

*Synthesis of the geographical evaluations  
managed by the Evaluation Unit  
during the period 1998-2006*

Final report

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission or by the authorities of the countries concerned*



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **PART ONE: METHODOLOGY**

#### **I) THE EVALUATION'S MANDATE**

The main objectives of this synthesis of the geographical evaluations managed during the period 1998-2006 by the Joint Evaluation Unit (JEU) and the Delegations of the European Union in partner countries were as follows:

- i. to show the evolution of the Commission's methodological approach to geographical evaluations;
- ii. to analyse, on the basis of the most recent evaluation reports, the accuracy of the use made by the evaluators of the JEU's methodological approach, using the information on the JEU's website as a benchmark ; *and*
- iii. to provide a synthesis of the conclusions and recommendations of the reports (focusing mainly on wider lessons drawn out with the specific aim of sharing knowledge).

#### **II) METHODOLOGY AND LIMITS**

##### **a. Methodology**

The set of geographical evaluations has been reviewed in four successive stages:

- i. An assessment of the evolution of the methodological guidance of the JEU over the period 1998-2006. JEU's methodological guidance has been set out in the ToR of each individual evaluation and, since 2005, on the JEU's website. This analysis encompasses 34 country evaluations and 6 regional evaluations, managed by the JEU, and 4 of the 12 country evaluations managed by DG Development.
- ii. For the same evaluations, an Inventory of the evaluation reports' main methodological features, so as to identify the main trends in the methodology employed by the evaluation teams.
- iii. A more detailed "conformity assessment" is undertaken on the most recent evaluations. The two first analytical steps check the presence of formal elements of methodology in the ToR and in the evaluations. The third stage facilitates a deeper analysis of the extent to which the JEU's methodological principles have been properly applied. The 17 reports drafted since 2001, which contained the first references to methodological guidelines provided by the JEU, were assessed.
- iv. The conclusions and recommendations (C&R) of those evaluations rated as conforming adequately to the JEU's methodological principles are analysed, so as to draw out the main messages from the country evaluations carried out so far. Thus the content of this chapter derives directly from the C&R sections of the evaluation reports and does not include any judgement by the team in charge of the present synthesis.

**b. Risks and limitations**

- The analysis has been exclusively based on the set of ToR and final reports, and therefore excludes any assessment of the evaluation process.
- The methodological choices of the JEU are not questioned. The focus of the study is on the extent to which the JEU's guidance is applied by the evaluation teams.
- Lessons learned: there are limits to generalisation :
  - The set of countries under review is highly diversified; many of them have experienced political, economic or environmental crises which have deeply disturbed their socio-economic development and the effectiveness of international aid programmes.
  - The group of evaluations under review is heavily focused on ACP countries which have a specific cooperation agreement permitting a multi-annual programming cycle. Most of the ACP countries are characterised by a level of development and of external assistance that is not comparable with any other group of countries. Countries benefiting from other instruments such as TACIS and ALA are represented by only a very small number of evaluations.

## **PART TWO: FINDINGS**

Two main levels of conclusions are provided here:

- the main findings of the assessment of the evaluation reports,
- the conclusions and recommendations most common to the regional and country evaluations under review, drawn from the reports which were rated as sufficiently in conformity with the JEU's methodological guidelines.

### **I) EVALUATION REPORTS ASSESSMENT**

#### **JEU's methodological guidance: consistency of the message, more formal requirements since 2001**

The ToR provided by the JEU have varied only slightly over time. Those provided for regional evaluations do not differ from those for country evaluations over the same period.

**Since 2001, however, certain practices have been systematically required:**

- reconstruction of the intervention logic, through an objective diagram (2001) and then through an impact diagram (2004), as well as formulation and analysis of Evaluation Questions ;
- systematic identification of the target audience, to help guide dissemination of results;
- since 2000, stronger emphasis on analysis of impact ;
- since 2001, systematic assessment of cross-cutting issues ;
- focus on issues such as institutions and the economy (foci which however had already been fairly constant, so that little change was required).

#### **Inventory of geographical evaluations: a slight stabilisation of the methodology**

Homogeneity of ToR has given rise to a higher level of methodological homogeneity in the reports. Indeed, the inventory presents only three trends, mainly steps for stabilisation of the methodology. As one would expect, these trends reflect, with a time lag of a few months, those observed in the ToR .

South Africa **2002** is a key report in the context of evolution of the methodology, bringing to light three main changes. From this report onwards, (i) **objective diagrams** have been standard, (ii) the approach to **addressing Evaluation Questions** has always been explained, and (iii) **two new tools** have been specified: statistical analysis and a detailed information database.

Two other reports key to the stabilisation of the methodology were Malawi **2003** and Tanzania **2006**: the **linkage** between findings, judgement criteria and Evaluation Questions has been systematically visible since Malawi 2003 (**except in DG DEV reports**<sup>1</sup>), while **impact diagrams** were introduced, at the request of JEU, from the Tanzania 2006 report.

However, the above findings are qualified by the conformity assessment. Indeed, even if the linkage is visible, its quality is sometimes inconsistent: in three of the four DG DEV reports conclusions are not related to recommendations, linkage with data and indicators is weak in three reports managed by the JEU, and linkage between JC and EQ is weak in two (one managed by the JEU, one by DG DEV).

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<sup>1</sup> PNG, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Africa 2006

Finally, as regards the presentation of informed conclusions and recommendations, evaluations show different degrees of quality and some share the same weaknesses: analyses often do not draw the maximum benefit from the available information, they are not explicit enough, and report presentation is still below what one might reasonably expect.

### **Regarding the conformity of evaluations to the JEU's methodological approach**

Ratings based on three groups of criteria have been used to present this more detailed assessment<sup>2</sup>:

- Group 1 assessing the extent to which the reports properly address the ToR ,
- Group 2 assesses the credibility of the report,
- Group 3 addresses the quality of the communication of the evaluation's findings and conclusions.

#### **Results reveal some variation:**

Reports are strong on Group 1 – **conformity with the ToR**: this criterion is rated 90%. The extent to which reports meet needs is rated 98% and the relevance of their scope also 98%. The evaluators showed good capacity for presenting a clear understanding of the objectives of the evaluation. Had more consultants provided information on the sample of interventions they analysed, the results would have been even better.

The Group 2 – **credibility of the reports** – reveal weaknesses with a rating of only 52%: defensible design, reliable data and sound analysis are only rated 69%, 62% and 57% respectively. The main reason is a **lack of information** on the methodology used for each evaluation. But despite that lack on information, the **credibility of findings of reports** is rated 73% and the **validity of conclusions and recommendations** also 73%: they address questions expressed in the ToR, and relate to the current context even if the underlying assumptions and limitations could have been made more explicit.

Limited information on the methodology and on the limits of the evaluations could indicate a lack of distance of the evaluators from the reports they produced.

In general terms, recent evaluation reports have better ratings. This may be explained in part by the fact that the Consortium in charge of the elaboration of the methodological guidelines was also in charge of some of these evaluations (Tanzania and China) and therefore all the criteria elaborated were at least known to them and clearly understood by them.


Finally, under Group 3 – **quality of communication** –a rating of 75% is given: **usefulness of reports** is rated 84% but their **clarity** at only 66%. This group of criteria assesses the communication quality of the report specifically for different target groups: programme managers, Commissioners, members of the European Parliament and stakeholders.

Their **clarity** is affected by **insufficiently synthesised information**. The adequacy of the reports' format (clarity, synthesis and organisation) varies according to the target group. Their main weakness is a format not well adapted to the needs of Commissioners and EP Members. The same remark can be made on the usefulness of reports: usefulness for Commissioners and EP Members is awarded a score 20 points lower than usefulness for programme managers and stakeholders. It could however be unrealistic to expect direct use of evaluations by Commissioners and EP members.

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<sup>2</sup> Rating computation is presented p17

A clear distinction can be made between JEU-managed and the four DG-DEV-managed evaluations. The first generally outscore the DG-DEV-managed evaluations on every criterion (meeting needs, relevant scope, defensible design, reliable data, sound analysis, credible findings, validity of C&R, usefulness, clarity). The largest gap is observed for Group 2 (credibility of reports). All reports are weak at providing sound analyses and ensuring the reliability of data used. Further, the DG-DEV-managed evaluations are particularly weak in design and scope. The sample of DG-DEV-managed evaluations was however very small and these findings deserve to be cross-checked on the basis of a broader sample.



## II) SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATIONS' MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The methodological homogeneity of the assessed country evaluations has led to some convergence in conclusions and recommendations. Too country-specific C&R have been left aside<sup>3</sup>, to facilitate summing-up of those common to several evaluations<sup>4</sup> and which could be considered as of general interest. The above assessment of the reports' "quality" does not imply that each of the C&R quoted below is of the same quality. The present study certainly does not permit an assessment of the reliability of each of the hundreds of C&R included in the reports examined. A convergence of views of several independent evaluation teams should however carry some weight.

### *The Commission's strategy: mixed results*

The evaluations' perceptions of the quality and adaptation of the **Commission's country strategies** to changing contexts vary considerably. Some reports assess them positively,

<sup>3</sup> The full lists of conclusions and recommendations of the selected reports are available in annexe 7

<sup>4</sup> It is important to remember that only the most recent evaluations conforming to JEU's methods are referred to here.

whereas others highlight **insufficient links between the proposed strategies and in-depth analyses** of the specific characteristics of the country or region, and also weak policy dialogue at regional level.

As far as **intervention logic** is concerned, evaluations highlight that the analysis do not address with adequacy the potential contribution of projects to the achievement of strategic goals and the complementarities between intervention levels. Complementarities between national and regional strategies are not referred to and there is no check on coherence with other EU policies.

Therefore the main recommendations relate to a need to increase the level of dialogue to improve adaptation, ownership and leadership by the partner. Stronger policy dialogue between donors is also recommended to improve coordination and synergy and could be linked to the programming cycle. Furthermore, coherence **between the Commission's development strategies and the wider range of EU policies** should be strengthened. Response strategies for foreseeable trends related to regional integration and trade policy should be adopted. In addition, **coherence between Commission instruments** should be improved internally (intra-region and intra-country) and externally (region and country). Socio-economic **disparities between the member countries** of a regional organisation should be clearly stated in strategic documents. This would favour synergy between regional and national development approaches.

***Thematic coverage: generally relevant but sustainability is at risk***

**Private sector:** support was effective when addressing the legal and institutional framework as well as when providing wider support for trade negotiations. Therefore support to these issues should be enhanced.

**Public finance and macroeconomic framework:** interventions are considered as relevant and generally effective despite weaknesses in programme design.

**Governance:** the decision to address this issue is not always related to the importance of the problem in the country. Evaluations recommend strengthening and mainstreaming Commission support to governance through support to decentralisation, electoral organisation, Civil Society, human rights and the rule of law.

**Rural development:** interventions contribute to the well-being of rural communities but the sustainability of their effects is at risk. The linkage with fostering the economy is not explicit. Evaluation recommendations are general in nature: increase policy dialogue, involve Non-State Actors and develop a results-based approach.

**Transport:** interventions have contributed to economic growth, social development and regional integration but their sustainability is at risk because of a lack of ownership and limited capacity to ensure maintenance. Therefore evaluations recommend establishment of specific conditionalities for the release of funds and strengthening of the regional dimension of the infrastructural network.

**Social sectors:** No common lessons learned can be extracted and generalised, conclusions and recommendations being too country-specific.

**Regional integration:** support was relevant and produced positive results, mainly in terms of technical capacities. However, results were limited by i) unclear analysis of the composition of regions and ii) more effective use made of the programmes by the most

advanced member countries rather than by the region as a whole. In order to avoid a possible increase in regional disparities, evaluators recommend supporting social cohesion and defining selection criteria for participation in horizontal programmes.

***Cross-cutting issues: to be mainstreamed***

Cross-cutting issues are generally not addressed in the Commission's strategies. According to the evaluation teams they should be mainstreamed. Gender and equality aspects are insufficiently addressed in country cooperation strategies; governments and regional institutions do not show interest in a sound strategy for environment and the Commission's support has had limited results.

***Implementation: a concern of all evaluations***

**General conclusion and recommendation:** delays due to heavy administrative procedures and serious delays between design and implementation are recurrent, and affect impact and effectiveness negatively. The evaluations recommend that they be reduced, better anticipated and more efficiently communicated to key actors. Efforts should focus on deeper analysis, project design and the need to implement audit on time and of ensure reliable cash flows when necessary.

**Aid delivery mechanisms:** budgetary support and sector policy dialogue have contributed positively to governments' ownership and accountability whereas stand-alone projects i) are often insufficiently linked to strategic priorities and to policy dialogue, and ii) do not allow for ownership, flexibility or capacity-building in the recipient institutions nor mid or long-term approach. However complementarity between instruments should be considered as a source of flexibility: budget support is recommended whenever possible and should be complemented with SWAps and stand-alone projects in specific cases (opening pathways into new areas of cooperation, strengthening the capacity of actors, and paving the way towards sectoral budget support).

**Donor coordination and complementarity:** despite weak coordination between donors, complementarity is observed mainly at sectoral level. It is recommended that governments be supported in taking the lead in such coordination.

**Sustainability** should increasingly be taken into consideration in design and implementation. The outcome of changes in EU policies should be anticipated. Where relevant, steps to ensure sustainability should be defined before the termination of projects. It is an issue that should be supported by continuity in strategic planning.

**Monitoring and evaluation:** a lack of a performance-based M&E system was observed which affects analysis of impacts. It has been worsened by poor institutional memory (high staff turnover, no clear paper trail, weak dissemination of lessons learned). Therefore M&E should be strengthened, internal coordination developed and an institutional learning process also developed.



## REVIEW OF EVALUATIONS

### 1 INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Content of the review of evaluations

This synthesis of the geographical evaluations managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit (JEU) during the period 1998-2006 was commissioned in January 2007. The Revised Launch Note for the study was approved by the JEU in March 2007 and the Inception Note in August 2007. The content of the report, following this introductory chapter, is the following:

- Chapter 2: Evolution of the Commission's methodological approach.
- Chapter 3: Inventory of Geographical Evaluations.
- Chapter 4: Conformity of evaluations with the JEU's methodological approach.
- Chapter 5: Lessons learned from Geographical Evaluations.

#### 1.2 Mandate and scope of the study

After further discussions based on the draft Inception Note the agreed mandate of the team was as follows:

##### **MANDATE:**

The main objectives of this study are:

- i. to show the evolution of the Commission's methodological approach to geographical evaluations during the period 1998-2006 (improvements, or elements which have been abandoned; good practices for evaluators);
- ii. to analyse, on the basis of the most recent evaluation reports, the degree of conformity of evaluation team practice with the JEU's methodological approach, using the material on the JEU's website as a benchmark; *and*
- iii. to provide a synthesis of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the reports (lessons drawn out with the specific aim of sharing knowledge).

