

*Evaluation of the European Commission's
Co-operation with Thailand*

Final Report

Volume 2

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Evaluation for the European Commission





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This evaluation was commissioned by:

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The evaluation was carried out by Particip GmbH within a consortium led by DRN. The external evaluation team was composed of Max Hennion (team leader), Jörn Dosch, Steven Ney, Florence Burban, Claudio Schuftan, René Madrid, Christopher Veit, Marcel Goeke, Tino Smail. Particip GmbH was the evaluation contract manager.

The evaluation was managed by the evaluation unit who also chaired the reference group composed by members of the services (EuropeAid, DG Dev, DG Relex), the EC Delegations to Thailand and representatives of the Royal Thai Embassy in Brussels.

*Full reports of the evaluation can be obtained from the evaluation unit website:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm*

The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries concerned.

Evaluation of European Commission's Cooperation with Thailand

Country Level Evaluation

Final Report

The report consists of 2 volumes:

Volume I: FINAL report

Volume II: Annexes

VOLUME I: FINAL REPORT

1. Introduction
2. Methodology
3. Background
4. Findings
5. Conclusions
6. Recommendations

VOLUME II: ANNEXES

1. Field mission information collection plan
2. List of people met
3. List of documents consulted
4. Information Matrix
5. List of EC projects

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ANNEX I: FIELD MISSION INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

The field phase is designed to generate additional evidence which can be used to fill gaps in the preliminary findings above, as well as test and probe whether the preliminary findings and conclusions based on them are sound.

In the case of Thailand, a relatively large number of project final evaluations and Mid-term Reviews are already available, many of which involved substantial collection and analysis of statistical data and the use of focus groups at the level of beneficiaries. This information has already, for the most part, been incorporated into the Desk Report although one aspect of the field mission will, of course, be the search for additional documentation.

In this Country Strategy Evaluation, therefore, the main tool applied in the field will be the semi-structured interview, either at the level of the EC Delegation, Government, or the project (see following chart). In order to give a framework for these interviews, a set of working hypotheses to be probed has been constructed (see pages following).

A combination of Bangkok and province / district-based interviews are planned, covering EC Delegation officials in Bangkok, in Government ministries, at the level of Provincial government, in districts where projects have been implemented, in various bilateral and multilateral partner offices, and in project units (see pages following). Because of the limited number of field days available, provincial interviews will be carried out in one province, to be identified with the Delegation.

Sources and respondents

	EC Delegation	Project management	Ministries	NSAs	Bene- ficiaries	MSs & donors
1			main			
2			main			
3			main			
4			main			
5				main		
6	main					
7	main					
8						main
9			main			

Projects proposed for analysis

Case studies in bold.

1	To what extent have the Commission's interventions contributed to improved trade and economic partnership with the country?	Small Projects Facility , ECAP, TREATY,
2	To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of higher education contributed to increase mutual understanding and awareness?	AsiaLink, AUNP , FWP (particularly the INCO programmes), Erasmus Mundus
3	To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of public health and health services contributed to the universal health care coverage?	HlthCareRefProj (HCRP641);Wom+ChCare+SuppHighHIVPrev(815);MigrHlthProj(912);ThaiVillHlthProjMSariang(612);ComprCare+SuppPersons HIV+families(2320).
4	To what extent were the EC programmes in the country consistent with the global objectives of EC response to global challenges faced by ASEAN, particularly environment issues?	COGEN, EAEF, ProEco projects (EcoToursim), CHARM , Asia Urbs
5	To what extent has EC mainstreaming of gender, governance and human rights into its cooperation programmes resulted in enhanced governance in the country?	All major programmes/projects + CCI's oriented ones (refugees/governance)
6	To what extent did the EC assessed and considered (i) the government's priorities, (ii) the needs of the country and, (iii) the evolving context in programming its strategic response, including the follow-up of the implementation strategy?	All major programmes/projects such as SPF, Health Care Reform, etc..
7	To what extent did the combination of instruments, approaches, financing modalities and/or channels of disbursement used by the EC contributed to achieve EC aid objectives?	<i>All major programmes/projects such as SPF, Health Care Reform, etc..</i>
8	To what extent has the EC coordinated and cooperated with EU Member states and IFIs intending to improve the complementarity of their interventions?	<i>All major programmes/projects such as SPF, Health Care Reform, etc..</i>
9	To what extent did the EC approach result in progress toward a balanced economic partnership between Thailand and the EU that would not have occurred absent EC co-operation programmes?	Trade policy dialogue, SPF

Hypothesis to be checked

1 To what extent have the Commission's interventions contributed to improved trade and economic partnership with the country?

- The favourable trade regime had been negotiated in Brussels and are not the direct result of the EC's cooperation programme;
- Individual SPF projects had a specific impact on trade relations;
- EC interventions and the Delegation contribute to achieving effective policy/legislative responses by the RTG;

- The most significant push for Europe's visibility has been Thailand's ASEM membership (and the pro-active role that Thailand has played in the forum);
- There are no specific programmes with an explicit focus on the promotion of European FDI and improvement of investment conditions.

2 To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of higher education contributed to increase mutual understanding and awareness?

- EC interventions have been successful in constructing functional and effective institutional vehicles of exposure and interaction;
- these programmes are administered in small doses with beneficial effects to be expected only in the long-run;
- Interventions have created the means of sustained and effective exposure between two socio-cultural, political and economic systems.
- Interventions have, so far, not led to a significant process of adaptation in the way Thai elites (students, researchers, business actors, policy-actors) perceive and act on Europe.
- Impacts of interventions have so far been limited to a relatively small group of direct beneficiaries and programme administrators.
- Intercultural understanding includes the transmission of positive as well as negative images of the EU and Europe as a place of study and research.

3 To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of public health and health services contributed to the universal health care coverage?

- Health coverage has expanded to low income groups;
- Public Health systems have been strengthened using European best practices as a model;
- Measurable health impacts can be attributed directly to EC interventions

4 To what extent were the EC programmes in the country consistent with the global objectives of EC response to global challenges faced by ASEAN, particularly environment issues?

- The EC primarily used bilateral instruments to address common concerns (e.g. biodiversity conservation) and regional policy programmes to pursue the EC's global policy goals (e.g. climate change);
- Projects aimed to generate policy-making competences among a wide range of stakeholders, most prominently communities and citizens at local levels (decentralization) with little short term impact on global challenges;
- The EC's choice and balance of subsector and policy instruments is broadly consistent with the trade-off of global environmental objectives and identified needs at different levels of governance;
- EC has avoided duplication and redundancy by letting regional programmes carry much of the programming and funding weight of environmental policy interventions;
- The EC's global environmental agenda and the environmental priorities of the RTG are incongruent.
- The EC did not address concerns that did not overlap with their own regional and global policy agenda.

- The European Commission identified and exploited synergies and overlaps between the EC's global agenda and the RTGs national environmental priorities to find areas of common interest.

5 To what extent has EC mainstreaming of gender, governance and human rights into its cooperation programmes resulted in enhanced governance in the country?

- Except for education, Governance, Gender and HR were not defined, prioritised, or integrated into the main EC cooperation sectors;
- There is an assumption that the increasing role of NGOs in Thailand will reinforce CCI performance indicators through project implementation through partnerships;
- A demand driven approach is more efficient than external analysis (TA) in ensuring increased CSO participation;
- a gradual change/improvement rather than a strategic-systematic change/improvement in the type of services provided to civil society organisations;
- EC and Thai authorities didn't use CCI related projects to improve dialogues, to define lessons learned;
- EC didn't positively influence the functioning of institutions designed to promote good governance to change political culture, and nothing is really done to influence the respect of international law on HR within National authorities ;
- Gender, governance and human rights issues have been a peripheral concern in both HE and environment/energy.

6 To what extent did the EC assess and consider (i) the government's priorities, (ii) the needs of the country and, (iii) the evolving context in programming its strategic response, including the follow-up of the implementation strategy?

- SOMs' were instrumental in ensuring consistency and flexibility of the programming process, and co-evolution of EC programming and RTG policies was effective;
- The sector/focal approach, adopted by the EC in 2002, was much better suited as a strategic response to Thailand's national needs than an ad hoc pre-2002 programming process;
- For all sectors except health, policy formulation support is carried out through EC regional programmes; Strictly bilateral projects are focused more on the implementation of the policy framework, compensation of impacts of new policies
- Synergies between policy dialogue and the cooperation programme were the rule for all sectors;
- Thailand is a case in point for developing new EC assistance instruments adapted to national policies needs (see the SPF) and using a mix of instruments, particularly by employing regional/bilateral programmes for well specified purposes.

7 To what extent did the combination of instruments, approaches, financing modalities and/or channels of disbursement used by the EC contribute to achieve EC aid objectives?

- Limiting factors such as the paucity of resources allocated to the NIPs, and the 2003 shift towards a partnership of equals, were addressed by the EC as a chance to employ an innovative mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities;
- EC cooperation, through its various instruments (foray, involvement in trade policy advocacy, SPF, environment projects, support to NGOs co-financed support to Burmese refugees, etc;)

demonstrated (based at this stage on documents available, thus biased by EC's own-assessment) a strong consistency with its strategic goals;

- A clear-cut distribution of role and function was implemented between instruments. On one hand, between national and regional programmes; the later, less open to national issues and more focused on long term SE Asia - EU relations, were focused on policy issues, while the former took on board some specifically targeted aspects relating to national concerns. On the other hand, budget lines, as thematic instruments were more frequently solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues;
- The SOMs and the proactive behaviour of the EC Delegation were effective in building policy dialogue and in developing cooperation programmes on emerging issues;
- High level of efficiency was achieved in adjusting implementing modalities to the needs of the actions, as well as to the capacity of the partner during the evaluated period, mainly from 2003 onwards;
- In both the environment/ energy and the HE sectors, the available instruments were skewed towards generic regional programmes rather than bespoke bilateral programmes."

8 To what extent has the EC coordinated and cooperated with EU Member states and IFIs intending to improve the complementarity of their interventions?

- While coordination and cooperation has clearly taken place, it was based on informal contacts or opportunities related to other matters (missions, fora, etc.) rather than coordination as such ;
- EC didn't avoided potential conflicts or resolved inconsistencies between its cooperation programmes and those of member states or other donors;
- The framework of a partnership of equals is likely to be contradictory to any effort from donors to elaborate a common platform for policy dialogue;
- As an emerging economy, Thai policy dialogue took place at a higher level than that common to most multi and bilateral cooperation programmes. This is most likely to be true too between the EC and MS, which remain very concerned regarding specific commercial issues;
- There was little coordination and integration of EC programmes and projects with similar programmes and projects of MS and/ or IFIs.

9 To what extent did the EC approach result in progress toward a balanced economic partnership between Thailand and the EU that would not have occurred absent EC cooperation programmes?

- There was little, if any, direct impact of the EC cooperation programmes on the easing of trade conflicts;
- The SPF helped Thai stakeholders to deal with issues related to the improvement of trade relations by focussing mainly on non-tariff matters."

Methodological tools

		Semi-structured interviews	Focus group	Statistical bench-marking	Field visits	Documents and press releases
1	To what extent have the Commission's interventions contributed to improved trade and economic partnership with the country?	main				
2	To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of higher education contributed to increase mutual understanding and awareness?		main			
3	To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of public health and health services contributed to the universal health care coverage?		main			
4	To what extent were the EC programmes in the country consistent with the global objectives of EC response to global challenges faced by ASEAN, particularly environment issues?				main	
5	To what extent has EC mainstreaming of gender, governance and human rights into its cooperation programmes resulted in enhanced governance in the country?				main	
6	To what extent did the EC assessed and considered (i) the government's priorities, (ii) the needs of the country and, (iii) the evolving context in programming its strategic response, including the follow-up of the implementation strategy?	main				
7	To what extent did the combination of instruments, approaches, financing modalities and/or channels of disbursement used by the EC contributed to achieve EC aid objectives?	main				
8	To what extent has the EC coordinated and cooperated with EU Member states and IFIs intending to improve the complementarity of their interventions?	main				
9	To what extent did the EC approach result in progress toward a balanced economic partnership between Thailand and the EU that would not have occurred absent EC co-operation programmes?	main				

Team tasks' allocation

	Max Hennion TL	Joern Doersh Economist	Claudio Schuftan Health	Steve Ney		Florence Burban CC issues	National exp.
				Higher education	Environment		
1 To what extent have the Commission's interventions contributed to improved trade and economic partnership with the country?	Support	Lead					Organise
2 To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of higher education contributed to increase mutual understanding and awareness?	Support			Lead			Organise
3 To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of public health and health services contributed to the universal health care coverage?	Support		Lead				Organise
4 To what extent were the EC programmes in the country consistent with the global objectives of EC response to global challenges faced by ASEAN, particularly environment issues?	Support				Lead		Organise
5 To what extent has EC mainstreaming of gender, governance and human rights into its cooperation programmes resulted in enhanced governance in the country?	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	Lead	Organise
6 To what extent did the EC assessed and considered (i) the government's priorities, (ii) the needs of the country and, (iii) the evolving context in programming its strategic response, including the follow-up of the implementation strategy?	Lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	Organise
7 To what extent did the combination of instruments, approaches, financing modalities and/or channels of disbursement used by the EC contributed to achieve EC aid objectives?	Lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	Organise
8 To what extent has the EC coordinated and cooperated with EU Member states and IFIs intending to improve the complementarity of their interventions?	Lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	Organise
9 To what extent did the EC approach result in progress toward a balanced economic partnership between Thailand and the EU that would not have occurred absent EC co-operation programmes?	Support	Lead					Organise

ANNEX II: LIST OF PEOPLE MET

Name	Organisation	Location
Rommanee Kananurak	Thai Embassy, Minister Counsellor	Brussels
Choltipa Vinyunavan	Thai Embassy, Second Secretary	Brussels
Andrew Jacobs	EC Delegation, Counsellor, Head of operations	Bangkok
Jean François Cautain	EC Delegation, Counsellor, Head of Political, Press and Information Section	Bangkok
Khobkhul Inieam	EC Delegation, Operations Assistant	Bangkok
Priya Waeohongsa	EC Delegation, Programme Officer	Bangkok
David Verboom	ECHO, Head of Regional Support Office	Bangkok
CJ Ozga	UN, Manager a.i	Bangkok
Gwi Yeop Son	UNDP, Resident Representative	Bangkok
Somchai Yensabai	UNDP, Programme Manager responsive Governance Unit	Bangkok
Lance Bonneau	IOM, Senior Regional Programme Officer	Bangkok
Khun Waraporn	IOM, Task officer on Human Trafficking	Bangkok
Giuseppe de Vincentis	UNHCR, Deputy Regional Representative	Bangkok
Jack Dunford	TBBC, Executive Director	Bangkok
Patrick Proctor	Voluntary Services Overseas, Country Director	Bangkok
Caroline Guinard	Voluntary Services Overseas, Programme Manager	Bangkok
Weerawit Weeraworawit	National Human Rights Commission, Deputy Secretary General	Bangkok
Vira Somboon	Chulalongkorn University, Department of International Relations, Assistant Professor	Bangkok
Arthur Carlson	IRC, Country Director	Bangkok
Yan Mazens	Handicap International, Country Representative	Bangkok
Isabelle Poppelbaum	EC Delegation Attaché (political)	Bangkok
Samuel Cantell	EC Delegation, First Secretary	Bangkok
Mads Korn	EC Delegation, Programme Officer	Bangkok
Georgios Antoniou	ASEAN Desk, RELEX.H.5	Brussels
Danièle Dal-Molin	RELEX Desk Thailand	Brussels

Jean-Phillippe Thouard	Coordinator of French Cooperation, Asian Institute of Technology	Bangkok
Professor Said Irandoust, PhD	President, Asian Institute of Technology	Bangkok
Professor S. Kumar, PhD	Dean, School of Environment, Resources & Development	Bangkok
Charit Tingsabadh	Asst. Prof., Ph.D. Director, Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University	Bangkok
Nipon Poapongsakorn, PhD	President, Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation	Bangkok
Deunden Nikomborirak, PhD	Research Director, Competition Policy and Consumer Protection, Sectoral Economic Programme, Electrical and Electronics Institute, Operation Standards Department	Bangkok
Qwanruedee Chotichanathawewong, D. Eng	Thailand Environmental Institute	Bangkok
Ratchaneekun Jarongnu	Group Manager, Electrical and Electronics Institute, Operation Standards Department	Bangkok
Thanasak Chaiyavech	Director, Electrical and Electronics Institute, Operation Standards Department	Bangkok
Sanchai Tandavanitj	Senior Advisor on International Fisheries Affairs, Department of Fisheries	Bangkok
Sutthiya Chantawarangul	Programme Officer, Delegation of the European Commission	Bangkok
Cherdchinda Chotiyaputta, PhD	Marine and Coastal Resources Management Specialist, Department of Marine and Coastal Resources	Bangkok
Chatchawan Pisdamkham	Director of Wildlife Conservation Office, National Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department	Bangkok
Rittler, M. and J. Gutierrez	Erasmus Mundus Special Window Evaluators	Bangkok
Melissa Chin	Erasmus Mundus Alumnus	Bangkok
André Philippe Chalmin	AIDCO D1, Desk Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar	Brussels
Pierre Clestrate	RELEX Policy Analyst - Principal administrator	Brussels

ANNEX III: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

EU Policy and Strategy

- The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)
- Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013
- Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2007-2010) Thailand
- The EU-Thailand Economic Cooperation Small Project Facility (SPF): “*Creating understanding, building capacity*”, The Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, Thailand
- Cooperation activities report 2005: “European Union – Thailand”, published by *the* Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand (March 2006)
- Council Regulation 1440/80 of 30 May 1980, OJ L 144, 10.06.1980

Trust fund:

- Completion Review: ASEM Asian Financial Crisis Response Fund, The World Bank (April 11, 2003, updated May 6, 2003)
- Completion Report: Asian Financial Crisis Response Fund 1, World Bank, Washington D.C., July 2003
- Summary Note: ASEM Trust Fund Review Meeting, Brussels, June 28, 2006
- Overview of Progress and Country Strategy Notes: Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM)
- Asian Financial Crisis Response Trust Fund Review (April 2006)
- Review of Country Strategies and Implications for ATF2: ASEM Trust Fund (April 2001)
- Review Meetings: ASEM Asian Financial Crisis Response Fund, Thailand: Financial Sector Advisory Services (April 19, 2002)
- Powerpoint Presentation: Thailand: ASEM Trust Fund 2: “Implementation Progress, Portfolio Performance and Results”, by Ministry of Finance, Thailand (June 28, 2006)
- International Trade Center/EC, Asia Trust Fund, Mid Term Review, Final Report, 31 August 2006

General documents consulted

- Report of the Workshop: Aid Effectiveness: “From Paris to Bangkok”, by Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency, European Commission, World Bank
- United Nations Development Programme (5 October 2006)
- Market Access Strategy “EU requests WTO consultations over Thai customs practices”
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/mk_access/pr270108_en.htm
- Overview: “The EU’s relations with Thailand”, European Commission External Relations (latest update: November 2006)
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand/intro/index.htm
- The EU – Thailand Economic Cooperation Small Project Facility (SPF), Creating understanding – building capacity, The Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand
- Cooperation activities report 2005: European Union- Thailand, The Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand

- Thailand Human Development Report 2007: “Sufficiency Economy and Human Development” by United Nations Development Programme
- Bertelsmann Country study Thailand, [Online] // Bertelsmann Transformations Index. - <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/126.0.html>
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- German Development Office Thailand [Online]. - 2007. - <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Thailand.html#t3>.
- France Diplomatie Thaïlande [Online]. - 2008. - http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/thailand_597/index.html.
- Kingdom of Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/59.php>)
- SEMA Group Strategic review mission, Malaysia [Report] : Rapport final / EC. – 2005
- Thai Press Reports, 2005

EU Projects

Civil aviation:

- News release EU-South East Asia Civil Aviation Cooperation Project, Embarks on regional harmonization, European Commission (15 December 2006)

COGEN:

- Abstract: “Thailand’s Biomass Energy”, Phongjaroon Srisovanna, Chief Country Coordinator COGEN 3, Energy Conservation Center of Thailand, Bangkok Thai Tower, 108 Rangnam Rd., Payathai, Ratchathevi, Bangkok 10400 THAILAND (14-16 January 2004)

Energy Facility:

- EC – ASEAN Energy Facility (EAEF): Electricity, Natural Gas, Clean Coal, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. A sector specific co-financing complement under four fiduciary funds to existing multilateral instruments. A Programme co-funded by the EU and the ASEAN

Environment:

- Report to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: “Measuring the progress and outcomes of Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management”, The CHARM project case study in Southern Thailand. Authors: Yves Henocque and Sanchai Tandavanitj, supported by the European Union and the Kingdom of Thailand (Completion date: May 2006)

Forest:

- 2005 Call for Proposals: “Environment in Developing Countries and Tropical Forest budget line” (published 4 August 2005)

Higher Education:

- Speech: 4th Plenary Meeting of ASEA-UNINET, 4 - 8 July, 1999 in Vienna, European Community Programmes for EU-Asia, Cooperation in Higher Education presented by Mr. Andrew Jacobs, DGIB, European Commission

- Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an action programme for the enhancement of quality in higher education and the promotion of intercultural understanding through cooperation with third countries (Erasmus Mundus) (2009-2013), Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 12.7.2007 COM(2007) 395 final 2007/0145 (COD)
- Erasmus Mundus Brochure:
http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/mundus/projects_en.html

Result-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports:

- ROM Report: REGIONAL - ASEAN – CAI – EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights, Cooperation Programme (ECAP II) – Thailand. MR-20054.02 – 18/12/03
- ROM Report: Thailand – THA – EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation Programme (ECAP II), Thailand. MR-20054.01 – 12/08/02
- ROM Report: Thailand – TH – Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/Aids and Development, MR- 20388.01 – 19/12/05
- ROM Report: Thailand - THA– Capacity Building to support Training and Education on Coastal Biodiversity in Ranong, MR-00139.01 – 26/04/01
- ROM Report: Thailand - THA– Capacity Building to support Training and Education on Coastal Biodiversity in Ranong,, MR-20019.01 –14/06/02
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Women and Children Care and Support in high HIV/AIDS Prevalence Areas, MR-20166.02 – 19/12/05
- ROM Report: Thailand - THA - Women and Children Care and Support MR-20166.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Coastal Habitats and Resources Management (Charm) MR-20162.04 – 26/06/07
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Coastal Habitats and Resources Management (Charm) MR-20162.03 – 20/06/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Coastal Habitats and Resources Management (Charm) MR-20162.02 – 03/12/04 (Date of Report)
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Coastal Habitats and Resources Management (Charm) MR-20162.01 – 05/12/03 (Date of Report)
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA- Improving Access to Comprehensive Care and Support for Persons with HIV/AIDS and their families in Thailand MR-20167.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA- Disability Right, Empowerment, Awareness and Mobility in Indonesia and Thailand (DREAM IT) MR-20174.01 – 25/02/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Electricity Network Upgrading Programme (ENUP) MR-20018.02 – 23/03/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Electricity Network Upgrading Programme (ENUP) MR-20018.01 – 14/06/02
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Health Care Reform Project (HCRP) MR- 20386.02 – 19/10/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Health Care Reform Project (HCRP) MR- 20386.01 – 19/12/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Health Care Reform Project MR-00138 – 26/04/01
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Karen Education Project III MR-20276.02 – 13/12/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Karen Education Project (KEP III) MR-20276.01 – 18/03/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Karen Education Project IV MR-20715.01 – 12/12/07
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Migrant Health Project MR- 20387.02 – 31/10/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Migrant Health Project MR- 20387.01 – 19/12/05

- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Assistance to People with Disabilities and Mine-Uxos Risk Education for Refugees along the Thai-Burmese Border MR- 20541.02 – 12/12/07
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Assistance to People with Disabilities and Mine-Uxos Risk Education for Refugees along the Thai-Burmese Border MR- 20541.01 – 13/12/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH- Sustainable Management of Phu Kheio Wildlife Sanctuary through Community Participation MR- 20168.03 – 03/11/06
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA- Sustainable Management of Phu Kheio Wildlife Sanctuary through Community Participation MR- 20168.02 – 25/02/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA- Sustainable Management of Phu Kheio Wildlife Sanctuary through Community Participation MR- 20168.01 – 18/03/04
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA- Rice and Building Materials for Burmese Refugees in Thailand MR – 20275.01 - 25/02/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- TH – EU-Thailand Economic Cooperation Small Projects Facility (SPF) MR-20381 – 15/12/05
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.02 – 02/07/03
- ROM Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.01 – 14/06/02
- ROM Report Ex-Post Thailand – TH- Thai Village Health Project MAE Sariang District MR- 20165.03 – 29/06/07
- ROM Report Ex-Post Thailand – TH- Thai Village Health Project MAE Sariang District MR- 20165.02 – 25/02/05
- ROM Report Ex-Post Thailand – TH- Thai Village Health Project MAE Sariang District MR- 20165.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- ROM Report Thailand – TH- Vocational Training Project Phase II. MR- 20714.01 – 12/12/07

Pro Eco II

- Open Call for Proposal: Guidelines for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals for 2006, EU – ASIA PRO ECO Programme Phase II, European Commission, EuropeAid

Pro Eco Tsunami

- Asia Pro Eco IIB – Post Tsunami
- Assisting the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the areas affected by the India Ocean Tsunami in Asia, “Contributing to sustainable reconstruction and development in the tsunami-hit regions of Thailand by designing, implementing and disseminating pilot technologies for energy-efficient housing and water management”, European Commission, EuropeAid

SPF

- EC News Release: “From fossil fuel to sweet fuel” (14 March 2007)

General Project related docs:

- Announcement of new funding: “European Commission approves €3.5 million / flexible cooperation facility with Thailand”, European Commission EuropeAid (12 September 2007)

Policy context

General:

- Dosch, Jörn, The Changing Dynamics of Southeast Asian Politics, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2008
- Bureau of Policy and Strategy Ministry of Public Health Thailand, Health Policy in Thailand 2007 [Report]. - Bangkok : [s.n.], 2007

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ANNEX IV: INFORMATION MATRIX

This matrix gathers all data, reference and findings of the evaluation process. It presents therefore a far more developed and substantiated answer to the EQs with all the causal links mobilized through indicators and judgment criteria. It is considered, under the Joint Evaluation Unit methodology, that comments from the RG should take into account those developments and not only the summary that is the answer to the EQ stated in the body of the report.

EQ1 - To what extent have the Commission's interventions contributed to improve trade and economic partnership with the country while improving EC visibility?

Trade relations between the EU and Thailand have increased significantly between 1996 and 2007. This development was entirely due to the increase in the volume of Thai exports to the EU (JC 1.1). During this period, overall trade between EU-27 and Thailand increased by 52% from € 16.1bn to €24.48bn (I 1.1.1). However, by comparison, trade between Thailand and the US over the same period grew more strongly by 68% from US\$18.53 bn (Thai exports to the US: US\$ 11.34bn; Thai imports from the US\$ 7.19bn) to US\$ 31.21bn (exports: US\$22.75bn; imports US\$8.45bn). While the EU had a trade surplus of €0.9bn in 1996, the EU had a trade deficit of € 8.72 bn in 2007. The considerable increase of Thai exports to the EU since 2004 (after a decline in 2001-2003) was mainly the result of the easing of trade restrictions as far as the access of Thai products to the EU market are concerned (I 1.2.1).

In 2003 the EC relaxed food safety testing requirements for prawns imported from Thailand. In 2005 the EC completed its switchover to a new rice regime when it struck an agreement with Thailand on new, more preferential tariffs for the import of Thai rice into the EU; In 2006 a new quota for Thai cooked poultry was set. In the same year, the EC introduced a new GSP regime, which restored GSP benefits for Thailand in the following sectors: fishery products, edible preparations and beverages, plastic and rubber, leather and fur skins, footwear, and consumer electronics. The full suspension of the GSP on Thai shrimp exported to the EU spanned over eight years (1999-2005) – in 1997 and 1998 the quota had been reduced by 50% (I 1.2.1).

The EC has been particularly successful in resolving disputes on tariff and non-tariff matters which shaped bilateral relations in the second half of the 1990s and first two years of the current decade (JC 1.2) Close and regular contacts between various departments within the Thai Ministry of Commerce and the EC Delegation/DG Trade have been instrumental in overcoming policy and legislative obstacles on the Thai side in trade relations. Examples include Thailand's customs regimes (and implementation of customs legislation) and the upgrading of Thai laboratories to facilitate the efficient and effective measurement of food residues to comply with EU health and safety standards for agricultural products, such as shrimp. As a response to food residue disputes with the EC, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) adjusted outdated laws with the main purpose to ban prohibited veterinary drugs, the establishment of new Food Safety and Standard Authority, and the adoption and purchasing of the European technology of residue detection. The Thai government also showed a tough crack-down on prohibited drug distributors could effectively reduce the cases of residue found (I 1.2.2).

The Delegation has played a significant role on health and safety matters in bilateral trade relations, by helping Thailand to adopt new regulations and comply with standards, for example through training programmes/seminars for government officials. However, both European and Thai stakeholders emphasised the general difficulty in drawing a clear line between development cooperation (as prescribed by DCI) – which by definition must only benefit the recipient – and two-way trade facilitation. For a middle income country like Thailand, which has very small capacity building and TA needs in the trade/economics sector(s), DCI doesn't provide a suitable instrument for the EC's relations with Thailand.

Various projects funded under the EU-Thailand Economic Co-operation Small Project Facility (SPF) have addressed issues related to the improvement of trade relations. SPF projects in general have proved to be a suitable tool for fast and flexible responses to 'Thai stakeholders' needs, for responding and adapting to EU legislation. But there is no hard evidence of a direct impact on trade relations. The impact has at best been indirect, in the sense of the provision of help for Thai stakeholders to comply with EU regulations. Overall only a small number of SMEs benefited from the SPF. Academic and research institutions have been the main beneficiaries of SPF (the same applies to the Co-op facility). Thai SMEs, without prior contacts/involvement in EU-Thai cooperation networks, have found it difficult to respond to the SPF call for proposals due to both problems in finding an EU partner and the cost involved in drafting a bid.

Thailand has markedly profited from the EC's regional programmes with ASEAN. Since 1997, Thai stakeholders have participated mainly in the following regional programmes under various budget lines (EC, 2005):

- ASEM Trust Fund which aimed at Asia's economic recovery after the 1997-98 crisis. While the Trust Fund is not explicitly directed at the improvement of trade relations, it contributes to economic relations in general through the strengthening of competitiveness. The Trust Fund Review Meeting concluded that the grants in Thailand helped the government prepare for international negotiations on trade and financial liberalization of services (ASEM, 2006, p.2).
- EC-ASEAN Energy Facility (EAEF) (ASIE/ASE/RELEX/2000/0053)
- ASEAN programme for regional integration support (ASI/2002/0499)
- EC-ASEAN intellectual property rights co-operation programme (ECAP II) (ALA/96/25);
- EC-ASEAN programme on standards, quality and conformity assessment (ALA/96/24);
- EU-Southeast Asia civil aviation project (ASI/B7-3010/IB/98/0171);
- Policy research for sustainable shrimp farming in Asia (ICA4-CT-2001-10042).

ECAP II is of particular importance to Thailand as ASEAN's Local Coordinating Unit (LCU) is based in the Thailand Intellectual Property Office (TIPO). As a result of the programme, Thailand introduced TRIPS compliant IPR legislation (CE, 2003). ECAP can be singled out as the most significant EC intervention in terms of its contribution to Thai policy-making and legislation. However, while ECAP had been the most beneficial for the modernisation and strengthening of Thailand's IPR regime, synergies for ASEAN cooperation (as envisioned by the programme) had been very limited due to the development divergences within ASEAN.

During the assessment period, various joint EU-Thai initiatives had been taken to improve the capacity of Thai firms in their trade relations with the EU (JC 1.3) The EC Delegation in Bangkok in collaboration with the RTG, the Board of Trade of Thailand and the Federation of Thai Industries has been increasingly active in informing Thai firms about new EU legislation and its impact on trade relations (I 1.3.2). The Delegation's Business Information Centre (BIC) has regularly organised high profile seminars and workshops (capacity building and dissemination of information) for government officials (usually at directors' level) and the private sector: has been attended by more than 4000 participants to date.

Generally, support to Thai SME has been an important focus of the EC and individual EU member states (I 1.3.3). The impressive number of information campaigns on various aspects of EU-Thailand relations has increased the visibility of the EC and the EU in general. Interviewees of Thai government agencies said that EC visibility had also increased as a result of the ongoing negotiations for an EU-ASEAN FTA. However, MoFA respondents clearly stated a lack of visibility of EC interventions. The EC Delegation acknowledged that it was difficult to strengthen or even achieve EC visibility in and through multi-donor projects. Various activities within the ASEM framework increased the EU's visibility in Thailand, and the most important push in terms of visibility came from the introduction of the EURO. Some interviewees stressed that the EU was

more visible in Thailand than in ASEAN as a whole (JC 1.5).

European **FDI** (net applications) grew from 21,821 million Baht (€ 584m) to 74,145 million Baht (€1,674m) between 2000 and 2007 (no official pre-2000 data is currently available). While the share of European FDI (net applications) in Thailand's GDP increased markedly from 0.46% in 2000 to 0.95 % in 2007, overall EU investments in Thailand have not recovered from the global post-2001 FDI slowdown to the same extent as other Asian countries have. In 2006, Thailand's share of total EU FDI in ASEAN accounted for only 4.9% (€ 651.7 million of € 13,361 million) (JC 1.4) This figure indicates that Thailand has not yet developed into a hub for European FDI in ASEAN as envisioned by the EU and the RTG. There are no specific programmes within the context of EC-Thailand cooperation with an explicit focus on the promotion of European FDI and improvement of investment conditions in Thailand and the finding of the 2002 ALA evaluation are still broadly valid "*The tapering off of FDI into the region and Thailand would represent a great threat to national and regional development. Investment facilitation should remain a very major component of the co-operation, to be addressed with both aid and non-aid instruments*" (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.57).

The promotion of European FDI – and interventions aimed at creating favourable investment conditions for European enterprises – has mainly been the domain of MS Embassies and bilateral chambers of commerce and industry. There was widespread consensus among interviewed European stakeholders that the lack of an EU-Thai Chamber of Commerce has hindered coordination and consorted EU initiatives directed at FDI promotion. The founding of a European-ASEAN Trade Centre in Bangkok that would have similar functions is currently being considered to overcome resistance at local level.

The Thai media has published some 600 major news items on relations between the EU and Thailand since 1 January 2000, about 60% of which focused on economic relations. However, while media reports may have increased EC visibility, there is no hard evidence that they have positively or negatively impacted on Thailand's exporting capacity and EC-Thailand economic cooperation and dialogue.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Note: Bath-Euro exchange rates are for 10 December of the respective year; changes in percentages refer to the amount in Baht.

Sources in addition to those listed under the JCs:

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JC 1.1 Trade and economic relations between EU Member States and Thailand increased

Between 1996 and 2007 overall trade between EU-27 and Thailand increased by 52% from € 16.1bn to €24.48bn (I 1.1.1). However, the increase was entirely due to EU imports from Thailand which grew by 110% from €7.6bn to €16.6bn, whereas the volume of EU exports to Thailand decreased by 9% from €8.5bn to €7.88bn due to significant fluctuations in the machinery and transport equipment sector which accounts for roughly half of all Thai imports from the EU (I 1.1.2). The substantial trade deficit with Thailand emerged after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. Thai exports to the EU's markets contributed considerably to stabilising the Thai economy in the wake of the crisis. EU-Thai trade has been increasing steadily with EU imports being concentrated in agriculture, machinery and textile and clothing (Consortium Eva-EU, Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report, vol. 1, 2002, p. 57)

The relative importance of the EU as a destination of Thai exports and a source of Thai imports has grown. Thai Imports from the EU (as a share of the country's total imports) grew from 10.9% (2000) to 12.5% (2007), Thai exports to the EU (as a share of the country's total exports) increased from 15.7% (2000) to 19.4% (2007) (no earlier data available; will be amended in the final report). The strong increase of the trade

volume since 2004, driven by Thai exports to the EU (after a period of shrinking trade between 2001 and 2003) was mainly due to the successful completion of trade negotiations between the EC and representatives of the RTG (see JC 1.2).

(Sources for all figures: Eurostat)

Related facts, figures, and references:

EU-27 Trade with Thailand, 2000-2007

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Imports in 1000 million of ECU/EURO	13.54	13.18	12.05	11.89	12.98	13.13	14.74	16.60
Exports in 1000 million of ECU/EURO	6.63	7.76	6.96	6.45	7.01	7.93	7.30	7.88
Trade balance in 1000 million ECU/EURO	-6.92	-5.43	-5.09	-5.45	-5.97	-5.19	-7.44	-8.72
Share in Total Extra-EU imports (%)	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.2
Share in Total Extra-EU exports (%)	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6

Source: Eurostat

Other Sources: Eurostat, External and intra-European Union trade. Statistical yearbook — Data 1958-2006, 2008 edition. Euromonitor International, Fact File Thailand, January 2008. US Census Bureau, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with Thailand, <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5490.html>

I 1.1.1 Trends in proportion of Thailand exports sold to EU market, by sector

The EU is Thailand's third largest trading partner and export destination, accounting for nearly 11.6% of its external trade and 13.9% (amounting to € 11.96 billion) of its exports in 2005. The export volume has increased in all sectors since 1999. This trend was mainly driven by continuous expansion of Thai exports to the larger economies, namely France, Germany and Italy, over the past five years. Agricultural exports have seen a major increase of 30.7% between 2005 and 2007 due to resolve of trade issues, mainly tariff reductions on Thai shrimp under the newly granted GSP and the easing of the effects of bird flue on chicken exports. In 2005 the Thai Commerce ministry set a target of a 110-per-cent export growth to the EU within five years, aiming to boost average annual exports to the EU to US\$ 52 billion by 2010 (WTO, Thailand Economic Monitor, November 2007; Thai Press Reports, Thailand: Commerce Ministry says Thai Conglomerates should consider expansion in EU, 3 November 2005).


Related facts, figures, and references:

Principal Thai exports are automatic data processing machines; motor-cars, parts and accessories; electronic integrated circuits; rubber and rubber products; plastics; iron and steel; precious stones and jewellery; chemical products; air conditioning machines and parts; radio-broadcast receivers, televisions; garments; prepared or preserved fish and crustaceans; and rice.

Agricultural products make up high performing sectors of the Thailand's economy, particularly in terms of the contribution to the substantial increase in Thailand's trade surplus with the EU in 2006 and 2007. Principal revenues from agricultural exports particularly from food-have been derived from rice, fish, shrimp, fruit,

sugar, manioc, and chicken.

Thai Exports to EU-27, 1999-2007, million ECU/EURO



Source: Compiled from Eurostat data

While the country's major export markets remain the US., EU, Japan and ASEAN, there has been an attempt to lower the dependence on these few markets by introducing exports to new markets such as China, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Chinese Taipei, Australia, Canada, India, and Middle East. In 2006, exports to the major markets grew steadily at 11.7% while exports to the new markets expanded by 24.7%, raising the proportion of Thai exports to the new markets to 43.2% from approximately 37% in 2003 (WTO, 2007).


I 1.1.2 Trends in proportion of Thailand imports originating in EU, by sector

While the volume of all manufactured products and materials imported from the EU has grown between 1999 and 2007, the overall growth of Thai imports has been hampered by significant fluctuations in the machinery and transport equipment sector which accounts for roughly half of all Thai imports from the EU.

Related facts, figures, and references:

The Thai principal imports are: crude oil; machinery and parts, chemicals; electrical circuit panels; electrical machinery and parts; iron, steel and steel products; computers, accessories and parts; other metal ores; jewellery, including silver bar and gold; electrical household appliances; vegetables and vegetable products; scientific, medical, and testing appliances; metal products; plastic products; fertilizer and pharmaceutical products; finished oils; and fresh, chilled or frozen aquatic animals.

Thai Imports from the EU-27, 1999-2007, million ECU/EURO



Source: Compiled from Eurostat data

Other sources: World Bank, Bangkok Office, 2007; WTO, 2007.

JC 1.2 Tariff and non tariff barriers were reduced and other EU-Thailand trade issues were resolved

During the assessment period Thailand was mainly affected by four tariff issues.

- 1) Full GSP (General System of Preferences) suspension on Thai shrimp which took effect in 1999. GSP was restored in 2005: The new GSP reduced the tariff for Thai shrimp from 4.2% on frozen shrimp and from 20% to 7% on cooked shrimp and abolished quota on import quantity (I 1.2.1)
- 2) Agreement on a new trade regime for Thai rice exports in 2005 (I 1.2.1);
- 3) As in the case of other countries, the EC has employed strict food safety policy, especially the zero tolerance policy on food residues, to food imports from Thailand. While the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has claimed that Thailand's agricultural trade in the EU had been negatively affected by the EC's policy of adopting higher standards than internationally recognised standard bodies especially the Codex Alimentarius and those of other major agricultural markets, especially the United States and Japan, as well as specific testing technology and methods, there is no evidence of any significant trade distortion due to the EC's food safety policy. The RTG and the EC have acted considerably to resolve issues related to food residues (I 12.2)
- 4) The negative impact of the 2003-04 bird flu outbreak in Thailand on chicken exports to the EU has eased and a new quota on chicken exports was agreed in 2006.

All issues listed here were resolved in trade negotiations between the EC and representatives of the RTG ("Team Thailand") in Brussels. The Delegation played a decisive supportive role in bilateral trade relations, particularly on health and safe matters, by helping Thailand to adopt new regulations and comply with standards, for example through training programmes/seminars for government officials. Overall, the role and involvement of the EC Delegation in trade negotiations depends primarily on the specific issue at stake (Interviews at the Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade Negotiations; and Board of Trade Thailand on 02 Feb 2009 and roundtable discussion at the DC Delegation on 28 Jan 2009).

It can also be concluded that both the SPF and regional programmes helped Thai actors to respond more efficiently and effectively to issues impacting on trade relations but this needs to be verified during the field

phase. The overall objective of SPF is to enhance the relationships between EU and Thailand on trade, investment and related areas in order to strengthen the economic partnership. The project purpose is to improve the mutual understanding and the joint visibility of the EU in Thailand and reciprocally by promoting civil society dialogue and facilitating interactions in the areas of economic reforms, trade-related matters and integration into the world economy. SPF is designed to provide a flexible and responsive tool to support initiatives in view of the above purpose (EC Thailand, 2003). The 2005 ROM Report concluded that SPF was proving effective mainly due to the demand-driven nature of the programme (EC, 2005).

Related facts, figures, and references:

Following the confirmation of avian influenza outbreaks in Thailand, the EC suspended the import of poultry meat and poultry products from Thailand into the EU with effect for poultry slaughters after 1 January 2004. In 2006 a new quote for Thai cooked poultry was set at 160,033 tons a year. Exports beyond the quota will be subject to a tariff of 1,024 euros per ton. Exports within the quota will be charged a tariff of 8.0 percent. While the agreement fell short of Thai exporters' demands for a quota set at 190,000-200,000 tons, it can be considered a balanced agreement meeting the interests of both sides.

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Thailand's Delegation to the European Community, Council approved measures to assist Thai Shrimp, July 2005


I 1.2.1 Significant changes in customs, non tariff barriers

The EC completed its switchover to a new rice regime on September 5, 2005 when it struck an agreement with Thailand on new, more preferential tariffs for the import of Thai rice into the EU (European Report, EU agrees new rice import regime for Thailand, 7 September 2005)

The EC introduced a new GSP regime as from 1 January 2006, which restored GSP benefits for Thailand in the following sectors: fishery products, edible preparations and beverages, plastic and rubber, leather and fur skins, footwear, and consumer electronics. The tsunami of December 2004 had severely hurt Thai shrimp exporters; to help them, the EU agreed to introduce retroactively the new GSP import tariffs for this sector, from 1 August 2005. As a result shrimp exports to the EU increased by 56% in 2005 compared to 2004 and a further 42% in 2006 (see chart below).

In 2003 the EC relaxed food safety testing requirements for prawns imported from Thailand, saying that Bangkok had taken adequate steps to prevent the export of prawns contaminated by nitrofurans (cancer-causing antibiotics). The decision boosted Thai prawn exports to the EU, which dropped by more than 30 per cent in 2002 year following the detection of traces of banned nitrofurans in many shipments of Thai prawns and poultry (Financial Times, EU relaxes Thai prawn tests, 24 January 2003).

Quantity of imported shrimp before and after GSP suspension on Thai shrimp, 1996-2006 (unit: tonnes)



Related facts, figures, and references:

Despite the resolve of tariff and non-tariff issues, the Thai Foreign Ministry's website still features complaints about EU practises based on outdated information. "One of the issues of which many Thai exporters are well aware is anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Thailand has suggested time and time again that the Commission should exercise greater caution in initiating any anti-dumping investigation. Furthermore, most of the Thai products subjected to the EU's AD and CVD measures are small and medium enterprises. Therefore, the EU's AD/CVD measures have created such negative impacts for SMEs and the employment situation in Thailand ... It is evident that EU's GSP cut has produced serious negative effects on exports of some certain groups of Thai products to the EU market. For example, the export of fishery products from Thailand to the EU market registered negative growth of 48.49 and 8.34 percent in 1999 and 2000 respectively (Kingdom of Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/59.php>)

References:

EIU ViewsWire, Thailand: Trade regulations, New York, 18 December 2007.

I 1.2.2 Changes in IPRs and Standards and Quality Assurance administration and enforcement

As a response to food residue disputes with the EC, the Thai government adjusted outdated laws with the main purpose to ban prohibited veterinary drugs, the establishment of new food safety and standard authority, and the adoption and purchasing of the European technology of residue detection. The Thai government also showed a tough crack-down on prohibited drug distributors could effectively reduce the cases of residue found.

A Thai Cabinet resolution of 7 May 2002 established the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodities and Food Standards (ACFS) under the Agricultural Ministry. This organ was designed specifically to solve the residue crises with the EU and was tasked with drafting a special law on agricultural and food standards (DLD, 2003: 158). The new organ included in its duties that of food standard setter in coordination with the Codex Alimentarius. Moreover, the Thai government applied a pre-emptive strategy to regain trust from the European Commission. After the first case of residue found in March 2002, Thailand's Custom Department, the Ministry of Finance, announced that all shipments of shrimp and chicken to the EU currently on the water were being recalled for testing. This act served to show the EU that the Thai authority wanted to preserve long-term viability of the industry and reassure European customers that Thai products contained none of the banned substances.

In September 2002, the Thai government also adopted a hard-line policy by requiring chemical distributors and shrimp farmers to report possession of 16 banned substances as part of a national crackdown on farm use of drugs prohibited by the EU (*The Wave*, 2002). The crackdown led to raids on four distributors in Bangkok: United Trading, Tana Soontorn Company, Ocean Farm Chemical Company, and Unity Techno Product Company. Tana Soontorn Company alone was found in possession of 118 kilogrammes of nitrofurans metabolites and 50 kilogrammes of chloramphenicol imported from Taiwan. In addition, the Thai government tried to restore its reputation by implementing a hard-line policy authorising 100 crime suppression police and officers from the Fishery Department to raid 30 shrimp cold storage facilities in six provinces to take samples and seize export documents from the companies that violated the laws (Wassayos, 2003).

The residue crisis became the turning point of the Thai government's legal adjustment on food safety, as evident in terms of legislation enactment and revision as well as the harmonisation of domestic legislation with international standards. In late March 2002, the Thai government addressed the problems of residue by revising the existing legislation and regulations, including import restrictions on 16 chemicals prohibited according to Annex IV of the Council Regulation 2377/90/EEC, by adapting the 1979 Export and Import Act under the Commerce Ministry (FAO, 2004: 125; DLD, 2003: 52). On 4 June 2002, nitrofurazone (SEM) and furazolidone (AOZ), two of the four nitrofurans metabolites, were withdrawn from the list of permitted veterinary drugs (DLD, 2003: 158). The Thai government also took this opportunity to harmonise the law revision to respond to the USFDA list of drugs prohibited from extra-label use in food animals by the Import and Export Act 1979 (FAO, 2004: 125).

Thailand's Livestock Department as a CA for poultry products reported a significant achievement of residue elimination: no residue was found in poultry in 2003, compared to 58 cases in 2002 (DLD, 2006). In 2004—the last year that the residue was found in Thai poultry—only two cases of poultry were found to have nitrofurans metabolites. Thailand's Department of Fisheries as a CA for fishery products reported 67 residue cases from nitrofurans metabolites in 2002 (Jirawan, 2006: 74). In 2003, the residue-positive products from prohibited veterinary drugs decreased to 33 cases. In 2004, no chloramphenicol or nitrofurans metabolites were found in shrimp. In 2005, only one case of furazolidone (AOZ) was reported in the EU RASFF (Jirawan, 2006: 74). In 2005, the Fishery Department conducted 68,236 samples of domestic aquaculture products; only 981 positive residue and contamination results were found—less than 1.5 percent of the total sample (Jirawan, 2006: 69). Among nearly 70,000 samples, the most commonly found substance was cadmium, which accounted for 343 cases. Only 38 cases of nitrofurans metabolites were found, and no further cases of chloramphenicol were reported. In 2005 Thailand's Industry Ministry prepared guidelines to help Thai industries conform with stringently enforced European Union (EU) import standards, particularly in the area of consumer safety (Thai Press Reports, 2005). The available documents do not give any information as to whether there was any specific EC support to the Ministry during the process of drafting the new guidelines.

