion Norwegian kroner has since been pledged annually to support such efforts both internationally and at the country level. This initiative is in other words the largest single undertaking within Norwegian development cooperation.

What are the results of such a substantial initiative? This report gives an overview of the documented main results achieved by the initiative up to 2013. The team was asked to assess the initiative’s contributions towards the global REDD+ regime and country progress in Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania, as well as the management of the initiative. Moreover, the report covers to some extent the progress through multilateral organizations.

The time has come for the Norwegian initiative and the international REDD+ community to take stock of the initial work done, and frame the next steps in preservation of the world’s forests. It is our hope that the results and lessons presented in this report will be taken into account in the continuation of the initiative.

This is a synthesizing report in a series of evaluations conducted “real time” as the Norwegian initiative is on-going. Through a framework agreement with a consortium of independent consultants and experts led by LTS International, evaluations progressively assess the results of the initiative with regard to its objectives and they are intended to provide timely information and recommendations to stakeholders and the public.

Oslo, August 2014

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Director, Evaluation Department
Acknowledgements

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Evaluation Team

This evaluation was led by a team consisting of Pat Hardcastle, Philippa Lincoln, Tapani Oksanen, Richard Tipper, Paul Wade and Chris Inglis. The visit to Brazil was led by Marisa Camargo with Fernanda Carvalho and Diogo Rossi; the Guyana visit was led by Andy Inglis with Matthew Brander; the Indonesia visit was led by Philippa Lincoln with Karen Edwards and Chris Bennett; the Tanzania visit was led by Jyrki Salmi with Marisa Camargo. Visits and interviews with multilaterals, international civil society organisations, and bilateral donors were undertaken by Pat Hardcastle, Philippa Lincoln, Tapani Oksanen, Richard Tipper, Vegard Vibe, Paul Wade, Kirsty Wilson and Majella Clarke. Chris Inglis reviewed drafts and provided overall quality assurance.

Additional data collection and analysis was undertaken by Aino Inkeinen and Benoit Rivard. Mike Paul designed the associated Policy Brief.
Acronyms

AFDB  African Development Bank
AMAN  Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara / Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago
APP   Asia Pulp and Paper
APRIL  Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings
AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development
AWG-LCA Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-operative Action
BIG   Indonesia’s Geospatial Information Agency
BNDES Brasilian Development Bank
CAR   Environmental Mapping and Registration of Rural Individual Properties Initiative, Brazil
CBD   Convention on Biological Diversity
CBFF   Congo Basin Forest Fund
CEEAC/ECCAS Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale / Economic Community of Central African States
CI    Conservation International
CIFOR Centre for International Forestry Research
COFA  Amazon Fund Guidance Committee
COIAB Coordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin
COMIFAC Commission des Forêts d’Afrique Centrale / Central African Forestry Commission
COP   Conference of Parties
CSO   Civil Society Organisation
DAC   Development Advisory Committee
DFID  United Kingdom Department of International Development
DKN   Dewan Kehutanan Nasional / Indonesia’s National Forestry Council
DNPI  Indonesia’s National Council on Climate Change
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo
EDF   European Development Fund
EIA   Environmental Investigation Agency
EFF   Eco Forestry Forum
EU    European Union
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FCPF  Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP   Forest Investment Program
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Programme
FORDA Indonesia’s Forest Research and Development Agency
FPIC  Free Prior Informed Consent
FREDDI Indonesia’s REDD+ Investment Fund
FUNBIO The Brazilian Biodiversity Fund
GAVI   Global Alliance for Vaccination and Immunisation
GCF   Green Climate Fund
GEF   Global Environment Facility
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<td>SFM</td>
<td>Sustainable Forest Management</td>
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<td>SIS</td>
<td>Safeguards Information System</td>
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<td>STRADA</td>
<td>Indonesian Subnational REDD+ Strategy</td>
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<td>Indonesia National REDD+ Strategy</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>The Nature Conservancy</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UKP4</td>
<td>Indonesia’s President’s Special Delivery Unit</td>
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<td>UNCCD</td>
<td>United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification</td>
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<td>UNCERD</td>
<td>United Nations Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNORCID</td>
<td>United Nations Office for REDD+ Co-ordination in Indonesia</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VPA</td>
<td>Voluntary Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>WOCAN</td>
<td>Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture</td>
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Executive Summary
Executive summary

This report presents the findings of a real-time evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) support of efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, taking into account forest conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+).

Background

The primary objective of the Norwegian Government’s climate policy is to help establish a global, binding, long-term post-2012 regime that will ensure deep enough cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions to limit global temperature rise to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Measures to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) in developing countries are considered essential if this target is to be achieved.

To work towards this objective, the Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) was launched by then Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg during the 13th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in Bali, December 2007, pledging up to three billion Kroner (circa US$ 500 million) a year in development cooperation funding in support of REDD+.

The evaluation

As NICFI will be managing a substantial component of Norwegian development cooperation funds until 2020, it is in the interest of policy-makers and the public to have access to impartial information about the progress and performance of the initiative.

A real-time approach to this evaluation has been adopted to facilitate rapid learning, to give advice at an early enough stage for changes in implementation to be feasible and to provide timely information to the international community engaged in REDD+ and climate change issues.

There are decisions to be taken about the future strategy of NICFI and the primary purpose of this evaluation is to provide inputs that inform the decision-making process. The aim is to synthesise the results of NICFI’s support towards achievement of its core objectives over the period from 2007-2013.
This is a summative evaluation, as described in the Terms of Reference; hence the focus is primarily a backward-looking compilation of documented results achieved. The assessment is made on available documents and the activities assessed are at different stages: design-implementation. It is intended to complement a forward-looking strategic study of NICFI commissioned by the NICFI Secretariat.

The Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad), which are responsible for NICFI, are the intended main audience of this report and users of the feedback and recommendations generated. The wider intended audience for the findings is the Norwegian Parliament and Norwegian public, the multilateral REDD+ institutions and the international REDD+ community.

This evaluation is the fifth in a series of real-time evaluations of NICFI.

**About NICFI**

The three core objectives of NICFI are:

1. To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime;

2. To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions;

3. To promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity.

These core objectives are intended to contribute to Norwegian climate policy objectives. As NICFI is funded through the Norwegian aid budget, contribution to achievement of the general objectives of Norwegian development policy is also an overarching objective for NICFI.

Funds are provided to a range of partners through four major channels with different expectations as to how they will address the NICFI Core Objectives:

- Activities focused on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations (*inter-alia* development of submissions; knowledge generation by supported initiatives and processes; consensus building research; offline workshops; funding of meetings) have been undertaken to encourage progress on the REDD+ elements of the UNFCCC negotiations;

- Multilateral REDD+ Institutions (Congo Basin Forest Fund; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility; Forest Investment Program; UN-REDD Programme) are supported in order to engage REDD+ countries and other donors; establish an international architecture and framework for REDD+ readiness; and for
results based payments prior to achievement of a post-Kyoto agreement containing REDD+ under the UNFCCC;

- Bilateral country partnerships provide an opportunity to demonstrate how REDD+ might work in a range of countries at different places along the forest transition curve;

- Support to civil society organisations to generate needed knowledge; advocacy (international and political); piloting; and facilitate / enable implementation.

Since 2008, a total of 10.3 billion NOK (US $ 1.7 billion) of NICFI funding was disbursed (Figure 1). Brazil has received by far the most funding (NOK 4.6 billion, 44% of all funds disbursed), followed by the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme (NOK 1.2 and NOK 1.1 billion respectively, around 11% each) and civil society (NOK 1 billion, 9%). These four recipients account for three-quarters of all major disbursements made. In respect of pledged support, the three major bilateral partners (Brazil, Indonesia and Guyana) account for the largest portions of the 19.8 billion NOK (US$ 3.3 billion) pledged to date, followed by civil society.

![Figure 1 NICFI disbursements 2008 - 2013](source: Norwegian aid statistics, www.norad.no)
Results against the NICFI Core Objectives

NICFI's contributions to the establishment of a global REDD+ regime

NICFI is the largest REDD+ donor globally, supporting all available multilateral channels and seven bilateral programmes across Africa, Asia, Central and South America. NICFI has pledged the majority of global funds for REDD+ and is a major donor to each of the multilateral REDD+ institutions. Bilateral partnerships have also been established with seven REDD+ countries: Brazil, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico, Tanzania and Vietnam.

Through its support of the multilateral REDD+ institutions, NICFI has made a substantial contribution to the development of the operational architecture for REDD+ and the engagement of a large number of REDD+ and donor countries.

Key decisions have been made on REDD+ in the UNFCCC climate change negotiations and Norway / NICFI has been instrumental to this progress. Norway is regarded by evaluation informants as having played a very important role in the UNFCCC REDD+ negotiations and was credited by many observers as being instrumental to the rapid rate of progress compared with other areas of the negotiations. NICFI financed foundational studies, created opportunities for knowledge-sharing and relationship building between REDD+ negotiators and, crucially, used experience from operational partnerships to formulate submissions. NICFI's financial commitments also helped build trust in the viability of REDD+.

The large flagship commitments through the bilateral partnerships have leveraged political support for REDD+ nationally and globally. The ‘one billion’ commitment to Brazil provided the first example of how national payments for emissions reductions could be managed at a large scale and increased pressure on both Brazil and the global REDD+ process to deliver results. It cemented Brazil’s role as a major player in the international REDD+ negotiations and Norway’s relationship with Brazil is regarded as instrumental in engaging other Amazon basin countries in REDD+. In Indonesia, the promise of US $1 billion provided the political leverage necessary to establish the REDD+ Task Force and ultimately the REDD+ Agency outside of existing institutions and to establish key activities such as the Moratorium, the One Map programme, and the review of licences.

NICFI's contributions to early action on REDD+

On Country Progress through the bilateral and multilateral channels

Brazil’s deforestation rate and corresponding greenhouse gas emissions have strongly decreased and activities established through NICFI’s payments for these results are also paving the way for future emissions reductions. Brazil successfully avoided deforestation of 6.2 million hectares between 2007 and 2013, averting three billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions and generating large results-based payments from NICFI. Emissions
were already decreasing as a result of national activities prior to 2007, and there is no information to illustrate what may have happened in the absence of the NICFI support. Nonetheless, the prominence of the Amazon Fund has stimulated policy debates and participation in the REDD+ debate has become a priority for policy-makers and civil society organisations. The Amazon Fund has also influenced the development of other elements of Brazil’s national low carbon framework financed state-level programmes to reduce, control and monitor deforestation.

In Guyana, technical and institutional pre-requisites for verifying avoided deforestation and degradation have been achieved, but much more action is required to mitigate the impact of mining as the main driver of deforestation. The Guyana-Norway partnership has been highly successful at developing a national-level monitoring, reporting and verification system, and reasonably successful at developing a financial mechanism for REDD+ payments. However, there are on-going concerns about the speed of disbursement, and further reform and development of the mechanism is needed as at present it does not represent a functioning ‘model’. There is also a lack of tangible interventions that directly address the expansion of mining, which is a key driver of deforestation in Guyana and a key part of the national economy.

With NICFI support, Indonesia has made good progress on readiness planning, establishment of an institutional framework for REDD+ and design of the systems and processes required in order to implement REDD+. However, the upcoming change in government and president and weaknesses in the legal basis for REDD+ in Indonesia, present a serious risk that progress may slip backwards and achievements be lost. There is insufficient specificity in political party platforms to be sure of the future political will to support REDD+ and the lack of implementing regulation for the Environment Act of 2009 and the existence of important contradicting policies each present critical threats to REDD+ progress.

In Tanzania, NICFI support has catalysed a large number of REDD+ activities; however, achievement of readiness outcomes has been limited by the lack of national government ownership and decision making. Plans to establish a national REDD+ financing mechanism (with some contribution from NICFI) have stalled due to a lack of political decision-making from national Government and there is doubt over the level of commitment on the part of the government to secure control of forest loss. In contrast to the slow progress at the national level, all of the supported pilot projects claim improvements in forest management and three projects have collected data on emissions reductions that have been achieved. However, there are concerns around the cost-effectiveness of the emissions reductions achieved and the sustainability of activities undertaken.

NICFI support through the multilateral institutions has contributed to the engagement of a large number of countries in REDD+ readiness planning; however readiness progress made is highly variable between countries.
Although the transition to results-based payments for national emissions reductions has not yet been achieved, the architecture has succeeded in initiating readiness activities in a large number of countries within a short timeframe. Of the 18 participants to the UN-REDD Programme that have country programmes, five countries have completed Phase 1 and one country has moved into Phase 2. With regard to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 19 countries out of 37 have a signed Readiness Preparation Proposal Grant; 11 are receiving disbursements against their Readiness Preparation Proposals, and one has a letter of intent to negotiate an emissions reductions purchase agreement with the Carbon Fund.

**On progress with REDD+ Systems and Processes**
NICFI has made a major contribution to the development of international policy and bilateral partners' progress on REDD+ Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and Reference Levels, although extent of country progress has been mixed. NICFI has provided an important contribution to the establishment of country level REDD+ financial mechanisms and generated useful learning. A strong contribution to safeguards development has been made through contributions to the UNFCCC negotiations, and through its bilateral, multilateral and civil society support. The multilateral institutions have been active in developing systems for grievance redress, and NICFI support has encouraged broad stakeholder engagement in REDD+. However, in many countries there has not been sufficient engagement with the private sector or with finance or agriculture ministries.

**NICFI's contribution to the conservation of natural forests**
The NICFI portfolio is providing a substantial, direct contribution towards the conservation of natural forests, from project-scale pilots to the establishment of new conservation forests. Pilot projects receiving support through NICFI civil society support and through the embassy in Tanzania have focused on natural forest conservation and management. Through the Congo Basin Forest Fund, projects address security and development threats to natural forest in national parks in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Amazon Fund portfolio includes important large scale activities aimed at conservation of natural forests.

Conservation of natural forests is also addressed through the planning frameworks of multilateral REDD+ institutions and through National and International Safeguard Systems. The multilateral REDD+ institutions all include biodiversity in their planning frameworks and have indicators to monitor progress on biodiversity conservation and the National and International Safeguard Systems developed and implemented through bilateral and multi-lateral NICFI support channels include criteria on natural forest and biodiversity conservation.
NICFI’s contribution to achievement of Norwegian development policy

The need for good forest governance is addressed throughout the NICFI portfolio, and fundamental steps to improving forest governance have been taken by Indonesia through the Indonesia – Norway bilateral agreement. The need to address governance issues is embedded in the approach of the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme, which aims to ensure that it is given priority focus by their partner countries in REDD+ planning. In Indonesia the fundamental steps taken by the Indonesia government towards improving forest governance include: i) the establishment of a moratorium on the granting of new concessions in natural forest; ii) a review of existing forest licences; iii) the upcoming development of a new licencing system; and iv) a process for reconciling conflicting land use maps across different sectors and ministries.

Tackling corruption, forest crime and illegality is an important component of the NICFI bilateral agreement with Indonesia and the NICFI civil society support fund. The UN-REDD Programme also contributes in a supportive capacity. In Indonesia, where forest sector crime is a key driver of greenhouse gas emissions, an important approach to tackling environment and natural resources related crime in Indonesia, the ‘Multi-Door Approach’ has been developed through the bilateral agreement. The 2013-2015 civil society project portfolio includes eight projects that are tackling illegal logging and corruption and the UN-REDD Programme held regional and multi-country training workshops on REDD+ transparency, accountability, integrity, and anticorruption.

Safeguards on indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights are addressed throughout the NICFI portfolio, with many activities that go further than ‘do no harm’. Most NICFI supported activities have gone beyond the UNFCCC safeguard requirements. For example, Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) is mainstreamed through the UN-REDD programme, addressed by a range of supported civil society partners, and is clearly differentiated from social safeguards within the Indonesian REDD+ Strategy.

NICFI support through the bilateral agreement and civil society programmes has contributed substantially to a distinct, positive shift in the discourse on indigenous peoples’ rights in Indonesia. Supported civil society organisations and the Indonesia REDD+ Task Force contributed to the ‘land mark’ commitment for action to address indigenous rights issues at a conference in Lombok in Indonesia and the development of a legal petition to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court against the current Forestry Law. This resulted in a milestone Constitutional Court decision in support of indigenous peoples’ rights.

Non-indigenous communities’ rights are less well represented in the NICFI portfolio. Non-indigenous communities are not well represented in the UN-REDD Programme and some concerns have been raised about inclusivity in relation to the partnership with Guyana, with non-Amerindian communities not well represented.
The NICFI portfolio is likely to provide a strong contribution to sustainable development and livelihoods improvement, with many activities directly contributing to this. For instance, The Forest Investment Program design principles require supported investments to have development benefits and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is working towards a target that activities supported by the FCPF incorporate indicators on forest community livelihood development. The Congo Basin Forest Fund portfolio contains activities focused on sustainable and equitable livelihoods and 32 percent of the funds invested by the Amazon Fund are allocated to projects that fall within the category of “Economic activities from sustainable use of forests”. The Tanzanian REDD+ pilot projects, and civil society pilots supported through the civil society support scheme also contribute directly to livelihoods development.

The multilateral institutions supported by NICFI are providing guidance and support in relation to land tenure and resource access and rights; while activities in Tanzania, Indonesia and the Congo Basin are providing a direct contribution. The UN-REDD programme has undertaken analysis and developed guidance on land tenure and REDD+ issues and the FCPF Assessment Framework requires the demonstration that action plans make progress in the short-, medium- and long-term towards addressing land tenure and titling issues. In Indonesia contributions to securing tenure and rights access for indigenous and local communities have been made through the bilateral agreement and by NICFI supported civil society projects. The Tanzania pilot projects, civil society pilot projects, advocacy and practical actions, and Amazon Fund projects have also contributed to furthering developments on land tenure.

Attempts have been made throughout the NICFI portfolio to address gender issues in REDD+; however, among the NICFI partners there is a lack of understanding of, and a low general capacity to address, gender issues. The strongest contribution to this issue has been through the UN-REDD programme, which has produced numerous publications on REDD+ and gender issues. Attempts to address gender issues have been made in relation to most of the NICFI channels; however informants displayed confusion and lack of understanding of gender issues.

Strategic findings and lessons learnt

On general REDD+ developments

The field is increasingly spread out among REDD+ countries, with some receiving results-based payments but others making little progress. Whilst recognising the need to engage countries with REDD+ to secure consensus at the UNFCCC negotiations, given the limited funds available, and the lack of progress made with REDD+ in many countries that started readiness, the logic behind some multilateral REDD+ institutions continuing to “sign up” new countries without a solid analysis of the reasons underlying the widely differing rates of progress is not readily apparent.
The most robust progress in the NICFI portfolio has been made by countries where the underlying context is supportive. The separation between the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) partner countries that are making readiness progress and those that are not does not appear to be related to REDD+ countries’ national income status per se. Of the NICFI bilateral partner countries visited for this evaluation, the most progress has been made in countries where the underlying political context is supportive.

Whilst the promise of funding has been an important factor in country engagement, results-based finance has acted as a political motivator rather than an economic incentive. In Indonesia, the ‘incentive’ was not the US $ 1 billion itself, but the opportunity (through the political leverage it provided) to push progressive policies that are aligned with an ongoing process of reform. In Brazil, Norway’s US $ 1 billion provided validation of national reforms already underway to tackle deforestation, and probably gave strength to continue this route. In both these cases, the funds were a motivator which had a much deeper and potentially more sustainable change rather than an economic incentive, which was likely to have only a short-term impact and be potentially less sustainable. Countries where the finance itself was the only or even the main incentive, generally have shown less commitment to REDD+ and are more likely to lose interest if funds for results-based payments – or even for readiness – do not flow as anticipated.

The lack of certainty over results based REDD+ funding is regarded as the single greatest risk to progress yet there has been a lack of attention to the cost of systems in relation to national capacity and the likely levels of REDD+ finance available to sustain them. Almost all donor and multilateral stakeholders consulted identified the challenges in mobilising sufficient resources for the countries engaged in readiness to progress to results based payments as one of the major challenges facing the REDD+ agenda. Readiness activities have so far been overly focused on start-up costs, with insufficient attention given to running costs and whether these will be affordable by partner countries given the likely level of rewards to be earned.

Expectations of the potential level of payments for emissions reductions within some REDD+ countries appear to be unduly optimistic and at times unrealistic. Interviewees from international civil society organisations expressed widespread concerns about unrealistic expectations in REDD+ countries, many of which anticipated substantial payments for emissions reductions. At sub-national level in REDD+ countries, there were also deep concerns expressed about the danger of raising community and district-level expectations either through unsustainable payments using project grant funds or through poor communication leading to frustration from unrealistically raised expectations.

There is a range of views among other donors and high level informants on whether payments for emissions reductions should be viewed as the primary end point of REDD+. There is a divergence between those that regard
results based payments for emissions as fundamental and those that see payments for emissions as ‘icing on the cake’ once the fundamental work had been achieved. Many donors and multilateral institution informants felt that a substantial number of countries were unlikely to access results-based payments given the slow rate of progress and stressed the importance of the intrinsic benefits of participating in REDD+ processes.

On NICFI’s strategy and role

Continued high-level political support, very substantial funding and a flexible government system in Norway has allowed NICFI to develop and utilise a uniquely responsive model. However, other donors are unable to work in the same way. This has implications for the way NICFI engages with other donors and its expectations of them.

The NICFI strategy as originally designed has not been sufficiently revised to accommodate the slow rate of REDD+ readiness progress by many countries. NICFI’s early activities were focused on a need to make rapid progress in time for Copenhagen, to engage as many REDD+ partner and donor countries as possible to provide momentum, and to secure the substantial funding required. Whilst NICFI has signalled an interest in generating a new narrative that focuses on REDD+ as one part of efforts to create a socially inclusive green economy, it is unclear whether the slower than anticipated REDD+ readiness progress in many countries, together with the limited finance available globally, has been fully reflected in NICFI’s strategic approach.

NICFI’s efforts to convene and coordinate with other donors are valuable in mobilising financial commitments and testing new approaches; however there is insufficient co-ordination with other relevant international initiatives. NICFI has prioritised donor collaboration. Its relationship with other donors has improved since the early years of the initiative, and several donor countries now regard Norway as their closest ally. Although there has been success in developing collaboration at the international level, this is less apparent at the national level in partner countries and co-ordination at the national level with other relevant initiatives has been limited.

There is evidence that the NICFI strategy is broadening in scope from one that is focused solely on an end point of results based payments for reduced greenhouse gas emissions. The Norwegian vision for REDD+ was initially simple and focused on payments for verified reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from deforestation and forest degradation. Engagement with the private sector, work at sub-national jurisdictional level and the strategic work being supported in the latest round of civil society fund grants demonstrate a commitment by NICFI to a wider-based approach than was the case initially.

NICFI has played a leadership role in establishing the international architecture for REDD+ but there are signs that its detached approach has
allowed inefficiency to proliferate in the multilaterals. While Norway has played a leading role in establishing the multilateral architecture to support REDD+, its hand-off approach has allowed the multilateral institutions considerable leeway in developing processes and practices. The recent acceptance of more countries into readiness funds when progress has been slow and when so many countries will not move to results-based payments in the short to medium term and when the architecture has become overly onerous has not been helpful. There is a danger that the growing perception that the main beneficiaries of REDD+ will be the multilateral institutions and large civil society organisations involved in processes will be found to be true.

NICFI views on the role of sub-national jurisdictional REDD+ programmes have not been clearly articulated. In recent years, with the limited REDD+ funding available from other donors, there has been increased interest in working at sub-national scales in jurisdictions or biomes that present specific opportunities. They are seen by some as an unwelcome distraction from national level policies but by others as a real opportunity to test intervention methods and deliver results albeit within more restricted areas that can be scaled-up to national levels.

Results on management of NICFI - operational and financial processes

On the management of NICFI

NICFI is admired for its ability to respond quickly and flexibly to new opportunities and make large commitments in ways which are perceived by informants to have generated momentum for REDD+. However, there is a need to balance this flexibility and responsiveness with the need for solid planning (including Theory of Change) and reporting. Neither a formally documented Theory of Change beyond an overarching narrative description, nor an associated results-based reporting framework has been developed for NICFI, which prejudices good internal coherence and synergy.

The current lack of a dynamic, strategic, results-based framework for NICFI hinders the development of shared priorities for coherent decision making. At present there is no single documented strategic framework for NICFI that contains specific, measureable indicators of success. The lack of a clearly articulated results framework for NICFI is unhelpful for securing coherent decision making and for optimising the value of available expertise and experience. The lack of a clearly articulated results framework for NICFI hinders the development of shared priorities and without this there is no basis for results based reporting to request this information from partners.

There is a need to develop a common understanding among the managing institutions in Oslo. The institutions involved have different expertise, experience and institutional cultures, which has given rise to a lack of common
understanding and interpretation of NICFI aims and strategies, including divergent views on partner countries. Good communication between the individuals and institutions where there are differing interests, experience and aspirations of individuals and the varying institutional priorities, cultures and, at times, inter-ministerial rivalries, is of paramount importance to ensure that the institutions pull in the same direction. **Securing a common understanding would be aided by a formalised planning and reporting framework created inclusively.**

The management approach and reporting systems associated with the NICFI Funding Scheme for Civil Society have been greatly improved since the last evaluation. The application process has changed and there has been a substantial change in approach, resulting in a tightly defined results-based programme across the themes and one that is also geographically balanced.

NICFI staff are regarded as dedicated and effective by other donors, but the number of staff is perceived as small, particularly the operational capacity in two countries with large bilateral programmes. NICFI secretariat staff are seen as being dedicated and effective, with the leadership held in particularly high regard and viewed as a playing an important convening role internationally. The NICFI operations in two key partner countries (Guyana and Indonesia) were less well regarded, both in terms of staffing levels and operational experience with these country partners. However, the embassy in Tanzania appears to be providing strong management, guidance on financial administration, and reporting of results in relation to the embassy administrated projects.

**On operational processes of NICFI partners**

There are concerns over the inefficiency of the multilateral institutions and complexity of the multilateral REDD+ architecture that has created co-ordination challenges and duplication. Despite reported improvements to inter-agency co-ordination within the UN-REDD Programme, there is a strong perception of management inefficiency among donors. Administrative costs of the FCPF have also been high. The fact that the multilateral REDD+ architecture contains a number of institutions has generated complexity and the need for co-ordination. **There have been numerous serious operational and management problems with the Congo Basin Forest Fund.** Attempts have been made to correct these and some improvements made.

Management of technical activities by NICFI's country partners in Indonesia and Guyana is generally effective. However, the ‘enabling activity’ indicators in the Joint Concept Note between Guyana and Norway are inadequate for managing and monitoring the implementation of these activities, and access to the project pipeline for the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund appears to be over-tightly controlled.
Results reporting and availability of information is generally inadequate for gaining a clear view on progress towards the NICFI Core Objectives. With one or two notable exceptions, the periodic reporting of the NICFI partners tends to focus on activities and outputs does not provide clear information on progress towards outcomes and is not always easily aligned with the NICFI Core Objectives.

**On financial processes**

The total funds pledged by NICFI since its inception are in line with the political commitment of NOK 3 billion a year, while disbursements have been around half of this. This is to be expected, as the bulk of funds pledged are allocated towards results based payments for emissions reductions achieved, this is to be expected as few REDD+ countries are yet at this stage. Disbursements from some of the multi-contributor trust funds to final recipients have been slower and lower than anticipated because portfolio development and delivery has been slower than initially expected.

The Norwegian government financial regulations are not set-up to handle disbursement of results-based payments to partner countries, requiring divergences from normal practice. Whilst divergences were authorised by the relevant minister or by parliament, this has slowed disbursement, caused resentment between the NICFI managing institutions in Oslo and adverse public comment. A proposal was made to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) in May 2014 that sought to address this problem and was accepted by Parliament in June 2014.¹

Financial management processes are found to be robust in mitigating against corruption risk within the NICFI portfolio.

**Conclusions**

**In relation to the NICFI Core Objectives**

There has been great success on the goal of including REDD+ in a new international climate regime (NICFI Core Objective 1). NICFI support, financial and non-financial, has resulted in the engagement of a large number of countries and, through UNFCCC negotiations and as a result of experience gained in bilateral partnerships, there has been valuable progress towards defining an operational architecture for REDD+ and developing financial mechanisms. The exceptionally large financial commitments, especially to Brazil and Indonesia, appear to have had a “flagship effect” that has helped create international moment and lever widespread political support.

There has been a good contribution on early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (NICFI Core Objective 2). This has been particularly notable in the more effective bilateral partnerships, with Brazil and Indonesia. Whilst there has been some progress in Guyana and Tanzania, in both countries there is still much further to go. NICFI support has been especially noteworthy on MRV systems and the generously funded Civil Society Support Scheme has made very valuable gains on matters related to safeguards and wider governance.

There has been a solid contribution to promoting conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity (NICFI Core Objective 3). NICFI support has aided forest conservation through pilot-scale projects and the establishment of new conservation forests. The Indonesia moratorium on new forest and peat land concessions is a notable step in the right direction. Safeguard systems on natural forest conservation have been developed and implemented with NICFI support through bilateral and multilateral channels and these have been taken up by multilaterals leading to development of appropriate frameworks and tools for the design of REDD+ activities that should lead to improved conservation.

There has been active contribution towards achievement of Norwegian development policy objectives with NICFI funding (Overarching Development Objective). This contribution goes substantially beyond “doing no harm.” Forest governance issues have been strongly addressed throughout the portfolio, including specific attention to tackling corruption and forest crime. Safeguards have been notably prominent in NICFI supported activities; bilaterally, multilaterally and through the Civil Society Support Scheme. Although the rights of indigenous groups have been given strong attention, the rights of non-indigenous groups require further action. There has been widespread strong contribution to sustainable development but while gender issues have been emphasised and addressed in NICFI support, progress has been limited by lack of understanding in some partners of how to tackle gender issues effectively.