The scope of the study draws on the following material:

##### **SCOPE:**

- 34 country evaluations and 6 regional evaluations managed by the JEU;
- 4 out of 12 country evaluations managed by DG Development, referred to in this report as "DG DEV evaluations";
- for each evaluation, the following documentation: **the final report, the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the quality assessment documents.**

The “population” covered by the study encompasses evaluations of varying scope. Thus geographical evaluations:

- are managed either by the JEU of the Relex Family, or by DG DEV; this might impact on the actual implementation of the methodology, and therefore on the quality and usefulness of evaluations;
- address the strategies expressed either in Country Strategy Papers (CSP) or in Regional Strategy Papers (RSP), which implies that different types of topic are addressed by the evaluations;
- address strategies implemented either under the European Development Fund (ACP countries), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the TACIS Programme, the ALA Conventions, or budget line financing, which means that they cover annual or multi-annual activities and involve different stakeholders and implementation procedures.

A total of 52 geographical evaluations were conducted over the period 1998-2006, of which 44 are analysed<sup>5</sup>. These 44 evaluations have been classified from 1 to 44 according to the date on which their final report was published; the higher the number, therefore, the more recent the evaluation.

#### Selection of four DG DEV evaluations

The ToR stipulate that “*the consultant is asked to analyse the final reports of the DG DEV evaluations available to date, although no more than four DG DEV evaluations (to be selected) should be analysed in detail.*” (ToR §2).

Annex 1 of the ToR identifies twelve geographical evaluations managed by DG DEV. To select four evaluations for the next steps of the study, the following criteria were applied:

- a) DG DEV evaluations should be selected for countries where the JEU had also conducted an evaluation. This would give added value to the assessment of lessons learned from successive evaluations in a specific country. It would also facilitate comparisons of the quality and usefulness of evaluations undertaken respectively by the JEU and DG DEV for certain countries.
  - ⇒ **South Africa** and **Papua New Guinea** meet criterion “a). The Commission’s strategy for South Africa was evaluated by the JEU in 1999 and 2002, and by DG DEV in 2006. Papua New Guinea was evaluated by the JEU in 2000 and by DG DEV in 2006.
- b) DG DEV evaluations conducted by Ecorys have not been selected, to avoid any conflict of interest due to the composition of the expert panel.
  - ⇒ The evaluations relating to Kenya, Cameroon and Eritrea are excluded from the analysis, as well as Mauritania and Zambia where Ecorys was also involved, albeit not as the leading partner.

With no other relevant criterion and to minimise the selection bias, the team selected the evaluations for the following countries:

- ⇒ **Sierra Leone** and **Madagascar**.

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
<sup>5</sup> The 8 evaluations not analyzed were managed by the DG DEV

### 1.3 Methodology of the study

The study has been structured in four phases:

- first, the team assessed **the evolution of the methodological guidance** of the JEU over the period 1998-2006, as enshrined in the individual evaluation ToR and on the JEU's website;
- second, the team made an inventory of **the evaluation reports** to identify the main trends in the methodology;
- third, the team assessed the extent to which the methodology implemented by the evaluators **conformed** to the guidance defined by the JEU, this conformity assessment being conducted for the most recent evaluation reports;
- fourth and finally, the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations were analysed, to draw out the main **transferable lessons** from experience.

#### Synthesis of geographical evaluations – Methodology



### 1.4 Risks and limitations

#### Description of the evaluation process/assessment of the evaluation products (ToR and reports)

The analysis is exclusively based on the set of documents listed above<sup>6</sup>, which therefore precludes any assessment of the evaluation process followed in each individual study.

<sup>6</sup> See section 1.2 "Scope".

*No judgment on the JEU's methodological approach*

The methodological choices of the JEU are not questioned. The focus of the study is on the extent to which the JEU's guidance was applied by the evaluation teams, and with what effects.

*Lessons learned: limits to generalisation*

The set of countries under review is highly diversified; many of them have experienced political, economic or environmental crises which have deeply disturbed their socio-economic development and the effectiveness of the respective international aid programmes.

The group of evaluations to be reviewed is heavily focused on ACP countries which have a specific cooperation agreement allowing multi-annual programming cycles. Most of the ACP countries are characterised by a level of development and of external assistance that is not comparable with that applicable to many other countries. Other instruments such as TACIS and ALA are represented by only a very small number of evaluations. These elements limit the extent to which the lessons learned can be generalised.

## **2 EVOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION'S METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

### **2.1 Objectives**

The study team was required to launch a “comparative analysis of **the demands of the JEU as expressed in the ToR**” (see ToR § 3.1.1). In particular, the following questions were formulated:

- Have the scope and the objectives of geographical evaluations changed?
- Is the current focus on impact a recent trend?
- Have the methodological requirements of the Evaluation Unit evolved significantly?

The team has not assessed the evaluation process. Judgements were conducted mainly on the basis of the available material, that is the evaluation ToR and the final reports.

### **2.2 Approach**

The analysis addresses the evolution of the scope and objectives of geographical evaluations over the period 1998-2006, and in particular the evolution of the focus on impact (see ToR §3.1.1).

The JEU's methodological guidelines are now available on its website. They have been used as a benchmark. The ToR of *each individual evaluation* were examined against the model defined by the JEU. The aim was to identify the features of the JEU's standard ToR model that (i) had pre-existed and always been used, (ii) were introduced during the period under study, or (iii) were mostly omitted from geographical evaluation ToR .

The examination of ToR also revealed elements that existed in ToR before the JEU's methodology was disseminated, but were not further integrated afterwards.

The results are set out in a dynamic table presented in Annex 2. This table shows in detail what is defined by the JEU as a model ToR (column A), and what was the actual content of ToR covered by the study (i.e. ToR 1 to 44) in relation to that model.

Finally, a chronogram summarises the methodological inputs provided by the JEU's guidelines since 1998 (see annex 3).

### **2.3 Observations**

#### *Preliminary comment*

Before mapping out the observations, it is necessary to bear in mind that the ToR mainly follow a common format which has slightly changed during the period under review. This can explain why no major changes in the ToR guidance were observed.

Background elements:

72% of the ToR provide elements of background (information on the legal basis and political commitment, the main features and evolution of Commission support to the country or region). However, the description of the Commission's support does not address sensitive debates relating to cooperation with that country. Moreover, less than 50% of the ToR (41% and 46% respectively) inform the evaluators either of the financial means of the Commission's support, or of the evolution of the partner's socio-economic context. For these elements, no continuity or discontinuity over time can be identified.

Evaluation objectives and scope:

The objectives of the evaluation were always defined: 100% were presented as formative<sup>7</sup> and 87% as summative<sup>8</sup>. Where ToR addressed both objectives, they were mainly focused on the formative dimension. 90% of the ToR include a definition of the scope (systematised since 2004). This indication had mainly been provided before 2001 (nine reports out of 13 define the scope) whereas from 2001 it was included in only eight reports out of 24, the ToR for Comoros, Seychelles and Mauritius being treated together as a single ToR. Finally, only two sets of ToR – both drafted before 1999 – provide indications of the sample of projects to be analysed (Ukraine 1998 and Azerbaijan 2000).

The **targeted audience** is defined in only 62% of the ToR. The chronogram in Annex 2 shows that, since 2001, all the ToR except three (Morocco 2003, Ethiopia 2004 and MERCOSUR 2004) have included this information.

The **main sectors to be analysed** as specified in the ToR are the following<sup>9</sup>:

- in ToR drafted prior to 2000: macro-economic reforms (6), structural reform (6) and policy and legal advice (3)
- in ToR drafted throughout the period: institutional and capacity building (8), civil society, democracy and human rights (4), regional cooperation and integration (4), and food production and processing (3)
- in ToR drafted since 2004: education (5), water and sanitation (5), transport (4) and decentralisation (4)

The focus since 2004 on social sectors and environmental issues is therefore the main trend to be considered<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Evaluations intended to support programme actors, i.e., managers and direct protagonists, to help them improve their decisions and activities. It mainly applies to public interventions during their implementation (ongoing, mid-term or intermediate evaluation). It focuses essentially on implementation procedures and their effectiveness and relevance.

<sup>8</sup> Evaluations undertaken after a programme has been implemented to assess their results and impacts, whether they achieved their aims and objectives, and whether they were overall beneficial to those they were intended to benefit.

<sup>9</sup> Figures in brackets indicate the occurrence.

<sup>10</sup> It can be assumed that this trend reflects the evolution of the country and regional strategy papers

**Table 1: Evolution of sectors covered by country evaluations<sup>11</sup>**

Sectors	Occurrences												
	Before 2000				Between 2000 and 2004				After 2004				
Macro-eco and structural reform													
Policy and legal advice													
Private sector enhancement													
Human resources development													
Network development													
° Energy													
° Telecom													
Entreprise restructuring													
Level of Commission resources													
Post-flood rehabilitation													
Institution and capacity building													
Civil society, democracy, Human Rights													
Regional cooperation and integration													
Food production and processing													
Social services													
Employment creation and income generation													
Sustainable development													
Infrastructure													
Health													
Agriculture and agro-industry													
Veterinary and phytosanitary issues													
Education													
Water and sanitation													
Transport													
Decentralisation													
Good governance													
Rural development													
Food security													
Financial instruments rationalisation													
Forestal ecosystem													
Trade													
Economic development													
Social cooperation													

The above table also reveals the evolution of the vocabulary used in some sectors, notably in agriculture and rural development. For instance, the shifts from “agriculture” or “food production” towards “rural development” or “food security” do not reflect major changes in sectoral resource allocation, but rather a different way of addressing issues in the same sector. Such evolutions were often triggered by major policy papers such as the EC Communications and related Council Resolutions on rural development policies issued between 2000 and 2002.

Evaluation methodology

Regarding the methodology, the following developments were observed:

- The division of evaluation studies into three main phases (desk phase, field visit, final reporting) has been consistently required since 1997, and so was already in use prior to the 2001 guidelines.

<sup>11</sup> Annex 4 presents the specified issues by report. This table only presents the occurrences of an issue over time. Therefore one box represents one set of ToR published during the period stated above.

- reconstruction of an intervention logic started to be a systematic requirement from 2001 onwards (although previously requested in the ToR for Georgia 1998, South Africa 1999, and Turkmenistan 2000);
- this reconstruction had to be presented as an objectives diagram from 2001 to 2005 (46% of the ToR) and as an impact diagram from end-2004 onwards (28%);
- elaboration of Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators has been a requirement since 2001 (77% of the studies covered);
- description of the development context has been a requirement since 2003;
- “key evaluation issues” were specified up until 2001, when they were replaced by EQs.

### Evaluation Questions

Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability have been DAC standard criteria since 1997.

Even if impact has always been questioned, it has been given stronger emphasis since 2000. This is mainly due to the reorientation of the Relex strategy towards results-based management practices promoted in all DGs and also to the requirement to “encourage partner Governments to focus their policies better”<sup>12</sup>. The request for an impact diagram from 2004 onwards (Tanzania) illustrates the increasing focus on this evaluation criterion.

Similarly, attention to “cross-cutting issues”<sup>13</sup> has increased over time. An assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues were taken into consideration in country programme implementation has been obligatory since 2001.

Finally, strategic considerations, the “3Cs” (coordination, complementarity and coherence) and cross-cutting issues (explanation provided above) were three issues less consistently subject to assessment. They were questioned in 85%, 82% and 62% of cases respectively whereas the five DAC criteria feature in between 95% and 100% of the studies.

### Dissemination and follow-up

The production of an Executive Summary is a request common to all ToR. In three cases a shorter summary sheet was required. This requirement cannot be related to any evolution of the Evaluation Unit’s guidance over time.

A dissemination seminar has been stipulated since 2001 (68% of the ToR).

## **2.4 Conclusion**

An overall observation is the homogeneity of the ToR produced by the JEU: the ToR for regional evaluations do not differ from those of the country evaluations for the same period.

Trends are clearer as regards evaluation **scope and methodology**. Indeed, since **2001**:

- reconstruction of the intervention logic as well as elaboration of Evaluation Questions has been required;
- the target audience has been systematically identified, to guide dissemination of results.

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<sup>12</sup> Introduction of the ToR

<sup>13</sup> Gender, environment, Human Rights, capacity building and in few reports HIV/AIDS, migration and governance.

The focus on issues such as institutions and the economy was fairly constant, with little change. Cross-cutting issues have been subject to assessment since 2001. One illustration of this evolution is that environmental sectors have been among the main identified sectors for evaluation mainly since 2004.

### 3 INVENTORY OF GEOGRAPHICAL EVALUATIONS

#### 3.1 Objectives

The inventory is intended to provide a classification of the evaluations (definition of evaluation clusters) so as to be able to:

- identify the main features of the methodology used by evaluators which existed over the whole period under analysis, or else which appeared or disappeared in geographical evaluations over time;
- assign to each evaluation characteristics classified as conforming to the JEU's methodological benchmark (see chapter 4);
- carry out an analysis of lessons learned from geographical evaluations (see chapter 5).

This inventory includes all the evaluation reports. A special comparison has been made of reports drafted before and after the issuing of the JEU's methodological guidelines<sup>14</sup> (in 2005), in order to assess the main methodological changes since that date.

#### 3.2 Approach

In order to identify the main evolutions of the methodology, each final report was sorted according to the criteria listed in the following table. The complete table is presented in annex 4 and in the Excel annex attached to the report.

**Table 2: Criteria used for the Inventory of Evaluations**

Field	Modality
(1) Country or Region	[Text]
(2) Year of publication of the report	[date]
(3) Budget allocated to the evaluation	[K€]
(4) Unit managing the evaluation	DG DEV/ JEU
(5) Consultancy in charge of the evaluation	[Text]
(6) The approach to addressing Evaluation Questions, i.e. whether Judgment Criteria, Indicators and sources were presented for each question	Yes/No <sup>15</sup>
(7) Whether justification of the Evaluation Questions was given.	Yes / No
(8) Whether tools of analysis and information were described	1 Document analysis. 2 Statistics analysis 3 Interviews

<sup>14</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)

<sup>15</sup> A "1" answer means that the Evaluation Questions, Judgment Criteria and Indicators are formulated in the report (or the annexes). At this stage of the inventory, this information has a descriptive purpose, and is not meant to be a qualitative assessment.