The EU and Thailand have continuously strengthened their collaboration to fight product counterfeiting and piracy (Thai Press Reports, 2005). It seems that the Delegation made constructive contributions to this end but this needs to be checked during the field phase.

Of particular importance has been the EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme (ECAP II) (ALA/96/25), designed in 1995-96 but only signed in 2000, in the context of supporting the improvement of IPR in Thailand in view of trade development. ASEAN's Local Coordinating Unit (LCU) is based in the Thailand Intellectual Property Office (TIPO). As a result of the programme, Thailand introduced TRIPs compliant IPR legislation. The 2005 MR concluded that the ECAP's overall effectiveness was poor but had improved compared to previous years (CE, 2003).

An "Organic Agriculture" project under the Asia Trust Fund (ATF) aimed at, inter alia, preparing Thailand to establish a relevant control system for organic products that could eventually allow the country to apply for inclusion in the EU's "third country" list for organic products. Under the project, effective training was

provided to strengthen Thailand's government control systems and requisites to prepare for application to such list (International Trade Center/EC, Asia Trust Fund, Mid Term Review, Final Report, 31 August 2006, p. 61). The Ministry of Industry strongly supports the strengthening of organic agriculture which has been identified as an area where Thai companies might be able to develop a competitive edge over other exporters. Organic agriculture is seen a very promising opportunity for Thai exports to the EU market (Interview with the Ministry's Deputy Permanent Secretary, 02Feb 2009).

Related facts, figures, and references:

The ATF was a 3-year programme (2004-2007) for the delivery of trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) to 19 Asian developing countries and two regional organisations (ASEAN and SAARC), managed by the International Trade Centre (ITC) with a budget of € 5 million, co-financed by the EC (€ 4.5 million) and ITC (€ 0.5 million).

The Thai organic market was estimated at USD 23 million in 2005. The EU is the biggest export destination for Thai organic products (*Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand*, Simpler EU rules boost export potential for Thai organic food exports, cited by Danish-Thai Chamber of Commerce, <http://www.dancham.or.th/fullnews.php?id=590>).

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The Wave (2002). EC defends testing of Thai food exports, 26 August 2002.

JC 1.3 Thailand firms and financial sector capacity to benefit from trade with EU was improved

During the assessment period various joint EU-Thai initiatives had been taken to improve capacity of Thai firms in their trade relations with the EU mainly under SPF, the Asia Invest Programme, the EC's business matchmaking initiative (I 1.3.3).

One of the biggest events was the EU-Thailand Partenariat 2005 (TH/Asia Invest/002), hosted by the Board of Investment (BoI). 132 companies were recruited in 20 EU Member States and 280 companies were recruited in Thailand. 1627 bilateral meetings were held (an average of 12 meetings per EU company and 6 meetings per Thai company) to discuss cooperation aiming to tap new technology to strengthen the potential of Thai firms.(European Union – Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005, p. 44; Bangkok Post, Thailand-EU SME marketing shaping up, 15 July 2005).

The Asia-Invest Forum (EU/EC/DELTH/CNP/SV/TH/2005-2006), also in 2005, provided a platform for EU and Asian private sector representative organisations to discuss the future orientations of European-Asian economic co-operation, and in particular to facilitate networking, strengthen existing partnerships and create

new ones. (EC, 2005, p. 45).

The Delegation in collaboration with the RTG, the Board of Trade of Thailand and the Federation of Thai Industries has been particularly active in informing Thai firms about EU legislation on environmental standards that impact on Thai exports to the European market, EU food labelling requirements, new regulations on corporate social responsibility (CSR), and other matters. There is anecdotal evidence that these extensive information campaigns have resulted in adjustments to EC regulations (I 1.3.2)

The 2005 Thailand Strategic Review and Programming Mission, concluded, “Traders consider that an EU Chamber of Commerce will enable the Thai business community to obtain better information on the EU trade regulations and mechanisms and develop stronger and more appropriate partnerships in relation to trade with the EU” (SEMA Belgium, 2005, p.20) (I 1.3.1).

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“The ALA Committee approved the CSP/NIP in May 2002 but it only managed to have the Small Project Facility of the first NIP (2002-2004) signed into existence in November 2004 before the expiry date of 31 December 2004.” - (SEMA Group, 2005, p.6)

I 1.3.1 Representative firms' perceived benefits from EC-sponsored trade

The 2005 Thailand Strategic Review and Programming Mission, concluded, “Traders consider that an EU Chamber of Commerce will enable the Thai business community to obtain better information on the EU trade regulations and mechanisms and develop stronger and more appropriate partnerships in relation to trade with the EU. The difficulties faced by many Thai industries, in particular in the food and agricultural sector, that wish to enter the EU markets are considered unfair practices. It is notably considered that the differences in levels of SPS standards between member countries of the EU reduce market transparency and competition. Agro-business called for the facilitation of organic food to enter the EU markets. In this light, the industries request the EC to foster improved trade co-operation under the CSP that would open markets. Support to the development of EU technologies in Thailand in particular for the use of biomass. The cooperation with EU textile-related industries will be welcomed” (SEMA Belgium, 2005, p.20). Interviews conducted during the field phase showed that while this assessment is still broadly valid, the Delegation's efforts in disseminating information on trade rules and regulations and contributions to capacity-building have significantly contributed to a more positive perception of the benefits from trade with the EU (see I 1.3.2).

I 1.3.2 Thai firms informed and adjusted to EC regulations influential for trade development

The EC Delegation in Bangkok in collaboration with the RTG, the Board of Trade of Thailand and the Federation of Thai Industries has been particularly active in informing Thai firms about EU legislation on environmental standards that impact on Thai exports to the European market, EU food labelling requirements, new regulations on corporate social responsibility (CSR), the food traceability requirement, requirements on Supply Chain Security, regulations on pesticide sediments, the Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (Reach) regulation, regulations on organic products, Health and Nutrition Claims Regulation, sanitary requirements for fruit and vegetables, and the Thailand-EC Cooperation Facility. These extensive information campaigns have resulted in adjustments to EC regulations (interviews with Thai government stakeholders).

The Delegation's Business Information Centre (BIC) has regularly organised high profile seminars and workshops (capacity-building and dissemination of information) for government officials (usually at director level) and the private sector that has been attended by more than 4000 participants to-date (Roundtable discussion, EC Delegation, 28 Jan 2009). All interviewed Thai government and private sector stakeholders (Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry, Thai Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Thai Industries) stressed the importance and usefulness of the Delegation's and BIC's activities. However, interviewees at the

Thai Chamber of Commerce mentioned that the Delegation could do more to address the needs of SMEs. “*The EC seems to be mainly interested in big companies*” (interview, 02 Feb 2009).

The BIC’s website (www.deltha.ec.europa.eu/bic/) is an excellent tool as it provides comprehensive, complete, very well structured and easily accessible information about access to the EU Market (customs duties and procedures; agricultural goods; industrial goods; EU law); EU funding; trade policy issues. The EC should consider using this website as a model for other Delegations.

Related facts, figures, and references:

References (selection)

Thai Press Reports, Thailand business ready for EU environmental challenge, 4 June 2008.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand foreign trade department to organize EU food labelling requirement seminar, 12 March 2008.

Thai Press Reports, European Union/Thai exporters urged to abide by EU’s new pesticides regulations, 6 June 2007.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand exporters urge to pay attention to the EU’s regulations on cooperate social responsibility, 13 February 2008.

Thai Press Reports, EU-Thailand European Union food traceability requirements explained, 21 December 2007.

Thai Press Reports, EU-Thailand European Union authorized economic operator status explained to Thai operators, 21 December 2007.

Thai Press Reports, Thai companies should prepare for new ‘REACH’ standards in EU, 7 March 2007.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand. EU Diplomat urges Thai exporters to better understand regulations on organic products, 15 December 2006.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand to hold seminar to explain new EU regulation on health and nutrition claims, 3 November 2006.

Thai Press Reports, TISI indicates that electronic products will show impressive figures of it can reach EU’s standard, 31 August 2006.

I 1.3.3 Capacity building for Thailand trade promotion in EU

Support to Thai SMEs have been an important EU focus and efforts have been made to enhance the competitiveness of Thai enterprises in the face of competition from low wage producers, aimed at upgrading what Thai enterprises produce on the value change especially in the agro-business sector (e.g. citrus, tapioca, palm oil) that are welcomed on EU markets. In some cases, business-to-business partnerships have been advocated with the specific objective of promoting eco-efficiency. Support to energy-saving technologies is particularly welcomed by the Thai government and business community.

Support for mutual market access for EU and Thai companies in their respective territories, and particularly assistance to help Thailand better understand the complexities of doing business in the EU market, was one of the objectives of the SPF. The SPF was a three-year programme, launched on 11 January 2005 with a contribution from the EC of € 5 million. Funding was allocated through grants, on the basis of published Calls for Proposals. Eligible applicants were not-for-profit, Thailand-based entities such as trade intermediaries, public administration and civil society organisations. Selected projects were of maximum one-year duration. EC funding covered up to 75% of eligible project costs and ranged between € 30,000 and € 200,000. A total of 28 projects was funded. The SPF aimed at enhancing co-operation in trade, investment and related areas, the aim being to implement innovative, short term projects of importance to both Thailand and the EU. Specifically, the project aims to improve the mutual visibility and understanding of the EU and Thailand by promoting civil society dialogue and facilitating interactions in the areas of economic reforms, trade-related matters and integration into the world economy (ROM Report, Thailand – Th – *Eu-Thailand Economic Cooperation, Small Projects Facility* (SPF) MR-20381.01 – 15/12/05; Delegation of the European

Commission to Thailand, *European Union – Thailand, Co-operation activities report 2005*, Bangkok March 2006).

However, the 2005 *Thailand Strategic Review and Programming Mission* found, “The SPF is inadequate to build long-term and significant economic ties, economic partnership with its 5-year time frame.” Furthermore, it was pointed out, “that Thai enterprises did not have an appropriate understanding of EU opportunities, nor did European enterprises understand the possibilities offered by partnerships with Thai enterprises. The setting up of a Thai/EU Business Forum was suggested. It would lead the way to partnerships?” (SEMA Belgium, 2005). While SPF projects in general have proved to be a suitable tool for fast and flexible responses to Thai stakeholders’ needs in responding and adopting to EU legislation there is no hard evidence for a direct impact on trade relations. The impact has at best been indirect in the sense of the provision of help for Thai stakeholders to comply with EU regulations. Overall only a small number of SME benefited from the SPF. Out of the 28 SPF projects only four had some SME participation, with all three projects being implemented either by a bilateral chamber of Commerce and Industry (the German and Italian Chambers respectively) or the Federation of Thai Industries Thai SME without prior contacts/involvement in EU-Thai cooperation networks have found it difficult to respond to the SPF call for proposals due to both problems in finding a EU partner and the cost involved in drafting a bid. In view of the complicated application procedures (that apply to all EC funded projects) SME often lack the required expertise and skills to put together a successful bid. In most cases a consultant needs to be hired to draft the application at an average fee of 50,000 Baht (€ 1000). This is a major expense for an SME as the outcome of the bid is uncertain and the financial volume of a project under the SPF is rather small (typically just 2 Million Bath/ € 40,000) (Interview with SPF beneficiaries, especially at the Federation of Thai Industries, 02 Feb 2009).

Academic and research institutions strongly benefitted from SPF. This, however, should not be seen in a negative light. The involvement of academic institutions contributed to the capacity-building for young researchers and this can be seen as an important contribution to the further strengthening of Thailand’s R&D infrastructure and expertise. 12 out of the total of 28 SPF projects were implemented by research institutions and universities; an equal number of project benefitted government departments and agencies (according to the lists of projects as published in *The EU-Thailand Economic Cooperation Small Project Facility. Creating Understanding, Building Capacity*, Bangkok 2008).

During the assessment period various joint EU-Thai initiatives had been taken to improve capacity of Thai firms in their trade relations with the EU mainly under the Asia Invest Programme, the EC’s business matchmaking initiative.

One of the biggest events was The EU-Thailand Partenariat 2005 (TH/Asia Invest/002), hosted by the Board of Investment (BoI). 132 companies were recruited in 20 EU Member States and 280 companies were recruited in Thailand. 1627 bilateral meetings were held (an average of 12 meetings per EU company and 6 meetings per Thai company) to discuss cooperation aiming to tap new technology to strengthen the potential of Thai firms. Many companies arranged factories’ visits with Thai counterparts. Thai businesses chosen to take part in the event include companies in agro-industry and processing, machinery and parts, automobiles and parts, electronics and ICT, fashion and service industries. Agro-industries and auto parts are expected to draw strong interest from SMEs from the Czech Republic, Germany and England, according to the BoI (European Union – Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005, p. 44; Bangkok Post, Thailand-EU SME marketing shaping up, 15 July 2005).

The Asia-Invest Forum (EU/EC/DELTH/CNP/SV/TH/2005-2006), also in 2005, provided a platform for EU and Asian private sector representative organisations to discuss the future orientations of European-Asian economic co-operation, and in particular to facilitate networking, strengthen existing partnerships and create new ones. By doing so, the event aimed to strengthen the role of the EU private sector in Asia by sustaining the network of industry/services associations; and by providing a forum to exchange views on the facilitation of open trade and investment in Asia (EC, 2005, p. 45).

JC 1.4 Direct investments of EU firms in Thailand increased (regional comparative approach)


Between 2000 and 2007 European FDI (net applications) increased from 21,821 million Baht to 74,145 million Baht. The share of European FDI (net applications) in Thailand's GDP also increased markedly from 0.46% in 2000 to 0.95 % in 2007 (I 1.4.2) Conditions (legislative and regulative frameworks) for EC foreign investments in Thailand have been gradually improving for the past four to five years as the result of reforms of the FDI regime (I 1.4.1) However the share of EU FDI of total FDI in Thailand decreased from 18% to 18.8% (Thai Board of Investments). Other main investors are Japan (30%), ASEAN member countries (27%), the United States (8%). EU investments in Thailand have not recovered from the global post-2001 FDI slowdown to the same extent as other Asian countries. In 2006, Thailand's share of total EU FDI in ASEAN accounted for 4.9% (€ 651.7 million of € 13,361 million). While this figure might have been affected by the implications of the military coup that took place in September 2006, it nevertheless indicates that Thailand has not yet developed into a hub for European FDI in ASEAN as envisioned by the EU and the RTG.

It should also be noted that major European investors (banks, retailers) have a long-term, established presence in Thailand which partly explains the relatively low level of new FDI commitments in the recent past (Interview at the German-Thai Chamber of Commerce, 28 Jan 2009; and MS Embassies on 28 Jan and 2 Feb 2009). There are no specific programmes within the context of EC-Thailand cooperation with an explicit focus on the promotion of European FDI/improvement of investment conditions in Thailand and the finding of the 2002 ALA evaluation are still broadly valid *"The tapering off of FDI into the region and Thailand would represent a great threat to national and regional development. Investment facilitation should remain a very major component of the co-operation, to be addressed with both aid and non-aid instruments"* (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.57).

There was widespread consensus among interviewed European stakeholders that the lack of a EU-Thai Chamber of Commerce has hindered coordinated and consorted EU initiatives directed at FDI promotion. While the establishment of a European Chamber was presented by some as being illegal according to Thai law, the founding of a European-ASEAN Trade Centre in Bangkok that would have similar functions is currently being considered (I 1.4.2).

Related facts, figures, and references:

EU FDI outward flows to Asia 1999-2006, in billion Euro



Source: data compiled from Eurostat and ASEAN Secretariat (for data on ASEAN).

Note: Comprehensive pre-1999 figures are currently not available but will be researched during the field stay.

Extracts:

“As regards trade and investment, the Government is gradually implementing protectionist measures, which are causing concern within EU business interests. In addition to import barriers and general ‘buy-Thai’ policy orientations, EU business has expressed serious concerns as regards the present foreign investment regime. In the longer term, this may further reduce EU investments and have a negative impact on the competitive position of Thailand as compared to other countries in the region, particularly once the AFTA comes into effect in 2003.” - (EC, 2001, p.13)

Sources:

ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistics, Table 26, ASEAN foreign direct investments net inflow from selected partner countries/regions, <http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table26.pdf>

For background on Thailand as a FDI hub: AFX – Asia, EU warns Thailand that foreign investment is stagnating, 1 April 2003

Thai Press Reports, Head of Delegation of European Commission to Thailand says liberalisation would increase EU investment, 8 November 2005

Euromonitor International Fact File Thailand, January 2008

fnWeb.com, EU views Thailand as gateway for trade and investment, says DPM, 14 November 2005.

I 1.4.1 Regulatory reforms, market opening in sectors where EU firms have comparative advantages

Thai missions to the EU have actively approached European companies to attract investment in logistics, alternative energy, aircraft engines and jewellery. Conditions (legislative and regulative frameworks) for EC foreign investments in Thailand have been gradually improving for the past four to five years as the result of reforms of the FDI regime. Thai Government post-Asian crisis initiatives aimed at restricting foreign business activities no longer seem to exist.

Related facts, figures, and references:

SEMA Belgium, 2005, p. 10

Thai Press Reports, Thailand Somkid leads Thai delegation to EU to attract investments, 20 September 2006

I 1.4.2 Share of European FDI in GDP

The share of European FDI (net applications) in Thailand's GDP increased markedly from 0.46% in 2000 to 0.95 % in 2007.

There was widespread consensus among interviewed European stakeholders that the lack of a EU-Thai Chamber of Commerce has hindered coordinated and consorted EU initiatives directed at FDI promotion. While the establishment of a European Chamber would be illegal according to Thai law, the founding of a European-ASEAN Trade Centre in Bangkok that would have similar functions is currently being considered (Interviews with the commercial counsellors of the German, British and French Embassies and German-Thai Chamber of Commerce on 28 Jan and 2 Feb 2009).

Related facts, figures, and references:

Calculated on the basis of Thai government statistics; GDP 4,637.1 million baht (2000); 7,806.8 billion baht (2007)

JC 1.5 EC visibility was enhanced by its economic dialogue and co-operation

The Thai media has published some 600 major news items on relations between the EU and Thailand since 1 January 2000, about 60% of which focused on economic relations. However, while media reports may have increased EC visibility, there is no hard evidence that they have positively or negatively impacted on Thailand's exporting capacity and EC-Thailand economic cooperation and dialogue (I 1.5.1)

Thailand's membership in ASEM has generally enhanced the visibility of Europe in Thailand – a factor that is

not explicitly captured by the indicators below.

As the host of the inaugural ASEM meeting in Bangkok in 1996 Thailand has been particularly active in ASEM's area of economic cooperation. It has drafted the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP) and served as co-facilitator of 3 sectors in the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) – standards and conformity assessment issues, sanitary and phytosanitary issues, and intellectual property. A project financed by the ASEM Trust Fund since 1998 to provide technical assistance on restructuring the financial sector and facilitating sustainable poverty reduction was completed in 2006. Exchange of views on the progress of the Doha Development Agenda among Asian and European members is a regular agenda item during the meetings of Leaders, Foreign Ministers and Economic Ministers (WTO, p. 28-29).

There is also preliminary evidence that the large number of events and activities sponsored and organised/co-organised by the EC Delegation as well as the SPF have contributed to a better visibility of the EC in Thailand.

However, as the EC admits itself, *“it is generally considered that knowledge in the EU about Thailand and knowledge in Thailand about the EU, and the process of European integration are insufficiently developed. The level of knowledge of European issues and culture among Thai students is not very high. Thailand's younger generations have directed their attention to other Asian countries and cultures, in particular Japan, as well as to the English speaking world.”* (EC Thailand, 2004, p.10-11).

Interviewees of Thai government agencies said that EC visibility had increased as a result of the ongoing negotiations for an EU-ASEAN FTA. However, MoFA respondents clearly stated a lack of visibility of EC interventions. The EC Delegation acknowledged that it was difficult to strengthen or even achieve EC visibility in and through multi-donor projects. Various activities within the ASEM framework increased the EU's visibility in Thailand, the most important push in terms of visibility came from the introduction of the EURO. Some interviewees stressed that the EU was more visible in Thailand than in ASEAN as a whole (roundtable discussion at the Delegation on 28 Jan 2009).

I 1.5.1 Medias reported on EC economic co-operation and dialogue and their positive impacts on Thailand economy and exporting capacity

The Thai media has published some 600 major news items on relations between the EU and Thailand since 1 January 2000, about 60% of which focused on economic relations (articles with Thailand and EU in the title as stored on the nexis lexis database). However, about half of these reports were negative as they dealt with controversial issues such as the ban on Thai fresh poultry exports to EU the (2004-2006) and the temporary EU ban of imports of instant noodles from Thailand (2005), the prawn dispute (until 2006) and more recently, EU complaints about Thailand's policy of issuing compulsory licences for patent drugs and Thai customs valuation practice as well as Thailand's accusations of unfair anti-dumping duty collected by the EU on Thai canned sweet corn and clashes over EU sugar exports/subsidies.

Positive media reports focused on the advantages of the new poultry import regime for Thai chicken exporters; the significant increase in Thai shrimp exports to the EU following the restoration of GSP privileges; the benefits of two rounds of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 for Thai exporters due to the EU's common market tariffs averages 6.3 per cent being lower than the previous average tariffs of most new EU members and the increase of the amount of Thai products that can enter the EU duty-free as part of a compensation agreement for charges raised by countries that joined the organization in 2004; the benefits for Thai rice exporters from the EU ban on importing genetically modified rice (Thailand, as the world's leading rice-exporter, has reaped a windfall as orders for non-GE rice have kept rising), the proposed EU-ASEAN free trade agreement.

There is no hard evidence that media reports have positively or negatively impacted on Thailand's exporting capacity and EC-Thailand economic cooperation and dialogue.

Related facts, figures, and references:

References (selection)

Thai Press Reports, Thailand's Charoen Pokphand Food PCL (CPF) better prospects for chicken exports to the EU.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand takes EU to WTO anti-dumping 'court' on canned corn, 8 June 2007.

Thai Press Reports, Thai exporters may gain from EU's inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, 27 December 2006.

Thai Press Reports, Thai rice exporters to benefit on EU Ban on importing genetically modified rice, 24 October 2006.

Thai Press Reports, Thailand shrimp exports to EU lead to sharp jump in 2006 earnings, 17 May 2006

Thai Press Reports, EU to increase amount of duty-free Thai imports, 3 April 2006

Thai Press Reports, EU bans instant noodles from Thailand, 16 December 2005.

I 1.5.2 EC economic co-operation and dialogue are valued by decision makers and private sector representatives

Thai stakeholders who have already had contacts with the Delegation highly appreciate a close relationship with the EC.

I 1.5.3 Projects implementing agencies and beneficiaries aware of the originating support of the EC co-operation and the logic behind it

The project implementing agencies and beneficiaries of the SPF and the Thailand components of regional programmes such as ECAP, Asia ProEco, ATF, and Asia Invest in the trade and economic sectors were all aware of the EC origin of the support. Based on the interviews conducted in Bangkok, it can be concluded that Thai stakeholders comparatively well informed of, and have at least a basic understanding of the EC's intervention logic.

EQ2 - To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of higher education contributed to increase mutual understanding and awareness?

Background and references:

(1) In the formal strategising of the EC, Higher Education, along with social or governance issues, is a non-focal policy sector. However, this seems to underestimate the fundamental importance support for Higher Education plays in the Commission's strategy for Thailand. In one sense, this reflects the rapid socio-economic transformation of Thailand from a relatively poor developing country into a dynamic and innovative middle-income economy (CSP 2002-2006). For these types of countries, so the argument goes, direct development aid less effective than more programmes of institutional capacity-building and knowledge exchange. Accordingly, for Thailand, the "...*European Commission no longer sees its role as a donor of development assistance but rather as a facilitator of knowledge sharing and a partner for policy dialogue on key development issues*" (EUThaiSPF). At a time in which the mastery of knowledge, science and technology is believed to hold the key to sustainable economic success, the Commission views cooperation in the field of Higher Education as a pivotal element of an integrated programme of economic and trade policy (CSP 2004-2006, CSP, 2007-2013, NIP 2004-2005). On the one hand, cooperation in the field of Higher Education, then, aims to construct sturdy institutional architectures that will enable constructive and profitable cooperation among economic and scientific elites in the emerging knowledge-based global economy. On the other hand, the Commission hopes that these formal and institutional channels of interaction and communication will lead to a deeper and more profound understanding and appreciation of the EU as a political, social and, not least, an economic entity and potential partner (CSP 2004-2006). This, then, may explain why the EC prioritised spending on Higher Education programmes, notably the Erasmus Mundus Asian Window, for the NIP 2005-2006.

HE policy also serves other, less directly economic policy objectives. For example, support of the potentially pivotal role of universities in public life provides a politically unobtrusive platform to address sensitive political (i.e. death penalty, terrorism or ethnic unrest in Patani) and social issues (e.g. gender issues) (2). Another, possibly less obvious reason, is that the EC is highly experienced and commands an impressive set of institutional capabilities in policy domains such as HE. Much of the soft governance approaches that characterise European policy-making have been developed in the European RTD and HE policy domains. Higher Education is also a good policy niche for the EC as an international organisation: while the explicit anti-poverty brief of organisations like the World Bank prevent them from focussing on HE, the EC has no such policy constraints. For these reasons, higher education has retained its central position in the EC's strategy for Thailand in the near future (European Commission, CSP 2007-2013).

(2) The EC's interventions have rested on several programme spanning different levels of governance. Much of policy aimed at improving mutual awareness and understanding has rested on regional or Asia-wide policy programmes. These include AsiaLink, the now-defunct ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP), the EC's Framework Programmes (particularly, but not exclusively, the INCO programmes of FWP 5 and 6), and Erasmus Mundus (specifically the Asia/Thailand windows). In the future, the Commission has announced that the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window will replace the AsiaLink programme (External Relations Website). Although these programmes aim at different target populations and pursue different policy goals, all instruments have in common that they enable institutional cooperation on a wide range of issues as well as promote student and researcher mobility.

ASIA LINK

AsiaLink funds cooperative projects between Asian and European Universities in three field: Curriculum Development, Human Resource Development, and Institutional and Systems Development. The project is demand-driven, collaborative and project oriented. By late 2007, Vincent Picket (2007) points out, five calls for proposals had generated 1338 applications involving 4600 institutions. Out of these, 175 projects have been selected which the Commission has funded to the tune of 65 million Euro (Picket, 2007). By the 2005 call, Thai HEI were involved in about 31 of 155 projects (AsiaLink List of Projects, 2005).

Monitoring and evaluation exercises of the AsiaLink programme have generally liked what they have found. The programme was and has remained highly relevant to both the European Commission's objectives as well as the needs and challenges of the Thai Higher Education Systems (Piket, 2007; AsiaLink MR1). The programme, evaluators noted, enjoys considerable support among project partners (AsiaLink MR1). Evaluations concluded, Picket points out, that sustainability and effectiveness of the AsiaLink projects have been good (Piket, 2007). Management and the demand-driven, bottom-up design have proved to be highly effective (AsiaLink MR 2). AsiaLink projects have shown impact on the environment outside the immediate project consortia (Picket, 2007). Picket points out, without however quantifying or qualifying his observation, that AsiaLink projects have raised the interest in European Higher Education and its reforms (Piket, 2007). Thus, a monitoring exercise concludes that there "...are clear indications that the ALP is contributing to an enhanced economic & HE co-operation and mutual understanding between both regions" (AsiaLink MR1).

To what extent these generic benefits of the AsiaLink Programme apply to Thailand specifically remains an open question for which data was not readily available. It is interesting to note, however, that an AsiaLink project is more likely to be successful if it is built on existing EU-Asian partnerships (AsiaLink MR1). Complaints of government actors about overly bureaucratic procedures and cumbersome communication and information channels emphasise Moreover, evaluators discovered regional biases and imbalances

on both the European and Asian ends: Chinese HEI's did disproportionately well as did universities in the UK and the Netherlands (AsiaLink MR2). Incidentally, Thailand's Asian Institute of Technology, along with Wageningen University, was singled out as institutions that have disproportionately profited from the AsiaLink Programme (AsiaLink MR2). Indeed, Thailand is represented in something like 20% of all projects (AsiaLink Project list).

ASEAN - EU University Network Programme (AUNP)

The ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP) has enabled senior university management from both regions to exchange views, approaches and practices. Called into life by the signing of a financing agreement between the two regional organisations in 2000, the AUNP did not become operational until 2002 and ended, as stipulated in the initial agreement, in January 2006. The AUNP, costing a total of 7 767 500 Euro (of which the Commission funded 7 million EURO) consisted of two main strands. First, a grant-driven element supported collaborative projects in the fields of applied research, human resource development and curriculum development. Grants ranged from 100 000 to 200 000 EURO (AUNP Brochure) and did not exceed 2 years (AUNP website). Twenty such projects were granted between 2002-2006 (AUNP Website). Specific information on Thai participation in these projects was not readily available. The second strand, the so-called Network Initiatives, was of a more top-down nature. This comprised three activities: two ASEAN-EU rectors' conferences, three Round Table Meeting, as well as Technical Assistance to AUN (e.g. QA in HE and credit transfer systems) (Ratananukul, 2007).

The AUNP, perhaps because it has run its course, remains somewhat inscrutable. Programme documentation hints that there was a considerable lag between signing the financing agreement in 2000 and the beginning of programme activities in 2002. There is some suggestion that this may have negatively impinged on the completion of the collaborative projects (AUNP Website). Regrettably, more detailed information has remained elusive. This notwithstanding, Picket (2007) tells us that the final evaluation in 2006 found the AUNP to have "improved ASEAN-EU and ASEAN-ASEAN HE relationship". Again, what this means for Thailand's Higher Education policy domain is an open question that calls for more empirical investigation.

EC's Framework Programmes

The European Commission's Framework Programmes have provided a platform for research collaboration and cooperation between researchers in the EU and Thailand. The FWP's are highly complex and involved RTD programmes aimed primarily at promoting collaborative research in the EU and Europe. However, certain programmes allow the participation of non-EU or non-European partners. For example, FWP 6 provided three pathways into research collaboration for non-European researchers. First, seven so-called Thematic Priority Areas encouraged non-EU research participation (Life Science, genomics and biotechnology for health; Information society technologies; Nanotechnologies, multifunctional materials and new production processes; Aeronautics and space; Food quality and safety; Sustainable development, global change and ecosystems; Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society). Second, the INCO programme was funded at 315MEuro in order to stimulate RTD collaboration beyond the EU. Last, non-EU researchers can take part in the programmes aimed at "human resource development and mobility" (i.e. Marie Curie programmes) (Delegation of EC in Malaysia, 2004). The INCO programme in particular is designed to encourage research cooperation beyond the borders of the EU and EEC. In general, the FWP support cooperation at the coal-face of applied research. Mobility and human resource development, however, is Since 1998, Thai researchers and their institutions participated in at least 72 (3) projects sponsored by FWP 5, 6 and 7 (Cordis Database, 2008).

Opinion -- expert or otherwise -- on the way Thai participation in the FWP's has impinged on mutual awareness and understanding appears difficult to come by.

PTA

At the national level, the PTA project was externally evaluated and it is apparent that although there was value as a result of this programme, the evaluator raised issues that related to effectiveness (particularly related to added value), impact (which was seen as fairly limited and confined to certain EU countries) and Sustainability (which had a low rating). (Max, I have absolutely no idea where the author got this information).

Erasmus Mundus

Erasmus Mundus, the international arm of the Erasmus exchange programme, aims to "to promote mobility for students and academic staff worldwide to enhance international cooperation between Higher Education Institutions to pave the way to the international recognition of studies and qualifications to enhance the role of the higher education sector by exchanging knowledge, skills and expertise" (Erasmus Mundus Brochure, #####).

Launched in Thailand in 2004, it pursues these objectives with four different instruments, called actions. Action 1, the core of the Erasmus Mundus programme, consists of Erasmus Mundus Master Courses which comprise "integrated courses at masters level offered by at least three universities in three different European countries" (EM Eval, 2007). Action 2 is made up of mobility grants for students and researchers. Action 3 involves providing grants for collaborative partnerships between European and thiridon a specific HE and RTD issues. Action 4 funds collaborative projects that improve the attractiveness of European universities and higher education. Vitorio Borelli (2006) of the European Commission tells us that, by 2006, Erasmus Mundus had produced 110 Erasmus Mundus Masters Courses, funded 6,000 grants for incoming third-country students and 1,000 grants for incoming third-country scholars, established 70 partnerships, paid for 4000 outbound EU-students and 800 EU-scholars as well as financed 50 attractiveness projects. Overall, the programme spent 240M€ between 2004-2008. Additionally, the Commission allocated a further

56M€ for the Asian Windows in 2005-2006 (Borelli, 2006); Thailand's share of these window funds was 3.2 M€ (NIP, 2005-2006). Since 2004, 207 Thai students and 13 Thai scholars have received mobility grants from Action 2 of the Erasmus Mundus Programme (http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/mundus/projects_en.html). What is more, 3 Thai HEIs have participated in Action 3 projects since 2004 (http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/mundus/projects_en.html).

At the national level, the programme "Postgraduate Technological Programme (PST) at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) - Thailand" was an effective instrument for fostering understanding and awareness. The wider objective of the PTS was to contribute to building long lasting relationships between future European and Asian policy makers/business leaders, and consequently to improve the economic, political and cultural collaboration between EU and South and South East Asia. It had as an underpinning objective the development of mutual understanding and awareness. Its specific objective was to provide opportunities for Asian and European students to study in each other's regions, in order to gain a broader understanding of its particular cultural, economic and technical environment and development.

The interim evaluation of the Erasmus Mundus programme, a key policy instrument of the CSP 2002-2006 as well as the CSP 2007-2013, paints a rather encouraging picture. Evaluators judged the underlying rationale as well as the programme design to be highly congruent with a range of European policy objectives, not least the Higher Education cooperation with third countries (CSES, 2007). Similarly, the programme shows a high degree of internal coherence between programme objectives and the arrangements of different Higher Education policy instruments. Most importantly for our present purposes, however, evaluators found that, with "...regard to the promotion of intercultural understanding, EM has been successful in encouraging cultural exchange of experiences" (CSEC, 2007) so that the programme "...can be said to have begun to make a very positive contribution towards achieving key objectives - such as promoting the European and international dimensions in education, promoting academic excellence, fostering intercultural understanding and supporting structured co-operation in higher education between European HEIs and those in third countries" (CSES, 2007). Similarly, the analysis of student feedback (via an online survey) suggests that the basic foundations of the programme are sound: students judge academic content to be of a high quality, teaching facilities to be satisfactory, and the positive impact on their career to be very high (DG EduCul, 2007).

However, evaluators also point to some shortcomings. While student and scholar mobility (Action 2) seems to work very well, partnerships in Action 3 have seen low participation. Indeed, of the 19 partnerships between 2005 and 2006, Thailand was represented in 2 (Borelli, 2006). The student survey also suggested student dissatisfaction with the administrative problems as well as accommodation (DG EduCul, 2007). The Thailand CSP evaluations similarly discovered that Thai government representatives felt the Erasmus Mundus programmes to be too bureaucratic and not particularly forthcoming in terms of information (Lim et al, 2005).

"As far as the Commission is concerned, in keeping with the provisions of the ALA Regulation, we have developed three different types of economic co-operation programmes and projects, all designed to serve the mutual interests of the EU and of our partners in Asia. Firstly, we recognise that the psychological distance between Europe and Asia is often greater than the physical distance, and so there are programmes that aim to promote better mutual understanding and awareness. These programmes include those in the higher education field (...). Returning now to programmes designed to facilitate mutual understanding and awareness, and particularly programmes in the field of higher education, this area of EU-Asia economic co-operation is a priority for the Commission, as we are convinced that closer linkages among academic institutions and increased access to learning opportunities pertinent to EU-Asian relations result in enhanced understanding among the elite - academics, high level civil servants, and business people, - and facilitate an intensification of mutually beneficial economic co-operation. The Commission is especially keen to support activities that result in:

- * increased study of contemporary Asian affairs in Europe and of contemporary European affairs in Asia;
- * mobility of post-graduates and teaching staff;
- * special linkages among institutions focussing on fields with a major influence on economic co-operation (e.g. business studies, management training, engineering);
- * joint research and curricula development;
- * mutual recognition of academic qualifications;
- * increased availability of information on study opportunities in Asia and Europe.

In this context, there are four main activities that I would like tell you about: the Postgraduate Technological Studies (or PTS) programme; European Studies Programmes; The ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP) and Asia-Link." (Andrew Jacobs, 1999).

PST: The project followed the ideas and conclusions of the ASEM meeting in Bangkok, March 1996. The project was developed following several communications between the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The communications concerned the new Asia strategy and the new dynamic in EU-ASEAN relations (1994 and 1996) where the importance of co-operation in Higher Education was stressed.

Type The project was a pilot instrument to implement these general objectives for the strengthening of mutual understanding between Europe and Asia (and its cultural, economic and technical environment) leading to an increase in the European economic presence in Asia.

Context and evolution of project The project was based upon the ideas and conclusions of the ASEM meeting (Bangkok, March 1996). There were several communications from the Commission to the Council to the European Parliament about the new Asia

Strategy. These communications outlined the new dynamic in EU – ASEAN relations (1994-1996) where the importance of cooperation in higher education was stressed. The project was, therefore, considered as a pilot instrument to implement these general objectives for the strengthening of mutual understanding between Europe and Asia (and its cultural, economic and technical environment), leading to an increase in the European economic presence in Asia

The PTS programme was the logical development of a series of strategy documents and declarations that favoured the creation of a climate of mutual interest between Europe and Asia links. These documents stressed the particular need for inter – regional cooperation between universities facilitating human resource development and training. The policy document "Towards a new Asia strategy" emphasised that the union needs as a matter of urgency to strengthen its economic presence (In Asia) in order to maintain its leading role in the world economy. The document continues that priority should be given towards strengthening higher education links with Asia, including University cooperation schemes targeted towards Technological, Policy and Management studies. This policy direction is reinforced in the Objectives of the Council of Essen, which emphasised that in order to achieve long-term improvement in mutual understanding, cooperation in the field of higher education would be a priority. Similarly the Chairman's statement at the ASIA-Europe Meeting, Bangkok 1996 makes reference to "The meeting expressed the view that cooperation in the field of human resources development constitutes an important component of the economic cooperation between Asia and Europe."

(3) Douse, 2006; Foulkes et al, 2006; RIttler and Guiterez, 2008, personal communication.

(4) UNESCO (2008), *Global Education Digest 2008: Comparing Education Statistics Across the World*, UNESCO, Paris.

(5) The ACA reports that respondents did not appreciate the EU as a cohesive polity with respect to Higher Education. Instead of thinking of the EU as one entity in which different types of HEI compete for students, Thai respondents seemed to believe (with some justification, one might add) that differences in HE quality depend on the particular national setting. This is compounded by a significant lack of knowledge and information about Higher Education opportunities in countries other than the UK, France or Germany (ACA, 2007).

(6) Nonetheless, the overall impression of the quality of Higher Education as well as the quality of life in Europe was found to be favourable. Respondents pointed out the strengths of individual European countries, such as advanced technology, a wide range of cultures, relatively low tuition fees, less complicated entry requirements for further study and a shorter period of study for postgraduate level. For this reason, some respondents saw potential in HE cooperation. One respondent argued: "I think it will increase. The countries have started to be interested in each other more than ever. Some factors, like relationships or commercial status among countries help convince them to get to know and to learn about each other more than ever" (ACA, 2004, p.35). Further, Thai respondents perceived Europe as a safer, albeit more expensive, place to live than the US (ACA, 2004, p.40).

(7) ACA, 2007; Wächter, 2007

JC 2.1 Strengthened linkages between EU and Thailand academics and policy makers

European HE programmes have been successful in forging new and strengthening existing linkages between academics and HE policy-makers. All of the European Commission's Higher Education programmes relevant to Thailand sought to forge individual and institutional links in academia and HE policy-making. Broadly speaking, the FWPs have been responsible for promoting networks of researchers while AsiaLink has focussed on networks of academics aimed at curriculum and human resource development. The AUNP's NIS forged networks of HE policy-makers in addition to funding 21 collaborative research, curriculum development and human resource projects (the so-called PAPs).

The AUNP successfully strengthened linkages between European and Thai policy-makers. In particular, the recognition of qualifications and the transfer of credits, as well as the attendant wider issues of quality in HE, have been the focal point for HE policy-maker linkages. Since issues of qualifications, credit transfers and HE quality are common concerns across the Southeast Asian region, these challenges were addressed at ASEAN level in terms of the Networking Initiatives of the AUNP programme. The impact of these initiatives on HE-quality concerns in Thailand is strongest in terms of knowledge transfer which, in turn, has affected agenda-setting in Thai HE policy-making. However, the AUNP Network Initiatives have, as yet, to make a concrete impression on quality-relevant HE practices in Thailand. In terms of networking, the AUNP Network Initiatives created a novel and useful platform for deliberation of European and ASEAN HE policy-makers. However, these networks now seem to lie dormant.

Since 1996, European HE and RTD programmes at global, regional or pan-Asian level forged stable and, in part, sustainable institutional links between European and Thai HEIs. During the reporting period (and beyond), some Thai HEI's have been highly successful in securing participation in all relevant European HE programmes (AUNP, AsiaLink, Erasmus Mundus and the FWPs). Moreover, programmes such as AsiaLink, the AUNP, and FWP have introduced European HE practices at the level of research collaboration (e.g. networking and consortium management) and curriculum development (joint Masters degrees) to the Thai HE policy domain. The evidence suggests that these practices may have significantly contributed to the perceived qualitative transformation in relations and links between European and Thai HEIs. However, the benefits of European HE and RTD programmes are limited to recognised islands of HE excellence and have not diffused widely throughout the Thai institutional landscape of HE. It would seem that European HE programmes have been successful in helping Thai HEI's with existing potential for excellence realise this potential. Conversely, European HE programmes have been less successful in generating potential for excellence where it has not yet developed.

A corollary of the disjointed diffusion of best European HE practices is that while accurate perceptions of Europe as a place to study and conduct research are strong among beneficiaries of European programmes, these perceptions of European HEIs have yet to reach a broader audience of students, parents and researchers in Thailand. Commentators understand this to be the outcome of the quantity and distribution as well as the quality and penetration of knowledge about European HEIs. In other words, observers point out that a small quantity of information about European programmes is regionally and socially concentrated. Moreover, the immediate benefits of European Programmes for Thai students and faculty are not always clear.

There is little evidence that European HE policy instruments have made a measurable impression on HE policy-making and the HE policy debate in Thailand. The main reason, respondents agree, is that there is no real HE policy debate in Thailand on which the EU could make an impact. In what little debate there is, European models do not figure prominently. While there seems to be some interest in the Bologna Process, most policy-makers remain primarily interested in upgrading infrastructure without having a clear vision how this infrastructure contributes to the RTD landscape as a whole. While there is little evidence that European HE models have penetrated into the mainstream policy debate, there is some indication that HE policy actors in Thailand have adopted European best practices such as cost-sharing, project-oriented research collaboration or output-oriented project management.

I 2.1.1 Mutual recognition of academic qualifications

European HE programmes were successful in strengthening linkages between European and Thai policy-makers. In particular, the recognition of qualifications and the transfer of credits, as well as the attendant wider issues of quality in HE, have been the focal point for HE policy-maker linkages. Since issues of qualifications, credit transfers and HE quality are common concerns across the Southeast Asian region, these challenges were addressed at ASEAN level in terms of the Networking Initiatives of the AUNP programme. The impact of these initiatives on HE-quality concerns in Thailand is strongest in terms of knowledge transfer which, in turn, has affected agenda-setting in Thai HE policy-making. However, the AUNP Network Initiatives seem to as yet have made little concrete impression on quality-relevant HE practices in Thailand. In terms of networking, the AUNP Network Initiatives created a novel and useful platform for deliberation of European and ASEAN HE policy-makers. However, these networks now seem to lie dormant.

The perception and recognition of HE quality and academic work are pivotal challenges in the Thai HE policy domain. On the one hand, the perceived level and distribution of quality across Thai HEI's has been a barrier to effective cooperation with European HEIs. While some niches areas of research and teaching excellence in Thailand are known by potential European partners (1), evidence suggest that these tend to be concentrated in the HEI's around Bangkok (2). Outside Bangkok, observers suggest, the quality declines precipitously. This is particularly true for former teaching colleges that have been newly promoted to

university status. On the other hand, there is no systematic approach to recognising the academic work and study undertaken in either Europe or Thailand. For students both in Europe and in Thailand, the absence of an effective credit transfer system is a significant disincentive to considering an exchange (3). For faculty, the standard quantitative assessment of academic excellence – something a commentator calls the ‘default view’ – may present a distorted picture of actual competences and capabilities of specific Thai departments and institutes (4).

During the reporting period, quality and recognition became the focal point for linkages between European and ASEAN (including Thai) HE policy-makers. This occurred within the framework of the AUNP Network Initiatives (2003-2006). These Network Initiatives provided a platform for HE policy-makers from the EU and the ASEAN to deliberate about common problems and exchange knowledge about specific challenges (5). The AUNP Network initiatives organised two ASEAN-EU Rectors' Conferences (in Kuala Lumpur and Leuven) and three AUNP Round Table Conferences. At all these events, Thai HE policy-makers attended. Further, the AsiaLink programme organised a series of AsiaLink Symposia across Asia. These were coordinated, where possible, with AUNP NIS meetings (6). The Thai AsiaLink Symposium in Bangkok in 2006 not only provided AsiaLink project partners to exchange experiences but also created a forum in which policy-makers and practitioners could discuss HE policy issues. The event was attended by both senior S&T policy makers from the regions (i.e. the ministers of education from Thailand, Cambodia and Laos) as well as Europe (e.g. senior EU diplomats and the Director of EuropeAid) (7).

Despite the fact that these Network Initiatives “substantial knowledge transfer occurred in relation to Quality Assurance and Credit Transfer” (8), it is not entirely clear that these linkages have made much of an impact on the recognition of HE quality in Thailand. Respondents argue that to date there is little in the way of a systematic approach to the issue of academic recognition. Granting double degrees from studies at universities in both the EU and Thailand remains problematic (9). In general, observers contend, some Thai universities do not seem ready for a trans-regional or international credit transfer scheme and double degree programmes. While the AUNP proposals for a credit transfer system based on the European model has provided an impetus for debate, experts argue, in practice qualifications and credits are transferred on a case-by-case basis (10).

Similarly, observers note that the networks of policy-makers created by the AUNP have proven to be transient at the national level in Thailand (11).

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.
- (2) Respondent L, 2009; RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (3) Respondent D, 2009;
- (4) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009;
- (5) The relevant Networking Initiatives are: First AUNP Round Table Meeting on Quality Assurance in HE (Bangkok, December 2003); First AUNP Workshop on Credit Transfer System in ASEAN and EU (Bangkok, August 2004); Second AUNP Workshop on Credit Transfer and Credit Transfer Systems in ASEAN (KL, May/ June 2005); Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium; http://www.aun-sec.org/activities_within_dialogue_1.html
- (6) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.; Ratananukul, 2007
- (7) For more details, see http://www.chef-bangkok.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3&Itemid=7
- (8) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium
- (9) Respondent D, 2009; Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (10) Respondent D, 2009
- (11) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent D, 2009

I 2.1.2 Joint research and curricula development

European HE and RTD programmes at global, regional or pan-Asian level have been successful in forging stable and, in part, sustainable institutional links between European and Thai HEIs. During the reporting period (and beyond), some Thai HEI's have been highly successful in securing participation in all relevant European HE programmes (AUNP, AsiaLink, Erasmus Mundus and the FWPs). Moreover, programmes such as AsiaLink, the AUNP, and FWP have introduced European HE practices at the level of research collaboration (e.g. networking and consortium management) and curriculum development (joint Masters degrees) to the Thai HE policy domain. The evidence suggests that these practices may have significantly contributed to the perceived qualitative transformation in relations and links between European and Thai HEIs. However, the benefits of European HE and RTD programmes are limited to recognised islands of HE excellence and have not diffused widely throughout the Thai institutional landscape of HE. It would seem that European HE programmes have been successful in helping Thai HEI's with existing potential for excellence realise this potential. Conversely, European HE programmes have been less successful in generating potential for excellence where it has not yet developed.

Table 1 provides an overview of the number of projects with Thai participants (both HEI and RO).

Table 1:

	AsiaLink	AUNP	FWP 4	FWP 5	FWP 6	FWP 7
Curriculum development	13 (1)	4	-	-	-	-
Collaborative research	19	7	16	32	30	12

The AsiaLink, Erasmus Mundus (Action 3) and AUNP (PAPs) programmes funded projects aimed at joint curriculum development. Curriculum development comprises a formal funding category for the AsiaLink and AUNP programme. It was a less formal element in the Erasmus Mundus (Action 3) Programme (1). In terms of joint research, the European Commission's Framework Programmes are the primary vehicle for promoting research collaboration between Thai and EU research institutions. Additionally, however, the AUNP also funded cooperative applied research as a part of the PAPs. In the reporting period, no bi-lateral HE policy initiatives between the EU and the RTG were launched (2).

