Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation
## Looking Back

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Looking Back

An evaluation is to look back. It is now five years since the Evaluation Department received its new mandate, which strengthened the position of the department and introduced routines for how to follow up evaluation reports. This took place after the responsibility for evaluation of Norwegian development funds had been transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Norad, and the number of employees was doubled. This might therefore be a good time to look back, take stock and assess the status of the evaluation work.

During these five years the Evaluation Department has published 85 reports. Of these, 35 were our own evaluations of Norwegian assistance. Eleven were carried out as joint evaluations with other countries. We have also supported 19 evaluations performed by the evaluation departments in the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The rest is made up of other evaluations we have participated in and various studies.

During this period we have performed quite extensive evaluations of the key areas in the development budget, from the state-to-state assistance and the funds channelled through NGOs, to humanitarian aid, the work for peace and support for human rights. The funds channelled through multilateral agencies have been covered through cooperation agreements with the World Bank and the UNDP, in addition to our own evaluations of earmarked Norwegian contributions.

Even so, the centrally commissioned evaluations which the department is in charge of will only cover a fraction of the budget at any time. Of equal importance are the local evaluations and reviews that are performed by embassies and responsible departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, and of course by the Norwegian and international agencies and organisations that manage the funds from the Norwegian aid budget.

Compulsory follow-up of the evaluation reports was introduced in 2006, and one of the positive effects of this seems to be that one can now document what has been done with the reports. This has most certainly been a contributing factor in Norad receiving the award for best enterprise measure in 2010 for our evaluation work, an award given by the Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management. The award committee particularly underlined our use of the evaluation outcomes. This was naturally a great encouragement to the department, but it should also be said that our evaluation work would not have succeeded without the support of the political and administrative leadership, and without the rest of the administration showing such willingness to cooperate.

What have we learnt during these five years – what works and what doesn’t work in development cooperation? The countries in the South are very different, goals and instruments have become much more diverse, and what we call the aid architecture has grown in size and complexity. Two or three findings seem to be recurring, however, whether one is looking at peacebuilding, development of infrastructure, capacity building or humanitarian aid: We do not know enough about the societies we are working in; we are not good enough at analysing the power structures and how the societies really work. We see problems rather than opportunities, and our knowledge does not always match our ambitions. Therefore, we do not always see the consequenc-
es of our proposals and measures, and we do not build on what is there already, on the existing structures. This is true whether we are talking of negotiations for economic reforms in southern Africa or of assistance in conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Sudan. It also holds true when we bring in emergency aid after natural disasters. In four of the five last annual reports, different variations of this conclusion have been brought out as one of the four key lessons to be learnt from evaluations. This admission has also come more and more to the fore in Norwegian as well as international discussions on development over the last two or three years.

The other definite finding, which especially applies to low-income countries, is that long-term involvement is crucial for the aid to yield sustainable results. In humanitarian aid it is important to begin planning the phase following acute emergency aid as early as possible. In state and capacity building one will often be able to secure the results only after several decades. When the international community is providing extensive support for a country’s schools or health services, clear results are achieved for the majority of the population. At the same time, though, the countries and programmes are made dependent on this assistance for both expertise and finances. That reality is not solely a negative one, but it does mean the donor has to be committed to being involved as a supporter and cooperation partner for the long haul.

One impression that one is left with after five years, is that Norwegian assistance has become more professional. Our programmes and measures rarely receive low scores for relevance. In other words, our assistance is basically suited to the needs, albeit with a few exceptions. Of course one can find problems concerning relevance, too, and measures that were relevant on the drawing board may quickly become the opposite during implementation, if we don’t have the necessary knowledge. But the systems for planning, following up and securing the results are generally not bad. Many NGOs do a good job in this area. Most programmes also achieve their goals to a great extent. What we know less about, not least because it is so difficult to measure, is cost-efficiency.

This year’s report nevertheless contains a warning light. We need to maintain a stronger presence in the cooperating countries. This is not just true for the planning and follow-up of bilateral assistance. Norway also has a lot of expertise to offer, both in the different disciplines and in development work per se, in cooperation and dialogue with multilateral organisations and global funds in different countries. In terms of the future, a weaker presence might also weaken the professionalism and flexibility which Norway has become known for in many countries.

April 2011

Asbjørn Eidhammer
Director of Evaluation
Lessons learnt in 2010
We must become better at making use of local knowledge

Several of this year’s evaluation reports point to what seems to be a general problem in development cooperation. There is too little knowledge of the community where our assistance will be provided, particularly knowledge of local conditions. This is linked to the fact that we make far too little use of local competence. The joint evaluation of western countries’ assistance to Southern Sudan pointed out that national coordination had been emphasised too much, at the cost of local knowledge and adjusting to conditions in the field. If more emphasis had been put on local knowledge, one might have been able to prevent local disputes from escalating into more wide-ranging conflicts. Too much emphasis on formal institutions contributed to weakening traditional structures.

The Western Balkans report mentioned under-utilisation of local competence by both the Norwegian state and Norwegian NGOs, while Norwegian assistance through the UN in Afghanistan was criticised for not having sufficiently involved civil society in Afghanistan.

However, several reports described good results where such involvement had been emphasised. Our democracy support through the UN in Malawi was praised for having strengthened the ability of local communities and organisations to promote their rights, and in Guatemala the indigenous people now have the opportunity to be heard in court following intensive Norwegian support through the UN.

A stronger presence is needed in the partner countries

The joint evaluation of assistance to Southern Sudan compared the efforts of different donors and multilateral organisations in the area. The report concluded that bilateral programmes with enough people on the ground, and with continuity and good routines, are the most effective. In Southern Sudan, that turned out to be the US assistance. The evaluation of Norwegian democracy support through the UN shows that such support works best when Norway is an active partner in the country, and the report calls for a greater Norwegian commitment. The need for a heavier Norwegian presence in cooperation countries is also mentioned in several country evaluations under the Climate and Forestry Initiative.

This agrees with findings in previous years’ evaluation reports, not least topical evaluations, where a stronger presence of Norwegian technical experts is wanted. This applies to the HIV and AIDS field, the fisheries sector and support for business development. There is a voiced concern in many evaluation reports over the last few years that the expertise aspect of Norwegian assistance is being weakened.
3

Long-term efforts bring results

Long-term work and continuity are necessary to secure lasting results - no lesson is repeated more often in reports from the last few years than this one. We see the same thing in this year’s reports. Support for parliaments and political processes requires a long-term effort, says one study. Support over many years is important if results are to be achieved, states the report on democracy support through the UN. One must not underestimate the time required to implement measures, says the evaluation of business support to Uganda. Rapid decisions and informal processing will have fewer long-term effects, says the evaluation report on Norwegian assistance to the former Yugoslavia. Both that evaluation and the one on the International Organization for Migration’s work to combat human trafficking find that annual allocations are a bad idea. The need for long-term assistance was also underlined in the evaluation of Norad’s master degree and research programmes in 2009.

4

Cash support is a promising new type of assistance

Two different evaluation reports, one from Pakistan and one from Colombia, confirm that cash support yields results in the education sector. In Colombia, a World Bank project has led to children in rural areas and particularly girls staying longer in school when their parents receive financial support. Children in families that receive such support also achieve as high scores at school as other children. In Pakistan, girls complete middle school to a greater extent when their families receive cash support. It also looks as if girls who receive education support wait longer before getting married. No negative effects of the cash support programmes were registered for other groups. Evaluations of humanitarian assistance have demonstrated that cash support may be an efficient way of providing emergency support. This turned out to be the case both after the 2004 tsunami and the earthquake in Pakistan. In many situations, cash gives the victims of a disaster the opportunity to buy what they themselves feel is most important to get re-established. For cash support to work, it is of course necessary that there are provisions to buy, but experience shows that one often underestimates the ability of local markets to meet people’s needs.