Field	Modality
	4 Survey 5 Focus group 6 Expert panel 7 Case studies 8 Complete database of interventions 9 Cluster analysis 10 Comparative tables 11 Benchmarking
(9) Whether the intervention logic is presented through an impact diagram, an objective diagram, another type of diagram, or not at all	Impact diagram / objective diagram / other diagram/ nothing
(10) Whether the report presents how each recommendation is derived from specific conclusions, and how each conclusion is derived from specific findings.	Yes/No
(11) Whether a quality assessment was conducted by the JEU and is available (on soft or hard documents)	Yes/No
(12) Whether a Commission “fiche contradictoire” is available	Yes/No
(13) Whether the results of the evaluation were published, presented to various actors, etc.	Yes/No <sup>16</sup>

### 3.3 Analysis

#### Preliminary comment

This classification is made exclusively on the basis of what is explicitly stated in the reports, in both the main volume and the annexes. The “fields” mentioned above have a descriptive purpose, in that they mainly describe the design of the evaluation (i.e. a description of the tools used to gather and analyse information).

#### The approach to addressing Evaluation Questions is explained: presentation of the Judgment Criteria, Indicators and sources for each question

The EQ are explicitly mentioned starting with the South Africa 2002 report. Previously, EQ were mentioned only in three reports (Ukraine 1998, Georgia 1998 and South Africa 1999). Since then, only the Madagascar 2006 report (managed by DG DEV) does not present EQs.

A cross-check with the “evolution of the methodological guidance” shows that this trend coincides with a JEU requirement.

#### The justification of the Evaluation Questions is given

Prior to the Morocco 2003 report, EQ were justified only twice – Azerbaijan 2000 and Moldova 2000. Since then they have been systematically justified. An EQ is considered justified when the consultants present the rationale and scope of the EQ. This requirement for

<sup>16</sup> The team considers that the dissemination was active as long as the report was presented to different actors, besides the JEU. Publication on the website is not considered part of active dissemination.

the definition of EQs dates back to the South Africa 2002 report. Since then only two reports – South Africa 2002 and Ukraine 2003 – have not conformed with JEU requirements.

*Tools of analysis and information are described*

The inventory only took into account the tools explicitly described in the report.

Since the Namibia 2001 report, tools for gathering information have always been described. Only three previous reports did not include such information – Georgia 1998, Russian Federation 2000 and Burkina Faso 2001.

The requirement to describe information sources was part of the guidelines published in December 2002<sup>17</sup>, the aim being to trace the accuracy of the evaluation findings.

From the inventory, the following tools are identified:

1. Document analysis (ToR, PIN, DSP, monitoring reports, mid-term evaluation, Delegation files, other donors' documentation, background etc.): the tool has always been defined.
2. Statistical analysis: used from South Africa 2002 on, with a frequency of two out of three.
3. Interviews: only four reports explicitly refer to this tool (Namibia 2001, Malawi 2003, Lesotho 2004 and Caribbean 2005) but it is a virtual certainty that all the evaluations used them.
4. Survey: a recent tool; only three reports explicitly refer to it (Benin 2005, Latin America 2005 and Madagascar 2006).
5. Focus group: its explicit use is recent – since 2004 with a frequency of two out of three (Egypt 2004, Benin 2005, Caribbean 2005, Tanzania 2006, Rwanda 2006, TACIS 2006, Central Africa 2006, Madagascar 2006 and China 2006).
6. Expert panel: its explicit use is recent (since Egypt 2004), and it is mentioned by seven reports out of 23 (Egypt 2004, Honduras 2004, Ethiopia 2004, Benin 2005, Tanzania 2006, Rwanda 2006 and Madagascar 2006).
7. Case Study: always used, as required in every ToR
8. Complete database of interventions: starts to be used with the South Africa 2002 report. Since then it has always been referred to but its coverage varies. Some evaluations present and analyse non-programmable aid interventions (thematic horizontal lines), others limit themselves to programmable aid.
9. Cluster analysis: used three times (Malawi 2003, MERCOSUR 2004, TACIS 2006).
10. Comparative tables: used three times (Honduras 2004, Mali 2006 and Central Africa 2006).
11. Benchmarking: only two recent reports refer to this tool (Tanzania 2006, Central Africa 2006).
12. SWOT analysis: only mentioned in the China 2006 report.

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<sup>17</sup> standards C(2002)5267

The releases of the South Africa 2002 and Egypt 2004 reports have been key moments for the explicit use of new methodological tools.

- Prior to the South Africa 2002 report, three tools were explicitly used – document analysis, interviews and case studies. Since then, the use of statistical analysis and a complete database of interventions has been explicit and frequent (two out of every three evaluations).
- Focus groups and expert panels appeared with the Egypt 2004 report and since then have been used in two out of every three evaluations (respectively 9 and 7 reports).

*The intervention logic is presented through an impact diagram, an objective diagram, another type of diagram or is not graphically represented*

The reconstruction of the intervention logic through an objective diagram had been required in ToR from the South Africa 2002 evaluation through to the Armenia 2006 evaluation.

Up until the South Africa 2002 evaluation, the intervention logic was graphically represented by an objectives diagram in five reports (Benin 1998, Ghana 1998, Russian Federation 2000, Azerbaijan 2000 and Turkmenistan 2000) even though it was not required by the ToR.

The Ukraine 2003 report graphically represented the detailed strategy but not through an objectives diagram as required. Thereafter up until Tanzania 2006, objective diagrams were systematically drawn up. Therefore only the Ukraine report does not conform with JEU requirements in this respect.

The first impact diagram appeared with the Tanzania report. A cross-check with the table “evolution of the methodological guidance” shows that this new trend coincides with a JEU requirement. Since then impact diagrams have been the rule, except in those evaluations managed by DG DEV. Only two out of four DG DEV reports conform with the JEU guidance (Papua New Guinea and Madagascar) and a third presents the strategy graphically (South Africa).

*The report sets out how each recommendation is derived from specific conclusions, and how each conclusion is derived from specific findings*

The clarity of the linkage between findings, conclusions and recommendations was variable prior to the Malawi 2003 report. Thereafter this linkage has been constantly visible except in three evaluations managed by DG DEV (Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and South Africa). The quality of the linkage is not assessed at this stage.

*Other comments*

Evolution of the budget: only half of the ToR referred to the evaluation budget. The table shows an increase of the budget allocated to the evaluations in 2001 (€k112) and 2003 (€k150/200). There is no relationship between the available budget and the nature of the evaluation (country/region)., It is not possible to identify a difference between the DG DEV and JEU budgets for each individual evaluation.

Fiches contradictoires: these were recurrent from the South Africa 2002 report onwards, with a frequency of two out of every three reports<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> For the missing documents, refer to annexe 5

### 3.4 Conclusion

ToR homogeneity had for consequences a methodological homogeneity in the reports. Indeed, the inventory indicates only three trends, mainly steps for stabilisation of the methodology. As one would expect, these trends reflect, with a time lag of a few months, those observed in the ToR.

South Africa 2002 is a key report in respect of evolution of the methodology, ushering in three main changes. From this report onwards the approach to **addressing Evaluation Questions** has always been explained, **two new and frequently used tools** have been specified in the reports (statistical analysis and a complete information database) and **objective diagrams** have been standard.

However the JEU approach is still not homogeneous. Although the study team had no access to any information related to each specific evaluation process - and therefore is mostly unaware of the quality of the guidance work carried out by each Reference Groups - it should be noted that there may be a link between the precision of the EQs in the ToR and the degree of conformity of the reports: the Tanzania and China evaluations, both having the highest degree of conformity, were the only two evaluations having a combination of a theoretical description of what an EQ is and a brief presentation on what should be assessed under each evaluation criterion.

Two other key reports for the stabilisation of the methodology are Malawi 2003 and Tanzania 2006: the **linkage** between findings, JC and EQ has been systematically visible since Malawi 2003 (except in DG DEV reports), and **impact diagrams** were introduced at the request of JEU, with effect from the Tanzania 2006 report. Nonetheless, it is necessary to specify that even if the linkage is visible, its quality is sometimes inconsistent. According to the conformity assessment, in three of the four DG DEV reports conclusions are not related to recommendations, linkage with data and indicators is weak in three reports managed by the JEU, and linkage between JC and EQ is weak in two (PNG 2006 and Madagascar 2006).

Finally, as regards presentation of informed conclusions and recommendations, evaluations show differing degrees of quality and some share the same weakness, namely a limited capacity for presentation of a comprehensive analysis.

## **4 CONFORMITY OF EVALUATIONS TO THE JEU'S METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH**

### **4.1 Objectives**

This chapter provides an assessment of “**the implementation of the evaluation methodology** proposed by the JEU by the evaluation teams” (see ToR § 3.1.1).

A comparative analysis of the evaluations has been conducted, focusing on the following aspects:

- the design (global methodological approach) proposed by the various evaluation teams, in order to point out the continuities and changes in the approach;
- the methods and mix of tools used by the evaluators;

The conformity assessment has been conducted mainly against the **benchmarks defined on the JEU's website**, complemented by a literature review<sup>19</sup>.

### **4.2 Approach**

The ToR of the Benin evaluation (April 2004) were the first to make reference to methodological guidelines provided by the JEU. Therefore, **the conformity assessment is conducted on the evaluations whose ToR were produced after those of the Benin evaluation** (April 2004; including Benin evaluation). Only the reports available with their ToR were assessed. This covers 17 evaluations<sup>20</sup>.

The assessment of conformity of these most recent evaluation reports with the JEU methodology is conducted against the nine quality criteria defined in the JEU Quality Judgment Grid. These nine criteria have been clustered in three groups as follows:

- **Group 1:** Adequacy of the ToR is judged on the following quality criteria:
  - Meeting needs
  - Relevant scope
- **Group 2:** Credibility of the reports depends on:
  - Reliable data
  - Sound analysis
  - Credible findings
  - Validity of the conclusions and recommendations
  - Defensible design
- **Group 3:** Quality of communication entails:
  - Useful recommendations
  - Clear reporting

Basically, assessment of conformity of the evaluation reports to the **Group 1** criteria consists of an analysis of the extent to which the evaluations address the demands of the ToR.

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<sup>19</sup> See Annexe 2

<sup>20</sup> The TORs for the Rwanda, Pacific 2006 and India 2006 studies were not available.

The conformity assessment on the basis of **Group 2** consists of:

- assessment of the extent to which the analysis is based on a correct understanding of the intervention logic, which expresses the strategy defined in the CSP or RSP and which is used with the ToR to define the Evaluation Questions (EQs);
- measurement of the “explicit linkage” between each evaluation step; this means that the evaluators’ recommendations should be explicitly based on conclusions, which in turn should be justified by the findings enshrined in the answers to the Evaluation Questions. Furthermore, identification of the sources of information and tools used, as well as the cross-references between findings, should be clearly explained in the report.

Finally, the conformity assessment for **Group 3** examines the extent to which conclusions and recommendations provide messages targeted on the identified groups of users of the evaluation results. This assessment is part of the analysis of the usefulness of the evaluations.

To ensure that the team members apply the same rules to conduct the conformity assessment, the conformity criteria referred to in the JEU’s Quality Judgment Grid are divided into sub-criteria (judgement criteria) and indicators. For each judgement criterion, the evaluator gave a score:

- 0 meaning that the sub-criterion was not validated;
- 1 meaning that the sub-criterion was only partially validated;
- 2 meaning that the sub-criterion was validated.

In some cases the criterion could only be assessed as “yes” or “no” (e.g. documentary references are provided in the report). In that case, the evaluation scores 0 (the indicator is not validated) or 2 (the indicator is validated).

The aggregation of scores against the nine criteria gives each report a **global score in percentage terms** (attributed score / maximum possible score). This allows for two types of analysis:

- horizontal analysis of each “conformity criterion”, which allows assessment of the rate of adoption of the criterion by the various reports;
- vertical analysis of each report, which facilitates assessment of the global conformity of each report against a maximum potential score (i.e. 100%). This exercise further makes possible exclusion from further analysis of reports with too low a conformity rate.

To validate the assessment conducted by the team, each report was scanned by two readers. Where the readers agreed, the judgement was supported by two independent opinions. Where the individual assessments differed, a discussion with the team leader was held to find a consensus. Where a consensus was reached the judgement was supported by three independent opinions; where no consensus was reached (less than 5% of the cases), the team leader effectively had the casting vote and the judgement was supported by two opinions.

The whole section should be read as a summary of the table presented in annex 6.

## 4.3 Observations

### 4.3.1 Group 1: adequacy in respect of conformity with the ToR

#### ***Criterion 1.1: Meeting needs***

*Sub-criterion 1.1.1: The report shows a clear understanding of the ToR by the team*

This judgment criterion (JC) is rated 93%. Evaluators correctly grasp the goal, purpose and scope of the evaluation. In six reports<sup>21</sup>, however, a superficial interpretation of the ToR was observed<sup>22</sup>.

*Sub-criterion 1.1.2: The focus of the ToR is reflected in the report*

The JC is rated 94%. Only the PNG 2006 EQs fail to reflect the focus of the ToR. As said previously, the analysis was made only on the basis of the ToR and the reports consulted. Therefore, if the ToR were modified by the RG, the team was not in a position to introduce this factor into the analysis. This sub-criterion is only assessed on the basis of the *original* ToR. However, it is important to highlight that only a small number of cross-cutting issues are addressed in the reports: gender and environment mainly. Democracy, human rights, the rights of indigenous people, HIV/AIDS and good governance are not addressed as such.

☞ ***This quality criterion is fulfilled at a rate of 93%. Two reports are considered inadequate - Madagascar 2006<sup>23</sup> and Mali 2006 - owing to the limited interpretation of the ToR by the consultants.***

### **Criterion 1.2: Relevant scope**

*Sub-criterion 1.2.1: When EQ are not provided by the ToR, the report includes EQ covering the main evaluation criteria:*

This JC is given a 97% rating. Only the TACIS report does not fully satisfy this criterion, impact assessment being limited. However, the definition of the 3Cs is not always well applied in the reports. The question of coordination is not always well defined and its analysis is weak. The definition of coherence varies from report to report.

*Sub-criterion 1.2.2: The period of time given by the ToR is covered, with a focus on the most recent interventions:*

This criterion is rated 74%. Five reports<sup>24</sup>, 4 of them being managed by the DG DEV, do not address the criteria (owing to unavailability of information). If one considers the lack of information on the date of the interventions analysed as a shortcoming, these reports were scored 0.

☞ ***This quality criterion is rated 85%, the main weakness being the lack of information on the sample of analysed interventions.***

As regards **conformity with the ToR**, the evaluations score 90% overall. One report can be considered as not conforming - Madagascar (50%) - and three only partially conform -TACIS, South Africa and Sierra Leone (64%). Of these four reports, three were managed by the DG DEV. Six other reports conformed partially.

General findings:

- Strengths: clear understanding of the ToR, mainly thanks to systematic presentation of the goals, purpose and scope of the evaluation.

