

# **COUNTRY LEVEL EVALUATION NIGERIA**

## **Final Report**

### **Volume I: Main Report**

May 2010

*Evaluation carried out on behalf of the European Commission*



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The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries concerned.

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## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>NAME</b>
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
AU	African Union
BGSP	Basic Guide for Routine Immunisation Service Providers
BL	Budget Line
BMPIU	Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit
bn	Billion
BS	Budget Support
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCB	Code of Conduct Bureau
CDE	Centre for the Development of Enterprise
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CEDEAO	Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CMD	Centre for Management Development, Lagos
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CRIS	Common RELEX Information System
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSP	Country support strategy paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DALE	Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy
DfiD	Department for International Development (UK)
DG DEV	EC Directorate General for Development
DPT	Diphtheria Tetanus whole cell Pertussis vaccine
DMO	Debt Management Office
EAMR	External Assistance Management Report
EBAS	EU-ACP Business Assistance Scheme
EC	European Commission
ECD	EC Delegation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EMCAP	Economic Management and Capacity Programme
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EQ	Evaluation Question
ETR	End of Term Review
EU	European Union
FA	Financial Agreement
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FEM	Final Evaluation Mission
FER	Final Evaluation Report

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>NAME</b>
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FMARD	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
FMEnv	Federal Ministry of Environment
FMOH	Federal Ministry of Health
FMWR	Federal Ministry of Water Resources
FRL	Fiscal Responsibility Law
FS	Focal Sector
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Taxes
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoN	Federal Government of Nigeria
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
HERFON	Health Reform Foundation of Nigeria
HF	Health Facility
HIV-AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus- Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HQ	Head Quarter
HSW	Human Solid Waste
ICC	Inter-agency Coordination Committee
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
ICT	Information & Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IFEMIS	Integrated Financial and Economic Management Information System
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFS	Instrument For Stability
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
INEC	Independent National Election Committee
INSIDE	Increasing Non-State Actor's Implementation and Development System
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
JAR	Joint Annual Review
JC	Judgment Criterion
JDBF	Joint Donor Basket Fund
JEU	Joint Evaluation Unit
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LEEDS	Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
LG	Local Government
LGA	Local Government Authority
LGC	Local Government Council
m	Million
MDAs	Maternal Mortality Rate
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MER	Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
MMR	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament

<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>NAME</b>
MPP	Micro Project Programme
MPP3	Micro Project Programme in 3 Niger delta States: Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta State
MPP6	Micro Project Programme in 6 Niger delta States: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Imo, Edo, Ondo and Cross River
MPP9	Micro Project Programme in 9 Niger delta States: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers State
MR	Monitoring Report
MS	Member States
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTR	Mid-term Review
NAO	National Authorising Officer
NAPEC	National Poverty Elimination Programme and Commission
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDPF	National Development Partnership Framework
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICS	Nigeria Immunisation Coverage Survey
NIDs	National Immunisation Days
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NPC	National Planning Commission
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NPI	National Programme on Immunisation
NSAs	Non State Actors
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLAS	Online Accounting System
OO	Overall Objective
OPE	Operational Programme Estimates
OVI	Objective Verifiable Indicator
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEI	Polio Eradication Initiative
PEMFAR	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (World Bank)
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PP	Project Purpose
PRIME	Partnership to Improve Immunisation Efficiency
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSI	Policy Support Instrument
PSU	Programme Support Unit
QSP	Quick Start Package
RG	Reference group
RI	Routine Immunisation
RIP	Regional Investment Programme
RO	Regional Organisation
ROM	Results oriented monitoring of projects



<b>ACRONYM</b>	<b>NAME</b>
SAO	State Authorizing Officer
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SERVICOM	Service Compact
SIAs	Supplementary Immunisation Activities
SMARD	State Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
SME	Small and medium size enterprises
SME <sub>Env</sub>	State Ministry of Environment
SMOH	State Ministry of Health
SNIDs	Sub-national Immunisation Days
SPS	Special Preference System
SPT	State Project Team
SRIK	Support to Routine immunisation in Kano
SRIP	Support to Reforming Institutions Programme
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
STU	State Technical Unit
STWSSP	Small Towns Water Supply & Sanitation Programme
SWA	State Water Authorities
SWB	State Water Board
SWD	Solid Waste Disposal
TA	Technical Assistance
TB	Tuberculosis
TC	Technical Cooperation
TCF	Technical Cooperation Facility
TOR	Terms of Reference
U5	Mortality of children under 5 years of age
UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union/ WAEMU)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VPD	Vaccine Preventable Diseases
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
WB	World Bank
WCA	Water Consumer Associations
WEDC	Water, Engineering & Development Centre
WFD	Water Framework Directive
WHO	World Health Organisation
WSS	Water Supply and Sanitation
WSSSRP	Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme
WTA	World Trade Association
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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## Executive Summary

This report covers the evaluation of the cooperation strategy of the EC with the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its implementation in relation to the Country Strategies and National Indicative Programmes of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Funds<sup>1</sup> (EDF) as well as to contributions from thematic budget lines and other cooperation instruments.

The main **objectives** of this evaluation are:

- To provide the external cooperation Services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission's past and current cooperation programme with Nigeria;
- To identify key lessons learned from the past cooperation with Nigeria with a view to improving the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

The evaluation was carried out in four phases during the period March 2009 to January 2010, mobilising five experts. In the **inception phase**, the Evaluation Team examined the EC strategic and policy documents on the cooperation with Nigeria in order to reconstruct the intervention logic and formulate the Evaluation Questions. In the **desk phase**, the Team studied all available documents and interviewed key staff in Brussels to take stock of the interventions and formulate preliminary answers to the Evaluation Questions, along with the methodology for testing them in the field. The aim of the **field mission** was to test the preliminary conclusions of the desk phase. The main tools used were interviews with key informants, a case study and focus group discussions. In the **synthesis phase**, the evaluators analysed the information collected, checked its reliability, made cross-analyses and formulated their Conclusions and Recommendations.

Throughout the process, the Team has interacted with a Reference Group comprising representatives of the relevant EC Services in Brussels, the EC Delegation in Nigeria (ECD)<sup>2</sup> and the Government of Nigeria (represented by its Embassy in Brussels). Preliminary team findings were discussed with the ECD and the Nigerian National Planning Commission. Finally, a discussion seminar was held in Abuja on 28<sup>th</sup> of January 2010.

### The Nigerian Context

The Nigerian context differs in several ways from that of most other cooperation countries. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a **large and complex country** with around 140 million inhabitants in 36 States and the capital, Abuja. It is one of the world's major oil exporters, yet a large part of the population live in poverty and the non-oil economy is poorly developed.

Hence, Nigeria is a classical **“rentier-state”** in which oil revenues are conducive to corruption and tend to reduce the dependency of the rulers on the ruled. Although Nigeria returned from military dictatorship to democracy in 1999, the political system's articulation of the non-elite population is weak as expressed in a certain “democracy fatigue” encountered by the Evaluation Team. There is a lively **civil society** - which tends to see itself as the real opposition - and **free quality media**, yet governance problems prevail: corruption is

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<sup>1</sup> 8th EDF was not applicable to Nigeria due to the interruption of cooperation under military rule.

<sup>2</sup> As of 1 December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission delegations have become European Union delegations. Since the evaluation took place before that date the old term is used.

widespread and the human rights situation is problematic. The rentier nature of the State also reduces the Government's dependency on foreign aid and sets the scene for a cooperation programme filled with challenges.

Nigeria is a **regional power** and a major contributor to peace-enforcement and peacekeeping in Africa, while its internal stability has been challenged throughout the period under evaluation by tension along the major ethnic and religious dividing-lines and by unrest in the oil-producing Niger Delta Region. Hence, its economic and political weight undisputed, UNDP and the World Bank classified Nigeria as a Fragile State.

**Development cooperation** corresponds to less than 1% of GDP. The main cooperation partners are the UK, USA, EC, the UN, AfDB and the World Bank. 19 EU Member States are represented in Nigeria but only a few of them have cooperation programmes.

### Main features of the EC's cooperation with Nigeria

The EC resumed cooperation with Nigeria in 1999. Before signing the Country Strategy in 2002, a "Quick Start Package" was meant aimed especially at reducing poverty in the Niger Delta Region. However, it proved impossible to act very fast.

In line with the priorities of the Government of Nigeria, **the overall goal of the EC cooperation has been poverty reduction**. Considering this goal and the modest – in relation to the size of Nigeria and of the Government funds – €652m of EC funds allocated for Nigeria under the 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF and €38m under thematic budget lines, **the overall approach of the EC Strategy was "pump-priming" for the benefit of the poor**. The bulk of the funds was to be used for technical support for improved service delivery in two interrelated focal sectors at State level (six selected States chosen as a representative selection of the different parts of Nigeria) in order to create an impact in those States and a potential wider impact through replication of success stories. Local Government has only recently been integrated in some projects.

The **focal sectors**, in which the interventions were to be mutually supportive, were:

1. Water Supply and Sanitation; and
2. State and Local Institutional and Economic Reform.

For both sectors, the support through the Government was to be supplemented with "control from below" by civil society, which in turn received support for this purpose.

**Table 1: Overview of EC Assistance to Nigeria per Sector 1999-2008 (M €)**

(Incl. EDF funds and Nigeria components of regional projects, excl. thematic budget lines; extracted from CRIS)

Total of 7 <sup>th</sup> to 9 <sup>th</sup> per sector	Amount allocated	Amount contracted	Amount paid
Water and Sanitation	105,4	94,1	44,5
Economic & Inst. Reform	204,8	179,5	159,4
Immunisation	138,3	133,9	108,0
Micro projects	105,1	69,3	57,5
Elections	48,5	20,0	19,0
Civil Society	20,0	6,8	0
Others	38,1	28,2	21,6
<b>TOTAL all sectors</b>	<b>660,3</b>	<b>531,8</b>	<b>410,0</b>

The table above shows the sub-division of the overall cooperation. The allocation for Water Supply and Sanitation was reduced owing to low sector performance in the cooperation States and the abandonment of the budget support approach. Economic and institutional reform includes €116.5m allocated and disbursed in support of the Census. Civil society was supported in various ways also in the other sectors.

However, the problems experienced with delivery and generation of results entailed a number of changes in the implementation of the Strategy over the years. These changes included the use of significant funds outside the original Strategy foci, such as:

- In focal sector 2, at Federal level in support of a national **census**, national **elections** and the **fight against corruption**;
- For non-focal sectors and States, inclusion of more **micro projects** in the Niger Delta Region, **immunisation** and capacity-building of **civil society organisations**;
- **Replacement of four of the cooperation States** with four others, which had performed better in relation to service provision.

Moreover, the Strategy foresaw that the cooperation should create the conditions for budget support, but this idea was abandoned since the necessary conditions in Nigeria did not materialise. Instead **traditional project support has been the implementation mode**. In consequence of the limited results, no replication from the cooperation States has taken place.

In addition to the support under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, a large number of (mostly small) projects have been funded under the **thematic budget lines** for NGOs and in support of democracy and human rights.

## Conclusions

The EC interventions were **relevant** and, notwithstanding implementation modalities open to debate, **the Nigerian partners appreciated** the responsiveness of the EC cooperation.

While the EC Delegation has achieved **impressive, albeit delayed, delivery** under difficult conditions, not least due to the flexible use of (or limited guidance from) the Strategy, the **overall effectiveness and impact of the EC interventions has been limited** in terms of results yielding tangible benefits to the poor. In addition, **time-efficiency has been low** as expressed in a low delivery rate and as a result of implementation delays, which have become normal.

The reasons for such problems were found on both sides: first on the **EC side** in procedures, which the partners sometimes considered cumbersome, and in the staffing of the EC Delegation, which did not appear fully adequate in relation to the tasks. Second on the **Nigerian side**, which reportedly displayed a lack of active ownership, resulting in slow procedures: some Government officials appeared to lack motivation incentives. Between the two parties, and between them and the implementing authorities, communication has not been optimal. The projects have suffered from deficient interaction, in that they were sometimes excessively blamed for the limited results.

**The Strategy was ambitious and complicated** in its requirement for reform of two different sectors without taking sufficient account of the nature of the Nigerian system and the need for incentives for the change agents. Thus, the project approach has entailed **only limited capacity-building** on the Nigerian side.

The more successful areas of technical cooperation in terms of results for the benefit of the poor have been the non-focal areas of **immunisation, micro projects and support for the anti-corruption unit**, the Economic and Financial Crime Commission. Common to these interventions was their direct linkage to end-users.

In the focal sectors, the **Institutional and Economic Reform** project has produced certain results in the six cooperation States, particularly in improving the budget process and its transparency in the States, partly through mobilisation of civil society as the “control from below”. At Federal level, the results of the support for the Census have been contested and there is still no clarity about the further usability and practical use to be made of the outputs.

The intervention in the **Water Supply and Sanitation** sector in the same States has as yet only produced limited results, while there is room for optimism regarding future cooperation in view of recent and increasing State acceptance of responsibility for the sector. Common to these interventions was an indirect approach, where pro-poor results depended on lengthy processes through the Nigerian political and administrative systems.

The interventions of a political nature (in the broad sense) present a mixed picture as regards results. Support for the (reportedly rigged) **elections** is a bone of contention among the representatives of the EU Member States, although the positive impact of civil society election support is uncontested. Support for the assemblies appeared to have been a failure. The impact of support through EDF and thematic budget lines for **civil society** capacity-building was not yet very visible, and little was known about the large and complex Nigerian civil society.

Support through thematic budget lines for **democracy and human rights** was not coordinated with the “main” intervention, hence potential synergy did not materialise. Acquisition of knowledge of the results of such support beyond the output level has not yet been attempted. A common denominator for these limitations was ECD’s apparent lack of realistic and operational knowledge in relation to the Nigerian civil society and the modus operandi of the Nigerian “rentier state”.

There was scope for a higher **EC profile in Nigeria** through improved dialogue based on strong analysis and good communications with the Nigerian authorities, the EU Member States and other members of the international cooperation community. The EU Member States and the cooperation partners regarded the contributions of the EC Delegation to the coordination role as limited during the period under evaluation.

The EC use of **development support communication** has been quite restrictive when considered in relation to the attempted outreach to the poorer parts of the population, to civil society and to the concern for EC visibility.

The considerable EC support for Nigeria’s participation in West African **regional integration** has not yet led to a corresponding prioritisation of that integration on the part of the Nigerian authorities.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the recent Strategy for the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF aims to address several of the shortcomings mentioned above.

## Principal Recommendations

1. In order to enhance time-efficiency and the production of pro-poor results, the EC cooperation should **promote Nigerian project ownership** through a more active approach to capacity-building in the Nigerian counterpart agencies, thus enhancing the incentives for active local ownership.
2. Cooperation States with a proven record of achievement in relation to **Institutional and Economic Reform and in the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector** should be further supported by the EC with advisory expertise provided that reform includes Local Government and that the budgetary provisions indicate a priority focus of the governments of those States.
3. Further EC support should be given for a **Partnership to Improve Immunisation Efficiency Programme, Phase 2**, which could cover almost the entire country, provided that there is greater co-financing by the States and the Federal authorities and support from other donors.
4. It should be ensured that **synergy is produced**, through coordination between the concerned units in Brussels and Abuja, **between EDF-funded and thematic budget line-funded support to democratic governance and civil society**.
5. The **communication and analytical profile and capacity of the ECD** should be strengthened in order to promote:
  - More active high-level policy dialogue with the Nigerian authorities;
  - More active participation in donor coordination;
  - Materialisation of the potential EC added value in relation to EU Member States;
  - Enhanced knowledge management;
  - More refined and realistic analysis of the Nigerian context as a whole, including civil society; *and*
  - Use of mass communication media for development of support communication in relation to the population at large, and particularly to the poorer parts of the population.

**Figure 1: Map of the Federal Republic of Nigeria**



Source: Joint Annual Review of the Development Cooperation between Nigeria and the European Union for 2008 (July 2009) p.83

**Table 2: EC Focal States**

2002-2006	since 2006
Cross River	Cross River
Osun	Osun
Plateau	Kano
Gombe	Yobe
Kebbi	Jigawa
Abia	Anambra



# 1 Introduction

This Synthesis Report follows the approval of the Desk Report, the subsequent field study and presentation of its preliminary findings in Abuja and in Brussels.

## 1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation

This report covers the evaluation of the cooperation strategy of the EC with the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its implementation in relation to the Country Strategies and National Indicative Programmes of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Funds (EDF)<sup>3</sup> as well as to contributions from thematic budget lines and other cooperation instruments<sup>4</sup>.

The main **objectives** of this evaluation are:

- To provide the external cooperation Services of the EC and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the Commission's past and current cooperation programme with Nigeria;
- To identify key lessons learned from the past cooperation with Nigeria with a view to improving the current and future strategies and programmes of the Commission.

The evaluation endeavours to strike an appropriate balance between:

- Being comprehensive in order to fulfil the accountability requirements; *and*
- Being specific enough to yield useful and relevant lessons that can be used by the EC and its partners to increase the results-orientation of its support.

As regards the thematic scope, the Evaluation covers the overall EC cooperation with Nigeria between 1999 and 2008, based on an inventory of the Commission's funding to Nigeria for this period of time<sup>5</sup>. It considers whether the recommendations of previous thematic and sector evaluations, including evaluations of regional cooperation of which Nigeria was part, were taken into account in the current programming cycle. Furthermore, the evaluation identifies relevant lessons and produces recommendations for the current and future strategic programme.

Besides the programmes within the focal and non-focal areas of the EDFs, the evaluation also takes into account other instruments that have been used during the above-mentioned period, such as non-programmable EDF resources and thematic budget lines. However, the investments of the EIB are outside the scope of this evaluation.

The Inception and Desk reports, and more specifically the Evaluation Questions below, further specify the remit of the evaluation in respect of the above-mentioned issues and criteria.

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<sup>3</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> EDF was not applied to Nigeria.

<sup>4</sup> For the detailed Terms of Reference for the evaluation, see Annex 1

<sup>5</sup> See Annex 9


## 1.2 Evaluation Methodology<sup>6</sup>

### 1.2.1 Overall Evaluation Procedure

The evaluation has proceeded through four phases:

- An **Inception Phase** (March-May 2009), the main purpose of which was to identify the logic behind the EC intervention in Nigeria, the main topics for the evaluation, and the Evaluation Questions with their corresponding judgment criteria and indicators. An Inception Report was produced.
- Under the **Desk Phase** (May-July 2009), preliminary answers to the Evaluation Questions were provided, based on written sources and on interviews with EC stakeholders in Brussels. The field study was prepared for by a preliminary team-leader visit to Nigeria, where interviews were held with EC and Nigerian stakeholders. A Desk Report was produced, containing preliminary conclusions and hypothesis to be tested during the field visit.
- Under the **Field phase** (Sept-Oct 2009, after the end of the Ramadan), the team (three international and two Nigerian experts and a trainee<sup>7</sup>) undertook a two-week field study in Nigeria in order to test the validity of the findings of the desk study and supplement them.
- In the **Synthesis phase** (Oct-Dec 2009), the findings from earlier phases are combined, leading to the Conclusions and Recommendations presented in a Draft Final Report, which was discussed with major stakeholders in a seminar in Abuja on the 28<sup>th</sup> of January 2010. This final report integrates the results of the Abuja seminar.<sup>8</sup>

**Figure 2: Phases of the Evaluation Process**



During all phases, there has been close dialogue with a Reference Group (RG) composed of EC and Nigerian stakeholders (represented by the Embassy in Brussels) and the Joint Evaluation Unit (JEU).

<sup>6</sup> For more details on the methodology, please see Annex 4.

<sup>7</sup> The trainee was also the Research Assistant on this evaluation.

<sup>8</sup> See Annex 12

At the end of the field study there was a debriefing meeting with the EC Delegation in Abuja and the Nigerian National Planning Commission, the comments from which were integrated in the subsequent reporting. After a RG meeting in Brussels and finalisation of the Synthesis Report, the report was presented by the team leader at the discussion seminar in Abuja. The subsequent comments were taken into account during the finalisation of this Report.

### 1.2.2 Methodology of the Desk Study

The Evaluation is based on ten Evaluation Questions (EQs) covering the EC strategy and its implementation, which are derived from the intervention logic (see Annex 3).

**Table 3: The Evaluation Questions**

<b>Evaluation Questions:</b>
<b>EQ 1:</b> ( <i>Strategy relevance and design</i> ) To what extent has the EC strategy over time been adaptive and consistent with the overall Nigerian and EC policy objectives in serving the needs of the population and responsive to occurred experience?
<b>EQ 2:</b> ( <i>Efficiency</i> ) To what extent has the mix of interventions, chosen delivery mechanisms and management of risk been adequate for implementation of the strategy?
<b>EQ 3:</b> ( <i>WATSAN</i> ) To what extent has EC support to water and sanitation sector accountability, management and infrastructure contributed to increased access to potable water, sanitation services and improved hygiene in 6 focal States?
<b>EQ 4:</b> ( <i>Institutional &amp; economic reform</i> ) To what extent has EC support to federal, State and local institutional and economic reforms contributed to strengthen the capacity to deliver services to the poor through better public financial management and civil service structures?
<b>EQ 5:</b> ( <i>Immunisation</i> ) To what extent has EC support to national immunisation programmes and polio eradication contributed to reduced incidence of vaccine-preventable diseases?
<b>EQ 6:</b> ( <i>Governance</i> ) To what extent has the non-focal support for consolidating democracy and the respect for human rights been conducive to progress in these areas?
<b>EQ 7:</b> ( <i>Regional integration</i> ) To what extent has EC support contributed to enhance Nigeria's trade and participation in regional integration?
<b>EQ 8:</b> ( <i>Civil society strengthening</i> ) In which ways and to what extent has the overall support been conducive to the strengthening of civil society in Nigeria?
<b>EQ 9:</b> ( <i>Rural poverty reduction</i> ) To what extent have programmes and projects in non-focal areas, including the QSP and micro projects, contributed to improvement and sustainability of rural livelihoods?
<b>EQ 10:</b> ( <i>3Cs</i> ) To what extent has the Commission's support to Nigeria been coordinated, coherent with and complementary to other policies and actions of the European Commission and other donors?