Other evaluations show that cash support given to mothers does more to improve children’s welfare than the same money given to fathers, while it also improves the status of the mother in the family. A British overview of microcredit programmes shows that simple cash support schemes may be effective in reducing extreme poverty. Cash support may also be problematic, however. Such support may be more vulnerable to corruption, and it requires a well-functioning distribution system.
One must not underestimate the time required to implement measures.
## Summary of Evaluations

| Report 2010/2 | Support to Legislatures |
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| Report 2010/4 | Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance. South Africa Case Study |
| Report 2010/5 | Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance. Bangladesh Case Study |
| Report 2010/6 | Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance. Uganda Case Study |
| Report 2010/7 | Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans |
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| Report 2010/11 | Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking |

**Sida/Norad**
- Supporting Child Rights. Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries

**The Netherlands & others:**
- Evaluation of Environmental and Social Standards

**World Bank**
- Study of impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on a Female School Stipend Program in Pakistan
- Study of Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Human Capital: Evidence from Colombia

**UNDP**
- Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Strengthening Local Governance
- Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Environmental Management for Poverty Reduction: the Poverty-Environment Nexus

### Evaluations in progress as of 1 January 2010

- Impact Evaluation of Norwegian Cooperation with Botswana in the Health Sector
- Joint Evaluation on Strategies and Approaches in Anti-corruption Work
- Evaluation of Norwegian Research on Development Cooperation
- Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka
- Evaluation of Norwegian Development aid to Promote Human Rights
- Norwegian Organisations’ Projects in East Africa
- Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action
- The use and Effects of Payment of Allowances when Attending Meetings, Seminars etc. in Partner Countries
- UN Spending
Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support (NDS)

**Evaluation of:**
The Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support (NDS) was established by Stortinget (the Norwegian parliament) in 2002. The purpose of the Centre was to allow the political parties in Stortinget to assist in the development of well-functioning and pluralistic political systems in developing countries. The support was to facilitate cooperation between political parties in Norway and political parties in the South concerning communication and long-term, democratic organisation-building. This was to take place through transfer of knowledge and advisory services. From 2002 to 2009, the NDS received support for 17 projects and 33 pilot projects, in all NOK 48 million. The Norwegian political parties were responsible for project implementation.

**Purpose:**
To sum up lessons learnt in the work NDS has carried out, and to learn in order to improve the future organisation of cooperation between political parties in Norway and in the South.

**Findings:**
The evaluation team has found few indications that the activities conducted by NDS have had a lasting effect on the partner organisations in terms of promoting democracy. Nevertheless, the report is able to identify positive results in some projects.

The report is particularly critical to the institutional model which has been chosen for this assistance. The Centre never functioned as an arena for common learning and for exchange of experiences, as had been the intention. One main conclusion is that NDS was unable to sum up experiences from individual projects and share these experiences with the political parties.

The report points out that the Norwegian political parties lacked an understanding of the complex situations in which the political parties in the South have to work, that the activities were too fragmented and that they showed little continuity. In many of the projects, the activities consisted of isolated seminars and meetings which were not followed up. The experts that NDS had engaged were not asked to improve the quality of NDS activities, and in consequence they gradually pulled out of NDS.

**Recommendations:**
The evaluation report presents a number of recommendations on how Norwegian support for political parties may be organised in the future. One recommendation is that the project activities should focus on fewer countries. The Norwegian parties must also consider how representative the parties in the South are, before choosing their cooperation partners. Cooperation partners must think carefully through the methodological challenges encountered when Norwegian political parties want to communicate their knowledge to parties in the South. A new public and independent institution should organise and implement the party cooperation. This institution should have a secretariat with relevant competence.

**Follow-up:**
Norad has been given responsibility for following up the further work of developing cooperation between Norwegian political parties and political parties in the South.
Study of Support to Legislatures

Title: Support to Legislatures
REPORT 2/2010 – STUDY
Prepared by: Christian Michelsens Institutt
ISBN:978-82-7548-477-0

Study of:
International and Norwegian experience of support to legislative assemblies.

Purpose:
To systematise international and Norwegian experience of support to legislative assemblies. Chart Norwegian support for legislatures.

Findings:
Of the five donor countries studied, the USA is the biggest, giving around USD 200 million in the period 1999-2009. The UK contributed around 60 million during the same period, Norway 30 million, and Canada and Sweden around USD 20 million each.

The Norwegian support seems to have been more random and scattered than support from the other countries. Norwegian-funded projects last on average approximately 2.7 years, and the projects cost on average approx. USD 640 000. Only Sweden has projects that are equally small. As for the duration of the projects, the USA stands out with an average of 5.5 years.

The Norwegian support has been given in this manner, and the UK and Sweden have operated in the same way. Canada and the USA seem to prefer bilateral cooperation.

For the last ten years, the biggest recipient of parliamentary support from the five countries has been Malawi, followed by Afghanistan and Iraq (largely from the USA). Malawi is also the biggest recipient of parliamentary support from Norway.

The support focuses on three issues: democratisation and good governance, budget processes and financial management, and anti-corruption. Issues like peace and conflict, human rights, poverty reduction, gender equality and the environment are given less attention.

Lessons learnt:
• There is no recipe for support in this area that will be right for all situations and circumstances
• Parliamentary support is politically sensitive
• Support measures should be driven by demand
• Clearly defined areas, e.g. budgeting, may be a good place to start

The authors underline that it is important to know the situation in the country well: its political system, its election system, the political parties, internal tensions within the state. They find that countries in a phase of transition to democracy are particularly open for support to legislative assemblies, as one has seen in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Recommendations:
• Have a long time horizon for achieving results.
• Keep up the support for several election periods, since many MPs are replaced in an election. This is particularly relevant for the Norwegian support, which so far has been given for shorter periods only.
• Consider basket funding rather than bilateral cooperation, given the sensitivity associated with support from e.g. former colonial powers in this area.
• Parliamentary support should be part of a wider approach to democracy support

Four recommendations of special relevance for Norway
• Choose measures to improve the institutional memory, for example systems for learning and knowledge storage.
• Develop a strategy for Norwegian parliamentary support.
• Establish long-term cooperation with strong technical support.
• Strengthen the expert resources in Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this area.
Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance

Evaluation of:
Norwegian business-related assistance, which has received support in the amount of just over NOK 5.5 billion for the period 1998/99-2009. Nearly half of this support has been channelled through Norfund (Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries). Nine other government bodies have also been involved, as well as nearly 700 companies and private individuals. The evaluation covers all instruments used during the period, with country studies in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, South Africa and Uganda.

Purpose:
To provide an overview and assessment of the results of Norwegian business-related assistance. To assess the opportunity to improve the assistance in coming years, in current and new partner countries. To provide advice on future policy and guidelines.

Findings:
• This support may have created 10,000 jobs in the formal sector and possibly 100,000 in the informal sector over the last 10-15 years, in addition to an unknown number of self-employed people.
• Internationally, Norfund seems to be one of the most interesting organisations in this field, not least through the development of the investment fund Aureos Fund and through hydropower investments.
• Support to develop microfinance through Norad and NGOs has contributed significantly to a more commercially oriented, global microcredit industry.
• Norwegian business and industry, particularly small and medium-sized Norwegian companies, are now more interested in business opportunities in developing countries.

Norwegian assistance has been poorly coordinated, however, and potential synergy effects have been lost. With some noticeable exceptions, the results for the partner countries have therefore been limited to the local level.

Conclusions:
• Developing a policy or strategy is not sufficient. There must also be an implementation plan that ensures the policy is followed through.
• Organisation is important. The reorganisation of the Norwegian aid administration in 2004 weakened the embassies’ administration in this field. On the other hand, Norfund’s framework conditions have contributed to the fund’s positive development. Organisations like the Strømme Foundation and Fredskorpset have been able to develop professionally and have achieved good results.
• Soft loans have worked well, and one ought to consider alternative ways of combining loans and donations.

• In order for the assistance in this field to have an effect beyond the local community, extra funds will need to be released, thus expanding the measures.

Recommendations:
• One should consider updating the 1999 business and industry strategy and introduce measurable result indicators linked to the overall political goals for all the players.
• A change in the work distribution between Norfund and Norad should be considered. The team recommends transferring Norad’s business and industry schemes to Norfund, while leaving the responsibility for microfinance and business framework conditions in Norad.
• The overall administration should be strengthened by improving the exchange of information and experience between the players. This should include the work at country level.
• Separate donor funds should be established in order to reduce the risk in Norfund’s investments, a policy framework should be developed for microfinance, and new assistance models should be investigated, including public-private cooperation measures.

Chapter 19 of the main report contains a number of recommendations concerning the activities of individual organisations.
Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance to South Africa

Evaluation of:

Purpose:
This report is part of a wider evaluation of Norwegian business-related assistance which has the following purposes: To document and assess the implementation and results of the assistance, and to provide advice on future policy, guidelines and assistance in this field.