Regarding strategic issues and lessons learnt

There is need for NICFI to take stock of its progress and the evolution of REDD+ in order to consolidate and rationalise its continuing and future interventions. While Brazil has made very solid progress, the good progress in Indonesia remains quite fragile. There has been mixed progress in Guyana and Tanzania but good progress through UN-REDD in Vietnam. Overall, bilateral efforts seem to have been the most rewarding but Norway is limited in the number of these it can manage. Multilaterals have allowed NICFI support to be widely spread but we are concerned at the large number of countries continuing to start readiness activities when mixed progress and limited finance for results-based payments mean many will gain more from inherent values than from the finance they were expecting. Managing expectations of these countries requires urgent attention. NICFI joint donor efforts, such as those with Germany and UK,
appear to be a positive and valuable modality. The relatively limited coordination with FLEGT is surprising as is the general lack of awareness of past experience from forest sector development programmes that bear strong similarities to the readiness phase of REDD+.

The cost-effectiveness of the REDD+ is deserving of more attention. While we note NICFI has made efforts on this matter, the topic is one that seems to be rather neglected generally despite its crucial importance to the viability of the REDD+ model. We believe more in-depth study is required but there are indications that while finance may be important to stimulate initial interest, there are deeper reasons for the political changes and political support that characterise the success noted in both Brazil and Indonesia. At the same time, it is also apparent that cost-effectiveness models need to be developed for non-closed forest countries that have highly fragmented but low carbon stock forest resources since the cost benefit equation for such countries will be very different.

There is good initial evidence that NICFI climate and development goals can be synergetic. There are interesting differences emerging between the way Indonesia approached the problem with action on the ground as distinct from the less direct approach of FCPF and UN-REDD which include development issues within the REDD+ framework. We believe that the more integrative the approach can be from the outset, with the inclusion of field-based activities to the maximum extent possible, the greater will be the likelihood of success. From the NICFI perspective, we see the revised management structure as providing a good opportunity for such an integrative approach to be applied for all NICFI interventions, with strong attention to the viability of scaling-up pilots and to long term economic sustainability. This would appear to be especially important for low-income countries that lack the resources to complement donor funding at the level possible in mid-income countries.

In relation to NICFI operational and management issues

The management style utilised by NICFI at the outset was appropriate but there is now need for more formalised planning and reporting systems. While initially NICFI was testing pilots and needed to respond quickly to changes in the then ill-defined international framework for REDD+, this is no longer the case. There is increasing complexity around REDD+, much experience has been gained and lessons learnt. The recent changes to NICFI management structure will require increased coordination and while basic information on the Theory of Change exists, it is quite widely dispersed across a range of documents. Furthermore, there is still no comprehensive planning and reporting framework. More formal documentation would be very helpful for effective coordination across the range of actors now engaged with complementary but disparate expertise, experience, and other demands on their time situated in agencies with different organisational mandates, cultures and priorities.
NICFI presence in some partner countries is perceived as being too limited. This is particularly so in Guyana where despite excellent technical progress, there is considerable dissent among wider stakeholders at the limited progress on enabling activities and a view that Norway has an incomplete view of how its funds are being spent. It is concluded that the staffing situation in Guyana requires deeper consideration of alternative options.

While multilateral partners have usefully extended the reach of NICFI support, there are concerns over slow disbursement of funds in some cases and limited strategic thinking around emerging problems. NICFI was very successful at influencing multilateral partners on improved governance and safeguards, there are increasing concerns with slow disbursement, leading to an accumulation of unspent funds in the multilaterals, and with high management overhead costs levied. It would be useful to revisit the disbursement process with the multilaterals. Although there has been recognition that many countries are making rather slow progress with readiness and, latterly, wider acceptance that relatively few of the countries engaging in readiness will secure results-based finance in the short to medium term, the implications of this in respect of maintaining commitment to avoid losing the gains made so far do not seem to have been given adequate attention.

Despite some problems fitting NICFI financing requirements into the wider Norwegian financial regulations, these now seem to have been largely resolved. In particular, the recent acceptance of a proposal submitted to the Norwegian parliament by the Ministry of Finance on handling of results-based payments is particularly helpful in this regard.

NICFI staff are widely recognised for their leadership of the debates around REDD+ and their unique ability to act quickly and flexibly is admired. By its efforts NICFI has acquired the mantle of leadership in the REDD+ arena. This allows NICFI to take the lead in addressing issues emerging in respect of multilateral partners. NICFI has also supported a range of innovative approaches to leveraging private sector funding as well as being proactive in partnering with other donors although overall, leveraging additional finance for REDD+ at the levels originally expected remains a challenge for all actors, including NICFI. There was certainly extensive dissent expressed by interviewees at the high transaction costs being incurred for REDD+, notably through multilaterals.

Good communication of results and achievements as well as working for greater transparency on all REDD+ issues needs to be given more attention. The website for the Civil Society Support Scheme has been widely praised and there is need for a mechanism of similar utility to present the valuable progress made by NICFI more widely to inform stakeholders and the wider public. Although Norway’s own records of pledges, commitments and disbursements are accurate and transparent, this is not so, especially for the multilateral funds for which the lack of clarity is inappropriate given the amount of finance flowing.
Recommendations

Given the experience now gained by NICFI and the changed management system put in place from the beginning of 2014, we believe that there is need for more formally documented planning and reporting systems to be established. While there is albeit dispersed information on the Theory of Change, there is no results-based planning and reporting framework yet established for NICFI.

In our view, such a framework needs to be established as a matter of priority to ensure that everyone engaged in delivery of NICFI interventions has clear information on aims and priorities and to buy in to the process of developing such a framework and be willing to stick to it as a management guide. In our view, such a framework would be dynamic and contain a documented Theory of Change as the basis of a strategic plan delineating strategic interventions, the rationale for their selection, the modalities to be employed and a broad indication of input levels, anticipated outputs, expected outcomes leading to desired impacts and the assumptions that have been made, and are required to hold good, in order to achieve the outcomes and impacts.

Linked to the Theory of Change, we would expect a Results-based Framework, again as a single document or suite of documents. In essence, this would build on the Theory of Change and lay out in greater detail the inputs required, the milestones to be achieved at specific points, the assumptions made together with qualitative and quantitative indicators, including progress towards outcomes and impacts, and means of verification covering progress and the extent to which assumptions are holding true.

In order to achieve this, we make two recommendations:

**Recommendation 1.** Using this report and other relevant material, assess the progress made on REDD+, the contribution of NICFI support together with that of other donors and the varied progress in REDD+ countries together with a gap analysis to provide an objective basis for a review of NICFI policy and strategy

**Recommendation 2.** Develop a revised NICFI policy and strategy including a formal Theory of Change linked to a responsive, results-based reporting framework that takes into account the needs and priorities of all the agencies engaged in NICFI

These two recommendations encompass the internal aspects of NICFI, geared towards improving coordination and cooperation and also delivering results-based reporting. Related to this is a need to review the partnerships through which NICFI operates leading to changes that increase the effectiveness of these.
Recommendation 3. Undertake a review of partnerships with other donors and the multilateral organisations, with a view towards optimising the multilaterals’ activities. This should take into account their differing mandates, constraints and opportunities for synergy with NICFI’s strengths. Develop a common approach with other donors to leverage greater efficiency and effectiveness from the multilateral institutions.

The need for a ‘stock take’ extends to the NICFI partnerships with the multilateral institutions and with other donors. A future approach may involve more intensive management to ensure the cost effectiveness of activities supported and that the activities supported are well aligned with current global priorities. Once NICFI has developed and agreed a revised approach for itself it will be necessary to agree the future roles of the multilateral institutions, with partner donors. NICFI has a role and a responsibility to lead on this given its dominance as a REDD+ donor.

Recommendation 4. For different reasons, there have been limitations to progress in Guyana and in Tanzania. Both countries should be visited by a high-level, multi-disciplinary team to discuss the reasons for this and whether and how NICFI support should be continued.

While there has been good progress in Brazil and valuable if fragile progress in Indonesia, progress in the bilateral partnerships with Guyana and Tanzania is slower than expected. While it might be said that there has been transformational change in Brazil and Indonesia, this has not yet occurred in either Guyana or Tanzania. Yet these two countries represent important models for NICFI, Guyana as a high forest cover / low deforestation country and Tanzania as a dry forest country with a high rural population dependent on the forest / agriculture interface. We consider that specific attention is needed to both these partners.

Recommendation 5. NICFI should give attention to communication: providing more information on its progress and successes through a variety of means. This should include, but not be limited to, a comprehensive website with links to reports and other sources of information. It should also continue efforts to secure greater transparency on the flow of funds around REDD+, especially where funds are channelled through multilateral partners.

Finally we observe that, while NICFI has made good achievements, these are not communicated or promoted to the extent they deserve and there would be benefit in more comprehensive communication to the wider public as well as to politicians and to those in partner countries and partner agencies.
Main Report
1. Introduction

This report presents the findings of a real-time evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) support of efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, taking into account forest conservation, sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+). This section of the report provides general background to the evaluation and an overview of the NICFI portfolio of activities, the evaluation object.

1.1 General background

The primary objective of the Norwegian Government’s climate policy is to help establish a global, binding, long-term post-2012 regime that will ensure cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions sufficient to limit global temperature rise to no more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Measures to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) in developing countries are considered essential if this target is to be achieved (Stern, 2006; Metz et al., 2007).

To this end, the Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative was launched by then Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg during the 13th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in Bali, December 2007, pledging up to three billion Kroner (circa US$ 500 million) a year in development cooperation funding in support of efforts to REDD+.

1.2 Real-time evaluation

As NICFI will be managing a significant part of Norwegian development cooperation funds until 2020, it is in the interest of policy-makers and the public to have access to impartial information about the progress and performance of the initiative.

A real-time approach to this evaluation has been adopted in order to assess and provide feed-back on the results of NICFI to facilitate rapid learning, to give advice at an early enough stage for changes in implementation to be feasible and to provide timely information to the international community engaged in REDD+ and climate change issues. This approach is valid given the dynamic nature of the international debate around REDD+. 
Four evaluations have been completed to date under the NICFI real-time evaluation:

1. NICFI contributions to an international REDD+ regime (2010);

2. NICFI support to the formulation and implementation of national REDD+ strategies in five countries (Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania, 2010);

3. NICFI Civil Society Support Scheme (2012); and,


1.3 Purpose of this evaluation

As stated in the Terms of Reference (Annex 3), there are decisions to be taken about the future strategy of NICFI and the primary purpose of this evaluation is to provide inputs that inform the decision-making process. The aim is to determine the results of NICFI’s support towards achievement of its core objectives over the period from 2007-2013.

This is a summative evaluation, as described in the Terms of Reference; hence the focus is primarily a backward-looking compilation of results achieved. This evaluation is intended to complement a forward-looking strategic study of NICFI commissioned by the NICFI Secretariat².

1.4 Intended audience of this evaluation

The Norwegian government Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad), which are responsible for NICFI, are the intended main audience of this report and users of the feedback and recommendations generated.

More widely, the intended audience for the evaluation also includes:

- The Norwegian Parliament, institutions, organisations, and the general public in Norway;

- Multilateral organisations engaged in REDD+ activities, including the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD programme), the World Bank and the regional development banks;

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• The international community, contributing to overall knowledge concerning the achievement of both REDD+ and sustainable development in general;

• The national REDD+ initiatives in target countries.

1.5 The evaluation object

Three elements are important in defining the object of this evaluation: 1) The NICFI Core Objectives; 2) The NICFI Theory of Change; and, 3) The NICFI Portfolio of funded activities.

1.5.1 The NICFI Core Objectives

The three core objectives of NICFI are:

1. To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime;

2. To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions;

3. To promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity.

These core objectives are intended to contribute to Norwegian climate policy objectives. As NICFI is funded through the Norwegian aid budget, the overarching objectives of Norwegian development policy are inherent but also overarching objectives of the Climate and Forest Initiative.

1.5.2 Theory of Change

While NICFI thinking is made relatively explicit in its budget propositions, submissions to UNFCCC and the bilateral agreements, there is no detailed Theory of Change formally written down in a single document which brings this information together to clarify why specific interventions have been selected and the impact expected from them.

Funds are provided to a range of partners through four major channels with different expectations as to how they will address the NICFI Core Objectives:

• Activities focused on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations (inter-alia development of submissions; knowledge generation by supported initiatives and processes; consensus building research; offline workshops; funding of meetings) have been
undertaken to encourage progress on the REDD+ elements of the UNFCCC negotiations;

- Multilateral REDD+ Institutions (Congo Basin Forest Fund; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility; Forest Investment Program; UN-REDD Programme) are supported in order to engage REDD+ countries and other donors; establish an international architecture and framework for REDD+ readiness; and for results based payments prior to achievement of a post-Kyoto agreement containing REDD+ under the UNFCCC;

- Bilateral country partnerships provide an opportunity to demonstrate how REDD+ might work in a range of countries at different places along the forest transition curve;

- Support to civil society organisations to generate needed knowledge; advocacy (international and political); piloting; and facilitate / enable implementation.

The assumptions underlying the interventions (as ascertained by the evaluation team based on interviews with NICFI), the first two of which also underlie REDD+ more broadly, include:

- Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation is a cost-effective, easy and relatively quick method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions;

- The financial incentive of results based payments will motivate REDD+ countries to achieve emissions reductions;

- Pilot demonstrations and results based payments will generate momentum for other REDD+ countries to take action;

- A post-Kyoto agreement under the UNFCCC will be reached;

- Norway’s finance is to be enabling and is not expected to meet the full costs but the funds needed for REDD+ will be available (either through UNFCCC Annex 1 country donations, markets, partner countries’ own contributions and / or other routes).

1.5.3 Portfolio overview

Since 2008, a total of 10.3 billion NOK (US $ 1.7 billion) of NICFI funding was disbursed. Of this total, 5.3 billion NOK (US$ 0.9 billion) went to bilateral partners (Brazil, Indonesia, Guyana, Tanzania, Mexico and Vietnam), 3.6 billion NOK (US $ 0.6 billion) to the multilateral initiatives (the Congo Basin Forest Fund

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3 Although Ethiopia is also a country partner of NICFI, no disbursements were made during the assessed period.
Figure 2: NICFI disbursements 2008-2013

- 44% Brazil
- 11% FCPF
- 11% UN-REDD
- 9% Civil Society
- 8% FIP
- 5% CBFF
- 4% Guyana
- 2% Tanzania
- 2% Indonesia
- 2% Other
- 1% ITTO
- 1% Vietnam
- 0% Mexico

Source: Norwegian aid statistics, www.norad.no

Figure 3: NICFI pledges 2008-2013

- 30% Indonesia
- 30% Brazil
- 8% Guyana
- 7% Civil Society
- 6% FCPF
- 6% UN-REDD
- 4% Ethiopia
- 4% FIP
- 3% CBFF
- 1% Tanzania
- 1% Vietnam
- 0% Mexico
- 0% ITTO

Source: Norwegian aid statistics, www.norad.no
CBFF, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), Forest Investment Program (FIP) and the United Nations REDD+ Programme (UN-REDD), 1 billion NOK (US $ 167 million) was disbursed to civil society partners and 0.3 billion (US $ 50 million) NOK to other recipients. A summary table of all NICFI disbursements is provided in the Financial Processes Annex.

Brazil has received by far the most funding (NOK 4.6 billion, 44% of all funds disbursed), followed by the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme (NOK 1.2 and 1.1 billion respectively, around 11% each) and civil society (NOK 1 billion, 9%). These four recipients account for three-quarters of all major disbursements made. Major disbursements are summarised in Figure 2. When disbursements are compared with pledges (Figure 3), the three major bilateral partners (Brazil, Indonesia and Guyana) account for the largest portions of the 19.8 billion NOK (US$ 3.3 billion) pledged to date, followed by civil society. The evaluation strategy for sampling across this portfolio is outlined in Section 2.2.

1.5.4 Background information on the Four NICFI partner countries included in this evaluation

This section provides a brief summary of some political economy indicators and forest statistics on the four partner countries covered. Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia are predominantly closed moist forest countries while Tanzania is essentially a dry forest country. In terms of forest carbon stocks, Tanzanian stocks are much lower than the others. Carbon stocks are highest in the peat forests of Indonesia. The potential earnings from reduced emissions are greatest for the peat forests and substantially higher for closed moist forest than for dry forest.

Figure 4: Political economy statistics

Source: Adapted from World Bank and UN development and forest statistics
The values included in Figure 4 are taken from UN and World Bank sources. Because the various indices are different in terms of 1 or 0 being the most desirable, they have all been converted to percentages and reversed where necessary so that the higher the number the better the achievement. The purpose of the chart is to give a simple illustration.

Table 1 below shows key basic statistics. Tanzania is by far the poorest, close to a (World Bank) low-income economy. Brazil is an upper middle income country while Guyana and Indonesia are both lower middle income countries. Population density is highest in Indonesia – although it varies very widely across the islands, Tanzania has a moderately high population density while Guyana is sparsely populated. Population in Brazil is highly urbanised. Tanzania has a high population growth rate.

**Table 1: Basic country statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Forest Change % 2000-2010</th>
<th>Population /km²</th>
<th>Population Increase %</th>
<th>Gross National Income per capita US $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>14,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>~0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>67,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of historic forest loss rates between 2000 and 2010, Guyana was close to zero, Brazil and Indonesia around 0.5% but Tanzania 1.1%. Tanzania also has a high rate of forest fragmentation and the dry forest type makes accurate determination of forest change more difficult than for closed forest.

The drivers of forest loss are different in the four countries. In Tanzania, it is almost entirely due to small-scale subsistence agriculture; note also that Tanzania has a very much higher proportion of poverty than any of the other partners. In Guyana, mining is the main cause of forest loss. In Brazil, it is large-scale agriculture and in Indonesia it is a mix of conversion for large-scale farming and tree crops, and for mining although there is some loss due to small-scale agriculture.

Under the UNFCCC, countries are not categorised in respect of either their approach to REDD+ or the viability of REDD+ as an appropriate mechanism for

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4 HDI is (UNDP) Human Development Index; CPI is (Transparency International) Corruption Perception Index; GII is (World Bank) Gender Inequality Index; GINI coefficient (World Bank) is a measure of income distribution within the country.
them. Obviously, the national situation reflected in the ecological facts and the socio-economic parameters, together with governance and capacity issues, will affect countries' ability to respond to REDD+, the speed at which they are able to do so and the extent to which they are dependent on external funding to do so.

We have endeavoured where feasible and possible to take these aspects into account during this evaluation but recalling these basic facts may help the reader to understand the reasons behind the differing levels of progress and the discussion on the way REDD+ is being developed globally.

1.6 The operating context

This section includes a description of the international context for REDD+ that NICFI works within. It then describes the Norwegian policy context for NICFI and outlines the operational structure and processes of NICFI. The descriptions of context are intended to provide the background necessary to facilitate interpretation of results.

1.6.1 The international context for REDD+

The REDD+ concept was originally focused on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and intended to be a way to rapidly and cost effectively establish a substantial reduction in greenhouse emissions by using financial incentives in an attempt to change the behaviour of forest users: forest conservation was to become more profitable than forest clearing as a result of payments for environmental / ecosystem services (Angelsen and McNeill 2012). REDD was then expanded in the Bali Action Plan at COP-13 in 2007, which stated that a more comprehensive approach should include “policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2008).

This initial concept has evolved, driven by the failure to reach a new international climate agreement at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC, in Copenhagen in 2009. The evolution has been affected by strong business-as-usual interests, a large number of actors with divergent agendas, and experience in the field (Angelsen and MacNeill 2012).

The major changes can be summarised as:

i) The focus has moved from carbon only to multiple objectives (Angelsen and MacNeill, 2012; UNU-WIDER, 2013);

ii) The policies adopted so far are not only, or even primarily, directed at achieving result-based payments (Angelsen and MacNeill, 2012; UNU-WIDER, 2013; UNFCCC, 2011b);
 iii) The funding to date is mainly from international aid and the national budgets of REDD+ countries, and not from carbon markets (Angelsen and MacNeill, 2012; Schalatek et al, 2012).

 Whilst the Durban Platform\(^5\) states that a post-Kyoto agreement should be ready by 2015 and take effect from 2020, REDD+ is no longer seen as ‘quick and easy’ as originally anticipated. The scope has broadened from RED, to REDD, to REDD+ under the UNFCCC\(^6\), while some actors push further towards landscape level approaches, and a range of additional objectives (‘co-benefits’) added. While no detailed cost-effectiveness study has been performed, discussion with interviewees suggests that readiness costs are much higher than anticipated, as would be expected with the move to multiple objectives while committed funding available to pay for emission reductions was widely perceived to be lower than anticipated, and carbon markets have not developed as some expected.

 There is now broad recognition of the need to establish building blocks for good forest governance and work on forest tenure issues in order to succeed. Slow progress with implementation has resulted in an increasing interest by donors and REDD+ countries in sub-national jurisdictional approaches.

 1.6.2 Norwegian policy context

 The primary objective of the Norwegian Government’s climate policy is to play a part in establishing a global, binding, post-2012 regime that will ensure sustained, deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions. Norway’s goal is for the average rise in global temperature to be limited to no more than 2° Celsius above the pre-industrial level.

 The Norwegian Climate Policy white paper of 2012\(^8\) re-emphasises the climate policy objectives contained in the 2007 Climate Policy Report; outlines the contribution of NICFI towards achievement of that policy and states that “Within an overall increase in development aid, the Government will… consider expanding the climate and forest initiative beyond Norwegian Kroner (NOK) three billion annually, as part of a multi-national payment mechanism for verified emission reductions, if other countries also increase their contributions.”

 In addition to the central position of NICFI in relation to delivery of Norwegian climate policy, NICFI is also strongly linked to Norwegian development policy and there is a clearly stated intention that climate policy and development policy should be mutually supportive: “The Government will strive to ensure that its

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\(^6\) RED: Reduced emissions from deforestation; REDD: reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; REDD+: reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, including the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.


climate policy and development policy reinforce one another. This means that climate policy must contribute to the achievement of development policy goals and that development policy must increase capacity to achieve climate policy goals”. Specifically, NICFI is anticipated to address Norwegian development policy by “contributing to the fight against poverty and the efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of ensuring environmental sustainability”.

1.6.3 Management and management processes

NICFI has been afforded high political importance from the outset, with then Prime Minister Stoltenberg taking a leading role along with former Minister Erik Solheim, joint Minister of Environment and International Development. Operationally, NICFI was managed jointly between two ministries and one directorate led by Minister Solheim: the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad (which is a directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The lead body was (and still is) the NICFI Secretariat, established in the then Ministry of Environment. The Secretariat reported directly to the Minister during its inception phase but thereafter to the directorship of the Ministry of Environment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ultimately responsible for financial compliance and upholding development policy, while Norad provided an advisory role related to partnership selection and implementation, technical and legal matters, in addition to management of civil society support.

From September 2012 when Minister Solheim stepped down, the two ministerial portfolios were separated, with the two individual ministers, the Minister of Development (Heikki Holmås) and the Minister of Environment (Bård Vegar Solhjell), having joint responsibility for NICFI. The separation of roles and responsibilities between the Minister of Environment, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Norad from this period is described in the Ministry of Environment Budget Proposal to the Storting 2013-2014.

The Environment Minister had the overall responsibility for the political and strategic direction of NICFI, including development and implementation of strategy and approach, choice of partners and design of country strategies and initiatives, Norwegian positions on REDD +, cooperation and communication on REDD + in other countries, and environmental policy goal achievement. The Minister of Development was responsible for development policy, including overall responsibility for the dialogue with the multilateral cooperation partners and the last word in decisions about the disbursement of funds and administrative responsibility for the funding. NICFI was able to request payments

be made up to the limits agreed in the budget with payments being made by MFA on request from NICFI.

At the same time as this change in ministerial responsibility for NICFI, a number of operational changes were also made. Firstly, two Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were seconded to the NICFI Secretariat at the Ministry of Environment, one of whom was to be a second deputy director with specific responsibility for development aspects and financial administration. Secondly, MFA decided that Norad should take on the management of a large portion of the NICFI portfolio. During the summer of 2013 the three managing institutions of NICFI outlined new rules and responsibilities for NICFI operations.

With the change of government following the 2013 election this arrangement has changed again. Currently, the new Minister of Climate and Environment has sole responsibility for NICFI, and there is a new line of reporting from NICFI to the Director General of the Department of Climate Change, within the Ministry of Climate and Environment. At the same time Norad has been given formal responsibility for making payments requested by NICFI with the Director General of Norad having ultimate responsibility for the use of funds. From January 1st 2014 under this new arrangement, for all matters related to NICFI Norad is formally a directorate under the Ministry of Climate and Environment.11

In parallel with the change of financial responsibility, systems have been designed within Norad for quality assurance and legal compliance checks on all payments and decisions taken including documentation and checking back on any deviation from advice given before such decisions are finalised. There is also provision for the designated budget authority holder in Norad to maintain a close administrative link with the NICFI Secretariat to ensure good knowledge of progress and new planned interventions through regular meetings and shared work plans.

Under the new arrangements within Norad, the designated budget authority holder will involve relevant MFA desks and embassies as required. At the same time, there is also from 1 January 2014 a cooperation agreement between MFA and MCE that requires close consultation between the two ministries on NICFI matters, with both parties specifying named contacts, to ensure that NICFI is administered in accordance with Norwegian foreign policy interests and in accordance with Norwegian policy towards the countries in question and international organizations, including multilateral development-banks.

As well as a general requirement to keep each other continuously informed on relevant matters, the MFA / MCE agreement also includes provision for high level (Permanent Secretary level) meetings every six months at minimum and more frequently if deemed necessary. The agreement also clarifies the important role of embassies and other missions in the disbursement of NICFI

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11 The team only had access to relevant documentation after this report had been prepared and this has limited the level of analysis of these changes that can be included.
finance and provides for Norad to maintain oversight of expenditure made through this modality as well as providing technical advice as needed (relevant sections in Norad being administratively linked to NICFI and MCE).

1.7 The financial context

In this section the source of NICFI funding, the financial guidelines and rules that govern its use and the current NICFI funding modalities are described.

1.7.1 Financial guidelines, rules and modalities

Source of NICFI funds

NICFI is funded through the Norwegian government’s budget for Official Development Assistance (ODA). As there was clear agreement in the Norwegian Parliament at the outset that funding for NICFI should be in addition to existing Norwegian aid commitments, the source of NICFI funding originates from an increase in the aid budget from 0.9 % Gross National Income in 2007 to 1 % Gross National Income in 2008. The new Government has confirmed its continued support for NICFI and also that it will maintain the current level of funding (NOK three billion per year) until at least 2020\textsuperscript{12}, a proposal adopted unanimously by the Norwegian Parliament in December 2013.

Regulations, guidelines and de facto criteria that govern the use of NICFI funds

As NICFI is funded through the aid budget, its financial operations are required to be consistent with the Norwegian "Regulations on Financial Management in Central Government", as well as the Norwegian Government’s "Grant Management Manual". Under regulation 6.3.5 (Chapter 6, section 3, clause 5) of the Regulations on Financial Management, all disbursements must be based on documented financial needs (within a specified time period which is typically three or six months). Financial need in this context means the expected costs to implement the supported programme within the specified time period. This means that disbursements to NICFI’s partners should only be made after financial need for the funds has been demonstrated, for instance, in the form of an implementation plan and budget for the next specified period. This form of foreign aid is often referred to as "receipt-based aid".\textsuperscript{13}

The use of NICFI funds by a recipient country must also meet Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Advisory Committee guidelines in order to be classed as Official Development Assistance. One guideline is that ownership of the funds must have changed hands from the Norwegian government to a recipient country or a fund manager (such as a multilateral development institution) to qualify as ODA.

\textsuperscript{13} There are some exceptions to the general rule: budget support, Trust fund and other contributions to multilateral organizations such as the UN and the World Bank, etc.
There are also some limitations on the type of partner organisation to which NICFI can disburse funds. Although there is no explicit rule or regulation associated with the selection of partners, it is the practice of the Norwegian authorities to select potential partner organisations following an assessment of their suitability as a partner. The criteria covered by these assessments include, inter alia: risk, competence and capability to manage the funds, whether the potential partner organisation is subject to limitations that could be problematic (for example, the Inter-American Development Bank is limited by its statutes to undertake procurements from member countries only), whether the partner organisation has a strong / active presence in the recipient country, whether relations between the partner organisation and the authorities in the recipient country are good, an overall judgement-based assessment of whether using the potential partner organisation is likely to be “an effective and appropriate way of achieving the purpose” (Norwegian civil service informant).

In practice, the chosen partners are typically “internationally recognised financial institutions” (Norwegian civil service informant) such as the World Bank and other multilateral development banks and United Nations organisations.

**Financial modalities under NICFI**

Funding arrangements under NICFI fall into two major modalities: multi-contributor trust funds and grants. Under the multi-contributor trust funds, Norway disburses funds to the fund trustee according to demonstrated need. The trustee then disburses funds to delivery partners, which use the funds for programme implementation in the recipient country. All of the multilateral REDD+ institutions fall into this category, along with the bilateral support to Brazil (Amazon Fund) and Guyana (Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund). Trustees include the development banks (World Bank; African Development Bank; Brazilian Development Bank; and the United Nations Development Programme). Delivery partner entities are the development banks and United Nations agencies.

The grant modality applies to the Civil Society Support Fund, which is a dedicated grant mechanism administered by Norad Civil Society Department on behalf of NICFI. The bilateral support to Tanzania also consists of grants (one-off grants, rather than through a dedicated mechanism) administered by the Royal Norwegian embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. Bilateral funding to Indonesia has so far consisted of grants made to a trustee (United Nations Development Programme) that manages the partnership. This is an interim measure until Indonesia’s designated financial mechanism, a multi-contributor trust fund, is established.
2. Methodology

This chapter outlines the evaluation approach, sampling strategy, data collection approach, analysis and reporting, team, and limitations. In order to protect anonymity, the text has been written to include the points made to the team in confidence in a way that precludes attribution to specific individuals.

2.1 Evaluation design

The terms of reference require a backward-looking focus on documented results and informant interviews as the major element in the evaluation which was then to be used to respond to forward-looking strategic questions identified by NICFI as being of interest. In parallel with this evaluation, the NICFI Secretariat also commissioned a separate study. This separate study was conducted fully independently from this evaluation and had a different purpose, although there is obviously overlap in the material used and people met.