The table below provides an overview of the sector-coverage of the evaluation questions and their relationship / correspondence to the five OECD plus two EC evaluation criteria.

**Table 4: Correspondence of Evaluation Questions and Evaluation Criteria**

Question \ Criterion	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	EQ5	EQ6	EQ7	EQ8	EQ9	EQ10
<b>Relevance</b>	X	(X)				(X)				
<b>Effectiveness</b>		(X)	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	
<b>Impact</b>			X	X	X	X	(X)	X	X	
<b>Efficiency</b>		X								
<b>Sustainability</b>			(X)	(X)	(X)			X	(X)	
<b>Coherence</b>	(X)						X			X
<b>Value Added</b>			(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	(X)	X

X= strong contribution (X) some contribution

The EQs identified and formulated in the Inception Report, with corresponding judgment criteria and indicators, were the starting point for the analysis of documents. In the time allowed, as many documents as possible were reviewed to identify the information needed to complete the matrix. As a first step, information was searched to verify (or otherwise) the indicators formulated for each judgment criterion (JC). At the end of the information collection process for the indicators, preliminary answers to the JCs were formulated. Finally, the preliminary answers to each of the EQs were formulated.

The scope of the analysis included documents relating to EC support as a whole, as well as to individual interventions:

**Table 5: Document inventory for the evaluation**

Documents relating to EC support	CSP/NIP for 7 <sup>th</sup> , 9 <sup>th</sup> and 10 <sup>th</sup> EDFs <sup>9</sup> Addenda to the CSP/NIP Joint Annual Reports (2004 – 2008) External Assistance Management Reports (2005, 2006, 2008) Mid-Term Review (2004) End-Term Review (2006) Evaluation Reports
Documents relating to individual interventions	Financing Agreements, including log-frames Identification Fiches Project estimates & project synopses Implementation Reports Monitoring Reports & Response Sheets Evaluation reports (mid-term & final) Cost-calculations/breakdowns and financial audit reports Procedural & administrative decisions and riders Documents produced under individual programmes

The analysis of available documents was complemented by semi-structured interviews with resource persons in the Commission Services in Brussels (DG AIDCO, DG DEV, Central management of Thematic Budget Lines, Operations Quality Support and the Evaluation Unit) conducted on 10-11 June 2009, in addition to telephone and mail communications.

While the Evaluation Team gratefully acknowledged the resource persons' frankness and support – during both desk and field phases – the presentation of findings avoids identifying individuals.

<sup>9</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> EDF was not applicable to Nigeria due to the interruption of cooperation under military rule.

Observations and conclusions from the desk phase were provisional since they were subject to subsequent critical reflection and validation during the course of the subsequent field phase.

### ***1.2.3 Field Study Methodology<sup>10</sup>***

The objective of the field study was to complete missing information and to verify, modify or correct the findings and conclusions of the Desk Report. The main tools for these tasks were interviews, focus group meetings, field visits and direct observation (part of which undertaken through a preliminary study by a Nigerian team-member). The categories of stakeholders addressed were:

- Government officials (at Federal, State and local levels)
- Programme officers at the Delegation, NAO and at programme level
- Administrative staff at the Delegation (Finance and Contracts Department) and at the NPC
- Representatives of other donors and EU Member States
- NGOs and civil society
- End-beneficiaries *and*
- Independent observers from the press community

### ***1.2.4 Data Collection Methods and Tools***

Below are listed the various means by which the Team verified the findings from the desk phase and gathered supplementary information. In order to give a quick impression of the nature of the team's work, the focus group meetings and the field observations are briefly mentioned here, while the complete list of interviews and meetings is found in Annex 7.

Collection of information entailed **triangulation** methods as much as possible (including cross-checking with different sources, and when possible, confronting stakeholders with differing answers from other interviewees).

#### **Interviews**

Interviews were semi-structured. An overview of the issues to be discussed during meetings was as far as possible made available to the interview partners ahead of the mission. The interviewees included the above-mentioned categories relating to the programmes and projects in focus for the Evaluation as well as independent observers from the press. Of the interviews planned, the Team was in the event unable to hold two: one with the Independent National Election Committee, the other with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources<sup>11</sup>.

#### **Focus Groups Meetings**

Such meetings were arranged during the mission in the cooperation States of Kano and Cross River relating to the two focal sectors Water and Sanitation, and Institutional and Economic Reform. In Kano both the relevant authorities and the CSOs supported by the EC to monitor the progress of implementation of the WSSSRP participated in a focus group discussion. In

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<sup>10</sup> For details, please see Annex 4

<sup>11</sup> Due to late NPC-preparations for the meetings and insufficient team-time to arrange for new attempts

Cross River State, a focus group interview was held with the CSOs, supported by SRIP to monitor the budgeting process. Here the Team also participated in a SRIP-sponsored joint conference for the State budget authorities and the monitoring CSOs. Prior to the field mission, a focus group interview was held with the “SRIP-CSOs” in Osun State by a Nigerian team-member. In addition, a focus group interview was held with Abuja-based CSOs/NGOs with EC links.

### **Field visits and observations**

Field visits and observations at State and community levels were undertaken simultaneously by the Team (splitting up into two sub-teams) in cooperation States that (i) covered the two focal sectors and (ii) represented the major geopolitical zones of Nigeria, namely:

- Kano in the North (Water and Sanitation and immunisation)
- Cross River in the South-East (Institutional and Economic Reform, micro projects and civil society)

### **Additional Documents & Statistics**

Certain new documents were collected under guidance from interviewees and integrated into the evaluation database. Available relevant Nigerian and EC statistics were used as much as possible.

### **Analysis**

Once the data had been collected and checked, it was used for the possible identification both of overall patterns relevant to answering the Evaluation Questions, and of findings of a more general nature. By logical juxtaposition of the findings with the objectives of the intervention under evaluation, the Team arrived at the descriptive conclusions, subsequently transformed into normative recommendations in those cases judged sufficiently important and operational.

#### ***1.2.5 Limitations of the Evaluation and team response***

While the Evaluation Team believes in the validity of the answers provided to the Evaluation Questions, it also considers that some answers might have been more precise had the work of the Team not been subject to certain constraints. These included some difficulty in accessing documents from the CRIS database, limited time for the field study, combined with belated Nigerian preparations and lack of knowledge of the results and impact of the budget line projects. The Team developed compensatory measures for these constraints to the extent possible (see Annex 4).

#### ***1.2.6 Relations between desk study and field study***

In general, the field study supplemented and refined the findings of the desk study as planned. Particularly in relation to EQ 5 on immunisation, this resulted in a more positive conclusion than the desk study was able to reach from available documents.

### **1.3 Report Structure**

Section 2 presents both the Nigerian and the EC cooperation background. A more detailed presentation of both aspects can be found in Annexes 2 and 3. The EC portfolio of Projects and programmes is presented in Annex 10.

The Methodology on which the evaluation study is based is described in detail in Annex 4.

Section 3 presents the answers to each of the EQs. Supplementary information on the background to the answers can be found in the Annex 5 information matrix as well as in a case study relating to EQs 4 and 8.

Sections 4 and 5 present the Conclusions deduced from the EQ answers and the Recommendations arising from the conclusions.

Annexes 6 and 7 contain the list of persons and institutions met respectively the calendar of the field study, and Annex 9 an overview of the documents consulted by the Team. Minutes of the Focus Groups are included as Annex 8.

In Annex 11, a Power-point presentation illustrates in headlines the evaluation context and methodology along with the findings of the evaluation and their limitations.

Lastly, Annex 12 contains the minutes of the Dissemination Seminar held in Abuja on 28<sup>th</sup> of January 2010.

## 2 Context of the Evaluation

### 2.1 Overview of Development Cooperation with Nigeria<sup>12</sup>

Donor funding in Nigeria represents only a small percentage of the Federal Government budget. The added value of donor support therefore manifests itself primarily through targeted support to national and State programmes and structures. However, in selected domains such as immunisation or civil society development, donor assistance is predominant.

Given previous long-term experience of failure by Nigerian institutions, donor support to these institutions is fraught with risks of continuing inefficiency, waste, misuse of resources, limited effectiveness, scarce impact, and low sustainability. However, the return of democracy in 1999 was believed to be an opportunity for reform, which merited support by EC and other donors to governance, institutional strengthening and public financial management (PFM).

The Government's commitment to institutional reform and the fight against corruption have created new opportunities for effective change, embraced by the development partners who initiated a dialogue not only with the Federal and State governments, but also with the private sector and civil society. The over-riding aim remains poverty reduction combined with redressing of the macro-economic balance after the end of military rule.

Tables 6 and 7 below present the commitments and disbursements of EC aid to Nigeria in the period 1999-2007 compared to those of EU Member States, other bilateral donors and multilateral donors. According to OECD/DAC data the EC committed a total of US\$ 912m (in current US dollars) between 1999 and 2007, equivalent to about 4% of the total aid committed to the country. Within the EU, which was by far the most significant component of the donor community in Nigeria, the EC accounted for about 5.5% of overall funding. It should be noted that large proportions of aid from bilateral donors to Nigeria, as reflected in the OECD/DAC data, represented debt cancellation. In ongoing development cooperation, the EC is considered one of six major donors: EC, UK, USA, the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the UNDP.

**Table 6: Commitments of ODA to Nigeria, 1999–2007**

	US\$m (current prices)	Percentage of total assistance
EU (Member States and EC)	16,500	74
<i>of which EC</i>	<b>912</b>	<b>4.1</b>
Other bilateral donors	3,612	16
Multilateral donors	2,117	10
<b>Total assistance</b>	<b>22,229</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OECD/DAC data, extracted

As shown in Table 7 OECD/DAC figures suggest that the EC accounts for 2.2% of actual disbursements in the period 1999-2007<sup>13</sup>, or a total of US\$480m (current US dollars) which makes up for about 3% of the overall EU funds disbursed to Nigeria within this period.

<sup>12</sup> For the Nigeria background and more details on the EC cooperation, see Annex 2 and 3

<sup>13</sup> 2008 data not yet available



**Table 7: Net Disbursements of ODA to Nigeria, 1999–2007**

	<b>US\$m</b> (current prices)	Percentage of total assistance
EU (Member States and EC)	16,093	75
<i>of which EC</i>	<b>480</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Other bilateral donors	3,017	14
Multilateral donors	2,341	11
<b>Total assistance</b>	<b>21,451</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: own presentation based on OECD/DAC data, extracted

## 2.2 EC Cooperation with Nigeria

Development cooperation between the EC and Nigeria dates back to 1976 but was suspended in 1995 following the execution of Ogoni leaders by the then military government. With the return to democracy in 1999, a Joint Communiqué by the EC and Nigeria specified that development cooperation was to be resumed immediately through a “Quick Start Package (QSP)” while the Strategy was being formulated. In 1999-2000, the EDF Committee approved project support totalling about €100m of which the largest component was micro project programmes in the Niger Delta Region (€63m).

It quickly became apparent that national management and institutional constraints, coupled with EC human resource and procedural issues, were hindering start-up, to the extent that the projects were only initiated from 2001 onwards.

In addition to the QSP, NGO projects continued to be supported under thematic budget lines (BL)<sup>14</sup>, including a budget line established for 1998 and 1999 to provide €7m of support for democracy and human rights in Nigeria, which funded 15 projects implemented by European and Nigerian NGOs.

### The Country Strategy

In their statement of 10 November 2000, the EU Council and the EC determined a number of areas in which Community action added value, including support for regional integration and cooperation and for institutional capacity-building, particularly in the areas of good governance and the rule of law.

In the Common Position adopted on 15 May 2001 by the EU Council of Ministers and Nigeria, it was specified that the EU would pursue a consistent and coherent approach to Nigeria, covering policies within the political, economic, trade and development fields. This was to be achieved through political dialogue and development cooperation. Cooperation was to be guided by Nigerian priorities, to be poverty-oriented and to involve Nigeria-led donor coordination.

In 2002, the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was signed between the EC and Nigeria. At the time of preparation of the CSP and the corresponding National Indicative Programme (NIP), no Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) had been prepared. However, in 2003 the GoN adopted the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), extended in 2005 by the States’ Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS), which constituted the main pillars of Nigerian development policy until the launch of the GoN NEEDS-II and 7-point Agenda, in 2007 and 2008 respectively.

<sup>14</sup> Especially B7-6000 – Co-financing of projects undertaken in developing countries by NGOs

### 2.2.1 Objectives

The overall objectives of the bilateral cooperation between the EC and Nigeria were:

- Consolidating democracy and respect for human rights
- Reducing poverty and achieving sustainable institutional reform, social and economic development
- Enhancing Nigeria's capacity to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development and to integrate into the world economy.

Within the overall objectives, the CSP chose to concentrate support on *reducing poverty and achieving sustainable institutional reform, social and economic development*, with non-focal support for the other objectives, which were also to be supported from budget line contributions for human rights and democracy, including elections.

It was further mentioned (CSP p.8) that: “strengthened relations between the EU and Nigeria shall be based on equality, dialogue and shared values of respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance.”

### 2.2.2 Approach

The overall approaches of the EC support to Nigeria were:

- Consistency of the strategy with the overall Nigerian priorities in serving the needs of the population
- Helping the Nigerian authorities in the cooperation States and at Federal level to improve service delivery through the activities in the focal sectors
- Obtaining a spread effect through the replication of positive cooperation experiences from the cooperation States to the other States and to the Federal level.

The strategy further makes clear that the EC policies are to support and encourage Nigeria's own processes in the areas covered by the strategy. In Section 5.2 (p.21), it is concluded:

“There are two obvious ways that EDF support can help in this regard:

- By directly helping the Nigerian authorities improve their own service delivery mechanisms through support to good governance, institutional strengthening, reform of public sector management
- By developing and promoting success stories.”

The strategy selected two focal sectors and six focal States for its support, on the grounds that in this way the available funds could be sufficient to make a significant difference in the focal sectors in the six States.

The main elements in the strategy were to be:

- A State-based approach in the six States for focal sectors to be identified; *and*
- Budget support as the reforms advance and start to improve service delivery.

On **donor coordination** (pp. 19-20) the strategy states:

*“EC strategy will build on other donors' experience, and will create a favourable environment for other donors' interventions. This is particularly true for other EU member states. ... Moreover, the EC programmes at state level could create a favourable environment*

*for specific complementary interventions by other donors, particularly the EU member states.”*

**Regional integration** was identified as a non-focal activity for EC support in that NIP funds could be used to complement RIP funding for regional projects, which involve Nigeria. In addition, funds could be allocated for building up Nigerian capacity, specifically to:

- Support negotiation of an EPA with EU;
- Review and implement trade-related obligations and participate in international negotiations;
- Articulate national policies with regional integration policies;
- Ensure application of multilateral trade rules (WTO).

Referring to the Cotonou Agreement (articles 6 and 7), the CSP Section 5.5. (pp.26-27) on Civil Society underlined the importance of the **role of civil society** in exercising “*control from below*” through advocacy and lobbying in the focal sectors of cooperation. As part of the rationale for the selection of sectors, it is mentioned in the CSP (p.25) that action to improve service delivery “*needs to be viewed from a social and participatory perspective. Civil society needs access to information on government action. Civil society as a whole and the poor and other socially excluded groups in particular, needs to be involved*”.

### **2.2.3 Choice of Focal States and Focal Sectors**

The strategy concluded that EC should focus on six States (Osun, Cross River, Abia, Plateau, Gombe and Kebbi) representative of all regions of the country and with regionally representative poverty profiles, in which EC support would represent some 15% of State budgets. However, with the end-term review (ETR) of the strategy in 2006, it was decided that four of these focal States would be replaced by four other States, which had shown a greater inclination towards reform according to the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS)-Benchmarking. Thus, the present focal States are Anambra, Jigawa, Kano, Yobe, Cross River and Osun.

As regards sectors of support, the focal sectors were chosen through a State-based approach, namely Water Supply and Sanitation (WATSAN) and State and Local Institutional and Economic Reform; while the non-focal sectors included (1) Federal-level public finance management, (2) regional integration, (3) elections and human rights, (4) immunisation and (5) private sector support with possible additional support to international programmes in Nigeria and Federal Budget Support.

Crosscutting themes are in evidence in both focal and non-focal sectors. Gender issues figure particularly prominently in the non-focal programmes as well as in the capacity-building and reform programmes, but also environmental and HIV/AIDS issues are relevant in interventions related to service provision, health and civil society. Other crosscutting issues are either not explicitly addressed or, like capacity-building, are already addressed *via* the focal sectors.

### **2.2.4 Funding allocation**

The following table gives an overview on the development of the funding allocation following the MTR in 2004 and the ETR in 2006. As illustrated below, from an equal starting point

focal sector 1 was reduced considerably, from €230m to €87m, while focal sector 2 was increased from €220m to €238.5m.

**Table 8: Subdivision and development of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF A-envelope funds over focal and non-focal sectors (million Euros)**


	Initial indicative allocation (CSP/NIP 16/07/2002)		Indicative allocation after 2004 MTR (rider 11/03/2005)		Indicative allocation after 2006 ETR	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
<b>Focal Sector 1- Water and Sanitation</b>	230.0	42%	150.0	27%	87.0	18%
<b>Focal Sector 2- State and local institutional and economic reform</b>	220.0	40%	215.0	39%	238.5	50%
<b>Non focal sectors</b>						
Immunisation	64.5	12%	110.0	20%	60.9	13%
Elections, human rights, support to Non-State Actors, TCF, support to the NAO Office, EPA negotiations, Cameroon-Nigeria border demarcation, micro projects plus reserve	37.5	6%	77.0	14%	90.8	19%
	<b>552.0</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>552.0</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>477.2</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: End of Term Review 2006

In terms of allocations, the largest non-focal activity is support for the immunisation campaign, taking account of the fact that an allocation of €77.4m was also recorded under the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF and thus not included in the above figures. It is, nevertheless, visible in the graphs below.

The initial €40m B-envelope allocation was reduced by the ETR to €4m for the fight against avian influenza.

**Figure 3: Amounts committed and paid under the 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF by sector, in percentages**



Source: own presentation based on CRIS data (2009)

**Table 9: EC Assistance to Nigeria per Sector through EDF funding 1999-2008**

Total of 7 <sup>th</sup> and 9 <sup>th</sup> EDF per sector:	Total (including EDF national projects and Nigeria components of regional projects; without Budget lines)		
	Amount committed (€m)	Amount contracted (€m)	Amount paid (€m)
WatSan	105,4	94,2	44,5
Econ. & Inst. Reform	204,8	179,5	159,4
Health (Immunisation)	138,3	133,9	108,0
Micro projects	105,0	69,3	57,5
Elections, Human Rights	48,5	20,0	19,0
NSA	20,0	6,8	6,8
Others	29,9	19,4	13,9
<b>TOTAL all sectors</b>	<b>651,9</b>	<b>523,0</b>	<b>409,0</b>

Source: compiled from Database CRIS, 2009 (for more details see annex 10)

The above table represents commitments, contracted amounts and payments recorded within the evaluation period.

### 3 Answers to the Evaluation Questions

The answers to the questions are structured by a short background rationale of the question, the presentation of the findings according to the original judgement criteria, based on indicators (for details see Annex 5), and finally a box with the overall answer to the question.

#### 3.1 EQ 1: Strategy Relevance & Design

**To what extent has the EC strategy over time been adaptive and consistent with the overall Nigerian and EC policy objectives in serving the needs of the population and responsive to occurred experience?**

##### 3.1.1 Background

The EC resumed cooperation with Nigeria in 1999. Before signing the Country Strategy in 2002, a “Quick Start Package” was meant aimed especially at reducing poverty in the Niger Delta Region. However, it proved impossible to act very fast.

In line with the priorities of the Government of Nigeria, **the overall goal of the EC cooperation has been poverty reduction**. Considering this goal and the modest – in relation to the size of Nigeria and of the Government funds – €652m of EC funds allocated for Nigeria under the 7<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, and €38m under thematic budget lines, **the overall approach of the EC Strategy was “pump-priming” for the benefit of the poor**. The bulk of the funds was to be used for technical support for improved service delivery in two interrelated focal sectors at State level (six selected States chosen as a representative selection of the different parts of Nigeria) in order to create an impact in those States and a potential wider impact through replication of success stories. Local Government has only recently been integrated in some projects.

The **focal sectors**, in which the interventions were to be mutually supportive, were:

1. Water Supply and Sanitation; *and*
2. State and Local Institutional and Economic Reform.

For both sectors, the support through the Government was to be supplemented with “control from below” by civil society, which in turn received support for this purpose.

##### 3.1.2 Findings

Overall, the 2002 Strategy relevantly addressed its main objective: the reduction of poverty in Nigeria through improved service delivery to the poor and improved sector governance at State and sector level, in line with Nigerian and EU policies and priorities and also in the context of a balanced approach to the geopolitics of Nigeria.