Findings:
Responsibility for business-related assistance was transferred from the embassy to Innovation Norway early in the period. Norfund has handled 64 per cent of the total budget, distributed on nine different funds, loans or investment mechanisms. Norad’s match-making programme (enterprise to enterprise) and other application-based schemes accounted for 21 per cent, Norad’s soft loans (ceased in 2000) for 10 per cent, while 3-4 per cent has been spent on institutional support and FK Norway’s activities.

The evaluation team concludes that:
• Most enterprises that received support from Norfund via cooperating funds have reached profitability. Many of the measures are unlikely to have got off the ground without these investments. The measures have contributed to better management and operation, and they have supported cross-cutting issues like poverty reduction, the environment and gender equality.
• The Norad programmes have mixed results. The match-making programme has supported cooperation measures involving 287 Norwegian enterprises. Less than one tenth of these have led to lasting cooperation, and the number of jobs created would be no more than 500-600 since 1997. The application-based schemes played a positive role early on in the efforts, but there have been weaknesses in the selection and follow-up of those who receive support. Norad’s support for institution-building has been effective.
Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance to Bangladesh

Evaluation of:
Norwegian business-related assistance to Bangladesh over the last 15 years.

Purpose:
This report is part of a wider evaluation of Norwegian business-related assistance which has the following purposes: To document and assess the implementation and results of the assistance, and to provide advice on future policy, guidelines and assistance in this field.

Findings:
About 60 per cent of the support (NOK 250 million) has been spent on credit or other economic support for small enterprises through three major programmes. These initiatives were started in the early 1990s and were managed partly by the embassy and partly by Norad.

About 40 per cent of funds have been spent supporting four major company efforts, including loans to Grameen Phone (mobile telephones) and Scancem (cement production).

The evaluation team concludes that:
• Just a handful of Norwegian companies have been established and the private Norwegian investments are small, except for one impressive flagship: Telenor’s investment and majority holding in Grameen Phone. Norad’s soft loan to this company in 1997 wasn’t very big, but it came at a crucial time and contributed significantly to the development of the enterprise. Grameen Phone had 4,800 employees and 28 million customers in 2010, and the company has become the biggest taxpayer in the country.

• The support for Scancem has contributed to the development of a competitive cement industry.

• Two credit programmes for small and medium-sized enterprises in two areas of Bangladesh have suffered from very slow administration in the state-owned banks and have struggled with low rates of loan repayment. However, the programmes may have contributed directly to the establishment of some 100,000 jobs, although this figure is uncertain. The cost-efficiency is also uncertain, but both programmes are still running, seven years after Norad pulled out.

• Support via the World Bank (International Finance Corporation, IFC) for a business development programme which is part of a regional programme for South Asia, has so far had little success.

• Norfund’s investments in microfinance have helped create some good results.

• In an overall perspective, the business support for Bangladesh scores reasonably high with regard to relevance, goal achievement, sustainability and profitability.
Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance to Uganda

Evaluation of:
Norwegian business-related assistance to Uganda over the last 15 years, comprising about NOK 450 million. Many of these measures are still running, and some of the findings are therefore preliminary only.

Purpose:
This report is part of a wider evaluation of Norwegian business-related assistance which has the following purposes: To document and assess the implementation and results of the assistance, and to provide advice on future policy, guidelines and assistance in this field.

Findings:
The initiatives have varied greatly and have been supported through a multitude of channels. Just over half of total funds (54 per cent) has been spent on investments, including studies and training measures. Thirty-five per cent of the support was spent on microfinance. Facilitation measures, including institution and capacity building, accounted for 11 per cent.

There has been limited coordination and information sharing between the various Norwegian aid players. Norfund’s investments represented around 35 per cent of funds, the embassy and Norad took care of 25-30 percent each, the Strømme Foundation 10 per cent and Norway FK one per cent.

The development of microfinance in Uganda has been a success story. According to the evaluation, Norway has been the leading donor in this field, and has been the only player involved in policy development, financing and investments as well as providing advice to organisations in the field.

The results have, with just a few exceptions, been sustainable in terms of poverty reduction, developing job opportunities, rural income generation and targeting women.

In an overall perspective, the programmes have largely achieved their objectives and contributed to initiatives that would otherwise not have been implemented. With some exceptions, the programmes have been implemented reasonably well.

The results of Norwegian enterprise investments have been mixed, however, with more bankruptcies and problem cases than successful initiatives.

Recommendations:
• Conduct careful assessments of local cooperation partners
• Make sure the enterprises that get involved are strong enough to handle the difficulties likely to occur as they get established in Uganda
• Emphasise market knowledge more heavily
• Quality-assure the projects at an early date, to prevent mistaken investments
• Be patient
Evaluation of Norwegian Support for the Western Balkans

Evaluation of:
This evaluation covers Norwegian support for the Western Balkans in the period 1991 to 2008, amounting to around NOK 10 billion.

The support can be divided into emergency relief, rebuilding and development, plus democratisation and Euro-Atlantic approximation. Financial support was given annually during the period, and more than 3000 agreements have been signed. The number of Norwegian-supported projects are lower than that, however, as many of the projects comprised several agreements.

Purpose:
The purpose of the evaluation was two-fold: firstly to survey the outcome of the Norwegian support, and secondly to identify useful experiences concerning the transition from humanitarian aid to more long-term assistance. The three countries investigated, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, have together received more than NOK 7.3 billion of the total NOK 10 billion support for the Western Balkans.

Findings:
The report concludes that the activities have generally achieved their targets, largely because Norwegian organisations were engaged to plan and implement the projects. Norway has channelled 62.5 per cent of its support for the Western Balkans through Norwegian players. This is a very high percentage, since the support has been given to medium-income countries that themselves possess considerable competence. According to the report, the benefits of this approach were quick decisions, easy and informal access to the cooperation partners, good control and the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been able to put pressure on the players to deliver as agreed.

However, the emphasis on flexibility and quick access to resources has had a negative impact on the more long-term effects. The report criticises Norway’s lack of an overall strategy for its assistance in the Western Balkans. According to the report, only one formal policy document was prepared in the period 1991-1998 for debate in Stortinget (the Norwegian parliament). The priorities for the Norwegian assistance were set through annual parliamentary budgets in Stortinget, and this lead to a fragmented portfolio with short-term goals and little emphasis on long-term effects.

The report also points out that there has been little systematic follow-up and quality assurance of the assistance. Annual allocations are time-consuming, and the report says this situation has led to a heavy work load on those who manage the funds in Oslo and at the embassies. The report wonders why local competence has not been used for following up the activities, not least in light of what the consultants feel is understaffing at the embassies. The report also questions why it took nearly ten years from 1997, when the Office of the Auditor General documented unsatisfactory project administration of the Norwegian support for the Western Balkans, until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began following this up systematically in 2006.

Recommendations:
The evaluation team has presented a number of recommendations to the Norwegian authorities, including the following:

- Any involvement in fragile states and situations should be based on the DAC principles from 2007, which emphasise the importance of local participation, leadership and ownership in building viable and democratic states. It is also important to harmonise and adjust the support in relation to other activities and other players.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should distinguish between resources for political and development-related objectives. When support changes from humanitarian emergency relief...
to more long-term development measures, normal procedures for management of assistance should be applied. One should also make sure that sufficient resources have been allocated for follow-up and quality assurance of the assistance, and one can e.g. use local professionals for this purpose.

- The report recommends a greater focus on documenting decisions and management processes, including multi-annual allocation frameworks, so that Norway is shown to be a transparent and responsible partner.
- The report recommends future assistance portfolios to be more strategic, with a greater emphasis on long-term effects.

Follow-up:
A Storting Report on Norwegian policy for the Western Balkans is under preparation. That Report will emphasise adherence to the report recommendations to strengthen local ownership, to focus the assistance more and to create a clearer strategic anchoring of the assistance.
Evalutaion of Transparency International

Evaluation of:
Transparency International (TI) is an international NGO whose main purpose is to combat corruption. Norway has supported both the TI Secretariat in Berlin (TI-S) and several of the 90 national chapters. Administration of the Norwegian support was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Norad in 2004. In the period 2005-2010, the Secretariat received NOK 15.7 million. Norwegian embassies supported TI’s national chapters in various countries during the same period.