Given the focus on synthesising results achieved against the NICFI Core Objectives, although the standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency for evaluations of development activities was used in developing the evaluation framework, it was not considered optimal for the report. Instead, the evaluation framework was expanded to include indicator themes against each of the NICFI core climate and development objectives (Sampling Strategy Annex). The indicator themes were based on anticipated results against each of the climate objectives, and Norwegian development policy priority areas for the development objective.

2.2 Sampling strategy

The purpose of the sampling strategy was to provide broad coverage of the key elements of the NICFI portfolio, so that a portfolio level assessment of results against the NICFI Core Objectives could be undertaken. Three criteria were used in devising the sampling strategy (Sampling Strategy Annex):

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1. NICFI's identification of the key portfolio activities anticipated to generate results against each objective;

2. Level of funding disbursed 2008-2012;

3. Geographic and contextual coverage.

The final sample included the four most established bilateral partnerships (Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania), which provide good coverage of country level results-based partnerships, including readiness progress, MRV and financial mechanisms. This sample also contains a range of ecological contexts (from rain forest to dry forest) and a range of positions along the forest transition curve. The more recent partnerships with Mexico, Vietnam, Ethiopia and Colombia were not included given time and budget constraints.

The multilateral institutions (Congo Basin Forest Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program, UN-REDD Programme) to which NICFI provides funding are an important component of the NICFI portfolio, so coverage of these was essential in the context of the overall NICFI portfolio. Each of these institutions is supported by their own evaluations that cover strategy and operational processes. In order to avoid duplication with the institution specific evaluations, this evaluation did not cover the activities and operations of these institutions in depth, instead referring to published evaluation reports, temporal reporting, publications and other published documentation, supplemented by interviews with key staff at each institution to identify results against the core NICFI objectives.

As the NICFI supported civil society portfolio was evaluated two years ago, that evaluation report provided the major source of information to this evaluation, supplemented by interviews with Norad Civil Society Department, limited review of more recent project documentation and the new civil society support website.

2.3 Data collection

The evidence for the evaluation was collected through desk reviews and through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with representatives from beneficiary countries, implementation partners, climate change negotiators, donors, and other stakeholders. Interviews were used to supplement and triangulate the evidence collected during the desk reviews and were conducted by telephone, or in person, with 122 individuals being interviewed altogether.

Visits of one week duration were made to Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia); Guyana (Georgetown); Indonesia (Jakarta); Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam); and the United States of America (Washington D.C). Shorter, visits were made to Geneva, Rome, London and Oslo. The Brazil visit took place in December 2013; the majority of the other visits took place in February 2014, apart from the
Guyana visit, which was undertaken in April 2014. Some additional interviews were undertaken by telephone outside of these visits.

Data collection templates were developed for each of the focal countries; for each of the multilateral institutions; for the NICFI contribution to the UNFCCC REDD+ negotiations; and, to compile the interview responses of high level informants\(^{15}\) to the evaluation that were not covered elsewhere (for instance, staff based at the headquarters of other donor agencies such as the United Kingdom Department for International Development; the German development bank KfW, and the German development organisation, GIZ). As the Brazil visit was undertaken earlier than the other visits, it was used as a pilot to test and refine the data collection tools.

A great deal of documentation has been collected through material requested directly from the NICFI Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the relevant Norwegian embassies. Norwegian government staff were very helpful in providing documentation. However, during the first round of comments it emerged that there were some gaps and the evaluation team were not informed about substantial developments that were underway.

### 2.4 Analysis, synthesis and reporting

Analysis was based on the available documentation (official documentation, project documents, planning documentation, results reporting, correspondence and interview data). The reporting of results is therefore limited to the quality of the results reporting of the NICFI portfolio. The numerous activities undertaken within the portfolio are at different stages of implementation: from design to completion, therefore the assessment is based on the most recent documentation available to the team. Hence examples given in the findings cover a range of stages of project implementation.

Two internal workshops were held. The first, held in January, to provide a ‘stock take’ of emerging results, as well as the operational processes and methodology of the evaluation, based on the Brazil pilot visit and the context establishing activities undertaken in Oslo. The second workshop involved presentations of the key results against the NICFI Core Objectives from each of the data collection activities. This enabled the core team to capture the ‘big picture’ of results across the NICFI portfolio and identify the overarching storyline to guide the development of the main report.

A workshop was held in Oslo prior to submission of the draft report, to present results and conclusions to NICFI, to provide an early opportunity for NICFI to respond to findings, and for the evaluation team to seek further clarifications.

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\(^{15}\) Senior REDD+ actors in donor or recipient governments, international non-governmental organisations and research organisations.
2.5 Attribution versus contribution

Results are attributed directly to NICFI where this is applicable; however, for many of the results identified by this evaluation NICFI’s achievement is a contribution among several or many. This is because NICFI does not work in isolation on REDD+. Through the multilateral channels, NICFI is one donor amongst several or many other contributors. Where NICFI activities have focused on national reforms, they are usually contributing to processes that have been underway for many years.

There are multiple donors to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Forest Investment Program. The Congo Basin Forest Fund has been funded jointly between Norway and UK\(^{16}\), while the UN-REDD Programme is predominantly NICFI funded. The presence of other donors makes attribution of outcomes to NICFI support difficult. Hence, the relative contribution of NICFI support towards achievement of outcomes is a more appropriate measure of success than attribution.

2.6 Team

A team of twenty two people was involved in this evaluation, comprising eight women and fourteen men, of six nationalities. The evaluation was led and managed by a core team of senior technical experts that co-ordinated the activities and inputs of the remainder of the team. A core team member was present on the majority of the data collection visits to ensure consistency in implementation. Of the three visits on which no core team member was present, consistency was secured by pairing senior country experts with team members that have been involved in at least three prior assignments within the NICFI real-time evaluation.

2.7 Limitations

NICFI does not have an indicator framework to measure achievement towards core objectives. The core objectives are also partially interlinked. This has complicated both the development of the evaluation framework and also the evaluation reporting, making duplication difficult to avoid.

To provide broad coverage of the portfolio, the time spent on each element was necessarily limited.

It was not possible for the team to have direct access to the archives in either the Ministry of Climate and Environment or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While we are extremely grateful for the efforts of the NICFI Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norad in providing the team with documentation, this

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\(^{16}\) Canada is a recent donor to the CBFF.
documentation was spread between the three institutions. The lack of a single, central repository for all NICFI-related documentation is a considerable constraint to the evaluation and has made the process very time-consuming. During the commenting round it was discovered that the evaluation team had not been informed about some important developments or provided with documentation on this. The fact that no single institution had full responsibility to provide the evaluation team with the documentation required is likely to have been a factor in this oversight.
3. Results

The results of this evaluation are presented in six sections following a short overview:

- Operational and Management Processes;
- Financial Processes;
- Results against NICFI Core Objective 1;
- Results against NICFI Core Objective 2;
- Results against NICFI Core Objective 3;
- Results against Overarching Development Objective; and,
- Strategic Findings.

3.1 Operational and management processes

Synopsis

The findings in this section relate to the management structure and processes developed to handle an intervention portfolio of up to NOK 3 billion (US $ 500 million) funding per year, encompassing bilateral and multilateral support. The portfolio was initiated quickly in support of the commitment made by Norway in Bali in 2007 to provide funding for REDD+, which would be complemented by others and with the expectation that rapid progress would be made leading to a global agreement on REDD+ being agreed in Copenhagen in 2009.

In Oslo, NICFI operated as a largely autonomous Secretariat within the Ministry of Environment, which liaised with both Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad. Operations were facilitated by then Minister Solheim who at the time held ministerial portfolios for both development and environment. Close coordination between the ministries was required to develop a common understanding and effective procedures; however this was not always apparent.

A light touch approach in terms of low staff numbers and a pragmatic application of the rules and regulations has been employed in relation to processes and
procedures. This has enabled rapid responses to opportunities that arise. However, the corollary of this is weaknesses in the planning and reporting framework and institutional memory. There are also concerns over the operational efficiencies of NICFI’s multilateral partners.

3.1.1 On the management of NICFI

Finding 1. NICFI has been able to respond quickly and flexibly to new opportunities in comparison with other donors but this has to be balanced with the need for solid planning and reporting

In the immediate aftermath of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Bali Conference of Parties (COP) in 2007, there was need for a quick-footed organisation that could quickly establish structures and systems to disburse the large financial commitment promised by Norway, which then held to the view that global agreement on REDD+ would be achieved in Copenhagen in 2009 (Norwegian Policy Context Annex). Neither a formal Theory of Change nor an associated results-based reporting framework was developed during this period, partly as a consequence of the political imperative for speed but partly because it was felt that to do so would prejudice the freedom to engage rapidly with new ideas and initiatives and give a more definitive “shape” to NICFI interventions than was deemed appropriate at that time.¹⁷

High level informants commented on the ability of NICFI to move quickly in response to opportunities and make large commitments in ways which generated momentum for REDD+. One donor emphasised that NICFI is really good at, and is particularly valued for, ‘being very fleet of foot’ and responsive (High Level Informants Annex). Other donors by comparison are not able to work in this way, face more constraints and require a lot more processing of an opportunity before a funding decision may be reached (High Level Informants Annex). NICFI’s support to the Biocarbon Fund was cited as a particularly good example of Norwegian ability to commit funds within a shorter timeframe than other donors.

The corollary of this is that where decisions are made rapidly according to political imperative, value for money of investments may be compromised through lack of sufficient planning and due diligence. For example, despite being a special case in NICFI’s general approach to bilateral partnerships, the selection of Tanzania as a country partner prior to the establishment of NICFI was identified by informants as one decision that risked compromising existing efforts to improve forest governance and tackle corruption. It was perceived by some donors active in the forestry sector at the time that bringing in new and

¹⁷ For purposes of clarity, a formalised Theory of Change is written down and shows what is being aimed for, the way in which it is proposed to achieve these aims and the underlying assumptions that impinge on progress in meeting these aims. A formalised Results-based Framework lays out the resources required, how they will be applied, defines milestones and specifies indicators of achievement and the means of measuring these. Both should be dynamic, i.e. they are revisited and revised regularly to take account of experience gained.
considerable funds for REDD+ might compromise ongoing efforts to restrict funding to the Ministry of Natural resources and Tourism (MNRT) because of corruption cases in that ministry (High Level Informants Annex). Norway handled this risk through avoiding direct funding through the MNRT as well as by adapting funding modalities and engaging in rigorous diligence prior to releasing funds.

The partnerships with Guyana and Indonesia were both established rapidly as high risk initiatives to exploit windows of opportunity to engage with these two countries. Indonesia was important because it contains a huge tropical forest resource and Guyana because it is a high forest cover / low deforestation country, and was seen as a potential model for rewarding avoided deforestation. The partnership with Guyana has been described in an academic study as “Aid in a Rush” (Bade, 2012), while the official Norwegian decision documentation on entering the partnership with Indonesia, including risk assessment, was prepared after the Letter of Intent negotiations had taken place (Indonesia Annex).

Whilst Norad, several sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the embassy in Jakarta were involved in the lead-up to the establishment of the bilateral partnership agreement and the bilateral agreement negotiations themselves, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Legal Section of Norad’s Quality Assurance Department were given only two days to comment on the content of the Letter of Intent. Despite this minor short-cutting of due diligence processes, key areas of risk and relevance to Norway’s policy priorities were identified and outlined in the decision note on the agreement and the Letter of Intent itself reflects and addresses some, though not all, of the main financial risks involved in entering into a REDD+ partnership with Indonesia (Indonesia Annex).

One high level informant commented that NICFI had been very careful to collect institutional information to inform its planning in relation to some of the new partnerships in contrast with its early partnerships (High Level Informants Annex). This suggests that lessons from the establishment of the early partnerships may have been learned.

Although speed was essential up to 2009, since then there has not been sufficient recognition of the need to balance this with a clearly defined and formally documented Theory of Change and associated results-based framework, neither of which yet exists in a formally documented format, although the White paper, Norwegian Climate Policy provides a narrative Theory of Change, with specific boxes on four partner countries. The lack of a results-based reporting framework was commented on adversely by the Office of the Auditor General in 2013.

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Finding 2. The current lack of a dynamic, strategic, results-based framework for NICFI hinders the development of shared priorities for coherent decision making

As noted in Finding 1, there is no overarching Theory of Change compiled by NICFI. The strategic planning framework for NICFI is a Performance Indicator Table published in the Ministry of Environment’s budget proposal to Norway’s parliament for 2008-2009\textsuperscript{20}. The ‘Performance Indicators’ listed are the NICFI Core Objectives, and the results indicators are “to be worked up” or absent.

Although we note that some development of achievement criteria was undertaken in 2013\textsuperscript{21} this is not yet finalised. Consequently, at present there is no documented strategic framework for NICFI that contains specific, measurable indicators of success, and much of the strategic thinking around NICFI is ‘in the heads’ of key staff within the NICFI Secretariat. The lack of a clearly articulated results framework for NICFI is unhelpful for securing coherent decision making and for optimising the value of available expertise and experience.

More formalised systems are also required in order to bridge the differences of view between the managing institutions that result from their separate pressures and different ongoing obligations. The lack of a clearly agreed “paper trail” defining strategies, outputs and outcomes sought, and including measurable indicators of progress, is a matter of great concern that requires urgent remedy if the current divergences are to be bridged.

Although clear reporting is a requirement of the new (summer 2013) “Rules” for NICFI\textsuperscript{22}, the lack of a clearly articulated results framework for NICFI hinders progress as without this there is no basis for results based reporting to request this information from partners.

It is unclear why, once the pressures from the need to make rapid progress to the Copenhagen Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2009 had passed without achievement of agreement, more effort was not devoted to developing and agreeing a dynamic results-based planning and reporting framework, including appropriate indicators, as has been done for the Civil Society Fund (Finding 4).

It is not clear that the need for a planning and reporting framework has been accorded sufficient priority by any of the institutions engaged in NICFI. Whilst it is understood that work is in progress on developing this, interviews with staff currently engaged with NICFI operations in Norad reported lack of sufficient time available to them to be able to contribute adequately to the development of the planning and reporting framework.

\textsuperscript{20} Ministry of Environment, St.prp.number 1, 2008-2009.
\textsuperscript{21} See Rules for Climate and Forest Initiative, Chapter.166, post 73.
\textsuperscript{22} See Rules for Climate and Forest Initiative, Chapter.166, post 73.
Finding 3. **Progress has been made on developing a common understanding among the managing institutions in Oslo but differences remain and more work is needed to solidify this foundation**

The three institutions that were involved in NICFI until October 2013 all have different expertise, experience and institutional cultures. The real-time evaluation baseline studies presented in 2011\(^{23}\) noted that individuals within the three institutions that manage NICFI held differing perspectives on its objectives. Those studies concluded that, while this range of perspectives was valuable in respect of tackling issues and developing strategies, good communication between the individuals and institutions was of paramount importance to ensure that the institutions pull in the same direction. The real-time evaluation of NICFI support to civil society presented in 2012 (Hardcastle et al. 2012) also drew attention to the apparent lack of common understanding and interpretation of NICFI aims and strategies. It re-emphasised the need for a common results-based planning and reporting framework for NICFI as a whole.

While the institutional responsibilities have been somewhat simplified, with only the Ministry of Climate and Environment and Norad now directly engaged in NICFI, wider diplomatic views and considerations from Ministry of Foreign Affairs remain important as Norad is a directorate under that Ministry. Interviews in Oslo in December 2013 revealed substantially divergent views between NICFI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in respect of partner countries. Guyana was singled out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a weak element of the portfolio because of slow progress in utilising Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund funds, failure to achieve adequate progress on the ‘enabling activities’ of the bilateral agreement and Norway’s lack of familiarity with the country. The NICFI Secretariat, view the partnership more positively, as Guyana has made remarkable progress on the technical aspects of the partnership.\(^ {24}\)

While recognising that documents such as submissions to parliament provide information on what NICFI is trying to achieve and how it proposes to do so, the large number of individuals involved in decision-making and delivery of NICFI interventions means that consideration has to be given to the differing interests, experience and aspirations of individuals and the varying institutional priorities, cultures and, at times, inter-ministerial rivalries. While such diversity is healthy and valuable in respect of developing plans, the lack of documented guidance, developed and agreed by all actors, in our view creates undue opportunities for NICFI aims to be "interpreted" on the basis of individual or departmental perspectives. This could be avoided by having more detailed documentation developed through a process that allows all actors to have influence but ultimately is agreed as binding with a clearly-defined revision process built-in to such a mechanism to ensure that everyone involved has a clear understanding of aims and strategies, and takes consistent decisions.

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\(^{23}\) Norad evaluation reports 12/2010 to 18/2010 – 7 reports altogether.

\(^{24}\) Lincoln et al 2013.
Internal communication is of immense importance as is institutional memory. A small, stable leadership group within the NICFI Secretariat (the current director and assistant director) has guided NICFI since its creation. Outside the secretariat leadership however, individuals have come and gone and have also held different roles and responsibilities. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, there has been substantial turnover of individuals with direct responsibility for NICFI, which has resulted in loss of direct knowledge and shared understanding. This again suggests there would be value in clearer and more definitive documentation.

During interviews in Oslo, it became apparent that many people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, at both senior and management levels, had had some engagement with NICFI but that this had often been quite fleeting and there was little evidence of a detailed common understanding. It was also clear that in many cases, the interest of the individuals related less to the specifics of NICFI than to how its activities fitted into wider government policies, including higher order diplomatic relations with other countries.

If there is to be internal coherence and consistency, it is important that all individuals involved have clear understanding of the differing institutional cultures and priorities that impinge on others in the overall team and that differences and misunderstandings are resolved. The current system appears to be an improvement on the previous one in this respect but it is too early to state whether or not the changes have been sufficiently deep and whether or not they will be sustained. Securing such changes would be aided by a formalised planning and reporting framework.

**Finding 4. Following the evaluation of the NICFI Funding Scheme for Civil Society, the management approach and reporting systems have been greatly improved**

For the current batch of projects that started in 2013, the application process for the NICFI civil society support was changed from a single stage, full proposal application process, to a two-stage process incorporating a concept note stage, followed by submission of full proposals by a much smaller number of shortlisted applicants. In response to the recommendations of the real-time evaluation (Hardcastle et al. 2012), Norad Civil Society Department has also undertaken substantial changes in approach, resulting in a tightly defined results-based programme across the themes and one that is also geographically balanced.

The initial reports (Civil Society Support Annex) confirm these changes but perhaps more importantly, the changes in management approach were highly appreciated by the sample of grant holders interviewed, who felt that they were much clearer over what was expected and also in respect of what else was being done and by whom. The new website was lauded by those interviewed as being of immense value to improving communication among grant holders. Specific praise was also given by several Civil Society Department grant holders.
for the 2013 REDD+ Exchange meeting, an international conference held in Oslo that many civil society grant recipients attended, as a valuable opportunity for grant holders to meet and discuss their projects.

Given its strategic nature and improved reporting, the civil society portfolio should provide a valuable knowledge base and resource for NICFI to use in strategic planning of its future directions.

**Finding 5. NICFI staff are regarded as dedicated and effective by other donors, but the number of staff is perceived as small, particularly the operational capacity in countries with large bilateral programmes**

High level informants saw the NICFI secretariat staff as dedicated and effective (High Level Informants Annex; Lincoln et al. 2013), with the leadership held in particularly high regard and viewed as a playing an important convening role internationally (High Level Informants Annex). Informants commented on the small numbers of staff responsible for implementing NICFI’s large portfolio. In some cases this reflected admirable efficiency, but in others was perceived as a potential risk if there was inadequate time for detailed political analysis and monitoring (High Level Informants Annex).

Whilst NICFI Oslo was highly regarded by high level informants, the country operations were less so, both in terms of staffing levels and operational experience with some of its country partners (High Level Informants Annex; Lincoln et al. 2013). The level of operational capacity in Indonesia in particular was commented on by a number of high level informants (High Level Informants Annex). This is reinforced by interviews in Indonesia - during each visit to Indonesia by this evaluation team, other donors and stakeholders have expressed surprise at the small number of NICFI staff involved in managing the bilateral partnership with Indonesia (Indonesia Annex; Mackenzie et al. 2011; Lincoln et al. 2013).

The implementation of bilateral partnership activities in Indonesia has been effectively managed by the implementing partners and, despite tensions between the REDD+ Task Force and the line ministries, the level of co-operation and dialogue has improved over the last few years. However, collaboration between the REDD+ Agency and the line ministries remains a challenge and serious obstacle to progress (Indonesia Annex).

The absence of any full-time staff on the ground in Guyana was commented on in the real-time evaluation baseline study (Hardcastle et al. 2011). This recommended an administrative post be located there to facilitate communication with government and other stakeholders in Guyana and enhance coordination with other donors. This recommendation was not accepted; however, the responsibility for diplomatic relations with Guyana was transferred to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Brasilia as a result of the abolishing of the post of Ambassador to the Caribbean Countries.
The Guyana field team found almost universal support among the people it interviewed (government and non-government) for a full-time administrative focal point (not diplomatic representation) to be established in Georgetown. The Brazil field team found support in the embassy in Brasilia for such an office in Guyana, as travel and communications problems make maintaining contact with Guyana from Brasilia extremely difficult, thus raising the risk of the Norway – Guyana partnership going awry (Brazil Annex).

The embassy in Tanzania appears to be providing strong management, guidance on financial administration, and reporting of results in relation to the embassy administrated projects (Lincoln et al. 2013), which may well have mitigated some of the perceived financial risks (although not the other risks) described in Finding 1.

Several donor respondents noted that NICFI is perceived as a ‘hands off’ donor, which may present a challenge in ensuring development results are achieved. There was a sense that greater operational capacity would be beneficial in making this a reality as funds are disbursed and spent in country. One multilateral respondent also noted that in one of the UN agencies implementing the UN-REDD programme, funds from other donors were subject to more stringent monitoring and planning processes than those from NICFI. This resulted in more effective implementation and more efficient use of funds. There is a perception amongst donor stakeholders that there are insufficient NICFI staff to guarantee this (High Level Informants Annex).

3.1.2 On operational processes of NICFI partners

Finding 6. There are concerns over the inefficiency of the multilateral institutions and complexity of the multilateral REDD+ architecture that has created co-ordination challenges and duplication

Concerns have been raised over the inefficiency and costs associated with the multilateral REDD+ institutions. Evaluations of the UN-REDD programme have noted the coordination challenges between the three UN member agencies and the heavy representation of UN agencies as active participants in the Policy Board, which limits its independence as an oversight group (UN-REDD Programme Annex). Despite reported recent improvements in inter-agency coordination, there remains a strong perception of management inefficiencies amongst donor informants, which is deterring donors from investing in the programme (UN-REDD Programme Annex). An exacerbating factor is that whilst information on the allocation of funds to member agencies and to country programmes is publically available on the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Gateway website, the documents available from Policy Board meetings do not articulate the rationale for the distribution of these resources between the UN-REDD member agencies, and it is not possible to discern how each agency has used their budget (UN-REDD Programme Annex).
A 2011 evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) noted that administrative costs were particularly high in the early years of operation (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). NICFI comments on the draft contribution agreement in 2007 questioned why the usual cost-recovery limit of 5% had not been specified (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). In 2013, the FCPF Readiness Trust Fund administration and FCPF Secretariat expenditures in 2013 accounted for approximately 20% of total spend (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

In addition, World Bank procedures are onerous considering the small size of FCPF readiness investments. Staff interviewed (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex and the Forest Investment Program Annex) highlighted the challenge of applying bank processes designed for much larger investments than those made by the FCPF, and also require a high level of ongoing follow-up and engagement (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). These procedures also slow disbursements and generate high transaction costs. The Independent Evaluation Group made a recommendation in its 2011 report for fund administrators to take advantage of internal World Bank reforms relating to micro and small grants, but progress in adopting this recommendation was not mentioned by respondents (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

The fact that the multilateral REDD+ architecture contains a number of institutions has generated complexity and the need for co-ordination. The added value and risk of duplication afforded by establishment of multiple institutions has long been questioned and these points were reiterated by several donor informants to this evaluation (UN-REDD Programme Annex). However, it should be noted that this was not a point that came up organically during interviews with the two country recipients of both FCPF and UN-REDD multilateral funding (Indonesia and Tanzania) and they were not specifically asked to comment on the issue.

In relation to this question, UN-REDD staff articulated a clear complementarity between the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme, given the UN’s greater experience on forest measurement and governance work as well as ability to act as a neutral convenor of multiple stakeholders from across Government, private sector and civil society (UN-REDD Programme Annex). Some United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and UN-REDD Secretariat staff also highlighted the opportunities that arise from the existence of two ‘competing’ multilateral REDD+ institutions, such as the pressure to improve performance; the availability of more diverse lessons learned and sharing of the work in making rapid start-up in a large number of countries (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

Coordination challenges and increased transaction costs as a result of overlapping mandates between the UN-REDD programme and the FCPF readiness fund were mentioned in independent evaluations of both multilaterals and by numerous interview respondents (UN-REDD Programme Annex; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). Improvements have been made in
coordination between UN-REDD and FCPF over the years, including use of UNDP and FAO as delivery partners for the FCPF, organisation of back-to-back governance board meetings and the development of shared tools and approaches are substantial achievements in improving coordination (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex, UN-REDD Programme Annex).

However, it is noted, by both donors and multilateral staff, that there are increased transaction costs as a result of this need to coordinate and several high level interviewees and UN-REDD staff agreed that the dual channels of readiness support through FCPF and UN-REDD had created a burden for recipient countries, particularly the 31 countries where both UN-REDD and FCPF are operational (UN-REDD Programme Annex). It is also necessary for countries to fulfil multiple due diligence requirements in order to access finance from these two different sources. There are also concerns that both the complexity of different organisational processes and the multiple stakeholders involved places stress on the limited resources available for coordination in REDD+ country governments.

A review of UN-REDD country evaluations noted the burden created by the differing requirements of the three UN-REDD agencies (UN-REDD Programme Annex). Whilst efforts have been made to streamline the processes between the different multilateral institutions – there are still operational procedures such as fiduciary risk assessments, procurement processes which are applied according to the requirements of the different implementing agencies. Donors also raised concerns about the potential for incurring further transaction costs in transitioning the architecture for REDD+ to the Green Climate Fund.

Finding 7. There have been numerous serious operational and management problems with the Congo Basin Forest Fund. Attempts have been made to correct these and some improvements made

The Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) has been dogged with operational problems since its inception. Most of the functional bottlenecks, such as limited priority of the portfolio to the portfolio managers at the African Development Bank, were foreseen by the Norad Appraisal Mission of the CBFF of April 2008 (Hoefsloot et al. 2011). Two years later the NICFI real-time evaluation country baseline report Democratic Republic of Congo (Hoefsloot et al. 2011) noted slow progress in implementation, with many actors interviewed by the evaluation team expressing frustration about this – the international civil society organisations because of slow operations, unclear procedures and contradictory instructions; the smaller Congolese non-governmental organisations because communication was poor and very few had been successful in having their project funded. The slow progress was considered to relate to both the inadequacies of the CBFF and its Secretariat, and due to the Fund operating in vulnerable countries where partners have weak capacity (technical, managerial,

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These early problems have continued and are comprehensively documented in the 2012 Operational Effectiveness Review by the African Development Bank and 2013 Portfolio Analysis by the CBFF Secretariat (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex). The Operational Effectiveness Review ascribed the problems to four causes: i) a governance system lacking consistency; ii) malfunctions prejudicial to the smooth running of the CBFF; iii) a lack of technical support; iv) a focus on procedures at the expense of achieving results. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) noted that the institutional arrangements for which it had originally advocated – for the African Development Bank to serve as trustee and administrator of the Congo Basin Forest Fund – has become one of the main factors contributing to the operational issues. This is because of the relatively small size of projects for African Development Bank to manage in comparison to the large infrastructure projects that its financial and reporting systems are better geared towards (CBFF, 2013b).

Attempts have been made to correct these problems and some improvements have been made. Measures taken included simplification of the CBFF operational procedures and recruitment of long-term consultants specialised in disbursement and procurement. However, a visit of the donors to the CBFF to the African Development Bank in June 2013 concluded that the steps taken were “insufficient to guarantee improvement in the Fund’s operations” (CBFF Secretariat 2013). These efforts have been ongoing, involving substantial input from the donors, including NICFI, and the overall assessment of a CBFF Governing Council session held in September 2013 concluded that CBFF performance in terms of the processing and approval of new projects had significantly improved (CBFF 2014).

Finding 8. There is an effective working relationship between Guyana and Norway on technical issues. The ‘enabling activity’ indicators in the Joint Concept Note are inadequate for managing and monitoring the implementation of these activities, while access to the project pipeline for the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund appears to be over-tightly controlled

There is a highly effective working relationship between the Guyana Forestry Commission and the NICFI secretariat staff on technical monitoring, reporting and verification issues and members of staff from the Guyana Forestry Commission commented that they are able to communicate easily with NICFI staff, and are able to jointly find solutions to issues that arise (Guyana Annex).

However, whilst the enabling activity indicators in the Joint Concept Note are reasonably specific, with specified time-periods for implementation, they are still open to overly wide interpretation and allow some divergence from the underlying intentions and spirit in which they were created. Most notably, the Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee excludes representatives from opposition
political parties, and, according to a range of government and non-government informants, and Rainforest Alliance (2012), members of the committee who were overly vocal in their criticisms have been de-selected. Questions have also been raised about the genuine representativeness of some members of the committee; in particular those who claim to represent Amerindian communities.

The openness of the indicators to interpretation also partly explains the varying results in the verification reports for the enabling activities in 2012 and 2013, though there may also have been genuine progress on the indicators as the two reports relate to different time periods. The problem of interpretation can be partially mitigated by increasing the specificity of the indicators in future iterations of the Joint Concept Note. However, given the inherent difficulty in striking the right balance between specificity and overly prescriptive language, ensuring adherence to the spirit of the partnership should also be addressed at a higher political level (Guyana Annex).

It is also notable that most stakeholders did not know if or how they could propose projects for funding through the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund. The restriction of access to the project pipeline may be justified by the fact that the amount of funding available is limited, and there are also high administrative costs associated with developing project proposals. However, opening access to the project-pipeline could help to de-politicise the Low Carbon Development Strategy, and avoid the current perception that it is being used to favour the Government’s perceived electoral power bases (Guyana Annex).