**JC 1.1: The strategic documents have been consistent with the overall policies and priorities of the EC and the GoN in relation to the needs of the population, with an emphasis on poverty reduction**

Most of the modifications of the strategic documents over the period of evaluation have reflected the evolution of Nigerian policies. This includes the abandonment of the originally

planned budget support and support for new projects at Federal level such as the 2006 Census and the 2007-11 Electoral Cycle. However, the significant downscaling of support for the WATSAN sector was due to problems experienced with implementation as expressed in the mid-term and end-term reviews (MTR and ETR) in 2004 and 2006. The EC did not accommodate a certain Nigerian wish for support for infrastructure projects.

**JC 1.2: The assumptions made are still valid and the inherent risks of the strategy have been taken into account in order to avoid their materialisation**

Over the evaluation period 1999-2008, it became increasingly evident that some of the main **assumptions**, on which the overall design rested, were either not valid or only partly so. In particular, the assumption of replication of success stories as part of the justification for the chosen cooperation State approach has not been fulfilled so far owing to a lack of success stories to replicate so far at State level. In addition, the validity of the implicit CSP assumption about the role of civil society as exercising “control from below” in the focal sectors is doubtful.

The inherent **risks**, adequately assessed in the CSP, were managed by the application of EC procedures. In a wider sense, risks relating to lack of will or motivation to enhance the cooperation programme reforms have led to strategy changes, most notably the downscaling of the WATSAN support and the replacement of four out of six cooperation States.

**Mass communication** elements were absent in the Strategy. Considering first that the end-beneficiaries are the poorest sections of the population, and second that there was an emphasis on “control from below”, reaching out to this target group through more intense application of development support communication might have been useful. Opportunities for doing so were readily to hand, considering for example the large Nigerian film production capacity as well as the existence of quality media (this is integrated in 10<sup>th</sup> EDF).

**JC 1.3: The replacement of four of the cooperation states with four other states after the MTR, and the inclusion of the federal level in addition to the state and local level after the ETR, have enhanced the appropriateness of the CSP**

The **choice and combination of the two focal sectors** (Water Supply and Sanitation, WATSAN; and Institutional and Financial Reform) represented an elaborate attempt to obtain substantial and sustainable results through using the (in the Nigerian context relatively limited) EC resources as “pump-priming” to impact on the use of the more substantial Nigerian resources for the benefit of the poor, both directly within WATSAN and indirectly through the institutional and financial management reforms. The **choice of six cooperation States** (based on screening of their reform inclinations and balanced in relation to the Nigerian geo-political zones) seemed to presuppose an impact in each State - as the EC funds had greater effect here than at Federal level - and hence a potential for further replication of results.

The subsequent inclusion of the health-related interventions as the “hidden third sector<sup>15</sup>” in the Strategy was, likewise, to produce results with direct benefit, not least for the poorer sections of the population.

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<sup>15</sup> So named by the ECD

The idea of a **Quick Start Package** (QSP) following resumption of cooperation in 1999, while the Strategy was being elaborated, was relevant in addressing directly the needs of the poor in the micro projects, which was the main element in the QSP<sup>16</sup>. In addition, support to the assemblies and to key institutions in the newly reborn democracy, as along with support through budget lines for Nigerian civil society working with democracy and human rights, was relevant in relation to the overall democratic goals of the EC cooperation. However, the Quick Start Package was later nicknamed the Slow Start Package and subsequent monitoring and evaluation has indicated that the results were mixed<sup>17</sup>.

Regarding the core Strategy activities, the mid-term and end-term reviews in 2004 and 2006 recorded slow progress in implementation and thus in the production of tangible results in the focal sectors. Particularly in focal sector 1, WATSAN, allocations were consequently reduced substantially, while design and objectives remained unchanged. Relatively late in the strategy lifespan, progress seemed more encouraging at State level while still not leading to the planned replication of success stories. In both focal sectors, the planned strengthening of civil society as “control-from-below” was not developed convincingly, although more was achieved in the second focal sector than in the first.

The consequent accumulation of large unspent EDF funds (out of the total allocation of €557m, see EQ 2 below) found its partial resolution following the 2004 MTR, with its decisions on reducing the allocation for WATSAN and on including the Federal level in focal sector 2. The latter decision resulted in the substantial funding of important elements in Nigeria’s societal and democratic development, the 2006 Census (€116m), the 2007-11 Electoral Cycle (€40m) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC, €40m). At State level, four of the six cooperation States were replaced by four others as a consequence of their better performance in the SEEDS-benchmarking, but nonetheless without clearly convincing results in terms of increased delivery.<sup>18</sup>

The situation at the end of the evaluation period, in 2008, was one of limited progress in the core intervention areas, allegedly due to limited dedication to reform on the part of the concerned Nigerian authorities, as well as to other bottlenecks (elaborated under EQ 2 below).

#### **JC 1.4: Existence of ability and will at the federal and state level to proceed with institutional and financial management reform so that the conditions for budget support are created**

At Federal level the ability to proceed with institutional and financial management reform, so that the conditions for **budget support** are created, are more or less in place in contrast with State level where this is only partially the case. However, at neither level has any will been expressed to proceed in this way – at least not until recently when the evaluation team was presented with the wish of the EC counterpart, the National Planning Commission (NPC), to proceed in the direction of budget support.

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<sup>16</sup> The total QSP allocation was of €101m, which included €63m for micro projects. For the QSP composition, see Annex 5, Information Matrix, Indicator 911

<sup>17</sup> See Annex 5 Section on Judgment Criteria 9.2 on the evaluation of the micro projects.

<sup>18</sup> For an overview of the changes in the composition of the elements in the entire intervention, see the above Table 6.



### 3.1.3 Overall Answer to the EQ

Overall, **the strategy was consistent with and adaptive to the EC and Nigerian policy objectives** – and to the occurred experience – as reflected in the substantial above-mentioned amendments flexibly undertaken within the existing framework. However, as a general rule, such changes were not based on a close dialogue with the GoN, as illustrated by the subsequent elaboration of the JARs. Frequent turnover of Nigerian NAOs over the period was perceived as a problem by the ECD and the cooperation with the SAOs was also generally not regarded as smooth. EC cooperation may have been hampered by having the less powerful NPC as its cooperation partner, as opposed to the IFIs, which interface with the Ministry of Finance, thus closer to the relevant decision-making structure for implementation.

As regards **the responsiveness of the Strategy to the needs of the population**, it was found, in the light of invalid assumptions and limited results for the final beneficiaries, that these deficiencies should have led to more comprehensive questioning of the validity of the Strategy. Its intentions were good, but a less ambitious and complicated design would have been preferable (see EQ 2 below). While it was possible to amend the Strategy substantially, it appears that it has served more as an *ad hoc* framework than as a real guideline for implementation.

The **replacement of four of the cooperation States** with four others did not appear to have had the desired effect, particularly as cooperation at State level was not developing very well in the WATSAN sector. In reverse, the partial shift from State to Federal level produced results in terms of large projects, which materialised within a short span of time.

In hindsight, it appears that **incentives to motivate implementing Nigerian counterparts were not taken sufficiently into account** in the intervention design. A more active approach to capacity-building, and certain compensation measures for the extra effort required, might have allowed for more competent and satisfied counterparts.

On the Nigerian side, some resentment was found over project implementation by foreign companies, which did not automatically lead to human and institutional capacity-building or other incentives for the counterpart institutions. PMUs headed by a qualified Nigerian team-leader (proposed by the contractor and approved by NPC and ECD) might have been conducive to better project results (and are being considered under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF).

Collaboration between the EC and the Nigerian authorities entails a **meeting between different administrative cultures**. The long-term planning rationale, the emphasis on procedures in writing and the careful decision-making of the ECD is quite different from Nigerian person-or-connection-driven structures. The latter are able to move fast, using mobile phones more than letters, filing and E-mail – but also to move slowly if procedures are perceived as difficult and incentives not obvious. While it is not possible or desirable to change culture overnight, a more express ECD understanding of the logics driving the Nigerian systems might be useful to reduce a certain sense of frustration.

However, as reiterated by the NPC and confirmed by other donors to the evaluation team, **the Nigerian authorities are satisfied with the responsiveness of the EC cooperation**, the main shortcoming in their view being the sometimes too meticulous EC procedures, according to which “*you have to account for every penny 25 times*”. The ECD underlines the necessity of the procedures for the sake of transparency and accountability and that this opinion is shared not only by the Nigerian counterpart but also by the PMUs.

## 3.2 EQ 2: Efficiency

**To what extent has the mix of interventions, chosen delivery mechanisms and management of risk been adequate for the implementation of the strategy?**

### 3.2.1 Background

When the EC resumed its interventions in Nigeria in 1999, it started preparing the CSP for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. Considering the complexity of delivering aid to Nigeria, the EC adopted the standard project approach, while not excluding the possibility, time passing, of introducing more modern management modes such as sector or budget support. The reason for not pursuing this option under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was clear lack of governance progress, which was a pre-condition for such an implementation mode. Ten years later, the issue is to assess the efficiency of the support mechanisms during the period, and to explore how, in view of latest developments in the principles guiding EC Technical Cooperation, the EC could envisage a revision of those mechanisms so as to increase the efficiency of the aid.

### 3.2.2 Findings

#### **JC 2.1: The geographical and sector distribution of EC support has contributed to implementation of the CSP**

Under the CSP for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the EC started work at State level: given the size, diversity and complexity of the country, the EC chose to work in a limited number of States, basing the choice of the States to be supported on objective and transparent criteria, with balanced geographical distribution.

The changes in the selection of States that took place in 2006, following the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF mid-term review, in order to align the cooperation States with the results of the SEEDS-benchmarking exercise (SRIP, WATSAN), considerably delayed programme implementation, resulting in loss of efficiency<sup>19</sup>. In focal sector 1, WSSSRP suffered numerous delays in programme start-up and implementation; the same applied to SRIP in focal sector 2.

At sector level, the situation at the beginning of 2009 was the following<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. WSSSRP MR-01721.02, 11/09/2008: “In April 2006 it was decided that the EC shall transfer its support away from four of the existing focal states to four States Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS), Anambra, Kano, Jigawa and Yobe States; only in Cross River State and in Osun State preparatory activities were allowed to continue. New Memoranda of Understanding with the states were negotiated, signed December 2006. The programme implementation framework consists of 3 different Lots of service contracts implemented by 3 different consortia. ... UNICEF implements the rural WSS component through contribution agreement with EC. Whereas UNICEF had already started in July 2005, the 3 other teams began operations only in November 2005 with the handicap for Lot-2 and 3 as well as UNICEF to await the conclusions from the SEEDS benchmarking process. UNICEF had to recall all activities in 4 States and start in the 4 newly agreed SEEDS States.”

<sup>20</sup> Data extracted from the detailed table in the Information Matrix, Annex 5, which shows the interventions in the different sectors, their size, the timing of their implementation and their delivery rate (as approximated by the ratio “payments/commitments”).

**Table 10: Financial Data, On-Going Programmes of NIP (7 Jan. 2009)**

	Amount €m	Committed €m	Contracts €m	Paid €m	Paid/Com.
7 <sup>th</sup> EDF	169	162	157	133	82%
9 <sup>th</sup> EDF	480	465	357	257	55%
<b>Focal Sectors:</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>360</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>60%</b>
I Water and Sanitation	87	87	80	36	41%
II Institutional & Economic Reform	277	273	213	182	67%
<b>Non Focal Sectors</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>43%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>649</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>62%</b>

Source: Evaluation Team calculations based on various ECD sources

## JC 2.2: Chosen EC delivery mechanisms were optimal for implementation of NIP

A combination of numerous factors contributed to low efficiency in terms of delivery. Most of these factors are not specifically Nigerian and have already been identified by the EC.<sup>21</sup> The general delivery mechanism is a decentralised system<sup>22</sup>. Around 80% of the aid consists of service contracts implemented by Programme Management Units (PMUs) directly managed by external private consulting companies<sup>23</sup>. Neither GoN nor EC were keen to move to the budget support envisaged in the CSP: for the ECD, budget support is financially more risky than project support, while for GoN it is likely to be accompanied by unacceptable conditions.

Following the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF Mid-Term Evaluation in 2004, the mechanism of budget support was discarded and the project approach chosen for the implementation of NIP. In a limited number of cases, the EC delegated implementation to specialised agencies (UNODC for EFCC, joint basket fund for elections) to take into account the fact that some specific programmes needed to be run by specialised bodies.

<sup>21</sup> C.f. 'Making Technical Cooperation More Effective' March 2009. All problems with Technical Cooperation identified in this document apply to Nigeria:

'What are the problems with Technical Cooperation?'

- Evaluations of TC effectiveness and efficiency have pointed to persistent problems with such support: A significant proportion of TC continues to be supply-driven with an overall low level of ownership.
- Many partner countries have insufficient capacity to ensure "active" ownership and coordinated TC.
- In many cases, the provision of TA personnel and the use of "PIU structures" is taken as a given, without questioning their appropriateness.
- TC effectiveness is compromised by lack of clarity about roles and results expected.
- Insufficient attention is given to ensuring that TA personnel have the necessary skills and profiles to be able to engage effectively in demanding change processes.
- Much of the TA and the majority of PIUs are provided to manage EC procedures and to comply with the various related requirements.
- Tendering and contracting procedures are lengthy and slow.
- Operational staffs do not always have a clear understanding on how to use existing procedures to promote and comply with aid effectiveness principles.
- There is limited experience in the use of alternative forms of TC provision such as the use of public sector expertise through twinning arrangements, and the use of South-South cooperation.
- The use of TC by the EC partly reflects management structures, incentives and internal capacity gaps. Human resource policies and the way delegations are managed has a bearing on current TC and programme implementation arrangements, as do incentives that tend to reward control, disbursements and quick results.'

<sup>22</sup> Decentralised system: decisions on the procurement and award of contracts are taken by the contracting authority and referred to the Commission for prior approval. Before the invitation to tender is issued, the final version of the terms of reference/technical specifications for a project must be approved by the contracting authority, if it is an international invitation, and by the Head of Delegation in other cases, together with the complete tender dossier. The terms contracting authority refer to the contracting authority designated by the government(s) of the ACP State(s), where the procedure is decentralised (i.e., the NAO, in Nigeria, the Head of NPC).

<sup>23</sup> Source: Interview of ECD Head of Finance & Contracts Division

However, implementation faced a number of bottlenecks that delayed programme achievements. Most difficulties arose from insufficient knowledge of EDF procedures on the part of the bodies in charge of implementation and from delays in the EC itself due to shortage of staff and sometime insufficient knowledge of EC procedures on the part of EC staff themselves<sup>24</sup>.

**Project design:** Overall efficiency in terms of aid delivery and programme implementation was reduced by too numerous and complex interventions, reflecting a lack of realism at the stage of programme design. Lessons on difficulties of working in the Nigerian environment, drawn from previous experience, have not deterred designers from conceiving highly complex programmes. WSSSRP is a typical example of such complexity.<sup>25</sup>

**Programme design** is not always sufficiently focused on service delivery and end results. This is reflected in the ToRs, in which OVI's often reflect expected outputs (e.g. number of seminars), rather than expected effective results. The EC does not have a culture of cost-benefit analyses. Programmes lack flexibility owing to the constraints imposed by strict detailed implementation programming. Pre-appraisals of even comprehensive programmes are not commissioned, and the programming studies leading to the FA are not assessed on validity. Draft FAs are not adequately circulated to and validated by beneficiaries. Budgetary realities and the management capacities of beneficiaries are not guiding factors in programme design. Finally, exit strategies were not integrated into the interventions.

**Inputs:** ECD is understaffed and not properly equipped with Internet access for all staff. ECD underlined its difficulty in recruiting qualified people. NPC is also confronted with a number of staffing issues; for example, most EC desk officers at NPC are not civil servants, but contracted on a temporary basis.

**Input-Output Ratio** (see Table 12 in the Information Matrix, Annex 5): Overall, under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF 'amount paid/ funds committed' was observed at the beginning of 2009, while the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was initially supposed to be fully spent over the period 2002-2007. The ratio would have been even lower if there had not been the support to the Census (within focal sector 2, Institutional and Economic Reforms) which allowed quick spending of funds outsourced to a Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF).

**Cooperation Modalities:** There is no consensus on the distribution of roles, functions and responsibilities between ECD and NPC, particularly in relation to Federal line ministries and State ministries. The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF workshop held in May 2009 acknowledged this: ECD and NPC agreed to enhance the role of ministries in the various stages of aid delivery from programming to implementation.

**EC Procedures and Management:** ECD management is rigid and its work organisation is weak. Most stakeholders consider ECD procedures as too complex. Information is not widely shared within the ECD; there is no database of cooperation stakeholders available to all ECD staff and regularly updated; information is not widely shared among ECD staff (lack of horizontal exchanges); and there is no institutional memory within the ECD, in which staff

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<sup>24</sup> See details in Information Matrix Annex 5 i.e. Indicator 431

<sup>25</sup> WSSSRP programme implementation framework consists of three different Lots of service contracts implemented by three different consortia. Lot-1 is managing the Programme Management Unit (PMU) and is responsible for the Federal component; Lot-2 operates the State Technical Units (STUs) in the three southern States and Lot-3 in the three northern states. UNICEF implements the rural WSS component through contribution agreement with EC.

rotation is high. Neither ECD nor NPC provide advisory support to PMUs to avoid the procedural hurdles, which jeopardise programmes<sup>26</sup>.

**Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting (MER):** Strategic recommendations by monitors and evaluators are largely ignored<sup>27</sup> or are addressed only by employment of additional TA. There is generally insufficient monitoring. The focus of both ECD and NPC is more on contracting than on monitoring of results. The changing policy environment is not monitored and programmes lack the option of addressing it. Programmes tend to get stranded (e.g. SRIP, the final evaluation of which describes this phenomenon in detail).

No appropriate indicators for **State and sector governance** are defined or addressed in the intervention logic. Mid-term reviews are geared to operational issues rather than to ensuring emphasis on monitoring of results and impacts. Dissemination is restricted and evaluation of recommendations not thorough enough. Programmes are not designed to include benchmarks and adjustment according to results. Implementation delays are not analysed and corrective actions not taken in due time.

PMU progress reporting usually does not refer to the mandatory indicators, nor does it sufficiently address implementation issues and any corrective action required. The policy environment (assumptions and risks) is referred to as explanation of past failure to achieve results rather than as a basis for refocusing and realignment of a project, which is avoided for contractual reasons. The over-specified set of deliverables stultifies any flexibility. Decisions on changes are not easily taken.

**Interrelations between the Stakeholders:** The high NAO turnover does not facilitate smooth programme implementation. PMUs perceive NPC as the single major risk to project implementation due to allegedly unpredictable processing of the documentation needed for replenishment of funds. The SAOs are most often considered as local facilitators and coordinators, not as partner bodies of the beneficiary State, and as yet the SAOs have no management function. Ownership problems are an almost universal factor of EC aid to Nigeria.

Supply procurement is the key element of interest for both beneficiaries and NPC; TA is just seen as an enforced precondition.

Working relations between PMUs, ECD, and NPC are difficult. Most PMUs declare that they work in isolation and do not receive efficient support from ECD or NPC. Participatory planning, involving key stakeholders, is largely rhetoric. Capacity-building issues are more centred on project implementation structures than on beneficiaries.

Extension of contract duration is almost universal, as illustrated by the recapitulative table in the Information Matrix (Annex 5).

Programme or Project Steering Committees either do not exist or else they meet rarely and not at a time when programme implementation most needs it. They do not constitute a management tool. Often they are just a FA obligation.

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<sup>26</sup> ECD staff, on one hand, considers that PMU staff should be perfectly conversant with EDF procedures, as this is a precondition for consulting companies managing the PMUs to obtain contracts. On the other hand consulting companies consider that it is not their job to become overly specialised in these procedures (the job of the EC itself), but rather to transfer EU expertise. They expect support from the ECD on procedural issues, which the ECD does not provide.

<sup>27</sup> For example, the monitors' recommendations to provide exit strategies (SRIP, WSSSRP, and MPP3) have not been implemented.

Programme Estimates are commonly over-optimistic and require extension of implementation time. Operative work plans are not assessed on realistic timeframes. Concurrent OPEs are not harmonised.

### **JC 2.3: High adequacy of risk management and consequent reactions**

The first risk factor mentioned in the CSP was of “**wastage and misappropriation of EDF funds**”. The ECD<sup>28</sup> admits that it is impossible to avoid misuse of funds, which mostly takes place during procurement procedures involving a long chain of intermediaries. Altogether, the EC has been able to recuperate misused funds and there has not been any misuse recently<sup>29</sup>.

In Nigeria the States are quite independent while risk management is highly centralised: the NAO is the only responsible body *vis-à-vis* the EU, not the SAOs; the NAO has limited authority in relation to the SAOs, who are nominated by the State Governor and report directly to him, not to the NAO. Implementation of most EC programmes takes place at State level, while financial control takes place at central level. The two key functions (implementation and control) have given rise to highly complex control systems, in which the PMUs and the NAO Office play key roles. This complexity has not facilitated quick and smooth implementation of EC programmes. The NAO support programme is currently carrying out extensive work on simplifying the control systems, while fully respecting the standard EC procedures.<sup>30</sup> In the past, the EC managed to limit risks by multiplying parallel controls and limiting access of non-EU staff to key positions in the cooperation process.

The second risk factor mentioned in the CSP was “**Failing to contribute to a real improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds.**” SRIP, and indirectly “Support to EFCC and the Nigerian Judiciary”, contributed to an improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds at Federal and State levels but not significantly at local and community levels (see EQ 4). The lack of an adequate MER system precludes measurement of such improvement, as this information mostly comes from interviews and various MER reports, and is not documented with the aid of objective indicators.