Purpose:
To evaluate the results of the TI-S work of combating corruption, and to assess the relationship between the Secretariat and the national chapters. Provide suggestions for how to make the organisation more effective in combating corruption, including how the donors can best contribute.

Findings:
In general, the evaluation report provides a positive assessment of the key programmes and activities:
TI has played a leading role among the international NGOs that work to combat corruption.
TI has developed an index of corruption in different countries, the Corruption Perception Index, which measures perceptions of corruption, as well as other indices that supplement it. These indices are in frequent use internationally.
TI has prepared a number of valuable research reports that discuss different aspects of corruption.
TI has played a key role in the work of developing international conventions against corruption, including the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption.
TI has developed an Integrity Pact which has been much used in many countries with regard to corruption in public procurement.
TI has developed Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres, which are now operating in 39 countries. These centres are considered highly successful.

The evaluation report points out, however, that the Secretariat should improve the organisation of its activities. The contact between the Secretariat and the 90 national chapters, as well as the direct lines between the national chapters, can be improved. The evaluation states that TI-S has young and capable staff, but that there is a high turnover, and that TI lacks the important middle management level with more experience. The evaluation also finds that TI should strengthen its evaluation function and the regular reviews of its own activities.

Recommendations:
To make TI a stronger and more efficient organisation, more resources are needed. The evaluation report therefore recommends that international donors, including Norway, provide more support both for the Secretariat and for the national chapters.
TI-S should, with increased resources, strengthen its linkage to the national chapters, strive for a more stable staff and improve the evaluation of its work.

Follow-up:
In November 2010, TI adopted a new strategy for the period up to 2015, and the organisation will also prepare a new activity plan for this period. The Secretariat has stated that TI will use Norad’s evaluation as a resource in its work on the new activity plan.
Is it Possible to Evaluate the Partnership Initiatives to Achieve Millennium Goals 4 and 5? A Study

Background:
Norway has signed partnership agreements with India, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tanzania to help reach the millennium development goals of reducing child mortality (goal 4) and improving maternal health (goal 5) by 2015. For the period 2006-2013, a total of NOK 1.225 billion has been allocated to these initiatives.

This study is a desk study which includes interviews with managers and interested parties in Oslo, at embassies and in some partner organisations. Assessments of existing project documentation, baseline studies, research and evaluations have also been included.

Purpose:
To assess the evaluability of the five initiatives, for instance whether the objectives of the initiatives have been defined precisely enough, so that the results achieved through the partnership initiatives may be reliably evaluated at a later date.

Key findings and recommendations:
The partnership initiatives are very different in many ways, with regard to how long the partnership has been established, what types of partners are involved, and the topical focus. In the context of an evaluation, this means that future evaluations of impact must be tailor-made for each initiative, and this might make it difficult to compare the results achieved through the different initiatives.

Based on the findings of the study, the evaluation team has presented several recommendations for what might be done so that activities may be measured more reliably in future:

- The partnership initiatives have not presented the logic (programme theory) behind the initiatives clearly enough. The study therefore recommends that the initiatives identify the objectives for the different activities more clearly, and that it is made clear how one is intending to use resources and the partners involved in order to achieve these objectives.
- The study recommends that the initiatives, to a greater extent than today, define their own role clearly within the complex donor environment in which they operate.
- The report also recommends that the initiatives further develop the systems for follow-up and evaluation, in order that the initiatives avoid collecting superfluous information. In the team’s view, the existing plans have too many indicators that are either difficult to measure or poorly defined.
- The study recommends that the partnership initiatives start using internationally accepted indicators for monitoring millennium goals 4 and 5, and that all partnership initiatives use the same indicators. The team suggests the following three indicators: the proportion of infants immunised against measles, the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, and the antenatal care coverage.
UN measures for democratic development have received around NOK 2 billion in Norwegian support over the last ten years. This evaluation covers assistance in Guatemala, Malawi, Sudan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Mozambique and Pakistan. Most of the programmes have been in operation for 5-10 years.

**Purpose:**
To provide information on the results of Norwegian support for democratic development through the UN; to assess Norwegian decision-making processes; to advise on improvements for future Norwegian support for democratic development; and to advise on Norwegian positions vis-à-vis relevant UN organisations.

**Findings:**
The evaluation found that the support for democracy has contributed to the public debate on a democratic development in the countries studied.

In Mozambique, media support through the UN has helped establish numerous local radio stations. These stations have provided information in local languages on election issues, markets and prices and health and education issues, and they have inspired a political debate. Women’s participation in designing the measures has been important. It is, on the other hand, uncertain whether newspapers have benefitted much from the measures. This programme relies on donor funding.

In Guatemala, Norway has supported the indigenous population’s legal protection and civil society since 2000. Today the indigenous population’s rights have a greater chance of being heard in the national courts than a few years ago. Fifteen offices were set up to defend the rights of the indigenous population, and these offices are now being funded over government budgets. The programme for support of the civil society in Guatemala comprised 109 individual projects. Several projects were successful, while others did not achieve their objectives. The UN Development Programme (UNDP), which managed the Norwegian support, is praised for its cooperation with Guatemalan authorities.

In Malawi, the objective was to promote good government, respect for human rights and development. The projects are developed by civil organisations or government institutions. The lack of formal authority structures at the local level was a challenge for the programme. There is no comprehensive overview of the main results of the assistance, but annual reports and evaluations describe several examples of good results. Some local communities and individuals achieved a greater recognition of their rights vis-à-vis the authorities, and several organisations have been strengthened. The programme relies on donor funding.

In Sudan, Norwegian support through the UN contributed to the implementation of the first internationally recognised elections since 1986. In Afghanistan, Norwegian support contributed to the country’s first elections being held. A number of local voluntary organisations and government employees have received training in how to conduct an election. The election programme in Afghanistan is the biggest individual democracy effort that Norway has been involved in. UNDP managed the Norwegian election support in both countries, and the organisation was praised for its good work under very difficult conditions. The evaluation points out that such support is particularly important in vulnerable states, where there will often be few other actors present who can stand up for democratic development principles.

In Afghanistan, the UNDP was criticised for too little involvement in civil society. In Sudan, the political and international situation has prevented amendments to the human rights legislation. Norway was criticised for not giving more definite support to the human rights work in the country.
In Nepal, Norwegian support made up just a small proportion of the support for two human rights programmes. The National Human Rights Commission was established in cooperation with UNDP in 2002, and information on 8000 cases of human rights abuse has been collected. The Commission is politically weak, however, and does not take the cases further. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has had observers in Nepal since 2006 and is to monitor the peace agreement which was signed in the same year. It is highly likely that the observers have contributed to stability through their mere presence. Of the cases which the High Commissioner has forwarded to the Human Rights Commission, few have been forwarded and fewer still have been investigated.

The gender equality programme in Pakistan has contributed to the training of several hundred women politicians. The deteriorating political climate and weak coordination of the assistance have lessened the chance of lasting positive results from this training.

The results mentioned above have come about after several years’ extensive support. Several of the programmes have weak systems for following up the results (Mozambique, Guatemala, Malawi), and this makes it difficult for the team to document any wider effects of the work. Norway has to a varying degree contributed to the design and follow-up of the programmes. Most of the programmes were relevant for the situation in the country at the time. The decentralised decision-making model, where Norwegian embassies allocate funds to UN organisations, often seems to function well.

Recommendations:

- The UN must continue to work for "One UN". This is particularly important when it comes to democracy development, where one often needs a composite and well coordinated effort from several UN players.
- The UN Development Programme should improve its result reporting system.
- Norway should become a better supporter for the UN within the often difficult field of democracy, especially when it comes to achieving a political dialogue at a high level.
Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking

**Title:** Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking

**REPORT 11/2010**


ISBN 978-82-7548-584-7

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**Evaluation of:**
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking. The evaluation covers Norwegian support from 2000 to 2010. During this period, IOM received just under NOK 90 million from Norway for its work in various parts of the world.

**Purpose:**
The evaluation has assessed the IOM mandate and evaluated its planning and implementation and the results of its work in five countries: Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Nigeria and Norway. The report also assesses the connection between evaluation and institutional learning in IOM.