**Finding 9. Results reporting and availability of information is generally inadequate for gaining a clear view on progress towards the NICFI Core Objectives**

With one or two notable exceptions, the periodic reporting of the NICFI partners does not provide clear information on progress towards outcomes and is not always easily aligned with the NICFI Core Objectives. Furthermore, the 2013 Auditor General’s report on NICFI also drew attention to the lack of results-based reporting.

The weakest example is the Congo Basin Forest Fund for which results reporting is extremely limited. Periodic reports focus largely on management processes and disbursements rather than results achieved by the portfolio (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex). Results reporting is largely confined to a very limited number of example results and the focus is on outputs rather than outcomes (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex). As a consequence it is not currently possible to ascertain the overall achievements from the CBFF portfolio, although the evaluators note that work is underway to improve the CBFF results reporting (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

Whilst the UN-REDD Programme reporting gives extensive, clear information on activities undertaken and outputs produced (reports completed, numbers of workshops held etc.), reporting at the outcomes level is limited. Efforts have
been made to improve this through the development of the results framework in
the new strategic plan (UN-REDD, 2011c) but there is still no clear
communication of the status of country readiness preparations across the
countries supported by UN-REDD (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

There are clear work plans, periodic reports and verification reports against the
indicators for the bilateral agreements with Indonesia and Guyana. In these
cases information on activities, outputs produced, and outcomes achieved are
clear and readily accessible, although the anticipated linkages to the NICFI Core
Objectives are not explicit (Guyana Annex).

The strongest reporting of results is by the FCPF and the NICFI civil society
portfolio. The FCPF has recently improved its annual reports, with clear
reporting at output and outcome level against its logical framework, a
comprehensive dashboard summary and set of country reports. Whilst the new
results framework has not been adopted by all countries in their reporting, there
is clear alignment of the FCPF logical framework and with the NICFI Core
Objectives, which helps identify key results (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
Annex).

The NICFI Civil Society Fund portfolio has adopted a portfolio-wide results-
based reporting framework into which all projects report. While it is too soon to
comment in detail, this has strong potential to provide, more comprehensive
reporting, enhanced coherence and better coordination. The new website26 is
highly informative and user-friendly (Civil Society Support Annex).

A compounding challenge is that there is no single central repository for all
NICFI-related documentation. Consequently, documentation is spread between
the Ministry of Climate and Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad, and
some of the embassies. No one institution has had responsibility, clear oversight
or, apparently, even a clear overview of what documentation is available. The
lack of a readily accessible repository is a constraint to effective management,
placing too much reliance on institutional memory, which in itself is restricted by
the relatively rapid turnover of personnel and exchange of responsibilities within
NICFI.

When management responsibility for a substantial proportion NICFI portfolio
was transferred to Norad, 'transfer files' containing the key documents for each
of the portfolio items were collated together and these have been archived by
Norad. NICFI notes that these were intended to alleviate the previous lack of a
central repository and thereby initiate the process of creating a strong
institutional memory to alleviate this problem, but this needs to be an ongoing
process.

3.2 Financial processes

Synopsis
Norway's development budget was used in order to secure funds for NICFI of the scale publicly committed by Norway's then prime minister. This was facilitated by the fact that then Minister Solheim held joint portfolios of environment and international development. The downside was that there are restrictions on the use of development funds, which have to meet wider development aims and must be used in line with the Norwegian Financial guidelines, which require demonstration of need before disbursements may take place. The upside was that this meant Norway’s development assistance would meet the desired target to increase the aid budget to 1% of Gross National Income.

Although a number of payments made by NICFI have required specific procedures to authorise them, such authorisation appears to have been granted in every case, albeit with irritation and sometimes dissent on the part of those involved in the process. A proposal to improve this process was recently approved by the Norwegian Parliament (Storting). Bilateral and multilateral programmes appear to have adequate controls built in to minimise fiduciary risk.

Finding 10. Total funds pledged by NICFI since its inception are in line with the political commitment of NOK 3 billion a year, while disbursements have been around half of this. As the bulk of funds pledged are for emissions reductions achieved, this is to be expected as few REDD+ countries are yet at this stage

Over the six years of operation, cumulative pledges of around 19.8 billion NOK (US $ 3.3 billion) have been made by NICFI, while cumulative payments amounted to NOK 10.6 billion (US $ 1.8 billion). Although the cumulative pledges are roughly in line with the political commitment of up to NOK 3 billion a year, the disbursements are far short of this. The reasons for this include: slower than anticipated implementation and over ambitious timelines (see Annexes on Indonesia, Tanzania; Congo Basin Forest Fund; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD Programme); constraints associated with the financial set-up (see Finding 12); and the fact that the bilateral agreements, which account for the majority of the pledges, are multi-year commitments so payments are spread over several years.

Another factor is the staging of the expected disbursements. Only one of the bilateral partnerships (with Brazil) was established at REDD+ Phase Three (payments for emissions reduced), the phase with which the bulk of the pledged funds is associated; the bulk of Indonesia’s pledged commitment (which is the same size as the commitment to Brazil) is not expected to be disbursed until a later phase of the partnership. Similarly, the majority of NICFI funds to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) have been used to capitalise the FCPF Carbon Fund (REDD+ Phase Three), while most FCPF countries are in Phase 1 or Phase 2 of REDD+ readiness. Sizeable disbursements from the Carbon Fund are not expected for some time to come – i.e. funds have not yet been disbursed.
to recipients (see Annexes on Financial Processes; Indonesia, Tanzania, Congo Basin Forest Fund, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the UN-REDD Programme).

**Finding 11. The system of results-based payments conflicts with Norwegian government financial regulations; however a proposal has been recently approved by the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) to improve this process**

The principle of results-based payments is that payment is made ex-post for results already achieved; however the Norwegian government financial regulations are based on a system of ex-ante payments for activities still to be undertaken, with the further requirement that the actual disbursements must be based on demonstrated need. There is thus incompatibility between the results-based system of NICFI bilateral agreements and Norwegian regulations for aid disbursement. Bilateral recipients of results-based funds, in addition to meeting the earning requirement, have to demonstrate need for the funds that have been earned before disbursement can take place (Financial Processes Annex).

Brazil’s success in reducing its emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has earned it annual allocations of between NOK 700 million (US$ 117 million) and NOK 1 billion (US$ 167 million) through the bilateral agreement. Because the funds are channelled to the Amazon Fund, the size of the actual transfers has depended on the Amazon Fund portfolio pipeline and its forecasted funding needs. As the Amazon Fund portfolio has taken time to build, forecasted expenditures of the Amazon Fund have been far lower than the allocated results based payments, so annual disbursements to the Amazon Fund ranged between zero and NOK 363 million (US$ 60 million) until autumn 2013. This resulted in an accumulation by mid-2013 of NOK 3.9 billion (US$ 650 million) in funds earned by Brazil but not disbursed from Norway to Brazil. This balance was disbursed to Brazil by the end of 2013 through granting of a Parliamentary exemption (Financial Processes Annex).

Unless this functional incompatibility is addressed, there are likely to be similar problems associated with the other NICFI bilateral partnerships once they enter Phase 3 payments for emissions reduction results. This has already happened in respect of the payments to Guyana and is especially likely for Indonesia, which has the potential to achieve large emissions reductions and therefore be eligible for sizeable results-based payments.

This is not, however, likely to be the case for the FCPF Carbon Fund. The fund’s Methodological Framework articulates the process by which emissions reductions are rewarded, but there is very limited provision for imposing conditions or tracking how the payments for emissions reductions are spent. The focus is on having an appropriate benefit-sharing mechanism and on ensuring

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27 This is normally a financing plan for three or six months ahead; grant management rules, see section 1.7.1.
appropriate measurement of emissions reductions in ways that avoid leakage and double-counting (Financial Processes Annex).

Interviews in Oslo confirmed that there had been initial discussion on using non-development funds for NICFI. It was concluded that, while not ideal because of the problems noted above, any other route would be much more difficult and time consuming to establish and would meet with more conflicting claims for increases from other ministries and departments. The use of aid funds also contributed to the achievement of the 1% Gross National Income target for aid (Norwegian Policy Context Annex).

The use of direct budgetary support would have reduced the problems with making payments. Given the higher order conditionalities that are normally applied to direct budgetary support, tackling matters related to governance, economic and fiscal policy, etc. this might have been helpful to addressing the underlying drivers of deforestation. The idea was, according to interviewees, only briefly discussed and this option was not pursued in detail (Norwegian Policy Context Annex).

In May 2014, after the completion of the analysis for this report, a formal proposal intended to address the problems with the financial process was made to the Norwegian Parliament by the Ministry of Finance. This proposal was formally accepted by the Norwegian Parliament in June 2014.

**Finding 12. Conflict with Norwegian government financial regulations has slowed disbursement, caused resentment internally and adverse public comment. Divergences from normal practice were authorised by the relevant minister or by parliament**

The build-up of undisbursed funds has generated a number of problems. The undisbursed funds were issued to Brazil in the form of ‘Promissory notes’ in a bid to comply with the Norwegian financial regulations on disbursement only on demonstration of need. As funds accumulated, the Norwegian government has been required to request the Norwegian Parliament to grant exemptions from the disbursement regulation. These have been granted and all accumulated funds were disbursed to Brazil in their entirety in December 2013 and January 2014 (Financial Processes Annex).

NICFI made a second payment to the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund in 2011 although the bulk of funds from the 2010 disbursement were still uncommitted to an approved project pipeline. The evaluation team has found no evidence of a parliamentary exemption for this and we presume it was approved by the minister (Financial Processes Annex).


Although it is correct practice according to the regulations to seek exemptions when there are discrepancies between political objectives and the established rules, this practice created dissent between the then Ministry of Environment and the NICFI Secretariat, responsible for the technical direction of NICFI, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was responsible to Parliament for the use of NICFI funds, according to informants. The Office of the Auditor General in its 2013 report on NICFI commented unfavourably on NICFI making payments to development banks when it was unclear that these funds were really needed.

All exemptions and divergences from normal practice were undertaken with the approval of either the relevant minister, or from Parliament. No breaches have been identified by the evaluation team. The new budget states that NICFI is likely to require more exemptions from regulations, so divergence from normal practice is accepted by the new government as being necessary for NICFI to operate (Financial Processes Annex).

In May 2014 the Norwegian Ministry of Finance submitted a proposal to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) that seeks to address the problems described in the previous paragraphs. It proposes criteria for full disbursement of results based payments without the need to request an exemption from Parliament and for ex-ante disbursement to multilateral organisations for future payments for verified emissions reductions (e.g. The FCPF Carbon Fund and the BioCarbon Fund)\(^\text{30}\).

In addition to the challenges associated with the disbursement regulations, there have been additional challenges associated with the conditions on reporting of aid. In order for funds to be reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s-Development Advisory Committee (OECD-DAC) as official development assistance (aid), the funds have to have left the donor country. This created a difficulty in reporting the allocated but undisbursed accumulation of results based payments to Brazil as aid. Norway’s initial position was that this could be undertaken when the money was deposited as promissory notes. The OECD position - which Norway accepted (and post facto adjusted its earlier reporting to conform to) - was that reporting could only take place once the money was paid into a BNDES-controlled account (Financial Processes Annex).

**Finding 13.** Disbursements from some of the multi-contributor trust funds to final recipients have been slower and lower than anticipated because portfolio development and delivery has been slower than initially expected

Expenditure from the FCPF Readiness Fund has been slow in relation to funds received from donors. By the end of 2013 cumulative expenditures (funds disbursed) amounted to only 13% of the Readiness Fund budget, although 91% of the funds are committed (Financial Processes Annex), so the disbursement...
rate should increase over the coming years. Over 98% of the Carbon Fund remains uncommitted, but as discussed under Finding 10, this is to be expected, considering the early stage of REDD+ readiness achieved so far in most partner countries. It is open to question whether the level of support to the carbon fund at this stage was fully justified even on the grounds of showing clear commitment by donors.

With regards to the Forest Investment Programme, 85% of funds are unused, although funds committed increased from 22% at the end of 2012 to 42% at the end of 2013, reflecting increasing progress with project preparation and approvals. The disbursement rate of the Congo Basin Forest Fund has also been slow, but has increased over recent years. By early 2014 36% of funds had been disbursed, and while the CBFF still holds considerable cash reserves, only 11% of its funds are uncommitted (Financial Processes Annex).

Expenditure has been slightly faster in the UN-REDD programme. As of February 2014, UN-REDD reported 34% of the pledged amount as expenditure and had committed 68% of the funds pledged to it by donors (Financial Processes Annex).

In the case of both the Amazon Fund (Brazil) and the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), the process of building a pipeline of approvable projects has been slow (see Brazil Annex, Guyana Annex and Financial Processes Annex) and this has led to disbursement being lower than expected by this time.

**Finding 14. Financial management processes are robust in mitigating against corruption risk within the NICFI portfolio**

The financial controls applied have been sufficient to mitigate against corruption risks in the bilateral partnerships and that for the multilaterals and civil society scheme, analysis of the financial management capacity of the partners and their ability to tackle potential corruption risks was used in the decision-making around fund allocations (Brazil Annex, Guyana Annex, Tanzania Annex, Civil Society Support Annex).

In Brazil, all the stakeholders interviewed on this topic acknowledged that the administrator of the Amazon Fund, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) has a solid reputation for fiduciary risk management and no claims of corruption or illegality have been raised against the institution or the Amazon Fund to date. Strictness of procedures, often seen as an excess of bureaucracy, appear to have been successful in ensuring funds are well managed and in some cases were noted in raising the management standards of grantees (Brazil Annex).

In Tanzania, funds were disbursed through a range of partners but financial management capacity was considered when selecting these. The Royal Norwegian Embassy was responsible for the management of the funds and had put a number of fiduciary risk controls in place. These included i) conducting
regular audits; ii) hiring an independent organisation to perform special audits when the Embassy sees the need for more information, clarity or suspected weaknesses or mismanagement; and iii) carrying out unscheduled visits to the project partners to review financial record-keeping. As a result, they were able to identify and correct cases of misuse of funds in pilot projects. The WWF project was suspended for one year due to misuse of finance, but has since put in place additional safeguards to meet Norwegian requirements and has been able to continue. The contract with the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania was terminated due to failure to meet contractual obligations (Tanzania Annex).

In Indonesia, funds have been channelled through UNDP and are subject to UNDP’s standards for fiduciary management, which are internationally accepted. The NICFI funded civil society projects are required to submit to an annual independent audit of funds and no irregularities have been found among the Indonesian components of the portfolio to date. However, the continued effective management of fiduciary risks will depend on the management of the new REDD+ financial mechanism (FREDDI). It is not yet clear where this fund will be located (Indonesia Annex).

3.3 NICFI Core Objective 1. To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime

Synopsis
This core objective addresses the following issues:

- Progress towards an agreement on REDD+ within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
- Establishment of an international architecture for REDD+, including the operational architecture for mobilising resources and processes established to ensure successful outcomes;
- The establishment of a 'ground swell' and momentum for REDD+ within the international community.

The NICFI efforts towards achievement of this objective have been a great success. NICFI has contributed to the engagement of a large number of REDD+ and donor countries, has made a substantial contribution to the development of the operational architecture for REDD+, has been instrumental in the progress of the REDD+ negotiations under the UNFCCC, and has leveraged political support for REDD+ through its flagship bilateral agreements. Uncertainty over the future of an international climate change regime remains a significant limiting factor for REDD+ but is beyond the scope of NICFI.
Finding 15. NICFI is the largest REDD+ donor globally supporting all available multilateral channels and seven bilateral programmes across Africa, Asia, Central and South America

Norway has pledged the majority of funds for REDD+, 63% of all funds pledged globally. Norway has also supported all the relevant multilateral REDD+ channels (CBFF; FCPF Readiness Fund and Carbon Fund; FIP; UN-REDD Programme), many of these from their inception. It has pledged 85% of total funds pledged to UN-REDD, 36% of funds pledged to the FCPF readiness fund, 44% of funds pledged to FCPF Carbon Fund and 24% of total funds pledged to the FIP (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program and UN-REDD Programme Annexes). NICFI also contributed 45% of the total funds available to the Congo Basin Forest Fund (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex). Bilateral partnerships have also been established with seven REDD+ countries: Brazil, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico, Tanzania and Vietnam.

Finding 16. NICFI has made a substantial contribution to the development of the operational architecture for REDD+ and the engagement of a large number of REDD+ and donor countries

The multilateral architecture developed to support REDD+ readiness Phases 1 and 2 includes the World Bank FCPF Readiness Fund, FIP, Biocarbon Fund, United Nations agencies (FAO, UNDP, UNEP) collaborating under the UN-REDD Secretariat. NICFI is a major donor of each of the initiatives.

Together, FCPF, FIP and UN-REDD Programme provide a means of managing donor contributions for the implementation of the core elements required of an interim institutional framework for REDD+. These institutions have developed an international framework for REDD+ readiness by establishing the key requirements of Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and Safeguard Information Systems, and defined a methodology to enable results-based payments to be made. They have also developed knowledge and guidance on key elements of REDD+ Readiness, and supported REDD+ readiness progress in a large number of countries (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Forest Investment Program and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

UN-REDD started with support only from Norway in 2008. Since then five other donors have pledged funds (Denmark 2009; then Spain 2010; Japan 2011; Luxembourg and the European Union in 2013) (UN-REDD Programme Annex). The FCPF Readiness Fund has received contributions from 14 developed countries plus the European Commission, while the Carbon Fund has had contributions from seven developed countries plus the European Commission, two private sector participants and one non-governmental organisation.

31 http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/themes/redd/TOC-Who-is-pledging-and-depositing-in-REDD-funds-
It is worth noting that the contribution of the Congo Basin Forest Fund to the architecture is currently limited by its operational difficulties (see Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex). Whilst it is considered as having a potentially important role in responding to the particular governance and forest context in the continent, unless it can demonstrate its ability to deliver results, it will struggle to attract further donor support to enable it to contribute to the REDD+ architecture in future.

Interview data from donors and multilateral staff note the importance of Norwegian financial support to the development of this architecture, but also positive contributions made by Norwegian representatives in the governing bodies of each of these multilaterals (High Level Informants Annex; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex; UN-REDD Programme Annex).

NICFI’s bilateral partnerships cover Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania, which were included in this evaluation, together with Ethiopia, Mexico and Vietnam, which were not. Through its partnerships in Brazil and Indonesia alone, NICFI aims to influence national governments responsible for 15% of the world’s forested land area and some 55% of GHG emissions from deforestation. The other four countries account for only a further 3% and include a wider range of country contexts and forest types.

Through its bilateral partnerships NICFI has also supported development of REDD+ Phase 3 financial mechanisms including: establishment of the world’s first dedicated multi-contributor REDD+ financial mechanism (the Amazon Fund); establishment of the first national multi-contributor REDD+ financial mechanism (the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund) (Annexes on Brazil and Guyana). More recently, commitments to the World Bank’s Biocarbon Fund and the German-led REDD+ Early Movers Initiative demonstrate that NICFI is still interested in testing new modalities and expanding its global reach.

The bilateral agreement and results-based payments made by NICFI in Brazil were also cited as important in generating lessons learned for methodological development, for example around the Carbon Fund Methodological Framework (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

The financial commitments from Norway and REDD+ allies have enabled widespread engagement in REDD+. There are currently 58 countries engaged in REDD+ readiness activities. The FCPF is working with 36 countries rather than 20 as initially planned. UN-REDD has engaged with 49 countries, with 31 of these countries engaged in both FCPF and UN-REDD processes (UN-REDD Programme Annex; Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).
Finding 17. Key decisions have been made on REDD+ in the UNFCCC climate change negotiations. Norway\textsuperscript{35} has been instrumental to this progress and decisions reached under the UNFCCC align well with Norway’s vision of REDD+

The UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ culminated in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (December 2013), which concluded negotiations on REDD+ Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and safeguards, and created a framework for REDD+ financing. Agreements have been made on seven key areas: finance; co-ordination of support; monitoring systems; reference levels; safeguards; MRV and drivers of deforestation.

Most elements of the UNFCCC negotiations on REDD+ elements have proceeded rapidly compared with other areas of the negotiations. Norway is regarded by evaluation informants as having played a very important role in the UNFCCC REDD+ negotiations and was credited by many observers as being instrumental to the rate of progress (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex). NICFI financed foundational studies, created opportunities for knowledge-sharing and relationship building between REDD+ negotiators and, crucially, used experience from operational partnerships to formulate submissions (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex; Lincoln et al. 2013). NICFI’s financial commitments helped build trust in the viability of REDD+ (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex).

The Norwegian negotiators are highly regarded within the international community (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex). All high level interviewees and negotiators noted that the negotiation team is well prepared, delivers consistent messages, and makes substantial effort to develop common ground in side meetings and offline workshops (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex). A number of interviewees mentioned that the Norwegian negotiators were often effective in reaching positive outcomes when chairing discussions (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex).

Norway’s vision of REDD+ in a post-Kyoto framework as outlined in its submissions to the UNFCCC contains the following characteristics:

• National level approach;

\textsuperscript{35} Norway rather than NICFI is used here to separate the national negotiation input from the NICFI specific.
• Phased progression towards results-based financial flows, whether from aid, markets or other sources, recognising the need to build necessary capacities and governance structures within participating countries;

• Robust systems for measurement, reporting and verification to underpin the results-based financial flows;

• Safeguards for local communities and indigenous populations and an emphasis on protecting biodiversity in natural forests.

Many of the elements included in Norway’s submissions to the UNFCCC are reflected in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+. Norway’s strongest contributions were in suggesting the Phased Approach\(^\text{36}\), which is fundamental to accommodating the needs of countries with different starting points in terms of levels of forest governance and technical capacity; and on MRV, where Norway has been instrumental to the achievement of agreement on a robust verification process (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex).

**Finding 18. The announcement of large flagship commitments through the bilateral partnerships has leveraged political support for REDD+ nationally and globally**

Whilst, all respondents note that the scale of financing provided by Norway is important, several donor and multilateral stakeholders, along with many national stakeholders, also highlighted that the charismatic scale of flagship bilateral pledges had generated a political profile that created momentum internationally and leveraged political support domestically.

Whilst Brazil had initiated the establishment of the Amazon Fund before the Norwegian commitment, Norway made the first and most high profile commitment to the fund that capitalised it and hence made it operational. Media reports (such as Reuters, 2008) on the Norwegian pledge to the Fund highlight the ‘one billion’ commitment and stress both the domestic and global implications of the pledge which include increased pressure on both Brazil and the global REDD+ process to deliver results. Interviews with Brazilian stakeholders also highlighted the local and global importance of the Fund, noting that it provided the first example of how national payments for emissions reductions could be managed at a large scale. Norway’s relationship with Brazil is seen as instrumental by high level informants (other donors, negotiators, international REDD+ actors) in engaging other Amazon basin countries in REDD+ (High Level Informants Annex). It also cemented Brazil’s role as a major player in the international REDD+ negotiations.

\(^{36}\) Formally decided at COP-16 in Cancun, this approach outlines a flexible and progressive path towards full-scale implementation of REDD+. Phase 1 relates to Readiness activities – the preparation of national REDD+ strategies and policies. Phase 2 is the Implementation and Investment Phase where these strategies and policies are implemented. Phase 3 is the phase in which countries can receive performance-based payments for emissions reductions.
A similar Flagship Effect can be observed in relation to the Indonesia – Norway bilateral agreement on REDD+ in Indonesia. Stakeholders interviewed agreed that the promise of US $1 billion provided the political leverage necessary to establish the REDD+ Task Force and ultimately the REDD+ Agency outside of existing institutions. Key activities established by the Task Force such as the Moratorium, the One Map programme, the review of licences, were also perceived by informants as a critical result of the political leverage gained through the bilateral agreement, and not considered to have been possible without the “charismatic” US $1 billion commitment.

3.4 NICFI Core Objective 2. To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions

Synopsis
Core Objective 2 covers readiness preparations; establishment of the ‘building blocks’ and systems required for achievement of verified emission reductions; and verified emission reductions achieved to date through the NICFI portfolio.

The most substantial contribution to emissions reductions, through stimulus to the national policy debate and changes, have come from Brazil although this cannot be attributed only to the partnership with Norway, as action to reduce deforestation was underway before this partnership was in place. Good progress has been made with preparatory work that could result in substantial emissions reductions in Indonesia although this remains fragile, especially in light of the elections in 2014. Guyana has delivered satisfactory performance on avoided deforestation, although there is a need to more strongly address mining as a driver of deforestation. In Tanzania, NICFI support has catalysed a large number of REDD+ activities; however, readiness outcomes are limited by a lack of national government ownership and decision making. NICFI support through the multilateral institutions has contributed to the engagement of a large number of countries in REDD+ readiness planning; however readiness progress made is highly variable between countries.

In terms of the establishment of systems and processes for REDD+, NICFI has made a major contribution to progress on REDD+ Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and reference levels, an important contribution to the establishment of country level REDD+ financial mechanisms; a strong contribution to safeguards development and has generated useful learning for others.

Finding 19. Brazil has exhibited a strongly decreasing deforestation rate and corresponding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Activities established through NICFI’s payments for these results are also paving the way for future emissions reductions
Brazil successfully avoided deforestation of 6.2 million hectares between 2007 and 2013, averting three billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions (Brazil Annex) and generating large results based payments from NICFI. Emissions were decreasing as a result of national policy changes and other national activities prior to 2007, and there is no counterfactual that can illustrate the likely trajectory of change in the absence of the NICFI support, which is channelled through the Amazon Fund.

Nonetheless, the financial support provided by NICFI can be seen to have produced a significant stimulus to policy debates on deforestation and emission reductions in Brazil (McNeish et al. 2011). Most stakeholders interviewed in late 2013 acknowledged that participation in the REDD+ debate has become a priority for policy-makers and civil society organisations involved in climate and forests issues and much of this is down to the prominence of the Amazon Fund. Stakeholders in Brazil identify the Amazon Fund (to which NICFI was the first and is the largest donor) as having been influential on the development of other elements of Brazil’s national low carbon framework: the National Policy on Climate Change; voluntary commitments to reduce emissions; and the Climate Change Fund (Brazil Annex).

Stakeholders also pointed out that one of the major contributions of the Amazon Fund has been in supporting state-level programmes to reduce, control and monitor deforestation, and regard these as valuable. Around 17% of the Amazon Fund projects include emissions reductions objectives, paving the way for achievement of future emission reductions (Brazil Annex).

Projects supported by the Amazon Fund are contributing to improved forest monitoring in Brazil and other Amazon Basin countries. The Environmental Mapping and Registration of Rural Individual Properties Initiative (known as CAR) was piloted through the Amazon Fund and has since become national policy through Federal Law (Brazil Annex).

According to Brazilian civil society, Federal and State Environmental agencies, the CAR Initiative is regarded as a key tool that will enable Brazil to maintain current lowered deforestation rates and possibly achieve further decreases. The Initiative is also enhancing monitoring and enforcement capacities at the national, state and local levels. According to the Amazon Fund Annual Reports, supported projects are expected to improve monitoring and reporting over more than 66 million hectares, including through a satellite imagery project that aims to strengthen monitoring in the entire Amazon region, including all seven border countries (Brazil Annex).

The Amazon Fund is contributing to developing practical capacity for REDD+ both nationally and in the other Amazon Basin countries. It has financed projects that, once completed, are expected to have trained over 20,000 people from 149 public and private sector institutions on aspects including using monitoring technologies to fight illegal deforestation, forest fire control for fire brigades, and sustainable forest management practices. It also funds 17 courses on monitoring
technologies that will be delivered in neighbouring Amazonian countries. Different actors commented on the relevance of these activities to strengthening governance and assisting other countries to build their capacity (Brazil Annex).

Finding 20. In Guyana, technical and institutional pre-requisites for verifying avoided deforestation and degradation have been achieved, but much more action is required to mitigate the impact of mining as the main driver of deforestation

The Guyana-Norway partnership has been highly successful at developing a national-level monitoring, reporting and verification system, and reasonably successful at developing a financial mechanism for REDD+ payments. The system has now successfully completed three rounds of reporting and independent verification, and two rounds of payments have been made to the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund.

Guyana is the first country to have a REDD+ funding mechanism that operates at the national-scale, however, there are on-going concerns with the speed of disbursement, and further reform and development of the mechanism is needed as at present it does not represent a functioning ‘model’. There is also a lack of tangible interventions that directly address the expansion of mining, which is a key driver of deforestation in Guyana and a key part of the national economy (Guyana Annex).

Finding 21. With NICFI support, Indonesia has made good progress on readiness planning, establishment of an institutional framework for REDD+ and design of the systems and processes required to implement REDD+

The timeline as envisioned in the Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway slipped badly. Nevertheless, the Second Verification Report of the bilateral agreement with Indonesia (Caldecott et al., 2013) concluded that it is actually more of a wonder that so much has been achieved so quickly given its complexity and pioneering nature, and that it is working against “turbulent political headwinds” (Indonesia Annex).

Informants to this evaluation felt that the over-ambitious timeline, and consequent failure to meet that timeline, caused embarrassment nationally and internationally and was damaging the effort to engender public will for REDD+ and in hindsight was probably a result of an overly rapid partnership establishment process. An over ambitious timeline was also identified as a risk for the Interim Phase, with the Norwegian Embassy requesting that the REDD+ Agency check the feasibility of their plans (Indonesia Annex). This is a critical point given the fragility of the progress made in Indonesia and need to generate strong District and Provincial level support for REDD+, whilst countering the frustrations at sub-national level that are a result of, in some cases

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The Amazon Fund is the first REDD+ financial mechanism, but it operates at sub-national scale.
unrealistically raised expectations. As pointed out by NICFI, there is also likely to have been an upside to the ambitious timeline through introduction of urgency and political momentum and the evaluation team acknowledges that there is a fine line between ambitious and over-ambitious.