<sup>21</sup> Benin 2005, Caribbean 2005, Armenia 2006, TACIS 2006, Madagascar 2006, South Africa 2006

<sup>22</sup> The evaluators only copied the ToR

<sup>23</sup> This evaluation was conducted by DG DEV

<sup>24</sup> Ghana 2005, PNG 2006, Madagascar 2006, Sierra Leone 2006, South Africa 2006

- Weaknesses: little information given by the evaluators on the sample of analysed interventions

### 4.3.2 Group 2: credibility of the reports

#### ***Criterion 2.1: Defensible design***

*Sub-criterion 2.1.1: The intervention logic is clearly presented through an impact or objectives diagram*

The JC is rated 68%. The intervention logic was not represented by an impact or objectives diagram in two reports (Latin America 2005 and South Africa 2006):

- Weaknesses: when the report includes a diagram, constraints and risks are generally not identified, either in the diagram or in the text. Only three reports present them, and then only in the text (Latin America, Mali and Madagascar). Moreover, external effects, hypotheses and uncertainties about the strategy are clearly stated in only half of the reports<sup>25</sup>.
- Strength: the diagrams appear coherent<sup>26</sup> and the sources for their construction are provided in the reports.

*Sub-criterion 2.1.2: Some EQ question the links presented in the impact or objective diagram*

The JC is rated 91%. Two reports do not conform to this criterion - Latin America 2005 (the diagram not being an impact or objective diagram) and South Africa 2006 (the report does not provide any diagram).

*Sub-criterion 2.1.3: The choice of facts, findings and analytical tools is explicit and justified:*

The JC is rated 71%. In two reports (Benin 2005 and Sierra Leone 2006), the choice of methodological tools is not explicit. In six reports, this choice is explicit but not justified. Nine reports fully conform to this criterion. In the case of the PNG report, the main justification for such choice is a time constraint which prevented the consultants from using different tools.

*Sub-criterion 2.1.4: Indicators inform JC which are used to answer EQ which themselves form the basis for Conclusions and Recommendations (C&R):*

This JC is rated 76%. The linkage JC-EQ-C&R is considered insufficient in seven reports<sup>27</sup>. The main weakness is the nature of the indicators. The quality of the indicators was assessed negatively in five of the seven inadequate reports:

- Benin 2005: value judgements are rather subjective; they are too broad in scope and not specific enough
- Armenia 2006: indicators are provided neither in the report nor in the annexes
- Central Africa 2006: indicators are insufficiently linked to the JC
- South Africa 2006: indicators are too descriptive and subject to personal interpretation; moreover there is no link between the indicators and JC

<sup>25</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/tools/too\\_obj\\_qua\\_en.htm#01](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/tools/too_obj_qua_en.htm#01) – Objectives and effects diagram - checklist for manager

<sup>26</sup> Links between output, outcome and impact or between results, specific objectives and general objective are coherent.

<sup>27</sup> Benin 2005, Armenia 2006, Central Africa 2006, PNG 2006, Madagascar 2006, South Africa 2006, China 2007

- China 2007: some indicators do not allow attribution of the findings to the Commission's interventions<sup>28</sup>.

For the two other reports the weakness remains in the link between the JC and the EQ.

*Sub-criterion 2.1.5: Sampling procedures are explicit and aim at reflecting the main dimensions of the country programmes:*

This JC is rated only 44%. Only seven reports out of 17 present the sampling methods, of which one does not justify this approach (PNG 2006).

- ↳ ***The level of conformity to criterion 2.1 is therefore 69%, the main weakness being the absence of justification of sampling methods (44%); the main strength is the use of the intervention logic to define EQs.***

***Seven reports are considered inadequate: Benin 2005, Ghana 2005, Armenia 2006, Madagascar 2006, Sierra Leone 2006, South Africa 2006 and China 2006. Three of these seven reports were managed by DG DEV.***

### **Criterion 2.2: Reliable data**

*Sub-criterion 2.2.1: Primary and secondary data are reliable*

The JC is rated 72%. Evaluations provide their sources in 15 reports out of 17 (two exceptions: Central Africa and Madagascar). The limits of their reliability are commented on in half of the reports.

*Sub-criterion 2.2.2: Tool selection is justified and used according to professional standards*

This JC could not be assessed because of the lack of information on tool selection. If the lack of information is considered as a shortcoming, the JC would be rated 24%: only the Tanzania and Central Africa 2006 reports fully conform to this JC. In 11 reports the consultants do not provide information on the tools used and do not justify them.

*Sub-criterion 2.2.3: Information has been cross-checked, especially for data collected from interviews, focus group, expert panel and surveys<sup>29</sup>:*

This JC is rated 79%. Cross-checks are explicit in 12 reports out of 17. In three cases (Mali, Sierra Leone and China 2006), cross-checks were rated as average (grade 1). Indeed, in these three reports few references to cross-checks were made (maybe 2-3 over the whole report).

*Sub-criterion 2.2.4: The overall limits of the information are described*

This JC is rated 65%. In three reports (Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles 2006) the limits are not presented under a specific heading but partly identified as deemed necessary. Therefore the reports did not identify the general limits of the studies. In the Benin 2005 report, the limits are very briefly described. In the PNG 2006 report the main limit identified is the lack of time to prepare the missions, conduct them and perform the analysis, owing to a tight deadline.

- ↳ ***Quality criterion 2.2 is rated at 62%. Eight reports are considered inadequate (Benin 2005, Caribbean 2005, Latin America 2006, Armenia 2006, Mali 2006, Madagascar 2006, Sierra Leone 2006 and South Africa 2006). Of those reports, three were drafted in 2005 and three were managed by DG DEV. Their main weakness is a poor justification of the tools selected.***

<sup>28</sup> For example indicators for EQ1 – JC1

<sup>29</sup> This sub-criterion is validated when the cross-check is explicit. It is rated “average” when the cross-checks are not explicit.

### **Criterion 2.3 Sound analysis**

*Sub-criterion 2.3.1: Quantitative and qualitative analysis are based on recognised tools:*

This JC could not be assessed because of the lack of information on analytical tools. If the lack of information is considered a shortcoming, the JC would be rated 24%, only the Tanzania and Central Africa 2006 reports conforming fully to this JC.

*Sub-criterion 2.3.2: Cross-checks have been made:* see **sub-criterion 2.2.3**

*Sub-criterion 2.3.3: Limits and assumptions underlying of the analysis are explicit*

This JC is rated 65%. Five reports do not define the limits and assumptions<sup>30</sup> of the analysis (Armenia, Mali, Comoros, Seychelles and Mauritius 2006) and two reports provide limits but no assumptions (TACIS 2006 and South Africa 2006).

☞ ***Because of a lack of information on analytical tools, conformity with this quality criterion is rated only 57%. This score cannot be directly imputed to poor analysis by the consultants but only to the lack of information they provide in the final reports on their methodology.***

### **Criterion 2.4: Credible findings**

*Sub-criterion 2.4.1: The linkage between data, analysis and findings is visible*

The JC is rated 68%. In three reports (Madagascar 2006, Sierra Leone 2006, South Africa 2006) the linkage is not visible: when the matrix of information is annexed, the framework is not followed in the report. In five reports the linkage is considered as insufficient: in three - Benin 2005, Caribbean 2006 and Armenia 2006 - this qualification is due to poor linkage with the data and indicators; in two - Latin America 2006 and Papua New Guinea 2006 - the weakness resides in the linkage with the judgement criteria.

*Sub-criterion 2.4.2: Exogenous influences are identified*

The JC is rated 71%. Exogenous influences are identified in all reports except two - Madagascar 2006 and South Africa 2006 - and are presented briefly in six reports.

*Sub-criterion 2.4.3: Causal links are demonstrated when possible*

The JC is rated 88%. Madagascar 2006 does not present causal links. Benin 2005 and PNG 2006 do not present the links clearly.

*Sub-criterion 2.4.4: Evaluators assumptions and limits are presented:* see **sub-criterion 2.3.3**

☞ ***The quality criterion is rated 73%. Three reports are considered inadequate (Armenia 2006, Madagascar 2006 and South Africa 2006). The main weakness regarding the credibility of the findings is the linkage between data, analysis and findings.***

### **Criterion 2.5: Validity of Conclusions and Recommendations**

*Sub-criterion 2.5.1: Conclusions are based on credible findings:* see **sub-criterion 2.4.1.**

*Sub-criterion 2.5.2: Conclusions address questions expressed in the ToR*

This JC is rated 97%, although only the TACIS 2006 report addresses all the issues (except one, impact).

<sup>30</sup> Constraints and hypotheses made by the evaluators that could affect the quality of the analysis.

*Sub-criterion 2.5.3: Recommendations are related to conclusions*

This JC is rated 76%. In three of the four DG DEV reports, recommendations are not related to conclusions (PNG 2006, Sierra Leone 2006 and South Africa 2006). In two reports, this relation is judged to be weak. In the Mauritius 2006 report, only the general recommendations are explicitly related to conclusions, not the specific recommendations. In the Seychelles 2006 report, recommendations are cross-referenced to conclusions but in some cases the numbering and references are incorrect.

*Sub-criterion 2.5.4: Conclusions and recommendations are organised*

This JC is rated 88%. In five reports out of 17 conclusions and recommendations are organised but are not focused on the most important, even if so required by the ToR.

*Sub-criterion 2.5.5: Conclusions and recommendations are related to the context*

This JC is rated 100%.

*Sub-criterion 2.5.6: Underlying assumptions and limitations are explicit*

This JC is rated only 9%. Only the Tanzania 2006 report provides information on the limitations and assumptions underlying the conclusions and recommendations. The Armenia 2006 report provides information only on the limitations.

↳ ***The quality criterion is met by 73% of reports. Five reports are insufficient – TACIS 2006 (67%), PNG (50%), Madagascar 2006 (67%) Sierra Leone and South Africa (42%), four of them managed by DG DEV. The main weakness is the lack of explicit assumptions and limitations - according to the evolution of the context - underlying the conclusions and recommendations. The main strength is that conclusions and recommendations are always related to the present context and address issues raised in the ToR.***

The credibility of the reports is validated with a score of 52%. Six reports are considered inadequate (three were managed by DG DEV and one was drafted in 2005) and one report is outstanding – Tanzania 2006 (77%).

- Strength: the credibility of the findings and the validity of conclusions and recommendations.
- Weaknesses: the quality of the analysis is difficult to assess, because of a lack of information. The main weakness is therefore a shortcoming in clarity of presentation of the methodology used to carry out the evaluations.

### 4.3.3 Group 3: quality of communication

For this group, each criterion has been divided into target groups – Programme Managers, Commissioners and Members of European Parliament, Stakeholders – with specific sub-criteria for each group.

***Criterion 3.1: Clarity of the report***

***For the programme manager only: reports are readable***

This JC is validated with an average score of 82%. Four reports were deemed only average – Benin 2005 (57%), Sierra Leone (64%), Madagascar and South Africa (both 71%).

- Weaknesses: reports are too long<sup>31</sup> (indicator shows that only 12% conformed) and the illustration of the report findings through graphs, diagrams and other non-verbal tools is limited, the main “illustration tool” being tables.
- Strength: the framework of the reports is always organised around the EQs. Elements of background, findings, analysis and so forth are clearly distinguished, as well as the presentation of technical information in annexes (covered in 81%). The vocabulary is understandable.

***For Programme Managers / Commissioners, members of EP: information is synthesised***

This JC is rated with an average score of only 46%. Two reports cover the JC at a rate of only 20% (Benin 2005, Ghana 2005) and five at a rate of 30%.

- Weaknesses: too many conclusions and recommendations are presented. A typical report has an average of 23 conclusions and 19 recommendations (not always organised).
- Strength: a short executive summary is always available.

***For Programme Managers / Commissioners, members of EP / stakeholders: information is organised***

This JC is validated with an average score of 63%.

- Weaknesses: only two reports identify lessons learned (Tanzania 2006 and Sierra Leone 2006). Moreover, in the Sierra Leone report, even if a paragraph is titled “lessons learned”, the content cannot properly be defined as such<sup>32</sup>.
- Strength: recommendations are prioritised and organised<sup>33</sup> along a visible hierarchy (88%) whereas conclusions are only organised.

☞ ***In conclusion the quality criterion relating to clarity of the report is rated at 66%, mainly owing to reports being easily readable. The result would have been better but for poor organisation and synthesis of the information provided.***

**Criterion 3.2: Usefulness of the report**

***For the Programme Manager:***

***Sub-criterion 3.2.1: Improved understanding of the programme***

This JC is rated 95%. Only one report was inadequate in this regard: South Africa 2006.

- Weaknesses: absence of a list of projects in annexes with a short description. This information is missing or insufficient in four reports (Benin 2005, Madagascar 2006, South Africa 2006 and China 2006).

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<sup>31</sup> The core of the report is less than 50 pages long

<sup>32</sup> A lesson is a conclusion that can be applied to subsequent cycles of the same intervention or to other interventions.

<sup>33</sup> Organised means that conclusions / recommendations are organised under various topics (sectors for example) whereas prioritized means that some conclusions / recommendations were presented as more important than others.

- Strength: the existence of a detailed background analysis in 15 reports out of 17.

*Sub-criterion 3.2.2: Improve the design of further Commission interventions*

This JC is rated 85%. Two reports do not propose practical recommendations focused on improvement of the programme – Benin 2005 (focus on the strategy not on the programmes) and South Africa 2006, and one only partially meets that criterion – Mali 2006. The case of Mali is rather specific as the conclusions and recommendations address coordination between France and the European Union.

*Sub-criterion 3.2.3: Support ongoing programme management*

This JC is rated 94%. One report is considered inadequate (South Africa 2006) and one average (Mali 2006). However it is important to remember that the Mali report is a special case as it is an EC-France joint evaluation. Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations were focused on coordination between the actors and not on the activities realised.

*Sub-criterion 3.2.4: Support the programme manager when submitting new projects to decision-makers*

This JC is rated 76%.

- Weaknesses: sound analysis is rated 56% only, six reports do not conform and three only partially.
- Strength: all the reports contain conclusions and recommendations relating to improving the strategy.

In conclusion, as far as Programme Managers are concerned, the quality criterion related to the usefulness of the report is validated with a score of 85%. Only one report is inadequate – South Africa 2006 (39% conformity). The main weak issues are the quality of the analysis (56% conformity) and the offering of practical recommendations focused on programme improvements.

***For the Commissioners and members of the EP:***

*Sub-criterion 3.2.5: Support visioning and strategic decision making<sup>34</sup>*

This JC is rated 95%. Only three reports are considered average. The TACIS and PNG conclusions and recommendations only partially address impact and utility and the Comoros recommendations present very few alternatives as regards strategy.

*Sub-criterion 3.2.6: Support identification of coherence-related issues between Commission interventions and other European policies*

This JC is rated only 38%. Only seven reports identify these issues, and in one of these cases identification was superficial (Central Africa).

*Sub-criterion 3.2.7: Improve resources alignment*

This JC is rated 76%. The main weakness is the capacity to provide recommendations on efficiency.