#### **3.2.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

##### **Mix of interventions**

Overall the mix of interventions has been adequate and has taken into consideration the constraints imposed by the size of the country, the level of development of the relations between Nigeria and the EC and particular conditions prevailing in the different sectors of intervention. Some changes from initial decisions have nevertheless sometimes slowed down implementation.

##### **Chosen delivery mechanisms**

From the outset, the mix of interventions was of an indirect nature: the focal sectors had to support each other through complex interventions, rather than directly focusing on service delivery and results for the benefit of the poor. This was the case with SRIP and WSSSRP. Subsequent addition of several non-focal interventions has strained the management resources

<sup>28</sup> Finance and Contracts Section

<sup>29</sup> Quote from Head of International Cooperation, NPC

<sup>30</sup> The Nigeria “governance profile”, a guide for all donors to deal with Nigerian authorities, was only elaborated under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF

of both the ECD and its counterparts and led to an overall reduction of efficiency in terms of aid delivery and programme implementation. A simpler and more robust approach would have been preferable.

Budget support having been discarded, the mode of implementation was the project approach, which was able to deliver results in respect of strategy implementation, albeit at a slow pace due to bottlenecks arising from procedural problems and deficient interplay between ECD, NPC and the ministries.

### **Management of risk**

Regarding the first CSP risk factor, “*wastage and misappropriation of EDF funds*”, the ECD admits that it is impossible to avoid misuse of funds. However, the risk management procedures applied have adequately prevented significant misuse of funds, but at the cost of such procedures slowing down implementation. As regards the second CSP risk factor “*failing to contribute to a real improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds*”, the EC support has contributed to some improvement in Nigeria’s management of its own funds at Federal and State levels but not significantly at local and community levels.

The EC Headquarters authorities are willing to make cooperation positions more accessible to non-EU citizens in general, and Nigerian citizens in particular, along with retention of strong risk management systems, which will have to adjust accordingly. Brainstorming is currently taking place within EC Headquarters and Delegations to calibrate the balance between risk control and country alignment. The EC is conscious that risk management should be a top priority under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. A precondition is the setting-up of an adequate MER system, harmonised with other donors; this will allow monitoring of achievements in terms of delays incurred and results achieved. General orientations for future cooperation are proposed in “*Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for External Aid provided by the European Commission, A Backbone Strategy*”, July 2008. The new Regulation of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF offers the possibility of more substantial delegation of funding decisions, paving the way for more de-concentration of EC funds. All proposed mechanisms aim to increase partner country ownership at all stages from conception to implementation.

## **3.3 EQ 3 Focal Sector 1: Water Supply and Sanitation**

**To what extent has the EC support to water and sanitation accountability, sector management and infrastructure contributed to increased access to potable water, sanitation services and improved hygiene in six focal states?**

### **3.3.1 Background**

The EC Country Support Strategy 2000-2007 has selected Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) as one of the two focal sectors of intervention critical for poverty reduction and appropriate to the State-based approach, through introducing better practices in the use of Nigeria’s own resources. The other focal sector is the Reform of State and Local Institutions, addressed through a programme directly related to the WSSSRP (Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme) and working in the same six focal States. The States

have to confirm their willingness to reform the WSS institutions in accordance with federal policies, that is to say:

- Co-finance WSS projects as per cost sharing formula
- Develop demand-driven and participatory approaches
- Establish partnerships with Local Government Areas, coordinate and consult with other WSS stakeholders.

Synergies will be sought with other Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS) interventions. The key is that fundamental reforms actually take place in the participating States, for subsequent replication throughout the country.

### 3.3.2 Findings

#### **JC 3.1: Due to EC support, WATSAN sector policies are being implemented with timely disbursement of adequate budgets by federal and state governments**

All EU focal States except Cross River State have drafted **WSS policies**, none of which, however, have yet been promulgated. New and adequate national framework legislation on water resources had still not been approved by the National Assembly in 2009, which is a great impediment to the progress of the entire sector at both Federal and State levels. Four new agencies have been created and the enabling bills are in the process of approval. There is some evidence that the role of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR) is to be reduced to regulation and control while infrastructure development will be the full responsibility of States and of Local Government Authorities (LGAs).

As the Federal share of the cost is currently 50% for rural and small towns' investments and 30% for urban areas and is to be reduced to zero, future WSS financing will become an important issue for debate. It can be expected that the State Governments will resist political pressure from the Federal level in order to maintain the present cost sharing system<sup>31</sup> WSSSRP has supported the process of finalising the water sector institutional framework by preparing, for example, a Water Resources Strategy and a Draft Water Bill with a holistic and integrative approach to water resources management as envisaged in the Financing Agreement (FA).

**Programme implementation** has experienced considerable delays on various levels. In April 2006 it was decided that the EC should transfer its support away from four of the existing focal States to four different SEEDS-States, Anambra, Kano, Jigawa and Yobe. Only in Cross River State and in Osun State were preparatory activities allowed to continue<sup>32</sup>. Negotiations for Memoranda of Understanding with the new States lasted until December 2006.<sup>33</sup>

Final agreements on the Guidelines for Disbursement of Funds for WSSSRP Work Contracts – the administrative procedure for the cost sharing – were achieved only as recently as August 2008. This brought the few ongoing work operations almost to a halt. Service contracts to the Programme Management Unit (PMU) and the State Technical Units (STUs) needed to be

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<sup>31</sup> At the cut-off date of the evaluation the evaluation team additionally discovered that in terms of the federal level's share for investment in rural and small towns (i.e reduction to 0%), the problem has been solved. The recently approved water resources policy 2009 maintains the original cost sharing formula

<sup>32</sup> As they remained focal states

<sup>33</sup> Even in the new and old states, Cross River and Osun, not much happened and they are not ahead.



extended and the contractor changed; the three northern States are now on their third contractor.

The new contractor for all six States' STU service started operations in February 2009. The PMU contract ends in November 2009, the STU contract in November 2010 along with the Works Operational Programme Estimates (OPEs) under the States' responsibility. The States' sectoral water policy, planned for approval by 2006, was still unfinished in 2009. Even after the 12-month extension (Addendum 1), the WSSSRP will run short of time unless an intensified and comprehensive monitoring system is immediately put in place for the remaining project period. The sector Monitoring and Evaluation system is a cornerstone for the water sector reform; but as yet, it has not made any progress, which is a very negative indicator of the current situation. Highly needed initiatives such as the Integrated Water Resources Management Project in two pilot River Basins are jeopardised by uncertainties regarding their counterpart institutions.

### **JC 3.2: EC support has increased transparency in sector governance at federal and state levels**

Water and Sanitation does not appear to be a high priority of decision-makers at either Federal or State levels. The piecemeal approach to infrastructure provision (often led by political interests in favouring certain contractors) has not been changing and a conceptual change is not yet visible.

The National **institutional and restructuring plans** had not been finalised by the Nigerian Federal Government as planned; the same applies to the States' policies and a mid-term sector strategy. The envisaged medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) still largely remains to be elaborated. WSSSRP propagates good international practices on water governance, but it fails to convince or make feasible the application and adoption of those practices in Nigeria.

There are numerous hydrological and technical problems confronting the water supply needs of the Nigerian population. Increasing demands and constantly inadequate rainfall in the northern States, which are part of the drought-affected Sahel zone, and the low water retention capacity of some soils in the southern States, are just some of the many constraints. Better technical options have to be explored but too little is being done to develop more economical and sustainable solutions.

Improving theoretical and practical sector planning skills has not been in focus of donors in the WSSSRP project; planning departments barely exist. Pro-active planning, which is necessary for addressing the resource base and for avoiding repetition of failures and pursuance of unsustainable approaches, is universally lacking. Yet no baseline studies are available which indicate the current water and sanitation supply situation in the LGAs through identification and assessment of existing infrastructure and population coverage, water yield, average daily consumption, or technical constraints.

The **institutional set-up** both in the Federal and States agencies is led by resource control interests, and hence is not conducive to cooperation or synergies. Agencies lack both the relevant budget and the autonomy to fulfil their water governance function. There is a lack of consensus in the water and sanitation sector on how the current poor service level may be raised and sustainability managed. Participatory approaches need considerably more time and have not yet been shown to generate greater system reliability. It is a cornerstone of sustainable water supply that the population has to accept water as an economic good.

The **financial implications** of water supply will become more prominent, yet are insufficiently considered in the WSSSRP programme. There is a general lack of perception of water as an economic good susceptible to public control. No target group or topic-specific approach is chosen to raise the awareness of what should be or can be done and by whom. Technical solutions are favoured and considered to provide safe supply and collection and storage issues are not addressed. Household-specific and community-based calculations on consumption do not exist.

**What is promising** is that State officials now realise that fundamental changes are necessary and that the States recognise the need for support to sector reform. However, this process is very slow and it will require much stronger support at top policy level. There is no shortcut to good governance. It takes time in Nigeria to formulate a rational approach to the needs, taking into account the participation of the various strata of the population and the State authorities. There has been some successful replication of the WATSAN programme within the focal states: in the areas of procurement using EDF procedures; replication of the Rural WSSSRP in Cross River and Osun States and in terms of beneficiaries contributing to investment cost.

#### **JC 3.3-4: Increased access to adequate sustainable systems for distribution of potable water and sanitation services in 6 focal states supported by EC**

The delayed implementation of WSSSRP, where only the rural component implemented by Unicef has resulted in concrete investments improving the access of selected rural small towns has not resulted yet in relevant numbers which would make a change. Even less sanitation measures have been implemented mainly constructions of school latrines.

##### **3.3.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

###### **Limited pro-poor impact**

The 1999-2008 EC support in the sector with the WSSSRP as the main project, along with the Small Town Water Sector Reform Project, Water Facility and Micro projects has had little impact if judged purely by the **number of people who obtained sustainable access to water supply and sanitation services**. The number of beneficiaries up to the present can be estimated at less than one million Nigerians for all programmes, representing 0.7% of the total population (team estimate).

This is not surprising given the **low performance of the sector at large**: less than 50% of all Nigerians have access to safe drinking water<sup>34</sup>, which is a decline from the 1991 figures, owing to vested interests maintaining erratic, uncoordinated infrastructure investment (huge contracts with private companies) and perpetuating existing sector inefficiency. Investments *per capita* are high compared to other African countries, but the lowest in terms of results.

<sup>34</sup> Water and Sanitation Monitoring Platform

EC support mainly addressed symptoms (as with WB, DFID and others), but the focus of EC support on water governance through the WSSSRP was relevant. It has already had a positive impact, but has been slow or unsuccessful at several levels, particularly the Federal. The shift of the Nigerian Government from prioritising the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) towards economic priorities (achieving G20 status by 2020)<sup>35</sup> had led to a refocus of Federal financial resources towards agricultural development and irrigation, thus leaving the States to deal with sector reforms and investments.

### **Recently improved sector prospects**

The **States** are slowly recognising that they have the *de facto* responsibility (already constitutionally stipulated) for sector reforms with some additional support from the MDG budget (US\$800m for all 36 States and all MDG-relevant sectors). Nevertheless, the depreciation of the of the water sector infrastructure alone exceeds this amount each year.

Only the EC support (WSSSRP) has tackled this challenge and, together with the Support to Reforming Institutions Programme (SRIP), it has aimed to help the interested State authorities. However, the **level of awareness, responsibility and readiness to reform in the States** was unpredictably low. Currently the States still formulate their water policies whereas they were supposed to have in place water strategies and budgets and a clear institutional set-up, as well as a stepwise action plan with targets.

Nevertheless State officials now realise that fundamental changes are necessary and the States recognise the need for support to sector reform. The EC support has therefore had a great impact in terms of inducing a trend towards Nigerian-led sector reform of the water and sanitation sector.

## **3.4 EQ 4 Focus Sector 2: Institutional and Economic Reform**

**To what extent has EC support to Federal, State and local institutional and economic reforms contributed to strengthen the capacity to deliver services to the poor through better Public Financial Management (PFM) and civil service structures?**

### **3.4.1 Background**

EC support to Federal, State and local institutional and economic reforms became the most important part of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF<sup>36</sup>. CSP noted that a pre-requisite for oil revenues reinforcing poverty-oriented services such as WATSAN, health and education, is improved PFM, respect for rule of law and reduced corruption. Thus, EC proposed a programme of support to reform, in six focal states, with the aim of improving service delivery. Subject to progress in improving service delivery, a second phase would provide substantial direct budget support. Transparency of public accounts at all levels was identified as an important component of these reforms, with civil society playing an important participatory role in prioritisation and monitoring.

<sup>35</sup> As reflected in recent statements from the Federal Government

<sup>36</sup> 8<sup>th</sup> EDF does not apply to Nigeria

### 3.4.2 Findings

#### **JC 4.1: EC support to institutional and economic reforms has reduced macro-economic imbalances**

During that period, some macroeconomic imbalances were reduced (decrease in external debt, stabilisation of federal expenditures and revenues, decrease in inflation), while in 2008, the influence of the world financial crisis had a negative impact on macroeconomic stability. The precise contribution of the EC support to these improvements, although not doubtful, is not measurable. Other macroeconomic imbalances persisted, in particular the widening gaps between the rich and the poor and between living standards in big cities *vis-à-vis* rural areas, and the deteriorating situation in the job market.

Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF the focus sector 2 programme was a package including not only the specific Support to Institutional and Economic Reform programme itself (SRIP), but also the Census Support Initiative, Support to Law Enforcement against Economic and Financial Crime, Support to the Electoral Process, and others.

#### **Census Support Initiative**

This, the largest 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programme, started in 2004 and was due to end in December 2009. At Federal level, the support for the Census Initiative is likely to have had indirect effects on the **reduction of macro-economic imbalances** through the provision of improved population data. Progress was recorded in Census data, yet there remains some controversy about the quality of the data. Basic Census data are not immediately useful for MDG monitoring, as further work is needed to establish the databases including all necessary MDG indicators.

#### **Support to Law Enforcement against Economic and Financial crime EFCC**

The programme started in October 2005. It has made progress, as shown by EFCC capacity-building and in the rating and perceptions of the judiciary. It is likely to have had indirect effects on the **reduction of macro-economic imbalances** through better control over corruption. Effectiveness was visible at Federal level, thanks to EFCC, the sustainability of which is subject to the political conditions for stable, active ownership.

#### **JC 4.2: EC support to institutional and economic reform has contributed to improved PFM at federal, state and local levels**

The Economic Management Capacity Project (EMCAP, €10.2m under the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF, implemented during 2001-2005) laid some basis for improved PFM. Institutional and Economic Reform is focus sector 2 in the CSP9 (2002-2007). With a total amount of €268m, the sector accounts for 58% of the 9th EDF funds (signed). The state of implementation of focus sector 2 programmes at the beginning of 2009 is briefly summarised in the table below.

**Table 11: 9<sup>th</sup> EDF Focal Sector 2: Institutional and Economic Reforms (01/2009)**

Projects	Amount M€	FA signature	D+3 end contracting	Project start	End Implem.	Com mit. M€	Con-trac-ted	Paid	Paid/Com. (%)
Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF)	10.7 <sup>37</sup>	27-May-04	5-May-07	27-May-04	31-Dec-07	5.1	5.1	5.1	100%
Study potential contribution to Census	0.1	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.1	0.1	0.1	100%
Support to the office of the NAO I	7.7 <sup>38</sup>	19-Nov-04	25-Oct-07	19-Nov-04	30-Jun-10	5.7	5.7	4.5	79%
Support to the office of the NAO II	4	19-Mar -08	19-Sept-10	19-Mar -08	31-Dec-13	2.6	2.6	0.9	34%
Census Support Initiative	116.5	17-Dec-04	15-Dec-07	16-Dec-04	31-Dec-09	116.5	116.2	115.4	99%
Support to Reforming Institution Programme (SRIP-I)	27.6	23-Dec-04	20-Dec-07	30-Dec-04	31-Dec-08	24.1	18.5	13.6	56%
SRIP-II	40.0	24-Jul-08	17-Oct-10	01-Jan-09	31-Dec-11	29.4	17.3	5.9	20%
Support to law enforcement against economic and Financial crimes EFCC	24.7	07-Oct-05	31-Aug-08	01-Nov-05	31-Dec-10	24.7	24.7	23.9	97%
Support to Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2006-2011	40	05-Sep-06	11-Jul-09	05-Sep-06	30-Jun-11	40	40	31.2	78%
Support to NGOs INSIDE	20	26-Sep-07	Jun-10	Sep-08	Jun-11	20	6.7	1.8	9%
<b>Total FS2</b>	<b>287.3</b>					<b>266.4</b>	<b>234.3</b>	<b>201.3</b>	<b>75%</b>
<b>Total 9<sup>th</sup> EDF</b>	<b>480.1</b>					<b>465</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>55%</b>

Source: Elaborated by Evaluation Team based on individual project documents, monitoring reports and ECD Finance & Contract follow up file (7 Jan. 2009)

### JC 4.3: EC support to institutional and economic reform has contributed to improved governance and delivery of public services at federal, state and local levels

#### Support to Reforming Institution Programme (SRIP-I)

SRIP-I was conceived to provide support to Good Governance in Nigeria in general and to reform institutions in particular. The aims were to:

- Make the budgeting process a more transparent, effective and accountable means of managing public finance; *and*
- Support Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to strengthen their understanding of the various processes and roles in the preparation and approval of budgets. SRIP-I was implemented in six States: Anambra, Kano, Yobe, Osun, Cross River and Jigawa.

Owing to the weakness of the systems for service delivery and public finance management in the six States and LGAs where SRIP-I was implemented, it was not feasible to adopt the first option, namely implementing the programme through State and local institutions. Since SRIP aimed to support States in need of reforming their systems and institutions for effective management of their financial resources (particularly in the areas of accountability and transparency), it was ‘aid delivery mechanisms outside the country’s systems’, that is ‘parallel project implementation units (PIUs)’, that was opted for.<sup>39</sup> Over the evaluation period, PFM improvement has mainly taken place at Federal level.

**At Federal level**, adoption of a legal framework in the WATSAN sector and drafting of Federal water policies were first steps towards improved governance in the sector.

<sup>37</sup> The budget in the FA was €10.7m. However, a total of €5,340,000 was decommitted leaving a balance of €5,360,000. Of this balance, €5,165,360.39 was committed leaving €194,639.61 uncommitted.

<sup>38</sup> The budget in the FA was €7.7m. However, a total of €1,200,000 was decommitted leaving a balance of €6,500,000. Of this balance, €5,718,113.59 was committed leaving €782,326.41 uncommitted.

<sup>39</sup> Source: EC Delegation comments on draft report on final evaluation of SRIP Phase I

The States are progressively adopting policy changes originating from Federal level, albeit at different paces. Some States have adopted the same financial management structure as that of the Federal Government, or similar structures elsewhere, to implement federal policies and programmes in a seamless manner. As a result, States have established Debt Management Offices (DMO), Due Process<sup>40</sup> and have started implementation of the Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF). Some States adopted Fiscal Responsibility Bills (FRL). However, lack of relevant indicators makes it impossible to measure the magnitude of those contributions.

The **local level** remains the weakest. Since LGAs are not autonomous but under direct State control, no significant improvement seems to have been evident. The only activities at local level were those performed by the associated WSSSRP programme, which had limited outputs and outcomes compared to its initial targets (see EQ 3).

At **State level**, as described above, SRIP has contributed to improved financial governance. Some States have their own 7-Point Agenda and some started reviewing their SEEDS 2 documents. These State strategic documents are being revised and updated to make them more strategic and better harmonised with new central level strategic documents also currently under revision.

SRIP has in some cases contributed to elaboration of such documents and their associated work plans. It has also contributed to budget oversight by citizens through the creation of CSO oversight networks, which, indirectly, is a step towards improvement in service delivery (inasmuch as citizens gain some control over the State budget). As regards direct delivery of public social services at State level, EC support has been provided only in the WATSAN sector.

However, it is the lower levels of government that are to deliver most MDG-oriented services (primary healthcare, primary education, rural water supply, feeder roads). Without significant improvements here, reforms at Federal level will not be sustainable. This interdependence between the three tiers of government needs to be taken into account in the EC's future cooperation efforts. The experience of working at State level, particularly in the six focal States, shows that the pace of and interest in reform and service delivery improvement varies widely between States and depends on the political commitment of the State authorities. The importance of donor involvement in direct service delivery has also been demonstrated.<sup>41</sup>

To the extent that PFM and CSOs have been strengthened, an **impact** on the capacity to deliver services to the poor could be expected, since improved State finances and CSO pressure should mean more funds being available for services to the poor; but even so, improvements recorded at local level have not been enough to make a measurable difference.

### **Support to Reforming Institution Programme (SRIP-II)**

The continuation of SRIP-I has the same aim. SRIP-II is implemented in the same six focal States: Anambra, Kano, Yobe, Osun, Cross River and Jigawa. Project implementation suffered from serious delays. The main source of problems was with the PMU and the service contract that could not meet its financial obligations (and still does not as of today).

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<sup>40</sup> Due process (more fully due process of law) is the principle that the government must respect all existing laws of the land in taking decisions or in implementing policies and programmes.

<sup>41</sup> Source: draft CSP10, Oct. 2009

One major outcome is that the attitude of State and local authorities to the budgeting process has started to change positively and that CSOs are reinforcing their capacity to involve government in implementation of the budget.