The figures indicate that Thai HEIs have been rather successful in securing a high level of participation in these programmes. In the AsiaLink Programme, Thai institutions make up just about 4.5% of all participating institutions. This places Thailand in second place after Vietnam (with 5.23% of all participating institutions) for all Southeast Asian countries. Similarly, Thai partners participated in over half of the AUNPs 21 PAPs. Significantly, Thai partners also coordinated project consortia in both the AsiaLink (4 projects) and AUNP (2 projects) programmes. Thai HEIs and ROs have participated in 90 projects funded in either the FWP 4, FWP 5, FWP 6 or FWP 7. This has resulted in about 146 contracts or participations for Thai ROs and HEIs (3). The data suggests that Thai participation in European Programmes has remained constant at a high level throughout the reporting period.

During the reporting period, European HE programmes in Thailand have facilitated the forging of stable links between Thai and European HEIs that have been sustainable in the medium-term (4). Due to the funding modalities and programme orientation, it is not surprising to see that the FWP projects enabled stable and more sustained collaboration. Nonetheless, there are some indications that AsiaLink and AUNP Partnership Projects also forged stable and sustainable links between Thai and European HEIs.

Out of the 106 projects that have given rise to 229 contracts/ participations, evidence suggests that European programmes enabled the formation of at least six stable research consortia in which Thai HEIs have been core members (note: A core member is a HEI or RO that takes part in more than half of the projects funded by European programmes). Table 2 provides an overview of these research consortia.

Table 2

Consortium	Core member
Aquaculture	Royal university of agriculture (kh) Universidade de aveiro (pt) Tribhuvan university (np) Research institute for aquaculture (vn)

	<p>University of agriculture and fisheries (vn) Centre de cooperation international en recherche agronomique pour le developpement (f) Cab international (uk) Stichting etc (nl) International center for living aquatic resources (my) Institut de recherche agricole pour le developpement (cm) Kasetsart university, faculty of fisheries (th) University of coimbra (pt) National aquatic resources research and development agency inland aquatic resources and aquaculture division (lk) University of peradeniya (lk)</p>
Malaria	<p>The natural history museum department of entomology National center for malaria control, parasitology and entomology Institut de recherche pour le developpement centre de biologie et gestion des populations National institute of malariology, parasitology & entomology Centre of malariology, parasitology and University teaching hospital department of paediatrics University of calabar college of medical sciences Department of pediatrics Fundacio privada clinic per a la recerca biomedica institut d'investigacions biomediques National institute for medical research London school of hygiene and tropical medicine department of infectious & tropical diseases Universite du mali faculte de medecine, pharmacie et d'odonto - stomatologie</p>
Aresunate	<p>Centre national de recherche et de formation sur le Fondation medecins sans frontieres access to essential medicines campaign Universite victor segalen Wellcome trust-mahidol university-oxford tropical medicine research programme University sains malaysia centre for drug research Instituto de tecnologia and famacos: far-manguinhos department of galenics Ellipse pharmaceuticals Drugs for neglected diseases initiative University of cape town department of pharmacology Knoll ag Ministry of health - ghana health research R p scherer gmbh & co. Kg Scanpharm s/a topstykket, Euro health group</p>
Soil science	<p>Mta foldrajztudomanyi kutato intezet (hungarian academy of sciences department of physical geography Agricultural research council (arc) - institute for soil, climate and water agricultural research council (arc) - institute for soil, climate and water Federal university of rio de janeiro lagesolos - laboratory for experimental geomorphology and soil erosion Hanoi agricultural university sustainable agriculture research and development center (sardc) The university of the gambia faculty of science and agriculture National agricultural research institute Katholieke universiteit leuven laboratory for experimental geomorphology The lithuanian institute of agriculture kaltinenai research station of the lithuanian institute of agriculture The catholic development office</p>
Plant genetics	<p>University of vienna faculty of earth sciences, geography and astronomy / institute of risk research Fundación 2001 global nature fundacion global nature Royal university of agriculture faculty of agronomy Hanoi agricultural university, faculty of land resources and environment department of environmental technology /faculty of land resources and environment The university of birmingham school of biosciences Edgbaston University of kassel institute of crop science / department for agrobiodiversity Agricultural research organization, the volcani center israel gene bank, plant science institute International plant genetic resources institute ecp/gr. And apo office</p>
Grassroots	<p>Royal university of agriculture (kh) Hue university, faculty Of economics (vn) National centre for social sciences and humanities National agriculture and forestry research institute University of hull centre for south-east asian studies Department of politics and asian studies</p>

Source: CORDIS Database; AsiaLink Website; AUNP project list

As Table 2 reveals, most of the stable consortia, with the possible exception of the two health related groups, have applied a wide range of disciplines to issues broadly within the environmental field (see I. 3.2.1 below). What is more,

the data suggests that European programmes have support large (Artesunate, Plant Genetics or Soil Science) as well as smaller consortia (Grassroots, Aquaculture). Notably, Thai HEIs are core as well as peripheral partners in at least one of the consortia (Aquaculture). Further, during the reporting period, Thai partners have been core partners in two forms of consortia architectures. On the one hand, HEP's such as AIT or Mahidol University are core members of a small group of HEIs that work with a much larger and much more variable group of peripheral actors from one project to the next. On the other hand, consortia such as the Soil Science or Plant Genetics feature a much larger group of core actors (including Thai HEP's such as Khon Kaen University or Chiang Mai University) with a far smaller size and variance of the peripheral group.

One way of assessing the sustainability of JR consortia is to compare their success in acquiring funds for further collaborative research from European projects (5). Table 3 displays the way different research consortia have performed across the different programmes.

Table 3

	AUNP	AL	FWP 4	FWP 5	FWP 6	FWP 7	Total
Aquaculture		1		1		1	3
Soil Science			1	1	1		3
Artesunate				2			2
Malaria Vector Control				2			2
Plant Genetics					2		2
Grassroots		1		1			2

Source: CORDIS Database; AsiaLink Website; AUNP project list

Table 3 shows that most stable consortia have been successful in acquiring two projects from different European projects. Two groups, the Soil Science and the Aquaculture consortia, have acquired three projects. The Soil Science consortium has been consistently successful in the FWPs: members of this group have managed to acquire a project in FWP 4, 5 and 6. The Aquaculture consortium has acquired funding for both JR projects (in FWP 5 and FWP 7) as well as a CD project in the AsiaLink programme. Here, both consortia follow a similar pattern of creating knowledge in one project and then acquiring funding for finding ways of disseminating this knowledge (6).

Different success rates in the European programmes imply varying degrees of sustainability. Table 4 compares the different periods of JR cooperation funded by the European programmes.

Table 4:

Consortium	Duration
Soil Science	1998-2009
Aquaculture	2002-2011
Malaria Vector Control	2001-2006
Artesunate	2001-2006
Grassroots	2001-2005 *
Plant Genetics	2006-2008

Source: CORDIS Database; AsiaLink Website; AUNP project list,

*Since no precise data on the duration of the AsiaLink projects is available, it has been assumed that consortium members exploited the full three years available.

As we can see, the duration and sustainability of the consortia varies considerably. While the Soil Science consortium has been collaborating for over a decade, the two projects in the Plant Genetics consortium lasted only two years. On average, then, European programmes have enabled consortia to cooperate for an average of 6 years.

Although the duration of AsiaLink projects generally was shorter, there are some indications to suggest projects funded by this programme also have forged stable links between Thai and European HEIs. However, on the available evidence to date, it would appear as if these links are perceived as being somewhat fragile. The evaluation of the AsiaLink programme concludes that all AsiaLink projects created international links (7); the evaluators assess three quarter of

these links to be “strong international networks” (8). Table 5 shows the two CD consortia examined for this study:

Table 5

Consortium	Members
Waste Management	Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg, Department of Waste Management (DE) Asian Institute of Technology Urban Environmental Engineering & Management Program (TH) , University of Padua, Image Department (IT), University Putra Malaysia, Department of Environmental Sciences (MY)
European Studies	College of Europe (BE) Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University (TH) University Sains Malaysia, School of Social Sciences Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen – Institut für Politische Wissenschaft (DE),

Source: AsiaLink Project List.

The available evidence for these consortia bears this out to some degree. On the one hand, the respondents in both consortia report strong institutional ties created during the AsiaLink projects. This includes mutual site visits (9), training programmes (10), and exchanges of graduate students (11). On the other hand, while the members of both consortia report that ties with European partners have remained intact after the end of the AsiaLink projects, all of the respondents interviewed seemed to perceive these links as fragile (12). After the AsiaLink project, that aimed to produce new teaching modules for advanced degrees in waste management, the consortium went on to successfully acquire an Asia Pro Eco project (13). However, the AIT did not take part in this AsiaPro Eco project (14). Respondents involved in the European Studies CD project point out that while links between the European (College of Europe) and Thai (USM) partners have become much weaker in the 2 years after funding had ceased (15). The problem here, they contend, is that relations are not institutionalised and are tied to particular individuals (16). A possible reason, a participant in one of the consortia suggests, is that the three year timeframe of the AsiaLink projects is too short for sufficiently institutionalising links (17): Although this claim needs more support, it is an interesting and relevant view with considerable implications for policy. Incidentally, however, the respondent claims that relations with the Thai partner (Chulalongkorn’s Centre for European Studies) have remained strong because they are institutionalised (18). For example, the International and Diplomacy Studies Master’s Programme at USM in Penang, the respondent claims, uses Chulalongkorn’s CES as external examiners.

The AUNP final evaluation argues that, on the whole, AUNP PAP groups proved sustainable. While many AUNP PAPs, so the argument goes, emerged from prior working relations, some PAP partnerships introduced partners for the first time (19). Indeed, the evaluator notes that several “... PPs not only applying and formalising project outputs but also continuing to work with their partners and sometimes, seeking further funding (e.g. through AsiaLink)” (20). However, the available evidence (21) provides no confirmation of this finding. Indeed, respondents argued that the AUNP projects, particularly the Networking Initiatives, faced sustainability issues (22). For example, one respondent pointed to an AUNP project in which Chulalongkorn University was involved. While it worked well and even was "great fun" for those involved, the outcomes of the project needed to be sold to the participants’ home institutions. This has proven difficult for a number of ‘good reasons’ such as changes in priorities and budgets, etc (23).

Despite these stable consortia, the majority of links forged by European programmes between Thai and European HEIs have been sustained in the short-term to medium-term only, at least with respect to further participation in European Programmes (24). In other words, only about 6% of linkages between European and Thai HEIs generated by European HE programmes were sustained beyond the short- and medium-term (25). The vast majority of participations in European programmes have not lead (as yet) to further participation in European JR or CD programmes.

The European HE programmes have provided a range of substantive and institutional benefits to participating HEI’s from Thailand (note: And, one might add, Europe). The JR projects -- aimed primarily at knowledge creation—have generated variety of knowledge products. These include traditional outputs such as journal articles or conference proceedings (note: It would seem as if the BORASSUS project produced eight journal publications (26). Other projects aim for more innovative forms of science dissemination. For example, the SARNISSA project has created a series of blogs on challenges of fisheries in Africa in order to break down language barriers that hinder the flow of information between Anglo-and Francophone aquaculture experts (27). Similarly the PREMA-EU project of the Malaria consortium publishes a regular newsletter about issues surrounding malaria and pregnancy (28). This, however, is in addition to

more traditional academic outputs such as conference presentations (29) and peer-reviewed articles (30). Moreover, the MALVECASIA project has produced health policy-relevant maps for controlling malaria vectors in Southeast Asia (31).

The CD projects examined in this study, in turn, generated new materials and approaches for graduate training. The waste management consortium used an AsiaLink project (the TETRAWAMA project) to produce teaching materials for waste management practices in developing countries (32). Essentially, project partners compiled case studies and transformed these into training modules for both waste management researchers and practitioners (33). Some of these teaching modules are available in print and e-book form (33). Other modules simulate waste management practices in so-called “interactive e-tools” (34). The European studies consortium developed and implemented the “Masters of International and Diplomacy Studies (European Studies)” at the USM at Penang in 2005 (35). Since this project, also funded by the AsiaLink programme, was focussed on developing and installing a functioning post-graduate programme in European Studies, the project has not produced any new knowledge. Last, the Aquaculture consortium’s CD project (36) has aimed to link different academic and industry knowledge-resources into post-graduate training programmes for aquaculture and aquatic resources management by devising a number of different internship programme (37). These placement programmes are now up and running: students can choose from a range of aquaculture internships in (for the time being) Thailand, Nepal and Vietnam (38).

The available evidence also suggests that European HE interventions have also generated institutional benefits for Thai HEI’s (39).

First, the EC’s HE programmes have been successful in exposing Thai HEIs to the international research community. Apart from forging links with European HEI, the EC’s HE programmes (particularly the FWP’s INCO programme) have exposed Thai HEIs to researchers and universities in South Asia (e.g. India, Nepal, Sri Lanka), East Asia (e.g. China), Southeast Asia (e.g. Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam, Laos), Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador), Africa (e.g. Malawi, Cameroon, Senegal) and the Middle East (e.g. Israel) (40). Notably, European HE programmes have also generated to stable link between Thai and other non-European HEI’s (41). Similarly, the Plant Genetics consortium established stable ties between Khon Kaen University and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Institute of Botany at the Chinese Academy of Sciences as well as the Hanoi Agricultural University (CORDIS Database).

Second, European programmes have enabled Thai HEI’s to work in multi- and interdisciplinary project consortia. Again, of the consortia examined, some are more pluralist than others and fall into three groups. First, the two medical consortia dealing with malaria are narrowly interdisciplinary in the sense that they brought together different disciplines within the life sciences (42). The second group of consortia reflect the multi-disciplinary and problem-oriented nature of their respective fields. Thus, in the waste management consortium we find environmental scientists, engineers and resource economists (43). Similarly, the European Studies consortium mirrors the multi-disciplinarity (within the humanities and social sciences) of the field of European Studies. Here, the consortium drew on the expertise of political scientists, literature professors and economists (44). Further, the consortia dealing with environmental issues (Soil Science, Aquaculture and Plant Genetics) brought together the range of disciplines and specialties that now populate environmental science (65). The third group of consortia managed to bridge the social science- humanities/ natural science-engineering divide (45). Here, the Grassroots consortium managed to create a framework for social scientists and environmental scientists to interact. There is no evidence that any of the projects achieved or aimed for transdisciplinarity.

Third, the available evidence also suggests that EC programmes have helped transfer best European HE practices to Thai HEIs. Participation in the AUNP (PAPs), AsiaLink and the FWP has not only exposed the affected Thai HEIs to new ways of knowledge production, knowledge dissemination, they have introduced them to European practices in proposal writing, project and financial management, reporting, and knowledge-dissemination (46).

It is likely that the benefits of institutional linkages and networks made possible by the European HE instruments have contributed, albeit in intangible and indirect ways, to change in HE in Thailand. Apart from the direct impacts of AsiaLink and AUNP projects (47), exposure to European best practices in proposal submission, inter-institutional collaboration or project management coincide with a qualitative transformation of practices in parts of the Thai HE landscape. Respondents seem to believe that institutional learning among HE policy-actors in Asia in general and Thailand in particular has taken place (48). During the reporting period, commentators point out that Thai HEI’s have matured and, consequently, collaboration is no longer simply capacity-building (49). This, in turn, has led to increased

interest on part of European HEIs for collaboration on projects such as mobility programmes or dual degrees with Thai HEIs has clearly increased (50). Moreover, respondents point to a change in the mode of collaboration. In the past European HEIs' strategy has comprised first choosing a funding platform, formulating the project second and, last, looking for Thai partners. Today, this process is reversed: projects are drafted within existing stable networks which then look for a suitable funding platform (51). Indeed, respondents point to a high and growing Thai participation in the FWPs (52). Similarly, the AUNP evaluation found that many of the PAP consortia – over half of which featured participation from Thai universities -- managed to overcome cultural differences and forged lasting cooperative relations (53). This, so the evaluator argued, was of particular value for partners that had cooperated for the first time (54).

However, while some HEIs in Thailand – notably the HEI's in and around Bangkok – have enjoyed the networking benefits of joint research and curriculum development projects, not all HEIs in Thailand have had the capacity or opportunity to participate in these programmes. Table 6 shows the distribution of contracts/ participations among Thai HEI's.

Table 6:

HEI	AUNP	FWP 4	FWP 5	FWP 6	FWP 7	AsiaLink	Total
Kasetsart University	3	4	4	4	0	5	20
Asian Institute of Technology	1	1	3	4	2	8	19
Chulalongkorn University	3	1	4	2	1	6	17
Chiang Mai University	1	2	3	4	0	3	13
Mahidol University	1	0	5	2	1	1	10
Khon Kaen University	1	0	1	2	0	0	4
King Mongkut Institute of Technology	1	0	0	1	1	1	4
Prince of Songkla University	0	0	1	3	0	0	4
Thammasat University	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
Naresuan University;	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Burapha University	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Joint Graduate School of Energy and the Environment	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Rangsit University	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Royal Thai Navy School of Marine Science and Technology	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Surinda Rajabhat School of International Relations	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Walailak University	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Rajabhat Institute Surin	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Suranaree University of Technology	1	0	0	0	0	0	1

Source: CORDIS Database; AsiaLink Website; AUNP project list

Table 6 shows that participation in European programmes has been highly selective. Of the roughly 93 public and private universities in Thailand (55), only 19 HEI's participated in European programmes (56). In other words, about 80% of Thai HEI's had no direct experience of the benefits of European HE programmes (57). Of these 19 Thai HEIs, the five universities (Kasetsart, AIT, Chulalongkorn, Chiang Mai, Mahidol) account for nearly 75% of all participations of HEIs in European programmes. If we include the HEIs with the next five highest participation rates (Khon Kaen, King Mongkut Institute of Technology, Prince Songkla, Thammasat University, and Naresuan

University), then the combined share of these universities in all contracts increases to about 91%. Most, but by no means all (c.f. Chiang Mai or Prince of Songkla University), of these universities are located in and around Bangkok. Thus, just over 10% of all Thai HEI's account for about 90% of all participations in European HE programmes.

Here, commentators point to a host of possible explanations. For one, observers point to persistent differences in institutional cultures that hamper cooperation and collaboration with European institutions. While European HEIs are familiar with collaborative research instruments and the logic of European programmes (i.e. regional instruments such as the FWPs), this is certainly not the case with all HEIs in Thailand (58). This is true despite systematic efforts by the National S&T Agency to promote the European Framework Programmes, particularly those oriented towards network building (59). Apart from language barriers, the discrepancy between conventional top-down and programmatic S&T policy-making and the new, more horizontal approaches have proven to be bottlenecks for Thai participation (60). Moreover, in Europe, internationalisation is in-built into HEI's practices: this is not necessarily the case with the new, teaching-oriented institutions in Asia (61). It would seem, then, that the fundamental institutional capabilities required to take part in European programmes – not least linguistic competence (62) – are concentrated in a few select HEIs. On the strength of existing evidence, then, we can tentatively conclude that European HE programmes have helped Thai HEI's with existing potential for scientific and teaching excellence to realize and channel this potential. So far, however, European HE programmes have been less successful at generating this potential for scientific and teaching excellence where it has not yet developed.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) Action 3 of the Erasmus Mundus programme has not been popular with HE policy actors (Rittler and Guterrez, 2009; Respondent L, 2009).
- (2) However, it is worth noting that Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University opened in 1997. The CES has been described as an “upgrade of the Chulalongkorn University European Studies Programme (CUESP)”, which had been funded by the European Commission since 1993. Commentators point out that the CES and its MA Programme in European Studies is a tangible, effective and sustainable output from a joint curriculum development initiative (Respondent D, 2009). Whether or not other CD projects (i.e. fro AsiaLink or the AUNP) will have an impact on HE practices in Thailand, an senior policy actor argues, remains to be seen (Respondent D, 2009).
- (3) CORDIS Database.
- (4) Here, the term “stable” denotes a network that has conducted more than one joint research of curriculum development project in European programmes. The medium term refers to duration of collaboration <5>10years.
- (5) Another interesting avenue of exploration would be to retrace whether research consortia have been able to acquire domestic funding to ensure sustainability. The experience from Europe is that domestic programmes, even those aimed at fostering international research collaboration, tend to be unsuitable for the types of interdisciplinary and international JR consortia created by the FWPs. The fieldwork uncovered no evidence of Thai RTD programmes for promoting these types if JR networks.
- (6) The FWP 5 project of the Soil Science consortium funded a large workshop (CORDIS Database).
- (7) Foulkes et al, (2006), “Evaluation of the EU Asia-Link Programme 2006”, Framework Contract Commission, EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Final Report, ECORYS Nederland BV.p.9
- (8) Foulkes et al, (2006), “Evaluation of the EU Asia-Link Programme 2006”, Framework Contract Commission, EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Final Report, ECORYS Nederland BV.p.9
- (9) Respondent U, 2008; Respondent V, 2008.
- (10) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
- (11) Respondent X, 2008.
- (12) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
- (13) CORDIS Database.
- (14) After the end of the Asia Pro Eco project, that encountered problems, the respondents report that ties have become somewhat dormant (Respondent U, 2008; Respondent V, 2008; Respondent X, 2008).
- (15) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
- (16) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009
- (17) Respondent S, 2009.
- (18) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009
- (19) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium; p.42, 46.
- (20) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium
- (21) CORDIS Database, AsiaLink List, Respondent D, 2009; Respondent, S, 2009; Respondent R, 2009.
- (22) Respondent D, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (23) Respondent D, 2009.
- (24) CORDIS Database.

- (25) For HEIs, alone (i.e. without ROs) this share increases to about 13%.
- (26) <http://www.borassus-project.net/>.
- (27) note: <http://www.sarnissa.org/tiki-index.php>
- (28) <http://www.prema-eu.org/prpublications.htm>
- (29) note: PREMA-EU papers presented at the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene meeting held in December 2003. Papers presented at the 3rd PREMA-EU annual partners' meeting, held in Amsterdam in April 2003, www.prema-eu.org/prpublications.htm
- (30) note: these include: Post-neonatal infant mortality in Malawi: the importance of maternal health, by Verhoeff F, le Cessie S, Kalanda B, Kazembe P, Broadhead R, Brabin B. This article was published in *Annals of Tropical Paediatrics*, 24, 2004, pp 161-169, and is posted with permission from Maney Publishing, London; Malaria and pregnancy: Clinical study in a general hospital of Sucre, Venezuela, 2000-2002, by Sanchez E, Vargas M, Piccolo C, Colina R, Arria M, Rodriguez AJ. Abstract published in *Venezuelan Journal of Infectious Diseases* 2003; 14:35-36; The contribution of malaria, by Bernard J Brabin and Francine Verhoeff. (pdf format) Chapter 6 in *Maternal Morbidity and Mortality*, by AB MacLean and JP Neilson. RCOG Press, 2002. For further information about this book visit The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists online bookshop. Copyright of this book is held by RCOG. It is permitted to download and print off a single copy for personal use only.; Do disturbances within the folate pathway contribute to low birth weight in malaria? Bernard J. Brabin, K. Alexander Fletcher and Nicholas Brown. (html format) This article was published in *Trends in Parasitology*, 19(1), January 2003, pp 39-43, Copyright 2003, and is posted with permission from Elsevier Science. <http://www.prema-eu.org/prpublications.htm>
- (31) Obsomer, http://www.epidemiology.info/promotions/Download/WS2_Frascati/Presentations/VObsomer20060307.pdf
- (32) <http://www.tu-harburg.de/aws/asia-link/default.htm>.
- (33) Respondent U, 2008; Respondent V, 2008; Respondent X, 2008.
- (34) Interactive etools can be accessed here: <http://www.tu-harburg.de/aws/asia-link/module.html>
- (35) <http://midspublic.coleurop.be/default.htm>; Respondent S, 2009, Respondent s, 2009.
- (36) Improving Master's Degree level education in Aquaculture and Aquatic Resources Management in Cambodia, Nepal and Vietnam
- (37) <http://www.aarm-asialink.info/objectives2.html>.
- (38) <http://www.aarm-asialink.info/Placements.html>
- (39) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent C, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (40) CORDIS Database
- (41) For example, the Soil Science consortium also created stable links between Chiang Mai University and two research organisations in China (Yunnan Agricultural University as well as the Government of Kedu Township' Soil and Water conservation section (CORDIS Database).
- (42) CORDIS Database
- (43) <http://www.tu-harburg.de/aws/asia-link/default.htm>.
- (44) Respondent R, 2009, Respondent Q, 2009, <http://midspublic.coleurop.be/default.htm>
- (45) CORDIS Database.
- (46) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent C, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (47) Douse, M. (2006), "ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)", Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium; Foulkes et al, (2006), "Evaluation of the EU Asia-Link Programme 2006", Framework Contract Commission, EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Final Report, ECORYS Nederland BV.p.9
- (48) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (49) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009
- (50) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (51) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (52) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent L, 2009.
- (53) Douse, M. (2006), "ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)", Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.
- (54) It is impossible to ascertain the lines of causality between European HE programmes and these perceived learning effects in this study. Partly, this is due to the severe resource constraints as well as the methodological architecture of this evaluation. Partly, however, this is also because there is a fundamental and inherent uncertainty about the cause and effect of policy change in complex, fluid and dynamic policy environments such as the Thai HE domain. In the past two decades, HE in Thailand has seen rapid expansion and a wide variety of different HE policies – mostly devised and implemented by the RTG. In a very real sense, HE policy of a wide variety of descriptions and from an even broader range of sources constantly criss-crosses through an open policy domain such as Thai HE. For example, Respondent C (2009) contends that strong ties between European and Thai HEIs have developed independently of European HE programmes. Similarly, Respondents E (2009), Respondent F (2009) and Respondent D (2009) argue that internationalisation of research and teaching is firmly enshrined in Thai HE policy.
- (55) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_universities_in_Thailand; note: This number disregards the Rajabhat Universities and the Rajamangala University of Technology.
- (56) ROs account for over half of all contracts/ participations in Thailand)

- (57) CORDIS Database
- (58) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009
- (59) . Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (60) Respondent I, 2009.
- (61) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009
- (62) Respondent I, 2009; Respondent E, 2009; Respondent F, 2009
- (63)

I 2.1.3 Increased availability of information on study opportunities in Asia and Europe.

Evidence suggests that the European Commission's HE interventions have been less successful in promoting accurate perceptions of Europe as a place to study (among prospective students and parents) and conduct research (among researchers and HEI administrators). Commentators understand this to be the outcome of the quantity and distribution as well as the quality and penetration of knowledge about European HEIs.

The primary finding of the ACA study both at global level and at the national level in Thailand is that information about study opportunities is scant and, where available, is not reaching the target audience. While the general perception of Europe, both as a place to live and a place to study, is good, these attitudes are fed more by conventional stereotypes (albeit positive) about Europe (1). In particular, evidence suggests that Thai's tend to appreciate Europe in terms in individual countries: it is very difficult to communicate to concept of the European Union to Thai students and parents (2). More informed opinions are based on knowledge from a very small selection of countries -- notably France or Germany.

What is more, there still seem to be misperceptions about the quality, specialisms and levels of European HEIs. For example, research in the Thailand report shows that a group of Interviewees had very fixed views about EU academic institutions. To quote, in the interviewees' opinion, each member of the EU is significantly different in terms of the quality of higher education, cost of living and living standards. The UK, France, and Germany are highly acceptable in different specialised areas. The UK, the most well-known country has a strong reputation for the quality of higher education in general, while France is highly recognised in creative and design study. Also, among Thais, Germany is famous for the engineering field and lower cost of study due to government support. However, other members of the EU are not recognised in any specific way and interviewees had no idea about their higher education system (3).

At the level of researchers and scientists, misperceptions about the European research landscape are also evident. For example, the AUNP evaluator points out, somewhat bemused, that ASEAN AUNP participants complained that what they perceived as being top-level universities (Oxbridge, Sorbonne and Bologna) were not involved in the AUNP (4). This, the evaluator continues, does not reflect the reality of European HE landscape in which actors know that the most renowned universities are not necessarily the most suitable institutions for exploring innovative modes of research collaboration. In Europe, old and prestigious universities are, in general, not known for being early adopters of institutional innovations (5).

Part of the reason is that, with the possible exception of the Erasmus Mundus programme and its attendant HE fairs, European programmes have not been very visible to Thai and European HE policy actors. The AUNP evaluation found that "...opportunities for EU visibility were seldom seized" (6). Knowledge of participation in AUNP PAPs and NIs among policy-makers and university representatives was generally poor. A related issue here is the lack of information on education in the EU. Similarly, a strategic evaluation of the Thailand CSP found that government officials feel that for both AsiaLink and Erasmus Mundus, information is difficult to obtain (7). Government officials, evaluators reported, contend that websites for AsiaLink and Erasmus Mundus were too complicated and difficult to navigate (8).

Notes

- (1) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31.
- (2) Respondent D, 2009.
- (3) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 /

001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31.

- (4) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.
- (5) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.
- (6) Douse, M. (2006), “ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)”, Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium, p.4.
- (7) Lim et al., 2005
- (8) Lim et al., 2005

I 2.1.4 Reference to EC models in sector policy documents and debates among policy makers

There is little evidence that European HE policy instruments have made a measurable impression on HE policy-making and the HE policy debate in Thailand.

The main reason, respondents agree, is that there is no real HE policy debate in Thailand on which the EU could make an impact (1). Commentators point to a growing awareness of the importance of HE among Thai policy-makers. However, debate is limited to the upgrading of faculty and tends to concentrate on target number of instructors with PhD (2). Significantly, commentators contend, there is no real debate about quality in HE or what one would use quality in HE for (3). In Thailand, policy debate has yet to connect HE policy with knowledge-driven industries and professions (4). The result is that often, universities will create good research infrastructure (i.e. labs) without the corresponding linkages to knowledge-based industries beyond the university (5). Respondents identified a similar problem in the field of technological innovation. Thailand has the full range of organisational and institutional structures available elsewhere in Asia or Europe (i.e. science parks, competence centres, etc.). However, while very successful in Europe or Taiwan, these institutions have not managed to create a synergy between knowledge-production and industry (6).

While inappropriate institutional incentives in HE and S&T organizations may account for part of this problem (7), evidence suggests that it also points to a more structural challenge (8). Observers do not believe the Thai economy to be knowledge-based (9). The Thai economy has successfully diversified but has not managed to upgrade to a more knowledge-driven model (10). Although there are signs of increased awareness of the knowledge-economy/ knowledge-society, the debate is still rather limited. In sum, the knowledge economy/ society is not a term in currency (11). The implication here is that this will require structural change (12).

In what little debate there is, European models do not figure prominently (13). There seems to be some interest in the Bologna Process and the EHEA, particularly in relation to the regional harmonisation of ASEAN HE systems (14). Most policy-makers, however, remain primarily interested in upgrading infrastructure (15) without having a clear vision how this infrastructure contributes to the RTD landscape as a whole. Part of this process has included the establishment of the “Office of the National Education Standards and Quality Assessment” (ONESQA) in 2000 (16). Commentators claim that the development of QA processes in Thailand have been informed by European HE Quality Assurance models, communicated predominantly through the AUNP Network Initiatives (17).

While there is little evidence that European HE models have penetrated into the mainstream policy debate, there is some indication that HE policy actors in Thailand have adopted European best practices. For example, the AIT has modelled its own collaboration programmes in terms of European cost-sharing and co-financing practices (18). Similarly, some universities in Thailand have developed professional programmes as well as centres of competence/ centres of excellence (19). At regional level, programmes such as the AUNP have introduced European HE practices as templates for HE reforms in the ASEAN in general and Thailand in particular. For example, the ASEAN Credit Transfer System, to be organised and administered by the ASEAN Secretariat, is to be modelled on the ECTS (20). What is more, respondents argue that the Quality Assurance activities, also organised in terms of the AUNP’s Networking Activities, have also informed Thai

HE policy-making during and beyond the reporting period (21).

Notes:

- (1) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; Respondent D, 2009.
- (2) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (3) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (4) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (5) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009
- (6) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (7) Part of the reason is that these institutions are very bureaucratic and do not create the right types of incentives for innovation and technological spin-offs (RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009): rather than responding to sector requirements, these organizations create rather bureaucratic incentive structures (RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009).
- (8) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009
- (9) Respondent D, 2009; RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (10) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (11) Respondent D, 2009.
- (12) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (13) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent D, 2009.
- (14) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009, Moshidi Sirat, 2008, <http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2008/10/21/towards-harmonisation-of-higher-education-in-southeast-asia/>
- (15) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (16) World Bank, Thailand Country Summary.
- (17) Respondent L, 2009; This claim could not be confirmed. In any case, the inclusion of EC models has not been explicit and is, hence, a matter of interpretation.
- (18) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (19) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (20) Douse, M. (2006), "ASEAN – External Final Evaluation of the ASEAN-EU University Network Programme (AUNP)", Framework Contract EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/MULTI , Cambridge Education Consortium.
- (21) Respondent L, 2009.

JC 2.2 Promotion of intercultural understanding

The European Commission's interventions have effectively stimulated intercultural understanding by promoting student and faculty mobility as well as furthering interest in contemporary European affairs. However, the impacts of these successful initiatives have been socially and regionally localised.

The European HE policy interventions effectively promoted intercultural understanding by providing high quality student and faculty mobility from Thailand to the European Union. The main instrument here was the Erasmus Mundus programme, specifically the Special Windows for Thailand (2004-2006). Evidence suggests that student and faculty exchanges funded by European HE programmes provided a deeply formative and highly valued experience. Participants perceive the Masters courses as well as the nature of the cultural exposure to be both unique and of very high quality. This is why evaluators and commentators note that the Erasmus Mundus Programme, like the AsiaLink Programme, has successfully established a truly European brand of HE programmes in Thailand.

Despite the success of the Erasmus Mundus Programme, both in terms of the quality of exchanges as well as in terms of branding and visibility, the programme did not impact significantly on perceptions and misperceptions of Europe as a place to study and conduct research. Part of the reason is that exchanges were limited to a small proportion of the Thai population of students and faculty. Another part of the reason is that the success in branding the Erasmus Mundus programme has not been translated into altered perceptions of European HEIs overall. More fundamentally, commentators point out that the Erasmus Mundus Master's Programmes are perceived to offer little in terms of value-added for student's net worth in the Thai labour market. What is more, during the reporting period the flow of students and faculty between the regions has been asymmetrical with many more Thai students and faculty visiting European institutions than vice versa.

On the ground, the European Commission's support of the Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn

University has contributed to intercultural understanding both within academia as well as Thai society as a whole. The CES's institutional mission is to promote understanding of and interest in contemporary European affairs. The CES pursues these aims using a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, the Centre provides informative programmes for the general public (seminars, website, publications, etc.). Here, observers argue, the Centre's success has earned it significant prominence in Thai society. Not only have evaluations of the CES been positive, the institute enjoys a high standing in Thai society. For example, the CES is involved in the ongoing ASEAN FTA negotiations. What is more, the CES was instrumental in setting up the European Studies Master's course in the University Sains Malaysia at Penang. On the other hand, the Centre provides an MA in European Studies as well as GE courses for the university as a whole. The centre is the only one of its kind in Thailand. It has no offices in other HEIs in or outside Bangkok.

I 2.2.1 Mobility of post-graduates and teaching staff

The European HE policy interventions successfully promoted intercultural understanding by providing high quality student and faculty mobility from Thailand to the European Union. The main instrument here was the Erasmus Mundus programme, specifically the Special Windows for Thailand (2004-2006). While other HE programmes, notably AsiaLink and the FWP's Marie Curie Fellowships, were also involved in promoting mobility, the number of students and faculty exchanges supported during the reporting period is so small as to be negligible. In terms of intercultural understanding, student and faculty exchanges funded by European programmes – predominantly the Erasmus Mundus Programme -- provided a deeply formative experience. Despite the success of the Erasmus Mundus Programme, both in terms of the quality of exchanges as well as in terms of branding and visibility, the programme did not impact significantly on perceptions and misperceptions of Europe as a place to study and conduct research. Part of the reason is that exchanges were limited to a small proportion of the Thai population of students and faculty. Part of the reason is that the success in branding the Erasmus Mundus programme has not been translated into altered perceptions of European HEIs overall. More fundamentally, commentators point out that the Erasmus Mundus Master's Programmes on offer little in terms of value-added for student's net worth in the Thai labour market. What is more, during the reporting period the flow of students and faculty between the regions has been asymmetrical with many more Thai students and faculty visiting European institutions than vice versa.

The Erasmus Mundus Programme, specifically Action 2, has been responsible for the lion share of student and faculty mobility. Since 2004, this programme has funded the mobility of about 207 students and 13 scholars (1). This figure roughly breaks down as follows:

Erasmus Mundus -- Action 2

Year	2004-2005	2005-2006		2006-2007		2007-2008		2008-2009	TOTAL
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>AW</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>AW</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>AW</i>	<i>Reg</i>	
<i>Student</i>	1	32	28	14	53	41	-	38	207
<i>Scholar</i>	-	1	-	2	-	2	-	8	13

Evidence suggests that the EM programme has been the most visible EU policy intervention in the HE sector (2). This, it would seem, is particularly true for the HE Fairs, which have been well attended by students, faculty and policy-makers (3). They have also received considerable attention from the media in Thailand (4). A significant success of the Erasmus Mundus Programme in Asia, evaluators argue, lies in the establishment of a truly European brand of HE programme in the region (5). Commentators point out that the EM programme, particularly the Special Windows for Thailand, marked a change in student and faculty mobility from Thailand to Europe (6).

The FWPs also provide mobility grants (i.e. the Marie Curie Fellowships). There is no information whether Thai researchers have received any mobility grants from the FWPs.

The AsiaLink programme funded projects under the heading of "human resource development". Broadly, these involved enabling the mobility of teaching faculty within the project network. Of 31 AsiaLink projects featuring Thai participation, 6 were designated HRD (again, the ambiguity of the project list means that this figure may be higher). The AsiaLink evaluation points out that the impacts had less on an impact on student mobility than on human resource development or student labour market participation (7).

The Post-Technological Studies (PTS) programme – a student mobility programme funded by the European Commission and implemented by the Asian Institute for Technology (AIT) – moved about 180 students between Europe and Asia between 1999 and 2001. Unlike the other programmes, the PTS programme funded exchanges of 90 students from Asia (including Thailand) and 90 students from Europe.

The impact of the European Commission's mobility programmes on intercultural understanding has been significant but selective. Evidence from Thailand and elsewhere in the region suggests that exchanges, particularly in the Erasmus Mundus Programme, are highly valued for three reasons.

First, the Erasmus Mundus scholarships, experts as well as beneficiaries agree are generous (4). The EM student feedback survey reports that 65.5% of respondents believe that the grant is adequate and 7.1% think the grant is "much higher than necessary" (8). This is echoed by the interview by the EM alumnus who claimed that the grant allowed her to live 'comfortably' in Hungary and Sweden (9).

Second, the cultural exposure to Europe and Europeans is perceived as beneficial and enriching. Europe as a study destination has become increasingly popular with Asians. On the one hand, European universities are less costly than American universities. On the other hand, the cultural opportunities in Europe (museums, opera, theatre, etc) are perceived to be more plentiful in Europe (10). Significantly, respondents felt that Europe is perceived to be a relatively safe place in terms of crime (11). Survey data and interviews reveals that participants appreciate and make use of the opportunity to travel and see Europe (12): 86.3% of respondents of the EM survey see the academic value of mobility as high or very high (13). Moreover, the Erasmus Mundus programme enables students to meet people from around the world (14).

Third, the quality of the course and the teaching is perceived to be at a very high level. The alumnus interviewed spoke of high quality resident lecturers that had an excellent grasp of their specialized fields. These were complemented by high calibre guest lecturers and guest speakers. The exposure to practitioners was particularly appreciated by the alumnus. European universities, it was noted, demand and encourage critical thinking and creativity (15). The alumnus' views resonate strongly with findings from the EM student feedback survey: 57,3% if respondents rate the study programme as excellent or very good while 33.5% are satisfied with the study programme they chose. Similarly, 59,4% of all respondents rated the availability of teaching staff as very good or excellent (16). For university administrators and HE policy-makers, in turn, the programme offers opportunities for internationalization of teaching. The wide choice of Master's courses in the programme helps diversify curricula in Malaysian universities (17)

However, other evidence suggests that the positive experiences and perceptions have not yet made a discernible impact on the attitudes of the larger pool of prospective exchange students and faculty in Thailand. Table 1 displays the top five preferred destinations of mobile Thai students.

Table 1

Year	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth

2006	U.S.A. (9,076),	Australia (5,014)-1,	U.K. (4,206),	Japan (1,623),	Germany (823)
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Part of the reason is that the numbers of students involved in exchanges during the reporting period (just over 200) is very small in terms of the pool of potential students (18). In terms of numbers, it seems as if the European mobility programmes did not significantly contribute to the overall number of student exchanges (19). Significantly, however, evidence suggest that the mobility programmes of the European Union made little impression on the preferred exchange destinations of Thai students in the reporting period. In 2006, there were 24 082 Thais studying abroad (20). Of these, most preferred to study in the USA (9076 students) followed by Australia (5014 students). The UK is the third preference (with 4206 students); Germany is the fifth (with 823 students) after Japan (with 1623 students) (21).

This seems to confirm the ACA study of Thai perceptions of European Higher Education that suggests much of what students, pupils, education professionals and parents think goes little beyond selected national stereotypes (22). Perceived language barriers, the cost of living as well as the perceived cultural and education diversity in Europe make prospective Thai students prefer Anglophone countries. Yet, the ACA is adamant that there is considerable potential in Thailand for the EU and HEIs in the EU to tap. What perceptions of European HEIs existed were predominantly positive. Bernd Waechter of ACA sees a strong potential for a European brand. The challenge for European HE policy-makers, he continues, will be to create a single European HE brand that unites all the common features of HE in Europe. So far, indications are that this has not yet happened (23).

However, there is reason to believe that lack of visibility, publicity and an effective communication strategy may only be a symptom of a more fundamental problem. A particular commentator argued that research institutes and potential students are well aware of both the need and opportunities for internationalisation (24). Internationalisation is part of the national S&T strategy and students are adept at getting hold of the relevant materials from a wide range of sources (e.g. web-sites, education fairs, national agencies such as the British Council). The real problem is that the advantages and benefits of a European exchange in terms of labour market opportunities in Thailand are highly unclear (25). Thai students, so the argument goes, look very closely at the potential value-added of an exchange in Europe: as a rule, they are not finding much to encourage an exchange (26). Although more research is needed to undergird this claim, the perception resonates strongly with quantitative data on Asian perceptions of Europe and mobile students' destination preferences. Thai students, this data suggests, are suspicious of the value of studying in Europe. The ACA study points out that Europe is perceived by Asian and Thai students more expensive than Australia but less expensive than the USA (27). Nonetheless, as we have see, the USA has remained the most preferred destination for mobile Thai students during and after the reporting period. Partly this is due to the justified belief that US universities provide more scholarships (28). Partly, however, this is due to the fact that there is a tendency among Asian students to discount the quality of European universities (29). This, then, suggests that Thai students perceive degrees from European HEI's as being of less marketable value than those of US HEIs.

Intercultural learning has also been localised and selective in the sense that much of the movement between Thailand and the European Union has been one-way, that is from Thailand to the European Union. Although quantitative data for inbound mobility into Thailand in the reporting period is lacking, the overall flows between the two regions are significantly lopsided (30). In 2006, 431 090 students from East Asia and the Pacific studied in countries from North America and Western Europe. Students in US universities accounted for more than half of this figure (24 713). Conversely, 33 837 students from North American and Western European countries were studying in universities of the East Asia and the Pacific region (31).

Commentators on the ground contend that European mobility programmes hinder and even prevent

– mostly through prohibitive financial disincentives -- European students from choosing to visit a Thai university (32). While in the past, demand for exchanges into Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular was modest – mostly due to the perception of poor HE quality in Thailand -- there is some indication that this may be changing. Commentators point out that European students are increasingly seeking exposure to Southeast Asia as a strategic attempt to globalise their studies and thereby increase their chances on ever-competitive global labour markets (33).

Notes:

- (1) http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/mundus/news_en.html
- (2) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent D, 2009.
- (3) Respondent L, 2009; <http://www.ehefs.org/web/>.
- (4) Respondent L, 2009
- (5) Respondent O, 2008; Respondent Q, 2008.
- (6) Respondent D, 2009; However, this particular expert also pointed out that the EM programmes do not easily fit into the career paths of the typical Thai student. The EM masters programmes seem to cater to outliers and highly specialised career plans (e.g. a student who studied for a Master's Degree in a space engineering related field). This opinion requires further research.
- (7) Foulkes et al, (2006), "Evaluation of the EU Asia-Link Programme 2006", Framework Contract Commission, EuropeAid/116548/C/SV, Final Report, ECORYS Nederland BV.
- (8) DG EduCul (2007), *How Well is Erasmus Mundus Performing. Results of Student Feedback*, The Third Erasmus Mundus Student Seminar, Brussels 11-12 October 2007.
- (9) Respondent P, 2008.
- (10) Respondent O, 2008; Respondent Q, 2008 Academic Cooperation Association (2006), Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31; The ACA report, however, argues that their research suggests these cultural advantages are less important to Asian students.
- (11) Respondent O, 2008; Respondent Q, 2008 ; Respondent P, 2008; Academic Cooperation Association (2006), Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31.
- (12) DG EduCul (2007), *How Well is Erasmus Mundus Performing. Results of Student Feedback*, The Third Erasmus Mundus Student Seminar, Brussels 11-12 October 2007; Respondent P, 2008
- (13) DG EduCul (2007), *How Well is Erasmus Mundus Performing. Results of Student Feedback*, The Third Erasmus Mundus Student Seminar, Brussels 11-12 October 2007.
- (14) Respondent P, 2008
- (15) Respondent P, 2008
- (16) DG EduCul (2007), *How Well is Erasmus Mundus Performing. Results of Student Feedback*, The Third Erasmus Mundus Student Seminar, Brussels 11-12 October 2007.
- (17) Respondent O, 2008; Respondent, Q, 2008
- (18) In 2005, the enrolment in tertiary education in Thailand was about 2.3 million (UNESCO, 2007). Even allowing for inflation due to definitional issues (i.e. counting polytechnics and teacher training colleges), the proportion of students affected by European mobility programmes is very small indeed.
- (19) And neither should it be expected. The aims, scope and funding of the Erasmus Mundus programme by design preclude any significant increases in student flows between Thai and European HEIs. To put the numbers in perspective, consider the following: the entire Erasmus Mundus programme from 2004-2009 funded 4398 exchanges worldwide (Erasmus Mundus Website, 2009); in 2006 alone, something like 2,6 million students spent time in universities of another country.
- (20) UNESCO (2008), Global Education Digest 2008, UNESCO, Paris.
- (21) UNESCO (2008), Global Education Digest 2008, UNESCO, Paris
- (22) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31
- (23) Waechter, Bernd (2007), *Perceptions of European higher Education in Third Countries*, Erasmus Mundus Conference – Cooperation and Promotion, Brussels November 28, 2006
- (24) Respondent D, 2009.
- (25) Respondent D, 2009.
- (26) Respondent D, 2009.
- (27) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31, p.224
- (28) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31, p.225
- (29) Academic Cooperation Association (2006), *Perception of European Higher Education in Third Countries*, Project 2004 – 3924 / 001 – 001 MUN-MUNA31, p.224
- (30) UNESCO (2008), Global Education Digest 2008, UNESCO, Paris.

- (31) This group includes Australia (22753), New Zealand (4986), and Japan (3848) that account for the lion-share of these exchanges.
- (32) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent O, 2008; The exception here has been the PTS and the subsequent practices at the AIT. Throughout, the AIT has had a fairly even balance between European and Thai/ Asian students (Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009). AIT provides an intercultural environment and offers the student from Europe a pan-Asian environment in addition to the Thai setting (Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent C, 2009). Respondents have argued that AIT has been underutilised as a strategic resource for promoting intercultural understanding in the HE sector (Respondent C, 2009; Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009).
- (33) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009

I.2.2.2 Increased study programmes and attendance of contemporary of contemporary European affairs in Thailand

The European Commission's support of the Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University has contributed to intercultural understanding both within academia as well as Thai society as a whole. The Centre for European Studies (CES), established in October 1997, grew from the Chulalongkorn University European Studies Programme (CUESP) funded by the European Commission from 1993-1997. Since 1997, the CES is funded by the RTG. Initially the CUESP programme promoted faculty mobility between Thailand and the EU. Later the programme also dispensed scholarships and grants for students.

The CES's institutional mission is to promote understanding of and interest in contemporary European affairs. The CES pursues these aims using a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, the Centre provides informative programmes for the general public (seminars, website, publications, etc.). Here, observers argue, the centre has gained significant prominence in Thai society. Not only have evaluations of the CES have been positive, the institute enjoys a high standing in Thai society (Respondent D, 2009). For example, the CES is involved in the ongoing ASEAN FTA negotiations. On the other hand, the Centre provides an MA in European Studies as well as GE courses for the university as a whole. The centre is unique in Thailand.