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<sup>34</sup> Indicators : Conclusions or recommendations deal with impact and utility; Some recommendations present alternatives regarding strategy

In conclusion, as regards the usefulness of the reports to the Commissioners and members of the EP, only two reports were considered as insufficient and a further five as of a low standard.

### ***For the stakeholders:***

#### *Sub-criterion 3.2.8: Increase awareness<sup>35</sup>*

This JC is rated 96%. The only weakness concerns assessment of effectiveness and impact, which are only superficially addressed in three reports (TACIS 2006, Central Africa 2006 and South Africa 2006).

#### *Sub-criterion 3.2.9: Address areas of concern and provide feedback on stakeholder needs<sup>36</sup>*

This JC is validated in all but three reports (Armenia 2006, Mauritius 2006 and Sierra Leone 2006). These reports do not provide evidence of exchange with stakeholders.

Reports are considered useful for stakeholders in 95% of cases. Weaknesses remain mainly in the area of quick assessment of effectiveness and impact in some cases and in lack of exchange with stakeholders in others.

☞ ***In conclusion the quality criterion of usefulness of reports is rated at 84%. The main strengths are the capacity to support ongoing management, support envisioning and strategic decision-making and potentially increasing the awareness of stakeholders. Six reports do not conform (two managed by DG DEV).***

The quality of communication is rated 71% for Programme Managers, 62% for the Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament and 79% for Stakeholders.

- Weaknesses: the main weakness remains synthesis of information: over-long reports and too many conclusions and recommendations. Moreover, the consultants do not identify lessons learned.
- Strength: on the other hand they have good potential for increasing awareness, thanks to information on programme design and effectiveness.

### **4.3.4 Conclusion**

Reports are strong in respect of Group 1 – **conformity with the ToR**: this criterion is rated 90%. The evaluators showed good capacity to present a clear understanding of the objectives of the evaluation. However, the result would have been better had more consultants provided information on the sample they analysed (five reports did not provide this information).

As regards Group 2 – **credibility of the reports** – weaknesses are evident and the rating is 52%. The main reason is a **lack of information** on the methodology used for each evaluation. When the reports and annexes refer to the methodology, the presentation is too general to allow an assessment. Moreover, when the tools are identified, evaluators do not describe the way they used them.

<sup>35</sup> Indicators: information on programme design is given; conclusions or recommendations assess effectiveness and impact


<sup>36</sup> The text provides evidence that the main conclusions based on exchanges with stakeholders are presented.

- ↳ Restricted information on the methodology and on the limits of the evaluations could indicate a lack of distance of the evaluators on the reports they produced.
- ↳ In general it must be noted that recent evaluation reports have better ratings. This may be explained in part by the fact that some of these evaluations (Tanzania and China) may have been addressed as tests of the methodological guidelines and therefore a particular attention was put on the methodological consistency of the criteria elaborated.

Finally, for Group 3 – **quality of communication** – an average result was achieved, with a rating of 75%, mainly because of a low score on communication to Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament. The **clarity of the reports** is affected by **insufficiently synthesised information** (limited use of diagrams, schemes, tables and so on). Adequacy of report format (clarity, synthesis and organisation) varies depending on the targets. The main weakness is an inadequate format for Commissioners and EP Members (the relevant sub-criteria, namely *information is synthesised* and *information is organised*, are respectively rated 46% and 63%). The same remark can be made on the usefulness of reports: usefulness for Commissioners and EP Members is awarded a score 20 points lower than usefulness for programme managers and stakeholders. However reports have good potential for increasing awareness thanks to information on programme design and effectiveness.

The following scheme gives an overall picture of the conformity rating against the nine conformity criteria. The blue area represents the score for the whole sample analysed. It is complemented by a score comparison between the evaluation reports managed by the JEU and those managed by DG DEV.

### Scheme 1: Conformity assessment – Global and JEU/DG DEV specific scoring



A clear distinction can be made between JEU-managed and DG-DEV-managed evaluations. The first generally outscore the DG DEV-managed evaluations on every criterion. The largest gap is observed for Group 2 (credibility of reports). All reports are weak at providing sound analyses and ensuring the reliability of the data used. Further, the DG-DEV-managed evaluations are particularly weak in design and scope. The sample of DG-DEV-managed evaluation was however very small and these findings deserve to be cross-checked on the basis of a broader sample.


The aggregation of scores against each conformity criterion gives each report a **global score in %** (attributed score / maximum possible score). This makes possible a clustering of the evaluation reports as follows<sup>37</sup>:

- **Conforming reports:** those reports scoring from 100% to 80%.  
Four in all, including:  
 ⇒ 4 evaluations managed by the JEU;  
 ⇒ 2 country reports and 2 regional reports.
- **Partially conforming reports:** those reports scoring between 80% and 68 %.  
Ten in all, including:  
 ⇒ 9 evaluations managed by the JEU and 1 by DG DEV;  
 ⇒ 8 country reports and 2 regional reports.
- **Non-conforming reports:** those reports scoring less than 68 %.  
Three in all:  
 ⇒ all managed by DG DEV (country reports).

<sup>37</sup> See the name of the reports next page

This clustering is illustrated below. It is confirmed that the evaluations managed by the JEU generally conform more closely to the JEU's methodology, while the reports managed by DG DEV generally rate low in that regard.

**Graph 3: Conformity assessment – Clustering of the evaluation reports against a global score**



Name of the reports:

25 – Benin

26 – Ghana

27 – Caribbean

28 – Latin America

29 – Armenia

30 – Tanzania

31 – Mali

32 – Comoros

33 – Mauritius

34 – Seychelles

35 – Rwanda

36 – TACIS

37 – Central Africa

38 – Pacific

39 – PNG

40 – Madagascar

41 – Sierra Leone

42 – South Africa

43 – India

44 – China

## 5 SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATIONS' MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Objectives and method

This phase differs from those preceding it, in that it does not focus on the evaluation reports' methodology, but rather **on what evaluation reports say about the design and implementation of Commission-financed interventions. Thus the content of this chapter derives directly from the C&R sections of the evaluation reports and does not include any judgement by the team in charge of the present synthesis.**

Only the conclusions and recommendations (C&R) of the “conforming” and “partially conforming” evaluation reports are taken into account. Their degree of conformity indicates that minimum quality standards are respected. It obviously does not provide a sufficient basis for judging the quality of each of the C&R.

The review of lessons learned or generalised messages has been conducted in three phases:

#### 1- Compilation of C&R

Identification of key lessons learned makes use of the C&R from the evaluations that are both:

- **recent**, that is to say their ToR were produced after the Benin evaluation's ToR of April 2004 (see section 4.2); **and**
- **“conforming or partially conforming”** with the JEU methodology.

Based on the conformity assessment, the recent final evaluation reports were ranked from “conforming” with JEU guidelines (80 to 100% of conformity: four reports), to “partially conforming” (68 to 79%: ten reports), and “non-conforming” (less than 60%: three reports). That means that the assessment of C&R is based on 14 reports<sup>38</sup> which together present 221 conclusions and 169 recommendations.

#### 2- Clustering

Each C&R from the “recent and conforming” reports has been identified and given a code, as follows:

- a number per report (chronological and alphabetical order, cf list in annex 2);
- three letters for the country or region;
- a date for the year in which the evaluation was finalised;
- a number for the conclusion (C1, C2, etc.) and for the recommendation (R1, R2, etc.);

Next, C&R have been classified by cluster. Clusters were not pre-defined but identified during a team workshop, based on the content of the C&R analysed<sup>39</sup>. The resulting **classification** of lessons learned is the following<sup>40</sup>:

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<sup>38</sup> Bénin, Ghana, Caribbean, Latin America, Armenia, Tanzania, Mali, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comores, TACIS, Central Africa, China, Papua New Guinea

<sup>39</sup> Each conclusion and recommendation has been summarised. These summaries were discussed on and clustered by the team and the expert panel.

<sup>40</sup> The following titles provide an overview of the content of the C&R chapters of the “conforming” final evaluation reports.

- i)*     **strategy** : relevance to country/regional needs, quality of the strategy, ability to adapt to changes over time;
- ii)*    **sectoral issues**: private sector and SMEs, public finance and macroeconomic framework, governance, rural development, transport, social sectors and regional integration;
- iii)*   **cross-cutting issues**: gender and environment;
- iv)*    **implementation**: aid delivery mechanisms, donor coordination and complementarity, monitoring and evaluation.

Tables summarising the C&R, in accordance with the clustering system just described, are presented in annex 7<sup>41</sup>.

### 3- Presenting the synthesis

Key messages from the evaluation teams were identified on the basis of these C&R. The methodological homogeneity of the assessed country evaluation has led to some convergence in conclusions and recommendations. Too country-specific C&R have been left aside<sup>42</sup>, so as to facilitate summing-up of those common to several evaluations<sup>43</sup> and which could therefore be considered as of general interest. Where relevant, differences between country and regional evaluations have been highlighted.

The above assessment of the reports' "quality" does not allow any judgement on whether the C&R cited below are of equal quality. The present study certainly does not allow any assessment of the reliability of each of the many C&R presented in the reports assessed. But any convergence of the views of several independent evaluation teams should be given due consideration.

## **5.2     Synthesis**

### **5.2.1     Strategy**

In terms of the Commission's strategy, the C&R of the analysed evaluation reports give the following message.

#### **CONCLUSIONS AT STRATEGIC LEVEL**

#### **Adequacy with country/regional needs and evolution over time**

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<sup>41</sup> The last column indicates the cluster the conclusion or recommendation belongs to. Codes from 10 to 13 are related to strategy issues (10: strategy in general; 11 to 13: sub-clusters), codes from 20 to 25 to coherence and coordination, codes from 30 to 38 to sectors, codes from 40 to 43 to cross-cutting issues, codes from 50 to 57 to implementation. Code 60 means that the C&R were too specific to provide guidance on lessons learned and codes in the 70s mean that the team was not able to classify the information.

<sup>42</sup> The full lists of conclusions and recommendations of the selected reports are available in annex 7

<sup>43</sup> It is important to remember that only the most recent evaluations which conform to JEU's methods are referred to here.

The **relevance and adequacy** of the Commission's strategy to specific needs is assessed positively in seven cases<sup>44</sup>.

However, as regards **adaptation** to the changing context – which is tackled by a limited number of evaluations – the evaluations' assessment is more critical, especially at regional level<sup>45</sup>. Procedures exhibit limited flexibility at project and programme level. At country level, adaptation is addressed in the PNG evaluation<sup>46</sup>, as well as **continuity** of the strategy. The Armenian evaluation also addresses continuity, stating the the Commission targeted a large number of sectors with limited financial resources and lack of continuity, partly as a result of a demand-driven approach<sup>47</sup>.

### **Quality of the strategy**

Seven<sup>48</sup> of the 12 evaluation reports that assess the quality of the EC country or regional strategy highlight insufficient **in-depth analysis** of the country's or region's specific characteristics (in terms of socio-political and economic context, institutional environment, etc.). This leads in some cases related to insufficient justification for the selection of focal and priority sectors and to insufficiently-tailored country or region interventions<sup>49</sup>.

**Policy dialogue** appears weak at regional level<sup>50</sup>. For the Latin American region, the lack of a regional counterpart partly explains the unilateral role of the Commission in the definition of its own strategy. In other cases, like in Central Africa it seems that the dialogue on regional strategy is stronger with some partner countries compared to others, and this affects the programming process. In the case of TACIS CSPs are not really discussed in depth and negotiated with the partner countries, thus leading, according to the evaluation team, to a limited partnership.

At country level, when policy dialogue is assessed<sup>51</sup>, effects are both positive and negative. In the case of the Armenia and Mali evaluations, positive practices are mentioned even though, when policy dialogue is insufficiently strong at sectoral level, sustainability of cooperation activities is affected. Good practices in sector policy dialogue are highlighted in Tanzania (C8 and LL3). In the Comoros and Mauritius evaluations, policy dialogue was mainly formal which implies, or may imply, a limited partnership.

As far as the **intervention logic** is concerned, several evaluations highlight the inadequate assessment of the potential contribution of the specific projects and programmes to strategic goals, as well as the insufficient effort to maximise possible complementarities between

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<sup>44</sup> Tanzania (Conclusion 1), China (C1), Caribbean, although with some limits (C8), Ghana (C2 & C23), Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles (C1), TACIS, although with some limits (C8), Papua New Guinea (C1)

<sup>45</sup> TACIS (C8), Latin America (C2) and Caribbean (C8)

<sup>46</sup> C7 of Papua New Guinea report pinpoints limited adaptation of the EC cooperation strategy to Governmental strategy: "the Government is placing greater emphasis on practical outcomes of rural development efforts in terms of quick returns in economic growth, while the EC is reversing its emphasis from economic growth orientation in EDF 8 towards longer-term rural development in EDF 9".

<sup>47</sup> C1 and C2 respectively

<sup>48</sup> Latin America (C15 & C16), Caribbean (C3), Ghana (C1), Armenia (C1), Comoros (C3), Maurice (C3), and Seychelles (C3) evaluations

<sup>49</sup> Ghana (C1), Latin America (C16), Caribbean (C4).

<sup>50</sup> In three of the four regional evaluations analysed

<sup>51</sup> Only in five of 13 country evaluation reports

different intervention levels<sup>52</sup>. Optimisation of resource allocation does not seem to have been a concern during the design of interventions.

**Complementarity between national and regional strategies:** according to the selected reports, these strategies generally do not refer to each other. Complementarity is weak: regional and national strategies are not explicitly linked, or are only so in very general terms (e.g. Latin America (C19), Ghana (C36), and Seychelles (C27)). Regional evaluations stress the insufficient attention given to disparities between countries within the regions<sup>53</sup>.

**Incoherence between country/ regional strategies and EU policies,** such as agriculture, is criticized in some regional<sup>55</sup> and country evaluations. At country level, three evaluations provide conclusions on this sphere: Ghana (C35), Mauritius (C37) and Seychelles (C29). The Ghana evaluation mentions a lack of coherence. Mauritius and Seychelles evaluations address this issue in terms of convergence and complementarity, not in terms of coherence.

**Limited resources for strategic analysis<sup>58</sup> and programming<sup>59</sup>,** mainly at financial but also at human level, affect in some cases the quality of EC cooperation. Some evaluations highlight the consequences of poor or good strategic analyses and programming. For instance, although in some cases the Commission cooperation was, among other things, clearly oriented to poverty reduction in terms of principles, its strategy was insufficiently focused<sup>62</sup>; in other cases, poverty reduction strategy was well designed and is starting to yield positive impacts<sup>63</sup>.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS AT STRATEGIC LEVEL**

The evaluations' main strategic recommendation is to **increase dialogue<sup>64</sup> with the partners**, taking into account their reform and development agenda, so as to increase ownership and leadership by the partner governments.