As regards improvement of the legal framework of public procurement and fiscal responsibility, all the States have undergone this process, which is now at varying stages of implementation. SRIP has provided assistance in the OPEs of the six focal States and has been mandated to coordinate with other donors in their provision of assistance in these areas.

Another outcome is the preparation and approval by the ECD of a call for proposals for CSO projects aimed at promoting anti-corruption measures, accountability and transparency in the budget process and effective public service delivery in the six focal States and selected LGAs.<sup>42</sup> The programme promoted the creation of a number of CSOs, which is having a positive impact on CSOs' capacity to influence the budget processes.

An impact is being made on States' financial planning with the introduction of medium term budgeting. In Jigawa State, the Ministries of Health and Education are preparing a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2010. In 2011, seven Ministries will be involved in this process, and all State Ministries will have their MTEF by 2012.

SRIP influences the budgeting process by orienting it according to policy objectives and operational strategies adopted by the Federal Nigerian Government (FNG), and it is therefore unlikely that the process supported by SRIP will be interrupted after the end of programme support.

#### **JC 4.4: EC support to institutional and economic reform has contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue**

Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the EC devoted substantial efforts and funding to supporting institutional and economic reform. This has contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue, as demonstrated by concrete achievements at different levels: at Federal level, EC support contributed to Government reforms and policies, including PFM, public procurement, tax reforms and the Fiscal Responsibility Law. At State level, the numerous activities of SRIP in PFM management, including seminars and study tours targeting high-ranking officials, have contributed to policy dialogue.

PFM improvement has been much higher at Federal and State levels than at local level where almost no progress was achieved. Possible future support provided to LGAs might impact on the role that these institutions now have in the country, helping them to become more autonomous and effective in delivering services and increasing their capacity to give voice to citizens in the local policy-making processes.

#### **3.4.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

The substantial EC efforts and funding under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF to support institutional and economic reform has **contributed to the effectiveness of the policy dialogue**. The experience has been one of major reforms in some areas at Federal level (such as PFM, debt management and fiscal management), limited reform in some States, but little progress at Local Government level.

<sup>42</sup> Source: based on MR-123283.01, 25.09.09 and interviews with SRIP staff and SRIP stakeholders in Abuja and Cross River State (Field Mission)

By contributing to the promotion of Fiscal Responsibility and Public Procurement legislation SRIP-I and SRIP-II had a **significant positive impact** on the business environment and the service delivery system at national and State levels.

Nevertheless, the results within focus sector 2 represent a mixed picture and the **linkage between the expressed reform objectives and the reduction of poverty is rather indirect**. Part of the reason is the poor performance in focus sector 1, WATSAN, which should have been the main beneficiary of the focus sector 2 reforms.

While the non-focal micro project programmes targeted the poor communities of the Niger Delta, the link to poverty was not so clear in the support to institutional and economic reform (in other words the key was 'reform' rather than 'poverty').

### 3.5 EQ 5 Immunisation

**To what extent has EC support to national immunisation programme and polio eradication contributed to reduced incidence of vaccine preventable diseases?**

#### 3.5.1 Background

Nigeria has a very poor health system and, as a result, very poor health indices. Infant mortality rate is 112/1000 live births; the under 5-mortality rate is 187 per 1000 live births; and the maternal mortality ratio is 10 per 1000 live births. Life expectancy at birth was only 52 years in 2003. Around 20% of childhood mortality is due to Vaccine Preventable Diseases (VPD) of which Nigeria has one of the highest levels of incidence in Africa. VPDs are a major cause of poverty through the increasing cost of health care for affected families. Immunisation coverage is very low in Nigeria, in 2003 covering only 12.7% of children aged 12-23 months, 7.1% of pregnant women and 8.3% of women of childbearing age (15-45 years).<sup>43</sup>

In Nigeria, the role of donors is predominant in the immunisation domain. WHO and UNICEF have been partners of the Government for decades and various other agencies have followed. The Interagency Coordinating Committee (ICC) has been set up by the Ministry of Health as a coordinating body for immunisation activities in Nigeria. It is to provide a forum for regular information sharing and networking among the major stakeholders so as to ensure synergy and complementarity of programme implementation. For immunisation, the ICC is a sub-group of the "Health Partners Coordination Committee" that has a coordination role over the whole sector. Thematic Working Groups are operative; the Training Working Group has been chaired by EU-PRIME (**P**artnership to **R**einforce **I**mmunisation **E**fficiency).

**EU-PRIME** spent €64.5m over a five-year period from December 2003 to September 2007. The first component, accounting for about one-third of the total budget, was designed to support the purchase of supplies as well as National Immunisation Days (NIDs), and formed a part of the Polio Eradication Initiative (PEI). The second component, absorbing two-thirds of the total budget, has been utilised to revitalise a system of RI spell-out services in the six focal

<sup>43</sup> National Demographic and Health Survey 2003 and 2008; World Health Organisation; PRIME Final Project Report 2003-2009



States. In March 2003, an additional €12.9m was earmarked for the 2004 Polio NIDs and disbursed through the WHO during February and March 2004.

A **Polio Eradication Initiative** covering 14 ACP countries, of which Nigeria is one, financed seven more rounds of NIDs with a budget of €25.4m for Nigeria. This programme was implemented by WHO between 2004 and 2007. An additional €20m was earmarked for polio eradication support between 2006 and 2008, and a specific project, *Support to Routine Immunisation in Kano State (SRIK)* with a budget of €15.5m, started in 2007 thus bringing the total amount of sector intervention to €138.3m between 2002 and 2010 (when SRIK ends), including €78.74m for polio eradication measures. During 2007, the PRIME project was granted a no-cost extension until 6 June 2009, which brought an additional 17 target States into the project target.

### 3.5.2 Findings

#### JC 5.1: Synergies developed and absence of conflicts between routine immunisation and polio eradication

Before the inception of the EU-PRIME programme, the general state of primary health care and immunisation was very poor. “Cold chain” functionality and availability as well as distribution of vaccines covered only about 10% of requirements and there was poor mobilisation of communities as well as poor funding of immunisation programmes at all levels, especially the Local Government level. Against this background it is not surprising that only 13% of children in the country were fully immunised. There was also a widespread misconception in the public that polio vaccination was all they needed and that routine immunisation was secondary. This misconception was largely overcome through extensive information campaigns.

The achievements of EU-PRIME are best assessed in terms of software development (capacity-building) and hardware (equipment) contribution.

As regards **software contribution**, EU-PRIME has been a leading capacity-builder and trainer of Federal, State and LGA staff in terms of

- Training and skills enhancement, covering areas such as procurement, budgeting, equipment maintenance and logistics, *and*
- Social mobilisation and awareness-raising, which has been accomplished with partners within Government and other development partners.

A total of 79,911 health workers have been trained in various aspects of immunisation. The objective of the Change Agent Programme was to expose committed individuals to countries that have excelled in their immunisation programmes and Primary Health Care.

PRIME supported eight **international study tours** to Tanzania, Zambia, Egypt and Malaysia. One such study tour to Egypt with religious and traditional leaders from the Northern part of Nigeria helped to resolve the polio rejection controversy in the country. The outcome was that the religious and traditional leaders held a press conference and signed a communiqué, which was distributed across the country and published in national dailies. It said that the religious and traditional leaders fully supported immunisation as a means of preventing serious diseases that was not in conflict with Islamic law, in contrast to previous statements. The **identification of targeted change agents** or champions within government at all levels has

institutionalised the commitment to Routine Immunisation (RI) as opposed to an emphasis on campaigns, national immunisation days (NIDs) or other one-off efforts to raise the level of immunisation coverage.

These important achievements of EU-PRIME have enhanced the potential for sustained government-managed-and-financed RI activities beyond the lifetime of the project.

As a result, there has been an expression of demand by beneficiaries in at least the six focal States of Gombe, Cross River, Osun, Plateau, Kebbi and Abia. There is clear evidence for this from raised demand at community level as well as from change in the working practices of government operations, examples being the drive for change towards a specific budgetary allocation for routine immunisation, and budget increases made by some States. There is little doubt that attendance at Health Facilities (HF), as already observed by WHO, will increase and that the LGA will have to respond to the increased demand.

### **JC 5.2: Improved facilities and modalities for vaccine storage and distribution**

Concerning **hardware contribution**, EU-PRIME has been instrumental in procuring equipment that supports improved RI delivery, focusing on the cold chain system which has included solar panels to supply electricity for refrigerators; refrigerators themselves; vehicles and other forms of transport including motorcycles, buses, speed boats, canoes, and so forth; and construction of cold stores. The list of procured items is impressive: prototype cold stores were established in 20 States; 23 cold rooms, solar refrigerators (in 368 locations) and 417 electric refrigerators have been procured; 81 health facilities and 50 LGA cold stores were renovated; and 570 motorcycles and 148 vehicles were distributed. Thus, the cold chain in the six focal States was re-established and transportation for delivery facilitated.

### **JC 5.3: EC support has contributed to greater immunisation coverage of the population**

There is general agreement by all stakeholders that the EC support has contributed to the greater immunisation coverage of the population. PRIME is rightly considered as a success programme of EU assistance in Nigeria. The termination of EU-PRIME in its present form in June 2009 raises the issue of the **sustainability** of measures undertaken so far. Particularly because the sustainability of RI delivery was not explicitly factored into the design and activities of PRIME, there has arisen an impression that PRIME was a substitute for the Government of Nigeria rather than a change facilitator. This impression is evident both in government circles and also, interestingly, among other donors operating within the immunisation sector.

There is, however, recognition that the project itself has adopted a resource mobilisation approach at LGA level to encourage Government to put into practice mechanisms for supporting RI, and also some evidence that certain States are beginning to adopt a resource mobilisation approach at LGA level.

### 3.5.3 Overall Answer to the EQ

#### Significant Results in the Cooperation States

In the EC-supported six focal States, **DPT 3 coverage** (Diphtheria–Pertussis–Tetanus) has risen to 75% (national average just over 50%). **Cold chain systems are in place** and services continued even after the termination of PRIME in June 2009. However, only a few activities could be supported in the 17 additional States from 2008 onwards. The State-specific routine immunisation project “Support to Routine Immunisation in Kano State” (SRIK) has not yet materialised, although it is urgently needed as Kano State is a hotspot for wild polio spread and WHO/UNICEF polio eradication campaigns rely on improved SRIK services. The EC has supported the WHO Polio campaign with €78.4m but **its objective of polio eradication has not yet been reached**. Donor coordination in the health sector is exemplary but has not led to substantially greater engagement by the Government.

#### EC-supported potential for national impact

More recently, and with substantial involvement of EU-PRIME, it has appeared that a more integrative approach between States, LGAs and traditional leaders, together with a greater emphasis on monitoring, has the potential to **support Nigeria in building up a National Primary Health Care System**, which will make it possible again to achieve much better health indices (as before 1990) and to achieve a sustainable and cost-efficient system.

The current institutional set-up is donor-dependent and capacity-building is not sufficiently systemic and focused on improved resource and financial management to achieve cost transparency. To fully immunise a child is estimated to cost US\$22, but the health system needs to look further to all age groups and to remote rural areas. **Without addressing poverty eradication** in a more integrated approach including education, water supply and food security, **little sustainability** will be achieved.

#### Need for more substantial government involvement

The EC intervention has been greatly appreciated and is considered a success, since it demonstrated that routine immunisation systems can work. However, the services have been rather a **substitute for missing Government intervention** and have only partly succeeded in bringing Government structures to a point at which they can fulfil their functions. There is no better return on investment possible for oil-rich Nigeria than to install and maintain an efficient routine immunisation system that prevents massive human costs both to households, which would have to bear the immense cost of nursing disabled family members, and to society at large.

The current immunisation system is considered by international donors to be **costly, inefficient** and dependent on continuous support from donors. Cost sharing between the Federal, State and LGA levels of Government remains problematic. As disease prevention is a public good, which benefits the whole nation (and beyond, as in the case of polio eradication as a *global* goal), the increased reliance on individual States to prioritise routine immunisation cannot be considered a viable approach.

### 3.6 EQ 6 Democracy & Rule of Law

**To what extent has the non-focal support for consolidating democracy and the respect for human rights been conducive to progress in these areas?**

#### 3.6.1 Background

While neither support for the consolidation of democracy (and its deepening through increased participation of the poor in the political processes), nor support for increased respect for human rights in focus forepart of the strategy foci, these objectives are nevertheless essential for the cooperation as well as for the overall framework for relations between the EU and Nigeria. Hence, considerable support for their materialisation has been provided through budget line projects as well through EDF funds for election support.

Democratic governance in Nigeria is being developed on the background of a challenge from the polity's "rentier-state" nature, in which the rulers "do not need the population" since the abundant availability of oil funds reduces the need for raising domestic incomes through taxation. Hence, the corresponding need for creating social consensus through the provision of welfare services (or favours to the "clients" as known from other cooperation States) may also turn out to be reduced. In this way, wealth and poverty may co-exist in ways, which the political system is not able to reconcile, with a risk of conflicts as in the Niger Delta Region.

#### 3.6.2 Findings

##### **JC 6.1: EC support has contributed to increased democratic participation of the poorer parts of the population**

###### **Election support**

From the EDF funds, administered by the UNDP under a Joint Donor Basket Fund, JDBF<sup>44</sup>, the EC supported the conduct of the 2007 elections, the first part of the 2007-2011 electoral cycle including pre-election education undertaken by CSOs, and facilitation of fielding of EU election observers. The evaluation findings on this support, underpinned by the results of evaluation team interviews with stakeholders and independent observers, indicate that it is likely that the CSO participation in the election process had a positive effect on the (otherwise much criticised) elections.

Thus while it has not been possible to find evidence for increased participation of the poor in the elections, there are indications that the pre-election education increased not only the level

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<sup>44</sup> The Joint Donor Basket Fund project was expected to deliver six main outputs, namely to:

- Establish financial mechanisms and operational arrangements to support Nigeria's 2007 elections;
- Provide advisory and operational support as and when requested by INEC;
- Build operational human resource capacity in INEC;
- Promote citizen participation in the electoral process;
- Promote gender equity in the electoral process
- Facilitate Nigerian Civil Society observation of the electoral process.

of voting by women, including that in the Muslim parts of Nigeria, but also their more general participation in the political processes.<sup>45</sup>

In line with the opinion of independent observers<sup>46</sup>, there appears to be a general view shared by EU Member States that the 2007 elections were rigged; and the Independent National Election Committee, INEC, has been subject to strong criticism for its conduct of them.<sup>47</sup> Against this background the NGO-coalition, Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), advocates that the planned EC support for the second election round in 2011 should not be given. However, the final evaluation report on the election support concludes that the support should continue provided certain conditions are fulfilled:

*“There is a weak legal and institutional framework for election administration in Nigeria that necessarily justifies continued support to key election administration bodies to actively engage in the electoral reform process. ...The impact of JDBF assistance to CSOs was much more positive than that to INEC, as most stakeholders have confirmed. ... INEC received a majority of the funding but with the least effect, while CSOs made good use of the relatively small grants they received. This calls for a rethinking on the extent of future engagement with the various democratic institutions in Nigeria. It is recommended that more support be provided to CSOs and political parties, while support to INEC should be carefully assessed in terms of its necessity and usefulness. An appropriate assessment of the election and political environment, as well as of its stakeholders, is essential for future programming. ... Similarly, an appreciation of the rich diversity of the Nigerian society need be integrated in a more comprehensive manner.”<sup>48</sup>*

### **Support for the Assemblies**

No evidence is found for an impact of EC support for the Federal and State assemblies under the Quick Start Package in terms of increased participation by the poorer parts of the population, whether through consultative arrangements between the members of the assemblies and their constituencies or between the assemblies and civil society.

The latest monitoring report comments, in line with team interviews with CSO-stakeholders:

*“The core of other state assemblies does not know anything of the project and could not express their interest in participation. ...The impact so far is negligible. Donors should discuss how the democratic system in Nigeria can better be supported and how the measures including to the civil society can make an impact. More coordination can bring a much greater effect than isolated, badly operated singular projects with great plans but little or no results.”*

### **Participation in Political Processes by the Poor**

The formal political processes do not seem to represent the poorer part of the population very explicitly. Against this background, the CSOs can be said to represent the political opposition and the “political mobilisation” of the poorer social strata. Through its support to CSOs from EDF funds and budget lines, the EC has contributed to their political representation. The

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<sup>45</sup> Information from a representative for the CSO-coalition, Transition Monitoring Group, TMG, which was in charge of EC-funded pre-election education.

<sup>46</sup> From the press and the NGO-community

<sup>47</sup> The evaluation team missed its foreseen meeting with INEC, where it would have defended its position. When the team arrived at INEC, with a representative for the NPC, which had arranged for it, INEC was not aware of the meeting.

<sup>48</sup> Mid Term Review for Support to Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2006-11 (October 2007)

measures included support for the role of civil society in the “control-from-below” mechanisms in focal sectors, in particular under the SRIP project in focal sector 2. This support has provided some contribution to increased democratic participation by the poorer parts of the population, particularly in the budgetary processes.

### **JC 6.2: EC support has contributed to the enhancement of the rule of law**

Support for the respect for human rights, including the rule of law and some support for the media, has mainly taken place through budget line projects. However, beyond the output level, which is covered by project monitoring and reporting, the outcomes, sustainability and impact of this support appeared not to be well known. While the CSP for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF mentions a planned EC-supported Nigeria Foundation for Human Rights, the possible plans for such an institution appear to have escaped the institutional EC memory, both in Abuja and in Brussels.

The EDF-funded support to the EFCC has contributed to the fight against corruption and hence has enhanced the rule of law in this field, apparently resulting in a consequently increased level of the esteem in which the judiciary is held.<sup>49</sup> Rule-of-law-related projects are accorded higher priority within the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.

#### **3.6.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

There are indications that EC election support through CSOs has contributed to increased political participation by women, but not to better political articulation of the interests of the poor sections of the population. However, EC-SRIP support has provided some contribution towards this objective. Support through thematic budget lines for respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law has generated considerable outputs, but little is known about impact.

#### **Democracy Support, Political Parties and Civil Society**

In line with the above-mentioned recommendation of the Final Draft Evaluation Report on the Election Support, the evaluation team sees good reason to recall that the **political parties** are, strictly speaking, also part of civil society and hence to be considered eligible for possible support. In a context where popular confidence in the possible benefit from the political processes appears limited, and where it has become common to hear that “*it might be better to return to military dictatorship than to continue with corrupt politicians*”, there is reason to support the consolidation of democracy including working with the parties, as is the case in other cooperation countries.

Political articulation and manifestation may take place to a large extent through a multitude of both new and traditional civil society organisations, which informally serve as a “political opposition” in the light of the apparently limited representation of the poor by the Federal and State assemblies. Even so, the institutions of the democratic political system need to be regarded seriously as a cooperation channel.

<sup>49</sup> See annex 5, Information Matrix Judgment Criteria 6.2

### **More Knowledge of Impact of Support**

The quite considerable support through thematic budget lines for **civil society**, working with the political articulation of the population, is supposed to have had a positive effect on their participation in democratic life, but so far no established knowledge of the results of the individual projects beyond the output level has been found to exist.

### **Coordination to Enhance Synergy**

There is reason to expect that such support could be made more effective through enhanced coordination, which facilitated strengthened synergy between the EDF interventions and the budget line projects. At present, the ECD's effective knowledge of the impact of the budget line projects appears limited<sup>50</sup>, while in EC HQ knowledge of the interplay between the budget line projects and other EC interventions in Nigeria is also limited<sup>51</sup>.

## **3.7 EQ 7 Regional Integration**

**To what extent has EC support contributed to enhance Nigeria's trade and participation in regional integration?**

### **3.7.1 Background**

By any standards, Nigeria must be recognised as a major power in Africa and the dominant regional power, representing over 50% of West Africa's GDP and population although major infrastructural and bureaucratic problems seriously inhibit trade in non-petroleum products. Agriculture, once a source of important export commodities, has become an import sector since Nigeria needs to import food for subsistence. Neighbouring countries acquired opportunities for export of food commodities to Nigeria, and Lagos, the single most important port in West Africa, further increased its importance as Nigeria developed into a huge market for imported goods as a result of its increased oil returns and the size and dynamics of its urban centres, particularly Lagos, Ibadan and Kano. Nigeria is the most important market in West Africa.

The region benefits from the size and competitiveness of the Nigerian market and Nigeria benefits from its trade with the region. Road transport covers more than 90% of all trade and the condition of the road and border infrastructure and associated modalities became increasingly important, but nonetheless lag behind in their development of essentials. International road transport in West Africa is characterised by multiple checkpoints with inefficiency, incompatibility of Customs regulations and procedures for transit goods, lack of coordination between stakeholders, and varying axle load regulations (largely ignored by many trucks, leading to premature deterioration and collapse of poorly-maintained road pavements). Free movement of people and goods is thus impeded leading to delays and increased costs, which in turn reduce competitiveness and compromise regional integration.

<sup>50</sup> To be regarded in the light of an understaffed ECD. A "Civil Society expert position" had been vacant for 2 years at the time of the preparatory visit of the team-leader of this evaluation, May 2009.

<sup>51</sup> The AIDCO Operations Quality Support Unit is working with initiatives to enhance the coherence between thematic support through budget lines and other EC intervention.

Availability and completeness of information on West African regional trade and integration topics continues to be an issue, especially for Nigeria where non-petroleum trade remains non-priority, largely informal and inadequately considered in relation to its socio-economic importance for jobs, supply and production. Moreover its growing importance for reducing poverty and for supporting sustainable development is largely ignored. Statistics do not demonstrate the dynamics and terminology is used ambiguously, the term “regional integration” covering integration of the West African economy as a whole into world markets as well as intra-regional trade, policies and strategies. More consideration is given to the wider region than to concrete cross-border issues or progress in cooperation.