**Findings:**
The evaluation finds that the major strengths in the IOM work to combat human trafficking are found in capacity building, awareness-raising among vulnerable groups and support for the victims of human trafficking. On the other hand, IOM is deficient in systematic reporting concerning what changes and lasting effects the measures have led to. This is particularly true for the information campaigns to prevent human trafficking in three of the countries studied. It cannot be documented for any of these campaigns that the information has led to an increased awareness among vulnerable groups, nor can it be documented that the risk of people falling victim to such trafficking has been reduced.

Respect for human rights is one of the main principles in IOM’s work. Nevertheless, the report questions whether international human rights standards have been sufficiently incorporated into the projects. The financing of IOM activities takes place through annual funding at the project level. This creates problems for planning and implementation as well as for the long-term work. One consequence is that IOM establishes measures to coincide with the donors’ support, rather than developing measures to fit the greatest needs.

IOM has no formal anti-trafficking mandate. However, IOM interprets its general mandate to mean that the organisation may work with all aspects of combating human trafficking, from prevention to direct support to the victims of human trafficking. Other organisations feel IOM is acting outside its mandate and claim that a lack of cooperation and coordination on the part of IOM leads to its activities overlapping with those of other organisations in this field.

**Recommendations:**
The recommendations for IOM focus on improving the organisation’s internal processes, including the introduction of needs assessments before a project is started, reporting on the results and the introduction of institutional follow-up mechanisms to make sure that lessons learnt are used in the planning of future activities. Further, the report recommends that IOM improve its cooperation with other players that work to combat human trafficking and that the organisation makes sure international human rights standards are being maintained in the activities. The main recommendation for Norway is to provide more funding on a multi-year basis, in order to create more long-term and more sustainable IOM projects.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to a Global REDD+ Regime

Evaluation of:
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), which was launched in December 2007 with a pledge of up to three billion Norwegian Kroner (US$ 500 million) per year to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in developing countries. This evaluation addresses NICFI’s contribution to the development of an international REDD+ regime within a broader climate change agreement, and covers the period from the launch of NICFI to the end of June 2010. It is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation.

Purpose:
To assess NICFI’s contributions to the development of an international REDD+ regime and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

Findings:
The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identifies preliminary achievements and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives.

Norway’s most notable contributions to progress with the international REDD+ mechanism were:
1. The overall momentum injected into negotiations by the strategic direction and level of funding commitment provided by NICFI
2. The agreement on a phased approach towards a fully functioning, results-based financing system
3. The contribution to institutional capacity building through support of the UN-REDD Programme, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Forest Investment Program, and to a lesser extent the Congo Basin Forest Fund
4. The contribution to the development of the Interim REDD+ Partnership

Norway’s contribution to the advancement of REDD+ within the international negotiations on a climate change agreement beyond 2012 has been substantial. It is unlikely that this section of the draft climate change agreement would have developed to its current form without the input of NICFI.

The conclusions include:
• Norway’s combined political, financial and institutional contribution through NICFI had a galvanising effect on the progress of REDD+ in the climate change negotiations during the period of the evaluation.
• The phased approach was a unique and important Norwegian contribution to the REDD+ structure, which helped resolve different parties’ views on how one might approach a long-term financing of the REDD+ mechanism.
• Norway has spearheaded an ambitious approach towards setting up an interim multilateral funding framework that has over 40 countries involved in preparatory activities.
• Whilst Norway played a notable role in making the Interim REDD+ Partnership a uniquely comprehensive initiative with significant potential, initial progress appears to be fragile. There is a danger that REDD+ activities will become fragmented and disparate, rather than operated through a clear mechanism.
• In its bilateral partnerships, there is a lack of clarity in NICFI’s expectations of REDD+ host countries in terms of low carbon strategies or action plans.
• Norway’s expectations in terms of safeguards for indigenous and local rights, and for biodiversity, appear to some outside observers to lack clarity.
• Unless Norway can find a way of bringing other key developed countries into a clear agreement on the operation and financing of interim REDD+ actions, NICFI risks becoming isolated as an exception. The evaluation team note, however, that of the US$ 4 billion pledged so far, US$ 1 billion has come from NICFI.
while the remaining US$ 3 billion has been pledged by other developed countries, so there is little indication at this stage that Norway is becoming isolated.

Additionally, the evaluation points to issues that represent potential constraints to NICFI achieving its objectives, such as:

- Without an overarching, binding long-term climate change agreement within the UNFCCC regime, progress in negotiations on the REDD+ mechanism will be of limited value. At present the prospects of success are poor.
- The greatest policy difference remaining to be resolved is how the operational phase will be financed after ‘readiness’ has been achieved.

**Recommendations:**

- NICFI should take stock of the medium and long-term prospects for REDD+ in light of the status of international climate change negotiations and international financial constraints.
- NICFI should explore ways of leveraging further funding and participation in interim REDD+ actions.
- Norway should continue to play an active role in the debate about funding of a REDD+ regime and could explore models for private sector involvement, to demonstrate its interest and to test various ideas being proposed.
- NICFI should promote more discussion to elaborate on the phased approach – to define what conditions need to be fulfilled at each stage and how countries should be offered incentives to progress towards a longer-term, results-based regime.
- NICFI should keep the issues of social benefits, governance and fiduciary controls high on its agenda and seek to develop good practice measures throughout the REDD+ institutions.
- NICFI should consider how the issue of biodiversity protection can be appropriately reflected in the operational detail of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to REDD+ in Brazil

**Evaluation of:**
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative’s (NICFI) support to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in Brazil. NICFI’s contribution to REDD+ in Brazil is mainly through results-based payments to the Amazon Fund. This evaluation is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation of NICFI’s contribution to national-level REDD+ processes.

**Purpose:**
To assess NICFI’s contributions to the national REDD+ process in Brazil and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

**Findings:**
The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identified preliminary achievements and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives, such as:

- There is a relationship between NICFI support and national policy, but Brazil has independently developed its own regulatory and monitoring systems, and is in the process of defining its own alternative position on REDD+.
- Brazil now operates an impressive system for the regulation and monitoring of the forests in the Amazon region, and as such is well advanced in readiness for REDD+. Whilst other countries can learn from the methodologies and technologies used by Brazil, there are difficulties in exporting these systems because of topographic differences and legal restrictions.
- Due to time constraints, but also the constraints of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) regulations and funding structures, the Amazon Fund has so far faced serious problems in its efforts to disburse funds efficiently.
- Whilst recognising both that NICFI has been effective in getting things started, and that there are areas for improvement in the operation of the Amazon Fund, it is too early to draw conclusions on effectiveness and efficiency.

**Recommendations:**
Based on the above findings, and acknowledging the political necessity for NICFI to recognise Brazilian sovereignty, the report makes the following recommendations, which are intended for follow-up by NICFI and their partners in their ongoing dialogue and partnerships on REDD+:

- Whilst recognising that legal changes can take time, a rapid review of the current regulations and application procedures of the Amazon Fund should be carried out.
- An integrated plan for the Amazon Fund, consisting of projects targeting key deforestation and degradation threats, should be developed.
- Appropriate measures to ensure increased participation of indigenous peoples and other forest-dwelling communities within the scope of the Amazon Fund should be discussed along with elaboration of projects for sustainable development.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to REDD+ in DR Congo

Title: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Contributions to national REDD+ processes 2007-2010. Democratic Republic of Congo country report

EVALUATION REPORT 14/2010

Prepared by: LTS International.

Evaluation of:
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative’s (NICFI) support to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. NICFI’s contribution to REDD+ is mainly through multilateral channels. This evaluation is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation of NICFI’s contribution to national-level REDD+ processes.

Purpose:
To assess NICFI’s contributions to the national REDD+ process in the Democratic Republic of Congo and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

Findings:
The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identifies preliminary achievements and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives, such as:

- The REDD+ process in the Democratic Republic of Congo is still very much at an early stage. The technical REDD+ readiness process is on-going and still needs 3-5 years to mature.

- Whilst the process will be challenging, the team concludes that it is possible.
- REDD+ is generally considered a forest sector issue, which does not enhance broad national multi-sector ownership.
- Generally, the support of NICFI through the multilateral channels is very much appreciated and the flexibility of NICFI to mobilise additional financial resources, if needed, has been noted.
- The multilateral channels have mostly been effective in executing the REDD+ readiness process.
- There is a widespread wish to see NICFI develop a direct bilateral relation with the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Recommendations:
The recommendations are intended for follow-up by NICFI and their partners in their ongoing dialogue and partnerships on REDD+.