The CES has also been active in promoting European Studies beyond the borders of Thailand. The Centre has been instrumental in establishing the Masters of International and Diplomatic Studies (European Studies) at USM in Penang. This post-graduate programme, set up by a consortium of four universities (USM, College of Europe, Tübingen, and the CES at Chulalongkorn University) funded by an AsiaLink Project (see I 2.1.2 above), was a top-down initiative suggested to the College of Europe by the Malaysian ambassador in Brussels (1). The idea, the respondents report, was to install a European studies programme at the USM in Penang to complement the Asia-Europe Institute at the University of Malaya (2). Since its launch in 2005, the programme has, in the words of one of the organisers, "been running at 50% effectiveness" (3): the number of student enrolled in the master's course has shrunk from 30-40 in 2005 to 7 students in 2009 (4). While many of these students are from abroad (e.g. Vietnam, Laos, Africa), most Malaysian students have been from the Foreign Service (5).

Notes

- (1) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
(2) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
(3) Respondent S, 2009.
(4) Respondent S, 2009; Respondent T, 2009.
(5) Respondent T, 2009.

JC 2.3 Facilitated intensification of mutually beneficial economic co-operation

During the reporting period, HE cooperation between Thailand and the EU has concentrated on environment research and sustainable development. Thai FWP involvement has been directed mostly at environmental issue as well as fisheries and agriculture. AsiaLink projects have managed to concentrate more economically relevant sectors such as engineering, marketing or management. Yet, here too, the environment

and sustainable development have proved popular research themes. The two Erasmus Mundus Action 3 projects are also oriented more towards the public interest (public health and legal studies).

The overall focus on sustainability issues, however, does not preclude some cooperative research in areas of more direct economic significance, such as engineering or business studies. In particular, the AsiaLink programme funded projects in these more economically-oriented sectors.


The reasons for this distribution of projects is, first, that the bottom-up, demand-driven nature of research collaboration instruments reflects the priorities and perceptions of the local research landscape and, second, that institutional and ideational linkages between economic sectors and knowledge-production in Thailand are not strongly developed (see I 2.1.4).

I 3.2.1 Special linkages among institutions focussing on fields with a major influence on economic co-operation (e.g. business studies, management training, engineering)

Overall, research cooperation has focused on issues of the environment and sustainable development. The AsiaLink programme has funded cooperative projects in more economically-oriented sectors. The reasons for this distribution of projects is, first, that the bottom-up, demand-driven nature of research collaboration instruments reflects the priorities and perceptions of the local research landscape and, second, that institutional and ideational linkages between economic sectors and knowledge-production in Thailand are not strongly developed (see I 2.1.4).

The focus of much of the cooperative research projects that featured Thai participation was predominantly on environmental issue areas (see EQ 4, below). The European Commissions' Delegation to Thailand (2007) points out that most projects concerned ecosystems, fisheries and agriculture, as well as health. Similarly, Thai-EU cooperation in international dialogues concentrates on food and feed chain protection as well as the Kyoto Protocol's CDMs. In regional dialogues, Thai and the EU HEIs are cooperating primarily in the ASEM water initiative.

Overall, the thematic spread of all AsiaLink Projects is as follows:



Source: Foulkes, et al, 2006

The 31 projects involving Thai organisations fall into the following categories:

- Business and Economics: 7
- Design, Engineering, Transport: 10
- Geography, Planning Tourism: 1
- Environment, Sustainable Development: 8

- Social and Political Sciences: 2
- Agriculture, Rural Dvlp, Food: 3 (1)
- Last, the two projects in Action 3 of Erasmus Mundus are:
- the Erasmus Mundus International Legal Studies masters course coordinated by
- the University of Hannover (CHULALONGKORN University)
- Erasmus Mundus tropEdNetwork masters course (KHON KAEN University(Faculty of Public Health))

In a very real sense, the distribution of projects reflects the fact that the Thai economy is knowledge-driven or research-based. Evidence suggests that although the Thai HE and wider RTD domain are institutionally well equipped (i.e. universities, research organizations, science parks, technology incubators, etc.), the actual linkages between research, innovation, product development and marketing are still in a state of development (2). Commentators observed that the Thai economy is not fundamentally knowledge-driven and that the interface between business and knowledge-production was tenuous (3).

Accordingly, evidence suggests that EC interventions in the HE sector do not seem to have affected economic relations and technology transfer (4). In food technology, most of the technology originates in Japan, US and, to a lesser degree, from Australia. Similarly, electronics are oriented towards the US, Japan, and Taiwan (5). Telekom and Banking technology, in turn, originates in Germany (i.e. Siemens). While European automobile manufacturers run some production in Thailand, they have, as a rule, been unwilling to transfer technology (6).

Given, then, that the European HE instruments, particularly the FWPs, AsiaLink and the AUNP PAPs, are essentially demand-driven, bottom-up programmes, the distribution reflects dominant concerns in the Thai HE policy domain on the one hand and, on the other, interests of potential partner HEIs in Europe. These concerns and interests in the revolve around environmental and sustainability issues, not least due to policy interventions and policy endeavours of the European Commission itself (see EQ 4).

What is more, observers argued that the structure and eligibility criteria of existing European RTD and HE programmes hinders the right kinds of institutions from participating. The example here is the multinational Asian Institute for Technology (7). As one of the few institutions in the region that works on the interface of knowledge-creation, innovation and business, it is an ideal institutional location for forging and fostering these links in the region. Yet, often the AIT – an transboundary HEI that specializes in research and teaching areas highly germane to economic cooperation – tends to be excluded from European projects due to its peculiar, yet highly relevant status.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) These numbers are for indicative purposes only. I have assigned projects to categories according to my own judgement rather than
- (2) AUNP NIS The tenuous state of relations between business and HE knowledge-production is embodied in the AUNP Third Round Table Meeting (August 2005). This NIS addressed the issue of University-Industry relations in the two regions. In a very real sense, this initiative was an agenda-setting exercise for a largely unexplored issue area. Here, the emphasis was on how industry linkages could provide access for AUN universities to resources, knowledge, opportunities and skills (Douse, 2006). These linkages should, however, not endanger non-marketable research or the basic principles of academic freedom (Douse, 2006). AIT is a research-oriented, postgraduate institute that covers 40 countries. It educates about 2300 students of which 1500 are Masters Students and the rest are PhD students. The AIT consists of three schools: Business School, an engineering School and a Schools of Environmental Sciences (Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009).
- (3) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; Respondent D, 2009; Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009
- (4) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (5) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (6) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (7) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.

I 3.2.2: Promotion of intercultural understanding

For the AsiaLink Programme and AUNP programmes, evaluators noted that established project partnerships tended to be more successful in attracting funding than others. Similarly, Thailand's share of project participation in the FWPs stayed more or less constant at about 30 across FWP 5 and 6 (which, given the radical change in the programme structure between FWP 5 and 6, is impressive). These admittedly cursory figures suggests, at least in a narrow institutional sense that some intercultural learning is going on. More focused empirical investigation into the relationship between project participation, "learning the ropes" (in terms of project management and follow-up), and intercultural understanding is necessary.

EQ3 - To what extent have the Commission's interventions in the sector of public health and health services contributed to the universal health care coverage?

Related facts, figures, and references:

Projects :

- Health Care Reform Project, MOH, 2004-2009. (5 million Euros). The project aims to improve institutional and policy-making capacities for the health sector reform (HCR) of the country; it provides TA in 4 key components (family medicine/PHC, health care financing, hospital management and advocacy for the HCR); the final beneficiaries are the general population. The Oct 2006 ROM Report rated it bcbbbb.
- Thai village health project Mae Sariang, Malteser, 2002-2005. (1.001 million Euros). The project aimed at strengthening the self-help capability of local community to deliver PHC services, foster behavioural change with respect to AIDS through community mobilization. It had an ex-post ROM Report that rated it baaab.
- Improving access to care and support to persons with HIV and their families, MSF/B, 2002-2005. (1 million Euros). The project aimed at adapting and optimizing the use of district health services and resources in the care and counselling of persons living with HIV, as well as to facilitate the collaboration of patient groups in the provision of care and counselling. The March 2004 ROM Report rated it cbbcb.
- Care and support of women and children care in high AIDS prevalence areas, Raks Thai Foundation, 2002-2007. (1.545 million Euros). The project aimed at reducing the spread of HIV among youth, women and children through effective prevention, counselling and support programs and services. It had an ex-post ROM Report that rated it bbbbbb.
- Migrant health project, IOM, 2004-2007. (510.670 Euros). This project catered to the health needs of migrants, especially undocumented migrants in Chiang Rai province. It aimed at developing a replicable model of health care for them by training CHWs and organizing outreach activities for curative and preventive care. It also aimed at strengthening the capacity of government institutions to deal with migrant health problems. The October 2006 ROM Report rated it bcbbbb.

Three Member States completed health projects in the country (France, Italy and the UK) (1) and two in refugee camps (Sweden and the Netherlands, as per CSP); none of the member states has ongoing health projects other than for refugees.

JC 3.1 Public health system was strengthened due to EC interventions

The main EC project targeting the health system as a whole is the Thai Health Care Reform project (HCRP) since 1996 (Projects ALA/TH/94/28 and ASIE/2002/002-641). The aim of providing universal access to health has progressed through this support to the Government that has strengthened the national health system. Additionally, the EC's aim of increasing equity, efficiency and quality of care, as well as increasing accountability and contributing to the battle of the three poverty related diseases (through the Global Fund* and thematic funding) has been successfully pursued with both the government and NGO partners --less demonstrably so for improvements in the quality of primary health care away from hospitals in the 20 pilot districts of the HCRP than in the partner NGO executed projects.

In the context of the health reform, the EC primarily contributed significantly to the (not yet completed) MOH process of decentralization of the curative aspects of PHC away from district hospitals (a model for this process is now being written up by a group of national consultants and one pilot district has already applied it; the EC can take credit for helping set up the financial aspects of this model). In the same token, the EC project was also instrumental in strengthening hospital management overall and of their decentralized financial management in particular (with more modest and slower results to show in the latter two areas).

EC support to the national health care financing at the MOH has been a successful, EC contribution culminating in a new model for the national health budget that will be applied from the 2010 budget onwards.

As relates to the participation of civil society initiatives in health, these have been particularly successful for PHA and migrants organizations; these groups have gained access to local decision-making fora through their empowerment in EC-funded projects (particularly IOM, MSFB and Raks).

Finally, the HCRP has an advocacy component that has had European social marketing technical assistance and uses the same to advance the new concepts the health sector reform is planning to implement; some advances have been reported in terms of MOH staff now understanding better that a decentralized PHC is more cost-effective, and in terms of communities now understanding they do not have to bypass the health centres and seek care in the district hospitals. The PHC model that the IOM applied for migrants proved successful and it is being replicated elsewhere. They also lobbied for the Ministry of Labour to accept the category of 'health worker' as one of the accepted job categories for migrants.

Related facts, figures, and references:

In the period covered by this evaluation, the EC supported a number of areas in the health sector in Thailand: 13 in-country projects through various partners (the MOH, IOM, Raks Thai Foundation, Malteser, MSF Belgium, VSO, Planned Parenthood through Interact Worldwide UK, Khon Kaen and Mahidol universities and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine); four ECHO projects (Malteser, AMI, MSF France and Handicap International France); and six regional projects (UNAIDS, Italian Center for Training and Research, Thammasat and Mahidol universities, Institute of Tropical Medicine Prince Leopold and Erasmus Universiteit). Moreover, as per the CSP, three member states completed health projects in the country (France, Italy and the UK) (1) and two in refugee camps (Sweden and the Netherlands); none of the member states has ongoing health projects other than for refugees. The shortened field visit only permitted evaluating the first five of the 13 in-country projects.

Notes

(1) The EU and Thailand Cooperation Activities Report, 2005 (pp.115-140) and ROM Reports from the ROM.

(2) NIP 2002-2006.

(3) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.1.1 Proportion of population with access to affordable health care in districts supported by EC and globally

To put needs in perspective, it is noted that only 2% of the population is estimated to earn less than U\$1/day with around 25% earning less than U\$2/day. (1)

This information is not available disaggregated geographically (i.e., by district) so is not available for the 20 HCRP projects. Nevertheless, as explained here below, since 2002 health care has become much more affordable to households which have seen their out of pocket expenditures for health go down dramatically. This important step towards universal coverage cannot be attributed to the EC support to the health care reform process in the country.

As confirmed in all interviews, Thailand has been steadily moving towards universal coverage, particularly since its 2002 national policy charging 30 baht per visit (the '30 baht scheme or insurance system'). The scheme has since been derogated (in 2008) with the GoT increasing the budget for health by a small percentage. (4) The issue of access to care for migrants and minorities that are not recognized as Thai citizens has persisted, though it has improved, importantly through the lobbying of donors and the NGO sector -- several of them EC partners.

The MOH now has readied a strategy for migrants' health that everybody hopes will be implemented nationwide. (4) It needs to be repeated here that the EC has given special attention to migrant workers in the North and South of the country and to populations living in villages adjacent to the refugee camps in the Burmese border. Results have been evaluated positively (ex-post monitoring of the Malteser and Raks projects) (2, 4). Efforts notwithstanding, there are still populations with non-affordable access to health in the country. (4)

It should be also reiterated here that:

1. Health is a national priority in Thailand and has a legal basis to become equity-based and decentralized (9th National Development Plan 2002-2006 and National Health Bill in Parliament in 2006). Thailand is committed to achieve the health MDGs and has a good institutional capacity in health to do so. (4)
2. Cross-border movement in the North and political instability in the South make health activities cumbersome and expensive in these areas. More work is still needed in streamlining the decentralization process and in the provision of better skills to the staff in more remote areas (also aiming at a reduced turn-over); Moreover, environmental health and more proactive measures on smoking and on alcohol consumption are still needed in the country. (3)

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) //hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
- (2) Projects REH/203/005-912 and REH/2001/004-612.
- (3) WHO, http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_tha_en.p
- (4) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.1.2 Breakdown of health expenditure between government, private insurance, and out-of-pocket

Public expenditure on health as percentage of GDP is 2.3% which is the highest for countries at a medium human development level in SE Asia (1). In 2006, the GNI per capita was U\$ 3,050 (2). Data on the breakdown sought in this indicator is presented in the following table:

EXPENDITURE (Million Thai Baht)	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Ministry of Public Health	15 801,97	24 267,10	19 983,99	5 417,05	4 438,67	3 790,91	1 405,61	1 041,95	580,08	839,06
Other ministries	1 438,27	1 622,12	117,07	577,85	1 076,28	1 277,61	254,05	317,35	194,94	142,56
Local government	1 082,21	1 802,56	1 916,96	1 607,30	1 479,38	1 722,78	1 890,66	7 229,24	2 277,10	2 499,00
Pub Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
State-owned Enterprises	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Universal Coverage Fund (Scheme)	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	3 696,43	1 212,52	3 550,00	3 592,98
Social Security Fund (Scheme)	67,89	24,57	14,04	11,92	8,09	0,00	0,00	12 428,81	0,00	0,00
Workmen Compensation Fund (Scheme)	8,69	3,71	1,24	0,92	0,52	0,00	0,00	599,84	0,00	0,00
Priv Private insurance	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Traffic insurance	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Employer benefit	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
Household	7 611,91	5 303,26	5 048,65	1 437,82	2 612,75	1 308,56	1 180,37	1 248,56	1 837,16	2 184,32
Non - profit organisations	263,92	246,31	416,22	321,08	243,88	196,38	213,93	233,09	253,99	276,78
Rest of the world	16,36	56,80	42,29	31,96	59,33	154,64	161,95	541,99	177,61	186,01
Total	26 291,22	33 326,43	27 540,47	9 405,90	9 918,90	8 450,89	8 803,01	24 853,36	8 870,88	9 720,70

Source: IHPP (2008) National Health Account, Thailand

Out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure experienced a dramatic turn around after the introduction of the 30 baht scheme in 2002: It went from 18 to 2% of household budget (3).

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) Compiled from UNDP statistics //hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
- (2) World Bank. (both as per Inception Report)
- (3) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

JC 3.2 Tangible benefits to health, especially for low income groups

Out of pocket (OOP) expenditures for health experienced a dramatic turn around after the introduction of the '30 baht scheme' in 2002: They went from 18 to 2% of household budget for people in the lowest income quintile. (2) After the 2008 derogation of the scheme the OOP expenditure of households dipped again, but only less than half a percentage point. Other health impact indicators have been improving steadily in the country, but cannot be automatically attributed to EC aid (see 1.3.2.1 below).

As said, benefits brought about by the MSF/B, Raks, Malteser and IOM projects are more clearly attributable to the EC's financing. (2) This because their funding came primarily from the EC and the good results achieved by their poor beneficiaries -confirmed by the evaluators in interviews with them (except for Malteser that does not have an office in Bangkok)- can be traced more directly to this funding. Funding contributed to

the HCRP at the MOH has not yet fully trickled down to give the same type of tangible benefits to beneficiaries. (The funding also is additional to GoT funding for the reform process).

The Malteser, Raks and IOM projects mentioned above clearly targeted groups in the lowest income quintile (2). It is noteworthy that NGO partners recipients of EC funding worked with local NGO partners (ACCESS and TNP+ in the case of MSF/B, and Power of Life in the case of Raks) and the latter have shown to be of great importance for sustainability; these partner NGO also trained their local counterparts to write proposals to apply for funds --which they have subsequently succeeded in doing (e.g., for GF projects). Finally here, it should be mentioned that both Raks and MSF/B succeeded in having PHAs accepted by hospitals to become active HIV counsellors. (2)

The challenge remains to build on the clinical skills of the growing number of PHC staff that will be called to deliver quality services once universal PHC access at peripheral level becomes a reality nationwide. In Thailand, universalizing access is clearly aimed at discriminating positively towards the poorest income quintile groups --and is progressively, hopefully, also to cover migrants and minorities; physical access is available at reachable distances for a very high percentage of the population and medicines are made available to Thai citizens through the social insurance scheme in place. (1, 2)

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) ROM Report 00138.01 of 2001.
- (2) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.2.1 Standard health indicators, such as: Proportion of women receiving adequate ante-natal care, immunisation coverage, infant mortality rate, under-five mortality rate, maternal mortality rate) in supported district and globally

Nationwide:

- IMR: 18/oo in 2005 (2), 16/oo in 2007 (3)
- U5MR: 21/oo in 2005 (2)
- MMR: 44 per 100,000 in 2000 (2)
- ANC coverage:
- Births attended by skilled staff): 99% in 2000 (2)
- Life expectancy at birth: 69.6 years in 2005. (1)
- Immunization coverage rate, measles: 96% in 2005 (2)
- <5 malnutrition rate: 22% in 2005 (2)
- Estimated number of HIV (+) cases: 800,000 to 1 million (as per CSP).

Information specifically broken down for the supported districts not available (4). In complying with MDG commitments, the baseline used to measure progress are data for 1990. Trends for these data from the year 2000 on were not collected in this mission since nationwide trends available do not respond to the specific disaggregated information sought by this indicator. Thailand is expected to achieve the health MDGs, some of them even before 2015.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) Compiled from UNDP statistics //hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
- (2) Table 5, Thailand MDGs, Inception Report.
- (3) Table 8 Inception Report.
- (4) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.2.2 Availability of prescription drugs

In most pharmacies in the country, medicines are widely available without the need for a prescription. The

social insurance scheme covers prescription drugs at no cost for all Thai citizens. [Before 2002, medicines were conceivably a good proportion of the OOP household expenditures for health (18%); from 2002 to 2008, the payment of the 30 baht gave access to prescription medicines at no extra cost]. Again, it cannot be said that the EC contributions in health can take a part of the credit for this specific policy shift of the GoT.

The access to free medicines situation for undocumented Thai residents in this respect varies widely depending on the attitudes of the health facilities where they consult. It was noted that there are problems with fake drugs in the market, but to a lesser degree than in neighbouring countries. (1)

Related facts, figures, and references:

(1) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.2.3 Affordability of drugs for low income groups

As said, the Thai social insurance scheme provides medicines free of charge to Thai citizens --and continues to do so after the '30 baht scheme' was abolished last year. It is further noted that self-medication is not infrequent in Thailand and that would come from OOP expenditures.

The Thai government also makes available ARVs free to all HIV+ patients (ARVs are now given to 180,000 people living with AIDS nationwide (excluding private sector and migrant recipients; migrants now have access to free ARVs through funds from the Global Fund available for six more years). (1, 2) It was brought to the evaluator's attention that a) there are still important deficiencies in the area of HIV and AIDS treatment of pediatric patients, and b) government funding for AIDS is much greater for treatment (ARVs) than it is for prevention and tackling the social aspects of the epidemic. (2)

The CSP 2002-06 also mentions that the EC is spending 4.8 million Euros for medicines although no information was found about how much of this was actually disbursed; most of it, but not all, was earmarked to its projects in the refugee camps (e.g., the IOM spent some of its own non-refugee project funds on drugs). There is no doubt that this contribution in kind (medicines) to the refugee population is of great importance to them since there is no Thai support for their health care; in camps, all health care depends on donor support to which the EC contributes together with others.

Related facts, figures, and references:

(1) ROM Report 20167.01 of 2004.

(2) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

JC 3.3 Decision makers and Medias are aware that health sector reform was inspired by EU best practices on universal health care coverage

This JC relates to one aspect of visibility that is not easily found in written documents acknowledging this fact. The interviewee of the MOH in Bangkok told the evaluator that this awareness exists, but it should be taken with a grain of salt.

It is noted that the HCR project has an advocacy component that uses social marketing techniques to advocate for the health sector reform; European experts have been involved in the effort and Thai staff has gone for training in the UK.(1)

Related facts, figures, and references:

(1) Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

I 3.3.1 Awareness among health staff in the sample of health centres visited

No health centres were visited during the shorten field mission.

I 3.3.2 Reference on EU health policy in govt policy documents and in media

No reference was found in the documentary review carried out both before and during the field visit.

It can be mentioned here though that a) MSF/B was asked to give inputs to the MOH in the preparation of the national pediatric HIV policy, and b) the Raks experience did influence the MOH policy on reproductive health, AIDS and women. MSF/B and Raks also are part of two national lobbying groups working for the rights of migrants, i.e., the Migrants Working Group and the Action Network for Migrants. (1)

Related facts, figures, and references:

Interviews in Bangkok Jan 2009.

EQ4 - To what extent were the EC programmes in the country consistent with the global objectives of EC response to global challenges faced by ASEAN, particularly environment issues?

During the reporting period, the EC's environmental interventions in Thailand successfully operationalised global environmental objectives in terms of national and local environmental policy priorities at programmatic and institutional level. Not only have EC-sponsored programmes and projects produced outputs and impacts relevant to local and national environmental needs, they have also provided Thai policy actors with the organisational and institutional capacity to address global environmental issues effectively. In that way, the EC's involvement in environmental policy contributed to an observable and significant intensification of Thai policy engagement with global environmental issues, most prominently global climate change. This was the case despite non-trivial project management issues caused by cross-cultural misunderstanding and miscommunication. During the reporting period, the mix of projects and instruments enabled the EC to frame global environmental objectives in ways that made them relevant and interesting for Thai environmental policy actors.

EC's environmental policy interventions in Thailand during the reporting period successfully addressed global environmental concerns – most notably Global Climate Change (GCC) – in terms of the programmatic and institutional priorities of the Thai environmental agenda. By only indirectly linking economic development in Thailand to climate change (via national policy priorities such as natural resource depletion), the EC's strategic programming documents arguably set up a sufficiently flexible and adaptable policy framework. In terms of programmatic priorities, the aims and impacts of EC-sponsored environmental projects helped Thai policy-makers grapple with environmental policy issues concerning the sustainable use of natural resources, be it fisheries, forests, or energy. In terms of institutional priorities, bilateral (e.g. CHARM) and regional (e.g. COGEN III) European interventions successfully generated a range of institutional capacities for local co-management of environmental issues. This has resulted in tangible improvements to natural resources, institutional capabilities for the effective co-management of resources as well as new knowledge relevant to the implementation of environmental policy.

Despite misunderstandings between Thai and European partners throughout the life-cycles of EC sponsored projects, EC interventions have contributed to an intensification of concern for global environmental challenges. Cross-cultural misunderstanding frustrated the implementation of sequential programme management. Much of these issues resulted from the clash of two very different organizational cultures on the one hand, and, on the other, the inherent complexities created by involving local communities in the policy process. Standard EC practices of programme management and financial oversight as well as the perceived cultural insensitivity of their implementation have led to considerable misunderstandings that have strained good working relationships. In addition, the inherent complexity of involving a wide range of stakeholders in environmental conservation has challenged sequential, linear and top-down models of programme formulation and implementation.

Notwithstanding these problems though, evidence suggests that European interventions have contributed to the observable increase in concern for global environmental challenges. During the reporting period, concern for and engagement with global environmental challenges – particularly Global Climate Change (GCC) and biodiversity loss – have intensified in Thailand. Significantly, this is not only true for policy actors in the public and tertiary sectors but also for business and industry. Observers point out that firms have become increasingly aware of the business potential of environmentally sustainable products and practices. Rather than restructuring an already well-established and clearly formulated environmental policy agenda, Thai environmental policy actors have preferred to deepen existing GCC and biodiversity policy initiatives on the one hand and, on the other, mainstream global environmental concerns into existing environmental policy priorities.

While difficult to quantify with any precision, European environmental interventions have contributed to this development in a number of practical ways. At a time when Thai policy-makers were highly sensitized to global environmental issues due to a number of high-profile triggering events (such as the Tsunami of 2004), European environmental programmes successfully directed policy-making attention towards challenges such as GCC. More importantly, however, the projects enabled Thai policy actors in public, private and tertiary sectors to develop and explore sustainable practices of resource use and management. In this way, the European projects provided access to best European resource practices and environmental technology. However, regardless of the recent

surge in interest and activity, policy actors argue that, due to a lacking evidence-base, the Thai government has yet to formulate a coherent GCC strategy based on an appropriate policy debate about mitigation vs adaptation. It is here that policy actors see an area of future cooperation between Thai and European partners.

The EC's balance and purpose of policy instruments reflected the need of the European Commission to operate within a well-developed institutional landscape and programmatic agenda of environmental policy. Environmental policy interventions in Thailand favour projects that support policy implementation rather than policy formulation. This balance reflects the accurate assessment on part of the EC that the RTG is capable of formulating coherent and innovative policy responses to global environmental challenges but still lacks institutional capacity to effectively implement these environmental policies. This is particularly the case at regional and local levels. The EC has deftly exploited synergies between regional and national policy dialogues as well as regional and national programmes. In its policy dialogue with the RTG -- in the form of regular Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) -- the EC has concentrated in focal priority issues (i.e. trade and investment, public health, peace and security. Discussion about Thai environmental issues of interest to the EC (i.e. issues with a global dimension) take place in the EU-ASEAN policy dialogue as well as the ASEM dialogue process. At programmatic level, the EC has avoided duplication and redundancy by letting regional programmes carry much of the programming and funding weight of environmental policy interventions in Thailand. In particular, the Commission has used the synergies of the the EU-ASEAN programmes (COGEN III, EAEEF, ARCBC) and the Asia-wide programmes (Asia ProEco, Asia Urbs) to address Thai-specific environmental issues with a global dimension: these have included energy as well as biodiversity issues.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Programmatically, the document "Policy and Prospective Plan for Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality, 1997-2016" set the Thai environmental policy agenda. It lists outlines six priority areas:

1. Policy on Natural Resources
2. Policy on Pollution Prevention
3. Policy on Natural and Cultural Environments
4. Policy on Community Environment
5. Policy on Environmental Education and Promotion
6. Policy on Environmental Technology (Wiertsema, 2004)

In 1992, the RTG enacted the 'Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act' which created three executive agencies -- the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP), the Pollution Control Department (PCD), and the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP) -- charged with enforcing environmental legislation. The Constitutional Reform of 1997 decentralised environmental policy-making by providing the provinces and localities with more formal responsibility for formulation and implementation of environmental programmes. In 2002, in the wake of a number of legal and administrative reforms, the new Ministry of the Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) with its 76 provincial offices was created to provide a more coherent institutional context for environmental policy (Wiertsema, 2004, CSP 2002-2006).

Extracts:

"Thailand has witnessed a significant level of environmental degradation. 60% of the population live close to the coastline and many important activities generating income and employment are located in these regions. In general, natural resources have been over exploited. Rapid industrialisation and an unsustainable management of natural resources have led to mangrove deforestation for shrimp farming, aggressive fishing practices, water pollution from organic and factory wastes, soil erosion, and a lack of treatment of effluents from urban areas, industry and agriculture." - (EC, 2001, p.14)

JC 4.1 The EC's strategic and programming documents clearly set out the rationale for Thailand specific share and policy issues in global challenges faced by ASEAN

EC's environmental policy interventions in Thailand during the reporting period were successful in operationalising global environmental concerns – most notably Global Climate Change (GCC) – in terms of the programmatic and institutional priorities of the Thai environmental agenda. Not only have EC-sponsored programmes and projects produced outputs and impacts relevant to local and national environmental needs, they have also provided Thai policy actors with the organisational and institutional capacity to address global environmental issues effectively. This has resulted in tangible improvements to natural resources, institutional capabilities for the effective co-management of resources as well as new knowledge relevant to the implementation of environmental policy.

The programming documents link the environmental situation in Thailand -- that is the scope and degree of environmental degradation and its causes -- to regional and global policy issues. However, these references are mostly indirect and implicit. For example, none of the programming documents explicitly link economic growth to global warming or climate change. However, all programming document acknowledge, either explicitly or implicitly, that environmental degradation in Thailand (loss of biodiversity, flooding, desertification, etc.) has been the outcome of rapid economic development in Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular. In the CSP 2007-2013, the Commission conclude that in Thailand "*...fast economic growth has been a major factor contributing to widespread environmental degradation and pollution. Forest depletion, loss of biodiversity, urban pollution, coastal erosion and decline of marine fishery resources, water pollution and energy consumption are identified as serious environmental concerns*" (CSP 2007-2013). Arguably, this created a sufficiently flexible framework for addressing global challenges within a policy context relevant for the existing Thai environmental policy agenda.

The sector balance of environmental policy interventions in Thailand reflects an engagement of the European Commission's global environment objectives with local environmental concerns at both programmatic and institutional level. Partly this reflects the relevance and importance of demand-driven EC environmental and energy programmes such as Asia Pro Eco or the EAEP. Yet even the bi-lateral environmental programmes suggest a negotiated agenda in which the European Commission pursues its global environmental objectives in terms of perceived local environmental challenges.

At the programmatic level, European policy interventions have successfully addressed global environmental challenges by linking them to focal issues on the Thai environmental policy agenda, most notably sustainable use of forestry, coastal/ marine, and energy resources. In terms of outputs and impacts, the bi-lateral endeavours, particularly the CHARM and Phu Kheio ,have led to appreciable improvements in quality and stock of fishery, coastal and wildlife resources (Respondent J, 2009; Respondent N, 2009). The energy programmes, particularly COGEN III, have generated viable bio-fuel cogeneration businesses.

At the institutional level, bi-lateral and regional programmes funded by the EC aimed at generating and fostering local environmental governance capacity, a central policy priority in Thailand since decentralisation in the early 1990s and constitutional reform in 1997. It is in this area that commentators identify the most valued and sustainable impacts. The bi-lateral projects generated and fostered considerable local capacity for the sustainable co-management of endangered natural resources. In doing so, the projects have create sustainable multi-level governance networks across sectoral boundaries. Moreover, all programmes and projects strengthened environmental governance capacity by generating policy relevant knowledge.

I 4.1.1 Logical framework of programming documents (CSP, NIP, MTR) related to the balance between economic development and global warming

None of the programming documents explicitly link economic growth to global warming or climate change. However, all programming document acknowledge, either explicitly or implicitly, that environmental degradation in Thailand (loss of biodiversity, flooding, desertification, etc.) has been the outcome of rapid economic development in Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in particular. In this way, the programming documents generate a flexible policy framing that has allowed EC environmental policy-makers on the ground to address global issues through the lens of national environmental priorities.

The CSP 2002-2006 contends that in Thailand, "*...natural resources have been over exploited. Rapid industrialisation and an unsustainable management of natural resources have led to mangrove deforestation for shrimp farming, aggressive fishing practices, water pollution from organic and factory wastes, soil erosion, and a lack of treatment of effluents from urban areas, industry and agriculture*" (CSP 2002-2006)

Environmentally unsustainable industrial and commercial practices, the Commission continues, could significantly impinge on the overall societal progress in Thailand: the country, the Commission contends "...faces critical development constraints that could affect the sustainability of its economic growth, such as inadequate development of skilled human resources and technology, infrastructure bottlenecks, environmental degradation" (CSP 2002-2006). The Commission points to a number of examples. First, in the Thai electronics industry "[s]emiconductor manufacturing is susceptible to cause environmental damage without strict waste management" (CSP 2002-2006). Second, subsector fishing and prawn farming, which accounts for 30% worldwide supply of shrimp, has caused "...increasing concern over the environmental damage caused by shrimp farming, and since 1998 the Government has imposed a total ban on inland (freshwater) shrimp and prawn farming" (CSP 2006-2013). Third, the Commission points to deforestation and forest encroachment.

While global climate change has not been an explicit concern in the strategy documents, the Commission is keenly aware of the relationship between rapid economic growth and environmental degradation of meso- and micro-environments at the national level. In the CSP 2007-2013, the Commission conclude that in Thailand "...fast economic growth has been a major factor contributing to widespread environmental degradation and pollution. Forest depletion, loss of biodiversity, urban pollution, coastal erosion and decline of marine fishery resources, water pollution and energy consumption are identified as serious environmental concerns" (CSP 2007-2013).

Although the NIPs pointed to the relationship between rapid economic growth and environmental degradation, the NIP's 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 for Thailand concentrated on economic and higher education issues. The NIP 2002-2004 stressed the funding of "...economic co-operation, namely technical assistance and capacity-building activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation" (NIP 2002-2004). Policy initiatives in non-focal sectors, including the environment, were to be "... supported, in the period of application of the present NIP, under the existing dedicated horizontal and regional programmes, and are therefore not part of the NIP" (NIP 2002-2004). However, the NIP refers to the environmental programmes via the environment and tropical forest budget lines (Lim, et al., 2005, p.13). The NIP 2005-2006, in turn, was devoted almost entirely to Higher Education programmes, specifically the Thailand window of the Erasmus Mundus programme (NIP 2005-2006; Lim et al., 2005, p.13).

The MTR for the Thailand CSP is not available. However, the Strategic Review and Programming Mission (Lim et al., 2005) points out that the environment has not the status in the country strategy that it may warrant judging from policy priorities at the regional/ ASEAN level. In particular, they argue that "... important 'cross-cutting issues' such as 'good governance', 'environment' mainstreaming and 'conflict prevention' would have been highly relevant to the situation in Thailand, but have been largely set aside. Most of these areas are not covered either by EU Member States bilateral co-operation".

1.4.1.2 Sector balance reflects environment national policy priorities and needs

The sector balance of environmental policy interventions in Thailand reflects an engagement of the European Commission's global environment objectives with local environmental concerns at both programmatic and institutional level. Partly this is due to the demand-driven nature of EC environmental and energy programmes (such as Asia Pro Eco or the EAEEF). Yet even the bi-lateral environmental programmes suggest a negotiated agenda in which the European Commission pursues its global environmental objectives in terms of perceived local environmental challenges. At the programmatic level, European policy interventions have addressed global environmental challenges by linking them to focal issues on the Thai environmental policy agenda, most notably sustainable use of forestry, coastal/ marine, and energy resources. At the institutional level, bi-lateral and regional programmes funded by the EC aimed at generating and fostering local environmental governance capacity, a central policy priority in Thailand since decentralisation in the early 1990s and constitutional reform in 1997.

During the reporting period, the European Commission operated within a well-developed institutional and programmatic environmental policy context in Thailand. Indeed, Thai policy-makers have formulated institutional and programmatic responses to perceived environmental challenges since the mid-1970s. Since then, the institutional landscape for environmental policy has developed simultaneously at different levels of governance ranging from the local to the constitutional (1). In terms of programmatic priorities, the RTG has laid out an ambitious policy agenda headed by concerns for sustainable resource use and the prevention of environmental pollutions (2). More fundamentally, the constitutional reform of 1997 created the basis for greater involvement of the public in environmental policy formulation and implementation (3).

Within this well-developed programmatic and institutional policy context, Thai policy actors not only have a keen understanding of local environmental challenges, but also are acutely aware of the concomitant issues of institutional capacity. Evidence suggests that the overarching programmatic policy challenge during the reporting

period was finding ways of sustainable natural resources use and reducing pollution (4). Thai policy actors were acutely aware of the need to resolve the tension between economic development and environmental conservation (5).

The central institutional challenge during the reporting period was building capacities for effective local involvement in environmental policy (6). Indeed, some commentators contend that the degree of natural resource degradation in Thailand, such as massive deforestation, requires an integrated and pluralist approach to environmental protection (7).

Within these overarching programmatic and institutional issues, policy actors identify cross-cutting concerns. Significantly, policy actors see global environmental challenges, most prominently global climate change and biodiversity loss, as exacerbating local environmental problems. For example, commentators point out that climate change is likely to exacerbate the precarious water situation (8). Further, Thai policy actors point to significant technical issues in data collection (e.g. detecting depletion in marine and coastal environment as well as for wildlife) and knowledge dissemination (i.e. processing and distributing scientific data to local communities) (9).

The sectoral balance of environmental policy interventions in Thailand reflects these policy priorities both in terms of project aims as well as project impacts. Environmental projects sponsored by the EC have aimed at strengthening producing knowledge, institutional capacity and exploring suitable organisational forms for effective community participation in environmental management of natural resources. Moreover, all projects aimed at exploring and developing regimes of sustainable resource usage. In this way, all projects have addressed key institutional (devolution and public participation of environmental policy) and programmatic (sustainable resource use, prevention of pollution) priorities on the Thai environmental policy agenda. Whereas the bi-lateral projects and projects in the Asia Pro Eco Programme and targeted biodiversity and resource management issues, the EAEF and COGEN III programmes more explicitly dealt with climate change issues.

EC projects and programmes successfully generated outputs and impacts that were of relevance to local and global environmental challenges. There are indications that suggest that European policy engagement has had tangible outcomes in terms of environmental quality and sustainable resource use. For example, the development of an integrated and participative approach to fisheries management in the CHARM project, policy actors contend, has improved of living conditions for the local communities by providing better, more plentiful fisheries resources (10). Similarly, both bi-lateral projects were successful in building awareness and institutional capacity for self-organisation at local level (11). Participants point to the pride in the civic achievements and the high level of visibility these projects have generated at local and provincial level (12). Similarly, the energy projects created viable and operational biofuel cogeneration plants (13).

EC projects have arguably been most successful at institutional level. Both bi-lateral projects were developed sustainable institutional networks between ministries, local government, NGOs, experts and, most importantly, local communities (14). In both the Phu Kheio and the CHARM project, actors explored and developed ecologically, politically and socially sustainable regimes for resource use (15). By introducing new agricultural practices in Phu Kheio -- specifically penned animal husbandry -- the European policy intervention has helped local communities live at the edge of the forest in a sustainable manner (16). The CHARM project, in turn, successfully developed and implemented community-based fisheries in a number of coastal communities. This new, participative approach was to replace a top-down, sanctions-based regulatory regime perceived to be underperforming (17). Further, the COGEN III programme funded three biofuel cogeneration plants (18).

Most projects successfully produced new knowledge relevant to the formulation and implementation of environmental policy in Thailand. The EAEF and COGEN III programmes produced a range of feasibility studies for renewable energy sources, particularly bio-fuel (19). The Asia ProEco projects generated knowledge-relevant products ranging from HE modules in environmental management to energy feasibility studies. Similarly, the CHARM project created a document library with 580 documents in English and Thai (available for download on the CHARM website) including a co-management manual and an assessment framework (20).

Notes:

- (1) Throughout the 1990s, the institutional basis for addressing environmental degradation has evolved rapidly. In 1992, the RTG enacted the 'Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act' which created three executive agencies -- the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP), the Pollution Control Department (PCD), and the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP) -- charged with enforcing environmental

legislation. The Constitutional Reform of 1997 decentralised environmental policy-making by providing the provinces and localities with more formal responsibility for formulation and implementation of environmental programmes. In 2002, in the wake of a number of legal and administrative reforms, the new Ministry of the Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) with its 76 provincial offices was created to provide a more coherent institutional context for environmental policy (Wiertsema, 2004, CSP 2002-2006).

- (2) The document "Policy and Prospective Plan for Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality, 1997-2016" set the Thai environmental policy agenda. It lists the following policy priorities

1. Policy on Natural Resources

- a. Soils and Land Use
- b. Forest Resources
- c. Water Resources
- d. Mineral Resources
- e. Energy Resources
- f. Coastal Resources

2. Policy on Pollution Prevention and Eradication of

- a. Water Pollution
- b. Air Pollution
- c. Noise and Vibration Pollution
- d. Pollution from Solid Waste and Night Soil
- e. Pollution from Hazardous Materials
- f. Pollution from Hazardous Waste

3. Policy on Natural and Cultural Environments

4. Policy on Community Environment

5. Policy on Environmental Education and Promotion

6. Policy on Environmental Technology (Wiertsema, 2004)

- (3) The 1997 Constitutional Reform devolved the governance of environmental policy and established a constitutional right for local involvement in environmental protection and sustainable resource use policy. (CSP 2002-2006, Wiertsema, 2004).

- (4) Respondent K, 2009; Rapid economic development of the past decades, actors from different parts of the Thai environmental policy community agree, has generated a range of challenges sustainable use of resources (Respondent N, 2009; RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009). These include the erosion of marine and coastal environments, (RESPONDENT M, 2009, Respondent J, 2009), soil erosion and deforestation (RESPONDENT G, 2009), as well as destruction of biodiversity (Respondent N, 2009). Similarly, issues surrounding solid waste disposal and air pollution are understood as critical policy challenges (RESPONDENT G, 2009).

- (5) Respondent K, 2009; Respondent N, 2009; RESPONDENT M, 2009; There is, however, some disagreement about how policy should resolve this tension. Some Thai environmental policy actors argue in favour of resolving this tension in favour of the environment. For example, a senior policy-maker likened human encroachment into the forest to a cancer that must be excised (Respondent N, 2009). This, so the argument goes, requires a fundamental re-orientation of environmental policy principles towards a more integrated, holistic and eco-centric approach (Respondent N, 2009). Others, in turn, contend that basic developmental goals, such as providing adequate water supply to rural areas in Thailand (RESPONDENT M, 2009) -- still remain overarching public policy priorities. Priorities, no less, that are being unduly neglected due to a misplaced concern for the environment and local participation (RESPONDENT M, 2009). Another respondent perceives a difference between the central government that seem acutely aware of the tensions and provincial governments that may face capacity challenges (Respondent R, 2009).

- (6) Respondent J, 2009; Respondent N, 2009.

- (7) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent K, 2009; Respondent R, 2009
- (8) RESPONDENT G, 2009; Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (9) RESPONDENT M, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (10) Respondent J, 2009; Respondent K, 2009; However, another respondent is more equivocal: first, the respondent contends, baseline data is missing, so an accurate assessment of how CHARM has improved living conditions is not possible. Second, drawing lines of causality is tricky, since the region has been the object of other projects and policy initiatives (Respondent R, 2009).
- (11) Respondent J, 2009; Respondent N, 2009; In the CHARM project, for example, local communities formulated strategic plans articulating the community vision of future fisheries resources which were submitted to the provincial governor. In particular, local communities developed the capability to monitor and police the fisheries regime themselves (set up volunteer monitors equipped with radios). These volunteers have augmented the understaffed patrol boats of the coast guard (Respondent J, 2009).
- (12) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent J, 2009.
- (13) COWI (2006), Ex-Post Evaluation of the COGEN 3 Programme: Popular Report,
- (14) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent J, 2009, Respondent K, 2009; Respondent R, 2009.
- (15) Respondent J, 2009; Respondent N, 2009.
- (16) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent R, 2009.
- (17) Administrative decentralization of 1992 was seen by policy actors as an opportunity to tackle overfishing caused by small-scale fishing operations (Respondent J, 1992). The aim of CHARM was to introduce fisheries co-management between local communities and fisheries department by involving involve stakeholders and communities in the management of coastal resources (Respondent J, 2009). The idea was to involve NGOs and local governments on the one hand and the ministry on the other in collaborative coastal resource management regimes and thereby forge a partnership between stakeholders at different levels of governance. In practice, ministry experts would supply local communities, NGOs and stakeholders with the requisite knowledge about costs and benefits of different courses of action. The government and communities then decided together on the basis of this information (RESPONDENT M, 2009)
- (18) COWI (2006), Ex-Post Evaluation of the COGEN 3 Programme: Popular Report,
- (19) Respondent C, 2009; KANTOR (2008), Ex-post Evaluation of the EC-ASEAN Energy Facility, EUROPEAID/119860/C/SV/multi; COWI (2006), Ex-Post Evaluation of the COGEN 3 Programme: Popular Report.
- (20) Respondent J, 2009; CHARM Documentation; <http://charmproject.org/cms/index.php?lang=th>.

The following projects were designed, funded and implemented on a bi-lateral basis:

1) Sustainable Management of Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary through Community Participation

This project addresses biodiversity loss and the protection of natural environments. The aim of the project was "...to conserve wildlife and its habitats by way of improving management capacity, reducing pressure on protected area resources (hunting, illegal fires, cattle grazing, timber and non timber products (logging), etc.), and raising awareness of environmental values" (PS-20168, p.1). Of the total costs of 12.2 mil EURO, the EC contributed 6 million EURO.

2) Coastal Habitats And Resources Management (CHARM)

This project addresses the degradation of sensitive landscapes and the resulting loss of biodiversity. This project, with a EC contribution of 8 million EURO, aimed at "... the promotion of a co-management approach at the national, provincial and local levels between the government, the private sector and local communities. Institutional arrangements and technical operations for co-management will be tested into two pilot areas." (PS CHARM, ###). The project aimed to design and implement a coastal co-management regime in two Southern Thai regions. These co-management regimes would, so the project logic, become replicable models for coastal management elsewhere in Thailand.

3) Local Participation in Highland Forest Conservation

This project deals with another highly sensitive landscape under considerable pressure from commercial logging and community encroachment. The project sought to create institutional mechanisms for involving local communities in the management and conservation of sensitive tropical forests (CSP 2002-2006, p.32). The EC funded this project with 0.76 million EURO.

4) Capacity building to support training and education on coastal biodiversity:

This project aims to fill a perceived knowledge gap by generating and disseminating new information about the biodiversity of marine tropical systems. Not only did the project aim to systematically create new knowledge but to construct institutional channels to distribute this information to major stakeholders, most prominently the local communities. The project cost the EC 690 000 EURO, nearly two-thirds of the total cost of 1 million EURO

Table 1: EAEF projects' financing

Facility	Category	Typical proponents/partners	EC grant maximum support	EC grant maximum support and minimum amounts	Actual Number Of Projects
1	Increasing market awareness	Public and/or Non profit organisations	50%	€20,000 to €100,000	10
2	Adapting Institutional Framework	ASEAN public sector (Regulatory bodies or utilities)	50%	€20,000 to €100,000	28
3	Conducting feasibility studies	Non profit organisations	50%	€50,000 to €500,000	25
4	Implementing demonstration projects	Non profit organisations	15%	€100,000 to €500,000	4

Source: Kantor, 2006

Table 2

SUB-SECTOR	Number of Projects	%
Electricity	15	22
Energy Efficiency	14	21
Clean Coal	3	4
Renewable Energy	34	51
Natural Gas	1	2
TOTAL	67	100

JC 4.2 The objectives of the EC programmes reflect the views and priorities of the country with respect to a comprehensive policy dialogue against global warming with the EU

Despite misunderstandings between Thai and European partners throughout the life-cycles of EC sponsored projects, EC interventions have contributed to an intensification of concern for global environmental challenges.

Cross-cultural misunderstanding frustrated the implementation of sequential programme management. On the one hand, the top-down formulation of project goals at SOM level proved impractical for the implementation of projects aimed at building local community capacity for environmental co-management. Indeed, commentators

suggested that the sequential programmatic logic is poorly suited to the types of environmental challenges Thai policy-makers face today.

On the other hand, both the European Commission's project management culture (articulated through practices such as cost-sharing) as well as, more importantly, exacting financial auditing and project management procedures caused considerable friction between Thai and European partners. For the energy programmes, these misunderstandings arguably led to a suboptimal level of outputs. For the bilateral environmental projects in Thailand, these misunderstandings have potentially strained good working relations between European and Thai environmental policy actors.

Yet, in spite of these managerial and cross-cultural difficulties, evidence suggests that European projects have impinged upon the Thai environmental agenda viz global environmental challenges. During the reporting period, concern for and engagement with global environmental challenges – particularly Global Climate Change (GCC) and biodiversity loss – have intensified in Thailand. Significantly, this is not only true for policy actors in the public and tertiary sectors but also for business and industry. Observers point out that firms have become increasingly aware of the business potential of environmentally sustainable products and practices. However, rather than restructuring an already well-established and clearly formulated environmental policy agenda, Thai environmental policy actors have preferred to deepen existing GCC and biodiversity policy initiatives on the one hand and, on the other, mainstream global environmental concerns into existing environmental policy priorities.

While difficult to quantify with any precision, European environmental interventions have contributed in a number of practical ways. At a time Thai environmental policy-makers were sensitized to global environmental issues due to a number of high-profile triggering events (such as the Tsunami of 2004), European environmental programmes successfully directed policy-making attention towards global environmental challenges. More importantly, however, the projects enabled Thai policy actors in public, private and tertiary sectors to develop and explore sustainable practices of resource use and management. In this way, the European projects provided access to best European resource practices and environmental technology.