### 3.7.2 Findings

#### **JC 7.1: EC support has strengthened Nigeria’s capacity to contribute to regional trade**

Despite problems of incomplete information on regional issues, it was confirmed by interviewees<sup>52</sup> that EC support to Nigeria is contributing to its capacity to contribute to regional trade, yet the political will in Nigeria to make use of this capacity does not appear strong. Huge oil production, corruption and poor economic management have led to under-investment in local production (especially agriculture – in the 1970s Nigeria was a major exporter of agricultural products; today it is a major importer) and general imports are increasing. As a result, trade restrictions, bans and high tariffs have been introduced by Nigeria since 2002 (in disregard of WTO obligations). This has negatively affected regional trade and encouraged smuggling and corruption.

There is a lack of complementarity and coherence between regional and national 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programmes; for example, the transport sector was rightly a focal sector in most NIPs but surprisingly not for Nigeria, nor was the trade sector focal for Nigeria in the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. The recent Evaluation of EC Regional Cooperation to West Africa (May 2008) explicitly formulated a main recommendation that, “*The EC must increase both the complementarity and the coherence between its regional and national programmes. In addition, the EC must carry out a complete review of operational strategies and existing plans for its support to the region (both countries and regional integration bodies) in order to ensure that the planned strategies and actions (including institutional development) will produce the results necessary for attainment of the integration objectives at all levels*”. This holds particularly true for Nigeria.

Given the size of its population and economy, Nigeria has a key role to play regionally and continentally. Thus, Nigeria’s commitment to the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations is pivotal for the region. Over the past decade Nigeria has renewed and strengthened her commitment to, the **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**, and thus to the **EPA negotiations** with the EU (which are established ECOWAS policy). However, ECOWAS has certain flaws that inhibit negotiation, such as the lack of organisational resources, serious institutional and organisational problems, regional political instability, lack of diversified economies, and arguably some distrust between Anglophone and Francophone countries. The EPA negotiations do not appear to enjoy high political priority in Nigeria; some members of government, press and civil society continue to inveigh against EPA and progress has also been delayed by unilateral trade restrictions

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<sup>52</sup> In particular by representatives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECOWAS, EU Member States and the Delegation of the European Commission



imposed by Nigeria (in disregard of WTO obligations) as a response to under-investment in national production, which has led to increased imports.

There has been some reduction in such trade restrictions, import and export bans and high tariffs but many remain in place. There is thus little evidence to show increasing shares of ECOWAS or WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union - UEMOA in French) countries in Nigerian exports or imports. But this is exactly where the focus has to be, and EC support is positively engaged. Such support will also contribute to increasing cooperation and harmonisation between the two regional organisations (ECOWAS and WAEMU) which, with different Member States and history, still remain more apart than increasingly integrated, an objective, which for the benefit of the region has to be achieved sooner rather than later. The EC support positively encourages harmonisation.

Border controls and procedures are gradually improving as a result of the EC support (through provision of EC support for information and communication technology [ICT] for trade facilitation and regional transportation, which includes provision of 'one-stop' border posts). However, ECOWAS and WAEMU have different speeds for regional convergence and there are continuing doubts about the motivation of those regional organisations to prioritise their mutual policies for regional integration, economic and monetary union, free movement of people and goods and improved border controls.

One of the major constraints of these regional programmes has been that the regional cooperation organisation has been the party requesting assistance for developing new border facilities or technical assistance to introduce new regimes, rather than this being specifically requested by the implementing parties such as the border organisations. The result is that the implementing parties have sometimes not fully 'bought into' the proposed development and, in some cases, they were not even consulted. The result is difficulties in translating the cooperation bodies' concept into physical infrastructure or modern operating practices on the ground.

### **JC 7.2: EC support has strengthened Nigeria's capacity of peace keeping and conflict prevention regionally and nationally**

Regarding EC support for Nigeria's capacity to support peacekeeping and conflict prevention, no direct linkage is evident between regional and national levels. The Programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP were insignificantly small, €10m, which represented only 4% of the RIP budget. This allocation increases in the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP to €119m, or 20% of the overall budget. From the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF NIP only the finalisation of border demarcation between Nigeria and the Cameroon was financed; this €2m project was linked to the Bakassi peninsular issues where Nigeria accepted a territorial concession based on the verdict of an international court.

#### **3.7.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

##### **Impact from EC Support**

As a vast market, Nigeria is benefiting from improved interregional trade. Border controls and procedures have gradually improved as a result of the EC support (for example, provision of 'one-stop' border posts was included in the EC support for information and communication technology for trade facilitation and regional transportation).

There was, however, a lack of complementarity and coherence between the regional and national 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programmes. The transport sector, which is rightly a focal sector in many NIPs but this was surprisingly not the case for Nigeria, and the trade sector were included in the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF NIP for Nigeria.

### **More Expression of Nigerian Political Will is Needed**

ECOWAS still greatly lacks the capacity to fulfil its functions from which Nigeria could benefit substantially. However, the political will in Nigeria to make best use of the inherent potential of regional integration did not appear to be strong and the country has only recently started greater engagement in ECOWAS.

Ownership problems in project implementations were persistent owing to lack of involvement of beneficiaries in programming. This contributed to delays in programme implementation, which reduced the positive impact of the EC intervention in respect of regional integration and trade.

## **3.8 EQ 8 Civil Society Strengthening**

**In which ways and to what extent has the overall EC support been conducive to the strengthening of civil society in Nigeria?**

### **3.8.1 Background**

International cooperation with Nigerian NGOs was strongly developed under the military dictatorship in 1990s in support of their fight for democracy. Following the restoration of democracy, civil society seems to have proliferated but as yet no systematic identification and mapping (an “NGO-Directory” as it is known in other countries<sup>53</sup>), has been elaborated<sup>54</sup>. The ECD’s operational knowledge of the Nigerian CSO community seems to be limited to lists of supported CSOs.

### **Large and Uncertain Numbers**

Some 27,000 NGOs are registered with the Corporate Affairs Agency<sup>55</sup>. While this number of organisations must have existed at one time or other given that, according to CSOs met by the evaluation team<sup>56</sup>, registration is a cumbersome and costly procedure, it is nevertheless a fair assumption, based on international experience, that the majority have a limited real-life existence. It can also be assumed that many existing organisations or small groupings have not been registered, so the actual number may be even higher. An indicator of the number of active CSOs was provided in 2008-09 during the launch period of the nationwide EC project, “*Increasing Non-State Actors’ Implementation and Development Expertise*” INSIDE, which

<sup>53</sup> An attempt is made to provide an overview is found in: Sheriffdeen A. Tella and Biodun Onunoyemi: “Non-State Actors in Nigeria: A Sectoral Overview”, 2005, and Identification Fiche for the INSIDE project of January 2006.

<sup>54</sup> In spite of being subject to repression under the military dictatorship, some international observers claim that the Nigerian NGO -community played a greater role in societal life by then, at least partly due to the substantial international support they received.

<sup>55</sup> Interview with the special CSO advisor to the President

<sup>56</sup> Focus group meeting with EC supported NGOs, Abuja

offers support for capacity-building in CSOs. This project was contacted by some 5,000 CSOs<sup>57</sup>, but not all CSOs would have been aware of the existence of INSIDE.

### **Modern Non-Governmental Organisations and Traditional Civil Society**

It is worth mentioning that while the EC documents refer to civil society organisations (CSOs) – or non-state actors (NSAs) – which in the operational Nigerian ECD context cover the same group, most of the organisations referred to are more like NGOs in the sense of small groups of people working for a benevolent cause with external funding, rather than CSOs representing certain sections of the population as in the classical civil society context. However, in addition to this modern NGO community, “*which speak the language of the donors*”, the traditional civil society, which is not registered and with whom the donors seldom operate, should not be forgotten. This includes for example the religious communities, which are very richly represented and are socially and politically important in Nigeria, not least in the Northern Muslim part of the country; trade unions; and traditional village structures.<sup>58</sup>

NGOs will often have a higher score on professionalism and institutional capacity, including use of the Internet for information searches and communication, while being more donor-dependent. Sociologically the NGOs often employ educated young people with remuneration better than is offered in comparable government positions (while the NGOs do not have the same possibilities for informal/illicit side-incomes)<sup>59</sup>. CSOs will often have stronger standing in terms of representing large constituent population segments. In normal, day-to-day language in Nigeria, CSOs are referred to as NGOs; but in line with common EC sector terminology, the term “CSOs” will be used here as the common denominator. NGOs tend to be somewhat individualistic and competitive since they often compete for the same donor funds<sup>60</sup>. While they are numerous, their overall capacity for concerted action appears limited as confirmed in several evaluation focus group meetings with them, as well as by an EC INSIDE pre-study<sup>61</sup>.

Most of the NGOs are based in Lagos or Abuja. Some of these claim national coverage and a certain degree of representation of the larger NGO community, which is difficult to obtain effectively in a setting of Nigeria's size and complexity. In the context of widespread poverty, the CSOs' internal capacity, funds and potential for income generation are limited, regardless of whether they are modern or traditional. The strengthening of organisational viability in a volatile and internally competitive NGO community, which to large extent depends on the availability of external funding, is therefore regarded as an overall objective of EC support.

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<sup>57</sup> Interview with Mr Walter Bresseleers, INSIDE-CTA

<sup>58</sup> The commonly used term “Community-Based Organisations, CBOs”, often refers to traditional civil society

<sup>59</sup> The international pattern, confirmed by CSO-representatives met at focus group meetings in Abuja and Calabar (capital city in Cross River State)

<sup>60</sup> As confirmed e.g. by the Case Study in Osun state.

<sup>61</sup> Sherifdeen A. Tella and Biodun Onunyeji: “Non-State Actors in Nigeria: A Sectoral Overview”, p. 9

## The EC Intervention

In line with overall EC policies, the ECD in Abuja has confirmed the importance it attaches to civil society<sup>62</sup> in general and in relation to specific objectives of the EC cooperation with Nigeria. It has therefore supported the development of Nigerian CSOs, both directly and as a crosscutting CSP element, in the following ways:

- Non-focal EDF funding for overall CSO capacity-building through the project “Increasing Non-State Actors’ implementation and Development Expertise”, INSIDE (€20m), which started September 2008, after long and delayed preparation.<sup>63</sup>
- Support for those CSOs supposed to be agents of “control from below”, which is to serve as a necessary complementary measure to “control from above” through the use of advocacy, lobbying and a “watch-dog” function within the areas of water and sanitation and institutional and financial reform (focal sectors 1 and 2).
- CSOs were supported as part of the Election Support programme.
- Contracting with NGOs as implementing agencies for micro projects is simultaneously indirect support for those NGOs

In addition to the EDF funds, NGOs which are particularly oriented to human rights, democracy and gender issues have been supported from the EIDHR and NGO budget lines in the context of the overall CSP objectives of strengthening democracy and respect for human rights, both directly as an advocate for these values, and indirectly as a tool for empowerment of the poorer sections of the population. This is implemented through calls for proposals, from Brussels for “macro-projects” above €30,000, and from the ECD for “micro projects” (€10,000-30,000), the latter managing an envelope of €900,000 for this purpose.<sup>64</sup>

Most macro-projects are contracted with international NGOs, which subcontract with Nigerian NGOs, while these prefer to go for calls for proposals issued from Abuja “*where a human face can be combined with the process*”. For example, the British NGO Concern Universal has implemented no fewer than five budget line projects in Cross River State. For such NGOs the EC is a much-appreciated funding agency, albeit perceived as having difficult procedures; in particular, allegedly slow disbursement of funds is quite a serious problem within the financial frames of NGOs.<sup>65</sup>

### 3.8.2 Findings

#### JC 8.1: Enhanced internal capacity of civil society organisations as a consequence of the EC support

The EC support has supposedly had a positive impact on the internal capacity of the CSOs, arising from the holding of contracts with the EC, and on their societal standing at large. That is to say, there is reason to believe that a number of Nigerian CSOs have had their internal capacity strengthened as a result of the considerable support from holding contracts with the

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<sup>62</sup> Interview with the ECD head of cooperation and staffs 23-25 May 2009 and JAR 2008.

<sup>63</sup> JAR 2008, p.21: “One major challenge is the time constraint on programme implementation”.

<sup>64</sup> JAR 2008, Annex 5C, p. 48-52 contains a list of ongoing budget line project as per closure of 2008. There are 38 such projects with a total EC contribution of €20,. Of this total the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, EIDHR, funds 7 macro-projects and 22 micro projects. All contract holders are international NGOs. The remainder is financed under NGO co-financing (5), and under the environment, health and NSA budget lines.

<sup>65</sup> Information from the Nigeria Director of Concern Universal, Calabar, Cross River State

EC, or sub-contracts with EC-contracted NGOs, since part of the funding is normally for the core capacity NGOs need to implement the projects (salaries, offices, equipment etc.). Furthermore, a number of budget line projects have aimed directly at capacity-building within Nigerian CSOs. However, evidence on the extent to which such strengthening is of a sustainable nature in a volatile NGO community is scarce.<sup>66</sup>

The **sustainability** as well as the **internal coordination and cohesion** of the CSO community can be expected to have increased for the same reasons as well as - albeit mainly in future - through the influence of the INSIDE project which aims directly at their capacity-building and coordination within parts of the CSO community<sup>67</sup>.

### **JC 8.2: CSOs have strengthened the “control from below”, through the use of advocacy, lobbying and “watch-dogging” within the focal sectors of water & sanitation and institutional and financial reform**

At this stage there is some evidence that CSOs can perform their assumed role in focal sector 2 (institutional and economic reform) but have only very limited capacity to do so in focal sector 1 (WATSAN).

In focal sector 2, the EC intervention has managed to bring together NGOs in budgetary watchdog and lobbying coalitions, which conduct an operational dialogue with the State authorities on the pro-poor aspects of budgets<sup>68</sup>. Their potential for insight in budgeting processes and in public finance management has improved in line with increased transparency on the part of the Government and (supposedly) with several budget line projects aimed both at strengthening their capacity to do so and at increasing their access to the Internet.

It appeared at a focus group meeting with SRIP CSOs in Calabar, as well as from the Preparatory Evaluation Study in Osun state, that the SRIP CSOs in these States had not been contacted by INSIDE, which apparently has not related directly to the core role of the CSOs in focal sectors 1 and 2.

### **JC 8.3: EC support has enhanced civil society contribution to democracy and the respect for human rights**

As mentioned, a considerable number<sup>69</sup> of EC **thematic budget line projects** have supported NGOs supporting democracy and human rights. Through project-specific monitoring reports and evaluations, their outputs are well documented, but so far, little is known about such projects' contribution to CSO sustainability and impact.

#### **Government-CSO Relations**

Traditionally **relations between the CSO community and the Government** are characterised by a certain animosity, exacerbated under the military dictatorship. However, the GoN has recently initiated steps to replace mutual mistrust with a collaborative approach.

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<sup>66</sup> While the above-mentioned recent sector evaluation of EC support to civil society underlines the needs for attempting to answer such questions, it does not contain specific studies on Nigeria

<sup>67</sup> The possible linkage between CSO cooperation with the EC, for example as “control form below” in the focus sectors, remains to be identified.

<sup>68</sup> The Team participated in such a consultation meeting between high-level Cross River State authorities and the SRIP-supported budget coalition of CSOs.

<sup>69</sup> 22 ongoing at the end of 2008. See JAR 2008, p. 48-52, in addition to the earlier projects.

While the GoN is not funding CSOs, it recognises their positive role particularly in community development where they are seen as complementary to LGA, strengthening rather than replacing it. The GoN, therefore, invites active collaboration with CSOs on project initiatives at local level, as institutionalised under the SRIP project in respect of participative budgeting at State level and strengthened interaction between the assemblies and civil society. It is seeking cooperation with the EC in this respect.<sup>70</sup>

It is worth noting that EC support for Nigerian civil society has - unlike in many other cooperation countries - been combined with only limited support for the free **media**, which is surprising given that civil society and the media reinforce each other, at both general and more specific levels. Indeed CSOs informed the team that they have good collaboration with the media and are often given free access to communication channels with a benevolent purpose.<sup>71</sup>

### 3.8.3 Overall Answer to the EQ

The EC support has contributed indirectly to the strengthening of the modern NGO sector of Nigerian civil society through the various above-mentioned interventions in which the NGOs were involved. The recently started INSIDE project can be expected to further enhance the strengthening of their internal capacity.

However, the impact of the support has been reduced by the following factors:

- **Insufficient coordination of the different forms of EDF support for civil society** – where the observed lack of use of the networks created under the SRIP in the INSIDE project serves as an illustration.
- The **ECD's understanding of the nature of the Nigerian CSO community** (NGOs/CSOs, traditional/modern) and knowledge of the specific characteristics of its cooperation partners might have been more refined (including more operational knowledge management in this field, the lack of which may explain the above-mentioned lack of coordination<sup>72</sup>). Such understanding and knowledge would facilitate a more targeted approach to this highly diverse field and perhaps inclusion of some traditional civil society inputs in the projects as well as more coordination and collaboration between the CSOs.
- There appears to have been **little or no coordination of decisions in support of interventions originating from EDF funds and those from Brussels-based thematic budget lines**. Such coordination would allow a higher degree of concerted action and as well as adherence to the same MER procedures, making possible increased and much-needed knowledge of the results of the budget line projects beyond the output level

There appears to be **a need for ECD to reconsider its tacit understanding that the CSOs are in opposition to the authorities**, given the recent initiatives from the Government in favour of more cooperation with CSOs (and of NGO participation in public-private partnerships as experienced in other cooperation countries).

<sup>70</sup> Information received from the office of the Special CSO Advisor to the President, Mr Chudi Akude, Technical Co-ordinator

<sup>71</sup> Focus group meetings, Abuja and Kano

<sup>72</sup> A foreseen ECD MS-secondment position for a civil society officer has been vacant for several years

It is a challenge to identify an appropriate administrative structure to manage properly the large number of small interventions required for effective support to civil society. An ongoing NGO study commissioned by ECD is attempting to remedy some of the shortcomings mentioned.

### 3.9 EQ 9 Micro projects

**To what extent have programmes and projects in non-focal areas including the QSP and micro projects contributed to improvement and sustainability of rural livelihoods?**

#### 3.9.1 Background

In 1999, a Joint Communiqué by the EC and Nigeria specified that development cooperation would resume immediately through a “**Quick Start Package (QSP)**”. The EDF Committee approved support, financed under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, of a total of about €100m. This covered micro project programmes in nine States in the Niger Delta (€63m); small town water supply in three States in the Niger Delta (€15m); economic management capacity-building programme (€10m); support to the National Authorising Officer (NAO) (€6m); and support to national and State assemblies (€6.6m). Within the QSP only the (main) Micro project Programme was to achieve improvements in and sustainability of rural livelihoods<sup>73</sup>. The subsequent answers to EQ 9 focus on that programme.

According to the Lomé Convention micro projects are one of the instruments of the EU/ACP development cooperation in response to the needs of local communities. They are to be undertaken "at the initiative" of local communities which have to "contribute to their implementation" in terms of services, cash or kind. The communities receive assistance through facilitation by CSOs engaged through calls for proposals. In 1999, the EC and the GoN agreed to prioritise the Niger Delta. Two micro project programmes (MPP3 and MPP6) started in 2001 and 2004 respectively. The overall objective of the MPPs was to improve living standards in the poor communities of the region, thereby contributing to the reduction of poverty, social tension and crisis in the Niger Delta.

<sup>73</sup> The programme “Small Towns Water Supply in three states in the Niger Delta” targeted small towns, not rural livelihoods.

**Table 12: Micro Project Programmes (MPP) in the Niger Delta**

	MPP3	MPP6	MPP9
States covered	3 States: Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers	6 States: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo, Ondo	9 States: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, Rivers
Estimated population	9.4 million	20 million	30 million
Targeted population	n/a	n/a	n/a
Purpose	Implement basic infrastructure, support income generating activities		Provide models to support reforms towards transparency and participation by States and LGAs
CSO selection	Done by the regional office (PMU)	Done by State MP Office (SMO) after assessment of CSO	To be done through call for proposals
MP selection			
N° of projects targeted (FA)	5,000 MP ranging from €1,000 to €20,000 Mainly in the sectors of water supply, village transport, health systems, income generation and micro-credit schemes.	10,000 reduced to 1500 (mid-term review)	1200
Project Number:	7 ACP UNI 51	7 ACP UNI 59	9 ACP UNI 017
Date Financing Agreement	22/03/2000	09/10/2001	03/08/2007
Start Date	26/11/2001	06/05/2003	12/04/2009
End Date	31/12/2006	31/04/2008	11/04/2012 (expected)
EDF contribution	€21m	€42m	€45,5m

Source: own compilation

### 3.9.2 Findings

#### **JC 9.1: The institutional, managerial and human resources and procedural capacities of EC and national institutions facilitated implementation of QSP**

Refer to the information matrix for details regarding the answers to this JC.

The implementation of the QSP was not an easy task. The package was created in order to facilitate the resumption of EC aid after a period of interruption of EC support, without having to wait for the elaboration and approval of the new Nigeria-EC cooperation strategy. Yet no specific adaptation of the procedural capacities of the EC and national institutions was foreseen to facilitate “quick” QSP implementation.