- The effectiveness of the Congo Basin Forest Fund should be reviewed at an early stage to confirm the value of the direction it has taken so far and to clarify, and where necessary unblock, issues of internal and external functioning, including the size and capacity of the fund, to allow it to respond to national REDD+ processes.
- NICFI could support the Democratic Republic of Congo in the design and implementation of a low-carbon development strategy.
- NICFI could mobilise support for the setting-up of a national early investment fund for REDD+.

This may require a closer bilateral relationship between Norway and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to REDD+ in Guyana

Evaluation of:
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative’s (NICFI) support to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in Guyana. NICFI’s contribution to REDD+ in Guyana will mainly be through results-based payments to the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund, which will be used to support the country’s Low Carbon Development Strategy. This evaluation is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation of NICFI’s contribution to national-level REDD+ processes.

Purpose:
To assess NICFI’s contributions to the national REDD+ process in Guyana and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

Findings:
The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identifies preliminary achievements and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives, such as:
- As a country with a high forest cover and low deforestation rate, Guyana has been keen to engage in a pilot of REDD+ for avoided deforestation and to utilise payments for the environmental services provided to protect its extensive forest resources and assist in funding its Low Carbon Development Strategy.
- The Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 2009 between Guyana and Norway created a system through which this could be achieved and it lays out the aims and obligations of both partners, including agreement on a financial mechanism and on securing the important safeguards required for the use of Norwegian development funds.
- The level of national ownership is high and Guyanese society is remarkably well informed about it, but the precise costs and obligations of REDD+ and the Low Carbon Development Strategy are not always fully understood.
- NICFI engagement has encouraged and supported national ownership, with REDD+ being actively and widely discussed in Guyana by many sectors of society. This has been paralleled by the setting up of specific government structures.
- Amerindian communities are allowed to opt in if they wish, and also to opt out subsequently. The way in which this could be accommodated within an internationally agreed REDD+ mechanism does not seem to have been considered in detail, and few Amerindian leaders had a real understanding of the obligations and restrictions which opting in would engender. Notably, untitled Amerindian communities have no right to opt in, and until titling is completed, they will derive no benefit from REDD+.
- The earlier delays in releasing funds had caused considerable antipathy in Guyana.

Recommendations:
The recommendations are intended for follow-up by NICFI and their partners in their ongoing dialogue and partnerships on REDD+.
- The partners should identify any activities proposed in the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) where there might be potential conflicts with agreed safeguard requirements, and agree on this with the Government of Guyana. It would be unfortunate if national funding for the LCDS activities were to compromise Norway’s efforts to apply sound safeguards to those elements of the LCDS that are supported from its payments.
- It would be useful to revisit the proposed speed with which outstanding Amerindian land titles will be settled and to endeavour to deal with all of them as soon as possible, in...
order to remove the disparity between titled and untitled communities in respect of REDD+.

- Given that the LCDS is a national programme with a timeframe that extends beyond the political cycle, it would be useful to support measures which encourage a stronger bi-partisan approach, in order to minimise the politicisation of the LCDS and increase the chances that it would be maintained and advanced by future governments of any party.

- A permanent Norwegian representation in Guyana, at least during the initial phase, would greatly facilitate programme delivery and should be considered for the remainder of the development phase.

- As monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) is crucial to long term success of REDD+, capacity building is very important, especially in light of the historic loss of skilled people from Guyana. Further efforts may be needed to fully utilise existing expertise in Guyana and to develop a balanced cohort of national personnel who can take over MRV from external people as soon as possible. External consultants should have skills transfer included in their contracts as a matter of course. Options for community-based MRV, which could also create rural employment, should be taken wherever possible.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to REDD+ in Indonesia

Evaluation of: Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative’s (NICFI) support to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in Indonesia. NICFI’s contribution to REDD+ in Indonesia will mainly be through a bilateral partnership, but funding has also been provided to multilateral organisations and civil society. This evaluation is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation of NICFI’s contribution to national-level REDD+ processes.

Purpose: To assess NICFI’s contributions to the national REDD+ process in Indonesia and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

Findings: The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identifies preliminary achievements and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives, such as:
- Norway is by far the biggest donor for REDD+ in Indonesia and one of the few to be contributing new money. Through the bilateral Letter of Intent, Norway has pledged performance-based payments of up to US$ 1 billion.
- The main components of NICFI have only recently started implementation, so it is still too early to assess their impact. In terms of relevance, NICFI’s support is very well matched to Indonesia’s REDD+ strategic priorities and policies, to Indonesia’s commitment to reduce its own emissions and to many of Norway’s REDD+ objectives.
- The Letter of Intent and the President’s commitment to it are emerging as a potential “game changer” for REDD+ in Indonesia. Although the details of the bilateral partnership were still being discussed at the time of the field mission evaluation, the Letter of Intent was already perceived by many observers as a catalyst for greater stakeholder participation, public interest and debate, and increasing the commitment, speed and effectiveness of the Indonesian Government’s action on REDD+.
- The overheads of NICFI appear very low, suggesting that future efficiency may be high, but lack of staff on the ground may compromise the eventual outcomes, and the evaluators consider the “light touch” approach to be risky.

Recommendations: The recommendations are intended for follow-up by NICFI and their partners in their ongoing dialogue and partnerships on REDD+:
- Several more staff persons should be employed in-country (at the Embassy and in the pilot provinces) to support the partnership. They are needed to track and respond to developments in Indonesia, liaise with NICFI staff in Oslo, other donors and NGOs, provide due diligence, provide focused and on-going advice and capacity building to the Government of Indonesia and to inform negotiations.
- The Letter of Intent calls for an independent annual review of deliverables, based on which the Joint Consultative Group will provide advice on level of payments. However, since REDD+ in Indonesia is developing rapidly, it is recommended that some kind of interim review be conducted six-monthly to help keep the programme on track.
- Encourage the Government of Indonesia to extend the moratorium to prohibit the conversion of all natural forests of an agreed ecological status, and all peatlands. To complement this extended moratorium, NICFI should support the Government to carry out an independent third party review of the legality of all existing plantation, logging and mining concessions and encourage the Government to cancel any that are found not to be fully legal.
- Move towards a more direct and explicit approach to ensuring social and environmental safeguards in national policy, strategy and legislation on REDD+, clarify mechanisms through which any partner organisations’ safeguards are to be upheld and, particularly, ensure the application of safeguards in the demonstration provinces. Provide support for the development of a monitoring system for safeguards. Ensure incorporation of social, legal and economic information about individual land units in the degraded lands database.
Climate and Forest Initiative. Contributions to REDD+ in Tanzania

Evaluation of:
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative’s (NICFI) support to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) in Tanzania. NICFI’s contribution to REDD+ in Tanzania has mainly been through a bilateral partnership, including civil society and research grants, and multilateral organisations. This evaluation is part of the first phase of a real-time evaluation of NICFI’s contribution to national-level REDD+ processes.

Purpose:
To assess NICFI’s contributions to the national REDD+ process in Tanzania and to provide early feedback to the stakeholders and the public.

Findings:
The real-time evaluation does not provide a definitive assessment, but it identifies preliminary findings and issues that may need to be addressed in order to achieve the objectives, such as:

• Norway is by far the largest donor to Tanzania’s REDD+ strategy development. REDD+ policy development is entirely financed by NICFI, and the establishment and implementation of all activities of the REDD+ task force and REDD+ secretariat have also been financed by NICFI.

• NICFI has been successful in launching and mobilising the REDD+ process in an unusually short time, compared to the design, planning and implementation of programmes of similar complexity and magnitude. NICFI support in Tanzania was mobilised in less than a year, and was moving ahead with full speed in less than two years.

• National ownership has not been entirely satisfactory, particularly at a high level. The NICFI financing and support through the very dedicated efforts of the Embassy of Norway were the vital and necessary triggers to get the process moving ahead.

• Cross-cutting issues, such as gender, HIV-Aids and anticorruption measures are yet to be properly addressed in the REDD+ process in Tanzania. However, many of the pilot projects and specific interventions have plans for addressing these.

• The capacity and capability for REDD+ monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) is still low in Tanzania.

• There is a need to increase Tanzanian ownership of the REDD+ agenda at a high political level.