Many of the key structural systems and elements for REDD+ implementation have been designed under Phase 1 of the Indonesia- Norway bilateral agreement. These include a national REDD+ financial mechanism; an MRV system (with contributions from the UN-REDD Indonesia country programme and FCPF readiness grant); safeguards and a safeguards information system. These are anticipated to become operational during Phase 2 of the bilateral agreement (Indonesia Annex).

Substantial progress on REDD+ Phase 1 readiness planning has been made, with a National REDD+ Strategy and National REDD+ Action Plan developed; sub-national REDD+ strategies and action plans have been completed in seven provinces (necessary given the decentralised governance structure in Indonesia) and are under development in a further four provinces and several districts. Note however, that with 34 provinces and 500 districts in total in Indonesia, there is also a long way to go (Indonesia Annex).

Despite a difficult consensus-building process, important progress on the institutional arrangements for REDD+ in Indonesia has been made, with the REDD+ Agency established by Presidential Regulation in late 2013. Good progress has been made in establishing the means for measuring and reporting of emissions reductions and the institutional framework for MRV (Indonesia Annex).

NCFI support contributed to a broad range of piloting activities and there are complementarities between the bilateral support programme and NICFI supported civil society activities (Indonesia Annex).

Finding 22. Given the elections and weaknesses in the legal basis for REDD+, there is a serious risk that progress may slip backwards in Indonesia and achievements will be lost

There is insufficient specificity in political party platforms to be sure of the future political will to support REDD+. Existing institutions such as the REDD+ Agency are likely to survive given the limited precedent in Indonesia for dissolution of agencies; however, current key and effective personnel within such institutions may well be changed through the political appointment processes. While the Agency is likely to survive, its place in the institutional firmament is fragile. The coming months will be critical if it is to become an established institution; gaining political support will be crucial for this. Selection of REDD+ agency staff that are politically savvy and able to build constituencies among the line ministries are regarded by stakeholders as critical requirements for the success of the REDD+ Agency (Indonesia Annex).
The legal basis for REDD+ in Indonesia is not yet clear as there is no implementing regulation associated with the Environment Act of 2009, which includes imperatives to address climate change. In addition, important contradicting policies present a critical threat to REDD+. For example, the Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia's Economic Development (MP3EI) identifies expansion of oil palm and mining as key economic growth strategies which, without doubt, will result in deforestation (Indonesia Annex).

Although the REDD+ Agency is involved in an initiative to “green” the MP3EI (an initiative that also receives NICFI funding through the Global Green Growth Institute), the plan is considered by stakeholders to be major threat, and powerful contradiction, to the Indonesia REDD+ effort. There is also a lack of clear understanding on how the sub-national REDD+ strategies link with the major development planning, policies and instruments, which makes it difficult for sub-national government to know how to respond (Indonesia Annex).

Given these threats to progress, there is an urgent need to build supportive constituencies among the political parties and at the sub-national level to help maintain momentum for REDD+ (Indonesia Annex).

**Finding 23. In Tanzania, NICFI support has catalysed a large number of REDD+ activities; however, achievement of readiness outcomes has been limited by the lack of national government ownership and decision making**

NICFI support to Tanzania resulted in: i) the formation of the National REDD+ Task Force, which developed the National REDD+ strategy; ii) the approval of a National REDD+ strategy; iii) the initiation of nine pilot programmes and two research projects, one on research and development of methods for forest monitoring and MRV (with relevant use to other countries in the region) and another on Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation, and Mitigation; and iv) the decision for the National Carbon Monitoring Centre to be hosted at the Sokoine University of Agriculture. Support was also provided for a survey of Woody Biomass in Zanzibar (Tanzania Annex).

The National REDD+ strategy was developed by the National REDD+ Task force (NRTF), with the practical and organisational support of the NRTF-Secretariat hosted at the Institute of Resource Assessment at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Stakeholders noted that the national REDD+ strategy development was a positive consultative and participatory process albeit with some notable gaps. Plans to establish a national REDD+ financing mechanism (with some contribution from NICFI) have stalled due to a lack of political decision-making from national Government. Interviews undertaken by this evaluation suggest that there is doubt over the level of commitment on the part of the government to secure control of forest loss, as there is no consensus amongst high-level decision makers that this will benefit livelihoods and economic growth, particularly given that payments for results are unlikely to materialise in the near future (Tanzania Annex).
In contrast to the slow progress at the national level, all of the supported pilot projects claim improvements in forest management and three projects have collected data on emissions reductions that have been achieved. However, there are concerns around the cost-effectiveness of the emissions reductions achieved and the sustainability of activities undertaken (Tanzania Annex).

Finding 24. NICFI support through the multilateral institutions has contributed to the engagement of a large number of countries in REDD+ readiness planning; however readiness progress made is highly variable between countries

The World Bank and United Nations REDD+ architecture was established to enable progress on REDD+ prior to the agreement of an international climate deal within the negotiations. Although transition to results-based payments for national emissions reductions has not yet been achieved, the architecture has succeeded in initiating readiness activities in a large number of countries within a short timeframe (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

The extent of progress with readiness varies quite widely. FCPF initially proposed 20 REDD+ Country Participants and by April 2014, this had risen to 40. However, three of those countries effectively withdrew, leaving 37 actively engaged. UN-REDD has 18 partners with national programmes, of which 11 are also engaged with FCPF, but two of these 11 countries are inactive. As of April 2014 there were 44 countries actively engaged in readiness through the two initiatives (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

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<tr>
<th>FCPF countries (as of FCPF dashboard April 03, 2014)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Countries engaged with the FCPF programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Readiness Preparation Proposal Formulation Grant Agreements Signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Readiness Preparation Proposal Grant signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receiving disbursements against Readiness Preparation Proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emissions Reduction Programme Idea Note presented to the Carbon Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letter of intent signed to negotiate an Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement with the Carbon Fund</td>
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<th>UN-REDD country progress (as of December 2013)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Countries with agreements for National UN-REDD programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries receiving ‘targeted support’ from UN-REDD agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries having completed the first phase UN-REDD programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Countries with Phase II UN-REDD programme</td>
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38 Three additional countries (Bolivia, Gabon and Paraguay) were engaged with FCPF, but did not submit their Readiness Preparation Proposal and lost guaranteed access to RP-P funding (https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/redd-countries).

39 Of these 18 countries, 9 are also engaged with FCPF readiness. Two countries, Bolivia and Paraguay, are also nominally engaged with FCPF readiness but have not pursued this.
Currently Costa Rica is the only country that has signed a letter of intent to negotiate an Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement with the FCPF Carbon Fund. This agreement is likely to be worth up to US $63 million. Whilst this demonstrates the potential of REDD+ to reward countries with historically low deforestation rates, its impact on deforestation globally will be relatively small. The Democratic Republic of Congo has drafted an Emissions Reduction Programme Idea Note and eight other countries (Chile, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, Ghana, Nepal, Republic of Congo and Vietnam) have presented early ideas (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

**Finding 25. NICFI has made a major contribution to the development of international policy and bilateral partners’ progress on REDD+ Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and Reference Levels, although extent of country progress has been mixed**

NICFI’s work on MRV and reference levels has made a major contribution to the debate on these issues at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. The activities supported by NICFI have provided valuable practical lessons on MRV and reference levels and relevant research (Lincoln et al. 2013). These lessons have enabled Norway to develop crucial evidence-based submissions to the UNFCCC to clarify aspects of MRV for negotiators, and have been viewed by negotiators as valuable for their discussions (Lincoln et al. 2013).

In 2013, the Real-Time Evaluation found that NICFI investments had enabled the bilateral partner countries to make progress on the ‘measurement’ aspects of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). The evaluation also noted that in most countries receiving bilateral NICFI support, progress had also been made on reference level development, but less had been done on reporting and verification. As of 2013 analysis, UN-REDD had received 47% of total NICFI spending in this area (Lincoln et al. 2013).

In reviewing the documentation for this synthesis evaluation, no consolidated outcome-level data were found that would enable an evaluation of UN-REDD country progress on MRV development. However, output reporting highlighted that a framework has been approved by the UN-REDD policy board for National Forest Monitoring Systems: Monitoring and Measurement, Reporting and Verification and that a wide range of tools, activities and training sessions have been delivered, which according to UN-REDD reports reached more than 20 countries in 2013 (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

NICFI bilateral support on MRV varies between countries according to context and need. The 2013 Real-time Evaluation on NICFI contributions to MRV highlighted some of the achievements and challenges in relation to NICFI support to MRV. In Indonesia, NICFI funding has supported the planning of the MRV system, as well as a number of significant technical and technological advancements. Clear progress has been made against Indonesia’s baseline
forest monitoring capability in 2009 particularly in carbon stock assessment (Lincoln et al. 2013).

In Guyana, NICFI support had been highly effective in developing the national MRV system and reference level. In Guyana there was also evidence that MRV data were used more broadly than for MRV to support forest management, for example in monitoring compliance with harvest plans and to assist with monitoring mining operations (Lincoln et al. 2013).

In Tanzania there has been a modest improvement to forest monitoring capabilities, and a range of studies, surveys and research have been conducted that either provide necessary data for MRV or trial approaches to elements of MRV. Whilst noting that NICFI set out to contribute to MRV in Tanzania, rather than develop the full MRV system, wider progress has been limited for several reasons (Lincoln et al. 2013).

**Finding 26. NICFI has provided an important contribution to the establishment of country level REDD+ financial mechanisms and generated useful learning for others**

In three of the four focal countries of this evaluation, substantial progress had been made on establishing a financial mechanism to receive and manage REDD+ payments. In addition, there is some evidence that multilateral REDD+ readiness support is supporting some countries to develop financial mechanisms.

Brazil’s sub-national REDD+ financial mechanism Amazon Fund was created in August 2008 as a nationally managed mechanism for accepting and using payments received for verified results achieved. The Brazilian REDD+ negotiators frequently cite the Amazon Fund in UNFCCC meetings as a demonstration of how a REDD+ mechanism may work (Brazil Annex).

The Amazon Fund is the world’s first REDD+ financial mechanism. NICFI was the first contributor to the Amazon Fund and is, so far, its largest donor. It accepts payments that reward Brazil for past emissions reductions and has played a vital role in demonstrating to the world how a performance-based mechanism can work. However, it is important to highlight that interviewees do not regard the Amazon Fund as a REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism, since the transfer of resources to stakeholders is mediated by project approval procedures (Brazil Annex).

Whilst the establishment of the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF) through the Guyana – Norway bilateral agreement is a valuable contribution in its own right, the slow disbursement of funds from the GRIF is one of the greatest concerns about the Guyana-Norway partnership raised by informants. The main reason for the delay appears to be the time required to work through the World Bank’s (or Inter-American Development Bank, or United Nations Development Programme) procedures, including their safeguard compliance
processes. In addition to the safeguard compliance process, informants also suggested that some delays may be due to slow sign-off by the Guyana Ministry of Finance and the limited number of personnel available to develop the project pipeline in the Guyanese Project Management Office. There was also some confusion among informants regarding the extent to which the expenditure approved by Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund Steering Committee would subsequently also go through a national parliamentary approval-by-voting process – apparently in an attempt to allow the Government of Guyana to report Norwegian funds as being part of their (published) national finances. This has given scope for opposition parties to ‘block’/vote against expenditure for the Low Carbon Development Strategy activities they feel have been politicised by the government.

Almost all the stakeholders expressed concern about the slow disbursement of payments from the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund, and this was cited as one of the barriers to implementing the enabling actions agreed to in the Joint Concept Note and has also threatened the political and public acceptance of the Guyana-Norway partnership (Guyana Annex).

In Indonesia, a national financial mechanism (FREDDI) has been designed, primarily through the bilateral agreement, but also through UN-REDD country programme contributions. This will focus initially as a granting entity, with four windows of disbursement covering both national and subnational programmes, competitive calls and small grants to community initiatives. The REDD+ Agency has been given legal authority to constitute FREDDI. The Indonesian government used lessons from the Amazon Fund and from the GRIF in developing the design of FREDDI (Indonesia Annex).

In Tanzania, the national financial mechanism is not yet in place. This is partly due to a lack of consensus on where the Fund would be located or which organization would host the modality. NICFI financial support to this was limited and directed towards identifying options for the Government of Tanzania to consider, rather than financing the entire enterprise. No major donor support has been leveraged for REDD+ work via the Government of Tanzania and there is, several Government stakeholders reported, a consequent “lack of urgency” in developing this mechanism (Tanzania Annex).

NICFI has been involved in the design of the FCPF Carbon Fund (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). UN-REDD has also supported the creation of the Democratic Republic of Congo National REDD Fund, which was launched as ready to receive contributions in 2013. FCPF Country Progress sheets do not necessarily attribute achievements to particular implementation modalities, but noted progress on the development of national finance mechanisms being made in Colombia, Costa Rica, Kenya, Nepal, and Nicaragua (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

Although there is serious concern about the impact of the delays, a number of stakeholders also commented that they believe the safeguard processes are important and necessary, particularly with regard to the financial safeguards (Guyana Annex).
NICFI support to civil society has also enabled testing of local-level financial incentives and benefit-sharing mechanisms. For example, Rainforest Foundation Norway supported the Shuar People’s Association in Ecuador to establish a decentralised mechanism for distributing funds from Ecuador’s national REDD+ programme to community members (Civil Society Support Annex).

Finding 27. NICFI has made a strong contribution to safeguards development through contributions to the UNFCCC negotiations, and through its bilateral, multilateral and civil society support channels

Norway’s submission to the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-operative Action (UNFCCC, 2008) outlined an early vision for REDD+ that included safeguards for local communities, indigenous peoples and biodiversity and Norway consistently argued for the inclusion of REDD+ safeguards. Norway provided co-funding to the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity to establish a workshop series on the need for biodiversity safeguards in a future REDD+ agreement and also hosted, and provided funding for, a Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice expert workshop on safeguards in 2011 (UNFCCC Negotiations Annex). Several of the civil society funded projects were involved in high level advocacy around REDD+ safeguards in the UNFCCC negotiations (Hardcastle et al. 2012). Although attribution is not possible, these activities clearly contributed to the Cancún Agreements of 2010 on requirements for safeguards and the near finalisation of the safeguard negotiations with the Warsaw Framework in 2013; there are still some limited negotiations over the content of the safeguards reporting scheduled for Lima in December 2014.

The multilateral REDD+ institutions supported by NICFI have established overarching frameworks for REDD+ safeguards that can be used by REDD+ countries. The Common Approach to Environmental and Social Safeguards, developed by the FCPF and UN-REDD has established norms for REDD+ safeguards that apply across the activities of the two institutions. The UN-REDD Programme has developed a set of Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria, which outline seven overarching principles and 24 specific criteria for safeguarding against unintended negative impacts of REDD+ (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

Guidelines to help national programme participants adhere to the principles and criteria have also been developed, along with a social principles risk assessment tool and policy briefs on putting REDD+ safeguards into practice. The FCPF had analysed how to best use the information generated from the application of safeguards as inputs into the UNFCCC-required national Safeguard Information Systems (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

As of December 2013, four countries with UN-REDD National Programmes are working on national approaches to safeguards (Indonesia, Ecuador, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Philippines), supported to varying degrees by UN-REDD tools. The UN-REDD programme has also developed a policy brief on putting
safeguards and safeguard information systems into practice and provided support to countries through regional workshops and support to at least six countries. A target of the Congo Basin Forest Fund is that five Central African Forestry Commission (COMIFAC) countries will have social and environmental safeguards in place by 2018 (Congo Basin Forest Fund and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

Work on establishing safeguards in Indonesia and Tanzania has been undertaken through the bilateral agreements with those countries. The design of the Indonesian safeguards, PRISAI, is now completed (Indonesia and Tanzania Annexes).

NICFI civil society support has also contributed to the development and implementation of national safeguards: HuMa (the Indonesian Association for Community and Ecology Based Law Reform), a national partner of the Rainforest Foundation Norway project was supported to contribute to the design of the Indonesian safeguards; Care Norway has promoted the implementation of REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards in nine REDD+ countries, with five other countries expressing interest in the approach, as well as sub-national governments in three countries. There are also 16 projects with a focus on safeguards in the 2013-2015 civil society portfolio (Civil Society Support Annex).

**Finding 28. The multilateral institutions in particular have been active in addressing systems for grievance redress**

In 2013 the UN-REDD Programme produced early guidance materials on grievance mechanisms in REDD+; has undertaken capacity building on grievance mechanisms Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Suriname; and initial scoping of national grievance mechanism in Cambodia. The FCPF has undertaken capacity building activities focused on grievance redress and undertaken analysis to identify the enabling features needed for an effective REDD+ feedback and grievance redress mechanism (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

Grievance mechanisms are recognised as necessary in the Tanzania REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards, though these are not yet under development. Some of the Tanzanian NICFI funded pilot projects have addressed grievance and conflict resolution issues at the project scale (Tanzania Annex).

**Finding 29. NICFI support has encouraged broad stakeholder engagement in REDD+; however, in many countries there has not yet been sufficient engagement with the private sector or with finance or agriculture ministries**

The independent evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme highlights its “ground-breaking work” in enabling indigenous people and civil society to influence global discussions. UN-REDD has worked with national and local stakeholder
networks and representative mechanisms to consult with and inform stakeholder
groups in Cambodia, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Ecuador, Honduras, Myanmar, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and the Republic of
Congo (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

The NICFI civil society portfolio has provided a strong contribution to civil
society engagement in REDD+. The real-time evaluation of NICFI Support to
Civil Society Organisations (Hardcastle et al. 2012) noted that Rainforest
Foundation Norway in Democratic Republic of Congo had brought full
Congolese civil society participation and involvement in developing the national
REDD+ strategy and all of its components.

Indonesian civil society has made a strong contribution to design elements of
REDD+, and key civil society actors have received support through NICFI civil
society funding towards this. The Rainforest Foundation Norway project
(Rainforest Foundation Norway, 2013) facilitated the participation of Indonesian
civil society partners in meetings on the readiness preparation proposals under
UN-REDD and FCPF, and its national partner, AMAN’s, advocacy around the
Indonesia Forest Investment Program Strategy. The project also supported
national partner, Warsi, to advocate on key issues in the Provincial REDD+
strategies of Jambi, West Sumatra and central Sulawesi (Indonesia Annex).

The importance of NICFI support to civil society in enhancing the capacity of
indigenous people and civil society to participate in the development of the
institutional arrangements at global and local level was also noted by interview
respondents (Civil Society Support Annex).

NICFI’s support to civil society also promotes some private sector participation
in REDD+. The Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) project of the
2009-2012 civil society support portfolio enabled an analysis of changes needed
in the commodity roundtables for soy, palm oil and sugar to facilitate REDD+.
There are twelve projects involving private sector commodity producers in the
2013-2015 civil society fund portfolio that will continue this work (Civil Society
Support Annex).

However, there are indications that private sector involvement is inadequate in
NICFI’s partner countries. For example, in Tanzania, several stakeholders
highlighted the importance of private sector involvement and noted their minimal
engagement. In Indonesia, the need to enhance inclusion of private sector
players was identified as a key strategic issue in the Second Verification Report
of the bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Norway at the end of 2013
(Indonesia and Tanzania Annexes).

The 2011 NICFI real-time evaluation and the 2014 independent evaluation of the
UN-REDD Programme noted that the absence of the private sector and of
ministries responsible for finance, planning, agriculture, industry, commerce and
education in planning discussions limited the extent of policy reform possible
(UN-REDD Programme Annex).
The World Bank’s internal review of the FCPF highlighted that the REDD+ readiness process is a more expensive, complex, and time-consuming process than originally envisaged because of the challenge of engaging more powerful and better funded agriculture, energy and transport ministries and because of the frequent changes in government administrations. The independent evaluation highlighted that continued efforts to engage non-sector ministries (agriculture, finance and rural development) would be needed to address long-standing problems that have negatively impacted on the forest sector (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

3.5 NICFI Core Objective 3. To promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity

Synopsis
This section covers direct and indirect results achieved by NICFI in the promotion of natural forest conservation.

The NICFI portfolio is providing a substantial contribution towards achievement of this core objective. In addition to good progress with safeguards in the negotiations, and through bilateral and multilateral partnerships, there has been direct contribution through the bilateral agreements and civil society projects.

Finding 30. The NICFI portfolio is providing a substantial, direct contribution towards the conservation of natural forests, from project-scale pilots to the establishment of new conservation forests

Pilot projects receiving support through NICFI civil society support with demonstration activities at the field level have focused on natural forest conservation and management. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) NICFI supported work in the Congo Basin, Peru and Indonesia focuses on the design of pilots and accessing finance to conserve natural forest. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) project supported village development planning processes in Indonesia that have secured the protection of 15,000 hectares of biodiversity rich forest and WWF have recently made efforts to secure “land swaps” with local oil palm and timber concessionaires to take high biodiversity forest out of their production areas. The 2013-2015 portfolio applications from WWF, TNC and Rights and Resources Initiative also specify planned outcomes in relation to the conservation of natural forests. Rainforest Foundation Norway has supported its local partner to work within Ecuador’s Socio Bosque programme to protect 89,500 ha of forest (Civil Society Support and Indonesia Annexes).

Eight out of nine of the NICFI-funded pilot projects implemented by civil society organisations in Tanzania, focused on protection of natural forest or developing tools to improve monitoring of carbon dynamics and change in natural forest. In all Tanzania pilot sites specific interventions have been implemented to address the drivers of deforestation. These include activities to promote natural forest
conservation such as facilitation of community forest management and conservation, fire protection and systematic early burning practices (Tanzania Annex).

Through the Congo Basin Forest Fund, projects address security and development threats to natural forest in Campo Ma’an National Park in Cameroon and Luki Forest Reserve in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finance has been provided through the Congo basin Forest fund for developing alternatives to firewood that may or may not have a direct impact of conserving natural forest. There is currently not enough evidence to demonstrate the impact of such financing but the initiatives are aimed at the protection of natural forest (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

On another scale, The Amazon Fund portfolio includes important activities with direct impact on the conservation of natural forests. The Amazon Fund project “Areas Protegidas da Amazônia – Fase 2”, once completed will have created a total of 13.5 million hectares of Protected Areas. The Fund is investing in projects to strengthen environmental management and control on existing public protected areas totalling 56 million hectares. A project has recently been approved for a forest inventory in the Amazon biome that covers 40% of the Brazilian territory. It is intended that the inventory will be used as a tool for informed decision making on natural forest protection (Brazil Annex).

In Indonesia, the Moratorium on new forest and peat land concessions and other governance products of the Indonesia–Norway bilateral agreement are an important step towards conservation of natural forest, although not yet fully effective (Indonesia Annex).

**Finding 31. The NICFI portfolio also includes activities that establish the ground work for forest conservation in REDD+ countries**

The UN-REDD Programme has also undertaken a number of activities that promote biodiversity issues in REDD+ design and implementation and are intended to contribute ultimately to the conservation of natural forests. For example: conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services is included in the UN-REDD Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria; biodiversity is a component of the UN-REDD ‘Planning for multiple benefits’ tool; and UN-REDD has published a policy brief on the 2020 Aichi biodiversity targets and their synergies with REDD+ (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is working towards a target that all national REDD+ strategies, monitoring systems and emissions reductions programmes incorporate biodiversity conservation indicators. No data are available as to how many national REDD+ strategies contain biodiversity indicators, but the REDD+ Strategy of the Democratic Republic of Congo is identified by the FCPF as a good practice example that contains indicators to

41 Although the total project cost is US$76 million the total financed by the Amazon Fund was US$9.3 million.
track progress towards biodiversity conservation in the national REDD+ process (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

All Forest Investment Program (FIP) investment plans are required to outline benefits related to biodiversity, soil and agriculture, water conservation, and climate resilience or adaptive capacity. All FIP pilot country participants are required to implement in line with the multilateral development banks’ safeguards, including on biodiversity, and as biodiversity features in the FIP results framework, FIP pilot countries are required to report on biodiversity outcomes (Forest Investment Program Annex).

In addition to the pilot demonstration activities operating in specific areas identified earlier it is worth noting the wide spectrum of readiness tools and systems that are the result of NICFI support covered under objective two and have been developed for future use in the improved conservation of natural forest.

**Finding 32. National and International Safeguard Systems developed and implemented through bilateral and multi-lateral NICFI support channels include criteria on natural forest and biodiversity conservation**

NICFI provided funding for a series of workshops on biodiversity and REDD+ established by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, that were described as ‘critical’ by informants in gaining consensus that biodiversity should be a component of the REDD+ safeguards that form the Cancún Agreements.

The UN-REDD programme and its respective strategy highlights the importance of integrating measures to conserve natural forests in national REDD+ strategies and in using safeguards on natural forest conservation in the programme’s delivery approach. The UN-REDD Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria prioritises natural forest conservation in Principle 5 and its two specific criteria (Criteria 12 and 13). Other criteria focus on biodiversity and ecosystem services which on paper also contribute to the protection of natural forest indirectly (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

Similarly the FCPF has supported countries to ensure that their National REDD+ Strategies promote the conservation of natural forest and will continue to require the application of safeguards to REDD+ activities. However, it remains to be seen how far these safeguards will be successfully implemented beyond the readiness phase of FCPF and UN-REDD. As yet there is no systematic information on the application of safeguards, for example those applied by the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

42 Criterion 12 – Ensure that REDD+ activities do not cause the conversion of natural forest, and do address the other causes of conversion. Criterion 13 – Minimize degradation of natural forest in order to maintain biodiversity and other key values.
Key elements of natural forest conservation and/or protection are included in national social and environmental safeguards for REDD+ of Indonesia (PRISAI), and the draft safeguards of Tanzania (Indonesia and Tanzania Annexes). Although there are no specific safeguards for Brazil these are covered by the guidelines for Amazon Fund projects by reference to ‘Enlargement of protected areas; management of public forests and protected areas; recovery of degraded areas, especially permanent protection areas and legal reserves’ (Brazil Annex).

In the 2009-2012 NICFI civil society support portfolio, funding to Care Norway was important in promoting the adoption of REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards in nine countries, which include “conservation of natural forests and biological diversity”. In the 2013-2015 civil society portfolio, there are 16 projects working on the implementation of safeguards which include the safeguard in relation to the protection of natural forests (Civil Society Support Annex).

3.6 Overarching Development Objective. Contribute towards the achievement of Norwegian development policy objectives

Synopsis
Progress with achievement of the development objectives has been more than simply avoiding harm and there are substantial examples of positive progress. Norway has promoted good governance strongly through its bilateral partnerships, within multilaterals and through its innovative and increasingly strategic Civil Society Fund.

Rights and tenure for indigenous peoples has been a major area of discussion and progress within REDD+ although there are issues relating to whether the interests of non-indigenous forest dependent peoples have been given sufficient attention.

The Forest Investment Programme in particular together with the Amazon Fund and some CBFF projects are addressing matters directly relevant to improving livelihoods and sustainable development.

Gender specific progress has been quite limited, despite strong interest from Norway. The main constraint appears to be the lack of understanding of gender issues and lack of capacity to deal with gender suggesting an alternative approach with greater concentration on capacity building may be required.

Finding 33. The need for good forest governance is addressed throughout the NICFI portfolio, and fundamental steps to improving forest governance have been taken by Indonesia through the Indonesia – Norway bilateral agreement

The need to address governance issues is embedded in the approach of the FCPF and UN-REDD Programme, which aims to ensure that it is given priority
focus by their partner countries in developing plans. The guidance provided to FCPF and UN-REDD country partners in developing their Readiness Preparation Proposals clearly specifies that countries should identify governance issues that need to be addressed. The FCPF Assessment Framework (2013) also requires the demonstration that action plans “make progress in the short-, medium- and long-term towards addressing … governance issues in priority regions” (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

The UN-REDD Programme and FCPF have also undertaken analyses of governance issues in relation to REDD+: The UN-REDD Programme has undertaken a Participatory Governance assessment in four of its partner countries; and the FCPF supported the production of an ‘Assessment of key governance issues for REDD+ implementation” through the implementation of the World Bank Program on Forests forest governance tool (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

Whilst the multilateral approach has focused on embedding forest governance issues at the heart of REDD+ readiness planning and activities, the comparatively larger funding available through the bilateral route has enabled fundamental steps towards improving Forest Governance in Indonesia to be taken by the government of Indonesia. These fundamental steps include: i) the establishment of a moratorium on the granting of new concessions in natural forest; ii) a review of existing forest licences; iii) the upcoming development of a new licencing system; and iv) a process for reconciling conflicting land use maps across different sectors and ministries (Indonesia Annex).

Through the bilateral agreement, efforts are underway to resolve overlapping licences, improve the system for issuance of licences, and transparency around the licencing system. At the end of the moratorium period, the expectation is to have two systems in place: one consolidated map of licences and land use claims, and a new land-use licencing system. The One Map initiative, established by the REDD+ Task Force under the bilateral agreement, is intended to resolve different maps from different sectors and contain in one place all relevant information linked to forest licencing and land use claims. This One Map is to be used as the reference map for land use decisions by all line ministries and other actors (Indonesia Annex).

New large-scale corporate licences have largely ceased to be issued in Moratorium areas with licence proposals covering around one million hectares rejected since the start of the moratorium. Through NICFI civil society support, Rainforest Foundation Norway’s partner, Walhi, has monitored implementation of the moratorium, collecting information on a non-compliant concessionaire in Tripa, Aceh. This contributed to a ‘landmark prosecution’ in which an Indonesian court found the concessionaire guilty of violating environmental laws (including the moratorium) and ordered it to pay US $ 30 million in fines and restoration costs (Indonesia Annex).
Identification of and review of land use permits is underway in three priority provinces (Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan and Jambi). A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Provincial Government of Central Kalimantan and the REDD+ Task Force in 2012 stipulating that all land use licences (for plantations, mining, forestry) issued in Central Kalimantan will be registered and the licence information centralised into a single online database system that can be accessed by the public. In 2013, a memorandum of understanding between UKP4/REDD+ Task Force, Governor of Jambi, and Governor of East Kalimantan was signed to resolve overlapping land use permits on plantations, forestry, and mining in their regions. The online licence database system is established in Central Kalimantan and is under establishment in East Kalimantan (Indonesia Annex).