However, continuing to support some NGOs projects under thematic budget lines was a faster approach. Budget lines key strength lies in the scope for providing assistance independently of the consent of third-country governments and other public authorities.

#### **JC 9.2: EC non-focal interventions have contributed to improved rural access to economic and social infrastructure, to improved agricultural production and encouraged rural private sector development**

The answer to this JC requires a thorough analysis of the successive MPP programmes and their developments, whose main aim was, in a region affected by conflicts and crises, to support improved rural access to economic and social infrastructure, improved agricultural production and to encourage rural private sector development:



### **MPP3, Micro projects programmes in 3 states of the Niger Delta**

MPP 3, the first micro project programme in three States of the Niger Delta, charged NGOs with undertaking a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in order to enable each community to identify its 'needs'.

MPP3 Final Report and Final Evaluation Report (FER) provided some information about results accomplished. The FER noted that 'Most important is that youth and women in different groups have risen to be heard and participate in taking decisions that concern their welfare'. However, there is no mention of any survey carried out to assess beneficiaries' satisfaction levels.

The FER mentioned that 236 primary schools were either constructed or renovated; 103 community health centres and 102 village markets were built; 73 resource centres and civic halls were provided; 39 footbridges were constructed; and 340 water boreholes (including a few mono-pumps) were sunk. According to MPP3 reports about 3.5 million people have benefited from the programme, out of a total population of 9.4 million in the project area. This suggests that over 37% of the population of three States have benefited, directly or indirectly<sup>74</sup>.

Monitoring reports gave high ratings<sup>75</sup> in general, particularly on **impact**: the overall objective was to 'improve the living standards in poor communities in three States, reducing poverty, social tension and crisis.' Little doubt remains regarding a degree of direct impact on poverty alleviation through increased access to basic services (water, health, education, mobility) and augmentation of sources of income (especially via rural markets). It is at the same time realistic to admit that MPP3's impact in terms of poverty alleviation in the region has remained rather limited, as MPP3 only supports one project in each recipient community, thus tackling only one of the numerous daily problems that poor communities are facing.

The level and use of services varies according to several aspects relating to the sector: health and education services do require the support of the line ministries, in terms both of staff and of running costs. Nigerian institutions in this sector have provided the expected support to the programme. Yet, the quality of this provision was generally poor. While the involvement of the LGAs was limited because they were not involved in the process, at Federal level the NAO proved interested in the MPP initiatives. The programme encouraged a change in the traditional scheme of power, especially through its bottom-up approach, sharing the decision-making process with various groups within the local communities.<sup>76</sup> However, the sustainability of such positive impact over time remains weak, owing to the lack of an **exit strategy**.

The non-existence of a properly defined exit strategy to ensure the viability of the implementation process was a deficiency of MPP3. The lack of an appraisal of the conditions for viability has made most MPs particularly fragile and highly dependent on the goodwill and financial capacities of a few individuals.

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<sup>74</sup> It is not known what percentage of the population of 20 million in the six States covered by MPP 6 was targeted, and what percentage effectively benefited directly or indirectly from those projects. As regards MPP 9 no target in terms of percentage of the total population of the Niger Delta region, estimated around 30 million, has been set up: MPP targets are expressed in terms of number of micro projects, not population.

<sup>75</sup> Impact was rated "b" (good) in MPP3 the ex post MR. This rate was however subjective as there was no tool in place to measure impact effectively. Projects OVI had been limited to physical outputs and number of beneficiaries, and did not take into consideration the quality of the MP or their potential viability, which proved fragile for a good number of them.

<sup>76</sup> Ex post Monitoring Report (MR)

As regards a **reduction of tension and crisis**, the impact remains questionable. Where local and micro conflicts were concerned and where they arose from a lack of access to services or opportunities, the MPP3 did very well in some cases, reducing tension and mitigating the causes of conflict.<sup>77</sup>

### **MPP6, Micro projects programmes in 6 states of the Niger Delta**

MPP6 seems to have had better results than MPP3. Beneficiaries of the successful MPP6 micro projects visited were satisfied. However, **project design** was in some cases unrealistic: for example, some maternity health centres were too spacious in relation to population needs, while at the same time construction was of poor quality. On the other hand, some projects perfectly fit the population needs, for example solar water pumps.

It was not easy to measure **efficiency**, owing to the lack of applied cost-benefit analysis. The amount of funding devoted to a number of projects was too small to ensure their sustainability, as the mechanisms for further management proved weak or absent. There was a general lack of ownership by some stakeholders: the states were not involved in the programme, LGAs only occasionally.

**Results** measured focused on outputs: number of communities supported, payments made, etc.. Precise results observed on a case-by-case basis cannot be generalised to draw conclusions at higher than community level. Sustainability, not guaranteed, depends on institutional, financial, technical capacity of supported communities beyond programme termination.

According to MPP6 Final Report dated August 2009 the tentative number of projects suggested by the TA was 12,000 with a cost per project estimated between €1,000 and €35,000. However, as the work started it became clear that implementing such a large number of projects in the communities was beyond the logistical capability of the TA. Overall, 1,920 projects were executed during the life of the programme. The largest number was in education (571 projects), followed by health (446 projects), water and sanitation (432 projects) and income generation (325 projects).

As MPP6 started (in 2003) while MPP3 was still being implemented, not all the lessons from MPP3 could be transferred to MPP6: no mechanism was put in place to measure the impact of MPP interventions on the communities supported, whether in absolute terms or relatively speaking (that is, in comparison with communities not supported). According to the MPP6 Final Report (August 2009): *'MPP6 has strengthened farmer groups and associations, and improved the capacity of programme staff to implement rural development projects. The implementation of agro-processing projects and micro-irrigation projects has contributed to improved productivity, food security and increased cash flow of the beneficiaries. The provision of water boreholes has reduced rampant water borne diseases, improved the level of domestic hygiene and facilitated the school attendance of children. The construction of a large number of markets has increased the economic activities in many communities and the transport component has provided more trade opportunities for communities.'*<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> MPP3 ex post monitoring report, 25/09/2009

<sup>78</sup> Source: MPP6 Final Report

However, the evaluation team's field visit to a number of MPP6 sites in Cross River State<sup>79</sup> provided a more mixed picture of results attained and potential impact, as some micro projects had been abandoned or some of their components were out of use. In one village, the toilets<sup>80</sup> were out of use, and the population had no access to clean water. The lack of an exit strategy reduced **sustainability**.

One of the OVIs of achievement of MPP6's overall objective was that "social tension and conflicts in the six states will be reduced by 40% between 1990 and the end of 2008". It was not stated how exactly such an OVI would be measured and the Final Report does not provide any information on that issue. However, an indication of the limited effect of the MPPs in achieving this objective is the fact that the crisis in the Niger Delta appears to have escalated between 1999 and now, in spite of the funds spent.

### **MPP9, Micro projects programmes in 9 states of the Niger Delta**

MPP9 was to remedy the deficiencies of MPP3/MPP6 (an annex to the FA "lessons learned" draws lessons from MPP3 and the MPP6 MTR). While being financed under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF (2002-2007), it will in fact be managed over the period 2009-2012, that is the period normally covered by the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF (2008-20013). MPP9 is a programme of the "**old generation**" which is not necessary in line with the latest developments in Nigeria-EC cooperation: in particular, "Private indirect decentralised operation", implemented by a PMU located in Cross River State and covering the nine Niger Delta states, is considered by various partners as an obsolete implementation modality, as it does not facilitate Nigerian ownership.

The main improvements in programme design, as compared to MPP3/MPP6, are:

The reflection in the overall objective statement of gender and local development governance issues in the context of achieving the MDGs; *and*

Involvement of LGAs: community participation is only possible when LGAs indicate their willingness to participate in the programme, and their contribution to costs is 25% of the total.

This intended to ensure that all local development partners would be involved, thus creating better conditions for project impact and sustainability than previously.

### **JC 9.3: Micro project programmes have promoted transparency and accountability in use of resources and contributed to conflict resolution and prevention**

MPP3, MPP6 and MPP9 implementation instruments were based on transparent calls for tender. MPP3 and MPP6 gave rise to projects in which respective roles of state, local government, community, NSAs were defined. All projects were run in full transparency towards all stakeholders. Working together on a common project developed cooperation links at local/community level that did not necessarily exist before. Common work contributed to conflict prevention and resolution. The sustainability of such results already achieved will depend on the capacity of stakeholders to maintain the links, around the projects, beyond EC presence.

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<sup>79</sup> The evaluation team visited only MPP6 sites, as the field visit to the Niger Delta was restricted to Cross River State.

<sup>80</sup> Akugon Sanitation (VIP toilets). There were 4 sets of VIP toilets each with 5 compartments located in 4 different places across the community. One unit was randomly selected for inspection and found to be badly constructed and not in use. The location was in a remote area with difficult access, and built behind somebody's house with almost no access. The toilets were never used, their surroundings were very dirty, walls had large cracks, doors were broken and they were not expected to last any longer. They were judged to be a waste of funds. (Source: Completion Report)

## JC 9.4: Adequate integration of crosscutting issues

The MPP programmes have devoted considerable attention to cross cutting issues, in particular with respect to gender issues and environmental issues. Yet at stake is the sustainability of the results achieved in these fields, which is not guaranteed.

### 3.9.3 Overall Answer to the EQ

The Quick Start Package contributed positively to the improvement and sustainability of rural livelihoods through its micro projects programme for three States in the Niger Delta region, **MPP3**. However, it could have had a greater impact, not least by the inclusion of exit strategies.

Similarly, the subsequent **MPP6** programme had, according to monitoring and evaluation data, a significant positive impact on rural livelihoods, whereas the project site visits of the evaluation team gave rise to a mixed picture of the sustainability of the micro projects, which would also have benefited from more elaborate exit strategies.

The recently started (after heavy delays) **MPP9** programme is intended to draw on the lessons from its forerunners, not least regarding the inclusion of Local Government in the nine Delta States now covered.

Part of the rationale behind the three programmes was the need for **mitigation of social unrest in the Niger Delta Region**. To the extent that the programmes have had a sustainable impact, this has served the objective of social peace, but it has not been possible to establish a direct linkage. This might have been easier had there been a stronger connection between these programmes and State and local development plans. The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF aims to focus more directly on enhancing livelihoods in this Region.

## 3.10 EQ 10 “3Cs”

**To what extent has the Commission’s support to Nigeria been coordinated, coherent with and complementary to other policies and actions of the European Commission and other donors?**

### 3.10.1 Background

Nigeria is an unusual cooperation country due, first, to the relatively limited weight of international cooperation which accounts for less than 1% of GDP; second, to its status both as a regional power with an influence on peace and security in Africa and as one of the world’s leading oil exporters; and, third, to the size of its population. As a result, the number of bilateral donors in Nigeria (see Annex 2 on the Nigerian Background) is limited. In addition to the EC, the most important are the UK and the USA. Together with the UNDP/UN, the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank (AfDB), these constitute the core of the donor community.

While 19 of the 27 EU Member States (MS) have been represented in Nigeria, for most of them development cooperation is limited or non-existent, their presence being more by reason of economic and political interests relating to energy supply, international and Nigerian

security issues, and migration issues including human trafficking and other international organised crime<sup>81</sup>.

### **3.10.2 Findings**

#### **JC 10.1: The EC aid is complementary to aid from EU-member states and other donors.**

It appears that the EC cooperation with Nigeria was not explicitly complementary to the MS cooperation, especially to that of DFID, the only MS cooperation partner with a large presence in Nigeria, which to a large extent covered the same sectors. Also, in relation to other cooperation partners, most working in the same main areas related to service provision and governance, there appears to have been no explicitly applied complementarity.

Still, complementarity was applied in practice, for example through the EC and DFID working in different cooperation States. On the Census programme, there was good complementarity since DFID provided satellite images while the EC covered the remuneration of the enumerators.

#### **JC 10.2: Objectives of EC development interventions and those of the other Community policies (*particular in the fields of migration, human trafficking, crime, peace and security*) converge in their intent towards Nigeria**

It was found that the EC cooperation with Nigeria is fully convergent with other relevant EC/EU policies in relation to Nigeria<sup>82</sup>. The overall cooperation objectives of improving public service delivery and ameliorating poverty serve to reduce the pressure, which increases such problems as human trafficking and other international organised crime and to reduce migration, to the extent livelihoods are improved in Nigeria as a consequence of cooperation.

Specifically the (so far limited) EC cooperation directed to strengthening of the Nigerian justice system works towards a reduction in human trafficking and other crime. Support for democracy, human rights and governance reforms tend to consolidate democratic values in Nigeria. The micro projects in the Niger Delta Region tend to reduce the level of internal tension in this oil-producing area, thus increasing the security of energy supply. Trade negotiations and EC support for Nigerian participation in West African integration process tend to stimulate regional economic progress as well as Nigerian participation in international trade in non-oil products.

As expressed in interviews with their local representatives, the MS would like to see the overall EC policies towards Nigeria reflected even more strongly in the cooperation. For that reason they are satisfied with the new Strategy for the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, which emphasises trade and security-related issues in the Niger Delta Region to a higher extent than under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. The MS participated in the elaboration of the EC strategy.

Apart from overall support for the restoration of democracy, no instances of a common political agenda, concerted action or agreed division of labour between the EC and the MS have been identified so far. According to the ECD, part of the reason may be that the MS tend to pursue their own national interests, which may not necessarily be convergent with the EC objectives for the cooperation.

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<sup>81</sup> For example, earlier Swedish cooperation with Nigeria was recently stopped.

<sup>82</sup> Joint Communiqué

### **JC 10.3: The EC and the member states have established mechanisms for the coordination of their aid to Nigeria**

The EC has effective coordination in particular with the UN organisations represented in Nigeria, which have been implementing large projects such as support for the Census and, on behalf of the EU, for the elections. Generally, the international cooperation partners, including the EC and the relevant MS, meet regularly for deliberations on cooperation with Nigeria. However, this does not automatically imply coordination and alignment of efforts in line with the Paris Declaration. As indicated above, the greatest coordination potential for the EC among the MS appears to be with DFID, which works with similar objectives in the same sectors as the EC.

So far, however, this potential has not been very much exploited. According to EC interviews<sup>83</sup>, part of the reason for this is bad timing in the sense that DFID had recently elaborated a new strategy for its own operations at the time of the conception of the CSP for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. But according to interviews with DFID and other cooperation partners, the reason is more simply, in their view, that they regard the EC as a somewhat closed and secretive partner which participates in the coordination meetings not very openly or actively, and they also have reservations about the adequacy and the quality of the staffing of the ECD.

While the ECD does not share this opinion, emphasising its longstanding prioritisation of donor coordination, it does admit that a longstanding management vacancy may have reduced the inputs it provided to the donor community.<sup>84</sup>

The most important step towards donor coordination in Nigeria so far is the adoption in July 2009 of a Joint Country Partnership Strategy for 2010-2013 by the AfDB, DFID, the World Bank and USAID. Given the UN cannot join such a strategy owing to its universal nature, it comprises all major donors except the EC, which in this context has defined itself as a multilateral donor with constraints similar to those of the UN. The non-participation of the EC has caused some surprise within the group of participants, according to the team interviews with them.

However, the EC position is explained in the 2008 Joint Annual Report:

*“WB, DFID, USAID and AfDB plan to have a common Country Partnership Strategy for 2010-2013. The three main pillars are improving governance, sustaining non-oil growth, and improving human development. Analysis and response strategy are close to those from EC cooperation. EC was not able to be part of it due to its own constraints: the link made with the political dialogue and the specific format to respect the CSP. The idea is to develop an overarching document with the government, which could be used as reference document by all donors (National Development Partnership Framework, NDPF). National Planning Commission and Ministry of Finance are supporting that process.”*

The same Report also states that *“EC programmes in Nigeria are aligned with the country strategy. The lack of a real National Development Plan is an obstacle for the improvement of aid effectiveness, to support alignment and complementarity of donors' activities.”*

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<sup>83</sup> Dev D, 11 June 2009

<sup>84</sup> The ECD Head of Cooperation also served as de facto Head of Delegation over most of a 3-year period 2007-09.

### **JC 10.4: The value added of EC-activities in relation to European bilateral cooperation is visible**

According to the ECD, EC value added arises from the EC not being tied to particular national interests in, for example, energy supply or migration, thus enabling the EC, more than the MS, to support Nigeria in such essential but politically sensitive areas as the census, the election cycle or the promotion of peace and stability in the Niger Delta area. In this context, any EC added value that materialises may not consist so much in coordinating and facilitating cooperation as in “reminding” EU Member States of the development needs of Nigeria and in maintaining the focus of cooperation with Nigeria on poverty orientation.

However, according to interviews with MS local representatives, only limited added value from the EC cooperation was evident, owing to what they saw as limited communication from ECD and the latter’s less than perfect performance. They did not share the argument about the EC having proved better at coping with politically-sensitive areas, being quite sceptical about the implementation of the support for the CENSUS-Initiative and for the elections, and also to some extent about the support for the EFCC. The ECD found that such statements did not reflect the general position of the MS community in Nigeria.

The evaluation team found that the potential EC added value in highlighting the poverty focus of cooperation with Nigeria and in addressing politically-sensitive issues remains important, since such issues might otherwise be sidelined by the EU Member States’ pursuit of their bilateral interests.

Regarding specific development issues relating to the fight against poverty and for the MDGs, no EC value added to EU Member States’ support has materialised. One finding regarding regional cooperation was that, although the EC brings specific experience and large resources to regional support, there was little or no evidence that such added value has yet materialised. In a similar way it was found that, as regards the micro project programmes, the EC’s contribution to improving rural livelihoods adds value to the support provided by the EU Member States.

#### **3.10.3 Overall Answer to the EQ**

The EC support to Nigeria was **fully convergent** with other relevant EC/EU policies in relation to Nigeria.

There appears to have been no overall **complementarity** with the support from other cooperation partners, although complementarity was evident in relation to DFID.

**Coordination** mechanisms with the other cooperation partners existed, this being a priority for the ECD. But according to those partners, the ECD was not very active in the coordination efforts.

In contrast with the ECD, local representatives of the EU Member States interviewed by the Team found only limited **added value** from the EC cooperation. There was no consensus among the Member States about the adequacy of EC support of a political nature, particularly in relation to the elections. Hence, the ECD needs to prioritise stronger communication with the Member States on the political background for, and the importance of, a poverty-focus in their relations with Nigeria.

In the field of peace and security, there appears to be a case for a future **common political agenda** and concerted action, given the high convergence of interests and the politically sensitive nature of the issues, which the EC may be in a better position to handle than the individual Member States.



## 4 Conclusions

The Conclusions are clustered into four categories: i) General Approach and Strategy Design; ii) Impact in the Main Interventions Sectors; iii) EC Profile and Visibility; and iv) Crosscutting Issues. The evaluation team considers four conclusions from the first three categories to be the most important. They are presented in Section 4.1. Additional conclusions follow in section 4.2.

For each conclusion a table presents the team's assessment of its importance (rated as follows: XXX = very high, XX = high, X = moderate); the strength of supporting evidence (XXX = high, XX = good, X = limited); the possibility of generalising the conclusions as Lessons; the Evaluation Questions to which they are referring; which recommendations (if any) refer to each conclusion; and which principal conclusions and those per sector relate to each other.

### 4.1 Principal Conclusions

#### General Approach and Strategy Design

**Conclusion 1:** The overall impact of the EC-intervention in Nigeria has been reduced by low pro-poor effectiveness, low time-efficiency and by complicated Strategy design.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Further conclusion
1	XXX	XXX	Yes	EQ 1, 2	1, 6	5

#### *Justification*

While the ECD managed impressive delivery under difficult conditions, not least due to very flexible use of the Strategy, the overall effectiveness of the EC intervention was low in terms of results with tangible benefits for the poor. In addition, time-efficiency was low, illustrated by a low delivery rate and heavy implementation delays.

The reasons for this were found on both sides: on the EC side first in procedures, which the partners considered as cumbersome, and second in the composition of the ECD, the staffing of which did not appear fully adequate to the tasks; and on the Nigerian side a reported lack of effective active ownership, GoN officials appearing to lack appropriate incentives, resulting in slow procedures. Between the two parties communication was not optimal.

At design level, the Strategy was excessively ambitious and complicated in its requirement for simultaneous success for reform processes in two different sectors, insufficient account being taken of the incentives needed for the change agents.

#### Impact in the Main Interventions Sectors

**Conclusion 2:** The more successful interventions in terms of pro-poor impact have been those with a more direct relationship to the end-beneficiaries.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Further conclusion
2	XXX	XX	Yes	EQ 3, 4, 5, 9	2, 3, 7, 9	6 - 10

### *Justification*

Within the main cooperation areas, the more successful in terms of delivering results for the benefit of the poor were **immunisation, micro projects and support for the Anti-Corruption Unit, EFCC**. Common to these was a more direct approach to the end-beneficiaries. In contrast, the results of interventions with an indirect approach, where poor results depended on lengthy processes through the Nigerian systems, represented a mixed picture: the **institutional and financial reform project** produced certain results, particularly in improving the budget processes in the cooperation States, and their transparency. The intervention in the **WATSAN** sector produced only limited results. The results of the support for the **Census** have been contested and there is still no clarity about the further use of the outputs.

**Conclusion 3:** The impact of the interventions relating to the Nigerian political system and civil society could have been enhanced by more strongly applied, realistic knowledge of them.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Further conclusion
3	XXX	X	Yes	EQ 6,8	4, 10	9

### *Justification*

The results of the **interventions of a political (in a broad sense) nature** present a mixed picture. As regards **elections**, the desirability of supporting reportedly rigged elections through INEC is a bone of contention among representatives of the EU Member States, while a positive impact of election support through civil society is uncontested. The (limited) support for the **assemblies** seems to have been a failure.