• There is a need for the forthcoming REDD+ strategy to address the issue of essential land use changes such as the conversion of some forests to other land uses due to the population increase and possible need to expand agricultural activities.

• Cross-cutting issues, such as gender, HIV-Aids and anticorruption measures, need to be articulated clearly in the National REDD+ Strategy.

• Private sector involvement and participation in the REDD+ process must be organised and supported.

• As a priority, there is a need to support the planning, designing, and eventual decision making on the REDD+ financing/performance-based payment mechanism as well as the fund disbursement system.

• Tanzanian lessons learned indicate that there is a need for stronger integration of REDD+ planning processes at the national level with broader national and local-level land use planning, particularly with reference to plans for agricultural development. High-level political discussions could be useful in this regard.

Recommendations:
The recommendations are intended for follow-up by NICFI and their partners in their ongoing dialogue and partnerships on REDD+.
Evaluation of Support for Child Rights

Title: Supporting Child Rights
Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries

JOINT EVALUATION: SIDA/NORAD

Prepared by: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)
ISBN 978-91-586-4173-0

Evaluation of:
Norwegian and Swedish assistance to promote child rights during the period 2001-2009. The two countries’ guidelines and strategies for such support are central in the evaluation. Sweden emphasises integration of child rights in the aid work to a greater extent than Norway does. Four countries were selected for further study: Guatemala, Kenya, Mozambique and Sudan.

Norad and Sida cooperated on this evaluation, which Sida had the main responsibility for.

Purpose:
To sum up the results of Norwegian and Swedish efforts to promote child rights and to contribute to learning and further development of strategies and methodology for aid in this field.

Findings:
- The report assesses the integration of child rights according to the main principles set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): no discrimination; the right to life, survival and development; the right to express one’s opinion and be heard; and the consideration of the child’s best interests. Both Norwegian and Swedish aid in the countries studied had paid due attention to these principles and to Norwegian and Swedish policy in the field, and most of the interventions had achieved their objective. Children’s participation is an exception, though, and in this area the efforts are described as symbolic rather than real.
- The report shows that Sweden has not been very successful in mainstreaming the consideration of child rights in their assistance. This strategy is highly ambitious and requires a great deal of resources, continuous attention and competence building. Mainstreaming makes sense as a principle, the team says, but the donors underestimate what it takes to make it work in practice. The team argues that mainstreaming should in principle be part of a two-fold strategy: mainstreaming gives the best results in the long term, while targeted efforts for children give good results in the shorter term.
- The report does not provide a clear answer concerning which channels are best for the promotion of child rights. State-to-state assistance is important for long-term anchoring of child rights. Civil society organisations are especially important while one is waiting for the state to be able to meet its obligations under the Child Rights Convention. The organisations are also important as supervisors and advocates of child rights. UNICEF is a key partner for the authorities when it comes to child rights. At the same time, the team questions UNICEF’s role as an intermediary between national and local organisations. The consultants fear this might hamper diversity and the independence of the organisations.

Recommendations:
- Use the Child Rights Convention as a source for and guide to political dialogue and programme planning.
- For Norway: to mainstream child rights in the general assistance, in combination with targeted measures – as Sweden has done.
- Based on identified weaknesses in both Norwegian and Swedish work when it comes to children’s participation: Norad/the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida should consider how children can be more involved in projects – from project design to evaluation.
- Swedish and Norwegian embassies should keep in closer contact with local authorities concerning child rights.
- Continue to support UNICEF at the present level, but Norway and Sweden should stop sending their support for local organisations through UNICEF.
Evaluation of:
Support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Southern Sudan. This evaluation covers the major Western donors’ assistance in the period following the signing of the peace agreement in 2005. The evaluation was organised by the Dutch Foreign Ministry’s evaluation department.

Purpose:
To assess to what extent the donors have contributed to a reduction in conflict and the building of peace in Southern Sudan, in order to improve future assistance.

Findings:
The overall conflict level has not been reduced in Southern Sudan during the last five years. Conditions in the area can therefore not be described as “post-conflict”. Rather, the period following 2005 has been one where many latent, local conflicts have surfaced.

Many community-based initiatives to improve local security have been successful. This includes measures for disarmament and conflict resolution.

Problems related to growing youth alienation have increased since 2005. The same is true for conflicts regarding access to land and water. The reason is little progress in reintegration of demobilised soldiers, while many refugees have also returned.

Most of the support was spent on measures for social and economic development – an estimated 65-85 per cent of the support investigated. In addition, governance measures and civil organisations received considerable support. Such support increased towards the end of the period. It now amounts to around a quarter of the overall support and looks set to increase.

Bilateral programmes were found to be the most effective, and the US support scored highly. Plenty of personnel on the ground, continuity and good follow-up routines were important success factors.

The multilateral donor funds have proven rather inefficient. This is especially true for the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund and to some extent for the multi-donor funds managed by the UN Development Programme.

The evaluation team is critical to what they see as a too-strong assumption among the donors, namely that if the population were able to access basic services quickly, this would in itself help prevent conflict. However, the team feels it can document that the reasons for violent conflicts are more often found in ethnic differences, disagreements concerning cattle (important as the bride price for young men wanting to marry) and land, plus a lack of schools and jobs.

Another criticism is that the donors have put too much emphasis on aid harmonisation and local ownership, at the expense of other issues which are important in vulnerable states: good local knowledge, field presence and adapting the activities to local conditions. Harmonisation, coordination and adaptation to the authorities’ overall plans are not sufficient in facing up to the challenges in vulnerable states.

Good analyses of vulnerability, power and causes of conflict were missing in the design and implementation of many support programmes. The uncertainty concerning the future of Southern Sudan as an independent state also made the planning difficult.

Donor coordination was often limited to an exchange of information; it was rarely based on a joint analysis and understanding. This was partly due to the individual donors’ lack of flexibility. The donors often met in Khartoum or at international conferences which were dominated by strategic questions regarding Sudan’s future, while local issues faded into the background.

There are big differences between areas concerning access to water, sanitation, health services and schools. If too much of the support goes to the capital Juba, this will easily lead to discontent in other areas.
Too little support has reached the different states and the local communities. Some of the aid programmes have been too focused on formal institutions. Traditional institutions, such as those associated with security and conflict resolution, have not received enough attention.

Recommendations:
1. Conduct conflict analyses and monitor peacebuilding activities, with frequent field studies.
2. Support the work to achieve agreement on how to share the oil revenues, in line with the 2005 peace agreement.
3. Invest in youth employment measures.
4. Cooperate closely with the authorities in those states which are most affected by conflict, in order to strengthen security before government primary services are developed. This might include following up disarmament measures, building up a credible police force, road construction and youth programmes. Local authorities, the civil society and traditional authorities are all important cooperation partners.
5. Support capacity building at the local level, emphasising the use of regional competence in the training.
6. Support training of the judiciary at the state and sub-state levels and make sure this is always working in tandem with support for the traditional institutions in this field.
7. Enable traditional leaders to handle the underlying causes of conflict in traditional institutions. Greater capacity building in these institutions.
8. Support the development of mechanisms for control and openness in the security sector.
9. Encourage the UN Security Council to strengthen its mandate for the UN operation in Southern Sudan (UNMIS) and support the operation’s ability to provide civil protection.
10. Support gender equality, including encouraging the government authorities to work towards having more women on agricultural land committees and supporting women’s interests in land issues in other ways.
Evaluation of:
Long-term impacts of a conditional cash transfer programme under which poor families receive a stipend on the condition that they keep their daughters in school. The programme evaluated is the Punjab Female School Stipend Program in Pakistan, which was implemented in the context of a larger education sector reform and in response to gender gaps in education. The evaluation covers the period 2003-2009.

The purpose:
of the evaluation is to gain knowledge about the impacts of the programme on participants’ school enrollment, labor market participation, marriage, and fertility decisions. Included herein is also an analysis of differences, if any, of the impacts across rural/urban sub-groups, and effects of the programme on boys who live in the same household as the participants.