**Stronger policy dialogue between donors** is recommended in three evaluations<sup>65</sup>, with a view to improving coordination and synergy with the governments' and other donors' interventions. A sound consultation process would also help identify stronger comparative advantages for the Commission, as stated in the Caribbean evaluation.

**Coherence between EU policies<sup>66</sup> and the Commission's development strategies<sup>67</sup>** should be addressed more carefully. In particular, EU trade policies should be better

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<sup>52</sup> Latin America (C2), Caribbean (C5 & C9), Ghana (C25); Maurice (C26)

<sup>53</sup> TACIS (C3) and Latin America (C4 & C8) evaluations

<sup>55</sup> Caribbean (C25) and Latin America (C20) evaluations

<sup>58</sup> Comoros (C3), Mauritius (C3), Seychelles (C3)

<sup>59</sup> Armenia (C10), Latin America (C4 & C17)

<sup>62</sup> Tanzania (C2), Mali (C1), Latin America (C2 & C15), Caribbean (C21)

<sup>63</sup> China (C8, in the field of environment and governance), Tanzania (LL3 & C7) in the road investment sector, Ghana (C3) Armenia (C13), PNG (C25)

<sup>64</sup> Seven out of 14 evaluations

<sup>65</sup> Armenia (R14), Papua New Guinea (R7) Central Africa (R3),

<sup>66</sup> Comoros (R34)

<sup>67</sup> Central Africa (R11), Ghana (R17), Comoros (R36),

harmonised with national PSD policies (Ghana, R17). Response strategies for foreseeable trends relating to regional integration and trade policy should be adopted<sup>68</sup>.

**Coherence between the Commission's instruments** should be improved internally (intra-region and intra-country) and externally (region and country). Information and synergies among different instruments should be better developed<sup>71</sup>. The linkage between national and regional strategy papers should be made more explicit<sup>72</sup>. Information flows and operational coordination should also be enhanced, including human resources development in the Delegations (mobilise expertise to create quality databases, increase staff in key sectors)<sup>73</sup>.

Socio-economic **disparities between the member countries** of a regional organisation should be clearly stated in strategic documents<sup>74</sup>. This would favour synergy between the regional and national development approaches. It would also make possible more reliable monitoring baselines.

The visibility of the **Commission's development cooperation principles** should be enhanced, not only during the elaboration of strategies<sup>75</sup> but also at the implementation stage.

## 5.2.2 Thematic coverage

### Private sector and SMEs<sup>76</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

Where support to both the legal and institutional framework was provided, results were positive, whilst this was not the case where the focus was limited to direct support to the operators (see Armenia C4 and TACIS C14)<sup>77</sup>. Furthermore, interventions are more effective when direct support to SMEs is included in wider support for trade negotiations<sup>78</sup>.

In two countries<sup>79</sup>, lack of project results is linked to management difficulties/irregularities.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The institutional and legal framework should receive further support and should come before direct support to local operators<sup>80</sup>. Within that framework, public-private partnerships could

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<sup>68</sup> Caribbean (R13) and to a certain extent TACIS (R12)

<sup>71</sup> Mauritius (R27, R28), Seychelles (R21, R22), Armenia (R3)

<sup>72</sup> Latin America (R1 & R11), TACIS (R8), Ghana (R25)

<sup>73</sup> Comoros (R1), Mauritius (R1), Seychelles (R1), Latin America (R12 & R13), Central Africa (R4 & R19)

<sup>74</sup> Caribbean (R7), Latin America (R2 & R5)

<sup>75</sup> Latin America (R3), Comoros (R8), Seychelles (R8), Mauritius (R7), TACIS (R24)

<sup>76</sup> Seven evaluations assess this sector. See under Annex 6 Conclusions codified with 31.

<sup>77</sup> The Ghana evaluation concludes that the main constraint of private sector is the institutional framework, which was not tackled by EC interventions, focusing on private operators.

<sup>78</sup> Armenia (C17)

<sup>79</sup> Comoros (C27) and Seychelles (C12 & C13)

<sup>80</sup> Comoros (R21)

be strengthened<sup>81</sup>, as also could capacity-building<sup>82</sup>. The importance of improving consultation and association with the private sector is stressed as well (Caribbean R4).

### **Public Finances and Macroeconomic framework**<sup>83</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Macroeconomic support and public finance management interventions are relevant. They are also generally effective<sup>84</sup>, despite sometimes being adversely affected by weak programme design (mainly related to implementation modalities)<sup>85</sup>.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

No specific recommendations on public finance are made in the reports<sup>86</sup>. On macroeconomic support, both the Ghana and Mali evaluations propose maintaining support in the form of general budget support.

### **Governance**<sup>87</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

The reports highlight some weaknesses in the prioritisation of the governance related issues. In Armenia and Central Africa, for instance, despite being a key concern, governance was not covered by the Commission programmes. In Mauritius and the Seychelles, where governance-related issues are not of major consequence, they are part of the Commission's priority themes. In the Comoros, governance is not covered in the Commission country strategy, despite the issue is being addressed at implementation level (C5). According to the Tanzania and China reports, governance is not adequately mainstreamed in the programming process.

Considering the actual results, EC contribution is judged particularly significant in Ghana (C30), and important, though the mentioned strategic weaknesses, at Comoros.

Civil Society is also an element of the Commission cooperation approach, but external factors influence support: the type of intervention affects global impact in the case of Armenia (C8: interventions dispersed and mostly micro-level based). The political framework in which CSOs operate remains volatile (TACIS C6).

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The main recommendation on governance in both country and regional evaluations regards strengthening and mainstreaming Commission support to governance<sup>88</sup>, starting from the

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<sup>81</sup> Seychelles (R7), TACIS (R18)

<sup>82</sup> Comoros (R25)

<sup>83</sup> Only Ghana and Armenia evaluations cover this sector

<sup>84</sup> Ghana (C5 & C16), Armenia (C14)

<sup>85</sup> Ghana (C17)

<sup>86</sup> However, the recommended use of budget support, directly linked to public finance management, is explicitly mentioned in seven evaluations (Tanzania, Ghana, Armenia, Mali, Maurice, Seychelles and TACIS)

<sup>87</sup> Seven country evaluations (Tanzania, China, Armenia, Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles, Papua New Guinea) and two regional evaluations (Central Africa, TACIS) address governance.

<sup>88</sup> Five out of the eight evaluations that address governance-related issues recommend it: Tanzania (R4 & R5), Central Africa (R3), China (R5), Armenia (R2), Comoros (R31).

planning stages, through support to decentralisation, electoral organisation, Civil Society, human rights, legal and administrative reform and the rule of law.

The need to strengthen the specific capacities in the EC Delegations and the monitoring and evaluation in the area of governance is stressed in the Central Africa evaluation (R21)

### **Rural development**<sup>89</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Rural poverty alleviation efforts have been recognised in some countries but the linkage with support to fostering economic growth is less explicit<sup>90</sup>. This linkage is made in two cases<sup>91</sup>, but in one of these cases effectiveness proved limited<sup>92</sup>. Rural development interventions contribute to the well-being of rural communities; but sustainability of the effects is at risk<sup>93</sup> and the necessity for continuous support is often indicated.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Recommendations are general. They advocate increasing policy dialogue at government level<sup>94</sup>. The involvement of non-state actors is also recommended<sup>95</sup>, as well as a more results-based approach including use of impact and outcome indicators<sup>96</sup>.

### **Transport**<sup>97</sup>

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Transport interventions have contributed to economic growth and social development (facilitation of rural access to markets and basic services)<sup>98</sup> and regional integration<sup>99</sup>. However, sustainability is at risk because of limited ownership and low country or regional capacities to ensure effective maintenance<sup>100</sup>. The actual use of the potential created depends on future investments (Central Africa C13).

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The establishment of specific conditionalities for the release of funds is strongly recommended, mainly in the Ghana and Central Africa evaluations. It should be linked to timely delivery of government commitments as well as continuous institutional support<sup>101</sup>. The ongoing decentralisation process in the Comoros should also be integrated in both programming and implementation of Commission transport interventions.

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<sup>89</sup> Covered in five country evaluations: Ghana, Armenia, Comoros, Mauritius and Papua New Guinea.

<sup>90</sup> Ghana (C3), Mauritius (C19), Papua New Guinea to some extent (C14)

<sup>91</sup> Ghana (C8), Armenia (C6)

<sup>92</sup> In Ghana (C8)

<sup>93</sup> Especially in the case of the Papua New Guinea interventions

<sup>94</sup> Armenia (R7)

<sup>95</sup> Comoros (R18) and Papua New Guinea (R1)

<sup>96</sup> Ghana (R5)

<sup>97</sup> Five evaluations address transport: four country (Tanzania, Ghana, Armenia, Comoros) and one regional (Central Africa)

<sup>98</sup> Tanzania (C7), Central Africa (C14), Ghana, with the exception of the most deprived areas (C4 & C13)

<sup>99</sup> Central Africa (C12)

<sup>100</sup> Ghana (C4, C12 & C14), Comoros (C20)

<sup>101</sup> Ghana (R10 & R11), Central Africa (R14)

The strengthening of the regional dimension of the infrastructure network should also be considered<sup>102</sup>, as a way of reducing countries' isolation and promoting regional integration. At country level the same is said for the Comoros (R14) in the context of connections between islands.

### **Social sectors**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

This relates mainly to the education and health sectors. No common lessons can be extracted and generalised. Nevertheless two common concerns are presented in some of the reports: limited sustainability of the interventions due to institutional instability, lack of ownership, limited resources and lack of continuity<sup>103</sup>.

In the Tanzania evaluation, the introduction of poverty reduction as a new overarching goal in 2001 has not been clarified enough and therefore low priority has been given to "improving basic services" and "reducing vulnerability". Furthermore, equity in access to basic services has not been mainstreamed systematically, for instance in the areas of basic education and water supply (C2). Nevertheless, in the same country, general budget support and a mix of sector policy dialogue and substantial financial support have led to significant progress in areas like enrolment in education, health and access to water (C 5)

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Some recommendations are recurrent in other sectors or levels and are therefore also underlined here: policy dialogue and capacity-building so as to strengthen the role of government are two examples<sup>104</sup>.

In the case of Tanzania, further support to basic education, where comparative advantage exists, is recommended (R1). The evaluation also recommends defining priority outcomes in equitable access to basic services (R2).

### **Regional integration**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The Commission's support to regional integration was relevant and has produced positive results, mainly in terms of technical capacities<sup>105</sup>. However, some specific limits of the regional integration support programmes are identified: unclear analysis of the composition of regions<sup>106</sup>, and more effective use of the programmes by the most advanced member countries than in the region as a whole. Furthermore, in a context of insufficient available financial resources, competition between participants leads to a concentration of programmes in the most advanced member countries<sup>107</sup>. This can increase regional disparities.

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<sup>102</sup> Central Africa (R7, R8 & R9)

<sup>103</sup> Armenia (C10 & C11) and Papua New Guinea (C11). In PNG lack of sustainability is linked to lack of cash income being generated.

<sup>104</sup> In the case of the Comoro islands policy dialogue would facilitate introducing a sectoral approach in the education field (R28), Armenia (R8), Papua New Guinea (R2 & R4)

<sup>105</sup> Caribbean (C1, C10 & C13), Latin America (C11, mainly at sub-regional level)

<sup>106</sup> In the case of Latin America, the approach adopted does not correspond in practice to the region's own approach (the latter having a sub-regional approach). And in the case of Central Africa, the fact that a single country belongs to several regional institutions affects the regional strategic framework.

<sup>107</sup> Latin America (C4 & C8).

The weakness of the policy dialogue and of an adequate framework for it makes difficult the identification of a strong rationale behind the regional strategy adopted<sup>108</sup>. These observations partly explain the evaluators' doubts on sustainability<sup>109</sup>.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The regions evaluated have their own specific characteristics; generalisation is not always relevant. However, two evaluations<sup>110</sup> highlight the necessity for supporting social cohesion measures so as to reduce disparities between countries. Another recommendation<sup>111</sup> stresses the need to define selection criteria for participation in horizontal programmes, with a view to increasing participation by poor countries.

Finally, the Central African regional evaluation makes reference to the necessity of preparing the region and its newly incorporated countries for the EPA process, as well as the need to increase dialogue with other regional organisations on the African continent<sup>112</sup>.

### **5.2.3 Cross-cutting issues**

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Cross-cutting issues are generally not well addressed in the Commission's cooperation strategies<sup>113</sup>. Only the Tanzanian case seems to demonstrate significant success: efforts to mainstream cross-cutting issues have been made at the right level (C4).

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Ghana (R24), Mauritius (R29) and the Caribbean (R12) evaluations propose establishing mechanisms for mainstreaming cross-cutting issues and monitoring trends.

TACIS evaluation (R16) proposes addressing of cross-cutting issues through global and sectoral support to governmental poverty reduction strategies.

#### **Gender**

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Only one conclusion addresses gender at country level: gender and equality aspects are insufficiently addressed in country cooperation strategies<sup>114</sup> (exception: Comoros Islands for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF in which, however, indicators are still not well developed - C48).

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Despite its lack of coverage in country strategies and programmes, only the Comoros evaluation recommends that gender becomes a key programming instrument (R10 & R41).

#### **Environment**

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<sup>108</sup> Latin America (C3, C6 & C12)

<sup>109</sup> Latin America (C13 & C18), Central Africa (C1)

<sup>110</sup> Latin America (R1, R2 & R5) and Central Africa (R1)

<sup>111</sup> Latin America (R7)

<sup>112</sup> Central Africa (R2)

<sup>113</sup> Ghana C33, TAC C7, Comoros C13 & C48, Caribbean C21.

<sup>114</sup> Ghana (C31), Comoros (C13)

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Government and regional institutions do not show interest and do not have sound strategies in this area. Therefore their financial contribution remains weak<sup>115</sup>. Commission's environmental support is mainstreamed but with limited results<sup>116</sup>.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

According to some evaluations, the inclusion and mainstreaming of environment in Commission cooperation should be strengthened<sup>117</sup>.

### **5.2.4 Implementation**

Implementation is a concern of all the evaluations.

**Generic conclusions** are presented here.

Delays in project implementation are recurrent. This is due to the elapse of time between design and implementation and to heavy administrative procedures<sup>118</sup>. Delays between agreement and effective start-up reduce the time available for implementation. Impact and effectiveness are adversely affected by those implementation delays.

At regional level efficiency is affected by the heavy organisational framework – both in the Commission and at regional level<sup>119</sup> – and by devolved responsibilities for managing regional programmes. The latter is also affected by scarce human resources.

Furthermore, several specific aspects can be highlighted:

## **SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS**

### ***Aid delivery mechanisms***

Budgetary support and sector policy dialogue<sup>120</sup> have positively contributed to governmental ownership and accountability<sup>121</sup>.