Regarding the support through thematic budget lines for democracy, human rights and civil society, the results beyond output level have not been identified.

A common denominator for these limitations was ECD's apparent lack of applied realistic knowledge of Nigeria's civil society and political systems.

### **EC profile and visibility**

**Conclusion 4:** There was a potential for a **higher EC profile** in Nigeria in relation to the Nigerian Government, the EU Member States and the international development community.

The **visibility** of EC cooperation in Nigeria appeared adequate but with a scope for strengthening it at the national level.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Further conclusion
4	XXX	XX	No	EQ 1, 3,4,5, 6,8, 10	5	11

### *Justification*

There was a scope for a higher **EC profile** in Nigeria through improved dialogue based on realistic analysis and good communication with the Nigerian authorities, civil society, the population at large, the EU Member States and the international cooperation community.

Among the EC Member States and the donor community at large, there is a need for a higher EC profile in order for the potential EC added value to materialise. Interviewees from both categories were of the opinion that the ECD had not been sufficiently outgoing and communicative in coordination forums.

They also had reservations about the adequacy and competence of the ECD staffing, which they saw as the main reason for the perceived “closed and secretive nature” of the ECD. In particular, they drew attention to an alleged tendency, during the period under evaluation, for the ECD to “express everything in technical terms” and not to apply the necessary political analyses sufficiently.

The EC cooperation would also have benefited from a more active high-level policy dialogue with the Nigerian counterpart.

The **visibility** of the EC cooperation in Nigeria appears to have been adequate and to have made significant progress recently. Yet it could have been enhanced through diversification of visibility measures and through measures with more impact at national level. This includes, not least, greater use of development support communication in order to reach out to the poorer parts of the population and civil society. Such action is foreseen in 10<sup>th</sup> CSP, which envisages collaboration with mass media in order to increase public awareness of governance issues and to enhance the impact of development projects.

## 4.2 Further Conclusions

### General Approach and Strategy Design

**Conclusion 5:** The **EC-strategy** was relevant in relation to its objectives and the Nigerian partners appreciated the subsequent intervention. However, the strategy proved not very realistic and it might have been appropriate to revise it thoroughly. Its implementation might have been strengthened by wider use of development support communication.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
5	X	XX	No	EQ 1, 2	1	1

#### *Justification*

The Nigerian partners appreciated the cooperation with, and the responsiveness of, the EC. Their main reservation was what they perceived as excessively meticulous procedures. The Strategy was relevant in relation to the overall EC and Nigerian objectives of fighting poverty.

However, the concrete **design** underestimated the difficulties of implementation. It was assumed that the availability of additional EC funds for the State budgets in the focal sectors would be enough to create the political incentive for taking forward reforms. However, such an assumption proved insufficient against the background of slow delivery. The overall **rate of disbursement** of committed funds under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was 55% by end-2008. In consequence, the Strategy was not very effective in terms of results produced but rather proved itself vulnerable to unrealistic assumptions and unforeseen difficulties. The basic assumption - on which the choice of cooperation States was predicated - about an expected replication of success stories has not yet been proved justified.

Faced with delays in implementation, the ECD increasingly supported activities outside the original focus sectors as needs appeared and in the light of availability of unspent funds. While such support was generally well justified (election support being contested), it appears that as a source of guidance the Strategy did not have much practical importance. It might have been better to revise the entire Strategy rather than amending it, since a revision would have provided an opportunity for a more realistic analysis of the prevailing situation and for providing new answers to the difficulties experienced.

At a general level, the difficulties experienced as regards Nigerian agencies assuming **active ownership** of EC-funded projects may be related to the NPC being the EC counterpart, while other donors go through the more powerful Ministry of Finance. More specifically, lack of ownership may be rooted in an absence of incentives in dealing with EC projects, which are perceived to have difficult procedures; that is, there was no “control from below” or provision of personal incentives in terms of “topping-up” salaries or capacity-building. This might have been a factor in often-encountered Nigerian resentment at EC projects being implemented by foreign companies. The expression was heard that “the aim is to plough the money back to Europe”. Therefore, it appears that a more active approach to Nigerian **capacity-building** could have been beneficial for the cooperation.

### Impact in the Main Interventions Sectors

**Conclusion 6:** The intervention in the **WATSAN sector** encountered unforeseen difficulties resulting in limited impact during the evaluation period. However, recent progress in terms of the cooperation States’ assumption of responsibility justifies continued sector support.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
6	XXX	XX	No	EQ 3	2, 7	2

#### *Justification*

The WSSSRP facilitated development of the water resources strategy for implementing the National Water Policy and the review of the institutional framework for water supply and sanitation in six States. In so doing, the programme propagated good international practices in water governance. However, it has so far failed to convince decision-makers and make probable the wider application and adoption of those practices in Nigeria. Water supply and sanitation does not appear to have been a high priority of decision-makers at either Federal or State level. The national institutional and restructuring plans, and the States’ policies or mid-term sector strategies were not finalised as originally planned. The envisaged medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) remains overall still to be elaborated.

Improvements in theoretical and practical **sector planning skills** were not in focus for the donors, the WSSSRP project not excepted, and planning departments barely exist. Pro-active planning is universally lacking. The **financial implications** of water supply were insufficiently considered in the WSSSRP programme. There was a general lack of perception of water as an economic good susceptible to public control. No target group or topic-specific approach was chosen to raise awareness of what should be and can be done, and by whom.

However, it is promising that State officials now realise that fundamental changes are necessary and that the States recognise the need for support for sector reform. In spite of limited results, the EC support therefore has had an impact in terms of inducing a trend

towards a Nigerian-led reform of the water supply and sanitation sector. However, the process is slow and it will require much stronger support from the Nigerian top policy level.

**Conclusion 7:** The intervention in the **Institutional and Economic Reform** sector has produced tangible impact, however mainly of an indirect nature with limited pro-poor results. Further support therefore needs to focus on this aspect.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
7	XX	XX	No	EQ 4	8	none

**Justification**

The intervention appropriately supported the Nigerian Government in its overall Governance Reform Process, including progress in PFM and the increased capacity of the public sector to deliver services. The results achieved at State and Federal levels contributed to increasing the potential capacity to deliver services to the poor through better public financial management and civil service structures. However, the overall focus of the intervention was more on reform than on poverty reduction. The *de facto* capacity to deliver services to the poor has not fundamentally increased, since the support programme design was too complicated and indirect in relation to them and was not integrated into a more coherent work-plan.

**Conclusion 8:** The EC-intervention in **immunisation** has been successful and had a high pro-poor impact. However, there is a need for much higher priority by the GoN in terms of construction of a stronger national framework in the Primary Health Care System.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
8	XX	XXX	No	EQ 5	9	2

**Justification**

The EC supported the WHO Polio campaign with more than €78m although its objective of polio eradication has yet to be attained. International donors consider the current immunisation system costly, inefficient and dependent on continuous donor support.

**Donor coordination** in the health sector was good, but it has not led to substantially greater involvement by the Government. The services have been a substitute for missing Government intervention and have only partly succeeded in bringing the Government structures to a point at which they could fulfil their functions. **Cost-sharing** between the Federal, State and local levels of Government remains problematic. Since disease prevention is a public good, which benefits the whole nation, increased reliance on the individual States to prioritise routine immunisation cannot be considered a viable approach. **The Federal intervention** has to go far beyond provision of vaccine and implementation of national immunisation campaigns, and needs to invest more in the set-up of management schemes, which build on training, retention of facilities and monitoring of the effective implementation.

More recently, with the substantial contribution of the **EU-PRIME** intervention, it has appeared that a more integrative approach between States, Local Government and traditional leaders, together with emphasis on monitoring, will have the potential to help Nigeria build up a National Primary Health Care System, which in turn will make it possible again to attain much better health indices (as before 1990) and achieve a sustainable and cost-efficient

system. The EC intervention has been greatly appreciated and is considered a success, since it has demonstrated that routine immunisation systems do work.

**Conclusion 9:** The EC sector interventions relating to **democracy, human rights and civil society** have been of a scattered nature. In order to produce synergy between the interventions and to enhance their impact, there was a strong need for a more coherent conception of the projects and for better coordination between them.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
9	XX	XXX	Yes	EQ 6, 8	4, 10	3

*Justification*

In order to enhance results, which actually benefit the poor and Nigerian democracy, the **EC needs to know more about the nature of civil society and about the results of the support** so far. Otherwise, there is a risk of mainly supporting modern NGOs who speak the language of the donors and have been trained in writing applications, rather than traditional civil society, which may have closer linkages to the poor.

Strategic guidance for civil society support will also require more knowledge of its contribution to democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, to which ends international and Nigerian NGOs have received considerable support through thematic budget lines. For **synergy** to be produced between the interventions, they need to be conceived in a concerted way, rather than originating in uncoordinated calls for proposals from Brussels and Abuja.

There is reason to reiterate that **the political parties** are also part of civil society and important for the democratic processes; whereas the NGOs, even if perceived as the “real political opposition”, do not have the same democratic legitimacy.

Notwithstanding structural animosity between **Government and civil society**, it is worth noting that the GoN has moved in favour of increased cooperation with civil society in local projects, for which it sees them as usefully complementary to Local Government.

The above findings call for a **more elaborated ECD strategy** on how to support civil society, combined with incentives for GoN-CSO cooperation and with support for democratic political institutions and processes.

**Conclusion 10:** The **micro project programmes** have had a positive impact on poverty in the rural Niger Delta Region. The impact could have been enhanced by exit strategies and linkages to the relevant development plans.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendation	Link to Principal Conclusion
10	XX	X	No	EQ 9	11	none

*Justification*

Despite certain weaknesses, MPP3 and MPP6 improved livelihoods among part of the poor population in the Niger Delta although, in the absence of baseline data, it is not possible to measure the impact accurately. The impact would probably have been enhanced if the programmes had given more consideration to all local stakeholders and to sustainability issues

(participation, financing, and exit strategy) and if they had been integrated into the wider sectoral and geographical strategies.

Some deficiencies at the start of MPP3, for example non-realistic quantitative targets and insufficient integration of key State and local partners and of cross-cutting issues, were progressively corrected, or are being corrected, in the design of the ongoing MPP9. MPP9 can benefit from the lessons learned through MPP3/MPP6, not least by ensuring that the MPP3 Monitoring Report, which contains solid recommendations, is made available to MPP9 key stakeholders.

**Conclusion 11: Regional integration** represents a great potential for Nigeria but has not been translated into corresponding political prioritisation. While the EC is further supporting Nigeria's participation in regional integration, the ECD is in need of reinforcement so as to be able to respond to the inherent challenges.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
11	XX	XX	No	EQ 7	12	None

*Justification*

The interventions in **trade** and **conflict resolution** were relevant to promotion of regional integration. However, they did not sufficiently accommodate emerging needs such as climate-change-induced drought or those domains in which the EU has a comparative advantage. The current programmes do not address the need for capacity-building for the planning of joint approaches or for involvement of national institutions beyond validation of work plans and deliverables. Conflict prevention is an area where **greater in-house capacity of the EC Delegation** may be needed over the coming years

More emphasis will be needed on a policy dialogue with ECOWAS and WAEMU to identify the interventions most needed for regional integration. While **ECOWAS** was created almost 30 years ago, it still lacks the necessary support from its member states. National interests are predominant and national and regional EDF programmes have been neither complementary nor coherent. This has been noted and the EC has increased the allocation for regional programmes from €235m in the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP to €597m in the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF RIP, which is intended to represent a major step forward.

**Crosscutting Issues**

**Conclusion 12: Gender equality** considerations are overall well integrated in EC interventions, but there is scope for enhancing the integration of **HIV/AIDS** and **environment**-related issues.

No	Priority	Strength	Generalisation	Origin	Recommendations	Link to Principal Conclusion
12	XX	XX	No	EQ 3-6, 8-9	None	None

*Justification*

As regards crosscutting issues, the best results have appeared in relation to **gender equality**. It is a general finding that the EC-supported interventions took gender-related issues into due

consideration both at the strategic level and during programme design and implementation. Gender considerations have been integrated into the EC cooperation culture.

For aspects of the cooperation relating to governance and civil society (including focus sector 2), there appears to be a consequent positive impact in enhanced gender equality in line with the general finding of a high degree of gender equality in the NGO community.

Most micro projects affected the life of women positively. Gender training was conducted for the staff and MPP6-implementing CSOs in 2006. In MPP9, “Capacity-building of communities on crosscutting issues like Gender Equality, HIV/AIDS and Environment” is among the measures likely to be selected for grant assistance.

In contrast, **HIV/AIDS**-related issues did not appear integrated in most cooperation, including the health-related interventions. In the WATSAN sector, such activities were carried out as a component of sensitisation on hygiene and sanitation practices, but apparently with no follow-up. Within the micro projects, MPP6 attempted to mainstream HIV/AIDS through the organisation of workshops for project staff and CSO partners in 2006. Hence, an impact in terms of a reduction in HIV/AIDS prevalence may be expected in the micro project section of the cooperation – but so far only in that area.

**Environment** was streamlined in micro projects, but only generically in the WATSAN sector. In regional cooperation cross-border, environmental management issues have been implemented in the agricultural productive sectors as well as in a regional approach to natural resource management. Thus, the environmental impact of the EC interventions was limited, reflecting its relatively low priority in most of the cooperation sectors.



## 5 Recommendations

The recommendations are clustered in four categories:

1. Principal recommendations of an overall strategic nature or of specific importance for major elements in the EC cooperation with Nigeria
2. General operational recommendations
3. Sector-specific recommendations
4. Recommendation related to regional integration

The recommendations are rated according to their priority (▲▲▲ = very high, ▲▲ = high, ▲ = moderate). The recipients to which the recommendations are addressed, and the conclusions from which the recommendations arose, are mentioned.

The time frame for the recommendations is the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. The evaluation team considers that all recommendations addressed to the EC can be implemented, if wished, without major difficulty and that corresponding action should start as soon as possible.

Most recommendations are addressed to the EC (the EC Delegation in Nigeria and the relevant services in DG AIDCO and DG DEV), since the evaluation focused on the EC intervention. However, the Government of Nigeria is indirectly involved in most of the recommendations, of which 8 and 10 are also addressed to the GoN.

### 5.1 Principal Recommendations

<b>Rec. No: 1</b>	Priority: ▲▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Headquarters, EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>In order to enhance time-efficiency and the production of pro-poor results, the EC cooperation should enhance Nigerian project ownership through a more active approach to capacity-building within the Nigerian counterpart agencies.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	As mentioned in the conclusions, it is found that Nigerian project ownership needs enhancement. More emphasis on capacity-building needed in the project counterpart agencies appears a constructive avenue to enhanced ownership. A counter-argument was encountered to the effect that capacity-building leads to increased staff turnover. But even if this were the case, increased capacity in the Nigerian society at large would still be a positive result.	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 1, 5	

<b>Rec. No: 2</b>	Priority: ▲▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>Cooperation States with a proven record of achievements in institutional &amp; economic reform, and in the water and sanitation sector, should be further supported by the EC with advisory expertise, provided that reform includes Local Government and that the State budgets indicate a priority to those sectors .</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	While the overall results in the WATSAN-sector have been disappointing, there are recent signs of increased involvement by the cooperation States in this sector also.	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 6, 7. Recommendations 7 and 8	

<b>Rec. No: 3</b>	Priority: ▲▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>Further EC-support should be given for a Partnership to Improve Immunisation Efficiency, PRIME Programme, Phase 2, which could cover almost the entire country.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	The support should be conditioned by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Greater co-financing from State and Federal levels, <i>and</i></li> <li>• Support from other donors that would open the way to wider use of existing technical knowledge in establishing an adequate nationwide network of services.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 8. Recommendation 9	

<b>Rec. No: 4</b>	Priority: ▲▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Headquarters, EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>The ECD, and the relevant services in DG AIDCO and DG DEV, should ensure that synergy be generated between EDF support and thematic budget line support for democratic governance and civil society, through coordination between the concerned units.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	Steps towards increased should include <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The establishment of operational knowledge about the impact of the support so far</li> <li>• Stronger operational knowledge of the composition of Nigerian civil society and its capability for concerted action</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 3, 9. Recommendation 10	

## 5.2 General Operational Recommendations

<b>Rec. No: 5</b>	Priority: ▲ ▲	Target Recipient: EC Headquarters, EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>The communication and analytical profile and capacity of the ECD should be strengthened.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	<p>This strengthening should in particular benefit the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A more active high-level policy dialogue with the Nigerian authorities,</li> <li>• Participation in donor coordination,</li> <li>• Materialisation of potential EC added value in relation to EU Member States,</li> <li>• Enhanced knowledge management,</li> <li>• More refined and realistic analysis of the Nigerian context, including civil society, <i>and</i></li> <li>• Use of mass communication media for development support communication in relation to the population at large, and specifically to the poorer parts of the population.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 3, 4, 9. Principal Recommendation 4	

<b>Rec. No: 6</b>	Priority: ▲ ▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>The efficiency of the cooperation should be enhanced through adaptive design of programmes and results-based monitoring.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	<p>To enhance the efficiency of the cooperation, <b>the ECD</b> should apply:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A simplified programme design, which gives the programmes more flexibility to adjust to changes in the environment,</li> <li>• Stronger logical frameworks focused on realistic and measurable objectively-verifiable indicators,</li> <li>• The use of cost-benefit analysis as a management tool, <i>and</i></li> <li>• Baseline studies as an integral part of project design, with a view to subsequent monitoring of progress.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusion 1	

### 5.3 Sector Specific Recommendations

<b>Rec. No: 7</b>	Priority: ▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation, Government of Nigeria
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>Support to the WATSAN sector should be continued</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	For continued support to the WATSAN sector, EC and GoN should apply the guidelines below: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Direct investment is part of a state owned, time-planned and budgeted programme, <i>and</i></li> <li>• Target aid on capacity-building at sub-regional level, so that it becomes more systemic.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 6. Principal Recommendation 2	

<b>Rec. No: 8</b>	Priority: ▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation, Government of Nigeria
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>In order to increase the capacity of the public sector to deliver services to the poor, the EC should continue its support to institutional and economic reform, including support for the GoN Anti-Corruption Unit, EFCC.</b>	
<b>Comment to the implementation</b>	Such support should <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be well aligned with the country planning documents, be coordinated with other donors and have an emphasis on pro-poor results and impact,</li> <li>• Explore new implementation modalities in order to promote Nigerian ownership and reduce management costs, <i>and</i></li> <li>• Be better coordinated with other donors.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 7	

<b>Rec. No: 9</b>	Priority: ▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation, Government of Nigeria
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>The EC should continue its support for the immunisation sector, provided that the GoN integrates polio eradication much better with routine immunisation and makes its objectives more transparent for the population.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	Under future immunisation sector cooperation, the division of labour below should be prioritised <b>by the EC and the GoN:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EC support focuses on capacity-building at Federal, State and local levels, while infrastructure investments will only be financed if an equal amount of counterpart funds has been established, <i>and</i></li> <li>• The GoN ensures increased investment in management schemes, training, and retention of facilities and effective performance monitoring as a Federal task.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 8. Principal Recommendation 3	

<b>Rec. No: 10</b>	Priority: ▲▲	Target Recipient: EC Headquarters, EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>In order to strengthen democratic governance and civil society in Nigeria, the ECD should, in cooperation with the relevant Services in DG AIDCO and DG DEV, explore the impact of the support thus far and possible new avenues for such support.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	<p>Such exploration should address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How political parties could be supported in order to better articulate the political interests of the population. Experience from support to political parties from other EC cooperation countries could usefully be drawn upon for this purpose,</li> <li>• How the GoN could be supported in its endeavours to create synergy between Local Government and civil society,</li> <li>• Possible enhanced integration of traditional civil society, and possible support for Nigerian independent quality media, as part of the civil society strategy,</li> <li>• How the outcomes and impact of EC support through thematic budget lines for democracy, human rights and the rule of law can be identified, <i>and</i></li> <li>• The adequacy of continued support to INEC for the Nigerian Electoral Cycle 2007-2011 and possible conditions for such support.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 3, 4, 9. Recommendations 4, 5	

<b>Rec. No: 11</b>	Priority: ▲	Target Recipient: EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>In its future support for micro projects, the ECD should further prioritise exit strategies and country alignment.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	<p>Such prioritisation should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training in planning, finance, feasibility studies and management of micro projects for local stakeholders (Local Government, CSOs, and communities),</li> <li>• Alignment with strategies for State and Local Economic Empowerment and Development (SEEDS and LEEDS), when such exist, in order to enhance State, local and community ownership,</li> <li>• Exit strategies enhancing the potential for sustainability and dissemination of successful experiences, <i>and</i></li> <li>• An EC coordinating role for agencies, which support micro projects in order to avoid overlap, harmonise approaches and ensure Local Government participation.</li> </ul>	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusions 2, 10	

#### 5.4 Recommendation related to regional integration

<b>Rec. No: 12</b>	Priority: ▲	Target Recipient: EC Headquarters, EC Delegation
<b>Overall statement</b>	<b>Regarding future support for regional integration, the ECD should be institutionally strengthened in relation to the priorities of the forthcoming RIP of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.</b>	
<b>Comment</b>	Such strengthening should support the materialisation of cross-border programmes, including conflict management in particular, and it should enable the ECD to better address the concrete needs of the population, planners and decision-makers.	
<b>Link:</b>	Conclusion 11	