Despite this intensification, however, policy actors argue that, due to a lacking evidence-base, the Thai government has yet to formulate a coherent GCC strategy based on an appropriate policy debate about mitigation vs adaptation. It is here that policy actors see an area of future cooperation between Thai and European partners.

I 4.2.1 Appropriate sequencing of policy dialogue, TA, capacity building, pilot projects, major programmatic interventions on global challenges

Cross-cultural misunderstandings frustrated the implementation of sequential programme management (1). On the one hand, the top-down formulation of project goals at SOM level proved impractical for the implementation of projects aimed at building local community capacity for environmental co-management. Indeed, commentators suggested that the sequential programmatic logic is poorly suited to the types of environmental challenges Thai policy-makers face today (2). On the other hand, both the European Commission's project management culture (articulated through practices such as cost-sharing) as well as, more importantly, exacting financial auditing and project management procedures caused considerable misunderstanding. For the energy programmes, these misunderstandings arguably led to a suboptimal level of outputs. For the bilateral environmental projects in Thailand, these misunderstandings have potentially strained good working relations between European and Thai environmental policy actors.

Documentary evidence for the CHARM project shows how initial shortcomings, based essentially on overly optimistic assumptions about the level of government commitment and support, cumulatively undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the CHARM project (MR1-4) (3). Similarly, monitoring reports for the Phu Kheio Wildlife Project question to initial formulations of the programme as too ambitious (MR 3 Phu Kheio, 2004) (4). In the two energy programmes – COGEN III and the EAEP -- the number of actual FSDP's was far below the numbers anticipated. Although evaluators agree that the relevance, applicability and quality of existing FSDPs is consistently high, the fact that two large programmes generated only nine projects --- which amounts to about a third of the expected projects -- is disappointing.

While part of the blame may be justifiably apportioned to simple management errors (5), part of the problems were due to more fundamental issues. First, the CHARM and Phu Kheio projects were established under what commentators have called the 'old project logic' (6). Under this logic, projects would emerge from high-level

bilateral SOM meetings where SOs would suggest and develop project ideas. Local communities had no involvement in the formulation of project goals or the design of project processes. However, they were expected to implement and execute projects over which they had no ownership. Yet, as project participants and commentators point out, the best project goals for these types of complex and messy problems emerge from the bottom-up rather than from remote experts (7). This, commentators argued, led to unsuitable project design and misunderstandings in implementation (8).

Evidence suggests that the top-down formulation of project goals introduced rigidities and inflexibilities. For example, In Phu Kheio, the MTR and monitoring reports point to an inability to adapt the intervention logic and scale down the ambitions of the project to a more workable level. Part of the reason, the reports claim, is that the fundamental project logic of first defining policy objectives and then thinking about their implementation may have imposed undue restrictions. Given the wide range of actors involved, the Thai project management was loathe to renegotiate fundamental agreements about project aims with the local communities (MR Phu Kheio, 2006). A particular commentator suggests that many problems in the Phu Kheio project originated from the fact that local communities did not participate in the formulation of project objectives (9).

Second, indications suggest that vertical policy and programming processes led to considerable cross-cultural misunderstandings. For COGEN III and the EAEF, part of the reason for disappointingly low numbers of full-scale demonstration projects may have been the administrative structure and underlying management culture of the programmes. First, the limited duration of COGEN III worked against younger projects who simply could not meet the tight deadlines. Second, the public-private partnership model of project financing turned the low awareness of cogeneration in the ASEAN region into an almost insurmountable hurdle for raising co-funding (10). Last, the lack of supportive policy environments at national level may have proven too large a barrier for fledgling cogeneration projects (11).

In the bi-lateral environmental programmes, the European Commission's standard project management procedures were the source of much misunderstanding and frustration. For participants in both the CHARM and Phu Kheio projects, the European Commission's project oversight was seen as heavy-handed and overbearing. Rather than providing practical advice on project management, participants contend, the Commission was more concerned with avoiding and uncovering suspected malfeasance. Not only do Thai participants complain about feeling badgered (12), they also perceived the many-layered financial auditing procedures – many of which did not take local realities into account -- as a sign of distrust (13). As a result, respondents argue, relations during the project were neither particularly collegial nor particularly congenial (14).

Related facts, figures, and references:

(Synoptic):

- (1) This vertical process moves from cooperative goal formulation (policy dialogue), to the identification and testing of policy alternatives (TA, capacity building, pilot projects) to decision-making and implementation (major programmatic interventions).
- (2) Respondent K, 2009; Respondent R, 2009; Saving the forest, an observer argues, is a complex task that requires a holistic policy approach (Respondent N, 2009).
- (3) On the one hand, the lack of involvement of government and private sector stakeholders hobbled the project's impact: monitors found that a "...significant number of key positions (much more than 50% according to the staff) committed by the DoF, as per the FA, were never filled, except on paper. The lack of contribution is especially felt at field level, with a fully stretched, but nevertheless committed, EC-funded team" (MR2Charm). As a result, the project lagged behind on the completion of its tasks by about 55%. On the other hand, the impact of the project depended on the effective implementation of environmental legislation by "...by relevant authorities, which may have not enough resources/capacities to do so" (MR2 CHARM).
- (4) From the outset, the project suffered from delays such as the replacement of EU TA staff or the difficulties in hiring short-term experts for a range of project critical activities (MR 2 Phu Kheio, 2005). An early monitoring report judges that provided "... this intervention is able to adapt its over ambitious initial scale into a more realistic or pilot / model approach and to overcome its initial problems in order to speed up implementation in both quantitative and qualitative terms, it will have a very positive impact" (MR 3, Phu Kheio, 2004). However, later reports reveal that these necessary adjustments did not take place. The upshot is that running delays on this project have meant that the successes of the project are little more than "islands of excellence" (MTR quoted in MR Phu Kheio, 2006).

- (5) For example, monitoring reports of the CHARM project pointed to the lack of an internal monitoring and evaluation process, something the Department of Fisheries had failed to implement. What is more, evaluations also highlighted the lack of a suitable cultural and communication strategy (MR). By 2006, monitors thought the project to be in a quandary. On the one hand, capacity shortages due to lack of commitment from the project authority (DoF) had made necessary a significant revision of the project. On the other hand, the lack of an internal monitoring and evaluation process created large uncertainties about what exactly to change (MR2CHARM 2006).
- (6) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (7) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent K, 2009; Respondent R, 2009.
- (8) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (9) Respondent N, 2009; While another respondent agrees in principle, she also contends that too much participation at local level can also become a barrier to the implementation of the project (Respondent R, 2009).
- (10) Incidentally, evaluators for the EAEF make the same point when they argue that the 50%/ 15% co-financing model acted as a disincentive for many firms (KANTOR, 2008).
- (11) COWI (2006), Ex-Post Evaluation of the COGEN 3 Programme: Popular Report, p.11
- (12) Thai respondents criticize the model of instituting both a European and a Thai project director. In one instance, a participant complains that the European project director – a European consultant – washed his hands of the project after it had finished leaving the Thai partner holding the responsibility for a demand for reimbursement to the Commission of ca 110 000 EURO (Respondent J, 2009). Another respondent argued that the appointment of advisors and consultants should be based on who can give the best advice rather than who has the most impressive university qualifications (Respondent N, 2009).
- (13) Respondent J, 2009; Respondent N, 2009.
- (14) Respondent J, 2009; The problem, two participants in the process argue, was not so much between the Thai actors and the Commission (either in Brussels or in Bangkok). Rather, the relationship between the Thai policy-makers and the European experts (particularly in CHARM) was fraught with tension (Respondent R, 2009; Respondent K, 2009). The Phu Kheio project, so the argument goes, featured a problem with Thai policy management (Respondent R, 2009; Respondent K, 2009).

I 4.2.2 Increased emphasis on global challenges and EC environment global objective in national policies

During the reporting period, concern for and engagement with global environmental challenges – particularly Global Climate Change (GCC) and biodiversity loss – have intensified in Thailand. Significantly, this is not only true for policy actors in the public and tertiary sectors but also for business and industry. However, rather than restructuring an already well-established and clearly formulated environmental policy agenda, Thai environmental policy actors have preferred to deepen existing GCC and biodiversity policy initiatives on the one hand and, on the other, mainstream global environmental concerns into existing environmental policy priorities. While difficult to quantify with any precision, European environmental interventions have contributed in a number of practical ways. First, at a time when Thai policy-makers were highly receptive to suggestions, European environmental programmes directed policy-making attention towards global environmental challenges. More importantly, however, the projects enabled Thai policy actors to develop and explore sustainable practices of resource use and management. In this way, the European projects provided access to best European resource practices and environmental technology. Despite this intensification, however, policy actors argue that, due to a lacking evidence-base, the Thai government has yet to formulate a coherent GCC strategy based on an appropriate policy debate about mitigation vs adaptation.

Although global environmental issues have always been high in the RTG's environmental agenda (1), commentators point to a noticeable increase in awareness and interest in issues such as GCC in the past 2-3 years (2). Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, policies and organisations have increasingly focused on mitigation strategies, biofuel production (3) and renewable resources. This is why, GCC has become a central research area for many HEIs and research organizations in Thailand (4).

For many commentators, however, the observed increased emphasis on global environmental challenges has not really amounted to a significant departure from or reform Thai environmental policy agenda. Observers point out that the Thai environmental agenda has changed only in details: biodiversity and climate change have been

mainstreamed into all areas of environmental policy (5). In forestry, for example, commentators point out that concerns for global wildlife conservation and climate change are now addressed in the recent national wildlife policy (6).

Significantly, concern for global environmental challenges has grown not only at the level of policy-makers and NGOs but also within the private sector (7). Going green and demonstrating corporate social responsibility (as one commentator put it "being seen as the 'good guy'") has become very important for Thai firms (8). The challenge now is to find the suitable economic instruments (i.e. like CDMs, which Thai firms now see as a means to generate profit) to exploit this interest (9). Indeed, some commentators argue that the private sector has a more sophisticated understanding of GCC than the government (10). The influence of NGOs on environmental policy has meant that firms, in contrast to some governmental policy actors (11), no longer subscribe to the "development first" argument (12). As a result, many firms, now having integrated green and environmental concepts into their business practices, work closely with environmental NGOs in the context of CSR commitments: for example, a leading environmental NGO works with business on mangrove and forestry projects.

The causes of this intensification of interest are difficult to pinpoint with any precision. However, it is highly likely that the European environmental interventions and instruments at bi-lateral and regional level have contributed to this development in practical and concrete ways. Commentators point to a general shift in the political climate concerning global environmental challenges. On the one hand, natural disasters – most prominently but not exclusively the Tsunami of 2004 – have successfully focused Thai policy-makers' attention on global environmental challenges. In the public debate, the issue has been framed in terms of policy learning: how can Thai society draw lessons from the past (i.e. disasters such as the Tsunami, sea-level rise, etc) (13)? What is more, policy actors are now realizing that global environmental challenges are likely to greatly exacerbate national and local environmental problems, such as the supply and quality of water (14). On the other hand, national and international donor agencies have stepped up the pressure on the Thai government by tying funding for many development projects to climate change issues (15).

It is into this sensitised political climate that many of the European environmental policy interventions, most notably CHARM and Phu Kheio, were launched. At a time when Thai policy-makers were receptive to ideas and concrete proposals for addressing global environmental challenges, European projects

- Helped further expand the issue by linking cooperation to global issues on the EC's policy agenda;
- Provided the ideational, institutional and technical tools for linking global environmental challenges to local problems;
- Provided an institutional, political and financial space for a wide range of actors and stakeholders to explore new ways of natural resource management within the context of global challenges;
- Provided access to European best institutional practices as well as European technical and organisational know-how

Table (1) shows how EC interventions have addressed global as well as regional challenges. In particular, these projects have allowed policy-makers as well as local communities to explore new, alternative and sustainable practices of natural resource (co) management.

	Global			Asia			
	GC C	Biodiversit y	Natural Resources	Strengthen ing Networks and Capacitu	Sustainable Consumptio n and Production patterns	"Brown" and Urban	Holism
CHARM	o	++	+	++	+	o	+
Capacity Building - Coastal Biodiversity in Ranong	o	++	++	++	o	o	+
Phu Kheio Wildlife Reserve	o	++	+	++	o	o	+
Forestry	o	+	++	++	+	o	+
COGEN III	+	o	++	o	++	+	+
EAEF	+	o	++	o	++	+	+

++ - Addresses global/ regional challenges or objectives directly and explicitly

+ - Addresses global/ regional challenge or objective indirectly and implicitly

o - Does not address global/ regional challenge or objective

In terms of agenda-setting and issue expansion, three of the four bi-lateral projects address the biodiversity issue directly (CHARM, Phu Kheio Wildlife Reserve and Capacity-building in Ranong); the Forestry project is indirectly involved in biodiversity preservation since it aims at securing the habitats of tropical forest-dwelling species. CHARM, observers contend, addressed biodiversity issues directly but address GCC concerns obliquely through information transfer and knowledge-creation (16).

In terms of linking local to global challenges, all interventions address the natural resources issue: four projects deal with the issue directly (EAEF, COGEN III, Capacity-building in Ranong and the Forestry project) while CHARM and Phu Kheio Wildlife Reserve address the challenge obliquely. Global climate change, however, is addressed by projects within the two energy programmes: COGEN III produced quality research as well as FSDPs about biomass as an energy source (17) whereas the EAEF research projects focused in renewable resources (18).

In terms of providing an exploratory policy space, three of the bilateral projects-- CHARM, Capacity Building in Ranong, and Phu Kheio-- aimed to strengthen institutional capacities and networks for the co-management of natural resources. These projects, with the possible exception of Capacity Building in Ranong, explicitly involved local communities in the environmental management and conservation (incidentally, also a policy objective of the RTG at constitutional level). For example, the CHARM project, participants surmise, has generated impressive results in natural resource governance: the project has helped local communities articulate their demands and built capacity for local participation (19). Further, all of the projects aimed for integration and joined-up policy-making. Indeed, the underlying rationale of the Phu Kheio project is to foster a more holistic approach to forestry and biodiversity management (20).

Finally, all projects provided access to European best practices and technical know-how. While the bi-lateral programmes – CHARM and Phu Kheio in particular – enabled local access to European institutional practices, the energy programmes, particularly COGEN III, successfully transferred European technological know-how.

However, despite the growth in interest in global challenges such as climate change, many commentators remain somewhat skeptical. For one, they argue, GCC is an issue with far too many variables, uncertainties and conflict among experts. As a result, commentators contend, the evidence-base for necessary policy action in Thailand is still rather incomplete. For example, experts argue that at present there is little knowledge of or research into the potential economic impacts of GCC in Thailand (21). This, they argue, is real barrier to policy-making (22) and may explain why the Thai government takes a serious stand on GCC in international negotiations (23).

As a result, commentators contend, GCC policy in Thailand is reactive and defensive (24). Furthering the debate in a meaningful way, these experts argue, requires some quantification of costs and benefits of GCC for Thai society. At present, no one knows the implications of climate change on the Thai economy. Similarly, observers contend

that it is unclear how people in Thailand are to respond to global challenges such as climate change. While people in Thailand seem to focus on GCC mitigation, experts contend that there is little scope for mitigation policies (25). In turn, adaptation has yet to enter the public debates. There has been no discussion about how best to adapt to sea-level rise, how to adapt rice paddies or what to do about water security (26). Here, commentators envisage a stronger involvement of European actors – policy-makers, firms, or knowledge-producers – to provide relevant knowledge for GCC policy-making (27).

Finally, skeptical policy-makers pointed out that although issues such as GCC have undoubtedly become more important, the main environmental agenda remains on local issues, such wildlife and forest resources in relation to the water supply (28). Indeed, these experts continue, since GCC is too abstract and too uncertain, the best strategy for addressing global challenges in Thailand was to frame them in terms of concrete and visible local environmental needs, be it wildlife conservation or water security (29).

Related facts, figures, and references:

- (1) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009; Observers contend that issue such as global climate change, biodiversity or brown vs green conservation have occupied a prominent place on the policy agenda for some time (Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009). This has been evident in the development plans (the NESDB).
- (2) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (3) In Thailand, there is increased interest in energy efficiency and biofuel; Biofuel is a big issue in Malaysia and Thailand. However, Respondent C believes that biofuel will not be a major contender because it is likely to compete with food production (Respondent C, 2009)
- (4) For example, the AIT has conducted projects on CDM, regularly provides data and expertise for Thai ministries (Respondent C, 2009).
- (5) RESPONDENT M, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (6) Respondent N, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (7) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009; RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (8) Respondent K, 2009; Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009
- (9) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (10) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (11) RESPONDENT M, 2009.
- (12) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (13) Respondent L, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (14) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (15) Respondent A, 2009; Respondent B, 2009.
- (16) RESPONDENT M, 2009. Respondent K, 2009.
- (17) COWI (2006), Ex-Post Evaluation of the COGEN 3 Programme: Popular Report.
- (18) KANTOR (2008), Ex-post Evaluation of the EC-ASEAN Energy Facility, EUROPEAID/ 119860/C/SV/multi
- (19) RESPONDENT M, 2009; Respondent R, 2009.
- (20) The guiding metaphor or image for the Phu Kheio project was that of a protective roof: the rainforest, participants argue, must be thought of as the "roof over the Royal Thai Kingdom". It protects Thailand by providing rain water. Thus the health of the forest directly affects the well-being of the Thai people. But, so the argument goes, since the forest is complex, protecting the roof requires a holistic policy approach to conservation (Respondent N, 2009).
- (21) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (22) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; RESPONDENT M, 2009.
- (23) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009.
- (24) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; Respondent K, 2009.
- (25) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (26) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (27) RESPONDENT E, 2009; RESPONDENT F, 2009; RESPONDENT G, 2009.
- (28) **Respondent N, 2009; Respondent K, 2009**
- (29) Respondent N, 2009;

The emphasis on global challenges and EC environment global objectives are selective and often implicit in the EC's environmental interventions in Thailand. At both regional and national strategy level, global environmental challenges and policy objectives play a subordinate but nonetheless integral role in the EC's policy portfolio. At national level in Thailand, policy interventions have focused selectively on perceived global challenges, primarily biodiversity loss and natural resource protection. Programmes and projects have addressed global climate change indirectly through energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. What is more, policies at the bilateral/ national level have also been selective in the regional policy objectives they pursue. In Thailand, environmental projects and programmes have aimed at building networks and institutional capacity

rather than focusing directly on sustainable consumption and production.

The 6th Environmental Action Programme (6th EAP) of the EU prioritises the following environmental challenges:

1) Climate Change: "*Climate change is already happening and represents one of the greatest environmental, social and economic threats facing the planet. The European Union is committed to working constructively for a global agreement to control climate change, and is leading the way by taking ambitious action of its own*" (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/home_en.htm).

2) Nature and biodiversity: "*The world is faced with an unprecedented loss of biodiversity, which threatens to undermine environmental, economic and social goals...At the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, at Johannesburg in 2002, governments committed themselves to significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010. The European Union has been legislating and taking action since the 1970s to safeguard biodiversity, and has also taken an active role on the international scene*" (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature_biodiversity/index_en.htm).

3) Environment and Health: "*Although much progress has been made in improving the quality of air, water and soil, the situation remains far from satisfactory from a health point of view. The EU therefore strives towards closer cooperation between the health, environment and research areas*" (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/health/index_en.htm).

4) Natural Resources and waste: "*Resources are the backbone of every economy. In using resources and transforming them, capital stocks are built up which add to the wealth of present and future generations. However, the dimensions of our current resource use are such that the chances of future generations - and the developing countries - to have access to their fair share of scarce resources are endangered. Moreover, the consequences of our resource use in terms of impacts on the environment may induce serious damages that go beyond the carrying capacity of the environment. These effects risk being aggravated once the developing world has taken up growth and resource use similar to the industrialised countries.*" (<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/natres/index.htm>).

Three of these challenges (climate change, biodiversity, and natural resources) are explicitly global in nature while the theme "environment and health" seems to aim primarily at the EU.

At regional level in Asia, the EC's environmental global challenges and policy goals have been an integral but not central part of the overall regional strategy. In the Communication "A new partnership with South East Asia" (Com (2003) 399), the environment is subsumed along with a wide range of other issues as a potential topic for "intensifying dialogue and co-operation" (EC, 2003, p.20).

Moreover, the Communication also outlines the EC's holistic approach to policy interventions. The EC (2003) contends that it takes "...a holistic approach to its broadened policy agenda, acknowledging the inter-relationship of different issues and addressing them through integrated policies...The Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade programme is a good example of this. It sees the problem of illegal logging in a number of South East Asian countries as involving economic, social, environmental and political dimensions, and recommends acting on a number of levels in response." (p.10)

Similarly, an overriding aim of the EC's strategy for the region is "...promoting closer linkages between civil societies in Asia and Europe and supporting sustainable partnerships and networks between institutions." (RSP p.#). Of the six policy goals in the EU-Asia cooperation, the environment, along with security, is singled out as an issue area for increased cooperation and partnership in "appropriate international fora" (RSPAsia, p.5). Nonetheless, the Commission does recognise the issue of environmental protection as a central challenge along with (but mentioned after) trade and investment as well as peace and security (RSPAsia, p.8). Again, the strategy paper does not specify the environmental challenges and does not explicitly link these to the 6th EAP.

JC 4.3 EC thematic, regional and national instruments and their combination are consistent with the environment global objectives

The balance, mix and aims of policy instruments reflect the policy context in which the EC has operated during the reporting period. In order to pursue global environmental objectives, EC projects and programmes needed to engage with the well-developed institutional and programmatic agenda of Thai environmental policy-making. For this reason, interventions concentrated on generating new and strengthening existing capacities for policy implementation, an area of perceived need. What is more, interventions have exploited synergies between regional and bi-lateral processes well in concentrating bi-lateral processes on local issues (such as forestry, wildlife, coastal and fishing resources) while leaving more generic regional challenges (such as energy provision) to regional and demand-driven programmes.

Environmental policy interventions in Thailand favour projects that support policy implementation rather than policy formulation. This balance reflects the accurate assessment on part of the EC that the RTG is capable of formulating coherent and innovative policy responses to global environmental challenges but still lacks institutional capacity to effectively implement these environmental policies. This is particularly the case at regional and local levels.

The four bi-lateral project at the national level (1) are explicitly and directly aimed at building institutional capacities. These projects address the institutional capacities of a wide range of policy actors including national and regional governmental agencies charged with environmental protection, knowledge-generating and -disseminating organisations, NGOs as well as local communities.

The programmes and projects dealing with energy (EAEF and COGEN III) addressed neither the environment

nor the formulation/implementation directly. However, both projects explored the institutional and technological means for implementing energy and environmental policy objectives. At the same time, the knowledge generated from research projects, particularly the projects of the EAEEF that were heavily biased in favour of renewable sources of energy, fed into policy formulation processes at national and regional level in both Thailand and the EU.

The environmental policy dialogue between the EC and the RTG has made deft use of synergies at regional and thematic level. In its policy dialogue with the RTG -- in the form of regular Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) -- the EC has concentrated in focal priority issues (i.e. trade and investment, public health, peace and security). The CSP 2007-2013 suggests that this will remain the case for the foreseeable future. However, sustainability, environmental and otherwise, suffuses and informs national policy dialogue on economic, health and security issues.

Both the EU-ASEAN policy dialogue as well as the ASEM dialogue process provide the two fora in which environmental issues relevant to Thailand are thematised. The so-called EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) offer the EU and ASEAN members the institutional space to discuss cooperation on, among other things, the environment (2). The ASEM process, in turn, offers a policy space for discussion of environmental policy at official, ministerial and summit level.

At programmatic level, the EC has avoided duplication and redundancy by letting regional programmes carry much of the programming and funding weight of environmental policy interventions in Thailand. In particular, the Commission has used the synergies of the the EU-ASEAN programmes (COGEN III, EAEEF, ARCBC) and the Asia-wide programmes (Asia ProEco, Asia Urbs) to address Thai-specific environmental issues with a global dimension: these have included energy as well as biodiversity issues.

Related facts, figures, and references:

1) The projects are CHARM, "Capacity Building to Support Training and Education on Coastal Biodiversity in Ranong", "sustainable management of phu kheio wildlife sanctuary through community participation", and "Local Participation in Highland Forest Conservation"

(2) http://www.deltha.ec.europa.eu/Thailand/thailand_pol%20dialogue.htm.

I 4.3.1 Balance between interventions supporting policy formulation and interventions improving policy implementation relates to identified gaps between EC global objective and national policies

The balance of the EC's environmental policy interventions in Thailand favours projects that support policy implementation rather than policy formulation. This balance reflects the accurate assessment on part of the EC that the RTG is capable of formulating coherent and innovative policy responses to global environmental challenges but still lacks institutional capacity to implement these environmental policies. This is particularly the case at regional and local level.

Notwithstanding the institutional landscape as well as programmatic agenda of environmental policy in Thailand, lacking policy coherence (1), fundamental disagreement about basic policy principles (2), and developing capacity for local governance (3) have constrained effective implementation of environmental policy.

The policy balance in favour of implementation and institutional capacity-building addresses the perceived gap between global challenges and national environmental policy capacities. In general, commentators agree that Thai policy-makers are capable of accurately diagnosing environmental challenges and formulating relevant policy responses (4). However, commentators point out that the activation of this potential will require the development of considerable institutional skill and capabilities (5). This is an area, the Commission argues, in which "...*European public administrations can offer a wealth of experience with regulatory approaches*" (RSP, p.22).

This is reflected in the aims and impacts of European environmental policy interventions towards support of policy implementation.

Table (2) provides an general overview of the balance between different policy aims:

	Policy Formulation	Policy Implementation
CHARM	o	++
Capacity Building - Coastal Biodiversity in Ranong	o	++
Phu Kheio Wildlife Sactuary	o	++
Forestry	+	++
COGEN III	+	+
EAEF	+	+

o - no mention; + - implicit and indirect ; ++ - explicit and direct

The four bi-lateral projects at the national level are explicitly and directly aimed at building institutional capacities. These projects address the institutional capacities of a wide range of policy actors including national and regional governmental agencies charged with environmental protection, knowledge-generating and -disseminating organisations, NGOs as well as local communities.

In terms of impacts, both the CHARM and Phu Kheio projects generated and deepened institutional capacity for sustainable co-management of natural resources. The CHARM project not only generated an awareness of the need for local self-organisation but also created necessary institutional skills and capabilities. In particular, local communities developed the capability to monitor and police the fisheries regime themselves (6). These volunteers have augmented the understaffed patrol boats of the coast guard (7). Moreover, the project has strengthened communities by building functioning and sustainable institutional networks across geographical boundaries as well as across levels of governance. In this way, the project has kickstarted community action (8). Overall, then, commentators note that EU projects are useful for knowledge creation and the generation of additional capacity to pursue the established environmental agenda (9).

Similarly, the programmes and projects dealing with energy (EAEF and COGEN III) addressed neither the environment nor the formulation/implementation directly. However, both projects explored the institutional and technological means for implementing energy and environmental policy objectives. At the same time, the knowledge generated from research projects, particularly the projects of the EAEF that were heavily biased in favour of renewable sources of energy, fed into policy formulation processes at national and regional level in both Thailand and the EU.

Notes:

(1) Commentators point out that there is little coherence across different levels of policy and governance. Wiertsema (2004) points out the coordination across the three tiers of environmental policy (constitutional provisions, parliamentary statutes, administrative regulations and notifications) is patchy. Much environmental policy of practical relevance is formulated at the level of administrative regulations. However, Wiertsema (2004) contends, "...that many of them are found to be outdated, not responding to current problems, or in conflict with one another. Furthermore, many of the old environmental laws do not correspond to the new Thai Constitution with its emphasis on people participation, decentralisation and good governance".

(2) There seems to some disagreement about the fundamental approach to environmental policy. Some policy-makers see the communities and localities as hindrances of effective environmental policy; indeed, this group often identifies communities as the main culprits responsible for environmental degradation. Another group of environmental policy-makers in Thailand believes that no sustainable and workable solution to environmental problems can be found without the active cooperation of local people (Wiertsema, 2004).

(3) Since administrative decentralisation is a relatively new governance arrangement in Thailand, many local environmental policy-makers at local level are still in the process of building appropriate policy-making and implementation capacity. The EC contends that, although environmental regulation exists, Thai authorities experience significant problems in policy formation and, more importantly, implementation. Administrative decentralisation of the 1990s has meant that the implementation and enforcement of key environmental regulation is in the hands of local and provincial authorities that lack adequate capacity (CSP 2007-2013).

(4) The "Policy and Prospective Plan for Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality 1997-2016" shows conclusively that the RTG is capable of perceiving global environmental challenges and formulating coherent policy responses to these challenges (Wiertsema, 2004, p.19). What is more, the evolution of the environmental policy network in Thailand over the past 25 years suggests that the institutional potential for implementing policy responses to global environmental challenges is in place.

(5) Wiertsema (2004) contends that some "...documents state clearly that for successful implementation of integrated natural resource and environmental management changes in the organisational culture of Thailand are called for³³. This is in line with suggestions from different sources

in Bangkok that the various government departments in Thailand often find it difficult to exchange and share information or to work together" (Wiertsema, 2004, p.24).

(6) The CHARM project set up volunteer monitors equipped with radios which have augmented the overstretched and underresourced coastguard capacity. As a result, local communities now police fishing quotas in cooperation with the coastguard. This cooperative management, participants argue, has led to a significant decrease in unauthorized fishing and unsustainable fishing practices (Respondent J, 2009);

(7) Respondent J, 2009; CHARM Documentation.

(8) As a spin-off, some CHARM communities have developed community-based tourism (Respondent J, 2009; Respondent K, 2009).

(9) RESPONDENT M, 2009.

I 4.3.2 Synergies between EC-Thailand thematic, regional and bilateral policy dialogue processes

The environmental policy dialogue between the EC and the RTG has made deft use of synergies at regional and thematic level. In its policy dialogue with the RTG -- in the form of regular Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) -- the EC has concentrated in focal priority issues (i.e. trade and investment, public health, peace and security). The CSP 2007-2013 suggests that this will remain the case for the foreseeable future. However, sustainability, environmental and otherwise, suffuses and informs national policy dialogue on economic, health and security issues.

Policy dialogue about the environment, then, takes place primarily in the context of the EU-ASEAN policy dialogue. The so-called EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) offers the EU and ASEAN members the institutional space to discuss cooperation on, among other things, the environment (http://www.deltha.ec.europa.eu/Thailand/thailand_pol%20dialogue.htm). The environment, the EC contends, "... is the transnational issue par excellence and organising programmes at a multi-country rather than national level offers therefore a clear added value" (RSPAsia, p.22).

The ASEM is another forum in which EU and Asian policy-makers at several different levels discuss environmental issues. At ministerial level, environmental policy makers have met three times to discuss global environmental challenges including global climate change, sustainable development and the protection of the environment (<http://www.aseminfoboard.org/Calendar/MinisterialMeetings/>). At the level of senior officials, two events will provide a space for policy dialogue on environmental issues (Asia-Europe Tourism Forum: "Enhancing Asia-Europe Partnership for Sustainable Tourism Development" in September 2008 and the ASEM Seminar on Adaptation to Climate Change 02 Oct 2008 to 03 Oct 2008 Tokyo, Japan). What is more, the environment has been an agenda item on most of the six ASEM Summits (<http://www.aseminfoboard.org/Calendar/Summit/?id=205>).

I 4.3.3 Synergies between EC-Thailand thematic, regional and bilateral environment cooperation programme and mainstreaming

The programmatic commitment of the EC to environmental policy in Thailand is similarly parsimonious. Much of the "work" in terms of programming and funding of environmental projects is left to the programmes at regional level. For the environment these include:

- ASEAN Level:

- ASEAN EC COGEN III programme
- EC ASEAN Energy Facility

- Asia-wide programmes

- AsiaUrbs
- Asia ProEco

Detailed data on the extent of mainstreaming of environmental concerns into more central focal areas is at present unavailable. However, monitoring reports point out that bi-lateral environmental projects, particularly CHARM and the Phu Kheio Wildlife Sanctuary, lacked gender strategies (MR2 Phu Kheio)

EQ5 - To what extent has EC mainstreaming of gender, governance and human rights into its cooperation programmes resulted in enhanced governance in the country?

Related facts, figures, and references:

References:

- The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)
- Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013
- Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2007-2010) Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, Thailand
- Co-operation activities report 2005: “European Union – Thailand”, published by the Delegation of the EC to Thailand (March 2006)

Extracts:

“In the NIP, gender is the only cross-cutting issue mentioned in connection to the gender balance of students” - - *Strategic Review and programming Mission 2005*, p. 12

JC 5.1 Gender, governance and human rights reflected in all relevant EC project documents / strategic documents

The EC’s strategic and programming documents set up a flexible and adaptable policy framework to enhance cross-cutting issues (CCI) in each sector of cooperation.

EC interventions related to CCI have evolved in a rather *ad hoc* manner since 2002, reflecting EC-Thai mutual commitments. However, the programmes undertaken were constantly in line with the EC-Thai policy dialogue. The various strategic documents, such as the CSP 2002 - 2006 or the CSP 2007 – 2013, tackle CCI mainly in the ASEM and ASEAN frameworks. It is noteworthy that several cross-cutting issues are mentioned as areas of potential co-operation with Thailand. The various CSP point to concrete ways to address cross-cutting issues through thematic budget lines as well as through the bilateral programmes outlined in the NIP 2005-2006. Governance and HR, along with other sectors, are identified under the “social policy” headline, with the goal of enhancing cooperation with the National Human Rights Commission; and that, for instance, applies to cooperation on trans-national issues (illegal migration, piracy, trafficking in human beings etc.) as well as to dialogue/cooperation on the death penalty.

The assumption is clearly made that “NGOs played an increasing role in Thailand in a large number of sectors, ranging from strengthening of civil society and assistance to refugees / displaced persons to environment and rural development” (CSP 2002-2006 p.15). To date, the portfolio of CCI mentioned directly or indirectly in the various CSP is large. And, so far, it has been assumed that progresses on Gender, Governance and HR issues will mainly be achieved through NGOs.

After extensive consultation with NGOs working in various sectors and regions, it was decided that maximising civil society participation would become one of the main way to tackle CCI (this appears clearly in most of the strategic documents).

Moreover the programming documents generate a flexible approach design. Given that the European strategic instruments primarily employed in the Thai context, particularly the EIDHR, AUP and NGOs co-financing budget lines, are essentially demand-driven and bottom-up approaches, strategic documents make sure to emphasize the importance of addressing Governance, Gender and Human Rights.

It is noteworthy that, over the reporting period, whilst all budget lines were used to reinforce the EC assistance to Burmese Refugees (on the Thai/Myanmar Border), EC strategic documents on Gender, Governance and Human rights have never put the emphasis on the refugee issues.

Since 1995, the EC has provided a total of EUR 123.1 million in support of the refugees living in camps along

the Thai/Myanmar Border. 60% (EUR 73.3 million) of the funds were used for DG ECHO operations and 40% for the AUP programme. Other international stakeholders have also participated in humanitarian assistance mainly in bilateral programmes.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)
- Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013
- Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2007-2010) Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, Thailand

I 5.1.1 Gender, governance and human rights incorporated into EC strategies and programmes at all levels.

Gender, Governance and Human Rights as such have not been explicitly and consistently incorporated into EC bilateral programmes, while CCIs' mainstreaming has been a key component of EC aid since 1996. They have been given extensive attention with refugee issues on the Thai/ Myanmar borders, even if it is not mentioned as such in EC CSPs. This support has been translated mainly by humanitarian aid through ECHO and by thematic budget lines.

Since 1995, ECHO has been providing food aid, health assistance, water and sanitation improved systems to some 150,000 refugees (living in nine camps on the Thai/ Myanmar borders) with a total funding of over € 73 million. In addition (since 2000) EC financial resources through budget lines (not including ECHO) was appreciatively estimated of € 27 million for those concerns. To complement ECHO, EC's interventions funds basic education, vocational education and health programmes. Moreover this budgetary lines approach was complemented by bilateral resources on education and health. In this sense, EC financial resources allocated to CCI and especially the refugees' camps were much more important than for cooperation under MIPs. (JC 5.1.2).

During the reporting period, at the strategic and programming levels, EC interventions concerning refugees successfully integrated Gender, Human Rights and Governance. EC has not only fostered aid effectiveness amongst stakeholders, but also achieved to build a consensus among the donor community to identify with the Thai Government a long term strategy or alternative solutions for refugees and displaced persons (sometimes "permanent refugees").

At the strategic level, EC as largest donor for the Assistance to Burmese Refugees progressively led and coordinated the donors group on these issues since 2007. This donors group is mainly composed by EC member states (Sweden, Netherlands, the UK, Denmark, Switzerland) but also Australia, US, Canada, Japan, international institutions and the TBBC. Its objective is to improve aid effectiveness but also to find out sustainable solutions for those refugees camps which became permanent. This group try to engage a policy dialogue with Thai authorities who have always had the tendency to pursue rather a containment policy. EC succeeded not only in reaching aid effectiveness but also in bringing together different donor positions in order to address common medium/long term strategies. In early 2008, EC delegation launched a "Strategic assessment and evaluation of assistance to Thai Burma Refugees camps". The objective of this study was to design a possible alternative to refugee assistance and to serve as a basis for advocacy and policy dialogue with Thai authorities and others stakeholders.

EC Delegation was instrumental in coordinating ECHO and EC development cooperation instruments in order to smoothen the transition from emergency/humanitarian actions and support to development. EC development projects have successfully followed up ECHO grants dedicated to refugee camps: while ECHO decreased its support progressively, the EC has taken over, coordinating all stakeholders, and building a consolidated and shared donors strategy on refugees. All observers pointed out the quality of the coordination between ECHO and the EC Delegation over the period. In particular, EC has avoided duplication and

redundancy by addressing quickly specific issues related to development in refugee camps.

Both approaches enabled to maintain an official commitment to refugee issues and, in parallel, to show a will to sustain a continuous dialogue with Thai authorities.

CCI have also been used to address issues that are not especially covered by EC programmes but that are trying to be tackled by several NGOs. For instance, health projects implemented by Malteser, the Raks Foundation or Handicap International focused on the need of universal coverage and showed the variety of vulnerable groups.

I 5.1.2 EC sponsored common actions undertaken by authorities or NGOs involved in gender, governance and human rights.

EC has exploited synergies between humanitarian and development actions to support its policy dialogue on Refugee issues. Since 1995, the EC has provided a total of EUR 123.1 million in support of the refugees living in camps along the Thai/Myanmar Border. 60% (EUR 73.3 million) of the funds were used for DG ECHO operations and 40% for the AUP programme. Other international stakeholders have also participated in humanitarian assistance. The assistance was mainly ensured by bilateral programmes under various budget lines such as NGOs cofinancing budget line, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Aid for Uprooted people (AUP).


Over the reporting period, all EC supported actions funded on budget lines related to CCI were focusing on Refugee issues. The total budget of the 18 EC-funded projects amount to EUR 27 Million.

EC programmes and especially AUP budget line ones which represent 90% of refugees programme funding have supported short term initiatives in health, education and livelihoods. Main beneficiaries of these funds were UN agencies (UNHCR), the consortium of international NGOs (Thailand Burma Consortium - TBBC) and various international NGOs. No Thai NGOs were involved. Given the fact that the EC strategic instruments, particularly the EIDHR, AUP and NGOs cofinancing budget lines, are essentially demand-driven, the presence of Thai community is crucial.

Most of the projects funded under instruments such as thematic programmes (AUP, EIDHR, NGO cofinancing) are not used in the broad context of supporting specific policy dialogue. Despite the fact that European as well as Thai NGOs have shown a great interest and capacity in implementing horizontal projects which tackle CCI, there is no evidence that those projects will be sustainable in the long term. All MRs (interim reports, final reports) were detailed in terms quantity of interventions implemented, but not really in terms of qualitative progress achieved (related to CCI) or in terms of achievement in comparison to the initial solutions. In particular, there is a lack of indicators and benchmarks.

Except several health projects (i.e. Malteser, the Raks Foundation or Handicap International projects which are implemented with Thai Provincial authorities inside and outside the camps), most projects sustain the humanitarian aid in refugees camps even if not always mentioned like this. These projects should emphasize more the importance of a change of strategy towards a gradual integration of refugees into local communities and local economy.

Moreover the addition of activities is not translated into political outcomes. No project involves Thai authorities and Thai NGOs to enhance a real partnership. Except an EC study which is now implementing by UNDP to focus on cost/effectiveness benefit for Thai authorities to cope with refugee issues, the various EC cooperation instruments are too restrictive and have not been translated into political outputs.



AUP instrument provided around of EUR 50 million and EUR 9 million are planned for 2009-2010.

There is clearly a gap between cooperation projects and political results. This doesn't help to find out an alternative strategy for refugees camps.

The EC's operational and political interventions have made little impact on Thai policy debate until now (JC 5.2). This may have more to do with the priorities of Thai policy debate in Thailand which has always been referred to refugees issues as national policy issues and as containment policy rather than a lack of EC commitment or an intrinsic failure of European projects dealing directly with CCI.

Nevertheless it is fair to recognise that the positive impacts of EC'S interventions have not been spread far beyond the group of immediate beneficiaries. For instance, it is particularly noteworthy that none of Thai NGOs are involved in those CCI projects related refugees issues on Thai / Myanmar Borders. All of EC funded projects are implemented by international NGOs with Burmese refugees' partners. (JC 1.5.1.2) Therefore there is no real transfer of knowledge about the refugees' situation amongst Thai civil society organisations or Thai Authorities.

While EC emphasis that there is now a real political will, there is still no concrete and organised short-medium or long term strategy to facilitate a refugee's situation transition without any commitment of Thai authorities. There is still no clear and organised information to find out alternative solutions. EC's interventions in Thailand support refugees' camps assistance and implementation rather than refugees policy formulation. Evidences suggest that that there is a problematic question about the quality of EC refugees projects outcomes and what could be used to engage a political dialog with Thai authorities. The nature of EC's projects is still focussed on Humanitarian approaches whereas EC delegation claims to shift from a humanitarian approach to development approach (JC 1.5.1.2). This situation seems partly due to the nature of EC cooperation instruments which are mainly translated into activities within the refugees rather than joint EC/ Thai activities which could be more appropriate institutional incentives. . Except one EC study which is implementing with UNDP to demonstrate the cost/ effectiveness/ benefit for Thai authorities to cope with the refugees issues, the various EC cooperation instruments are too restrictive and have not been translated into EC political outputs.

There is a need for more flexible instruments to reconcile the initiatives of the cooperation section with the political section at the Delegation.

Related facts, figures, and references:

1. Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Women and Children Care and Support in high HIV/AIDS Prevalence Areas, MR-20166.02 – 19/12/05
2. Monitoring Report: Thailand - THA - Women and Children Care and Support

- 3.MR-20166.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- 4.Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Improving Access to Comprehensive Care and Support for Persons with HIV/AIDS and their families in Thailand MR-20167.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- 5.Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Disability Right, Empowerment, Awareness and Mobility in Indonesia and Thailand (DREAM IT) MR-20174.01 – 25/02/05
- 6.Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Karen Education Project IV MR-20715.01 – 12/12/07
- 7.Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Migrant Health Project MR- 20387.02 – 31/10/06
- 8.Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Assistance to People with Disabilities and Mine-Uxos Risk Education for Refugees along the Thai-Burmese Border MR- 20541.02 – 12/12/07
- 9.Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Rice and Building Materials for Burmese Refugees in Thailand MR – 20275.01 - 25/02/05
- 10.Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.02 – 02/07/03
- 11.Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.01 – 14/06/02
- 12.Monitoring Report Ex-Post Thailand – TH- Thai Village Health Project MAE Sariang District MR-20165.03 – 29/06/07
- 13.Monitoring Report Thailand – TH- Vocational Training Project Phase II. MR- 20714.01 – 12/12/07

Extract :

“Care and assistance of refugees and displaced people: to reinforce co-operation in this area, building on the available results of ongoing projects providing assistance to refugee camps and to villages around camps. This concerns especially the Karen, Karenni and Shan communities on the Thai-Burmese border. Assistance should be oriented to humanitarian aid and support to operations in favour of uprooted people, under the respective budget lines, in dialogue with the National Security Council of Thailand, and paying particular attention to protecting refugees from occasional military clashes at the (badly-delimited) border. This should be carried out in co-operation with ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office) and the UNHCR.”

14. the MR on Women and Children Care and Support in high HIV/AIDS Prevalence Areas assessed that *“the no-cost extension granted will help to promote sustainability... the project still needs some time to consolidate capacity on counselling and prevention and increase awareness on HIV issues among local authorities.”*

15. MR on the Karen Education Project IV (MR-20715.01, 12/12/07) assessed that *“The sustainability of the project is weak from its inception as an emergency aid. The camps are fully dependent on external resources. ECHO is in charge of the relief and food security in the camps and many organizations are working in health, sanitation and the different needs of the camps.”*

16. MR on the Karen Education Project IV (MR-20715.01, 12/12/07) stressed that *“Being a food aid programme entirely depending on the funding provided by bilateral and international donors, the project leads to this ambiguous situation in which “total” impact leads to “zero” sustainability. Local authorities in Thailand do not provide any financial support to the project. The dependency of refugees on food aid nearly equals 100% as the lack of space in the camps does not allow the production of any kind of food, which in most places is prohibited by the Thai authorities in any case.”*

17. The MR on “Disability Right, Empowerment, Awareness and Mobility in Indonesia and Thailand (DREAM IT) (MR-20174.01, 25/02/05)” stated that *“The project does not benefit from any support at national policy level. Implementation has been limited to existing VSO partners and no new “partners” have been taken on board. At micro-level, the institutions in which volunteers have been working will be capable to maintain a certain level of knowledge, but without support “outside”, which could be from a more central structure, the sustainability will remain very fragile.”*

JC 5.2 EU Gender, governance and human rights approaches and objectives promoted in national policy documents and government practices.

There is little evidence that European CCI instruments have been promoted in national policy practices. Across the sector approaches, The main reason is that EC is poorly understood especially with its conception of gender, Governance and Human Rights. All interviewees agreed that there is no real promotion of CCI in national policy documents and European models do not figure prominently.

While the refugee’s situation progress is crucial for EC, Thai authorities continue to consider this question as

national security issues. The Thai Status quo seems to be the norm. The EC position is clear on Human Rights (HR) when it comes to international treaties. It is fair to recognise that working with governance, Human rights and gender matters, opens up huge capacity challenges for the EC (as for other donors) . But there is no evidence that integration of those cross cutting issues especially on Burmese refugee's issues have had an influence on Thai's authorities. Although all stakeholders emphasis that there is now a real political will to find out an alternative solution on refugees situation, there is still no concrete reply from Thailand. For instance, the Donors groups on Burmese refugees situation have recently send a letter to the prime minister to engage a dialog about the future of the refugees situation. There is not answer until now.

While EC emphasis that there is now a real political will, there is still no concrete and organised short-medium or long term strategy to facilitate a refugee's situation transition without any commitment of Thai authorities. There is still no clear and organised information to find out alternative solutions. Evidences suggest that that there is a problematic question about the quality of EC refugees projects outcomes and what could be used to engage a political dialog with Thai authorities. The nature of EC's projects is still focussed on Humanitarian approaches whereas EC delegation claims to shift from a humanitarian approach to development approach. This situation seems partly due to the nature of EC cooperation instruments which are mainly translated into activities within the refugees rather than joint EC/ Thai activities which could be more appropriate institutional incentives. Regarding the highly politicised situation on Burmese refugee's question, it is surprising that EC has not developed yet incentive instrument to promote intercultural understanding by providing exchange of experiences between EC/Thai authorities EC/Thai MP etc. or exchange of views or experiences between politicians or administrations. Regarding the fact that refugees, migration and asylum seekers is regional, it is surprising to assess that there are no specific programmes within the context of Bali Process which can be compared to Budapest process.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)
- Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013
- Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (2007-2010) Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2002-2004, Thailand
- National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, Thailand
- Co-operation activities report 2005: “European Union – Thailand”, published by the Delegation of the EC to Thailand (March 2006)

Extracts:

“In 2008 the EC funded an External Strategic Assessment¹ which has confirmed the need of a change of strategy and has formulated a number of recommendations in this regard, in particular in relation to an opening of the camps and a gradual integration of refugees into local communities and the local economy. In the short-to-medium term practical solutions are proposed to improve operational aspects of the current approach, particularly with respect to refugee screening and registration, camp management, and distribution of food and non food items. These long term proposed solutions will help shape the AUP Programme, with greater emphasis being placed on seeking durable solutions and a move from short term relief aid to longer term strategic planning, and will complement any continuation of ECHO support.”(Action Fiche for Thailand 2009-2010- Aid to Uprooted People

I 5.2.1 Gender, governance and human rights incorporated into national strategies and programmes at all levels

While EC emphasis that there is now a real political will, there is still no concrete and organised short-medium or long term strategy to facilitate a refugee's situation transition without any commitment of Thai authorities. Evidences suggest that that there is a problematic question about the quality of EC refugees

¹ Strategic Assessment and Evaluation of Assistance to Thai-Burma Refugee Camps, AGRER Consortium

projects outcomes and what could be used to engage a political dialog with Thai authorities. The nature of EC's projects is still focussed on Humanitarian approaches whereas EC delegation claims to shift from a humanitarian approach to development approach. There is a symptomatic absence of Thai authorities as real partner of the refugees' question. This situation seems partly due to the nature of EC cooperation instruments which are mainly translated into activities within the refugees rather than joint EC/ Thai activities which could be more appropriate institutional incentives.