In contrast, stand-alone projects are often insufficiently linked to strategic priorities and to policy dialogue; they do not allow for ownership, flexibility or capacity-building in the recipient institutions. The monitoring of stand-alone projects is also focused on outputs rather than outcomes. As they are limited in time, stand-alone projects do not allow for medium-to-long-term approaches.<sup>122</sup> Sustainability is therefore jeopardised.

### ***Donor coordination and complementarity***

Despite weak coordination between donors, complementarity exists, mainly at sectoral level. At country level the active role of the Commission Delegations in sectoral policy dialogue has

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<sup>115</sup> Central Africa (C15 & C16), TACIS (C16), Mauritius (C40)

<sup>116</sup> Comoros (C47), Mauritius (C15), Seychelles (C32)

<sup>117</sup> Central Africa (R15), Mauritius (R30)

<sup>118</sup> Central Africa (C21)

<sup>119</sup> Caribbean (C7 & C18), Central Africa (C3 & C19), Comoros (C10), Mauritius (C10)

<sup>120</sup> Tanzania (LL3)

<sup>121</sup> Tanzania (C6 & C12)

<sup>122</sup> Tanzania (C13), TACIS (C10 & C12), Central Africa (C18), Caribbean (C19 and to some extent C9)

contributed to improved coordination. Maximisation of complementarity is not sufficiently achieved because of low partner country or regional leadership<sup>123</sup>. In the case of Ghana, Mauritius, Seychelles and Mali, coordination has provided positive results in areas where a policy framework and a political dialogue exist.

At regional level the size of the region, its disparities and the different cooperation approaches increase the difficulty of coordination<sup>124</sup>. In some cases, the interventions of each donor were very specific, and complementarity was reached *de facto* without coordination<sup>125</sup>. In the case of the Caribbean, the existence of a policy dialogue between donors was a success factor (C24).

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

Almost all the evaluation reports address the lack of a proper performance-based M&E system<sup>126</sup>. The lack of a results-based approach in Commission interventions and the lack of results indicators affect the analysis of impact<sup>127</sup>. This is worsened by poor institutional memory due to a high staff turnover, lack of a clear paper trail and weak dissemination of lessons learned<sup>128</sup>.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Implementation delays** should at least be better anticipated and communicated, and wherever possible reduced<sup>129</sup>. Human resources development is stressed, mainly at Delegation level<sup>130</sup>. The effects of an increase of resources would be:

- deeper analysis, elaborated on past experience and expertise, with better complementarity between PIR and PIN;
- improved project design;
- the possibility of implementing audit on time and of ensuring reliable cash flows as necessary.

**Sustainability** should be increasingly taken into consideration in design and implementation. The outcome of changes in EU policies should be anticipated. Where relevant, steps to ensure sustainability should be defined before projects are terminated<sup>131</sup>. It should be supported by continuity in strategic planning.

It is recommended to consider the use of complementary aid delivery instruments<sup>132</sup>. Indeed it is a source of flexibility<sup>133</sup>. Their selection should be based on a deep analysis and on their combined contributions to the objectives. The increased use of **budget support** is recommended whenever possible; indeed it would help increase predictability and

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<sup>123</sup> Armenia (C22)

<sup>124</sup> Latin America and Caribbean (C24)

<sup>125</sup> This is specially the case for Latin America, where other donors do not have the continental approach adopted by the EC. Also Mali to some extent (C4)

<sup>126</sup> China (C7), Comoros (C9), Mauritius (C9)

<sup>127</sup> Tanzania (C15 & C16), Mali (C2), Comoros (C4), Mauritius (C4), Seychelles (C4)

<sup>128</sup> This is specially the case for Latin America horizontal programmes and for TACIS-related projects (C18, C19 & C20).

<sup>129</sup> Comoros (R4), Mauritius (R4), Seychelles (R3)

<sup>130</sup> Central Africa (R21), Ghana (R22), Comoros (R1 & R7), Mauritius (R1), Seychelles (R1 & R6), Armenia (R13), Papua New Guinea at NAO level (R11 & R16)

<sup>131</sup> Caribbean evaluation

<sup>132</sup> Caribbean (C23) and Armenia (C21)

<sup>133</sup> Caribbean (C23)

ownership<sup>134</sup>. According to the Ghana and Armenia evaluations, it should be complemented by SWAPs. Macro-economic and sectoral programmes have to be complementary<sup>135</sup>. Therefore there is a need to improve sectoral dialogue and to support institutional reforms. Nonetheless SWAPs should be set up only if programmes are in line with the Paris Declaration<sup>136</sup>, that is to say if they:

- are partnership based
- are linked to the partner strategy
- encompass institutional objectives
- involve adequate donor coordination
- aim at achievement of results assessed through performance indicators
- are based on an *ex ante* assessment of adaptation to evolution of context

Stand-alone projects in specific cases (opening pathways into new areas of cooperation, strengthening capacity of government, strengthening the capacity of non-state actors, paving the way towards sectoral budget support) should complement budget support<sup>137</sup>, especially in sectors focused on the poor. Such projects would secure a minimum level of support to the poorest and provide direct information on the target. If conditions for budget support (general or sectoral) are not met, a programme approach should be adopted.

**Donor coordination.** It is recommended that governments be encouraged and supported in taking the lead in donor coordination. Local administrative capacities should be strengthened so that they can formalise coordination, define a regulatory framework and integrate it into government planning<sup>138</sup>.

**Monitoring and evaluation** capacities should be strengthened. Performance-based M&E systems should be set up<sup>139</sup> or enhanced so as to develop a sound basis for performance and results assessment<sup>140</sup>. Internal coordination, covering *inter alia* knowledge management aspects and information dissemination, need to be developed<sup>141</sup>. This includes concentration of information gathered via systematic *ex post* evaluations, identification and application of good practices, and exchanges between experts. Information flow to and from other development partners should be developed and systematised. An institutional learning process needs to be developed<sup>142</sup>.

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<sup>134</sup> Tanzania (R8), Mali (R5), Armenia (R12), Ghana (R14), Mauritius (R3), Seychelles (R2), Caribbean (R2)

<sup>135</sup> Mali (R5)

<sup>136</sup> Armenia (R12)

<sup>137</sup> Tanzania (R11)

<sup>138</sup> Comoros (R35), Mauritius (R25), TACIS (R25), Papua New Guinea (R6)

<sup>139</sup> Comoros (R6), Mauritius (R6), Seychelles (R5), Papua New Guinea (R10)

<sup>140</sup> In this regard the Seychelles evaluation proposes giving more weight to national performance indicators in regional programmes. Also TACIS (R22)

<sup>141</sup> Central Africa (R19), Ghana (R8), Mauritius (R28), Seychelles (R19 & R22), TACIS (R23 & R24)

<sup>142</sup> Tanzania (R7), Latin America (R8 & R9), Caribbean (R8)

**ANNEXES**

**ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE**



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

**SYNTHESIS OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL EVALUATIONS  
MANAGED BY THE EVALUATION UNIT DURING THE  
PERIOD 1998-2006**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE**

*December 2006*

### **Context and objectives**

Since 1998, the Evaluation Unit common to the Directorates-General for Development (DG DEV), External Relations (DG Relex) and EuropeAid (Aidco) has managed (or is managing) 56 geographical evaluations (39 at country level and 17 at regional level). In addition to the evaluations managed internally, the Evaluation Unit has also provided a methodological support to 10 evaluations led by DG DEV in 2005-2006.

Between 1998 and 2006, the evaluation methodology has undergone many changes, one of the most important elements of improvement in the recent years being the production, since 2002, of methodological guidelines which are now available on the Evaluation Unit's website<sup>143</sup>. With the recent publication of its methodological guidelines, the Evaluation Unit would like to conduct a study consisting in a synthesis of its geographical evaluations carried out between 1998 and 2006.

The study is part of the 2006 evaluation programme as approved by External Relations and Development Commissioners. Its main objectives are:

- to analyse the evolution of the methodology used in evaluations since 1998 and propose paths for improvements;
- to identify key lessons learned from the various geographical evaluations carried out so far.

### **Scope**

As regards the Evaluation Unit's evaluations, the study will cover 32 evaluations at country level and 5 at a regional level (see list of countries and regions selected in annex). The consultant is also asked to analyse the final reports of the DG DEV evaluations available to date, although not more than four DG Dev evaluations (to be selected) should be analysed in detail.

For each evaluation, the consultant is asked to analyse both the final report and the terms of reference (ToR). As far as the Evaluation Unit is concerned, all final reports since 2000 are available on the Unit's website. Reports for the preceding period will be provided on demand.

Final reports of the DG Dev evaluations available to date will be provided on demand.

### **Key themes and issues**

#### ***Methodological and quality assessment***

*Comparative analysis of the methodology used for the geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit between 1998 and 2006*

Since the evaluation methodology has evolved a lot between 1998 and 2006, the consultant is asked to analyse the most significant changes occurred since 1998 both in the methodological guidance contained in the demands of the Evaluation Unit and in the implementation of the methodology by the evaluation teams.

For each evaluation, the consultant shall examine what the demands of the Evaluation Unit (as expressed in the ToR) were, in order to answer such questions as:

- have the scope and the objectives of geographical evaluations changed?
- is the actual focus on impact a recent trend?
- have methodological requirements from the Evaluation Unit evolved significantly?
- etc.

As regards the implementation of the evaluation methodology by evaluation teams, the consultant should make a comparative analysis of:

- the design (global methodological approach) proposed by the various evaluation teams, in order to point out the continuities and changes in the global evaluation approaches;
- the methods and mix of tools used by the evaluators;
- etc.

For the most recent evaluations, the consultant should use the methodological guidelines available on the website of the Unit as a benchmark when analysing the methodology used by the evaluators.

*Quality judgement on the final reports of the geographical evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit between 1998 and 2006*

The consultant is also asked to assess the quality of the final reports, mainly against the following criteria:

- **Reliable data:** To what extent are the primary and secondary data selected adequate? Are they sufficiently reliable for their intended use?
- **Sound analysis:** Is the quantitative and qualitative information appropriately and systematically analysed according to the state of the art so that evaluation questions are answered in a valid way?
- **Credible findings:** Do findings follow logically from, and are they justified by, the data analysis and interpretations based on carefully described assumptions and rationale?
- **Validity of the conclusions:** Does the report provide clear conclusions? Are conclusions based on credible findings?
- **Usefulness of the recommendations:** Are recommendations fair, unbiased by personal or stakeholders' views, and sufficiently detailed to be operationally applicable?

*Assessment of the quality of the final reports of the evaluations managed by DG Dev*

This assessment will be made for the four evaluations which will have been selected earlier (see 2. Scope), using the same criteria as for the evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit (see above).

*Paths for improvement*

On the basis of the preceding work, the consultant shall propose elements of improvement as regards the methodology for geographical evaluations. These proposals should be aimed at improving the usefulness of evaluations as well as improving their management, either by the Evaluation Unit or by other services of the Commission, in Brussels or in Delegations.

The consultant will also be asked to propose paths for improvement in the implementation of evaluations, mainly targeted to present or future evaluators.

### ***Lessons learned***

#### *Regarding the effects of the Commission's interventions*

The consultant is asked to draw lessons from the main effects of the Commission's interventions relating to the evaluations under review. The consultant will in particular consider:

- the cooperation strategies;
- the sectors of intervention (focal and non focal);
- the cross-cutting issues and transversal themes (gender, environment, good governance, etc.)
- etc.

The consultant will distinguish lessons which are country/region specific from lessons which are more global and/or transferable.

#### *Regarding the implementation*

The purpose of this part is to identify potential "good practices" regarding the implementation of the Commission's interventions. The conditions under which such "good practices" could be transferable should be clearly specified.

#### *From one programming cycle to another*

The consultant is asked to analyse the extent to which lessons learned from geographical evaluations have been taken into account in the last generation of programming documents (country strategy papers (CSPs) and regional strategy papers (RSPs)).

### **Management and supervision of the study**

The Evaluation Unit (AIDCO 03) is responsible for the management and monitoring of the study. No Reference group is foreseen for this study.

The study should be carried out by a team with advanced knowledge and experience in geographical evaluations as well as in evaluation methodology.

Several meetings (held in Brussels) are foreseeable between the Evaluation Unit and the Consultant.

The reports shall be written in English.

### **Timing And budget**

The work on the study shall start in January 2007 and should end up with the submission of the final report in December 2007. The overall cost of the study cannot, in principle, exceed € 120.000.

## ANNEX 1: list of countries and regions covered

### Evaluations managed by the Evaluation Unit

	<b>Countries</b>	<b>Regions</b>
1998	Ukraine	
	Georgia	
1999	South africa	
	Senegal	
2000	Russian federation	
	Azerbaijan	
	Moldova	
	Turkmenistan	
	Dominican republic	
	Papua new guinea	
	Mozambique	
2001	Burkina faso	
	Namibia	
	Uganda	
2002	South africa	
2003	Ukraine	
	Maroc	
	Bangladesh	
	Malawi	
2004	Egypt	Mercosur
	Honduras	
	Ethiopia	
	Lesotho	
2005	Benin	Caribbean
	Ghana	Latin america
2006	Armenia	Tacis
	Tanzania	Central africa
	mali	Pacific
	Mauritius, seychelles & comores	
	rwanda	
2007	India	
	China	

### Evaluations (at country level) managed by DG Dev

2006	Png
	Kenya
	Eritrea
	Madagascar
	Zambia
	South Africa
	Sierra Leone
	Mauritania
	Guinea Bissau
	Dr Of Congo
	Cameroon
	Jamaica

## **ANNEX 2 – BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### ***Evaluation reports:***

1. Ukraine, Evaluation of EC Country program, ADE, July 1998
2. Mid-Term evaluation of TACIS activities in Georgia, Evaluation report, DRN, January 1998
3. Evaluation of the EC country strategy : South Africa 1996-1999, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, August 1999
4. Evaluation de la stratégie de la CE : Sénégal 1996-1999, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, December 1999
5. An evaluation of the TACIS country programme in Russia, DRN, Linden Consulting, January 2000
6. Evaluation of the EC TACIS country strategy : Azerbadjan 1996-1999, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, March 2000
7. Evaluation of the EC TACIS country strategy in Moldova, Nomisma, Economisti associate, Agrex, December 2000
8. Evaluation of TACIS country strategy : Turkmenistan 1996-2000, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, December 2000
9. Evaluation of EC country strategy: the Dominican Republic 1996-2000, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, August 2000
10. Evaluation of EC country strategy: Papua New Guinea 1996-1999, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, June 2000
11. Evaluation of EC country strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, December 2000
12. Evaluation de la stratégie pays de la CE : Burkina Faso 1996-2000, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, April 2001
13. Evaluation of EC country strategy: Namibia 1996-2001, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, April 2001
14. Evaluation of EC country strategy: Uganda 1996-2001, Investment Development Consultancy and Development Strategies, February 2001
15. Evaluation of the EC country strategy for South Africa, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, December 2002
16. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Ukraine, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, June 2003
17. Evaluation de la stratégie pays de la Commission Européenne pour le Maroc, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, July 2003
18. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Bangladesh, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, November 2003
19. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Malawi, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, September 2003
20. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Egypt, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, February 2004
21. Evaluation de la strategy de cooperation de la Commission Européenne avec le Honduras, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, February 2004
22. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Ethiopia, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, May 2004
23. Evaluation of the European Commission's country strategy for Lesotho, MWH, ODI, ecdpm, August 2004
24. Evaluation of the EC support to the MERCOSUR, DRN, May 2004