These developments in Indonesia, though in many cases imperfect, are still recognised as being of critical value by the stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team. The system for reviewing all natural resource licenses is widely welcomed by all stakeholders consulted and seen as a major step to improving forest governance. Two stakeholders stated that five years ago they would not have imagined it possible that a moratorium and review of licences could be established. Another key civil society stakeholder regarded the One Map as a fundamental step forward, noting that civil society in Indonesia had been pushing for something similar for 10-15 years and nothing had made as much progress (Indonesia Annex).

Finding 34. Tackling corruption, forest crime and illegality is an important component of the NICFI bilateral agreement with Indonesia and the NICFI civil society support fund. The UN-REDD Programme also contributes in a supportive capacity

In Indonesia, where forest sector crime is a key driver of greenhouse gas emissions, addressing forest sector crime is a key component of the activities supported through the bilateral agreement. An important approach to tackling environment and natural resources related crime in Indonesia, the ‘Multi-Door Approach’ has been developed through the bilateral agreement. Such crimes are multi-dimensional and connected to other crimes across various sectors (e.g. forestry, mining, plantation, taxation, money laundering, and corruption) so the idea is that by using a combined approach of enforcing laws across multiple sectors, it will be easier to prosecute and more difficult for perpetrators to evade prosecution. The Multi-Door Approach was described by a stakeholder as “tackling issues never addressed before” (Indonesia Annex).

Through the Multi-Door Approach, a capacity building curriculum for law enforcers has been developed; training activities and seminars held for 306 participants (judges, prosecutors, police, and civil servant investigators) in three provinces (REDD+ Task Force, undated 2). Sixty-three cases have been reviewed by the Ministry of Forestry and the Judicial Mafia Task Force to identify the most serious violations. According to the documentation, 43 of these have been ‘addressed’ using the Multi-Door Approach, but it is unclear whether these
are prosecutions achieved or in process. Of the 43 cases, 39 involve plantation, forestry or mining companies. The cases in Central Kalimantan were ‘addressed’ using combined plantation and forestry laws, while those in Aceh (including Rawa Tripa) using combined environmental and plantation laws (Royal Norwegian Embassy Jakarta, 2013) (Indonesia Annex).

The 2013-2015 civil society project portfolio includes eight projects listed as tackling illegal logging and corruption. This includes support to the Environmental Investigation Agency, Interpol, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Transparency International. The Interpol Law Enforcement Assistance for Forests project aims to improve law enforcement capacity and effectiveness of operations to tackle illegal logging in Indonesia and other countries. The UNODC project aims at improving capability to address transnational organised forest crime. Relevant examples of activities undertaken by the Environmental Investigation Agency include investigation of potentially fraudulent carbon trading cases in Peru and trained indigenous representatives in Indonesia on monitoring legality on plantations and investigated smuggling of merbau timber in West Papua (Indonesia Annex).

The UN-REDD Programme has sought to develop capacity for addressing forest sector crime through holding regional and multi-country training workshops at global and regional level on UNREDD on transparency, accountability, and integrity for REDD+, and anticorruption. Several national level activities have been established through country programmes such as establishment of online, anonymous surveys that allow respondents to provide perceptions of corruption risk; corruption risk assessments and studies; and design of activities focused on tackling corruption, such as awareness raising, systems to provide open information, complaints mechanisms and drafting reforms to close legislative loopholes. Since there is limited outcome reporting from the UN-REDD programme and the effectiveness of these approaches is hard to measure, it is difficult to ascertain what they have achieved43 (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

**Finding 35. Safeguards on indigenous peoples and local communities are addressed throughout the NICFI portfolio, with many activities that go further than ‘do no harm’, although outcomes are not yet clear**

The FIP safeguards applied to the investments are consistent with the UNFCCC safeguard which requires “the full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities” (Forest Investment Program Annex)

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43 UN-REDD report an effort towards this in relation to the Participatory Governance Assessment: documenting preliminary results after the governance data is available, how this informs policy making, has led to changes in policy to avoid or mitigate corrupt practices, opened up a space to constructively address corruption risks and also for civil society actors to have a meaningful dialogue with relevant government actors. This information is now being updated each quarter and is available for Indonesia here: http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=3463&Itemid=53
Other NICFI supported activities have gone beyond the UNFCCC safeguard requirements. For instance, the UN-REDD programme has developed programme level guidelines on Free, Prior, Informed Consent (FPIC) and an associated legal companion; country specific guidance for FPIC in Papua New Guinea and Vietnam; and undertaken country level planning of FPIC in Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru. While the FCPF procedures do not require Free, Prior and Informed Consent to be in place, these principles are included in the FCPF’s ‘Global Action Plan’ on Indigenous Peoples developed in 2013; however, it is not clear whether the FCPF procedures have been adjusted to take this into account (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD Programme Annexes).

In Indonesia, NICFI supported civil society partners such as the Forest Peoples Programme and The Centre for People and Forests (RECOFTC) have been developing, testing processes and building capacity for FPIC. Rainforest Foundation Norway has supported its partners to work through the National Forestry Council to advocate for FPIC to become a national policy priority for the forestry sector in general (Rainforest Foundation Norway, 2013). Recognition of Indigenous Peoples rights and implementing a policy of FPIC as part of the REDD+ process is mainstreamed throughout the Indonesia National REDD+ strategy, developed through the bilateral agreement. FPIC is clearly differentiated from social safeguards within the Indonesian REDD+ Strategy (Indonesia Annex).

Several NICFI supported civil society pilot projects in Tanzania report that they are promoting FPIC. For example, as of December 2013, 19 of the 21 villages in the planned project area of the Africa Wildlife Foundation have endorsed the project. In the other two villages the village council voted against being involved (Tanzania Annex).

Indigenous representatives are included in the governing body of the FCPF and the FCPF has established a capacity building programme that aims to promote the effective participation of indigenous people and local communities in REDD+ (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

The UN-REDD Programme independent evaluation highlights that the programme has done “ground-breaking” work to enable indigenous people to influence global discussions on REDD+. However there is limited evidence of substantial influence on decision making or rights in REDD+ implementation as a result of this engagement (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

UN-REDD has demonstrated its ability to respond to grievances raised and successfully resolve emerging rights issues: the UN-REDD country programme in Panama was put on hold for a period due to concerns raised by the National Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples in Panama (COONAPIP). An independent investigation and evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme in Panama was established by UN-REDD, which found that while there were no violations of individual human rights by the UN-REDD Programme, there were
faults in the National Programme design, and problems with the consultation process which hampered the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the implementation of activities. Efforts were made by the government of Panama to resolve the problems identified and the country programme implementation is now underway again with the full agreement of COONAPIP (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

A ‘Global Indigenous Peoples Dialogue with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility’ was held in December 2012 in Qatar, which produced a ‘Global Action Plan of Indigenous Peoples Relating to FCPF (2013-2015)’. It is “a set of activities aimed at implementing FCPF within the human rights framework […] with the spirit of UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)”. It is too early for the outcomes of this initiative to be clearly apparent (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

A Dedicated Grant Mechanism for indigenous peoples and local communities has been established under the Forest Investment Program (FIP) to provide grants for indigenous peoples and local communities in the FIP countries. As this mechanism is newly established, no results are available; however, all eight FIP pilot countries have requested funding from the mechanism (Forest Investment Program Annex).

Results are less clear from the Congo Basin Forest Fund portfolio. The annual reporting suggests that indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights are taken seriously by the CBFF management, however, the inadequacies of the reporting are such that it is unclear what CBFF projects have achieved. According to the very limited reporting, 1,590 indigenous peoples have been “trained and sensitised” on REDD+, and 50 indigenous and local community representatives “trained on REDD+” in Republic of Congo. No information is provided on the purpose of these activities and what this training has achieved (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

**Finding 36. NICFI support through the bilateral agreement and civil society programmes has contributed substantially to a distinct, positive shift in the discourse on indigenous peoples’ rights in Indonesia**

An international conference on Forests, Governance and Enterprise was held in Lombok in 2012, organised by the Rights and Resources Initiative (with NICFI support, amongst others) and the International Tropical Timber Organisation, and hosted by the Ministry of Forestry. At this conference, Pak Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, head of the Indonesian President's Special Delivery Unit and chair of the REDD+ Task Force, declared his government's intention to recognise the rights of its forest communities, by stating that "We must accelerate the delineation of the legal status of the nation's forest area, guaranteeing the recognition of adat customary rights". This is considered to have been a 'land mark event' and explicit commitment for action to address indigenous rights issues in Indonesia (Indonesia Annex).
In May 2013, the Indigenous Peoples Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) filed a legal petition to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court against the current Forestry Law, which states that “customary forest is State forest located in the areas of traditional-law society”. AMAN was financially supported (amongst others) by the Rainforest Foundation Norway civil society project to undertake the development of this case (Rainforest Foundation Norway, 2013). A Samdhana Institute NICFI supported project also provided evidence building for some areas of the petition to strengthen AMAN’s case (Samdhana Institute, 2013) (Indonesia Annex).

As a result of the petition, The Court ruled that the word “State” contradicted the Indonesian Constitution, which recognises the existence of indigenous peoples and their rights, including over customary forest in their indigenous territory, thus rendering that element of the Forestry Law legally void. The Rights and Resources Initiative, describe the Lombok conference as “a contributing milestone along the road to the landmark [constitutional] court decision as a result of which 40 million forest peoples are now fully visible and recognised within the legal system” (Rights and Resources Institute, 2013) (Indonesia Annex).

Although the Constitutional Court decision is viewed as progressive, and many of the key civil society organisations promoting indigenous rights issues in Indonesia have received NICFI support, it must also be recognised that the discourse on indigenous peoples’ and community rights over forests in Indonesia was taking place prior to the REDD+ agenda and other opportunities have also helped to bring these issues to prominence. Although substantial steps forward have been made, and the NICFI support has been one of the catalysts, the NICFI supported activities are one contribution among many others, to a much wider governance reform process that is taking place in Indonesia (Indonesia Annex).

**Finding 37. Non-indigenous communities’ rights are less well represented in the NICFI portfolio**

The UN-REDD Programme independent evaluation highlights that non-indigenous communities are not well represented in the programme. Similarly, the Guyana baseline country report of this evaluation (Hardcastle et al. 2011) found that non-Amerindian communities were not well represented and received little by comparison, causing great resentment. Some concerns have been raised about the inclusiveness of some of the projects, for example, the Amerindian Development Fund of the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund focuses exclusively on Amerindian communities, and does not provide support to other sections of the rural poor, however, the Micro and Small Enterprise Development project is open to all sections of society, and particularly encourages the participation of vulnerable groups. This may serve to redress some balance (Guyana Annex).
Finding 38. The NICFI portfolio is likely to provide a strong contribution to sustainable development and livelihoods improvement, with many activities directly contributing to this

The Forest Investment Program (FIP) design principles require supported investments to have development benefits. The FIP design document specifies that investment plans must “contribute to the livelihoods and human development of forest dependent communities including indigenous peoples and local communities.” Adherence to this principle in the development of investment plans has been confirmed by the 2013 Interim Report of the Independent Evaluation of Climate Investment Funds (Forest Investment Program Annex).

All FIP investment plans include poverty reduction, gender impacts and livelihoods or job creation. All eight investment plans explicitly name local communities as project beneficiaries, and six name women, low-income groups, and indigenous peoples. Four investment plans name children as beneficiaries (Forest Investment Program Annex).

The limited reporting of results from the Congo Basin Forest Fund portfolio indicates that it contains activities focused on sustainable and equitable livelihoods, including a ‘green entrepreneurship’ project working with rural communities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has trained 60 eco-entrepreneurs (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

Of the funds so far invested by the Amazon Fund, 32 percent is allocated to projects that fall within the category of “Economic activities from sustainable use of forests”. All projects funded by the Amazon Fund are required to demonstrate their coherence with the Sustainable Amazon Plan (PAS) and are expected to contribute to sustainable development in the region (Brazil Annex).

The Tanzanian REDD+ pilot projects supported by NICFI also contribute directly to livelihoods development. The Jane Goodall Institute project has disbursed US $ 200,000 (in a trial payment to demonstrate the benefit sharing mechanism) to the target communities in for conserving the Masito forest. The recipient communities have used the funds to construct social infrastructure such as school classrooms, teachers’ houses and village offices. The African Wildlife Foundation and Tanzania Forest Conservation Group have made substantial trial payments to the participating communities. The Wildlife Conservation Society has been promoting woodlots as a way to generate income and create alternatives to natural forest wood products. The African Wildlife Foundation is promoting training on conservation agriculture with focus in maize, pigeon peas, sunflower and millet in 19 villages, with training in business planning and market linkages provided to 201 men and 287 women in 11 villages (Tanzania Annex).

In Indonesia the main area of support where a specific focus and key results in targeting poverty alleviation and vulnerability can be seen is through the demonstration activities in pilot provinces undertaken through the NICFI civil society support scheme. These projects have worked with vulnerable forest
dependent communities to implement alternative livelihood activities in situations where community livelihoods have been threatening forest areas or to build value from existing forest areas (Civil Society Support and Indonesia Annexes).

Examples include the Clinton Climate Initiative’s Lamandau project that has helped establish community associations (farmers’ groups, women’s groups), as existing community organisations were weak. These community associations developed a completely new income stream for two women’s groups based on Nipa palm sugar production and additional incomes generated from wild rubber tapping (through formal access to the Lamandau Reserve) and the sale of seedlings from a now well-established nursery (Civil Society Support Annex).

Community groups and village heads were very positive about the project and gave examples of how the work of the community groups has inspired other members of the village / nearby villages to either develop their own associations or want to join these existing ones. Other examples have been demonstrated through The Nature Conservancy support in Berau district for small-scale rubber plantation development. It was assumed that conservation organisations had the required experience in community development, although in some cases this was not the case and is a lesson drawn for future REDD+ activities (Civil Society Support Annex).

The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is working towards a target that all national REDD+ strategies, monitoring systems and emissions reductions activities supported by the FCPF incorporate indicators on forest community livelihood development. While no data are available in the FCPF reporting on how many national REDD+ strategies contain this, the strategy of the Democratic Republic of Congo is identified as a good practice example that contains indicators to track progress towards the enhancement of livelihoods in its national REDD+ process (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

Finding 39. The multilateral institutions supported by NICFI are providing guidance and support in relation to land tenure and resource access and rights; while activities in Tanzania, Indonesia and the Congo Basin are providing a direct contribution

The UN-REDD programme has undertaken analysis and developed guidance on land tenure and REDD+ issues. Land tenure was identified as a key priority in the Country Needs Assessment undertaken in 2012. UN-REDD has held a number of expert meetings, country and regional workshops, and undertaken consultation on tenure issues. A report “Addressing tenure for successful REDD+: Analysis of Opportunities and Options”, and a related policy brief have been developed by UN-REDD, along with a report on tenure issues in the countries of Meso-America. Country level assessments of tenure issues in eight countries have been undertaken by the UN-REDD programme (UN-REDD Programme Annex).
The FCPF Assessment Framework (2013) requires the demonstration that action plans make progress in the short-, medium- and long-term towards addressing land tenure and titling. The FCPF reports specific cases in Mozambique and Liberia where national legislation on carbon rights and land rights (respectively) was amended as a result of the REDD+ process in the respective countries, however, it is difficult to attribute these achievements to the FCPF support (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

In Indonesia contributions to securing tenure and rights access for indigenous and local communities have been made through the bilateral and by NICFI supported civil society projects. As described in (Finding 35), the Chair of the Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, made a landmark declaration of his government’s intention to recognise the rights of its forest communities by implementing legislation that had been in progress for a decade (Indonesia Annex).

The NICFI civil society funded Rainforest Foundation Norway and Samdhana Institute undertook mapping of indigenous territories, contributing (along with many others) to the 2.4 million hectares of indigenous territories submitted for inclusion in the One Map Initiative, that seeks to reconcile land claims in one single map (Finding 33) (Indonesia Annex).

Both the World Wide Fund for Nature and The Nature Conservancy NICFI civil society projects in Indonesia have reported success in negotiating the withdrawal of forest areas used by local communities from existing commercial concessions and registered these as formal community forest areas (Indonesia Annex).

The Samdhana Institute project, through its small grant scheme, is funding community mapping, a fundamental building block towards those communities securing tenure and village forestry licences. Rainforest Foundation Norway’s partner, Warsi, has been helping communities secure licences for village forests through the project. The Clinton Climate Initiative project worked with participating communities to secure community forest licences (Indonesia Annex).

The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) is working to secure conditional land tenure for the participants of their demonstration project, which is essential for it to function and The Nature Conservancy is working in its project area to have boundaries registered legally while the Centre for International Forestry (CIFOR) has produced five research papers on the importance of land tenure in REDD+ (Indonesia Annex).

In Tanzania, some of the NICFI supported pilot projects are supporting communities in gaining land tenure and user rights. For example, the Care project is promoting a decentralised national forest management system that grants forest management rights to local communities. Land-use mapping activities undertaken by the Tanzanian pilot projects in response to unclear
tenure has in some cases created disputes over land between villages and individual farmers. In these instances, the projects have worked with district government officials to mediate the conflict (Tanzania Annex).

The Rainforest Foundation UK project ‘promoting community land tenure rights in the Congo Basin’ is described in the Congo Basin Forest Fund Portfolio analysis as “performing well”, although the basis for this assertion is not provided in the report (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

The Amazon Fund has also driven legislative innovation in relation to land tenure. For example the successful implementation of a new approach to registering rural properties (CAR) was financed by the Amazon Fund and ultimately resulted in new legislation enacted as part of Federal Law signed in 2012 (Brazil Annex).

**Finding 40. Attempts have been made through the NICFI portfolio to address gender issues in REDD+; however, among the NICFI partners there is a lack of understanding of, and a low general capacity to address, gender issues**

The strongest contribution to this issue has been through the UN-REDD programme, which has produced numerous publications on REDD+ and gender issues. This has included the development of a ‘business case for mainstreaming gender in REDD+’ as well as implementation aids and guidelines on integrating gender into REDD+ safeguards; implementing gender sensitive REDD+ strategies; and an information note that outlines five steps towards gender sensitive REDD+. The recent evaluation of the UN-REDD Programme found that while gender issues are reflected in most policy and programmatic documents and guidelines, the implementation of gender mainstreaming activities at the country level is not taking place in a cohesive and systematic way throughout the Programme (Frechette et al. 2014 (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

A cross-practice relationship between the United Nations Development Programme Gender Team and UN-REDD Programme team has been established to provide technical support and build capacities to facilitate integration of gender considerations into the support provided by the UN-REDD Programme. This collaboration has resulted in the formation of an interagency gender working group of the UN-REDD Programme. Gender considerations have been integrated into the 2010-2015 stakeholder engagement guidelines, and comprehensive integration of gender considerations into the 2010-2015 UN-REDD programme strategy, making gender equality one of the guiding principles of the UN-REDD programme (UN-REDD Programme Annex).

Whilst a number of elements in the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) governance and process aim to promote gender equality, there is not yet evidence that this has translated into benefits for women forest users. Gender is not mentioned in any of the FCPF Annual Reports; however an assessment of
gender-based risks or unequal benefits is required in the readiness preparation plan template (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

In 2013, the Facility Management Team received a request, which was granted, to invite a ‘Women’s Observer’ to the Participants Committee meetings. The FCPF Partner Countries are expected to report on the level of participation and engagement with various stakeholder groups, including women. There is a risk that a focus only on participation may not result in action that benefits women (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

Six of the seven Forest Investment Program (FIP) investment plans identify women as beneficiaries but don’t dedicate budget to the promotion of gender considerations. A FIP Sub-Committee decision in October 2013 encouraged countries to consider gender mainstreaming in the review of their results frameworks (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex).

The Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), albeit with the limited information available, seems to take gender issues seriously. It has a specific gender policy and preference was given to gender sensitive projects during project selection with positive impacts for women a criterion among the guidelines for project appraisal. The CBFF reporting mentions specific results for women, for example that 20 out of 60 ‘eco-entrepreneurs’ trained by a CBFF project in Democratic Republic of Congo were women (Congo Basin Forest Fund Annex).

Gender issues are at the heart of the Tanzanian REDD+ strategy. Several sections of the Tanzanian REDD+ strategy mention gender issues, and a consultancy was undertaken to make the strategy ‘gender sensitive’. One of the nine objectives of the strategy is to ensure that gender is mainstreamed in the implementation of REDD+ process and Action Plan. However, an independent desk review of gender issues in two of the NICFI supported pilot projects conducted by Norad concluded that there were considerable differences between projects in the extent to which gender issues are mainstreamed through project activities. The desk review was based on the original design documents of two pilots projects. One stakeholder reported that subsequent work that has been carried out by the pilots to ensure appropriate gender approaches are being undertaken (Tanzania Annex).

Some recognition of the importance of gender is made in Indonesia’s National REDD+ Strategy and in the proposed staffing structure of the REDD+ Agency, but outcomes remain to be seen. The previous reports of this evaluation assessed the early implementation of the bilateral agreement and civil society support project implementation to be largely gender blind with the exception of some specific activities by AMAN (The Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago, Indonesia) for building capacity of women in REDD+ and Clinton Climate Initiative and which monitored its impact on gender through the Social and Environmental Safeguards system (Indonesia Annex).
Indonesia’s REDD+ National Strategy (STRANA) includes several references to gender/women, which reflects increasing awareness and commitment to integrate gender into REDD+ policies and implementation. The UN-REDD programme explicitly examined dimensions of gender in relation to the national REDD+ safeguards in Indonesia (PRISAI) and concluded that gender perspectives have been well integrated but that women’s secure control over forest lands and resources and a more gender sensitive approach to Free Prior Informed Consent needed to be emphasised. It was also recommended that indicators in relation to gender were made clearer and more practical within the PRISAI system. PRISAI has been through various revisions but it is unclear whether these recommendations were integrated into the current version (Indonesia Annex).

The Interim Phase Project Document of the bilateral agreement between Norway and Indonesia indicates a commitment towards achievement of gender balance in the staffing of the REDD+ Agency. As the REDD+ agency structure is still under discussion, it is still unclear whether a gender focal point will be identified as suggested in the interim project document. This is also the case with promoting a gender equality policy in provincial REDD+ Agency establishment that has also been advised (Indonesia Annex).

A number of other gender mainstreaming interventions have also been integrated into the project document for the interim phase including gender sensitive screening of proposals for small grants. The overall REDD+ framework has made some recognition of the importance of gender in the implementation of REDD+ but there has been limited analysis of this within the provincial REDD+ strategies (STRADA) and its outcomes remain to be seen. The need for a monitoring system to assess how such mainstreaming actually influences gender equality outcomes has been recognised in some of the documentation (Indonesia Annex).

Gender considerations are not directly covered in the NICFI partnership with Brazil and informants displayed confusion and lack of understanding of gender issues. The Amazon Fund has no specific safeguards or provisions on gender and information on gender issues is not presented in the annual reporting, although the Brazilian Development Bank, BNDES, points out that gender issues are observed in all Bank operations given the safeguard of non-discrimination. Gender considerations are indirectly addressed by the Fund in one project, the Bolsa Floresta - Forest Allowance Programme, in which women in state protected areas in Amazonas state receive the payments made for forest conservation (Brazil Annex).

The Guyana field team briefly met with the women miners’ group. In addition to their work on securing economic engagement in mining for women, there was strong interest and activities related to gender negative social impacts from other mining activities, which is a very positive step (Guyana Annex).
3.7 Strategic findings

This section draws on general points made earlier and is complemented by interviews. In order to protect anonymity, the text has been written to include the points made to the team in confidence in a way that precludes attribution to specific individuals.

3.7.1 On general REDD+ developments

Finding 41. The field is increasingly spread out among REDD+ countries, with some receiving results-based payments but others making little progress

While a few countries are making substantial progress, and a few others are making some progress, a substantial number are making very little headway. One donor commented that it is possible to “see a few emerging ‘leading lights’ followed by a long tail of slower progress countries” (High Level Informants Annex). Among these ‘leading lights’, Costa Rica is at the point of securing finance from the FCPF Carbon Fund (Finding 25), Brazil and Guyana have both received results-based payments from Norway as a result of verified progress (Findings 19 and 20), and Vietnam has moved to Phase 2 of the UN-REDD Programme (UN-REDD Programme Annex). Tanzania, by contrast has made relatively little progress towards a national REDD+ programme despite useful gains at individual project level (Tanzania Annex).

By way of example, using the FCPF dashboard milestones⁴⁴, Figure 5 shows the number of FCPF country partners that have progressed to the first two stages of the FCPF Readiness Process. Of the 39 country partners engaged by the FCPF since 2009, 33 have submitted (or expect to submit in 2014) a final Readiness-Preparation Proposal (R-PP), which if accepted will lead to a grant, and 24 already have an R-PP grant signed (or it is expected to be signed in 2014) to part finance implementation of their R-PPs (Figure 5). Of these, more than half (16) were signed in 2013 or are expected in 2014. Most countries are therefore still engaged in the very earliest stages of the readiness process.

Whilst recognising the need to engage countries with REDD+ to secure consensus at the UNFCCC negotiations, given the limited funds available, and the lack of progress made with REDD+ in many countries that started readiness, the logic behind some multilateral institutions continuing to “sign up” new countries without a solid analysis of the reasons underlying the widely differing rates of progress is not readily apparent.

⁴⁴ Milestones recorded https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/readiness-fund.
**Finding 42. The most robust progress in the NICFI portfolio has been made by countries where the underlying context is supportive**

The separation between the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) partner countries that are making readiness progress and those that are not does not appear to be related to REDD+ countries’ national income status *per se* (Figure 6). The 24 countries with FCPF Readiness Preparation Proposal Preparation Grants already signed or expected to be signed in 2014 are fairly evenly distributed among the Least Developed Countries, the Lower Middle Income Countries and the Upper Middle Income Countries (Figure 6). However, it is notable that the small group of ‘leading lights’ described in (Finding 41) are all middle income countries.

**Figure 6: FCPF country partner progress towards signed readiness preparation proposal (R-PP) preparation grants**

Source: Summarised from the FCPF Dashboard April 2014.
Of the NICFI bilateral partner countries visited for this evaluation, the most progress has been made in countries where the underlying political context is supportive. The governments of Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia had all made public commitments to avoid deforestation or reduce emissions from forest loss before engaging with NICFI. These existing commitments were an important factor in NICFI engagement with them; NICFI support provided validation of these aspirations. At the same time, the large amounts of money committed publicly by Norway through the bilateral agreements – US $ 1 billion each to Brazil and Indonesia and US $ 250 million to Guyana provided a powerful, wider message helping to maintain the political interest and commitment.

At the time the agreements with NICFI were made, Brazil already had a successful track record in reducing deforestation, while in Indonesia the REDD+ effort had strong support of the president and has leveraged an ongoing drive for reform essential to making future progress. The fact that Indonesia, with a similar level of financial support as Tanzania, made substantially more progress and that funds disbursed to (and within) Brazil over much of the partnership have been far less than those allocated suggests that the money was not the sole motivator in either case (Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania Annexes).

In Guyana, rapid progress on the technical elements of the partnership was enabled by high level support from the previous and current Presidents, together with a highly effective implementation team (Lincoln et al. 2012). In this case however, while there was an initial motivational effect from the agreement with NICFI, slow delivery of funding from Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund has been unhelpful to maintaining this motivation (Guyana Annex).

By contrast, in Tanzania, where progress has been fragmented, the lack of high level political leadership is identified as a major reason for this and government informants indicated that the process was driven by NICFI funds and the UN agencies rather than being country-led (Tanzania Annex).

Finding 43. Whilst the promise of funding has been an important factor in country engagement, results-based finance has acted as a political motivator rather than an economic incentive

For Indonesia, the charismatic US $ 1 billion provided the political leverage needed to push progressive policies that are aligned with an ongoing progress of reform. Indonesian stakeholders clearly state that the ‘incentive’ was not the cash, but the opportunity to push through hoped for governance reforms. In their view, payments for reduced emissions will essentially be a ‘co-benefit’ of these reforms (Indonesia Annex). This is very different from pre-Copenhagen view of finance driving such changes.

For Brazil, Norway’s US $ 1 billion provided validation of national reforms already underway to tackle deforestation, and probably gave strength to continue this route, although there is no counterfactual; again, it was a motivator, not an incentive.
Considering the REDD+ partnership finding that many countries sought readiness funds quickly from what was then seen as a finite pot of cash to access before it disappeared, it is likely that in these cases the funding was an ‘incentive’, but arguably these are the countries that are happy to make use of available funds but, lacking solid internal political commitment, are unlikely to make substantial progress in the short term.

There is a good analogy here with Herzberg’s two-factor theory of personnel motivation. Finance alone analogous to his “hygiene” factors; while without it there may be lack of interest in engagement, it does not on its own motivate continued engagement. Motivation in Herzberg’s model, comes from the attention and support of others and acceptance into peer group membership. This in essence has happened with Brazil, Guyana and Indonesia. Countries where the finance itself was the only or even the main incentive, generally have shown less commitment to REDD+ and are more likely to lose interest if funds for results-based payments – or even for readiness – do not flow as anticipated.

*Finding 44. The lack of certainty over results based REDD+ funding is regarded as the single greatest risk to progress yet there has been a lack of attention to the cost of systems in relation to national capacity and the likely levels of REDD+ finance available to sustain them*

Almost all donor and multilateral stakeholders consulted identified the challenges in mobilising sufficient resources for the countries engaged in readiness to progress to results based payments as one of the major challenges facing the REDD+ agenda (High Level Informants Annex).

Since the Copenhagen COP, the uncertainty over demand for emissions reductions has reduced the perception of potential revenues from REDD+, while the costs of REDD+ have proven much higher than expected (Lincoln et al. 2013. Readiness activities have so far been overly focused on start-up costs, with insufficient attention given to running costs and whether these will be affordable by partner countries given the likely level of rewards to be earned (Lincoln et al. 2013).

If donor funds for REDD+ are used to build MRV and management systems for a country without the potential to benefit from results-based payments there is a danger that the effort and funds will be wasted. While the cost of this waste may be affordable to the donors, even if it is not efficient, this is of much less importance than the opportunity cost to poor countries of diverting funds and other scarce resources such as trained personnel from other activities that might be a more appropriate priority for them; for example there may be less investment in basic forest protection and management to address the drivers of

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deforestation. There are parallels here with experience of Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania, where successful pilots failed in scaling up because of lack of resources to maintain the systems. As pointed out by NICFI, it should be noted that whilst this is a real risk, another side to this issue is that capacity building activities on remote sensing, forest inventories, cadastral mapping etc. are in high demand in the NICFI partner countries. This has certainly been evident during the country visits undertaken by the evaluation team.