EC's interventions have clearly paved the way for a future collaboration with Thai authorities on CCI. However, since there is no political window such as the recent Rohingya refugees' event which was very detrimental for the Thailand image or a change of Myanmar political situation, the CCI impact will be concentrated on refugee's camps maintenance.

The promotion of CCI has been mainly the domain of EC NGOs and MS embassies. At present there is widespread consensus amongst all stakeholders of international community that the lack of Thai authorities' commitments has been an obstacle to find out a solution for the question of Burmese refugees.

I 5.2.2 Gender, governance and human rights regulatory framework convergent with EC one (No of EC compatible legal acts).

There is no hard evidence of a direct impact of CCI on national strategies and national regulatory or legal framework. The national Commission of Human rights which reports to the Parliament and the Prime Minister clearly stated the lack of sustainability of EC interventions. The interviewee states that there is no knowledge about refugees question amongst Thai society. This question is not relayed by the media, the MP and HR matters a fundamental question in Thailand.

At present, Thailand has not yet signed the covenant of torture, death penalty and the covenant of refugees of 1951. As consequences, there is a widespread opinion that refugees called "displaced persons" by the Thai authorities and are mainly illegal migrants.

I 5.2.3 Improved Thailand's gender, governance and human rights indicators

There is hard evidence that EC has positively impacted CCI indicators especially on Burmese refugee camps.

At this stage, there is no indicator or benchmarks available to gauge Thai Gender, Governance and Human Rights indicators of performance through documentation. It is assumed that the numerous projects implemented have directly or indirectly tackled those CCI, and have planted seeds with the main beneficiaries. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of ownership by Thai authorities, no evidence of replicability, etc....

For instance, the CSP 2002-2006 clearly intended to support new institutions, established under the new constitution to monitor respect for Human Rights, such as the National Human Rights Commission. To date, no project has been implemented relating to the National Human Rights Commission.

Related facts, figures, and references:

- The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)
- Thailand-European Community Strategy Paper for the period 2007 – 2013
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Women and Children Care and Support in high HIV/AIDS Prevalence Areas, MR-20166.02 – 19/12/05
- Monitoring Report: Thailand - THA - Women and Children Care and Support
- MR-20166.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Improving Access to Comprehensive Care and Support for Persons with HIV/AIDS and their families in Thailand MR-20167.01 – 18/03/04 (Date of Report)
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Disability Right, Empowerment, Awareness and Mobility in Indonesia and Thailand (DREAM IT) MR-20174.01 – 25/02/05

- Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Karen Education Project IV MR-20715.01 – 12/12/07
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Migrant Health Project MR- 20387.02 – 31/10/06
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- TH- Assistance to People with Disabilities and Mine-Uxos Risk Education for Refugees along the Thai-Burmese Border MR- 20541.02 – 12/12/07
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA- Rice and Building Materials for Burmese Refugees in Thailand MR – 20275.01 - 25/02/05
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.02 – 02/07/03
- Monitoring Report: Thailand- THA – Social Support Project (SSP) MR 20220.01 – 14/06/02
- Monitoring Report Ex-Post Thailand – TH- Thai Village Health Project MAE Sariang District MR-20165.03 – 29/06/07
- Monitoring Report Thailand – TH- Vocational Training Project Phase II. MR- 20714.01 – 12/12/07

EQ6 - To what extent has the EC assessed and took into account (i) the government's priorities, (ii) the needs of the country and, (iii) the evolving context in programming its strategic response, including the follow-up of the implementation strategy?

Before 2002, the objectives of EC programmes were neither fully consistent with the RTG views and priorities, nor with the needs of the country. The internal coherence of the bilateral EC-Thai programme was limited because the strategy was more an aggregation of comparatively small and uncoordinated projects, implemented in an ad-hoc fashion, rather than an approach focusing on RTG priorities. The weak internal consistency of the EC strategy in Thailand was also partly a consequence of the comparatively large share of the resources emanating from the horizontal budget lines, designated from Brussels for highly specific types of interventions.

At the 7th Senior Officials' Meeting, held in Bangkok in March 2001, it was agreed to shift bilateral relations from a project-based approach to an enhanced policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest. This comprehensive policy dialogue oriented EC bilateral support mainly to two focal areas, with the first focussing on initiatives aimed at fostering trade, investment, and related areas for sustained cooperation links. The CSP 2002-2006 and NIPs 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 were, thus, more effectively focused on Thailand's priorities and needs. Many priority areas are covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC and the focus on economic co-operation, universal health care coverage and higher education reflects national policy priorities and needs.

At sector level, EC intervention goals are consistent with country needs. Higher education programmes all addressed the issue of quality in Thai HE institutions – be it teaching or research, widely acknowledged as major issues. In health, many priority areas of the government agenda have been covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC. The EC's environmental policy interventions addressed global environmental concerns in terms of national environmental priorities at the programmatic and institutional level (I 6.1.1).

The very specific context of dialogue with Thailand, as an emerging economy in a particularly sensitive geo-political area, irritants are numerous and enjoy a higher priority for the EC in some ways than the 2M€ a year dedicated to development co-operation. The EC first engages in trade regulation debates, which are often not related to the needs of the partner country but instead to unilateral EU needs and then decides on their global nature, without consideration of their impacts on the Thai economy. The same issue arises for governance and human rights, where global concerns, translated into projects funded by certain budget lines, are propelled into EC-Thai co-operation without much consideration of other components of EC strategy.

In this context, sector policy dialogue is hard to establish. The limited resources of the NIP did not help very much in addressing these deficits. For all sectors, apart from health, policy formulation support is mainly carried out by EC regional programmes (and through the EC support to the ASEAN Secretariat). Bilateral projects are focused more on implementation of the policy framework (biodiversity through improving coastal habitat management), compensation of impacts of new policies (particularly EC trade regulations) and the exploratory phase of future or desirable policy changes (tackling global climate change, improving HE quality, etc.).

EC bilateral interventions covered both policy dialogue and implementation only for universal health care coverage, at the price of a long-term involvement in this sector. For other sectors, the balance was aimed at targeting, on the one hand, regional programmes supporting ASEAN-level policy dialogue and at national level implementing capacities (ECAP being a good example), and on the other hand, bilateral programmes mostly focused on implementation (SPF). According to each sector, the balance was unevenly reached. The balance has been reached for the economy and trade sectors, as the SPF can be considered the most flexible and potentially efficient tool for the development of trade between the EU and Thailand. For HE, the lion share of policy interventions aimed at strengthening institutional capacities. For the health sector, policy

formulation came first but was complemented by support for implementation of the reform and for NGO projects for refugees. In the environmental sector, policy implementation prevailed (I 6.1.2).

Two sections of the 2002-2006 CSP relate to Thai policy agenda and country analysis, as well as providing the general information needed for strategic programming in order to correspond to national needs. Considerable information is provided on choices made and their grounds. The documents are based on an accurate analysis of the political and economic situation and trends. Furthermore, relevance and consistency with the Thai national agenda is highlighted. The EC analysis proved to be relevant and truthful (I 6.2.1).

Thailand was the first country to have an EC Delegation in Southeast Asia and therefore, there has been a long cooperative relationship. As the documents were adopted at Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) it may be said that the documents show both consistencies with the situation they address and flexibility to the changes witnessed. The SOMs, organised regularly up to 2003, were instrumental in keeping EC interventions in line with national needs. As far as possible, which means as far as EC programming regulations may allow, a flexible approach was adopted to gear projects towards Thai shareholder demands, particularly with the SPF and to a lesser extent for environmental projects. In the health sector, the follow-up of the reform support through two programming cycles demonstrated that EC programme aims were closely related to national needs, explicitly stated in fruitful sector dialogue with the MoH. The consistency of EC strategy and interventions with national needs is not questioned by EM representatives.

In all sectors but higher education, co-operation strategies are drawn from informed analysis on national needs. Information was not generated by an EC projects, but expertise to use existing data and fact-findings missions were specifically intended to produce EC view on Thailand needs and priorities (I 6.2.1).

In trade, health and environment, synergies were achieved by EC interventions between policy dialogue and co-operation programmes, playing mainly between regional and bilateral levels. That was not the case for higher education where policy dialogue over HE between Thailand and the EC is sporadic and disjointed. Synergy was more difficult to achieve with projects funded using budget lines, which are strongly targeted towards beneficiaries and do not leave much room for policy dialogue. This aspect is left, to a large extent, solely to the Delegation's political section (I 6.2.2).

The EC's strategic response evolved using lessons learnt and good practise, as well as government policies. Integrating emerging policy issues was not explicit, except for health reform issues, until the CSP 2002-2006. Several factors can be related to this change, some of these reasons have their origin at the national level (such as the 2001 SOM, 2003 midterm review), and others at a more regional (2002 ALA regulation evaluation) or global level (WTO Doha declaration). It is out of the scope of this evaluation to weight each factor, as it seems that it was the result of all of the factors considered together that induced a major change in EC strategy in Thailand. Since then, however, strong emphasis has been placed on emerging policy issues when arising, particularly in the sectors trade, the economy and the environment. Indeed, in sectors where there were not many developments during the period in terms of emerging policy issues, like for higher education, no significant change was introduced in EC implementing strategy. (I 6.3.1).

The only available monitoring/evaluation report covering the period until 2000 is the Evaluation of the ALA regulation 443/92 (Consortium Eva-EU, *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report*, vol. 1, 2002). This is a recurring feature of a lack of institutional memory inside the EC and is not taken as hard evidence of insufficient monitoring at that time. The programmes implemented afterwards are relatively well documented by ROMs and evaluations, with a thrust towards the end of the reporting period (as 2009 mid-term review comes closer). Health, higher education, and environmental projects were particularly closely monitored and evaluated. The monitoring was less close for the SPF as a whole (evaluated only in 2005) but this should be related to the numerous projects covered, which does not assist the attainment of global findings. CCIs' mainstreaming was not specifically monitored.

The use of lessons learnt from experience and is also well emphasised in ROMs and evaluations, is mentioned in EC programming documents. It was also evidence by interviews, where project managers and their

counterparts showed a good command of the content of the projects and the reasons for introducing adjustments over time according to lessons learnt and the changing context. However, some ROM recommendations, notably for health and environment projects, were found in several consecutive reports, showing a lack of proper reactions (or non-documented disagreement of the EC or project staff). (I 6.3.2).

The RTG requirement for donors to move towards a partnership of equals was the major evolution in national policies that directly affected EC interventions during the reporting period. Faced with this situation, it can safely be assessed that the EC responded by setting-up innovative demand-driven bilateral instruments (through the SPF) and a renewed combination of regional/bilateral projects with well specified purposes (policy formulation support / policy implementation or compensation support). It is not sure that the RTG request was the only driving factor for this change, as issues faced while negotiating the PCA and political instability were also instrumental in pushing for mobilising NSAs in a demand-driven approach.

Apart from maybe the trade sector, no RTG sector policy underwent a significant evolution during the reporting period, at least not one that would forcefully imply a dramatic change in EC co-operation instruments: health care reform retained the same fundamentals; environmental policy was not affected by major changes, unless a stronger commitment was pushed by an ever stronger public concern; higher education policy stayed unchanged. On trade, the demand-driven SPF was a wise move to stay aloof from conflicting issues, while allowing for compensation of controversial new EU regulations (I 6.3.3).

Under the ALA regulation, the main focus of EC assistance is seen as targeting mutual interest and understanding. This applied all over the reporting period. The new regulation, namely DCI, applied at the very end of the period and did not have any impact on EC programme outcomes covered by this evaluation.

In November 2003, the former PM Thaksin announced that from 2004 onwards, Thailand would (...) receive or request financial assistance (...) from foreign countries only if such assistance is given without any conditions, commitments or obligations which will make Thailand lose its negotiating power as an equal partner with that foreign country. However, Thai authorities have indicated that technical assistance would in practice be welcome if such support was provided on the basis of partnership rather than taking the form of a traditional donor-beneficiary relationship (as quoted in the CSP 2007-2013, p. 12). The EC has responded to this change in outlook (and the underlying fact of Thailand's graduation from being an ODA recipient country) by turning towards providing technical assistance to support the achievement of Thailand's national development goals and by promoting economic co-operation in the mutual interests of Thailand and the EU. Overall, in line with the Thai government's political stance, the EC like other donors have gradually shifted their emphasis from financial assistance for physical infrastructure to technical assistance for social infrastructure, focussing on human resource development, poverty alleviation, and the environment. On the other side, most MSs phased out from ODA with Thailand and focused more on cultural and scientific co-operation, keeping a strong involvement in traditional embassies' competencies such as education, trade and FDI issues.

In 2003, the EC's strategy for SE Asia calls for promoting policy dialogue in the spirit of partnership of equals. Negotiations to reach a bilateral Partnership Cooperation Agreement with Thailand, as with all ASEAN countries, started in November 2004 and are still on-going.

The Mid-Term Review (2003) of the implementation of the CSP/NIP 2002-2006 stated that it was mutually decided by the Thai authorities and the EC to *'move gradually from development co-operation to economic co-operation'* in which *'research and technological development co-operation and (...) educational issues'* play an essential part. The scope for cooperation goes increasingly beyond traditional development cooperation and covers issues like: trade & Investment, regional economic cooperation, migration, minority rights, and indigenous people. Traditional EC areas of cooperation such as the environment and the health sector were preserved. Development cooperation was to be envisaged only on an exceptional basis and only if it addresses key national development priorities where the EC has a distinctive added value.

In 2003, the Commission's Strategy for SE Asia calls for promoting policy dialogue in the spirit of a

partnership of equals; a new bilateral Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) started in November 2004 and is under negotiation along these lines.

The EC-RTG Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) provided the framework for joint strategic programming up to 2003-2004. Those meetings are reported as useful joint exercises. Since 2003, SOMs were no longer organised. Allegedly; their continuous postponing is mainly due to political instability. There is, however, some ground for analysing this also in the light of the numerous negotiation rounds on the PCA: even if most technical or sector-wide issues are allegedly resolved, MoFA keeps pointing to governance issues as major obstacles to reaching any agreement. The 9th is planned in March 2009.

There is no doubt about the good working relationships entertained by the EC Delegation with line ministries when dealing with project formulation. This was checked for all the main sectors of intervention (health, environment, economy) and is consistent with the close link acknowledged between RTG sector policy agenda and EC programmes. Higher education is removed from this finding. Programmes applied in Thailand are either global (Erasmus Mundus) or regional (AUNP, Asialink, etc.), without direct involvement by the line ministry in formulating the activities (I 6.4.1).

Evidence for informing these indicators are too sketchy to reach a clear statement and there are huge differences between sectors and issues.

Firstly, in relation to co-evolution of cooperation programmes and sector policy dialogue the following can be said. The situation for health care is the clearest: EC interventions supported building the universal coverage reform, at least in relation to its key financial issues. Here there is an identity between projects and the policy dialogue. For higher education, no policy dialogue was established, thus EC's programmes stand alone to a certain extent. On the environment, EC programmes were directly involved in defining the implementation of the policy, which was not really a matter of dialogue (which was taking place at ASEAN level). In trade co-operation programmes and thus mainly SPF, no policy dialogue was explicitly considered: most small-scale projects were focused on very technical issues.

Secondly, on political dialogue and development co-operation the following issues were raised. Here, the assessment is more about incompatibility than co-evolution. In PCA negotiations, political issues relating to governance, namely the King's position in relation to international judiciary organisations, refugees and migrants proved to be major impediments. On the one hand, the lack of PCA was acting as an obstacle towards integrating EC development programmes into a comprehensive bilateral framework since 2003. On the other hand, implementing development programmes did not change RTG statements on conflict issues in the draft PCA by any means (I 6.4.2).

The sequencing of policy dialogue, TA, capacity building, pilot projects and major programmatic interventions is more adjusted to development co-operation than to the partnership of equals progressively established between Thailand and the EC. It can be implemented only when related financial resources are made available across several programming periods, which was not the case in Thailand where only minimal bilateral resources are available compared with the needs of the country. Such sequencing had not taken place during the assessed period.

Therefore, if almost all those approaches can be found across the evaluated period in Thailand, they are not encompassed in a chronologically logical path. They are mainly related to the RTG's standing on limiting ODA to TA. Financial opportunities picked from various EC sources of funds at different times were another important issue for formulating projects. Programmatic interventions had rather been predominantly the result of trial and error and lessons learnt in the evolution of development cooperation (I 6.4.3).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The RTG and the EC agreed in 2001 to move gradually from development co-operation towards economic co-operation for mutual interests.

Higher education: EC interventions in HE addressed the central issue, namely that of quality in the Thai HE

landscape, through a range of different instruments. While many of these instruments provided implementation support, some also provided a platform for ASEAN-wide HE policy formulation. Strategic programming documents and SOM dialogues have provided a very general but, nonetheless, appropriate framework for HE sector interaction. Instead, programmes and projects in HE have been mostly driven by demands emerging from the HE communities themselves. Evidence suggests that lessons learnt from monitoring and evaluation processes have shaped follow-on programmes and projects. For the reporting period, HE interventions still resembled development assistance.

Health: The ultimate justification of the EC's aid in health has been to follow the Government's priorities and the needs of the country as they have evolved over time (JC 6.1 and 6.2). In keeping with targets for these priorities, the ROM system has proven to be an excellent EC vehicle to follow-up on the implementation of EC interventions, precisely to make changes using lessons learnt, when there is still time, in both the tactical and strategic aspects of its aid portfolio (JC 6.3). The field phase confirmed that health projects, mainly those implemented by partner NGOs, have been truthful in addressing felt needs and priorities especially in serving migrants and ethnic minorities in border and remote areas - i.e., vulnerable populations not well served by the government. (JC 6.4). For the NGOs visited (MSFB, Raks and IOM) follow-up has happened since their respective EC-funded projects ended, since they continue to work with the same vulnerable groups.

Environment: During the reporting period, the EC operated within a well-defined institutional and programmatic environmental policy agenda. Programmes and projects in the environmental domain have reflected and corresponded to national needs. On the one hand, strategic documents framed the environmental arena with sufficient flexibility to enable actors on the ground to formulate relevant programmes. On the other hand, the EC's environmental policy engagements have also reflected the strengths and weaknesses of policy dialogue at SOM level. Although the mix of instruments did not change significantly, the EC reacted swiftly to emerging events, particularly the Tsunami of 2004. However, evidence suggests that many recommendations from evaluations were not implemented for good (i.e. inherent and uncontrollable project complexities) and not so good (i.e. cross cultural miscommunication) reasons. In terms of the formal processes (i.e. joint programming, co-evolution of programmes and dialogue, as well as a sequential policy process), the EC's interventions in the environmental domain aspired but not always succeeded to generate a partnership of equals.

Cross-cutting issues: The strategic programming documents are based on an accurate and detailed analysis of the political and economic situation and trends in Thailand. CCI are mainly demand-driven by Thai civil society or by GOV (with SPF). Relevance and consistency with the Thai national agenda is highlighted. Moreover, the CSP 2002 - 2006 has fitted neatly into the evolving policy framework and thus effectively anticipated the direction of EC/Thai relations, based mainly on partnerships and no longer on aid development.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“Over the years Thailand has undergone a rapid process of development. As a result, the nature of EU co-operation with the Kingdom has fundamentally changed and can today best be characterised as a partnership of equals. Emphasis is placed on the sharing of expertise in areas such as technology, research, and the environment. Economic co-operation and higher education also feature prominently” - (EC, 2005, foreword)

“(during the period 1993-2000) Four macros sectors utilise nearly equal shares of the overall programme (Figure 6.3), with the humanitarian sector being the largest (29.7 per cent), followed by the social sector with 25.0 per cent, the economic one in the third place (24.3 per cent) and the natural resources and environment utilising just below 20 per cent. Main features are that:

- humanitarian assistance focuses on the politically sensitive issue of Myanmar/ Burma refugees on the Thai-Burma border;*
- the social sector comprises different components, including health sector reform aiming to improve the quality and accessibility of primary health care;*
- economic co-operation includes a wide range of small projects such as technology workshops, commercial information, urban*

planning, with a focus on trade facilitation as well as research and development; and
- natural resource management involves the rehabilitation of coastal habitats and interventions to shore up agricultural productivity, mainly in the poorest north-eastern provinces.” (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002 p.58)

“Over time, the focus of EC-Thai co-operation has gradually shifted from development aid to economic co-operation, while increasingly concentrating on specific sectors such as environment and fisheries, as well as on projects in the areas of social policies, promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises and human resource development.”
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand

“At present, there is a significant number of EC-supported projects/programmes in Thailand, both bilaterally (in the sectors of energy, public health, environment, narcotics, NGO co-financing, humanitarian assistance, for a total EC grant of € 59.3 million), and in the context of regional programmes, such as ASEAN co-operation (€ 82.2 million), ASIA Co-operation (€ 166.4 million), and ASEM co-operation (€ 18.25 million). - (EC, 2001, p.16)

“In recent years, Thailand has graduated from being a recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA). As a result, and in line with the Thai government's stance, donors are now focusing on providing policy advice and technical assistance as well as capacity building.” - EC, 2005 p.14

“Reflecting the new realities of a more mature and wide-ranging partnership, the Commission has diversified its partner structure and co-operates with a multi-faceted group of stakeholders ranging from government entities to private sector associations, universities and NGOs.” http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand

“In 2002, the EC adopted a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Thailand for the years 2002-2006. The purpose of CSPs is to improve the coherence of EU policy towards third countries, particularly, to ensure a match between political priorities and spending on co-operation activities”. - EC, 2005 p.14

JC 6.1 The objectives of the programmes reflect the views and priorities of the country with respect to a comprehensive policy dialogue with the EC

Considerable information was provided in the CSP and NIPs for Thailand on choices made and their grounds. The documents are based on an accurate analysis of the political and economic situation and trends. Furthermore, relevance and consistency with the Thai national agenda is highlighted (I 6.1.1). As the documents were adopted at Senior Officials' Meetings it can safely be said that the documents show both consistencies with the situation they address and flexibility to the changes witnessed. Thailand was the first country to have an EC Delegation in Southeast Asia and therefore there has been a long cooperative relationship with the RTG (see also Sema Belgium, *Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission For Country Strategies*, Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005).

Until the year 2000, the internal coherence of the bilateral EC-Thai programme was limited because the programme consisted mainly of comparatively small and uncoordinated projects, implemented in an ad-hoc fashion. Allocating the comparatively small programmes across four macro-sectors limited resources and impact, thereby also reducing the relevance. The weak internal coherence of the Thai programme was also partly a consequence of the comparatively large share of the resources coming from the horizontal budget lines designated for highly specific types of interventions.

At the 7th Senior Officials' Meeting, held in Bangkok in March 2001, it was agreed to shift bilateral relations from a project-based approach to an enhanced policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest. To this effect, the CSP oriented EC bilateral support mainly to two focal areas, with the first focussing on initiatives aimed at fostering trade, investment, and related areas for sustained cooperation links.

The CSP 2002-2006 and NIPs 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 were thus more effectively focused on Thailand's priorities and needs. Many priority areas are covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and

regionally by the EC and the focus on economic co-operation, universal health care coverage and higher education reflect national policy priorities and needs.

At sector level, EC intervention goals are consistent with country needs. Higher Education programmes all addressed the issue of quality in 'Thai HE institutions' – be it teaching or research, widely acknowledged as a major issue. In health, many priority areas of the government agenda have been covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC. The EC's environmental policy interventions addressed global environmental concerns in terms of national environmental priorities at the programmatic and institutional level (I 6.1.1).

The very specific context of dialogue with Thailand is that of an emerging economy in a particularly sensitive geo-political area, irritants are numerous and enjoy a higher priority for the EC in some ways than the 2M€ a year to be spent on 'technical' co-operation. The EC first engages in trade regulation debates, which are often not related to the needs of the partner country but instead to unilateral EU needs and then decides on their global nature, without consideration of their impacts on the Thai economy. The same issue arises for governance and human rights, where global concerns, translated into projects funded by certain budget lines, are propelled into EC-Thai co-operation without much consideration of other components of EC strategy.

In this context, sector policy dialogue is hard to establish, except for health care in which the EC has been involved since the late 90's. As a consequence, as well as due to budgetary constraints imposed on the NIP for all sectors apart from health, policy formulation support is carried out by EC regional programmes (and through EC support to the ASEAN secretariat).

Strictly bilateral projects are focused more on the implementation of the policy framework (biodiversity through improving coastal habitat management), compensation of impacts of new policies (particularly EC trade regulations) and the exploratory phase of future or desirable policy changes (tackling global climate change, improving HE quality, etc.).

EC bilateral interventions covered both policy dialogue and implementation only for universal health care coverage, at the price of a long-term involvement in this sector. For other sectors, the balance was aimed at targeting, on the one hand, regional programmes supporting ASEAN-level policy dialogue and at national level implementing capacities (ECAP being a good example), and on the other hand, bilateral programmes mostly focused on implementation (SPF). According to each sector, the balance was unevenly reached. The balance has been reached for the economy and trade sectors, as the SPF can be considered the most flexible and potentially efficient tool for the development of trade between the EU and Thailand. For HE, the lion share of policy interventions aimed at strengthening institutional capacities. For the health sector, policy formulation came first but was complemented by support for implementation of the reform and for NGO projects for refugees. In the environmental sector, policy implementation prevailed (I 6.1.2).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: At the 7th Senior Officials' Meeting, held in Bangkok in March 2001, it was agreed to shift bilateral relations from a project-based approach to an enhanced policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest. To this effect the CSP oriented EC bilateral support mainly to two focal areas, with the first focussing on initiatives aimed at fostering trade, investment, and related areas for sustained cooperation links. In terms of balance the SPF can be considered the most flexible and potentially efficient tool for the development of trade between the EU and Thailand focussing both on the policy formulation and implementation side, although – given the limited financial scope of individual projects - is it difficult to make definite judgements on the specific impact of projects. The SFP has achieved its goal of enhancing the efficiency of the budget earmarked for trade and investment in the NIP; enhancing knowledge and understanding of the EC legislation (directives and regulations) on trade; enforcing the decisions taken in WTO negotiations, and in particular the Doha agenda; supporting the development of EU business in Thailand (seminars, conferences, fairs, etc.); and developing market access on both sides, among other issues

(see also Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission For Country Strategies, Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005)

Higher education: EC interventions in HE addressed the central issue, namely that of quality in the Thai HE landscape, through a range of different instruments. While, many of these instruments provided implementation support, some also provided a platform for ASEAN-wide HE policy formulation.

Health: As stated, this JC's wording applies to the area of health. What cannot be said after inquiries during the field visit is how much of this is the result of an actual 'policy dialogue' with the MOH. There is no doubt that the Health Reform Project with the MOH has given the public health team of the Delegation ample opportunities to interact with their counterparts on policy issues be it in PHC and/or on health care financing issues. (Ind. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2)

Environment: During the reporting period, the EC operated within a well-defined institutional and programmatic environmental policy agenda. Consequently, interventions were channelled through existing environmental policies. What is more, many of the projects explored new and strengthened existing institutional capacity for delivering existing environmental policy commitments.

Cross-cutting issues: Thailand was the first country to have an EC Delegation in Southeast Asia and therefore there has been a long cooperative relationship (see also Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission For Country Strategies, Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005). Given Thailand's advanced level of socio-economic development, the nature of Thai-EC relations has during the assessment period changes from a traditional donor-recipient relationship to a partnership among equals. Consequently, since the CSP 2002-2006 the EC has no longer seen its role as a donor of development assistance but rather as a "facilitator of knowledge sharing and a partner for substantive policy dialogue on key sectoral issues" (MIP 2007-2010).

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"At the March 2001 Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) it was agreed that EC-Thai co-operation would evolve from a project-centred approach to an inclusive process, based on a wider policy dialogue. Project financing should be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation issues agreed under that dialogue." - http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand

"A new institutional arrangement of bilateral meetings is described as resting on the SOM meetings, at the level of Permanent Secretary (Thai side) and Deputy Director-General (RELEX) and of regular political contacts between the Commission and the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs on an annual basis to review regional/multilateral issues and 3-monthly meetings to monitor on-going cooperation at project level and following up on new project proposals." - SEMA Belgium, 2005 p. 10

"There is no doubt that considerable information is provided in the CSP and NIPs for Thailand on choices made and their grounds. The documents are based on an accurate analysis of the political and economic situation and trends. Furthermore, relevance and consistency with the Thai national agenda is highlighted. As the documents were adopted at Senior Officials' Meetings it may be said that the documents show both consistency with the situation they address and flexibility to the changes witnessed." - SEMA Belgium, 2005 p. 12

"The bilateral EC-Thai programme is perceived as relevant since it addresses relevant needs of Thai society" - EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002 p.58

The CSP clearly asks for this policy dialogue to inform the priorities selected by the EC in its bilateral aid program, in this case in health.

I 6.1.1 Sector balance reflects national policy priorities and needs

Until the year 2000, the internal coherence of the bilateral EC-Thai programme was limited because the programme consisted mainly of comparatively small and uncoordinated projects, implemented in an ad-hoc fashion. Allocating the comparatively small programmes across four macro-sectors limited resources and impact, thereby also reducing the relevance. The weak internal coherence of the Thai programme was also partly a consequence of the comparatively large share of the resources coming from the horizontal budget lines designated for highly specific types of interventions (Consortium Eva-EU, *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92* – Final Report, vol. 1, 2002, p. 57).

At the 7th Senior Officials' Meeting, held in Bangkok in March 2001, it was agreed to shift bilateral relations from a project-based approach to an enhanced policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest. To this effect, the CSP oriented EC bilateral support mainly to two focal areas, with the first focussing on initiatives aimed at fostering trade, investment, and related areas for sustained cooperation links.

The CSP 2002-2006 and NIPs 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 were thus more effectively focused on Thailand's priorities and needs. Many priority areas are covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC and the focus on economic co-operation, universal health care coverage and higher education reflects national policy priorities and needs.

At sector level, EC intervention goals are consistent with country needs. Higher education programmes all addressed the issue of quality in 'Thai HE institutions' – be it teaching or research, widely acknowledged as a major issue. In health, many priority areas of the government agenda have been covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC. The EC's environmental policy interventions addressed global environmental concerns in terms of national environmental priorities at the programmatic and institutional level.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: At the 7th Senior Officials' Meeting, held in Bangkok in March 2001, it was agreed to shift bilateral relations from a project-based approach to an enhanced policy dialogue in areas of mutual interest. To this effect the CSP oriented EC bilateral support mainly to two focal areas, with the first focussing on initiatives aimed at fostering trade, investment, and related areas for sustained cooperation links.

Higher education: HE programmes and interventions all addressed the issue of quality in Thai HEI's – be it teaching or research. Quality, in turn, is the dominant policy concern in the Thai HEI landscape.

Health: What exactly a balance is in the health sector is difficult to say. But, for sure, many priority areas have been covered by the rainbow of projects funded both nationally and regionally by the EC (e.g., most vulnerable population groups, three poverty-related diseases, refugees, women, children, migrants, minorities, etc). The policy priorities that still need more proactive interventions are the tobacco/alcohol areas and the more focused support to the health needs of migrants and ethnic minorities (not forgetting the myriad health needs of the refugees in the camps). (H1).

Environment: The EC's environmental policy interventions addressed global environmental concerns in terms of national environmental priorities at the programmatic and institutional level. Programmatic priorities focus on sustainable resource use. Institutional concerns centre on issues of local governance capacity for the co-management of environmental protection.

Cross-cutting issues:

Related facts, figures, and references:

Reference:

H1. National policy priorities and needs are presented in the following documents: The 9th National Development Plan 2002-2006, and the National Health Bill, 2006? (the latter not available yet to the sector's evaluator) + WHO, http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_tha_en.p

Extracts:

“The regional programmes, with a strong focus on economic co-operation, seem well matched to the

objectives of the regional emerging economies, which are shifting from industrial growth to the provision of post-industrial trade in services.” - *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report, Thailand case study, 2002, p.59*

“It may be suggested that the CSP/NIP refer implicitly to the Thai 9th National Economic and Social Development Plans (NESD).” - *Strategic Review and programming Mission 2005, p. 13;*

I 6.1.2 Balance between interventions supporting policy formulation and interventions improving policy implementation.

The very specific context of dialogue with Thailand is that of an emerging economy in a particularly sensitive geo-political area, irritants are numerous and enjoy a higher priority for the EC in some ways than the 2M€ a year to be spent on 'technical' co-operation. The EC first engages in trade regulation debates, which are often not related to the needs of the partner country but instead to unilateral EU needs and then decides on their global nature, without consideration of their impacts on the Thai economy. The same issue arises for governance and human rights, where global concerns, translated into projects funded by certain budget lines, are propelled into EC-Thai co-operation without much consideration of other components of EC strategy.

In this context, sector policy dialogue is hard to establish, except for health care in which the EC has been involved since the late 90's. As a consequence, as well as due to budgetary constraints imposed on the NIP for all sectors apart from health, policy formulation support is carried out by EC regional programmes (and through EC support to the ASEAN secretariat).

Strictly bilateral projects are focused more on the implementation of the policy framework (biodiversity through improving coastal habitat management), compensation of impacts of new policies (particularly EC trade regulations) and the exploratory phase of future or desirable policy changes (tackling global climate change, improving HE quality, etc.).

EC bilateral interventions covered both policy dialogue and implementation only for universal health care coverage, at the price of a long-term involvement in this sector. For other sectors, the balance was aimed at targeting, on the one hand, regional programmes supporting ASEAN-level policy dialogue and at national level implementing capacities (ECAP being a good example), and on the other hand, bilateral programmes mostly focused on implementation (SPF). According to each sector, the balance was unevenly reached. The balance has been reached for the economy and trade sectors, as the SPF can be considered the most flexible and potentially efficient tool for the development of trade between the EU and Thailand. For HE, the lion share of policy interventions aimed at strengthening institutional capacities. For the health sector, policy formulation came first but was complemented by support for implementation of the reform and for NGO projects for refugees. In the environmental sector, policy implementation prevailed.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: In terms of balance, the SPF can be considered the most flexible and potentially efficient tool for the development of trade between the EU and Thailand, focussing both on the policy formulation and implementation side, although – given the limited financial scope of individual projects - is it difficult to make definite judgements on the specific impact of projects. The SFP has achieved its goal of enhancing the efficiency of the budget earmarked for trade and investment in the NIP; enhancing knowledge and understanding of the EC legislation (directives and regulations) on trade; enforcing the decisions taken in WTO negotiations, and in particular the Doha agenda; supporting the development of EU business in Thailand (seminars, conferences, fairs, etc.); and developing market access on both sides, among other issues (see also Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission For Country Strategies, Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005)

Higher education: The lion share of policy interventions aimed at strengthening institutional capacities for delivering quality in teaching and research. However, the AUNP NIS also provided institutional spaces for

policy deliberation and common HE-policy formulation.

Health: The various projects under evaluation have elements of both types of intervention. The big support to policy formulation is in the health care reform project over its two phases (ALA/TH/94/28 and ASIE/2002/002/641). One of the regional projects, Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS and development (SANTE/2003/061-303) is also geared towards supporting policy formulation (not evaluated). Four further projects can be classified in the same category: the Traditional Medicine Across European and Asian Cultures project, the Network for Health Response for Conflict and Disaster-affected Populations project, the Development of Oral Fixed-dose Artesunate-based Combinations for the Treatment of Uncomplicated Malaria project and the Operations Research in STI and Related Services for Women in High Risk Situations in Cambodia and Thailand project (not evaluated).

Environment: The EC's environmental interventions focused on exploring new and strengthening existing capacity for policy implementation.

Cross-cutting issues:

JC 6.2 The objectives of the programmes correspond to national needs

Two sections of the 2002-2006 CSP relate to the Thai policy agenda as well as country analysis and provide general information needed for strategic programming to correspond to national needs. The EC's analysis proved to be relevant and truthful (I 6.2.1). The SOMs, organised regularly up to 2003, were instrumental in keeping EC interventions in line with national needs.

As far as possible, which means as far as EC programming regulations may allow, a flexible approach was adopted to gear projects towards Thai shareholders demands, particularly for the SPF and to a lesser extent for environmental projects. In the health sector, the follow-up of support to reform through two programming cycles demonstrated that EC programme aims were closely related to national needs, explicitly stated in a fruitful sector dialogue with the MoH.

In all sectors but higher education, co-operation strategies are drawn from informed analysis on national needs. Information was not generated by EC projects, but expertise to use existing data and fact-finding missions were specifically intended to produce EC views on Thailand's needs and priorities (I 6.2.1).

The consistency of EC strategy and interventions with national needs is not questioned by EM representatives.

In trade, health and environment, synergies were achieved by EC interventions between policy dialogue and co-operation programmes, playing mainly between regional and bilateral levels. That was not the case for higher education where policy dialogue over HE between Thailand and the EC is sporadic and disjointed. Synergy was more difficult to achieve with projects funded under budget lines, which are strongly targeted towards beneficiaries and do not allow very much room for policy dialogue. This aspect is left solely to the Delegation's political section to a large extent (I 6.2.2).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The CSP/NIPs since 2002 have been more explicitly directed and steered towards Thailand's national needs than the previous cooperation programmes. Again, SPF has to be mentioned as a flexible approach to respond to national needs. The potential for impact is all the more promising that the programme is demand-driven. Because most grant projects and ad hoc missions respond to specific and straightforward needs (such as a "computerized traceability solution" for the shrimp industry), the interventions are focused. All interventions logically build on EU expertise whose identification is proving sometimes difficult (EC, 2005).

While the bilateral EC-Thailand cooperation before 2002 partly failed to address national needs in an effective and efficient way due to its limited coherence, implementation in an ad hoc fashion, dispersion of the co-operation resources and instruments, and limited internal co-ordination of the programme as a whole (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p. 58), the regional programmes have been rated significantly higher as far as their

correspondence with beneficiaries' needs is concerned: "With respect to relevance and coherence, the regional programmes address the concerns of both Thai and EU actors directly facilitating trade and investment, as well as addressing issues of technological co-operation and development. The regional programmes, with a strong focus on economic co-operation, seem well matched to the objectives of the regional emerging economies, which are shifting from industrial growth to the provision of post-industrial trade in services" (ibid).

Higher education: Programmes and projects in HE have been mostly driven by demands emerging from the HE communities themselves. Strategic programming documents and SOM dialogues have provided a very general but nonetheless appropriate framework for HE sector interaction.

Health: From the documentary review and from interviews in Bangkok, in the case of health, one can confidently say that the objectives of the many EC-funded projects are relevant to the national priorities for the sector (I 6.2.1). This is said many times over in the ROM Reports reviewed in their section on relevance and quality of design and was confirmed by the Delegation team and the MOH representative interviewed (I 6.2.2).

Environment: Programmes and projects in the environmental domain corresponded to national needs. On the one hand, strategic documents framed the environmental arena with sufficient flexibility to enable actors on the ground to formulate relevant programmes. On the other hand, the EC's environmental policy engagements have also reflected the strengths and weaknesses of policy dialogue at SOM level.

Cross-cutting issues: coherence ensured as far as CCIs are concerned, see EQ5

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The officials interviewed in EU Member States' Embassies did not question the appropriateness of the priority sectors adopted by the EC for support." - (SEMA Belgium, 2005, p. 15)

I 6.2.1 Rationale's framework of programming documents (CSP, NIP, MTR), based on information and analyses on national needs generated by the cooperation programme

Logical frameworks here do not mean LFM's (matrices), but rather 'the logic of these programming documents'.

In all sectors apart from higher education, co-operation strategies are drawn from informed analysis on national needs. Information was not generated by EC projects, but expertise to use existing data and fact-finding missions were specifically intended to produce EC views on Thailand's needs and priorities.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Information and analyses on Thailand's needs in the area of trade and investment relations as a direct result of learning from, and experiences of, the cooperation process, have been fed back into the logical framework and programming documents.

Higher education: Strategic programming documents refer only to the importance of HE without basing this on any evidence of HE needs in Thailand.

Health: Programming documents reviewed are based on information and analyses of national needs -- not those generated by EC cooperation programmes.

Environment: The strategic programming documents framed global environmental issues in a flexible way which provided players on the ground with the required leeway to formulate projects relevant to both local problems and global environmental concerns

Cross-cutting issues: The insertion of CCI and the logical framework of programming document is generated mainly by the limitation of resources available for Thailand and the political and economical analysis and dialogue with authorities rather than EC cooperation results (CSP 2002 2006).

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"It may be suggested that the CSP/NIP refer implicitly to the Thai 9th National Economic and Social Development Plans

(NESD). (...). *A comprehensive picture is drawn of Thailand of its population and territory, system of government, political situation, foreign policy, economic situation, social situation, sustainability of current policies and the medium term outlook and prospects.*" (SEMA Belgium, 2005, p. 13)

I 6.2 2 Synergies between policy dialogue and cooperation programme

In trade, health and environment, synergies were achieved by EC interventions between policy dialogue and co-operation programmes, playing mainly between regional and bilateral levels. This was not the case for higher education, where policy dialogue over HE between Thailand and the EC is sporadic and disjointed. Synergy was more difficult to achieve with projects funded under budget lines which are strongly targeted towards beneficiaries and do not allow very much room for policy dialogue. This aspect is left solely to the Delegation's political section alone to a large extent.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Synergies are particularly clear for trade cooperation and, taken from EC programming documents, would be the rule for all sectors. However, as already outlined under EQ1, in interviews both European and Thai stakeholders emphasised the general difficulty in drawing a clear line between development cooperation (as prescribed by DCI) – which by definition must only benefit the recipient – and policy dialogue directed at, for example, trade facilitation and the improvement of investment conditions. DCI clearly restricts the EC in general and the Delegation in particular to create a higher level of synergies between the cooperation programme and official interaction with the Royal Thai Government.

Higher education: Policy dialogue over HE between Thailand and the EC is sporadic and disjointed. As a rule, the shape of the cooperation programme reflects the needs of the HE policy communities in both regions. Given the nature of HE, the community-driven nature is highly appropriate.

Health: Such a synergy shines through after talking to the MOH and available partner NGO representatives. EC aid objectives are congruent with what the EC does in health in Thailand.

Environment: Environmental interventions have closely mirrored the development of the policy dialogue. In particular the bilateral projects have reflected both the strengths and the shortcomings of the policy dialogue at SOM level.

Cross-cutting issues: In regional programmes and thematic programmes framework, an apparent synergy has been built between EC/ Members states and Thai. "*There are some 90 NGOs' projects with which there is an on-going dialogue*" + "*Every two months there is a meeting with the Chambers of Commerce of the European Member States*". Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission, Thailand 2005) + "*At the March 2001 Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) it was agreed that EC-Thai co-operation would evolve from a project-centred approach to an inclusive process, based on a wider policy dialogue. Project financing should be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation issues agreed under that dialogue.*" (CSP 2007; 2013).

JC 6.3 The EC's strategic response evolved with lessons learned, and the government policies

Integrating emerging policy issues was not explicit apart from in relation to health reform, until the CSP 2002-2006 was produced. Several factors can be related to this change, some of them being at national level (such as the 2001 SOM, 2003 midterm review), and others at a more regional (2002 ALA regulation evaluation) or global level (WTO Doha declaration). It is out of the scope of this evaluation to weight each factor, as it seems that it was the result of all of the factors considered together that induced a major change in EC strategy in Thailand.

Since then, however, strong emphasis has been placed on emerging policy issues when arising, particularly in the sectors trade, the economy and the environment. Indeed, in sectors where there were not many developments during the period in terms of emerging policy issues, like for higher education, no significant change was introduced in EC implementing strategy. (I 6.3.1).

The only available monitoring/evaluation report covering the period until 2000 is the Evaluation of the ALA regulation 443/92 (Consortium Eva-EU, *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report*, vol. 1, 2002).

This is a recurring feature of a lack of institutional memory inside the EC and is not taken as hard evidence of insufficient monitoring at that time.

The programmes implemented afterwards are relatively well documented by ROMs and evaluations, with a thrust towards the end of the reporting period (as the 2009 mid-term review comes closer). Health, higher education and environmental projects were particularly closely monitored and evaluated. The monitoring was less close for the SPF as a whole (evaluated only in 2005) but this should be related to the numerous projects covered, which does not assist the attainment of global findings. CCI's mainstreaming was not specifically monitored.

Use of lessons learnt from experience and emphasised in ROMs and evaluations is mentioned in EC programming documents. It was also evidenced by interviews, where project managers and their counterparts showed a good command of the content of the projects and the reasons for introducing changes over time according to lessons learnt and the changing context. However, some ROM recommendations, notably for health and environmental projects, were found in several consecutive reports, showing a lack of proper reaction (or non-documented disagreement of the EC or project staff). (I 6.3.2).

The RTG requirement for donors to move towards a partnership of equals was the major evolution in national policies that directly affected EC interventions during the reporting period. Faced with this situation, it can safely be assessed that the EC responded by setting-up innovative demand-driven bilateral instruments (through the SPF) and a renewed combination of regional/bilateral projects with well specified purposes (policy formulation support / policy implementation or compensation support). It is not certain that the RTG request was the only driving factor for this change, as issues faced while negotiating the PCA and political instability were also instrumental in pushing for mobilising NSAs in a demand-driven approach.

Apart from maybe on trade, no sector policy underwent a significant evolution during the reporting period, at least one that would forcefully imply a dramatic change in EC co-operation instruments: health care reform kept the same fundamentals; environmental policy was not affected by major changes, unless a stronger commitment was pushed by an even stronger public concern; higher education policy remained unchanged. On trade, the demand-driven SPF was a wise move to stay aloof from conflicting issues while allowing for compensation of controversial new EU regulations (I 6.3.3).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy and Trade: Integrating emerging policy issues was reflected by the 2003 Mid-Term Review (MTR) which concentrated mainly on accommodating the new issues arising from the WTO Doha Development Agenda (TRTA). The NIP (2002-2004) had a strong focus on helping Thailand in implementing its WTO commitments. For the period since 2002, the availability of ROM Reports is limited to an assessment of the SPF in 2005 (no further evaluations since then), the EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme (ECAP II) in 2003, several reports on the ASEM Trust Fund and the Asia Trust Fund 2006 mid-term review, which evaluated the Thailand component (a project on organic agriculture).

Higher education: HE in Thailand, as in other places, is characterised by dynamic and intense interaction between a plurality of institutional players in an attempt to deal with long-term and largely impervious policy issues. Having said that, evidence suggests that lessons learnt from monitoring and evaluation processes have shaped follow-on programmes and projects.

Health : Health is special in that lessons could be learned from a first phase of the health care reform project (1996-2001) and these were indeed considered in the preparation of the CSP 2002-06 (I 6.3.2). Lessons learned from other partner-executed EC-funded health projects come out clearly in the various ROM reports, in the 2003 MTR, in the EU and Thailand Cooperation Activities Report of 2005, as well as in the interviews carried out in Bangkok. (I 6.3.1 and 6.3.3).

Environment: Although the mix of instruments did not change significantly, the EC reacted swiftly to emerging events, particularly the Tsunami of 2004. Despite projects and programmes being subject to monitoring and evaluation processes, many of the recommendations of these exercises was not implemented

for good (i.e. inherent and uncontrollable project complexities) and not so good (i.e. cross cultural miscommunication) reasons.

Cross-cutting issues: No information of CCI from strategic documents CSPs, NIPs that EC strategic responses on CCI have emerged from lessons learned. It is noteworthy that there 3 on 5 results on EC cooperation are related to on governance issues, HR and gender and are detailed in CSP 2002 2006 (p 17). It assessed that EC-Thai co-operation can be summarised as ...gender issues: increased participation of women in economic decision-making at local levels, as well as in regional and international conferences, workshops and exchange programmes ...good governance and community development: increased understanding among Thai officials of issues related to civil service reform;, networking and participation of national and regional NGOs through co-operation with EU NGOs; Nevertheless there is no lesson learned from those results.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The main lessons from the implementation of EC projects in Thailand are:

- Agriculture projects: *poor fertility of lands and fast development of the country have impacted negatively on agricultural projects in the Northeast. Increased yields were not sufficient in comparison with alternative solutions (e.g. better incomes through migration to cities), though the choice of the productions in the North-east was governed by the Tapioca agreement;*
- Development projects in general: *Insufficient preparation led to shortcomings as to the economic impact and the sustainability of some projects. However, projects were successful when oriented to the development of farmer groups and to the setting up of links between farmers and the commercial private sector (marketing), thus underlining the need for thorough preparation and management by the Project Management Units throughout the project's duration;*
- Economic co-operation: *projects directed to the achievement of mutual benefits have had a significant impact, increased Thai awareness of EU capacity, and are therefore most sustainable. For example, the promotion of enterprise co-operation responds best to private sector interests when it emphasises access to EU technology for Thai firms and access to Thai and regional markets for EU firms. **The best assistance to SMEs was obtained through support to reforms (e.g. access to credit and supportive structures) and contacts with EU enterprises (e.g. technology and market analysis);***
- Economic co-operation projects in general: *bureaucratic difficulties in the implementation of economic co-operation projects were encountered. Successful cases with autonomous entities (e.g. Chulalongkorn University) prove that sustainable solutions can be developed locally. Future projects should consider carefully the commitment of the partner for co-operation and for involvement in the change/reform."* - (EC, 2001, pp.17-18)

"Last but not least, the impact is also perceived as weak because of a lack of efficiency in project cycle management, in particular the long time lag between project identification and the signature of the financial memorandum". ((EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.58).