Findings:
Analyses of the data show that, after four years of programme implementation, • adolescent girls in stipend districts are more likely to progress through and complete middle school, and to engage less in paid or unpaid work • there is some evidence to suggest that participating girls delay their marriage by more than a year and have fewer births by the time they are 19 • the impacts of the programme are greater for girls who belong to poorer urban households and who have parents with at least primary education. • there is no evidence that the stipend programme has adverse indirect effects on educational outcomes for boys living in the same household as the participating girls. However, boys in these households are more likely to be enrolled in higher quality private schools whereas the girls are enrolled in lower quality public schools, and this may widen the learning gap between boys and girls.

Recommendations:
The findings give a partial picture of the impacts. There is a need to investigate other relevant aspects such as: • whether improvements in school attendance also have an impact on the participants’ test scores • how implementation and contextual factors may influence programme impacts • whether the benefits of the programme justify the costs
Assessing the Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer on Human Capital: Evidence for Colombia

**Evaluation of:**
long-term impacts of a conditional cash transfers programme under which poor families get a stipend on the condition that they keep their children in school. The programme evaluated is the “Familias en Acción” programme in Colombia, that provides a monthly stipend for children on the condition of 80 percent school attendance. The evaluation uses data for eligible children who completed their schooling during the period 2003-2009.

**The purpose:**
of the evaluation is to gain knowledge about the impacts of the programme on the participants’ likelihood of completing high school, impacts on learning, how the impacts are distributed across gender and rural and urban areas, and indirect impacts on non-participating children in the same households.

**Findings:**
The analyses show that:
- children participating in the programme are 8-16 percent more likely to finish high school. Bearing in mind the size of the current beneficiary population, this means that roughly 200,000 additional students could finish high school compared to a scenario without the programme.
- programme recipients who graduate from high school, perform at the same level in mathematics, Spanish, or the overall test as equally poor non-recipient graduates. This implies an improvement in learning among those who would not have gone to school without the programme. However, it also indicates that there is no additional positive impact on test scores for participating children who are already enrolled (the majority of beneficiaries) compared to non-participants.
- the programme appears to have bigger positive effects on high school completion for girls and children in rural areas.
- there is no evidence that the programme has adverse indirect effects on educational outcomes for non-participating children in the same households.

**Recommendations:**
Although conditional cash transfers are not meant to be a tool for improving such learning performance as may be measured by test scores, there is a need to assess the impact of innovations in these programmes, for example by:
- linking the benefits under the programmes to student performance
- accompanying the programme with supplementary measures such as improving school quality and increasing resources for low-performing students.
Evaluation of the World Bank’s Social and Environmental Safeguards

Title: Evaluation of the World Bank Social and Environmental Safeguards

WORLD BANK EVALUATION

Prepared by: World Bank IEG

Evaluation of:
the safeguards and sustainability policies of the World Bank Group (which includes The World Bank, The International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) that were put in place to prevent or mitigate adverse effects of its projects on people and the environment. This evaluation looks, for the first time, at the full set of safeguards and sustainability policies used in the World Bank Group.

The purpose:
of the evaluation is to inform the ongoing reviews of the environmental strategy of the World Bank Group and the Sustainability Policy and Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation, as well as the ongoing reform of investment lending at the World Bank, in order to attain greater effectiveness in achieving environmental and social outcomes.

Findings:
• The safeguards and sustainability policies have helped avoid or mitigate large-scale social and environmental risks in the projects financed by the World Bank Group.

• However, as the World Bank projects have been undertaken with the help of mandatory compliance policies and procedures, this approach has had weak ownership among clients and is becoming less effective as the Bank portfolio moves beyond the traditional investment projects.

• The new performance-standards approach at the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency that rely on self-assessment by business clients has resulted in improved ownership among private sector clients.

• However effective, supervision and public disclosure of the self-assessments by IFC’s clients have been inadequate, and environmental and social outcomes of IFC’s approach are not yet known.

• Categorization of projects based on environmental and social risks differs across the World Bank Group and is not based on objective criteria to assess social and environmental risks.

Recommendations:
The World Bank Group should
• jointly adopt and use common objective criteria to assess social and environmental risks in their projects
• work to enhance capacities, responsibility and ownership of safeguards and polices at the country level
• revise guidelines, instruments and incentives to strengthen supervision arrangements
• strengthen safeguards that monitor evaluations and completion reporting of outcomes of safeguards
• improve systems and instruments for accountability and grievance redress mechanisms.
Evaluation of the UN Development Programme’s Support for Local Governance

Evaluation of:
The UNDP’s contribution to strengthening local governance. The evaluation covers the period 2000-2009.

Purpose:
The evaluation has three main objectives: 1) to assess the relevance, cost-efficiency, effectiveness (goal achievement) and sustainability of the UNDP support for local governance, 2) shed light on the strategic role of UNDP vis-à-vis other partners, and 3) provide recommendations on UNDP strategies, policies, approaches and interventions in support of local governance.

The evaluation covers global, regional and country-specific programmes.

Findings:
The UNDP support to strengthen local governance has been relevant, not least because most of the programmes have been developed in cooperation with the countries’ authorities. This has ensured the authorities’ interest, and the organisation has fallen in with national priorities. In several cases, however, the demand-driven approach has led to fragmented work. Some pilot measures have not been followed up.

There has been no unifying framework for the organisation’s support for local governance, and this has hampered the organisation’s contribution. The UNDP has been unable to make full use of its own strengths. The work of identifying lessons learnt during the process, which would have benefited the decision-makers, has been inefficient.

However, the UNDP support has helped create opportunities to promote rights, and this has been seen both in increased democratic representation and in improved provision of basic services. The organisation has also had several successful efforts concerning gender equality in local government. Here too, however, there has been no clear strategic approach.

Among important external conditions that have affected the projects, one might mention the degree of political stability, the role of political parties, the presence and involvement of non-state players, local participation and the degree of trust between local institutions and the population. For countries in conflict it has been particularly important to have strong networks and to have people participating who have experience in peacebuilding. In many cases, the UNDP has been able to use such networks successfully. It has proven difficult, however, to achieve sustainable results in conflict-affected areas.

UNDP-supported projects have often been without clear goals, indicators and a results framework. This has led to weak monitoring and evaluation of the programmes. The organisation has had varying success in cooperating with civil society, the authorities and other UN agencies.

The evaluation recommends: UNDP should:
• develop a unified and joint framework for support for local governance. This should include a clarification of what change theories the work is based on.
• be more forceful and systematic in its work of analysing, learning from and communicating its experiences.
• invest more in developing pilot projects, and these ought to be assessed more carefully before they are expanded.
• develop and strengthen its cooperation with other UN agencies and programmes, not least with the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF).
Evaluation of the UN Development Programme’s Environmental Management for Poverty Reduction

Title: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Environmental Management for Poverty Reduction: the Poverty-Environment Nexus

UNDP EVALUATION


Evaluation of:
The UNDP support of environmental management for the purpose of contributing to poverty reduction (an evaluation of the connection between poverty and the environment). The evaluation covers the period after 2004 and comprises nine country-specific studies.

Purpose:
To identify what has worked well and less well. Provide advice on future assistance. Contribute to the integration of environmental management and poverty reduction in UNDP programmes and other parts of the UN system.

Findings:
It is widely recognised in UNDP that poverty and the environment are interconnected and that work at country level is important in order to promote sustainable development. However, this is not always sufficiently borne out in the work of the organisation.

The UNDP is organised in a way that discourages cooperation between different units of the organisation. The absence of clear goals or incentives hampers cooperation between the poverty unit and the environment unit of the organisation. The work depends on the government authorities’ attitude to the field, and the involvement varies greatly between the 38 country offices that were studied.

The UNDP’s reliance on external funding for its environmental work aggravates the problems in achieving cooperation between the different units. The absence of indicators and processes for monitoring work in the areas of environment and poverty also plays a role.

However, UNDP is quite well equipped to strengthen the existing partnership schemes in the UN system and to coordinate the work for poverty reduction and a sustainable environment. Cooperation with the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the joint Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) are examples of this. In addition, UNDP works with the UN-REDD programme on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.

The evaluation recommends:
• UNDP must learn from successful efforts and put more work into replicating such successes.
• The UNDP policy work and advocacy should be reflected more consistently in the organisation’s programmes.
• The Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI) should be scaled up and used as a model for UNDP work at the country level.
• The UNDP should contribute with guidance and develop verifiable indicators in order to encourage the integration of poverty and environment work into other units of UNDP work.
• The UNDP must do more to facilitate cooperation within the organisation.
## Evaluation Follow-up

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