There has been little attempt by REDD+ country governments or other donors to assess the costs and benefits of different approaches and of achieving given levels of precision. This is despite the fact that current costs appear to far exceed Readiness Preparation Proposal budgets, and that the overall cost of MRV and reference level establishment in some countries is likely to be substantial (Lincoln et al. 2013). Since this point was made in the NICFI MRV Evaluation, NICFI has initiated activities that are likely to assist in cost-benefit analysis of different forest monitoring and MRV approaches.

**Finding 45. Expectations of the potential level of payments for emissions reductions within some REDD+ countries appear to be unduly optimistic and at times unrealistic**

Interviewees from international civil society organisations expressed widespread concerns about unrealistic expectations in REDD+ countries, many of which anticipated substantial payments for emissions reductions. Note that this is not the case in the countries that have bilateral agreements with NICFI.

Given the lack of agreement on REDD+ financing under the UNFCCC negotiations, the major multilateral institution for making results-based payments is currently the FCPF Carbon Fund. However, according to the FCPF Carbon Fund website and World Bank interviewees, only around five countries will be able to benefit from this at its current level of capitalisation. There are a number of other bilateral (NICFI in Brazil, Indonesia) and multilateral initiatives (BioCarbon Fund, Rapid Early Mover Initiative, Phase II UN-REDD project in Vietnam) making results-based payments but overall finance at present levels could not meet the needs if all countries currently engaged in readiness were to proceed to being eligible for verified results-based payments.

This point was addressed by the World Bank Internal Evaluation Group report in 2011, which recommended greater emphasis on other benefits, such as improved governance, the “no regrets” approach to country engagement and to funding decisions. Whether partner countries that have expectation of results-based finance will see these alternatives as being of equivalent value is a moot point.

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In light of the slow readiness progress of many countries and the limited funds available for results based payments, such payments are only likely to accrue to a small number of countries in the short and medium term. Related to this is the overarching problem of there being no agreement on finance of REDD+ under the UNFCCC and hence lack of clarity on whether results-based payments will ultimately be donor funded, market based, or a combination of these.

At sub-national level in REDD+ countries, there were also deep concerns expressed about the danger of raising community and district-level expectations either through unsustainable payments using project grant funds, as in Tanzania\(^\text{49}\), or through poor communication leading to frustration from unrealistically raised expectations, as in Indonesia (Indonesia and Tanzania Annexes).

**Finding 46. There is a range of views among other donors and high level informants on whether payments for emissions reductions should be viewed as the primary end point of REDD+**

Donor and multilateral respondent views differed as to whether more grant, investment or results-based payments were needed and whether payments for emissions reductions should be regarded as the sole end point of a REDD+ readiness process (High Level Informants Annex). There is a divergence between those that regard results based payments for emissions as fundamental and those that see payments for emissions as ‘icing on the cake’ once the fundamental work had been achieved (High Level Informants Annex). Given the slow rate of progress of many countries, combined with the lack of available Phase 3 finance, there is a consensus amongst REDD+ stakeholders that results-based payments for emissions reductions are one part of a range of approaches needed (High Level Informants Annex). Another example given was the efforts of donors towards engaging private sector to certify deforestation free products that would reduce Phase 3 financing requirements (High Level Informants Annex).

Many donors and multilateral institution informants felt that a substantial number of countries were unlikely to access results-based payments given the slow rate of progress and stressed the importance of the intrinsic benefits of participating in REDD+ processes High Level Informants Annex\(^\text{50}\).

\(^{49}\) Although some pilot projects have the potential to generate payments from the voluntary carbon market, others have indicated that they will close down when the NICFI funding comes to an end.

\(^{50}\) The FIP Sub-committee at its meeting in June 2014 requested a paper be prepared providing guidance on the link between FIP investment funding and REDD+ performance-based mechanisms, taking into account the international REDD+ architecture and, in particular, the Warsaw Framework for REDD-plus. This should be very useful for the ongoing debate around REDD+.
3.7.2 On NICFI’s strategy and role

Finding 47. Continued high-level political support, very substantial funding and a flexible government system in Norway has allowed NICFI to develop and utilise a uniquely responsive model. However, other donors are unable to work in the same way

As recorded in the high level interviews no other donor interviewed has either the flexibility or ability to appraise and approve investments as quickly as Norway. It has managed to do in six weeks what other donors require 12 months to agree (High Level Informants Annex). At the same time, few other donors take the long-term view that Norway has been able to take. At the Warsaw Conference of the Parties in 2013, Norway made a commitment to maintain current funding levels until 2020 while other donors were only able to match this with a commitment to 2018. In part of course, this also reflects the great prominence of REDD+ within Norway’s development portfolio, a prominence not matched by any other donor. Other donors also noted that they were not able to approve bilateral commitments of comparable size to NICFI (High Level Informants Annex).

The results of interviews with other donors and the multilaterals found that there are substantial divergences between Norway’s “rapid response” approach, with its ability to take decisions and mobilise finance quickly compared with the notably slower decision making processes of other donors. At the same time, delivery processes through multilaterals are onerous and slow (Guyana Annex, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Annex). Within other donor countries, different institutions are addressing REDD+ through differing perspectives. Norway by comparison has a single institution that can coordinate all national interventions High Level Informants Annex.

Finding 48. The NICFI strategy as originally designed has not been sufficiently revised to accommodate the slow rate of REDD+ readiness progress by many countries

The Stern Review (Stern, 2006) drew attention to the importance of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and land use change and at the 2007 Bali UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) there was expectation that agreement for REDD+ would be reached at the 2009 Copenhagen COP. This provided the starting point for NICFI in that early activities were focused on a need to make rapid progress in time for Copenhagen (Norwegian Policy Context Annex).

At this time, the imperative was to engage as many REDD+ partner and donor countries as possible to provide momentum, enable widespread progress on REDD+, and secure the substantial funding required. The early development of the NICFI portfolio is well aligned with this imperative. There were: large disbursements made to the multilateral REDD+ institutions to enable the establishment of a framework for readiness, define systems and processes and engage a large number of countries; establishment of bilateral partnerships with countries that are either important targets for reducing emissions, or provide
piloting opportunities for different forest loss contexts (see 1.5.3. Portfolio Overview).

Partnership agreements and first disbursements for most elements of the NICFI portfolio (Tanzania, Brazil, CBFF, FCPF, UN-REDD, FIP, civil society first portfolio) pre-date the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen (or followed soon after, in the case of Indonesia and Guyana). Hence, although agreement did not materialise at Copenhagen, NICFI supported activities primarily reflect this original imperative.

Most donors interviewed felt that NICFI had taken rather a strong ideological view regarding payments for emissions reductions as the ultimate focus the early years of NICFI and perceive and welcome a “softening” of this strong view (High Level Informants Annex). Other donors perceive that NICFI has signalled its interest in generating a new narrative that focuses on REDD+ as one part of efforts to create a socially inclusive green economy (High Level Informants Annex). More recently established activities provide examples of this: for instance the Ethiopia – Norway bilateral agreement focused on green, low carbon development; and support through the Civil Society Fund for work on sustainable supply chains, landscape-level approaches and forest governance.

Overall, however, it is unclear that the significance of the slower than anticipated progress in both the international negotiations and REDD+ readiness progress in many countries, together with the limited finance available globally, has been fully reflected in NICFI’s strategic approach.

**Finding 49.** NICFI’s efforts to convene and coordinate with other donors are valuable in mobilising financial commitments and testing new approaches; however there is insufficient co-ordination with other relevant international initiatives

One high level informant commented that NICFI has been making progressively more effort to improve donor coordination and work closely with other donor governments (High Level Informants Annex). An observation of the evaluators that have followed NICFI since 2010 through the real-time evaluation is that, at least at the international level, NICFI’s relationship with other donors has improved since the early years of the initiative, when it was quite isolated.

There is evidence that new, close, operational partnerships with other donors have been forged. For instance, alongside the UK, NICFI was one of the major architects of the ‘Five Donor Statement’ on tackling deforestation and forest degradation released at a meeting in 2012 hosted by the Prince of Wales.51 The statement includes the resolution of the donors to work together on six elements

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of REDD+. All donor partners interviewed recognised the value of this statement (High Level Informants Annex).

Representatives of several donor countries interviewed during the evaluation stated that they regard Norway as their closest ally. The ability to transition from the joint statement to the establishment of a joint NICFI – UK programme in Colombia in a relatively short period of time was seen as an important achievement. In addition to prioritising donor collaboration, and providing high level effort for this, the success in fostering collaboration is also in part due to an evolution in the NICFI approach (Operational and Management Processes- Oslo Annex) to one that is considered by other donors closer to their own thinking (High Level Informants Annex).

Although there has been success in developing collaboration at the international level, this is less apparent at the national level in partner countries. Other donors in Guyana noted difficulties of coordination with Norway due to lack of physical presence in country to both the 2011 and 2014 field visit teams (Finding 2). In addition, co-ordination at the national level with other relevant initiatives has been limited. For example, interviews with NICFI and relevant politicians suggested that there is a lack of familiarity and engagement with European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) processes. The Guyana – Norway bilateral agreement, which requires that Guyana engage with the (FLEGT) initiative, is the only real example in the portfolio of close engagement.

As Norway is not a member of the European Union (EU), it has not been closely engaged with the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative. Furthermore, it does not import significant quantities of tropical timber and what is imported comes from the EU and is covered by the EU Timber Regulation. Nevertheless, many of the background activities that have been undertaken for FLEGT are very similar and / or relevant to those for REDD+ and closer engagement might be useful.

In some countries, such as Indonesia, REDD+ and FLEGT are led by different agencies, making cross linkages more challenging. One high level interviewee commented that while there is little connection between REDD+ and FLEG in Indonesia, in Vietnam, FLEGT work helped identify stakeholders and aided substantially their wider participation in REDD+. There would be value in revisiting a better engagement with FLEGT processes.

Finding 50. There is evidence that the NICFI strategy is broadening in scope from one that is focused solely on an end point of results based payments for reduced greenhouse gas emissions

The Norwegian vision for REDD+ was initially simple and focused on payments for verified reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from deforestation and forest degradation (Norwegian Policy Context Annex). Several high level informants commented that NICFI had initially taken a very strong ideological
view regarding ultimate focus on payment for emissions reduction results (High Level Informant Annex).

One donor regarded the early NICFI approach of focusing on all the readiness phase elements only as steps to results based payments for emissions reductions as the sole end point as inflexible and unhelpful. The reasons given for this perception were broadly that in a situation where there is not enough funding to pay for results based payments, and in which only a few countries are likely to make it to that point, there is a need to ensure that there are other benefits from working on REDD+ and move away from a one-size fits all approach High Level Informants Annex.

Other donors felt that this flexibility is starting to develop in NICFI’s activities and commented positively that NICFI seems to be increasingly open to explore new approaches, including engagement with the private sector and work at sub-national jurisdictional level High Level Informants Annex.

The development of the new partnerships with Ethiopia and Colombia (not included in this evaluation), which in both cases are in partnership with other bilateral donors and the strategic work being supported in the latest round of civil society fund grants demonstrate a commitment by NICFI to a wider-based approach than was the case initially.

**Finding 51. NICFI has played a leadership role in establishing the international architecture for REDD+ but there are signs that its detached approach has allowed inefficiency to proliferate in the multilaterals**

While Norway has played a leading role in establishing the multilateral architecture to support REDD+ (Finding 16), its detached approach has allowed the multilateral institutions considerable leeway in developing processes and practices. This has not prejudiced their valued contribution to safeguards and the overall architecture (Finding 46) but the recent acceptance of more countries into readiness funds (Finding 24) when progress has been so slow (Finding 15), when so many countries will not move to results-based payments in the short to medium term and when the architecture has become overly onerous (Findings 6 and 7) has not been helpful.

Our evidence (Findings 6 and 7) indicates that the multilateral architecture is in danger of becoming too complex and cumbersome in relation to the slow rate of progress with multiple small-scale projects going on. The expected development of the Green Climate Fund could add to the complexity if this is not carefully managed. There is a danger that the growing perception that the main beneficiaries of REDD+ will be the multilateral institutions and large civil society organisations involved in processes will be found to be true.
Finding 52. NICFI views on the role of sub-national jurisdictional REDD+ programmes have not been clearly articulated

In recent years, with the limited REDD+ funding available from other donors, there has been increased interest in working at sub-national scales in jurisdictions or biomes that present specific opportunities, e.g. Germany - Acre province in Brazil; UK - Cerrado, Mata Atlantica in Brazil and Ethiopia, jointly with Norway.

The role of such programmes and projects within the REDD+ framework has not yet been clearly articulated. They are seen by some as an unwelcome distraction from national level policies but by others as a real opportunity to test intervention methods and deliver results albeit within more restricted areas that can be scaled-up to national levels. This seems to mesh closely with the overall NICFI aim of finding out what works and what does not work for REDD+.
4. Conclusions

This chapter brings forward the findings into a series of overarching conclusions that lead into and are linked to the recommendations.

4.1 Operational processes

4.1.1 On the management of NICFI

Conclusion 1. The management style employed by the NICFI Secretariat was a consequence of the political imperative in the early years of NICFI but has not been subsequently revisited and revised

The lack of robust management practices was understandable in the early years of NICFI given the political imperative to make rapid progress in the expectation of a REDD+ agreement under the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009 (Finding 1). However, the corollary of this is that where decisions are made at speed, due diligence can be short-circuited (Finding 1) and, where normal government processes are not followed, lead to resentment in those who have to deal with this (Finding 12). While there has been some improvement in the planning there is still no formal Theory of Change and associated results-based framework (Finding 1).

The realisation that no agreement was forthcoming in Copenhagen and later, that REDD+ progress has been much slower than anticipated for the majority of countries engaged, presented opportunity to take stock, document and better define the overarching strategy, and put more comprehensive management systems in place. Such systems needed to have clear monitoring targets and to include specific systems for feedback and updating of strategy and forward plans. While some progress was made, it was not sufficiently comprehensive.

Conclusion 2. The absence of a clear strategic framework linked to forward planning and results-based reporting are constraints to fully effective management

Given the differing institutional cultures and priorities of the institutions involved in the management of NICFI, ensuring internal coherence and consistency is a necessity so that all individuals involved have a shared and agreed understanding of NICFI priorities and processes (Finding 3). The current lack of a tightly documented dynamic, strategic, results-based framework for NICFI
hinders the development of shared priorities based on a common understanding and limits monitoring of NICFI's results since, without this, there is no basis for results-based reporting nor even to request this information from partners (Finding 2).

Whilst overall the results reporting is currently inadequate (Finding 9), the improvements to the Norad Civil Society Department – managed civil society fund partner reporting in line with the now tightly defined results based framework (Finding 4), demonstrate the level of improvements that can be made. The lack of a readily accessible repository for NICFI documentation is a further constraint to effective management (Finding 9). The very recent changes to the management structure of NICFI suggest that more formal documentation of both the Theory of Change and the results-based framework would be helpful for coordination.

Shared development of a results based framework would enable the formulation of a common and agreed understanding of priorities and needs, as well as of the way in which Norwegian government systems and regulations will be applied. This should also limit the level of bad feeling where there are different cultures of understanding on how to apply the regulations. It is a matter of concern that the need for a clear planning and reporting framework does not appear to have been sufficiently prioritised (Finding 2).

**Conclusion 3. The level of capacity is not adequate to deal with the complexities of the NICFI portfolio, the diversity of progress and the wealth of new information that is now available and needs to be considered**

Whilst a more settled management team in Oslo may have been desirable given the number of staff changes that have taken place over the last four years, NICFI staff members in Oslo are highly regarded, by donors, country partners and multilateral staff (Finding 5). However, the NICFI operational capacity in partner countries is questioned and regarded as being too “light touch,” both in terms of staffing levels and in relation to operational experience (Finding 5). There is a perception amongst some other donors that there are insufficient NICFI people on the ground to guarantee that results are achieved and that country strategies are based on sound and up-to-date knowledge of the country situation High Level Informants Annex.

This deficiency is particularly apparent in Guyana where, despite excellent technical progress, the wider enabling activities and the operating framework are poorly understood and inadequately reported and there is widespread perception that Norway has incomplete knowledge of how its funds are being used. This has the potential to seriously derail the gains that have been made and generate adverse publicity (Finding 20).

Adequate staffing levels are required to minimise the potential for misunderstandings and miscommunication and to provide high level political
engagement at critical times during the partnership (Finding 5, Finding 9). Greater operational capacity would be beneficial in reducing risk of failure or perverse outcomes from the substantial funds that are disbursed and spent at the country level (Finding 9, Finding 5).

4.1.2 On operational processes of NICFI partners

Conclusion 4. While multilateral partners have spread NICFI support widely and aided consistent and concerted action by donors, high administrative costs, slow disbursement and lack of a clear strategy to accommodate all countries engaged in readiness has created numerous problems and may undermine ultimate progress

NICFI has been perceived as having too light a touch in terms of what it asks of its multilateral partners (Finding 51). While there has been strong engagement with the CBFF to address performance problems (Finding 7), other multilateral partners have not been sufficiently held to account by NICFI (Finding 5). For example, with regard to the perceived management inefficiencies of the UN-REDD Programme (Finding 6), high administrative costs, especially associated with the FCPF (Finding 6) and the duplication, and transaction costs associated with the multilateral REDD+ architecture (Finding 6).

In Guyana, there has been slow disbursement of FCPF readiness funds (Lincoln et al. 2013) and the Inter-American Development Bank has been slow in its disbursement rate of GRIF funds (Guyana Annex).

The number of new countries recently joining the readiness process (Finding 24) is a matter of concern in the light of slow progress to result-based payments and indicates urgent need for a realistic stock take (see Conclusion 11).

There is obvious benefit from the inherent value of work on governance and the development of safeguards (Findings 27 and 39, for example) undertaken by the multilaterals. However, the multilaterals’ approach to management of risk has been by application of standard procedures unrelated to the size of the payments or the level of risk of non-compliance with safeguards. This has been unimaginative and unhelpful towards the overarching aim of NICFI to determine whether and how REDD+ can be made to work across a wide range of countries.

Safeguards and due diligence are essential but rapid disbursement is also highly desirable to demonstrate commitment to partners. It would be useful to revisit the processes in concert with the multilateral agencies to try and find a better balance between the application of safeguards and due diligence and more rapid disbursement.

In those countries that do not proceed to results-based payments, there is also risk from the opportunity cost of personnel being focused on REDD+ rather than on other forest sector issues, particularly from work done on MRV beyond what is useful for national resource management. This risk is highest for Least
Developed Countries with the fewest human and financial resources and the greatest need for support. Given that this point is already known, (Finding 45), it is unfortunate that more progress has not been made in preparing risk mitigation measures. It should, however, be recognised that capacity building activities on remote sensing, forest inventories, cadastral mapping, etc. are in high demand in the NICFI partner countries.

4.2 Financial processes

**Conclusion 5.** Whilst some of the NICFI financial processes have performed well the Norwegian government regulations are not designed to handle disbursements of results-based payments and options to address this need to be identified\(^{52}\)

Whilst the financial controls and financial management risk analyses applied by NICFI have successfully mitigated corruption risks in the portfolio (Finding 14), there have been problems with the disbursement of results-based payments (Finding 12). The current State Budget states that NICFI is likely to require more exemptions from regulations. However, need to secure exemptions from Parliament for each disbursement that exceeds the anticipated need for funds and the associated friction caused (Findings 11 and 12), suggest that the current process is not an appropriate solution in the long term.

As NICFI will be active until at least 2020, there is a need to identify possible solutions to resolve this problem. Previously dismissed options such as the use of a budgetary support mechanism could be considered, along with a review of other financial mechanisms. The possibility of development of a new regulation for disbursement of results-based aid payments could also be considered. It is understood that Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Advisory Committee is currently working on how to pay from aid budgets for services that deliver global benefits; this issue is not likely to be quickly resolved.

**Conclusion 6.** Whilst low disbursements compared with pledges is expected in some case because of they are staged over a number of years, the financial support process needs to be reviewed and revised in the light of experience

While there has been some understandable slippage in delivery related to overambitious plans, the primary reason that disbursements to bilateral partners have fallen short of pledged amounts is because commitments are multi-year

\(^{52}\) Note that after the evaluation data collection was completed, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance submitted a proposal to the Norwegian Parliament that contains proposed new criteria for disbursements associated with results based payments in relation to NICFI. http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dep/fln/Dokument/proposisjonar-og-meldingar/prop/2013-2014/Prop-93-S-2013-2014.html?id=759710.

This proposal was accepted in June 2014. Decision 581, Disbursement of grants. https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=59868.
and staged in relation to different phases of the partnerships, with the largest disbursements expected at latter stages (Finding 10).

Similarly, sizeable disbursements from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund are not expected for some time as most FCPF partner countries are still undertaking readiness activities (Finding 10).

Whilst the disbursements from the national-level, multi-contributor trust funds have been slower than anticipated because portfolio development has been slow, many of the supported projects are individually small in relation to the size of the fund and much smaller than most multilateral administrations are used to handling (Finding 8, Finding13). Disbursements from the multi-contributor trust funds held by the multilateral REDD+ institutions to final recipients have also been slower and lower than anticipated again because portfolio development and delivery has been slow (Finding 13).

There is a need to look at the processes for programme development, approval and delivery processes, as well as the nature of activities funded, to identify ways to improve efficient disbursement. This needs to maintain the discipline of results-based payments while recognising progress on interim factors leading ultimately to reduced emissions may need to be rewarded. This is necessary to maintain momentum of interest (so that supported countries can quickly see a tangible benefit) and manage expectations. NICFI cooperation with Germany on REDD+ Early Movers should be relevant in this.

4.3 Progress towards the NICFI Core Objectives

4.3.1 NICFI Core Objective 1. To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime

Conclusion 7. The NICFI activities in this area have been a great success and there has been a solid contribution to achievement of Core Objective 1

NICFI is the largest REDD+ donor globally and through support of the multilateral REDD+ institutions and establishment of seven bilateral programmes, NICFI has contributed to the engagement of a large number of REDD+ and donor countries (Finding 15, Finding 18). Via the multilateral REDD+ institutions, there has been substantial contribution to the development of the REDD+ operational architecture (Finding 16) and an international framework for REDD+ readiness systems and processes. Through its bilateral programmes and involvement in the design of the FCPF, NICFI has made a major contribution to the development of REDD+ financial mechanisms (Finding 16, Finding 26).
NICFI and the Norwegian negotiators have played an “instrumental” role in the progress made in the UNFCCC REDD+ negotiations and these align well with Norway’s interests and aims (Finding 17). The “flagship effect” of its large bilateral partnerships generated a political profile that created momentum internationally and leveraged political support domestically (Finding 18).

4.3.2 NICFI Core Objective 2. To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions

Conclusion 8. There has been an overall good contribution to achievement of this objective, with the most progress achieved through the best performing bilateral partnerships

Whilst noting that there is still much to do, such as much more action on mining as the main driver of deforestation in Guyana, (Finding 20) and further strong efforts to secure the achievements made in Indonesia and mitigate the risk that achievements are lost, (Finding 21, Finding 22), several of the key bilateral partnerships have performed well, particularly on technical aspects.

The partnership with Brazil has supported momentum for continuation along a trajectory of strong reductions in deforestation; influenced the development of other elements of Brazil’s national low carbon framework; contributed to developing practical capacity for REDD+ in Brazil and the other Amazon countries; as well as paving the way for future emissions reductions through Amazon Fund supported projects (Finding 19).

The partnership with Indonesia has resulted in good progress on readiness planning, establishment of an institutional framework for REDD+ and design of the systems and processes required implementing REDD+ (Finding 21). The Guyana-Norway partnership has been highly successful at developing a national-level monitoring, reporting and verification system, and reasonably successful at developing a financial mechanism for REDD+ payments (Finding 20).

There have also been strong and important contributions to the definition and piloting of systems and processes: particularly Measurement, Reporting and Verification (Finding 25), financial mechanisms (Finding 26), and on safeguards through both UNFCCC negotiations and its very successful support to civil society (Findings 4 and 27). The multilateral institutions have also been effective in developing grievance procedures (Finding 28).

Other elements of the portfolio have made a less satisfactory contribution. Whilst the bilateral support to Tanzania has catalysed a large number of REDD+ related activities, progress has been slow at the national level due to the lack of national government ownership (Finding 23).

Whilst support through the multilateral institutions has resulted in the initiation of readiness activities in a large number of countries, only a minority of countries have progressed to the later stages of the readiness process (Finding 24). To a
certain extent this is understandable given the small amount of funds allocated
to each participant country and the complexity of the REDD+ architecture and
the onerous processes (Finding 6), but it also begs the question of whether
REDD+ process was and is correct for all of the countries engaged.

Given the critical importance of Brazil and Indonesia for achievement of REDD+
at a significant global scale, the good progress in these two countries far
outweighs some of the less positive results in others, and it must also be
acknowledged that REDD+ is still a relatively new concept and, in any piloting
activity or initiative, a range of degrees of success of the supported activities is
to be expected. All in all, there has been a good and solid contribution to the
achievement of NICFI Core Objective 2.

4.3.3 NICFI Core Objective 3. To promote the conservation of natural
forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity

**Conclusion 9.** A solid contribution to achievement of this core objective
has been made, both directly and through establishment of supportive
frameworks and inclusion in safeguards

A substantial, direct contribution towards the conservation of natural forest has
been made by the NICFI portfolio, from project-scale pilots to the establishment
of new conservation forests (Finding 30) and while other key activities are not
yet fully effective (such as the Moratorium on new forest and peat land
conversion concessions in Indonesia) these are an important step in the right
direction (Finding 30).

The Safeguards Systems developed and implemented through bilateral and
multi-lateral NICFI support channels all include criteria on natural forest and
biodiversity conservation (Finding 32) and the multilateral REDD+ institutions
have established additional frameworks that promote the conservation of natural
forests in the design of REDD+ activities and developed tools for this (Finding 31).

4.3.4 Overarching Development Objective. Contribute towards the achievement
of Norwegian development policy objectives

**Conclusion 10.** There has been a good contribution to achievement of the
development objective that goes a long way beyond ‘do no harm’, with
some important successes. However, non-indigenous community rights
are not well covered and there is a low general capacity to address gender
issues

Forest governance issues are addressed strongly throughout the portfolio. The
multilateral approach has embedded forest governance at the heart of REDD+
readiness planning and fundamental steps forward have been made through the
Indonesia bilateral agreement (Finding 33). Corruption and forest crime are
tackled through the bilateral agreement with Indonesia, several civil society
projects and the UN-REDD programme (Finding 34).
Safeguards have been strongly addressed at all levels; the UNFCCC negotiations, the multilateral REDD+ institutions, bilateral partner countries, and through the civil society support scheme but the development results of the NICFI portfolio go well beyond the ‘do no harm’ principle in many cases (Finding 35). Indigenous rights issues are established as a central feature of the operational frameworks of the multilateral REDD+ institutions (Finding 35) and an important contribution to furthering Indigenous rights issues in Indonesia has been made (Finding 36). However, non-indigenous communities’ rights are less well represented and remain a gap that requires further action (Finding 37).

Tenure and resources access are addressed directly in Indonesia, Tanzania, through the civil society portfolio and the Congo Basin Forest Fund, and through provision of guidance and support on these issues by the other multilateral REDD+ institutions (Finding 39).

Many activities also provide a strong contribution to sustainable development through poverty alleviation and livelihood improvement albeit primarily at the project scale, so the wider impact will be limited (Finding 38). Gender issues are addressed in some way across all elements of the portfolio (but Brazil), with some direct positive contributions, but with varying levels of depth and understanding (Finding 40).

4.4 Conclusions on strategic issues

4.4.1 On general REDD+ developments

Conclusion 11. This is a critical juncture in the evolution of NICFI and the concept of REDD+ more broadly

Now, at five and a half years since the establishment of NICFI, many lessons have been generated. A few REDD+ countries are making substantial progress, while many are making very little progress (Finding 41), with most robust progress being made by countries where the underlying context is supportive (Finding 42). There are also lessons in relation to the nature of REDD+ incentives (Finding 43).

At the same time, there are important risks associated with the level of funding available (Finding 44) that are compounded by, in some cases, unrealistic expectations over the level of payments that may be achieved (Finding 45).

In addition, a range of views on the primary end point of REDD+ have developed (Finding 46) and there is evidence that NICFI's own strategy is broadening in scope compared with that envisaged in 2008 (Finding 50), but not that it has been sufficiently revised to accommodate the slow rate of progress in many countries (Finding 48).

The partnership with Ethiopia was not covered in this evaluation; however, it is interesting because of Ethiopia’s forest resource base, political dedication to a
green economy and Norway’s support being jointly with another donor, the UK. In Colombia and Ecuador, Norway is partnering with Germany through the REDD+ Early Movers scheme (High Level Informants Annex).

While the multilaterals have been helpful in securing a developmentally sound framework for REDD+ (Conclusion 8), the best progress has been made bilaterally. By continuing to bring more countries into REDD+ readiness, given the slow progress in the bulk of most countries already engaged (Conclusion 4), it is difficult to conclude that this modality has been fully effective. It has also brought substantial criticism within Norway of the accumulation of unspent finance (Conclusion 6).

Most effort so far has been devoted to readiness processes and systems rather than directly generating emissions reductions. Despite these efforts, many countries are failing to make much progress (Finding 41) and it may now be appropriate to consolidate funds in countries that are willing and able to make progress. This requires attention to the drivers of deforestation which, while it is addressed in readiness funding and through civil society grants, neither of these modalities brings large-scale funding to deal effectively with these issues in full. FIP is the main modality that can do this and its funding to each country is anticipated to be in the order of five to 10 times greater than that under FCPF Readiness but only has to accommodate the requirements of eight country partners.53

It is also noted that many of the most difficult problems being encountered, such as rights, tenure and improved governance, are those that often stalled earlier programmes of forest sector support. In Indonesia, the REDD+ window (Finding 21) seems to have provided opportunity for progress that eluded interventions from World Bank, DFID and others in the 1990s.