I 6.3.1 Emerging policy issues effectively integrated into EC approach.

Integrating emerging policy issues was not explicit, apart from for health reform, until the CSP 2002-2006. Several factors can be related to this change, some of them being at the national level (such as the 2001 SOM, 2003 midterm review) and others at a more regional (2002 ALA regulation evaluation) or global level (WTO Doha declaration). It is out of the scope of this evaluation to weight each factor, as it seems that all of them together contributed to inducing a major change in EC strategy in Thailand.

Since then, however, strong emphasis has been placed on emerging policy issues when they arose, particularly in the fields of trade, the economy and the environment. Indeed, in sectors where little arose in terms of emerging policy issues during the period, as was the case for higher education, no significant change was introduced in EC implementing strategy.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Integrating emerging policy issues was reflected by the 2003 Mid Term Review (MTR) which concentrated mainly on accommodating the new issues arising from the WTO Doha Development

Agenda (TRTA).The NIP (2002-2004) had a strong focus on helping Thailand in implementing its WTO commitments.

Higher education: Given the general and catalytic nature of the ECs policy involvement in the Thai HE domain, no issue that emerged during the reporting period was sufficiently challenging to prompt a fundamental departure from the catalytic approach.

Health: The 9th National Development Plan 2002-2006 calls for an equity-based decentralized health system. In Thailand the path towards universal access was already mandated constitutionally in 1996. In that spirit, the evolving health care reform, has been taking elements from the European experience in universal access, and this has informed the EC approach to support this process in Thailand (H1). A policy towards assimilating migrants in the North of the country has been slow in coming, but its principles are in line with EC policy; the IOM and Raks EC-funded projects have been very instrumental in lobbying for this assimilation (H2). As said in EQ3, the health team of the Delegation should take a more proactive role with the NGO/donor groups lobbying for migrants rights.

Environment: In the environmental policy domain, actors responded swiftly to events such as the Tsunami of 2003 by extending and amending existing programmes (such as the Asia Pro Eco Programme).

Cross-cutting issues: It is noteworthy that there is an emerging consideration of CCI (gender which will be mainstreamed in all policies) and in perspective within national policy and among government officials and decision-makers involvement (CSP 2007-2013 p 19)

Related facts, figures, and references:

References:

(H1) WHO, http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_tha_en.p

(H2) ROM Report 20387.02 of 2006.

I 6.3.2 Availability and use of EC monitoring and evaluating outcomes

The only available monitoring/evaluation report covering the period until 2000 is the Evaluation of the ALA regulation 443/92 (Consortium Eva-EU, *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report*, vol. 1, 2002). This is a recurring feature of a lack of institutional memory inside the EC and is not taken as hard evidence of insufficient monitoring at that time.

The programmes implemented afterwards are relatively well documented by ROMs and evaluations, with a thrust towards the end of the reporting period (as 2009 midterm review comes closer). Health, higher education, and environment projects were particularly closely monitored and evaluated. The monitoring was less close for the SPF as a whole (evaluated only in 2005) but this should be related to the numerous projects covered that don't help to come to global findings. CCIs' mainstreaming was not specifically monitored.

Use of lessons learned from experience and emphasised in ROMs and evaluations is mentioned in EC programming documents. It was also evidence by interviews where project managers and their counterparts shown a good command of the content of the projects and the reason to introduce changes over time according to lessons learned and the changing context. However, some ROMs' recommendations, notably for health and environment projects, were found in several consecutive reports, showing a lack of proper reaction (or non-documented disagreement of the EC or project's staff).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: For the period since 2002 the availability of ROM Reports is limited to an assessment of the SPF in 2005 (no further evaluations since then), the EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation Programme (ECAP II) in 2003, several reports on the ASEM Trust Fund and the Asia Trust Fund 2006 mid term review which evaluated the Thailand component (a project on organic agriculture).

Higher education: Many of the evaluations were available only towards the end of the reporting period. Evidence suggests, however, that many of the recommendations have been flown into the design process of subsequent HEI programmes (such as the new version of Erasmus Mundus).

Health: The full set of ROM Reports (health) was available. The 2003 MTR was also available and of great help.

Environment: Evaluation reports of various kinds are available for all projects. There is evidence to suggest, however, that policy actors did not implement many of the recommendations that flowed from monitoring and evaluations processes.

Cross-cutting issues: Evidence from ROMs that projects tackled CCI especially in term of capacity building, involvement of European and local NGOs, etc... Nevertheless the impact of those activities and projects on CCI progress is not clear through documentation; No evidence that projects results were taken into account by Thai authorities, no evidence of institutional memory, data of indicators etc.....

I 6.3.3 Mix of instruments and development of new instruments adapted to evolving national policies.

The RTG requirement for donors to move towards a partnership of equals was during the reporting period the major evolution in national policies that directly affects EC interventions. Faced to this situation, it can safely be assessed that EC responded by setting-up innovative demand-driven bilateral instrument (through the SPF) and renewed combination of regional/bilateral projects with well specified purposes (policy formulation support / policy implementation or compensation support). It is not sure that the RTG request was the only driving factor for this change, as issues faced while negotiating the PCA and political instability were also instrumental in pushing for mobilising NSAs in a demand-driven approach.

Apart maybe in trade, no sector policy underwent during the reporting period a significant evolution, at least the one that would forcefully implied a dramatic change in EC co-operation instruments: the health care reform kept the same fundamentals; environment policy was not affected by major changes, unless a stronger commitment pushed by a ever stronger public concern; higher education policy stayed unchanged. In trade, the demand-driven SPF was a wise move to stay aloof from conflictual issues while allowing compensations of controversial EU new regulations.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Thailand is a case in point for developing new EC assistance instruments adapted to national policies needs (see the SPF) and using a mix of instruments, particularly by using regional/bilateral programmes for well specified purposes (policy formulation support / policy implementation or compensation support). This move appears at this stage as an appropriate reaction to the 2003 Thailand request to be considered as an equal partner.

Higher education: The mix of instruments did not change significantly during the reporting period. However, given the positive impact of European HE programmes on Thailand's HEIs, the policy-mix may need revisiting for the immediate future.

Health: It is not clear to what instruments this indicator refers to in the case of health. What does come out from this evaluation is that software was introduced both for hospital management and for overall health care financial management purposes.

Environment: During the reporting period, the mix of instruments did not change significantly.

Cross-cutting issues: No evidence

JC 6.4 EC moved from traditional development assistance toward partnership of equals.

Under ALA regulation, the main focus of EC assistance is seen as targeting mutual interest and understanding. This applied all over the reporting period. New regulation, namely DCI, applied at the very end of the period and didn't had any impact on EC programmes' outcomes covered by this evaluation.

In November 2003, former PM Thaksin announced that from 2004 onwards Thailand would (...) receive or request financial assistance (...) from foreign countries only if such assistance is given without any conditions, commitments or obligations which will make Thailand lose its negotiating power as an equal partner with that foreign country'. However, Thai authorities have indicated that technical assistance would in practice be

welcome if such support was provided on a partnership basis rather than taking the form of a traditional donor-beneficiary relationship (as quoted in the CSP 2007-2013, p. 12). The EC has responded to this change in outlook (and the underlying fact of Thailand's graduation from being an ODA recipient country) by turning towards providing technical assistance to support the achievement of Thailand's national development goals and to promote economic co-operation in the mutual interests of Thailand and the EU. Overall, in line with the Thai government's political stance, the EC like other donors have gradually shifted their emphasis from financial assistance for physical infrastructure to technical assistance for social infrastructure, focussing on human resource development, poverty alleviation, and the environment. On their side, most MSs phased out from ODA with Thailand and focused more on cultural and scientific co-operation, keeping a strong involvement in traditional embassies' competencies such as education, trade and FDI issues.

In 2003, the EC's strategy for SE Asia calls for promoting policy dialogue in the spirit of partnership of equals. Negotiations to reach with Thailand, as with all ASEAN countries, a bilateral Partnership Cooperation Agreement started with Thailand in November 2004 and are still on-going.

The Mid-Term Review (2003) of the implementation of the CSP/NIP 2002-2006 stated that it was decided mutually by the Thai authorities and the EC to *'move gradually from development co-operation to economic co-operation'* in which *'research and technological development co-operation and (...) educational issues'* play an essential part. The scope for cooperation goes increasingly beyond traditional development cooperation and covers issues like: trade & Investment, regional economic cooperation, migration, minority rights, and indigenous people. Tradition EC areas of co-operation such as environment and health were kept. Development cooperation was to be envisaged only on an exceptional basis and if it addresses key national development priorities where EC has a distinctive added value.

In 2003, the Commission's Strategy for SE Asia calls for promoting policy dialogue in the spirit of partnership of equals; a new bilateral Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) started in November 2004 and is under negotiation along these lines.

The EC-RTG Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) provided the framework for joint strategic programming up to 2003-2004. Those meetings are reported as useful joint exercises. Since 2003, SOMs were no more organized. Allegedly, their continuous postponing is mainly due to political instability. There is however some ground for analysing this also in the light of the numerous negotiation rounds on the PCA: if most technical or sector-wise issues are allegedly resolved, MoFA kept spotting on governance issues that are major obstacles to come to any agreement. The 9th is planned in March 2009.

No doubt about the good working relationships entertained by the EC Delegation with line ministries when dealing with project formulation. This was checked for all main sector of intervention (health, environment, economy) and is consistent which the close link acknowledged between RTG sector policy agenda and EC programmes. Higher education is apart in this. Programmes applied in Thailand are either global (Erasmus Mundus) or regional (AUNP, Asialink...), without direct involvement of the line ministry in formulating the activities (I 6.4.1).

Evidences for informing these indicators are too sketchy to reach a clear statement and there are huge differences between sectors and issues.

First, co-evolution of co-operation programmes and sector policy dialogue. The situation for health care is the clearest: EC interventions supported building the universal coverage reform, at least in its financial key-issues. Here there is an identity between projects and the policy dialogue. For higher education, no policy dialogue was established, thus EC's programmes stand somehow alone. In the environment, EC programmes were directly involved in defining the implementation of the policy which was not really matter of a dialogue (that was taking place at ASEAN level). In trade co-operation programmes, and thus mainly SPF, no policy dialogue was explicitly considered: most small-scale projects were focused on very technical issues.

Second, political dialogue and development co-operation. Here, the assessment is more about incompatibility

than co-evolution. In PCA negotiations, political issues relating to governance, king's status towards international judiciary organisations, refugees and migrants proved to be major impediments. On the one hand, the lack of PCA was since 2003 a obstacle for integrating EC development programmes in a comprehensive bilateral framework; working. On the other hand, implementing development programmes didn't changed in any means RTG statement on conflictual issues in the draft PCA (I 6.4.2).

The sequencing of policy dialogue, TA, capacity building, pilot projects, major programmatic interventions is more adjusted to development co-operation than to the partnership of equals progressively established between Thailand and EC. It can be implemented only when related financial resources are made available across several programming periods, which was not the case in Thailand where only minimal bilateral resources are available compared with the needs of the country. Such sequencing had not taken place during the assessed period.

Therefore if almost all those approaches can be found across the evaluated period in Thailand, they are not encompassed in a chronologically logical path. They are mainly related to RTG stand on limiting ODA to TA. Financial opportunities picked from various EC sources of funds at different times were another important issue for formulating projects. Programmatic interventions had rather been predominantly the result of trial and error/ lessons learned in the evolution of the development cooperation (I 6.4.3).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Thailand has emerged as a new donor, providing substantial levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to its neighbours and strategically engaging in development cooperation in the region and beyond. As a successful middle-income country with decades of experience and lessons learned in advancing human development, Thailand is well-positioned to contribute to the global partnership for development called for in MDG 8. In September 2005, Thailand became the first non-OECD country to publish a report on its contribution to MDG 8 – developing a global partnership for development. In 2003, Thailand's ODA was estimated at US\$ 167 million. This contribution represented 0.13 percent of the gross national income - a level comparable to OECD countries, and a significant contribution for a middle-income country. 94 percent of Thai ODA is going to LDCs, in comparison with an average of 26 percent for OECD countries (Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency EC, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme Aid Effectiveness: "From Paris to Bangkok", Report of Workshop, Bangkok, 5 October 2006, p. 3-4.)

Higher education: For the reporting period, HE interventions still resembled development assistance. However, the HE sector in Thailand has changed considerably during this time. In future, HE cooperation will take place on an increasingly equal footing with some Thai HEIs. This is an impact of the EC's policy interventions in the Thai HE sector.

Health: As per the Delegation in Bangkok and the officer of the Ministry of Health interviewed, this shift from assistance to partnership has occurred. The Thai counterparts at the MOH have a very clear idea where they want to go and the EC has assumed a role of, according to their means, helping them in getting there. It must be mentioned that, with EC funding, many Thai professionals were sent for training in Europe and are now back in the MOH.

Environment: In terms of the formal processes (i.e. joint programming, co-evolution of programmes and dialogue, as well as a sequential policy process), the EC's interventions in the environmental domain aspired to generate a partnership of equals. However, cross-cultural misunderstandings and miscommunication has undermined this potential partnership.

Cross-cutting issues: Given Thai's advanced level of economic development, the EC moved from traditional assistance towards partnership of equals since 2000. The EC-Thailand Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 (28 February 2002)

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The EC's ALA Regulation applies to Thailand. The Regulation focuses on strengthening the co-operation framework and on

making an effective contribution, through institutional dialogue, economic and financial co-operation, to sustainable development, social and economic stability and democracy”. - (EC, 2001, p.4)

I 6.4.1 Joint EC-RTG strategic programming and project formulation

The EC-RTG Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs) provided the framework for joint strategic programming up to 2003-2004. Those meetings are reported as useful joint exercises.

In 2003, the Commission's Strategy for SE Asia calls for promoting policy dialogue in the spirit of partnership of equals; a new bilateral Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) started in November 2004 and is under negotiation along these lines.

Since 2003, SOMs were no more organized. Allegedly, their continuous postponing is mainly due to political instability. There is however some ground for analysing this also in the light of the numerous negotiations rounds on the PCA: if most technical or sector-wise issues are allegedly resolved, MoFA kept spotting on governance issues that are major obstacles to come to any agreement. The 9th is planned in March 2009.

No doubt about the good working relationships entertained by the EC Delegation with line ministries when dealing with project formulation. This was checked for all main sector of intervention (health, environment, economy) and is consistent which the close link acknowledged between RTG sector policy agenda and EC programmes. Higher education is apart in this. Programmes applied in Thailand are either global (Erasmus Mundus) or regional (AUNP, Asialink...), without direct involvement of the line ministry in formulating the activities.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The CSPs were developed in collaboration with the RTG, the EU Member States, other donors, and representatives of civil society (EC, European Union – Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005, p. 14) According to 2005 Strategic Review and Programming Mission, *“It cannot be said that all government agencies knew of the CSP/NIPs or were fully informed of them. It has to be said that they each promoted their individual agency's interest. They had a view on priorities to be given to further co-operation strategies. The agencies which led or were better informed of the CSP/NIPs were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce and the Education authorities”* (Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission For Country Strategies Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005, p. 18-19) - needs to be followed up.

Higher education: No strategic project formulation took place at EC-RTG level. However, the AUNP provided a platform for European and ASEAN HE policy-makers to formulate strategic programmes and policy. Given the nature of the HE domain, the regional level is a more appropriate institutional location for policy formulation.

Health: No specific information.

Environment: The EC and the RTG developed several bilateral environmental projects. Evidence suggests, however, that cross-cultural misunderstanding and miscommunication undermined any conception that these projects were based on an equal partnership.

Cross-cutting issues: Except SPF.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“At the 7th EC-Thailand SOM, held in Bangkok on 28/29 March 2001, the two parties reviewed the state-of-play of the bilateral relationship, notably the ongoing EC cooperation programmes, and agreed on a number of co-operation areas and activities.” - (EC, 2001, p.20)

I 6.4.2 Co-evolution of cooperation programmes and sector and political dialogues.

Evidences for informing this indicators are too sketchy to reach a clear statement and there are huge differences between sectors and issues.

First, co-evolution of co-operation programmes and sector policy dialogue. The situation for health care is the clearest: EC interventions supported building the universal coverage reform, at least in its financial key-issues. Here there is an identity between projects and the policy dialogue. For higher education, no policy dialogue was established, thus EC's programmes stand somehow alone. In the environment, EC programmes were directly involved in defining the implementation of the policy which was not really matter of a dialogue (that was taking place at ASEAN level). In trade co-operation programmes, and thus mainly SPF, no policy dialogue was explicitly considered: most small-scale projects were focused on very technical issues.

Second, political dialogue and development co-operation. Here, the assessment is more about incompatibility than co-evolution. In PCA negotiations, political issues relating to governance, king's status towards international judiciary organisations, refugees and migrants proved to be major impediments. On the one hand, the lack of PCA was since 2003 a obstacle for integrating EC development programmes in a comprehensive bilateral framework; working. On the other hand, implementing development programmes didn't changed in any means RTG statement on conflictual issues in the draft PCA.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: In line with the maturing Thai-EC relationship, the mode of cooperation has shifted gradually away from a traditional project-based approach, which characterised most of the assessment period, to an enhanced policy dialogue between equal partners which has taken full effect under the CSP 2007-2013, culminating in the establishment of the Thai-EC Co-operation Facility.

Higher education: During the reporting period, no EC-RTG policy dialogue on HE took place. As is common practice in S&T, RTD and HE policy, policy dialogue is decentralised and takes place among HEIs themselves.

Health: As said, there was a gradual evolution towards a situation of a dialogue of equals with the MOH. The three public health professionals in the Delegation have to be praised for this transition.

Environment: Evidence provides no indication that policy dialogue and the cooperation programme developed in tandem.

Cross-cutting issues:

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The EC-ASEAN Agreement of 1980 constitutes the legal framework for relations with Thailand. At the bilateral level, the dialogue takes place through regular, informal EC-Thailand Senior Officials' Meetings (SOM) led by the Commission on the EC side. The first SOM was held in Bangkok on 6 March 1992 and the latest (the 9th) on 16-17 December 2004 in Bangkok." http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand

"After the crisis, i.e. between 1998 and 2000, the bulk of the EC co-operation strategy focused on supporting the Thai Government in tackling the most urgent issues for the improvement of the socio-economic situation, notably alternative employment generation, the social cushioning of the economic crisis, measures to stabilise the rural communities and technical assistance to reform the financial sector.

At the November 1999 Senior Official s' Meeting (SOM) it was agreed that EC financial support would be directed to the institutional reform process, in particular towards health and the management of environmental protection in coastal areas. At the March 2001 SOM it was decided that EC-Thai co-operation would evolve from a project based approach to an inclusive process, based on a wider policy dialogue. Project financing should be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation issues agreed under that dialogue." - (EC, 2001, p.15)

"At the 7th EC-Thailand SOM, held in Bangkok on 28/29 March 2001, the two parties (...) also decided on a new institutional arrangement to support the implementation of the work plan, as follows:

- *The SOM is upgraded to the level of Permanent Secretary (Thailand MFA) and Deputy Director-General (Commission – External Relations DG);*
- *Regular political contacts between the Commission and the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs will be organised in the margins*

of multilateral meetings (ASEM, ARF etc), on an annual basis if necessary, to review bilateral and regional/ multilateral issues

- A co-ordination mechanism, with 3-monthly meetings, is established to monitor ongoing co-operation at project level and to oversee the follow-up of new project proposals as well as to assess the overall co-operation.

It was also agreed at the SOM that EC-Thai co-operation would be part of an inclusive process whereby project financing is to be used to facilitate the implementation of co-operation issues agreed under a wider policy dialogue.” - (EC, 2001, p.20)

I 6.4.3 Appropriate sequencing of policy dialogue, TA, capacity building, pilot projects, major programmatic interventions.

The sequencing of policy dialogue, TA, capacity building, pilot projects, major programmatic interventions is more adjusted to development co-operation than to the partnership of equals progressively established between Thailand and EC. It can be implemented only when related financial resources are made available across several programming periods, which was not the case in Thailand where only minimal bilateral resources are available compared with the needs of the country. Such sequencing had not taken place during the assessed period.

Therefore if almost all those approaches can be found across the evaluated period in Thailand, they are not encompassed in a chronologically logical path. They are mainly related to RTG stand on limiting ODA to TA. Financial opportunities picked from various EC sources of funds at different times were another important issue for formulating projects.

Programmatic interventions had rather been predominantly the result of trial and error/ lessons learned in the evolution of the development cooperation.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Such sequencing had not taken place during the assessed period. Programmatic interventions had rather been predominantly the result of trial and error/ lessons learned in the evolution of the development cooperation.

Higher education: Sequencing has not taken place and would be inappropriate for the HE sector.

Health: In matters of health, the interactions of the Delegation with projects in health with project implementers was good with partner NGOs and is ongoing with the MOH. Technical assistance has been brought-in as needed although sometimes with delays. (H1) Capacity building is an activity that runs across pretty much all EC-funded health projects in the country. A couple of them can be considered as pilots in that they were implemented in some districts, but have lessons learned that can be/have been replicated elsewhere with major potential programmatic implications (e.g., the IOM model used with migrants and the Raks model used with people living with HIV/AIDS). (H2)

Environment: Cross-cultural misunderstandings on the one hand, and the inherent complexities of stakeholder involvement on the other undermined sequential and vertical programme management practices.

Cross-cutting issues: More information needed. About NGOs it is said that “*The groups met obviously promoted their own interests. For example, a representative of a protection of children's rights centre concerned with child abuse spoke of the sharing of the European experience, skills, training, study visits, internships even scholarships, fellowships. This has legitimacy considering the stand taken by the EC against child trafficking*” (Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission, For Country Strategies Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005)

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“*In view of the increasing importance of bilateral economic relations, and of the momentum initiated with the Doha Development Agenda, the EC's bilateral co-operation strategy with Thailand will focus on technical assistance and capacity-building activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation (focal area 1). It is also proposed that development support be provided to the sector of public health and health services (focal area 2) through the consolidation of previous assistance to the Health Reform process*”. - (EC, 2001, p.3)

References:

(H1) The MTR of 1st quarter of 2003 points out that the NIP 2002-04 had a late start due to difficulties in contracting an appropriate consulting firm.

(H2) For example the project on care and support of women and children in high HIV/AIDS prevalence areas, the Thai village health project, and the project to improve access to comprehensive care and support to persons with HIV/AIDS and their families in Thailand.

EQ7 - To what extent was the EC mix of instruments (regional and thematic budget lines), approaches (fiduciary funds, project approach, macro-level programmes, SWAP), financing modalities (specific procedures, budget support, joint funding) and/or channels of disbursement (government, private sector, NSAs, multilateral organisations) appropriate to the national context and EU strategic policy aims?

Lessons from the weakness and overall ineffectiveness of the cooperation programme until the end of the 1990s resulted in a much improved approach in terms of instruments and financing modalities during the period under evaluation. The EC's move from an 'ad-hoc project approach' before 2002 to a sector-specific focal approach since 2002 in response to the changing economic context (Thailand's upgrade to a middle income country and becoming an ODA provider) has been particularly appropriate. Over the evaluated period, EC co-operation demonstrated the ability to combine, with limited means at bilateral level, instruments, approaches and financing modalities.

Limiting factors such as the paucity of resources allocated to the NIPs, and the 2003 shift towards a partnership of equals, were addressed by the EC as a chance to use an innovative mixture of instruments, approaches and financing modalities. This case can be seen as a good practice example for other countries or regions.

To appreciate the adequacy to EC strategic goals, one has first to define them. The main strategic goal of co-operation with Thailand during the period was implicit: to be present, visible and effective, as much as the progressive move towards a partnership of equals is allowed, being mainly focused on technical assistance. This implicit goal was particularly strong when PCA negotiations started (2003). It partly overcame strategic goals enunciated in the CSP, their achievement being somehow postponed until the PCA would provide the needed comprehensive framework for co-operation. In this, the EC co-operation, through its various instruments and approaches (fora, involvement in trade policy advocacy, SPF, environmental projects, support to NGOs co-financed support to Burmese refugees, etc;) and their combination, demonstrated a strong consistency with the implicit strategic goal, staying indeed in-line with explicitly stated goals.

Limiting factors such as the paucity of resources of the NIPs and the 2003 shift towards a partnership of equals were used by the EC as a chance to design an innovative mixture of instruments, approaches and financing modalities that can be seen as good practices for other regions.

A clear-cut distribution of roles and functions was implemented between instruments, namely bilateral and regional programmes; the later, less open to national issues and more focused on long-term SE Asia - EU relations, was focused on policy issues, while the former took on board some targeted aspects of their implementation. Budget lines were more solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues.

For approaches, an innovative mix was also reached by mobilising fiduciary funds (Trust Fund I and II, the Global Fund), at first based on emergencies (financial, then related to the tsunami) and then to set-out a demand-driven approach through SPF. On the other hand, resources, as well as the partnership of equals did not allow to opt for macro-programmes and sector-wide approaches, which are underlined by the dominant position of the EC in policy dialogue.

Apart from joint funding through the Trust Funds I and II designed in the early period, the EC did not find a new mixture of financing modalities that have possibly allowed to go beyond projects implemented to-date.

With the establishment of the SPF in response to the changing economic context conditions (Thailand's upgrade to a middle income country and its graduation from being an ODA recipient, the EC moved from an 'ad hoc project approach' before 2002 to a sector-specific focal approach since 2002. In other major co-operation areas (health, HE, environment), EC projects stayed unchanged during the two programming

periods covered by this evaluation (I 7.1.1).

The SOMs and the proactive behaviour of the EC Delegation were effective in building policy dialogue and cooperation programmes on emerging issues until 2003. After this year, SOMs were regularly postponed due to, on the one hand, political instability, and on the other hand, PCA negotiations that cover the same topics. Or in the case of bilateral co-operation, the calls for proposals of the SPF allow for a close connectedness to emerging issues by mobilising NSAs.

The fact that major policy changes were pushed through ASEAN, for which the EC remained a significant partner all along the evaluated period, was instrumental in reaching that capacity of adjustment. This capacity was shown also for emergency (tsunami in 2004) and humanitarian issues (I 7.1.2).

The EC used an extensive range of instruments and approaches in Thailand. As the financial contribution of each is roughly around the same range, there is a balance between each instrument/approach/financing modality that is very specific to Thailand (and other ASEAN middle-income countries). The situation is extremely different from more EDF-dependent EC strategy in poorer countries, and might bring useful insights on EC efficiency. With the combined effect of MSs and IFIs phasing out from their usual ODA programmes, the EC was not in a position to mobilise various financing modalities, usually related to SWAP and joint funding.

EC strategy here is based on the combination of bilateral and regional programmes as well as projects supported under specific budget lines imposed by bilateral annual resources of some 2 M€. This combination proved to be instrumental in achieving EC goals in Thailand, with synergies particularly in environmental advocacy, universal health coverage and refugees issues. Combinations reached less convincing results for the trade and higher education sectors. On trade, international regulations and EU unilateral requirements did not give much weight to projects on contributing but marginally to achieving EC goals. In HE, resource constraints were too high compared with needs that whatever combination would overcome them.

The EC used various approaches in the same way, but no sector-wide approach was employed due to limited resources and the partnership of equals looked for by the RTG. Both project/programme approach and funds/facilities were used, the latter on bilateral resources (SPF), regional (trust funds for economic recovery, emergency funds after the Tsunami) and global resources (global fund for poverty diseases). Whatever the results and impacts of each approach wielded, the EC would not have achieved its goals with only one of them, therefore their combination was instrumental. All of them proved to be efficiently implemented, beyond operational issues that are inherent to such endeavours.

Considering the limited amount of money and human resources devoted to the management of EC interventions at the Bangkok Delegation, a high level of efficiency was achieved during the evaluated period, mainly from 2003 onwards (I 7.2.1).

EC co-operation with Thailand tried, and was successful to some extent, at overcoming regulations which were badly adjusted towards the specific context of the country, among which, a high level of capacity of NSAs comes first.

The main drivers for combinations used in Thailand were first the limited resources available under the NIPs and the RTG call for a 'partnership of equals'. That was therefore not to suit partners' capacity first. However, the choice of the calls for proposals approach for bilateral and regional programmes was definitely based on an assessment carried out by the EC on the NSAs' capacities in Thailand, and more widely in the ASEAN countries. Whether the EC was a bit overoptimistic about it is another issue, but, from world-wide experience of EC programming, the use of NIP resources mainly through a fiduciary fund (the SPF) was clearly an innovation brought in more to widen EC partnership to NSAs than to narrowly suit usual NIP project allocations.

This flexibility was allowed, to our understanding, by ALA regulations and supported by a relatively tight network of persons in charge at Brussels HQ and EC Delegation in Bangkok.

The SPF is the best case, which uses funds, dedicated to well pre-identified projects, funded by fiduciary funds totally open to any sort of demand-driven initiatives. This move was justified by the capacity of beneficiaries (mainly SMEs), provided a minimum of control is kept by the EC Delegation. This flexibility was allowed by ALA regulations and supported by a relatively tight network of persons in charge at Brussels HQ and the EC Delegation in Bangkok (I 7.2.2).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade:

Higher education: EC cooperation made good use of existing regional and global instruments to create a useful framework for cooperative and policy-relevant partnerships between Thai and European HEIs. However, the main policy instruments in the HE sector suited only a small proportion of Thai HEIs and students. Programmes such as the FWPs or AsiaLink were unsuited to the institutional capabilities of many Thai HEIs. What is more, the EM Master's programmes are relevant to a very small proportion of Thai students. No single institution or group of actors was recognised as the centre of strategising for European HE policy interventions. Indeed, programmes coordination for HE interventions was widely dispersed (e.g. AsiaLink in Jakarta, AUNP in Bangkok and FWPs in Brussels).

Health: In the case of health, this question is only partly justified since some of the financing modalities mentioned do not apply. The health portfolio does make use of a mix of regional and thematic budget lines; it uses primarily the project approach, as well as the policy support approach to strengthen the capacity of nationals (JC 7.2, also see list of all projects in health during this evaluation period); it has channelled disbursements through the government, partner NGOs, UN organizations, the IOM, universities and specialized institutes, and follows many of them up with ROM (JC 7.1 and 7.3).

Environment: The EC deployed bilateral and regional programmes deftly promoted and supported policy initiatives aimed at global environmental challenges within a well-developed Thai environmental policy agenda. Evidence suggests that environmental programme and project modalities were tailored to the specific environmental needs and priorities. However, the implementation of the programmes revealed that many assumptions about institutional capacities and cultural understandings proved overly optimistic. No single authority took responsibility for coordinating environmental policy interventions. In particular, the energy programmes seemed to run on another track from programmes aimed at sustainable resource use and biodiversity conservation.

Cross-cutting issues: EC mix of instruments (regional and thematic budget lines), approaches are appropriate to the national context (demand driven by beneficiaries) . But there is no evidence that EC mix of instruments on Gender, HR and Governance are consistent with that trend.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“Not every project is based in Thailand. Many are multi-lateral in nature and simply involve a Thai institution or organisation working together with various European and Asian partners. The sheer variety of participants is impressive. Over 130 partners from various EU Member States have been involved in EC funded initiatives alone. It should also be noted that the majority of projects are designed and implemented by participating organisations. Activities are therefore truly demand-driven.” - (EC, 2005 foreword)

“The bilateral EC-Thai programme is perceived as relevant since it addresses relevant needs of Thai society, but its internal coherence is limited because the programme consists mainly of comparatively small and not co-ordinated projects, implemented in an ad hoc fashion. Given the limited size of the EC bilateral programme, a limited impact may be expected, though much more is demanded by interlocutors from the Thai government as well as from beneficiary organisations”. - (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002 p.58)

“As the EC-ASEAN agreement of 1980 is outdated and no longer sufficient as a basis for our relations, the 2003 Commission Strategy for Southeast Asia offers bilateral agreements to interested countries in the region. Such bilateral agreements

would promote a relationship based upon a modern policy agenda with an appropriate institutional framework and enabling a policy dialogue on a wide range of policy issues. On that basis, the Council granted in November 2004 negotiating directives for bilateral Partnership and Co-operation agreements with Thailand.” - http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/thailand

“[Delegation statement] Co-operation with Thailand is more than just projects. It covers all areas and it does not necessarily involve funds. More traditional development paradigms become less and less relevant for the mutual cooperation.” - (SEMA Belgium, 2005 ; p. 14)

“In view of the increasing importance of bilateral economic relations, and of the momentum initiated with the Doha Development Agenda, the EC’s bilateral co-operation strategy with Thailand will focus on technical assistance and capacity-building activities in the sectors of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation (focal area 1). It is also proposed that development support be provided to the sector of public health and health services (focal area 2) through the consolidation of previous assistance to the Health Reform process. Other sectors (i.e. science and technology, education and human resource development, environment, energy, social policy related issues, care and assistance of refugees and displaced people, and knowledge-based economy and culture) are considered as non-focal areas and will be addressed under the existing thematic and regional (ASEAN, ASEM, Asia) programmes.” - (EC, 2001, p.3)

JC 7.1 EC co-operation was able to combine timely instruments, approaches and financing modalities to suit its strategic goals

Limiting factors such as the paucity of resources of the NIPs and the 2003 shift towards a partnership of equals were made by the EC a chance to design innovative mix for instruments, approaches and financing modalities that can be seen as good practices for other regional areas.

A clear-cut distribution of role and function was implemented between instruments, namely bilateral and regional programmes; the later, less open to national issues and more focus on long term SE Asia - EU relationships, was focused on policy issues while the former took on board some targeted aspects of their implementation. Budget lines were more solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues.

For approaches, an innovative mix was also reached by mobilising fiduciary funds (Trust Fund I and II, the Global Fund), at first based on emergencies (financial, then related to the tsunami) and then to set-out a demand-driven approach through SPF. On the other hand, resources as well as the partnership of equals didn’t allowed to go for macro-programmes and sector-wide approaches which are underlined by a dominant position of EC in policy dialogue.

Apart from joint funding through the Trust Funds I and II designed in the early period, EC didn’t found new mix of financing modalities that have possibly allowed to go beyond projects implemented to-date.

With the establishment of the SPF in response to the changing economic context conditions (Thailand’s upgrade to a middle income country and its graduation from being an ODA recipient, the EC moved from an ‘ad hoc project approach’s before 2002 to a sector-specific focal approach since 2002. In other major co-operation areas (health, HE, environment), EC projects stayed unchanged during the two programming periods covered by this evaluation (I 7.1.1).

The SOMs and the proactive behaviour of the EC Delegation were effective to build policy dialogue and cooperation programmes on emerging issues until 2003. After this years, SOMs were regularly postponed due to, on one hand, political instability, and in the other hand, PCA negotiations that cover the same topics. Or bilateral co-operation, the calls of proposals of the SPF makes sure to stay connected to emerging issues by mobilising NSAs.

The fact that major policy changes were pushed through ASEAN for which EC stayed a significant partner all along the evaluated period was instrumental reaching that capacity of adjustment. This capacity was shown also for emergency (tsunami in 2004) and humanitarian issues (I 7.1.2).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: This was not the case until 2000. Given the limited size of the EC bilateral programme, a limited impact was to be expected. The reasons for a weak impact were to be found in the dispersion of the co-operation resources and instruments, which reduced the coherence and the internal co-ordination of the programme as a whole. The impact was also weak because of a lack of efficiency in project cycle management, in particular the long time lag between project identification and the signature of the financial memorandum (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002). While delays in the signing of agreements are still common, the combination of timely instruments, approaches and financing modalities has much improved since the EC moved to sector-specific focal approach in the CSP 2002-2006.

Higher education: EC cooperation made good use of existing regional and global instruments to create a useful framework for cooperative and policy-relevant partnerships between Thai and European HEIs. However, since HE sector in both Europe and Thailand is difficult to steer, this policy framework has limited itself to enabling and supporting initiatives that bubble-up from the HE sectors in both regions.

Health: As can be seen from the indicators below, this JC corresponds to the reality that was picked up from reading the available documentation and from interviews in Bangkok. The few instruments mentioned were combined in a way that is deemed complementary. It is noted that the Delegation has no records or knowledge of the regional projects.

Environment: The EC deployed bilateral and regional programmes deftly to promote and support policy initiatives aimed at global environmental challenges within a well-developed Thai environmental policy agenda.

Cross-cutting issues:

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The fact Thailand enjoys a relatively high level of economic and social development means that co-operation during the period of the present strategy (2002/6) should be mainly economic, with EU development aid to be used only in exceptional circumstances".- (EC, 2001, p.4)

"The period 1994 to 1999 has shown Thailand rapidly evolving from the status of aid recipient to that of economic partner. As a high level of financing was no longer required, the EC developed a strategy of technical assistance to help Thailand's development priorities and serve mutual interests." - (EC, 2001, p.15)

I 7.1.1 Mix of instruments, approaches and financing modalities different according to sector specific factors and changed over the period along with the context

Limiting factors such as the paucity of resources of the NIPs and the 2003 shift towards a partnership of equals were made by the EC a chance to design innovative mix for instruments, approaches and financing modalities that can be seen as good practices for other regional areas.

A clear-cut distribution of role and function was implemented between instruments, namely bilateral and regional programmes; the later, less open to national issues and more focus on long term SE Asia - EU relationships, was focused on policy issues while the former took on board some targeted aspects of their implementation. Budget lines were more solicited for sensitive issues along the lines of governance, gender, and other cross-cutting issues, as well as humanitarian issues.

For approaches, an innovative mix was also reached by mobilising fiduciary funds (Trust Fund I and II, the Global Found), at first based on emergencies (financial, then related to the tsunami) and then to set-out a demand-driven approach through SPF. On the other hand, resources as well as the partnership of equals didn't allowed to go for macro-programmes and sector-wide approaches which are underlined by a dominant position of EC in policy dialogue.

Apart from joint funding through the Trust Funds I and II designed in the early period, EC didn't found new

mix of financing modalities that have possibly allowed to go beyond projects implemented to-date.

With the establishment of the SPF in response to the changing economic context conditions (Thailand's upgrade to a middle income country and its graduation from being an ODA recipient, the EC moved from an 'ad hoc project approach's before 2002 to a sector-specific focal approach since 2002. In other major co-operation areas (health, HE, environment), EC projects stayed unchanged during the two programming periods covered by this evaluation.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: In response to the changing economic context conditions (Thailand's upgrade to a middle income country and its graduation from being an ODA recipient (Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency, 2006), the EC moved from an 'ad hoc project approach's before 2002 to a sector-specific focal approach since 2002, as outlined under several points above.

Higher education: The mix of policy instruments, in particular a heavy reliance on regional instruments such as AsiaLink or global ones like Asia window of Erasmus Mundus programme, did not change significantly during the reporting period.

Health: In the case of health, this combination has worked. Both a mix of modalities and changes in approach over time were implemented according to need.

Environment: The mix of instruments did not change as a matter of policy strategy throughout the reporting period.

Cross-cutting issues: EC approach has been focused on budgetary lines and horizontal lines to address the CCIs

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"In the time period of the present strategy (2002-06), the resources for the EC's cooperation with Thailand will arise primarily from the existing thematic and regional (ASEAN, ASEM and Asia) programmes. Extra efforts will need to be deployed to facilitate the access to information and participation of potential partners in Thailand in co-operation initiatives under these programmes.

In addition, a total amount of € 13,2 million will be made available to support specific bilateral co-operation projects with Thailand designed to respond to the particular needs and opportunities of Thailand's economic development." - (EC, 2001, p.21)

"The reasons for a weak impact are to be found in the dispersion of the co-operation resources and instruments, which reduces the coherence and the internal co-ordination of the programme as a whole. Allocating the comparatively small programme across four macro-sectors limits resources and impact, therewith also reducing the relevance. The weak internal coherence of the Thai programme is also partly a consequence of the comparatively large share of the resources coming from the horizontal budget lines designated for highly specific types of interventions." (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.58).

I 7.1.2 Emerging issues incorporated quickly and effectively into policy dialogue and cooperation programme.

The SOMs and the proactive behaviour of the EC Delegation were effective to build policy dialogue and cooperation programmes on emerging issues until 2003. After this years, SOMs were regularly postponed due to, on one hand, political instability, and in the other hand, PCA negotiations that cover the same topics. Or bilateral co-operation, the calls of proposals of the SPF makes sure to stay connected to emerging issues by mobilising NSAs.

The fact that major policy changes were pushed through ASEAN for which EC stayed a significant partner all along the evaluated period was instrumental reaching that capacity of adjustment. This capacity was shown also for emergency (tsunami in 2004) and humanitarian issues. .

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: This seems to be the case but the available ROM Reports and other documents do not provide explicit evidence for the timeliness and efficiency of the EC's approach towards 'emerging issues'.

Higher education: HE did not experience any emerging issues that affected the general policy framework.

Health: Overall, this is true in the health sector. One good example of where this response was very effective was in the response to the tsunami. (IR p.12)

Environment: The EC responded swiftly to the Tsunami crisis of 2004 by extending the Asia Pro Eco programmes.

Cross-cutting issues: More information needed.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“The second NIP (2005-2006) focuses its additional budget of 3.2 million Euro on higher education delivering a dedicated ‘Thai window’, under the EC’s Erasmus Mundus Programme. This may be seen as a change of direction from the focal areas of NIP (2002-2004) as Education was not seen as a focal area by the CSP for Thailand but a ‘non focal area.’” - *Strategic Review and Programming Mission 2005, p.11*

JC 7.2 For the main actions the implementing modality responded to the needs of the actions, as well as to the capacity of the partner

The EC used in Thailand an extensive range of instruments, and approaches. As financial contribution of each is roughly of the same range, there is balance between each instruments/approaches/financing modalities that is very specific to Thailand (and other ASEAN middle-income countries). The situation is extremely different from more FED-dependent EC strategy in poorer countries, and might bring useful insights in EC efficiency. With the combined effect of MSs and IFIs phasing out from their usual ODA programmes, the EC was not in a position to mobilise various financing modalities, usually related to SWAP and joint funding.

EC strategy here is grounded in the combination of bilateral and regional programmes as well as budget lines' supported projects imposed by bilateral annual resources of some 2 M€. This combination proved to be instrumental in achieving EC goals in Thailand, with synergies particularly in environment advocacy, universal health coverage, and refugee issues. Combinations reached less convincing results for trade and Higher education. In trade, international regulations and EU unilateral requirements didn't give much grip to projects on contributing but marginally to achieving EC goals. In HE, resources constraints were too strong compared with needs that whatever combination would overcome them.

EC used in the same way various approaches, but no sector-wide approach due to limited resources and the partnership of equals looked for by the RTG. Both project/programme approach and funds/facilities were used, the latter on bilateral resources (SPF), regional (Trust funds for economic recovery, Emergency funds after the Tsunami) and global (Global Fund for poverty diseases). Whatever was each approach own results and impacts, the EC wouldn't have achieved its goals with only one of them, therefore their combination was instrumental. All of them proved to be efficiently implemented, beyond operational issues that are inherent to such endeavours.

Considering the limited amount of money and human resources devoted to management of EC interventions at Bangkok Delegation, a high level of efficiency was achieved during the evaluated period, mainly from 2003 onwards (I 7.2.1).

EC co-operation in Thailand tried, and was successful to some extent, to overcome regulations which were maladjusted to the country specificity, among which a high level of capacity of NSAs comes first.

The main drivers for combinations used in Thailand were first the limited resources available under the NIPs and the RTG call for a “partnership of equals”. That was therefore not to suit partners' capacity first. However, the choice of the call of proposals approach for bilateral and regional programmes was definitely based on an assessment carried out by EC on NSAs' capacities in Thailand, and more widely in the ASEAN

countries. Whatever the EC was a bit overoptimistic about it is another point, but, from world-wide experience of EC programming, the use of NIP resources mainly through a fiduciary fund (the SPF) was clearly an innovation brought in more to widen EC partnership to NSAs than to narrowly suit usual NIP projects allocations.

This flexibility was allowed, to our understanding, by ALA regulations and supported by a relatively tight network of persons in charge at Brussels HQ and EC Delegation in Bangkok.

The SPF is the best case, which uses funds dedicated to well pre-identified projects to a fiduciary funds totally open to any sort of demand-driven initiatives. This move was justified by the capacity of beneficiaries (mainly SMEs), provided a minimum of control is kept by the EC Delegation. This flexibility was allowed by ALA regulations and supported by a relatively tight network of persons in charge at Brussels HQ and EC Delegation in Bangkok (I 7.2.2).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: EC co-operation in Thailand tried, and was successful to some extent, to overcome regulations which were maladjusted to the country specificity, among which a high level of capacity of NSAs comes first. The SPF is the best case, which uses funds dedicated to well pre-identified projects to a fiduciary funds totally open to any sort of demand-driven initiatives. This move was justified by the capacity of beneficiaries (mainly SMEs), provided a minimum of control is kept by the EC Delegation.

Higher education: The main policy instruments in the HE sector suited a small proportion of Thai HEIs and students. Programmes such as the FWP or AsiaLink were unsuited to the institutional capabilities of many Thai HEIs. What is more, the EM Master's programmes are relevant to a very small proportion of Thai students.

Health: As stated, this JC is confirmed in health. Only in one of the projects addressing the needs of the disabled did the partner not show the capacity to implement the project; this was later corrected. (Ind. 7.2.2).

Environment: Evidence suggests that environmental programme and project modalities were tailored to the specific environmental needs and priorities. However, the implementation of the programmes revealed that many assumptions about institutional capacities and cultural understandings proved optimistic.

Cross-cutting issues: MR on NGOs project are positive on projects relevance and activities implemented.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

Given the limited size of the EC bilateral programme, a limited impact may be expected, though much more is demanded by interlocutors from the Thai government as well as from beneficiary organisations.” - *Evaluation of ALA regulation 443/92 – Final Report, Thailand case study, 2002. p.58*

I 7.2.1 Combinations of instruments, approaches and financing modalities were instrumental in achieving EC goals with a minimum of effort and cost

The EC used in Thailand an extensive range of instruments, and approaches. As financial contribution of each is roughly of the same range, there is balance between each instruments/approaches/financing modalities that is very specific to Thailand (and other ASEAN middle-income countries). The situation is extremely different from more FED-dependent EC strategy in poorer countries, and might bring useful insights in EC efficiency. With the combined effect of MSs and IFIs phasing out from their usual ODA programmes, the EC was not in a position to mobilise various financing modalities, usually related to SWAP and joint funding.

EC strategy here is grounded in the combination of bilateral and regional programmes as well as budget lines' supported projects imposed by bilateral annual resources of some 2 M€. This combination proved to be instrumental in achieving EC goals in Thailand, with synergies particularly in environment advocacy, universal health coverage, and refugee issues. Combinations reached less convincing results for trade and Higher education. In trade, international regulations and EU unilateral requirements didn't give much grip to projects

on contributing but marginally to achieving EC goals. In HE, resources constraints were too strong compared with needs that whatever combination would overcome them.

EC used in the same way various approaches, but no sector-wide approach due to limited resources and the partnership of equals looked for by the RTG. Both project/programme approach and funds/facilities were used, the latter on bilateral resources (SPF), regional (Trust funds for economic recovery, Emergency funds after the Tsunami) and global (Global Fund for poverty diseases). Whatever was each approach own results and impacts, the EC wouldn't have achieved its goals with only one of them, therefore their combination was instrumental. All of them proved to be efficiently implemented, beyond operational issues that are inherent to such endeavours.

Considering the limited amount of money and human resources devoted to management of EC interventions at Bangkok Delegation, a high level of efficiency was achieved during the evaluated period, mainly from 2003 onwards.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: It will be difficult to find empirical evidence for this indicator. How does the EC define "a minimum of effort and cost"? This indicator seems to be open to broad interpretation.

Higher education: HE interventions in Thailand have been both successful and cost effective. The impacts of these programmes, however, have been highly localised.

Health: Certainly different approaches were used in the health projects financed. As said, funding modalities included direct funding, European NGOs co-financing and thematic funding. Both national and regional funds of the EC were tapped. Certainly not to be forgotten is the fact that the EC and the member States finance over 50% of the Global Fund which is active in the three diseases of poverty in Thailand.

Environment: Environmental interventions in Thailand have been costly both in terms of finances and effort. However, it is difficult to see how ambitious projects such as CHARM, COGEN III or Phu Kheio could have been less costly and achieved the same impacts.

Cross-cutting issues: No evidence that major EC goals (especially Gender, HR and Governance) are not achieved (no political change on Burmese people/ displaced persons or no signature or ratification of international agreements). No contextual analysis, no statistical data of any CCI, no indicator of CCI performance through projects.

I 7.2.2 Combinations of instruments and approaches were defined to suit partners' capacity more than regulations of each financing modality

The main drivers for combinations used in Thailand were first the limited resources available under the NIPs and the RTG call for a "partnership of equals". That was therefore not to suit partners' capacity first. However, the choice of the call of proposals approach for bilateral and regional programmes was definitely based on an assessment carried out by EC on NSAs' capacities in Thailand, and more widely in the ASEAN countries. Whatever the EC was a bit overoptimistic about it is another point, but, from world-wide experience of EC programming, the use of NIP resources mainly through a fiduciary fund (the SPF) was clearly an innovation brought in more to widen EC partnership to NSAs than to narrowly suit usual NIP projects allocations.