At the same time, there would be benefit from identifying and using earlier experience from other processes that are inherently similar to REDD+. FLEGT, which allows trade in legal timber even when illegal timber still exists in the country of origin, and the Global Forest Trade Network, which gave formal interim approval to suppliers working towards certification (Finding 49). Both have relevance to current ideas on jurisdictional approaches to REDD+ (Finding 52).

**Conclusion 12.** There is urgent need for good analysis of the cost-effectiveness of REDD+ in different country situations and for different types of partner and also for much greater transparency on financial flows for REDD+ to avoid unrealistic expectations

The most robust progress has been made in countries where there is an underlying political commitment to REDD+ (Finding 42) and the separation between a purely economic incentive and a motivator that also supports the

53 https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/Forest_Investment_Program.
political commitment (Finding 43) needs to be recognised. This difference has major implications for decisions about the need for building up a results-based payment fund (such as the FCPF Carbon Fund) as well as for the allocation of readiness funding to different countries. It certainly is clear that simply seeking further funding without greater clarity on where it is applied and why would not be appropriate.

This analysis should take into account how REDD+ could be configured for countries with fragmented, low carbon forests and landscapes that are socially complex.

One major issue that has been given inadequate attention generally in REDD+ is the cost-effectiveness of the current model (Finding 44), a deficiency widely acknowledge but not taken up. This point was highlighted in the evaluation of NICFI support to MRV (Lincoln et al. 2013). Given the much greater costs than expected being incurred (Finding 6) and uncertainty over the level of results-based finance that will be available in future (Finding 44), much greater clarity over cost-effectiveness would benefit all donor and recipient countries involved in REDD+.

Widespread concern was expressed by many interviewees from donors and the multilaterals over the unrealistic expectations of some countries in respect of REDD+ (Finding 45) and NICFI, together with other donors and multilaterals, will need to work to manage these expectations. Solid information on cost-effectiveness will be an important element in this in concert with managing views about the relative value of REDD+ payments and other benefits that have accrued from readiness work (Finding 46).

4.4.2 On NICFI’s strategy and role

**Conclusion 13. There is good initial evidence that the NICFI climate and development goals can be synergetic and the lessons learned so far should be integrated into a NICFI results-based planning framework and NICFI strategy**

Each element of the NICFI portfolio assessed by this evaluation has made (or is anticipated to make) a positive development contribution (Findings 33 to 40) and the portfolio provides clear evidence that work towards the climate and development goals of NICFI can potentially be synergetic. One key, direct example is the Indonesia – Norway bilateral agreement activities. In Indonesia the approach to tackling deforestation is by addressing key development policy issues: forest governance, crime and corruption, tenure and land use claims (Findings 33, 34 and 39) and in doing so has contributed to the furthering of indigenous rights (Finding 36).

However, the scope of the FCPF and UN-REDD programmes inevitably requires a focus on establishing development issues within the operational frameworks for REDD+, rather than undertaking activities on the ground. This combined with
the fact that many of the countries engaged through the multilateral institutions are still undertaking early readiness activities, suggests that direct contributions to development in many of the countries engaged may be limited at this stage to transparency and participation at the country level and improvements in information about land cover and land cover change. Whilst the pilot projects are also contributing in a mutually supportive manner, there are problems with economic sustainability (Finding 23) and hence potential for scale-up.

This suggests that there is a need for NICFI to better define the way it intends to address the NICFI climate and development goals concurrently. Middle income countries such as Brazil and Indonesia have the best potential to make a strong impact on achievement of the climate goals and also include good potential for contribution to the political governance aspects of the development goal. However, poverty alleviation impacts, which are particularly important for the least developed countries, are likely to be small scale, mainly indirect and largely in the future.

This also suggests that different approaches will be required for different country contexts. These different approaches will need to be included in the results-based framework for NICFI that specifically outlines what is to be addressed where and the expected outcomes.

**Conclusion 14.** NICFI operates in a unique way compared with other donors and Norway has acquired the mantle of the dominant voice among donors for REDD+; there is a need to play this role responsibly

Both donors and multilateral respondents noted the important role that NICFI staff had played in coordinating with other donors (Finding 1). They were commended for their vision, clarity of position and ability to work quickly, constructively and flexibly. At the same time, other donors are not able to work in the same way (Finding 47), which has implications for the way NICFI engages with other donors, and its expectations of them. This gives NICFI a unique role that needs to be better capitalised in its partnerships with other bilateral donors and within the multilaterals. At present, NICFI seems to be giving this insufficient attention. Angelsen and MacNeill (2012) note the difficulties many donors face from pressure to spend their allocated annual budget.

Since NICFI has played such an instrumental role in setting up the multilateral architecture it has an added responsibility to ensure that it is fit for purpose and that inefficiency is not perpetuated (Finding 6).

There is no systematic evidence that suggests how engagement in REDD+ readiness enables countries to leverage wider investments into the forest sector or into measures to tackle the drivers of deforestation through agriculture or trade. Whilst it is too early to examine the success of FIP investments in meeting their leverage targets, there is currently only one country (Mexico) where it has been linked up with other Bank investments (Forest Investment Program Annex). Respondents frequently highlighted the opportunity for NICFI and its multilateral
partners to consider how greater linkage could be made between sectoral programmes (e.g. REDD+ and agriculture – Finding 29) in order to create more rapid progress in ‘catalysing green economy’ transformations.

There are a number of innovative Civil Society projects (Finding 50) that engage with private sector organisations, for example the Amazon Environmental Research Institute (IPAM) used NICFI support to develop a ‘Pathways to Finance’ approach for assessing financing gaps, sources of finance and risks for investment into climate-smart and roundtable certified commodities via REDD+. ICRAF also developed recommendations in relation to securing private investment into REDD+ processes. However, these are likely to remain small-scale unless they receive wider support from large private companies or donors. To date, private sector engagement in REDD+ remains far below that envisaged in Bali in 2007. One aspect that needs urgent attention is the need to reduce the complex architecture and onerous processes around REDD+ (Finding 6)

Conclusion 15. Good communication at a range of levels is of crucial importance if mistakes are not to be perpetuated, synergy is to be optimised and stakeholders are to be kept adequately informed

Within Norway, the most informative website on NICFI is the highly regarded one developed for the Civil Society Fund (Finding 4). Given that Brazil and Indonesia are the dominant recipients of NICFI finance, there is urgent need to make the real gains achieved (Findings 19 and 21) much more explicit.

In addition to improved communication within NICFI (Conclusion 2) better public communication is needed and, noting Conclusion 14, greater clarity with other donors and multilaterals may also be required, particularly following any revision of the NICFI strategy as suggested in Conclusion 11.

Norway’s own records of pledges, commitments and disbursements are accurate but information on overall financial flows for REDD+ are incomplete and inconsistent. Given the amount of finance flowing for REDD+, this is surprising and the lack of clarity and transparency (Findings 6 and 9) certainly does not help in managing countries’ expectations (Conclusion 12). It also likely adds to negative impressions within civil society and Norwegian public.
5. Recommendations

This evaluation has focused predominantly on looking backwards at the progress made since the UNFCCC conference of the parties in Bali in December 2007. Great progress has been made against the three NICFI core climate objectives and there has been substantial achievement also with the core development objective (Conclusion 7 to Conclusion 10).

At Bali, REDD+ was in essence a conceptual aspiration. Since then it has evolved and there is now a much clearer view of REDD+ in the global arena than was then the case. NICFI has been highly instrumental to this evolution and, in the process of securing progress against its four core objectives, numerous lessons have been generated. A number of high-level interviewees (High Level Informants Annex) commented that “There would be no REDD+ without Norway”, which is a very laudable achievement. There is now a rich lode of knowledge and experience available on the evolution of REDD+ and about what has worked and where.

We identify the large number of countries that have started the REDD+ readiness progress but are not likely to secure results based payments in the short to medium term – for a variety of reasons – as being a major risk to progress with REDD+ unless an alternative is developed that builds on and supports the gains made. We also interpret the revised management structure for NICFI as one that will demand much more detailed and specific planning and reporting than has been in place to date.

At this juncture, it is appropriate for NICFI to undertake a critical review of its strategy and determine where there would be benefit from change and where the current strategy should remain. There is a huge difference between continuing a strategy because change has not been considered and continuing with a strategy after confirmation that it remains the best option. It is important for politicians and the public in Norway, for donor and REDD+ country partners and for the wider global community that NICFI demonstrates clearly that it has done this; doing so would be a valuable contribution for the REDD+ community.

The diversity of experience and expertise within the institutions now formally engaged in NICFI is a two-edged sword. While it brings valuable knowledge and ideas, it also risks creating dissent due to the varying backgrounds, other priorities, organisational cultures and the specific interests of the individuals engaged. If the progress made to date is to be continued, we consider it essential that NICFI plans are “owned” by everyone involved in their delivery. We also consider that maintaining public and political support for what is a major
development initiative for Norway will increasingly require firm evidence of progress being reported against clearly defined targets and time frames.

The recommendations that follow in essence provide the key pointers for a NICFI strategic planning exercise the results of which would be a clearly defined strategy for the future, including regular review and revision as appropriate. Consequently, all the recommendations relate to this level, in essence the overarching operational and financial processes.

**Recommendation 1. Using this report and other relevant material, assess the progress made on REDD+, the contribution of NICFI support together with that of other donors and the varied progress in REDD+ countries together with a gap analysis to provide an objective basis for a review of NICFI policy and strategy**

There have been great achievements made by NICFI (Conclusion 7 – Conclusion 10) but some elements of the portfolio are less successful (Conclusion 4), particularly the multilateral modalities. Given the progress made, and the dominant role of NICFI as a global REDD+ leader (Conclusion 14), there is a need to take stock and rationalise the NICFI interventions (Conclusion 11) and the modalities through which these are delivered.

An analytical and comprehensive assessment is needed that not only covers the lessons learned (Conclusion 13) and interventions of NICFI itself, but also those of other donors, progress with REDD+ at the global level, in partner countries and for other stakeholders. This evaluation combined with other relevant evaluations, inter alia those of UN-REDD, the Climate Investment Funds hosted by the World Bank (FCPF and FIP), CBFF and other donors, key research studies and NICFI internal and commissioned reports, studies and documents provide the bulk of the material necessary although some work will be required to draw these sources together. Any serious missing information can be provided by an additional short study or studies.

Such an assessment will identify the current state of play for the REDD+ effort and pinpoint where gaps have emerged; gaps may be where progress has been sub-optimal or newly created opportunities that have arisen from progress made. In both cases, it will be important to identify the gaps, to determine whether changes are needed and, if so, how these changes should be implemented. Cost effectiveness issues for different actors at a range of levels have been neglected but should be an important focus in this (Conclusion 12).

The assessment recommended should lead to identification of where and how more or less resources should be applied and include scenarios of how changes to the current picture could and should be made to optimise the overall value from NICFI support, including consideration of whether greater concentration is required, for example on fewer countries to facilitate more rapid progress.
Recommendation 2. **Develop a revised NICFI policy and strategy including a formal Theory of Change linked to a responsive, results-based reporting framework that takes into account the needs and priorities of all the agencies engaged in NICFI**

**Box 1 Theory of Change and results-based framework**

Both of these two terms are interpreted and used to mean widely differing things to different people. To avoid doubt, we refer in this report to "formal" versions of both to mean when they are written down in a single document. During this evaluation, while we have found elements of the NICFI Theory of Change are included in documents such as the annual budget submissions to parliament, Climate White Papers, and UNFCCC submissions, the information has not been amalgamated into a single source. Thus, while people in the NICFI Secretariat may be fully aware of their Theory of Change, people outside this have to search through quite copious and disparate documentation in order to acquire similar familiarity.

There is much discussion and debate about what constitutes a Theory of Change; what we envision is a Theory of Change for strategic planning and coordination purposes contained in a single document. Such a document would be expected to delineate the strategic interventions and the rationale for their selection, the modalities and a broad indication of input levels, anticipated outputs, expected outcomes leading to desired impacts and the assumptions that have been made, and are required to hold good, in order to achieve the outcomes and impacts.

Linked to the Theory of Change, we were also expecting a Results-based Framework, again as a single document or suite of documents. In essence, this would build on the Theory of Change and lay out in greater detail the inputs required, the milestones to be achieved at specific points, the assumptions made together with qualitative and quantitative indicators and means of verification covering progress, including progress towards outcomes and impacts, and the extent to which assumptions are holding true. Such a framework can be "nested" to facilitate use. We envisage such a planning framework as being dynamic with regular review and revision on the basis of experience gained and lessons learnt as well as the accommodation of new interventions.

In our experience documentation of this type is very helpful for coordination when a large number of people with different and diverse backgrounds, some of whom may be remotely located, are engaged in programme delivery and it aids consistent decision making regardless of external pressures and priorities. It is also helpful for preparing coherent and consistent reporting at the level of detail required for various purposes and audiences.

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54 We note that the NICFI Secretariat do not agree that formal documentation at the level proposed here is required; their view is that current documentation is adequate for the purposes noted.


56 For example: Norway’s submission to the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Co-operative Action (UNFCCC, 2008).

There are two fundamental requirements linked to more a formalised management approach. The first is a Theory of Change and the second a results-based reporting system. To date the Theory of Change has been largely generic and, while NICFI management has had a clear idea of what it is aiming for, without a formal Theory of Change, developed, discussed, agreed with all the agencies involved, and on which there is common understanding, there is too much scope for misunderstandings and a lack of transparency.

The formalised Theory of Change and the results-based planning and reporting framework are dynamic resources that need to be reviewed and revised regularly. The Theory of Change should also cover the management approach required to achieve the NICFI objectives, and be based on a sound understanding of cost-effectiveness issues and their implications for REDD+ countries and other donors (Conclusion 12).

The dynamic strategic framework and results based management process (Conclusion 2) should take into account the critical assumptions behind the current portfolio of interventions and results achieved so far (Conclusions 7-10; Conclusion 13) as well as revisions made following the detailed assessment of progress and success. This framework should clearly specify the expected outcomes and impacts for each of the climate and the development objectives, the activities required to achieve these outcomes and impacts, and provide a limited set of tightly-formulated, specific indicators to measure progress.

Indicators for directly supported in-country activities should report on the underlying operating environment as well as specific progress. For activities that are delivered through multilateral partners, indicators will be required that reflect strategic level progress as well as activities. The evaluation framework annexed in this report and the approach developed by Norad Civil Society Department to managing the NICFI civil society support can provide the starting point for this work.

Notwithstanding the generally good progress made so far against climate and development objectives, we believe that the revised structure for NICFI provides enhanced opportunity for great integration of strategies to meet all the objectives from the design stage onwards. We also believe that such an opportunity can only be optimally grasped with the closer cooperation and coordination engendered by the manifesto type approach from the bottom up; i.e. full engagement of all relevant people in developing a commonly understood Theory of Change and results-based planning and reporting framework and in the interventions that are agreed and emerge from this process.

The dynamic Theory of Change and reporting framework, including the indicators, should be reviewed regularly to ascertain whether the assumptions, outcomes and activities, and the reporting system itself, need adjustment and, if so, be revised accordingly in cooperation with representatives of all agencies engaged with NICFI. A review of staffing needs, numbers and workloads in Oslo and operational capacity in bilateral partner countries (Conclusion 3) is also
recommended as part of the overall review, taking into account the organisational changes implemented from 1 January 2014, which we have not been able to assess as they are too new but which we consider to be highly appropriate.

We strongly feel that the substantial progress made to date by NICFI will not continue unless a more formal system of planning and reporting that incorporates lessons learnt and experience gained is put in place.

At the same time, we recognise the great value NICFI has had through its ability to work much more quickly than other donors (Conclusion 14) and observe that more a detailed planning system should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate this valuable strength.

In respect of Conclusion 6, we note that changes have been made to financial regulations (Section 1.7.1) to facilitate results-based payments. We anticipate that further changes may be required in future as REDD+ develops.

**Recommendation 3.** Undertake a review of partnerships with other donors and the multilateral organisations, with a view towards optimising the multilaterals’ activities. This should take into account their differing mandates, constraints and opportunities for synergy with NICFI’s strengths. Develop a common approach with other donors to leverage greater efficiency and effectiveness from the multilateral institutions.

The need for a ‘stock take’ (Conclusion 11) extends to the NICFI partnerships with the multilateral institutions (Conclusion 4) and with other donors. A future approach may involve more intensive management than the approach taken so far (Conclusion 3), to ensure the cost effectiveness of activities supported (Conclusion 12) and that the activities supported are well aligned with current global priorities (Recommendations 1 and 2). NICFI has a role and a responsibility to lead on this given its dominance as a REDD+ donor (Conclusion 14).

Once NICFI has developed and agreed a revised approach for itself it will be necessary to agree the future roles of the multilateral institutions, with partner donors. This highlights the importance of good internal and external communication (Conclusion 15) so that all actors are clear on what NICFI is aiming to achieve and how it plans to do this. It is vital that everyone in all the agencies that comprise NICFI present a consistent picture whenever they meet with others. The potential linkages to the proposed Green Climate Fund should be a priority in developing progress with REDD+.

**Recommendation 4.** For different reasons, there have been limitations to progress in Guyana and in Tanzania. Both countries should be visited by a high-level, multi-disciplinary team to discuss the reasons for this and whether and how NICFI support should be continued.
As noted in Conclusions 3 and 4, progress in Tanzania and Guyana has been slower than expected for differing reasons (Conclusions 8 and 11). Both are important countries in that they represent specific country situations; Guyana is a high forest cover / low deforestation country while Tanzania is a dry forest country with a high rural population dependent on agriculture, often at the forest/agriculture interface. Following the review of progress made in Recommendation 1, such visits would be helpful for defining a revised approach to both countries that is usefully synergetic with the overall NICFI portfolio.

While Tanzania has an actively engaged Norwegian Embassy, there is no on-the-ground Norwegian presence in Guyana and access from Brasilia is very difficult. We recommend that consideration be given to locating a permanent administrative contact point (not a diplomatic mission) in Georgetown to facilitate contact with the government of Guyana, the national stakeholders and other relevant donors and actors in that country.

**Recommendation 5.** NICFI should give attention to communication: providing more information on its progress and successes through a variety of means. This should include, but not be limited to, a comprehensive website with links to reports and other sources of information. It should also continue efforts to secure greater transparency on the flow of funds around REDD+, especially where funds are channelled through multilateral partners.

As noted in Conclusion 15, the updated Civil Society Fund website has been much praised and highly valued by interviewees, especially from civil society organisations. We believe that NICFI has much of interest and value to promote through a similarly informative website for the Initiative as a whole and such a website could be complemented by other social media.

While we found that Norway's own financial records are complete and relatively easily followed, this is not so for REDD+ more widely, especially through multilaterals and we recommend that NICFI presses for all REDD+ multilateral agencies to work to higher standards of transparency on this important aspect.
Annexes
## Annex 1 List of people interviewed

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**Country partner governments**

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### Negotiators

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Annex 2 References


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Annex 3 Terms of reference

Terms of reference
Real-time evaluation of Norway’s international climate and forest initiative:

Synthesis evaluation 2007-2013
19.09.2013

1. **Background**

**REDD+ and Norway’s initiative**
The Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) was launched in December 2007, pledging substantial development cooperation funding towards efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD²). The primary objective of the Norwegian Government’s climate policy is to play a part in establishing a global, binding, long-term post-2012 regime that will ensure deep enough cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions for the average rise in global temperature to be limited to no more than 2°C above the pre-industrial level.² The international climate policy has changed since the Initiative was initiated with no new comprehensive agreement in place within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), although some achievements was made on climate and forest under the Cancun Agreement in 2010, and further progress were made on technical issues in Durban in 2011. However, according to the Norwegian government’s annual proposition No.1 (Prop.1S 2012-2013), the rationale behind the government’s climate and forest initiative is still valid and the strategy and objectives for the Initiative remains.

*The funding shall be used in accordance with the objectives of NICFI*: To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime;

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1 Appendix 1 provides a table of total NICFI disbursement 2009-2012 (in million Norwegian kroner). Source: Statistical database, Statistical team, Norad.
2 REDD stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest degradation in Developing countries. REDD+ includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions;

To promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity.

Sustainable development and poverty alleviation are overarching goals of Norwegian foreign and development policy\(^5\) (ODA). Thus, in addition to the climate-related goals, these are essential goals for NICFI. In pursuing the different goals, the climate policy and the development policy should be mutually supportive.

NICFI is working through four main areas; negotiations under the UNFCCC, partnerships with individual countries, multilateral programs, and support for civil society. The majority of NICFI’s financial support is channelled through multilateral units including; the UN-REDD Programme (hosted by United Nations Environment Program, United Nations Development Program, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (hosted by the World Bank), the Forest Investment Program (hosted by the World Bank), the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), and the Congo Basin Forest Fund managed by the African Development Bank. Norway has also entered into formal agreements with Brazil (where funding is provided to the Amazon fund managed by the Brazilian National Development Bank), Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Tanzania. A climate partnership with Ethiopia was launched during the UNFCCC negotiations in Durban in 2011 and formalized agreement is to be signed in the coming months. Discussions are taking place preparing for bilateral support to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Non-governmental organisations are funded through a support scheme administered by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad).

The set-up and political context of NICFI has changed since the initiation. In 2007, there was one responsible minister for NICFI being Minister of the Environment and International Development. This changed in 2012 and there are now two ministers that are sharing this position; the Minister of International Development and the Minister of Environment. The Ministry of Environment still hosts the Secretariat of the NICFI, which has expanded with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being placed at Ministry of Environment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supported by Norwegian missions abroad and Norad, is responsible for foreign and development policy related to NICFI, as well as the management and disbursement of funds. In 2013, a large part of the administration and management of the portfolio will be transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Norad. This transfer involves updated rules for how to manage the portfolio and budget items.

\(^5\) The ODA objectives include social and economic development, poverty reduction, the welfare and rights of indigenous peoples and other people living in or from forests, better land use, and the protection of biodiversity and the environment in general.
Overall, NICFI emphasises the importance of recognizing and designing REDD+ as an element of national development strategies and green economy approaches.

The real-time evaluation of the Norway’s international climate and forest initiative

Norad’s Evaluation Department started the real-time evaluation in early 2010, entering into a framework contract with LTS International covering the four-year period 2010-2013. The purpose of this real-time evaluation is to facilitate rapid learning by progressively assessments the results of NICFI with regard to its objectives. Real-time evaluation is not an evaluation methodology - what distinguishes it is the point in time in which it takes place. The evaluation is guided by the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The approach involves a range of evaluation activities of specific thematic or geographic areas carried out irregularly, which can also be repeated at regular intervals.

The overall objectives of this real-time evaluation are to assess the results of NICFI’s support towards its climate and development objectives.

The evaluation has revolved around the following three levels:

- Global level: The Initiative’s contribution to an international REDD regime
- National level: The Initiative’s support to the formulation and implementation of national REDD strategies
- Local level: Lessons learned from REDD demonstration projects supported by the Initiative

The first evaluations carried out were NICFI’s contributions to a global REDD+ regime (2007-2010), and NICFI’s contributions to national REDD+ processes (2007-2010) in Brazil, Guyana, DR Congo, Tanzania, and Indonesia. A real-time evaluation framework with indicators to be used throughout the evaluation period was developed. The evaluations constructed a baseline retrospectively (2007 – the year of the launch of NICFI) and thereafter assessed NICFI’s support to the global and national work within REDD+ from 2007-2010. The evaluation of NICFI’s support to civil society organisations was published in 2012, covering advocacy and demonstration activities on the ground with field studies in Indonesia, Peru, Cameroon and DR Congo. In 2013, the thematic-

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6 Norsk: følgeevaluering.
7 The main indicators for the global REDD+ regime was clustered under the following themes: 1) Progress of REDD+ section of climate change negotiation text 2) Progress on an overarching climate agreement 3) Progress on detailed REDD+ modalities and processes 4) Progress with developing an institutional framework 5) Political commitment and momentum rearing REDD+ 6) Consistency and coherence of interim actions on REDD+.

The main indicators for the national REDD+ processes was clustered under the following themes: 1) National ownership 2) REDD relevant policies, strategies, plans, actions 3) MRV capacity and capability 4) Deforestation and forest degradation 5) Livelihoods, economic and social development and environmental conservation.

See further the country evaluation reports and the global regime report http://www.norad.no/no/evaluering/publikasjoner/publikasjon?key=333472.
evaluation of NICFI’s support to Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) is to be published (with field studies in Indonesia, DR Congo, Tanzania, and Guyana).

The synthesising evaluation that this specific terms of reference corresponds to will be the final one to be conducted under the existing real-time evaluation framework contract.

2. **Purpose, objectives and scope**

There are two main reasons for this evaluation: 1) It is stated in the first terms of reference for the real-time evaluation from 2010 that «the ultimate outcome of the real-time evaluation is expected to be a synthesis report that addresses the four overall objectives». 2) There are strategic decisions to be taken about the future strategy of NICFI, and this evaluation can provide inputs to that process. Hence, the purpose of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which the anticipated outcomes were produced. It will synthesise the results and lessons learned and serve as input to NICFI and the broader REDD community in the future work and strategic decisions.

The main objective of this evaluation is to assess the results of NICFI’s support against the overall objectives, and shall cover the period from 2007-2013. The evaluation shall synthesis results and lessons learned based on qualitative and quantitative evidence on global, national and local level, and identify their potential implications for NICFI’s future and strategic work.

Since this evaluation will assess results against the overall objectives, it will be of importance in the inception phase to clarify how NICFI defines the relationship between the climate and development policies. This will then guide the evaluation. It shall be clarified, to the extent possible, if there are changes over time on how these two policies have been emphasised, both in the design (agreements) and the implementation phases. The focus will be on achievements of results against the each of the objectives, and how they are interlinked.

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8 A summative evaluation rather than formative.
9 As stated above:
   To work towards the inclusion of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a new international climate regime;
   To take early action to achieve cost-effective and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions;
   To promote the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity.
Sustainable development and poverty alleviation are overarching goals of Norwegian foreign and development policy (ODA). Thus, in addition to the climate-related goals, these are essential goals for NICFI. In pursuing the different goals, the climate policy and the development policy should be mutually supportive.
3. Methods

This evaluation shall assess the results of NICFI’s support against baseline data made available by previous evaluations and studies, both within this real-time evaluation and other related studies and evaluations. Relevant existing international best knowledge and evaluations covering REDD+ programs and activities shall be reviewed. The evaluation shall build upon the already constructed and revised evaluation framework and indicator tables for the global and country evaluations (appendix 2). A Theory of Change shall be reconstructed covering, to the extent possible, the climate and development dynamics. New data, both qualitative and quantitative, shall be collected where needed in order to make an up to date assessment. Baselines can be reconstructed if needed. The evaluation will be of a broader and synthesising character. A sample of in depth studies can be conducted if needed for verification of data.

The evaluation shall be objective, transparent and evidence-based and use multiple information sources and triangulation\(^\text{10}\) of data to substantiate findings and assessments.

Where the team does not find sufficient information to make meaningful assessments against the objectives of the evaluation, the team shall list the sources sought and not found and describe the type of information sources they would have required to carry out such an assessment.

The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards\(^\text{11}\). Gender aspects shall be taken into account where relevant.

4. Evaluation activities and deliverables

_Inception report_

The inception phase will start off with meetings with the evaluation department and stakeholders in Oslo in September. The main aim of these meetings will be to define and agree upon a measurable definition of how NICFI considers the mutually supportiveness between the climate and development goals. This will also provide the ground work for reconstruction of a Theory of Change for the evaluation. During the inception phase, the team shall review relevant baseline data, evaluations, reviews and project documents. The inception report shall include a suggestion of countries and modalities to be studied in detail, based

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\(^{10}\) Defined as: ‘The use of three or more theories, sources or types of information, or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment. OECD DAC. Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management. 2002.

\(^{11}\) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/0/44798177.pdf
on selection criteria. The team shall propose a methodology for the evaluation including an evaluation framework\textsuperscript{12}. A list of information collected to date shall be included, and information gaps shall be identified as well as a strategy on how to fill the gaps.

**Final report**

The final report shall be prepared in accordance to the Guidelines for Reports and not exceed 50 pages excluding annexes. The executive summary shall not exceed one tenth of the length of the main report and shall function as an independent excerpt free of references to other parts of the report.

**Communication brief**

Based on the executive summary, a communication brief not exceeding two pages shall be prepared. It shall include the most important findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. It shall be written in an accessible language, possibly including clarifying examples, and be evidence based. The specific format for the communication brief may be agreed in more detail later.

All reports shall be written in a non-technical and accessible language, with the use of acronyms kept to a minimum. Findings and conclusions must refer to specific and well-documented sources and references and shall include an analysis that shows how and why the evidence presented supports the position taken. In general, all the reports shall be prepared in accordance to the “Guidelines for Reports under the call-off orders” (annex 5 in the tender document).

**Deliverables and timeframe:**

9-10th September: Start of the inception phase. Meetings with stakeholders in Oslo.

7th October: Submission of inception report

October: Comments on Inception report submitted to consultants

End of March: Submission of draft final report

April: Comments on the draft final report to consultants

May: Submission of final report

June: Final public seminar and internal workshop with stakeholders

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\textsuperscript{12} The evaluation framework (Appendix 2) already developed by LTS for this on-going real-time evaluation shall be used and revised when applicable.
5. **Evaluation team**

The evaluation will require a team with extensive knowledge of REDD, climate strategies and development work at international, national and local level, as well as knowledge of the countries and international initiatives under study. Preferably at least one member of each of the previous country/global/thematic evaluations should take part in the corresponding country teams of this evaluation.

The team leader shall have documented experience in managing complex, multi-disciplinary evaluations. The team leader shall ensure methodological and conceptual consistency throughout the evaluation.

LTS International shall suggest a composition of the team, taking into account the size of the evaluation and the expected distribution of personnel categories (see tender document).

6. **Budget**

LTS International shall propose a budget based on the personnel requirements and the expected travel and subsistence expenses.