This flexibility was allowed, to our understanding, by ALA regulations and supported by a relatively tight network of persons in charge at Brussels HQ and EC Delegation in Bangkok.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: EC co-operation in Thailand tried, and was successful to some extent, to overcome regulations which were maladjusted to the country specificity, among which a high level of capacity of NSAs comes first. The SPF is the best case, which uses funds dedicated to well pre-identified projects to a fiduciary funds totally open to any sort of demand-driven initiatives. This move was justified by the capacity of beneficiaries (mainly SMEs), provided a minimum of control is kept by the EC Delegation.

Higher education: Since the Thai HE sector is characterised by extreme diversity, instruments have tended to appeal to HEIs with significant managerial, teaching and research capacities. Weaker HEIs have not been able to profit as much from the cooperation instruments such as the FWP or AsiaLink.

Health: n/a.

Environment: Evidence suggests that the environmental policy instruments at regional and bilateral level were poorly suited to the organisational capacities and cultural background of either the European or the Thai project partners.

Cross-cutting issues:

JC 7.3 One instance was recognized the Authority on strategic thinking and combining EC instruments/approaches and was supported by monitoring and evaluation reporting.

Out from the EC Delegation, no targeted single instance is recognized with the authority on strategic thinking and combining EC instruments/approaches. Sharing on EC instruments with stakeholders was not considered but comparative advantages of newly adopted instruments and approaches were publicised. The full range of monitoring and evaluation tools was available to the Delegation to adjust its projects and global strategy to the needs of the country.

The issue of sharing with stakeholders and the government on EC instruments and approaches was not considered during the period. The strong statement on ODA taken in 2003 by the RTG limited strongly the scope for such a process. Workshops and seminars organised by EC regional programmes were more oriented towards policy dialogue or operational issues than EC implementing strategy at national level. Negotiating the PCA could have been another way to achieve the same result, in a more institutionalised set-up. With the limited evidences shared with the evaluators on this process, it can be suppose that it was the case for most sector issues (I 7.3.1).

The CSPs, NIPs and MIPs since 2002 and various summary report and press statements explain the comparative advantages of newly adopted instruments and approaches in sufficient detail. Each move to a new instrument/approach is comprehensively discussed and justified in the respective documents (I 7.3.2).

The CSP 2007-2013 is particularly detailed in linking strategic programming to lessons learned from previous stages in the cooperation programme. Lessons learned are depicted in almost all ROMs and the EC Delegation was keen to integrate most of them in implementing the projects. The main lesson learned in the area of economy and trade relates to the SPF. In the case of HCRP, some ROM reports' recommendations were not followed (I 7.3.3).

EC projects in Thailand were closely monitored, and ROM reports were used by the Delegation. All ROM Reports elaborate in some detail on the observed efficiency and effectiveness of instruments and approaches in relation to the objectives of the respective programmes. The many ROM ROMs available for health projects in the country do systematically look at the five evaluation criteria; they point out lessons learned and make recommendations which, as some repeat ROMs show, have not always been followed (I 7.3.4). ASEAN programmes were systematically evaluated, and in those Thailand was systematically taken as a case study. Bilateral programmes' evaluation was also undertaken, either as such or as final monitoring (I 7.3.5).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: This was the case for the ASEM Trust Fund.

Higher education: No single institution or group of actors was recognised as the centre of strategising for European HE policy interventions. Indeed, programmes coordination for HE interventions was widely dispersed (e.g. AsiaLink in Jakarta, AUNP in Bangkok and FWPs in Brussels)

Health: No such an authority identifiable.

Environment: Evidence suggests that no single authority took responsibility for coordinating environmental policy interventions. In particular, the energy programmes seemed to run on another track from programmes aimed at sustainable resource use and biodiversity conservation.

Cross-cutting issues: There is no evidence that there is EC dedicated staff to CCI. There is an assumption that civil society will assume the achievement of CCI progress through projects but there is no other strategic

view of the nature of Thai NGOs in Thailand. (in which extend Thai NGOs represent the main beneficiaries (Burmese displaced persons) that they work with?)

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“EU-Thailand relations take place mainly under the institutional framework of EU-ASEAN relations as well as in the ASEM dialogue process”. - (EC, 2001, p.4)

I 7.3.1 EC organized fora and workshops with government and other stakeholders on comparative strength and weaknesses of various EC instruments and approaches

The issue of sharing with stakeholders and the government on EC instruments and approaches was not considered during the period. The strong statement on ODA taken in 2003 by the RTG limited strongly the scope for such a process. Workshops and seminars organised by EC regional programmes were more oriented towards policy dialogue or operational issues than EC implementing strategy at national level. Negotiating the PCA could have been another way to achieve the same result, in a more institutionalised set-up. With the limited evidences shared with the evaluators on this process, it can be suppose that it was the case for most sector issues.

Thematic Experts’ analysis:

Economy & Trade: There is no doubt about the frequency and usefulness of a broad array of seminars and workshops, mostly organised by the Delegation in cooperation with national stakeholders on issues impacting on trade and investment relations (see EQ1 for a more detailed assessment). However, it is not clear whether instruments and approaches were discussed with regards to their comparative strengths and weaknesses. Most workshops were organised with the aim of dissemination of information on EC regulations and legislation as well as trade promotion and capacity building for Thai stakeholders.

Higher education: On the one hand, the European HE fairs and AsiaLink Symposia provided stakeholders with a critical overview over different European HE policy instruments. On the other hand, the Thailand Delegation has help public briefings and workshops on new and/or improved HE instruments (e.g. such as the 7th FWP).

Health: n.a.

Environment: Workshops on regional instruments (such as Asia Pro Eco) are often organised in another ASEAN country (Philippines, Indonesia, or Malaysia). This reduces accessibility for Thai participants (as well as for participants from other ASEAN countries for workshops held in Thailand).

Cross-cutting issues: fora and workshops are organised with many stakeholders such as NGOs, Members States, etc... (see above)

Related facts, figures, and references:

(H1) ICA4-CT-2001-10027.

I 7.3.2 Reports and notes issued by EC defining comparative advantages of the various instruments and approaches in the Thailand context

The CSPs, NIPs and MIPs since 2002 and various summary report and press statements explain the comparative advantages of newly adopted instruments and approaches in sufficient detail. Each move to a new instrument/approach is comprehensively discussed and justified in the respective documents. The NIP (2002-2004) provides a good example for a comparative assessment of small versus large projects by outlining the comparative advantages of the SPF in the focal area of trade, investment, and related areas for sustained co-operation (p. 6). On the other hand, none of such notes were found for the health sector, environment, governance,....

Thematic Experts’ analysis:

Economy & Trade:

Higher education: Evidence suggests that these notes play little role in HEI's decision process. For direct beneficiaries, knowledge of relative strengths and weaknesses is strong. However, visibility and knowledge of EC policy instruments declines rapidly outside the small circle of beneficiaries.

Health: None of such notes were found for the health sector. Lessons learned are depicted in almost all ROM reports. It is difficult to know how many and which of them were actually integrated into future projects and EC strategies. In the Health Reform project the response to this indicator is yes. There is one regional operations research project on STIs which is comparing intervention strategies for these infections in Cambodia and in Thailand. (H1)

Environment: Policy-actors in the environmental field exhibited a strong knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of different instruments.

Cross-cutting issues: Except on Health, no notes on what EC intends to achieved on CCI or EC added value on CCI. No explanation on how those thematic and regional approaches on CCI can be used by EC to strength its position in Thailand.

Related facts, figures, and references:

References:

(H1) ICA4-CT-2001-10027.

I 7.3.3 Experience learned and documented integrated in strategic programming documents

The CSP 2007-2013 is particularly detailed in linking strategic programming to lessons learned from previous stages in the cooperation programme. Lessons learned are depicted in almost all ROMs and the EC Delegation was keen to integrate most of them in implementing the projects. The main lesson learned in the area of economy and trade relates to the SPF. In the case of HCRP, some ROM reports' recommendations were not followed.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: : *"The SPF experience ... shows that future programmes should have even greater flexibility allowing at least 20-30% of SPF funds to be directly allocated by the Delegation because multilateral, regional and bilateral trade policy objectives and trade-related needs tend to change substantially faster than the EC programming cycle"* (p. 14)

Higher education: No evidence of policy-oriented learning in HE section of strategic policy documents.

Health: The Health Care Reform project has had a long history spanning over more than 10 years and such integration has indeed occurred. The many ROM reports available for health projects in the country do specifically look at the five evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability; they point out lessons learned and make recommendations which, as some repeat such reports show, were not always followed.

Environment: There is no evidence that the lessons from the environmental projects – that, in fairness, are only beginning to filter through the policy process – have been incorporated in the strategic policy documents.

Cross-cutting issues: No specific documentation through Projects on gender, governance and HR experience learned

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"Last but not least, the impact is also perceived as weak because of a lack of efficiency in project cycle management, in particular the long time lag between project identification and the signature of the financial memorandum." - (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.58)

I 7.3.4 Monitoring and evaluation focused on instruments and approaches efficiency and ability to achieve EC assistance's goals

EC projects in Thailand were closely monitored, and ROM reports were used by the Delegation. All ROM

Reports elaborate in some detail on the observed efficiency and effectiveness of instruments and approaches in relation to the objectives of the respective programmes. The many ROM ROMs available for health projects in the country do systematically look at the five evaluation criteria; they point out lessons learned and make recommendations which, as some repeat ROMs show, have not always been followed. Mention is sometimes made of congruence of project goals with EC assistance goals.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Higher education: Evaluation reports were constructive in that they focused on relevance, efficiency and effectiveness.

Health: ROM reports routinely cover efficiency issues, so plenty information was available on this aspect of projects. The three co-funded projects looked at were run efficiently.

Environment: Monitoring and evaluation reports were constructive in that they focused on relevance, efficiency and effectiveness.

Cross-cutting issues: the huge number of projects focused on CCI give good inputs at local levels but no evidence of efficiency in terms of synergy and indicators of performance at the national level (MR seen at second EQ)

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The bilateral EC-Thai programme is perceived as relevant since it addresses relevant needs of Thai society, but its internal coherence is limited because the programme consists mainly of comparatively small and not co-ordinated projects, implemented in an ad-hoc fashion." - (EVAL-EU Consortium, 2002, p.58).

I 7.3.5 Related evaluations undertaken.

ASEAN programmes were systematically evaluated, and in those Thailand was systematically taken as a case study. Bilateral programmes' evaluation was also undertaken, either as such or as final monitoring (CHARM and the Phu Kheio project).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Higher education: Project evaluation for AsiaLink, AUNP and Erasmus Mundus were available. Moreover, during the fieldwork period, another team of was conducting an evaluation of the Asian Special Windows of the Erasmus Mundus project. A meeting was arranged and the colleagues were interviewed about their preliminary findings.

Health: The mid-term evaluation was of help to frame some of the questions asked during face-to-face interviews in Bangkok.

Environment: Evaluations are available for the Asia Pro Eco, the EAEF and COGEN III programmes. Final completion reports and final ROM Reports are available for CHARM and the Phu Kheio project.

Cross-cutting issues: MR positives of partnerships projects which tackles directly and indirectly CCI but sustainability is jeopardised by the nature of NGOs. *"The groups met obviously promoted their own interests"*. Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission, For Country Strategies Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005,).

EQ8 - To what extent has the EC coordinated and cooperated with EU Member states and IFIs intending to improve the complementarity of their interventions?

In the CSP (2002-2006), the EC committed itself to “*an approach providing for complementarity in co-operation programmes at EU and international level*” (p. 24). The EC led monthly coordination meetings for development co-operation for years on the one hand and for trade issues on the other. The latter are still going on and are highly appreciated by MS representatives while the former stopped a few years ago due to a lack of scope for coordination: as MS phased out, meetings turned to be only informative about EC programmes. The ASEM Trust Fund was coordinated under Thailand's In-Country Steering Committee from 2002 to 2006. ICSC established a trouble-shooting team in 2005 (I 8.1.3).

Missed opportunities in terms of coordination are however reported on organic agriculture projects that had been implemented at the same time (2005-2006) under the Asia Trust Fund and the SPF but were not harmonised (International Trade Centre/EC, Asia Trust Fund, Mid Term Review, Final Report, 31 August 2006, p. 59). A similar point can be made on IPR, supported by both EC ECAP2 and a French initiative. Apart from those two cases, EC leading contribution to coordinating MSs' ODA in the covered period avoided potential conflicts (I 8.1.1) and resolved inconsistencies (I 8.1.2) between its co-operation programmes and MSs interventions. The phasing out of MSs from their previous ODA involvement with RTG reduced the scope for coordination.

Cooperation and coordination in the trade/economy sector is formalised and facilitated by the monthly meeting of the Delegation's and MS commercial counsellors. Both the Delegation and the three interviewed trade counsellors (of the German, French and UK Embassies) expressed a high level of satisfaction with the Delegation's approaches to coordination and information sharing with the MS Embassies. However, when it comes to the national economic interests of individual MS (for example with regards to large investment projects and market access for enterprises, Embassies regularly lobby the Royal Thai Government based on their own national interests with little coordination. Based on the assessment of Thai government stakeholders, the EC and MS had not always coordinated their views in the process of (the currently stalled) negotiations for an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement.

No joint programmes (I 8.2.1) or efforts to establish a common platform for policy dialogue (I 8.2.2), at least at sector level (such as health, global change, etc.) have been established. The framework of a 'partnership of equals' sought by the RTG is contradictory to any effort from donors to elaborate a common platform for policy dialogue which implies some sort of influence on national policy issues. This framework allows for individualised policy dialogue, based on know-how or valuable experience recognised by the Government, as is the case for universal health care coverage with the EU. The phasing out of most MSs and IFIs from cooperation left the EC largely on its own in relation to policy dialogue, which in a way is inherent to the goal of poverty reduction.

As an emerging economy and slightly more than that for some exports, trade policy dialogue is more about solving conflicting interests than about carrying a global reform. For this, the EC have taken a leading role, acknowledged by MS representatives.

EC funded trust fund or facilities managed by international agencies (WB, UN agencies) stayed consistent with EU long-term goals (I 8.3.2). As for consistency with EC co-operation interventions, implementation strategies, in the case of global or regional facilities or funds, do not take explicitly on board EC country strategy or ASEAN strategy but are still consistent with the agreed overall framework. In the case of outsourced projects, like with the UNCHR in Thailand, there is a clear consistency in implementing the project (I 8.3.1) and a better regards has been taken towards EC visibility requirements (I 8.3.3).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Cooperation and coordination in the trade/economy sector is formalised and facilitated by the monthly meeting of the Delegation's and MS commercial counsellors. Both the Delegation and the

three interviewed trade counsellors (of the German, French and UK Embassies) expressed a high level of satisfaction with the Delegation's approaches to coordination and information sharing with the MS Embassies. However, when it comes to the national economic interests of individual MS (for example with regards to large investment projects and market access for enterprises, Embassies regularly lobby the Royal Thai Government based on their own national interests with little coordination. Based on the assessment of Thai government stakeholders, the EC and MS had not always coordinated their views in the process of (the currently stalled) negotiating of a EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. According to a senior official at the Ministry of Commerce, "*sometimes the EU member states do not seem to understand the whole situation and sometimes the Embassies make statements that are not helpful as they seem to contradict the EC's standpoint. In these cases the Delegations tries its best to clarify the situation but some Thai counterparts are still confused*" (interview, 02 Feb 09).

Higher education: The PTS programme was evaluated as showing a good deal of Complementarity and coherence with other related donor activities. It fitted well into the general concept that was held that economic links could be achieved by the reinforcement and further development of economic links. Consultation with the donor organisations confirmed the PTS programme as an important initiative that has assisted the development of links between the regions and dovetailed into their strategies for the region.

Health: In health projects for Thai populations, the EC has not cooperated with IFIs or member states since they have not had stand-alone health projects other than for refugees.

Environment: Although potential synergies with other cooperation programmes at international level (i.e. the GEF) or at national level are evident, there is no evidence to suggest that EC's interventions in the Thai environmental policy arena were coordinated with any of these programmes.

Cross-cutting issues: It is noteworthy that the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are at present and provide similar cooperation assistance as EC. The Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign Office and the British Council. Current activities support work human rights, good governance and Grants of Sweden go to the Burmese refugees in Thailand amount to € 2.2 million. Annually. (CSP 2002 2006) . Nevertheless no evidence of Alignment or complementarity between EC/ MS

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"Co-operation between the European Union (EU) and Thailand takes two forms: programmes funded by the budget of the EU and managed by the EC — the executive arm of the Union — as well as bilateral initiatives of the EU Member States themselves." (...) *"Among the EU Member States, Germany, France and Denmark have the largest co-operation programmes with Thailand. Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK also co-operate with the Kingdom in various areas. Key areas for EU Member state co-operation are the environment, higher education, research and HIV/AIDS."*
- EU - Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005, p.14

JC 8.1 EC contributed to establish coordination with member states on one side, and multilateral donors (particularly the World Bank) on the other side, on their co-operation programmes

In the CSP (2002-2006), the EC committed itself to "*an approach providing for complementarity in co-operation programmes at EU and international level*" (p. 24). The NIP (2002-2004) stipulated that "*Coherence of EU policies and complementarity within the EU and with other donors will be pursued in all areas of the co-operation. Closer co-ordination among EU partners on the ground will contribute to greater efficiency and to the projection of a common image.*" (p. 3).

EC led for years monthly coordination meetings for development co-operation on one side, and trade issues in the other side. The latter are still going on and are highly appreciated by MS representatives while the former stopped a few years ago due to lack of scope for coordination: as MS phased out, meetings turned to be only informative about EC programmes. ASEM Trust Fund were coordinated under Thailand's In-Country Steering Committee from 2002 to 2006. ICSC established a trouble-shooting team in 2005 (I 8.1.3).

Missed opportunities in terms of coordination are however reported on organic agriculture projects that had been implemented at the same time (2005-2006) under the Asia Trust Fund and the SPF but were not harmonised (International Trade Centre/EC, Asia Trust Fund, Mid Term Review, Final Report, 31 August 2006, p. 59). A similar point can be made on IPR, supported by both EC ECAP2 and a French initiative.

Apart from those two cases, EC leading contribution to coordinating MSs' ODA in the covered period avoided potential conflicts (I 8.1.1) and resolved inconsistencies (I 8.1.2) between its co-operation programmes and MSs interventions. The phasing out of MSs from their previous ODA involvement with RTG reduced the scope for coordination.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Cooperation and coordination in the trade/economy sector is formalised and facilitated by the monthly meeting of the Delegation's and MS commercial counsellors. Both the Delegation and the three interviewed trade counsellors (of the German, French and UK Embassies) expressed a high level of satisfaction with the Delegation's approaches to coordination and information sharing with the MS Embassies. However, when it comes to the national economic interests of individual MS (for example with regards to large investment projects and market access for enterprises, Embassies regularly lobby the Royal Thai Government based on their own national interests with little coordination. Based on the assessment of Thai government stakeholders, the EC and MS had not always coordinated their views in the process of (the currently stalled) negotiating of a EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. According to a senior official at the Ministry of Commerce, "*sometimes the EU member states do not seem to understand the whole situation and sometimes the Embassies make statements that are not helpful as they seem to contradict the EC's standpoint. In these cases the Delegations tries its best to clarify the situation but some Thai counterparts are still confused*" (interview, 02 Feb 09).

Higher education: No evidence of active and strategic coordination.

Health: The Delegation had no formal coordination on health with the WB or with member states.

Environment: No evidence of active strategic coordination.

Cross-cutting issues: The coordination exist between members states but It is noted that nothing was done to evaluate the progress made. It is also suggested that reviews should be carried out on a thematic basis Sema Belgium, Final Report, Strategic Review and Programming Mission, For Country Strategies Cluster 6, Part 1, Thailand, 5 April 2005.). The formulation of CCI in CSP 2007- 2013 is particularly in line with multilateral donors (UNHCR) + members states

I 8.1.1 Records of EC avoiding potential conflicts between its co-operation programmes and member states ones or other donors ones

Lack of harmonization was identified in only two cases: between EC's ECAP2 and a French project and between SPF and the WB implemented ATF on organic agriculture. The size of those projects did not led to any significant impact.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Both a bilateral French project and ECAP were directed at the improvement of Thailand's IPR regime. And both France and the EC supported and tried to strengthen their respective project approaches through policy dialogue. While interviewed stakeholders stated that there had been no overlap or, even worse, conflict or open contradiction between the two approaches, coordination does not seem to have taken place either.

The Asia Trust Fund (AFT) mid term review makes an interesting point about missed opportunities with regard to coordination and harmonisation of parallel EC-funded interventions. Under the SPF the EC was financing two projects on organic agriculture, which were being implemented at the same time as the ATF project on organic agriculture (2005-2006): "Enhancing competitiveness of organic rice and tapioca cultivations" and "Growing organic Kamut wheat in Northern Thailand for the EU market". "*No attempt was made to harmonize these two initiatives with the ATF project or create synergies between them. The SPF projects were not even brought to the attention of the National Team Leader*" (International Trade Center/EC, Asia Trust Fund, Mid Term Review, Final Report, 31 August 2006, p. 59).

Higher education: n/a

Health: No such records found for health issues.

Environment: No evidence of records of this kind.

Cross-cutting issues: No information, no evidence (see previous EQ)

I 8.1.2 Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation programmes and member states ones or other donors ones

Unless for the duplicated projects mentioned in I 8.1.1, no other inconsistencies were identified.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: No such records available at this stage.

Higher education: No evidence of records of this kind.

Health: n/a

Environment: No evidence of records of this kind.

Cross-cutting issues: No information on CCIs

I 8.1.3 Reports on coordination mechanisms put in place

EC led for years monthly coordination meetings for development co-operation on one side, and trade issues in the other side. The latter are still going on and are highly appreciated by MS representatives while the former stopped a few years ago due to lack of scope for coordination: as MS phased out, meetings turned to be only informative about EC programmes.

ASEM Trust Fund were coordinated under Thailand's In-Country Steering Committee from 2002 to 2006. ICSC established a trouble-shooting team in 2005.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The establishment of coordination mechanisms is best documented for the ASEM Trust Fund. Thailand's In-Country Steering Committee (ICSC) was established in 2002 to review, prioritise, and monitor the progress of grants, and provide the donors with updates on the status of projects and other relevant information. The Committee, which met regularly (times between 2002 and 2006) played a proactive role in monitoring the activities funded by ASEM TF2 grants. It held annual monitoring workshops at which donors and government officials, as well as the responsible agencies, exchanged views on the implementation progress of each grant and make recommendations for improvement. Following the ASEM TF2 Review Meeting in Washington DC in April 2005, ICSC established a trouble-shooting team to provide real time support and monitor the implementation of ASEM TF2 activity, resolve administrative bottlenecks, and accelerate grant implementation. The team comprises representatives from the World Bank, the Public Debt Management Office, and the Fiscal Policy Office (Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) Asian Financial Crisis Response Trust Fund Review, April 2006, Overview of Progress and Country Strategy Notes, p.46).

Higher education: No evidence of records of this kind.

Health: n/a

Environment: No evidence of records of this kind.

Cross-cutting issues: No such information on CCIs

JC 8.2 EC contributed to launch EC-Member States joint programmes or consistent policy dialogue with the Thai authorities

No joint programmes (I 8.2.1) or efforts to establish a common platform for policy dialogue (I 8.2.2), at least at sector level (such as health, global change, etc.). The framework of "partnership of equals" sought by the RTG is contradictory to any effort from donors to elaborate a common platform for policy dialogue which implies some sort of influence on national policy issues. This framework allows for individualized policy dialogue, based on a know-how or valuable experience recognised by the government, as for universal health care coverage with EU. The phasing out of most MSs and IFIs from co-operation left EC largely on its own for policy dialogue (for example with the Health care system) which in a way inherent to the goal of poverty reduction.

As an emerging economy and slightly more than that for some exports, trade policy dialogue with dialogue is more about solving conflicting interests than on carrying a global reform. For this, the EC have a leading role, acknowledged by MS representatives.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Joint EC/member states programmes do not exist.

Higher education: No evidence of such initiatives.

Health: Not in health. Mention was made to the evaluator of a Counsellor's Meeting in April 2008 in which the French Cooperation mentioned something about their policy in health. No records were found on this and no time was available to check with them.

Environment: No evidence of such initiatives.

Cross-cutting issues: Except on humanitarian aid (emergency), no evidence of Joint programmes on CCI

I 8.2.1 Existence of joint co-operation programmes

No joint programmes. See also I 8.1.1.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The ASEM Trust Fund is a joint co-operation programme managed by the WB. All bilateral cooperation programmes between the EU and Thailand in economy and trade are either financed by the EC or individual member states. Joint EC/member states programmes do not seem to exist.

Higher education: No evidence of joint co-operation programmes.

Health: n/a

Environment: No evidence of joint co-operation programmes.

Cross-cutting issues: UNHCR/ EC/ ECHO was positive.

JC 8.2.2 Existence of joint policy dialogue or common donor platforms upstream to policy dialogue with Royal Thai Government

No joint policy dialogue or policy dialogue platform. The framework of "partnership of equals" is contradictory to any effort from donors to elaborate a common platform for policy dialogue. As an emerging economy and more than that for some exports, Thailand policy dialogue takes place at a higher level than multi and bilateral co-operation programmes.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: No information available.

Higher education: No evidence of such joint dialogue or common donor platforms.

Health: n/a

Environment: No evidence of such joint dialogue or common donor platforms.

Cross-cutting issues: dialog exist but nothing it really done to set up common platforms of complementarity.

JC 8.3 EC funded trust fund or facilities managed by international agencies (WB, UN agencies) stayed consistent with EU long-term goals and EC co-operation interventions

Overall, global objectives at least are common to EC and the facilities or projects outsourced (I 8.3.2). Implementation strategies, in the case of global or regional facilities or funds, don't take explicitly on board EC country or ASEAN strategy but is still consistent with the agreed overall framework. In the case of outsources projects, like with the UNCHR in Thailand, there is a clear consistency in implementing the project and a better regards towards EC visibility requirements (I 8.3.1, 8.3.3).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Case for the ASEM Trust Fund.

Higher education: No such trust funds or facilities in the area of HE during the reporting period.

Health: n/a

Environment: No such trust funds or facilities in the area during the reporting period.

Cross-cutting issues: UNHCR stay consistent and efficient with EC objectives (MR) and pays attention to EC Visibility requirements.

I 8.3.1 Consistency of logical framework and approaches between EC regional and bilateral co-operation strategy and externalized facilities logical framework and management

EC national strategy was design without considering explicitly facilities (Global Fund, Trust Funds) partly funded by it at a global level. Those facilities in turn don't take into account specifically each national context to build its implementation strategy, apart from government policy framework.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Consistency remains for global objectives, but implementation strategies don't take into account specifically EC country strategy.

Higher education: n/a

Health: The review of all bilateral and regional projects in the health portfolio indeed shows a wide fan of different problems addressed. The same do seem to the evaluator to be complementary and to follow a consistent logic compatible with the Commission's cooperation strategy as presented in the CSP.

Environment: n/a

Cross-cutting issues:

I 8.3.2 Consistency of externalized facilities logical framework and management with EU long term goals in Thailand

EC long term goals in Thailand are not taken specifically on board. The fact that those facilities are partly financed by the EC at a global level implies a minimal consistency with EC global strategy or shared emergency concerns.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: n.a.

Higher education: n.a.

Health: As 8.3.1. above.

Environment: n.a.

Cross-cutting issues: No information on incentive of change for CCI which can only be considered as long term changes

I 8.3.3 EC Visibility with externally managed facilities

Contributors' visibility has been weak during the implementation for global funds. Outsourced projects, particularly with the UN, are more taking out account visibility requirements of their donors.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: From ASEM TF documentation, contributors' visibility has been weak during the implementation process.

Higher education: n.a.

Health: n.a.

Environment: n.a.

Cross-cutting issues: UN implemented facility uses to add EC logo in its documents.

JC 8.4 EC contributed to achieve complementarity between Member States and other donor's interventions

Above all, the framework of partnership of equals is a key factor for the relevance of usual EC evaluation concept such as coordination/complementarity. The 2003 RTG's "ban" on ODA had MSs and IFIs phased out. There was no more ground for complementarity and even for coordination that progressively stopped (I 8.4.2, I 8.4.3).

There is no evidence of synergies with other co-operation programmes (see also I 8.1.1) (I 8.4.1). Strategic documents all over the period are rather superficial in their description of MS and IFIs programmes, as such and even in relation to EC strategic response. This didn't allow identifying gaps or overlaps. On the other hand, in absence of sector-wide approach, co-operations entertain numerous projects in various fields and with various targets that is likely to strongly limit the scope as well as the interest of identifying gaps.

The CSPs, NIPs, MIT and other documents do not specially address the issue of the actual or potential comparative advantages of EC-Thailand cooperation (I 8.4.4), not allowing to assess that EC interventions are characterised by "additionality" and "gap-filling" (I 8.4.5).

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: There is no evidence for the extent of such EC contribution. The EC claims in all its strategic programming documents that it tries to contribute to complementarity but this just seems to apply to information sharing and harmonisation of EC/MS dialogues with the Royal Thai Government as facilitated by the monthly commercial counsellors meeting which is led by the Delegation.

Higher education: The PTS programme was evaluated as showing a good deal of Complementarity and coherence with other related donor activities. It fitted well into the general concept that was held that economic links could be achieved by the reinforcement and further development of economic links. Consultation with the donor organisations confirmed the PTS programme as an important initiative that has assisted the development of links between the regions and dovetailed into their strategies for the region.

Health: As already described in the IR for this evaluation, the Delegation holds regular meetings with member States' development cooperation counsellors in order to ensure harmonization and consistency of approach (Ind. 8.4.1). In this regard, no specific mention about gaps or overlaps in health issues found (Ind. 8.4.2 and 8.4.3).

Environment: No conscious effort was made to exploit and identify synergies with other environmental programmes in Thailand.

Cross-cutting issues: More information needed

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"The EU Member States should be involved in the definition of co-operation programmes 'since the concept' (...) Efforts undertaken by Member States should build upon EC projects."- Strategic Review and Programming Mission 2005, p.15

I 8.4.1 Records of EC achieving synergies between its co-operation programmes or policy dialogue and Member States ones or other donors ones

Apart from the humanitarian interventions towards refugees, no such synergy identified. The fact that RTG called in 2003 for a virtual stop of ODA suppressed the scope for gap-filling or search for synergy among donors.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Some evidence is available in the case of ECAP II where *"the strong involvement of US and Japan in the IPR field in Thailand also benefits European and Thai companies in protecting their IP rights and in understanding the hedge between IPR costs and protection. The resulting general enforcement, protection and awareness have had a positive unplanned effect on the programme general objectives but lots of efforts are still needed to reduce constant counterfeiting in Thailand"* (ROM Report Regional - ASEAN – CAI – EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme (ECAP II) – Thailand. MR-20054.02 – 18/12/03, p. 2).

Higher education: No evidence of such records.

Health: No member state representatives interviewed since none has health projects other than for refugees.

Environment: No evidence of such records.

Cross-cutting issues:

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

“The officials interviewed in EU Member States’ Embassies did not question the appropriateness of the priority sectors adopted by the EC for support. They highlighted on the other hand the focus that they gave to components of the same sectors through bilateral projects or to other sectors considered to be complementary. Advice was also given on the choices made for the achievement of objectives adopted by the EC.” - *Strategic Review and Programming Mission 2005, p.15*

I 8.4.2 EC strategic planning documents identify gaps with other co-operation programmes and discuss means of filling them.

Strategic documents all over the period are rather superficial in their description of MS and IFIs programmes, as such and even in relation to EC strategic response. This didn’t allow identifying gaps. On the other hand, in absence of sector-wide approach, co-operations entertain numerous projects in various fields and with various targets that is likely to strongly limit the scope as well as the interest of identifying gaps. Again, the framework of partnership of equals is a key factor for the relevance of usual EC evaluation concept such as coordination/complementarity. As the one who eventually decides if a project is worthwhile or not is the RTG (or the donors itself in the case of emergency or humanitarian interventions), there is no more room for EC, MS and IFIs to look for complementary outside their relationship with the RTG ministry dealing with the project.

Thematic Experts’ analysis:

Economy & Trade: All strategic documents since the beginning of the decade explicitly identify gaps in the economic relationship and are specific on the means of narrowing them. For example, the establishment of the SPF was a response of identified gaps and obstacles in trade and investment relations.

Higher education: Strategic documents do not make reference to other HE cooperation programmes.

Health: The CSP and NIPs do provide the frame for the selection of the projects finally funded. As described in 8.4.5. below, the latter do fill identified gaps.

Environment: Strategic documents do not point to gaps in other environmental cooperation programmes.

Cross-cutting issues: More information needed

I 8.4.3 Actions taken to ensure minimisation of overlaps with other co-operation programmes

See I 8.4.2 as overlaps are another issue for complementarity of the same nature than gaps.

Thematic Experts’ analysis:

Economy & Trade: The CSP (2007-2013) is the first strategy document that explicitly addressed the coherence of the policy mix and, consequently, aims at reducing overlaps. The draft Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) – which had been negotiated since 2004 but not signed yet - sets the framework for Thai-EC cooperation while ensuring coherence of all Community policies and can be considered the first major direct action taken to minimise overlaps in the cooperation programme. The current CSP announces that “The Commission will seek to maximise the coherence of [its] interventions with bilateral initiatives in order to enhance aid efficiency and effectiveness“(p. 20). Accessible ROM Reports and other documents do not elaborate on the question whether the EC has efficiently and effectively minimised overlaps between its own and bilateral interventions in the past.

Higher education: No actions taken.

Health: n/a

Environment: No actions taken.

Cross-cutting issues: No evidence of data base remaining all projects and activities on gender, governance and HR. The potential duplication of activities, or projects in various zones need to be verified on the field.

I 8.4.4 EC strategic planning explicitly takes comparative advantage into account.

The CSPs, NIPs, MIT and other documents do not specifically address the issue of the actual or potential comparative advantages of EC-Thailand cooperation. Moreover, the issue of PCA is taken for granted, which doesn't allow for an analytical approach of pro and cons, and eventually what to do without PCA.

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: The CSPs, NIPs, MIT and other documents do not specially address the issue of the actual or potential comparative advantages of EC-Thailand cooperation in the trade and investment sector.

Higher education: n.a.

Health: Worth mentioning here is the fact that selected experiences in Europe with universalisation of health care were applied in the EC-funded health reform project. Moreover, several of the projects financed through European universities and institutes make use of this comparative advantage (CEFPAS and DIBIT, Italy; Natural Resources Intl Ltd and Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, UK; Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium and Erasmus University, Holland). The partnering with European NGOs in several projects takes advantage of their proven national and international expertise in the field of health.

Environment: n.a.

Cross-cutting issues: Except on health, no EC specific Added value on EC value mentioned.

Related facts, figures, and references:

Extracts:

"[The officials interviewed in EU Member States' Embassies] It was also considered important that the CSP mentioned appropriately actions undertaken by the EU Member States." - *Strategic Review and Programming Mission 2005, p.15*

I 8.4.5 EC interventions characterised by "additionality" and "gap-filling"

See I. 8.4.3

Thematic Experts' analysis:

Economy & Trade: Not the case for Economy and Trade

Higher education: n.a.

Health: At least in two cases (projects) this issue of gap filling is very patent: The village health project in Mae Sariang district around the refugee camps on the Burmese border and the Migrant health project in Mae Fah Luang in the North. Other small projects also filled important gaps, i.e., four ECHO projects in refugee camps, two AIDS support projects, one project for the disabled, one curriculum development project for health professionals and three projects on malaria.

Environment: n.a.

Cross-cutting issues: No evidence

EQ9 - To what extent did the EC approach result in progress toward a balanced economic partnership between Thai and EU within the overall process of integration into the world economy that would not have occurred absent EC co-operation programmes?

As there are no Preferential Trade Agreements between the EU and Thailand (bilateral trade relations are instead governed by the GSP) and the draft bilateral Partnership and Co-operation Agreements has not been signed yet, the evolution of the economic partnership during the assessment period was based on trade negotiations and cooperation programmes within the framework of the CSP. As outlined under EQ1, the resolution of several trade disputes and irritants between the mid 1990s and 2002 was first and foremost achieved through negotiations between the representatives of the RTG (“Team Thailand”) and the EC. There was little, if any, direct impact of the EC cooperation programmes on the easing of trade conflicts. However, there is evidence that the SPF helped Thai stakeholders to deal with issues related to the improvement of trade relations by focussing mainly on non-tariff matters. The EC-ASEAN intellectual property rights co-operation programme (ECAP II) (ALA/96/25) resulted in Thailand introducing TRIPs compliant IPR legislation. The two NIPs (2002-2004 and 2005-2006) strong focus on economic cooperation and Thailand’s integration into the global economic system (Focal area 1: Trade and investment in the NIP 2005-2006) was, inter alia, directed at providing technical assistance and capacity building to help Thailand in implementing its WTO commitments, specifically in key areas agreed at Doha (NIP 2005-2006, p. 4). Meetings, workshops and seminars have regularly taken place during the assessment period at various political and expert levels and have at least increased transparency and confidence in EU-Thai relations.

There is little, if any, evidence for a direct impact of the EC cooperation programmes on the easing of trade conflicts. While cooperation programmes were indeed not directed at the easing of trade conflicts (this would not be possible under ALA and DCI anyway as development cooperation is supposed reap exclusive benefits for the recipient of aid), Thailand components of regional (such as ASEAN standards programme, ECAP, Asia Pro Eco, Asia Trust Fund etc.) and to a lesser extent bilateral programmes (such as SPF) have had indirect effects on resolving and - equally importantly - preventing trade conflicts by helping Thai stakeholders to comply with international and EU norms, standards and regulations (interviews with European and Thai stakeholders).

Related facts, figures, and references:

ROM Report Regional - ASEAN – CAI – *EC-ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Co-operation Programme (ECAP II) – Thailand*. MR-20054.02 – 18/12/03.

JC 9.1 EC Bilateral/regional policy dialogue on trade issues was influential in Thailand arbitration on controversial national regulations

There was no arbitration on controversial national regulations during the assessment period. However, the EC has claimed that since September 2006 “Thailand appears to have systematically challenged and has in many cases rejected the declared transaction price of certain EU products imported into Thailand ... The relevant Thai measures and their application appear to violate the basic principle that customs valuation is, except in specific circumstances, based on the transaction value of the imported goods as set out in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. Furthermore, the Thai measures violate not only substantive and procedural obligations of the Customs Valuation Agreement, but they also appear to violate other WTO obligations, including the requirement not to discriminate among other WTO members” (Global Europe, Factsheet Thai Customs Practise). According to the most recent WTO Trade Policy Review on Thailand, the Thai Customs Department “has adopted the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation and thus the relevant rules, under the Agreement are being applied” (WTO, Trade Policy Review. Report by Thailand, WT/TPR/G/191. 22 October 2007, p. 15). The WTO also stresses that Thailand was supporting free and fair trade and has no complaints about Thailand’s import and export regimes. However, the chairperson’s concluding remarks on

the Trade Policy Review mentioned “areas of concern, including customs valuation practices and import restrictions involving licensing and prohibitions, where Thailand was encouraged to make improvements” (TRADE POLICY REVIEW: THAILAND, 26 and 28 November 2007, Concluding remarks by the Chairperson, <http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/i/ae/db/200712/20071205259594.html>). A second dispute was triggered when Thai health minister Mongkol Na Songkhla of the previous government issued compulsory licenses in January 2008, overruling patents on four treatments for cancer. This was the latest in a series of decisions by the RTG designed to bring down the prices of drugs that would otherwise be too expensive for a large section of the country's population. The EC has requested the newly installed government headed of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to reconsider the move. The EC's view is that compulsory licensing, while allowed by WTO rules, should be regarded as a last-resort option, and that negotiations and collaboration with pharmaceutical companies should be sought (Interpress Service, 20 March 2008). These two cases will not be further discussed here as they are ongoing and no assessment can be made as to whether the bilateral and regional policy dialogues have helped to ease the disputes.

I 9.1.1 Existence of legal acts related to trade contradictory with EC/donors policy orientations

According to the WTO Trade Review, no such acts contradictory to WTO rules and commitments exist on the Thai side. However, the EC has recently accused Thailand of unfair customs and licensing practises (see above, 9.1).

I 9.1.2 Joint meetings, seminars, workshops on regional integration hold regularly

Such gatherings have regularly taken place during the assessment period at various political and expert levels. The most recent high level meeting took place on 9 June 2008 in Brussels when Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama met with Javier Solana discussing ASEAN integration and ASEAN-EU relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand, 11 June 2008). The Thai Foreign Minister considers ASEAN integration a cornerstone of Thai foreign policy and EU-ASEAN cooperation a decisive contribution towards regional integration in Southeast Asia (personal conversation with the Minister in London on 2 June 2008).

JC 9.2 EC adds value to the Member States' as well as international community's engagement with Thailand through coordination

Among the EU Member States, Germany, France and Denmark have the largest co-operation programmes with Thailand. Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK also co-operate with Thailand in various areas. The European Union – Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005 lists all organisations, institutions and authorities from EU Member States which have participate in EC-funded programmes without, however, assessing the role and specific contributions of those stakeholders or the role of the EC as a coordinator (I 9.2.1). The CSP 2007-2013 summarises the programmes of EU member states and other donors in Thailand and briefly declares “EU donor co-ordination is facilitated by the EC Delegation to Thailand which organises regular meetings with the Member States' Development Co-operation Counsellors in order to ensure harmonisation and consistency of approach” (p. 15). No further information on coordination is available from the documents.

I 9.2.1 Through regular consultations and meetings, EC coordinates activities of Member States in Thailand.

The European Union – Thailand Co-operation activities report 2005 lists all organisations, institutions and authorities from EU Member States which have participate in EC-funded programmes without, however, assessing the role and specific contributions of those stakeholders or the role of the EC as a coordinator

I 9.2.2 EC finances other coordination agencies.

During the assessment period the EC has financed two other coordinating agencies in the trade and investment sector: WTO (ASEM Trust Fund) and AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) (EU-Southeast Asia Civil Aviation).

I 9.2.3 Joint programming activities undertaken.

No such activity undertaken.

I 9.2.4 Issues such as environment, human rights, etc. mainstreamed more successfully than would have been possible absent EC action

Not the case (see EQ5).

ANNEX V: LIST OF EC PROJECTS

EC supported projects	EC funding	Agency	Duration	Starting	Ending	EC	RTG	Total
1. Economic Co-operation								
EU-Thailand Economic Co-operation Small Projects Facility	NIP	MoFA	3	2 004	2 007	5,0 €	1,3 €	6,3 €
Intellectual property rights co-operation programme	ASEAN	EPO	6	2 000	2 006	7,4 €	1,6 €	9,0 €
Regional co-operation programme on standard and quality	ASEAN	TISI	2	2 003	2 005	9,0 €	1,7 €	10,7 €
Regional integration support programme	ASEAN	IBF int'	3	2 003	2 006	4,0 €	0,5 €	4,5 €
EU-Southeast Asia civil aviation	ASEAN	ASD	3	2 003	2 006	8,5 €	- €	8,5 €
Asia-Invest	ASIA	AI secretariat	5	1 998	2 003	45,0 €	- €	45,0 €
Asia EcoBest	ASIA	RIET	5	1 997	2 002	8,0 €	- €	8,0 €
EU-Asian civil aviation programme	ASIA	AECMA	3			22,0 €	8,0 €	30,0 €
ASEM Trust Fund 1	ASEM	World Bank	3,5	1 998	2 002	15,0 €	27,0 €	42,0 €
Sub-total Economic Co-operation:						123,9 €	40,1 €	164,0 €
2. Public Health								
Health Care Reform	NIP	NHSO	5	2 004	2 009	5,0 €	0,3 €	5,3 €
Thai Village Health Project Mae Sariang	Budget line	Maltaser	3	2 002	2 005	1,0 €	- €	1,0 €
Women and Children Care and support in HIV/AIDS areas	Budget line	Raks Thia F.	4	2 002	2 006	1,6 €	0,2 €	1,7 €
Asia Pacific Leadership forums on HIV/AIDS and develop.	Budget line	UNAIDS	3	2 003	2 006	0,6 €	4,7 €	5,3 €
Health Care Reform	NIP	Min. Public Health	5	1 996	2 001	4,8 €	60,0 €	64,8 €
Sub-total Public Health:						12,9 €	65,2 €	78,1 €
3. Higher education								
University Network programme	ASEAN	Secretariat	5	2 001	2 006	7,0 €	0,8 €	7,8 €
Postgraduate Technological Studies Programme (PTS)	ASEAN	AIT	5	2 001	2 006	2,4 €	0,3 €	2,7 €
Asia-Link	ASIA	AIDCO	5	2 000	2 005	40,0 €	10,0 €	50,0 €
Asia IT&C	ASIA	SEMA	5	2 000	2 005	25,0 €	26,0 €	51,0 €
5th framework programme 1998-2002 Research	EU		4	1 998	2 002			
Sub-total Higher Education:						74,4 €	37,1 €	111,5 €
4. Energy								
Electricity Network upgrading programme	NIP	PEA	3	1 996	1 999	3,0 €	0,6 €	3,6 €
COGEN 3	ASEAN	AIT	5	2 000	2 005	16,3 €	- €	16,3 €
Energy Facility	ASEAN	JKT	5	2 001	2 006	18,0 €	13,5 €	31,5 €
Sub-total Energy:						37,3 €	14,1 €	51,4 €
4. Environment/Natural Resources								
Coastal Habitats and Resources Management Project	NIP	MoAC	5	2 002	2 007	8,0 €	8,5 €	16,5 €
Phu Khieo Wildlife Sanctuary	Budget line	MoNR&E	7	2 002	2 009	6,0 €	6,2 €	12,2 €
Tropical Forestry Small Grants Programme	Budget line	UNDP	7	2 000	2 007	15,3 €		15,3 €
Management of Chemicals (AT)	ASEAN	UNITAR	3			0,8 €	0,2 €	1,0 €
Classification and labelling of chemicals	ASEAN	UNITAR	4			0,9 €	0,3 €	1,2 €
ASEAN Centre for diversity	ASEAN	Secretariat	4	2 005	2 009	6,0 €	1,3 €	7,3 €
Local participation in Highland forest conservation	Budget line	CARE Denmark	4	1 999	2 003	0,8 €	- €	0,8 €
Training and education on coastal biodiversity	Budget line	KURDI	3	2 000	2 003	0,7 €	0,3 €	1,0 €
Regional centre for biodiversity conservation	ASEAN	ASEAN	5	1 999	2 004	8,5 €	- €	8,5 €
Asia Urbs	ASIA	AU Secretariat	3	1 998	2 001	30,0 €	- €	30,0 €
Asia-Europe environmental technology centre	ASEM	Thai MOSTE	3	1 998	2 001	3,3 €	- €	3,3 €
Sub-total Environment and natural resources:						80,2 €	16,8 €	97,0 €
5. Rural development								
Development and Extension of Fruit and Vegetable Production in	NIP	MoAC	11	1 990	2 001	9,5 €	6,0 €	15,5 €
Social Support Project	NIP	BAAC	5	1 999	2 004	15,0 €	- €	15,0 €
Thai Business Initiatives for Rural Development	Budget line	DF - PFA	4	1 997	2 001	0,4 €	- €	0,4 €
Community Agroforestry project in Ubon and Amnart Charoen (I)	Budget line	DF - PFA	5	1 996	2 001	1,5 €	- €	1,5 €
Support to agroforestry project	Budget line	DWHH	3	1 999	2 002	0,5 €	- €	0,5 €
Sub-total Rural Development:						26,9 €	6,0 €	32,9 €
6. Uprooted programmes								
Migrant Health Project Chiang Mai	Budget line	IOM	3	2 004	2 007	0,5 €	0,6 €	1,1 €
Gender sensitive reproductive health service Thai/myanmar	Budget line	Interact Worldwide	3	2 004	2 007	0,8 €	0,3 €	1,0 €
Disability rights in Indonesia and Thailand	Budget line	VSO	3	2 004	2 007	0,7 €	0,2 €	0,9 €
Assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand	Budget line	Aide médicale internationale	5,5			2,0 €	- €	2,0 €
Karen Education Project III (KEP III)	Budget line	UNCHR	2	2 004	2 006	1,2 €	0,4 €	1,6 €
Rice and Building materials for burmese refugees	Budget line	TBBC	2	2 004	2 006	4,0 €	14,1 €	18,1 €
Assistance to disabilities and mine education Thai/Burma	Budget line	Handicap Int	3	2 005	2 008	1,0 €	0,6 €	1,6 €
Vocational training project, Phase 2	Budget line	ZOA refugee care	3	2 005	2 008	1,0 €	0,8 €	1,8 €
Sub-total Uprooted programmes:						11,1 €	17,0 €	28,1 €
7. Narcotics								
Upgrading and extension of BMA's Services in the field of treatr	Budget line	BMA	5	1 997	2 002	0,6 €	- €	0,6 €
Drug abuse prevention programme in Asia	ASIA	UNESCO	3	1 998	2 001	1,3 €	- €	1,3 €