25. Evaluation stratégie pays Bénin, Egeval, ADE, Eureval C3E, Particip, February 2005
26. Ghana : strategy country evaluation, Egeval, ADE, Eureval C3E, Particip, April 2005
27. Evaluation of the Commission's regional strategy for the Caribbean, DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, April 2005
28. Evaluation de la stratégie régionale de la CE en Amérique latine, DRN, ADE, ECO, NCG, April 2005
29. Armenia : Country strategy evaluation, ADE, January 2006
30. Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the United Republic of Tanzania, EGEval, EEIG, EDI, April 2006
31. Evaluation stratégie Mali, EGEval, Sofreco, September 2006
32. Union des Comores, Evaluation de niveau national, EGEval, November 2006
33. Maurice, Evaluation de niveau national, EGEval, November 2006
34. Seychelles, Evaluation de niveau national, EGEval, November 2006
35. Evaluation de la coopération de la Commission Européenne avec le Rwanda, évaluation de niveau pays, EGEval, Eureval, Prodev, November 2006
36. Evaluation of council regulation 99/2000 (TACIS) and its implementation, DRN, ADE, ECO, Ecorys, NCG, January 2006
37. Evaluation de la coopération régionale de la CE en Afrique Centrale, DRN, ADE, ECO, Ecorys, NCG, October 2006
39. Evaluation of the Commission's support to Papua New Guinea, Country level evaluation, Integration, Managed by DG Dev, February 2006
40. Evaluation stratégie pays Madagascar, Integration, Managed by DG Dev, Février 2006
41. Evaluation of the Commission's support to Sierra Leone, Country level evaluation, Integration, Managed by DG Dev, August 2006
42. Evaluation of the Commission's support to South Africa, Country level evaluation, Athos Origins, Calcopietro, Strategic Alternatives, Managed by DG Dev, September 2005
44. Evaluation of the European Commission's cooperation and partnership with the people's Republic of China, EGEval II, EEIG, April 2007

### **Terms of Reference**

Terms of reference of evaluations:

- 1 to 4
- 6
- 8 to 34
- 36, 37
- 39 to 42
- 44

ToR of evaluations 5, 7 and 35 were missing, and evaluations 38 (Pacific) and 43 (India) were missing at the moment of the study.

**Guidelines:**

- EuropeAid, evaluation website:  
[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm)
- A guide to the evaluation procedures and structure currently operational in the Commission external cooperation programmes, EuropeAid Cooperation office, March 2001
- Good practice guidelines for the management of the evaluation function, SEC(1999) 62, European Commission, February 1999 and update, January 2000
- Evaluation standards and good practice, communication for the Commission from the president and Mrs Schreyer, C(2002)5267, December.2002
- Evaluation of Socio-Economic Development - The GUIDE ; European Union – Regional Policy  
[http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/evalsed/index_en.htm)

**Usefulness of the report:**

- Discussion with QUINN PATTON Michael, l'évaluation axée sur l'application, IRDC website
- Evaluating drug control and system improvement projects, Guideline for projects supported by the BJA, National Institute of Justice
- The program manager's guide to evaluation, US Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for children and families, Office of planning, research and evaluation.
- Rétroaction et diffusion des résultats sur l'évaluation, Banque Africaine de Développement, juin 2006
- Case studies on the uses and drivers of effective evaluations in the government of Canada, Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor du Canada, August 2005
- CLARKE Allan, Evaluation Research, an introduction to principles, methods and practices, 1999
- MANCINI & Alii, Country-based program research: context, program readiness and evaluation usefulness, Journal of community practice, vol 12, 2004
- JONES & MITCHELL, Communicating evaluation findings: the use of a chart essay, Educational evaluation and policy analysis, vol. 12, n°4

## **ANNEX 3 – CHRONAGRAM OF TOR EVOLUTION**

*Caption:*

25	The ToR explicitly confirm that the new guidance (made partly by Egeval) is consolidated
35	Tor are not available
N*	link to csp
1	Specific reference to the audience
1	Explicit focus on relevance
1	Explicit focus on strategy
1	Explicit focus on effectiveness
1	Explicit focus on efficiency
1	Explicit focus on impact
1	Explicit focus on 3 Cs



## **ANNEX 4 – MAIN ISSUES TO EVALUATE AS QUOTED IN THE TOR**



## **ANNEX 5 – INVENTORY OF GEOGRAPHICAL EVALUATIONS**

### *Comments on the table:*

- A "1" in the box "Visible linkage - Yes" does not necessary mean that the linkage is sound. In some cases this means that the linkage is not really visible at first sight. However it has been considered preferable to carry out a detailed analysis and not to draw aside the report immediately.
- Tools of information and analysis are only those described in the reports (or annexes). Therefore, other tools may have been used but they were not quoted.

### *Caption:*

Tools of information and analysis:

- 1 - Document analysis
- 2 - Statistics analysis
- 3 - Interviews
- 4 - Survey
- 5 - Focus group
- 6 - Expert panel
- 7 - Case studies
- 8 - Complete database of interventions
- 9 - Cluster analysis
- 10 - Comparative tables
- 11 - Benchmarking
- 12 - SWOT

In order to increase the visibility of the chronological evolution, answers to some indicators were highlighted (one colour per indicator). Colours are only a tool to improve visualisation and do not have other purpose.







**ANNEX 6 – TABLE OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT** – for more information see the excel table in “soft” annexes

Conformity criterion		Judgement criteria - Indicators - Sources																							TOTAL %
		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44				
<b>Adequacy with the ToR</b>																									
Meeting needs	The report shows a clear understanding of the TOR by the consultant.	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		2	1	2	1		2	<b>82</b>			
	The evaluators properly reflect the goals, purpose and scope of the evaluation	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>97</b>			
	The design of the evaluation is consistent with the above interpretation.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>100</b>			
	The focus of the ToR is reflected in the report	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	1	2		2	<b>94</b>			
<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>80</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>80</b>		<b>80</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>		<b>80</b>	<b>93</b>			
Relevant scope	When EQs are not provided by the TOR, the report includes EQ covering the main evaluation criteria	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>97</b>			
	The period of time given by the ToR is covered, with a focus on the most recent interventions	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	0	0	0		2	<b>74</b>			
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>85</b>										
<b>GROUPE 1</b>		<b>79</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>		<b>71</b>	<b>86</b>		<b>79</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>64</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>90</b>			
<b>Assessment of the quality analysis</b>																									
Defensible design	The intervention logic is clearly presented through impact or objective diagram.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	<b>94</b>			
	documentary references and quotations are provided in the report	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	<b>94</b>			
	the list of the documents consulted to establish the diagram is presented	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	<b>94</b>			
	the diagram of impact / objectives appears coherent	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	<b>88</b>			
	the relations between objectives and effects are explicit in the diagram or the text	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		0	2	1	0		1	<b>76</b>			

		hypotheses and uncertainties about the objectives' links are clearly stated in the diagram or the text	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	2		1	2		1	0	1	0		0	38
		the external effects have been identified in the diagram or the text	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	1		1	0		0	0	1	0		1	32
		the constraints and the risks are exposed in the diagram or the text	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0		0	0		1	0	0	0		0	12
		Global quotation	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		1	1	1			1	68
	The choice of fact findings and analytical tools is explicit and justified	Report	0	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	1	0	1		1	71
	Some EQ question the links presented in the impacts or objectives diagrams	Text of the EQ	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	91
	Indicators inform judgement criteria which are used in answers to evaluation questions, which themselves form the basis for conclusion	Design of the EQ	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	1		1	1	2	0		1	76
	Sampling procedure are explicit and aim at reflecting the main dimensions of the country programmes	Evidence of explicit sampling methods and of a justification of the sampling approach	0	0	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	0		2	2		1	0	0	0		0	44
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		<b>40</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>80</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>10</b>		<b>50</b>	<b>69</b>
	Primary and secondary data are reliable	Evaluators provide their sources	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	1		2	1	2	2		2	94
		The limits of their reliability is commented	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	2		2	1		2	0	0	0		2	50
	Tool selection is justified and used according to professional standards.	Justification and use correspond to professional guides (The Guide - DG regio / Evaluation methods for european external Aid - EuropAid)	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0		1	2		0	0	1	1		0	24
<b>Reliable data</b>	A cross-check of information has been made especially for data coming from interviews, focus group, expert panel an surveys	Explicit cross checks in the report	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	0	0	1		1	79
	Overall limits of the information base of the evaluation are presented	Report and annexes	1	2	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	1		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	65
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		<b>40</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>		<b>90</b>	<b>80</b>		<b>80</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>Sound analysis</b>	Quantitative and qualitative analysis are based on recognised tools	The quality of the tools is assessed according to professional guides (The Guide, Evaluation methods for European External Aid)	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0		1	2		0	0	1	1		0	24
	Cross checks have been made		2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	1	0	1		1	82
	Limits and assumptions underlying of the analysis are explicit.	Report and methodological annex.	2	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0		2	2		2	2	2	1		1	65

Credible findings	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		67	67	67	67	33	100	33	33	33	33		83	100		67	50	50	50	0	33	57
	The linkage between data, analysis and findings is visible	Check based on a sample of C&R	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	0	0	0		2	68
	Exogenous influences are identified	Sources : report	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		1	0	2	0		1	71
	Causal links are demonstrated when possible.	Sources : report	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	0	2	2		2	88
	Evaluators' assumptions and limits are presented.	Sources : report	2	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0		2	2		2	2	2	1		1	65
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		63	100	75	88	50	100	63	75	75	75		100	100		63	25	75	38	0	75	73
Validity of conclusions and recommendations	Conclusions are based on credible findings	Link explicitly made with findings assessed as credible according to the above criteria	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	0	0	0		2	68
	Conclusions address questions expressed in the ToR	Cross check with the TOR	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		2	2	2	2		2	97
	Recommendations are related to conclusions	Sources : report	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1		2	2		0	2	0	0		2	76
	Conclusions and recommendations are organised	Structure of the chapter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		1	2	1	1		2	88
	Conclusions and recommendations are related to the context	Explicit reference to the present context in the C&R drafting	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	100
	Underlying assumptions and limitations are explicit	Validity of the conclusion if assumptions made about the evolution of the context are not confirmed	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0		0	0		0	0	0	0		0	9
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>		75	83	75	75	83	100	83	83	75	75		67	83		50	67	42	42	0	83	73
<b>GROUPE 2</b>			43	60	52	58	42	77	47	58	57	53		67	68		50	35	40	27		50	52

Conformity criterion	Target Groups	Judgement criterion	Indicators	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	%	
Usefulness of the report	ProgrammeManager	Improve understanding of the program	Existence of a list of the different projects with description	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	1	2	0		1	79	
			The intervention logic is presented	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	91
			Existence of a detailed background analysis	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	1	2	2		2	94
		Improve the design of further EC intervention	Practical recommendations focus on the improvement of the programme	0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	85	
		Support on going programmemanagement	In the findings, presentation of what works and what doesn't	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	1		2	97
			Suggestions for management improvement are formulated	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	0		2	91
		Support the PM when submitting new projects to decision-makers	Evidence of a sound analysis (see 4.2.2)	2	2	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		2	2		2	1	1	1		0	56
			Evaluation is clearly reported (see 4.2.3 - table "clarity of the report")	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	2		1	2		1	1	1	1		2	71
			Recommendations provide guidance for improving geographical strategy	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	100
	<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>				<b>78</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>89</b>		<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>89</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>39</b>		<b>83</b>	<b>85</b>
	Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament	Support visioning and strategic decision making	Conclusions and/or recommendations deal with impact and utility	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		1	2	2	2		2	94
			Some recommendations present alternatives regarding strategy	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	97
		Support identifying coherence related issues between EC intervention and other european policies	Coherence related issues are clearly identified	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		2	1		0	0	0	0		2	38
		Improve resources alignment	Some conclusions deal with information and judgement on resources allocation	2	2	1	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1		1	1		2	2	2	2		2	74
			Recommendations propose alternatives regarding efficiency	2	0	2	2	1	2	0	1	1	2	2		2	2		1	1	1	1		2	68
Conclusions and/or recommendations sustainability assess			2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		2	2	2	1		2	88	

<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>			<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>75</b>		<b>75</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>67</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>67</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>Stakeholders</b>	Increase awareness	Information on programmedesign is given	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>100</b>
		Conclusions and/or recommendations effectiveness and impact	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	1		2	2	2	1		2	<b>91</b>
	Address areas of concern and provide feed-back on stakeholders needs	The text provides evidences that main conclusions stemming from exchange with stakeholders are presented	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1		2	2		2	2	1	2		2	<b>91</b>
<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>			<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>83</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>94</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>89</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>83</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>92</b>		<b>83</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>56</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>84</b>

<b>Clarity of the report</b>	<b>ProgrammeManager</b>	The report is easily readable	The core of the report is less than 50 pages long	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1		0	1		1	0	0	2		1	<b>35</b>	
			The frame of the report is visible	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>100</b>
			The report is organised along evaluation questions	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>100</b>
			There is a physical distinction between element of background, findings, analysis, methodology for the analysis, and conclusions	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	0	2		2	<b>91</b>
			Vocabulary used is understandable by a non specialist reader	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	2	2	2		2	<b>100</b>
			Some information is illustrated through graphs, tables or other visual tools	0	1	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1		2	2		1	1	1	0		2	<b>59</b>
			Technical information is presented in annexes	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		2	1	2	0		2	<b>88</b>
			<b>SUB-TOTAL %</b>			<b>57</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>86</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>93</b>		<b>86</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>71</b>		<b>93</b>
<b>ProgrammeManager /Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament</b>	Information synthesised	is	Existence of an executive summary providing an introduction to the subject (element of background), to the methodology and its limits, the main conclusions and recommendations	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1		1	2	1	1		1	<b>56</b>	
			The executive summary is made by less than 5 pages	0	0	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	2		0	2		1	0	2	2		2	<b>65</b>	
			Less than 10 Conclusions	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		0	0		0	0	0	2		2	<b>15</b>	
			Less than 10 Recommendations	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0		0	0		0	0	1	2		2	<b>35</b>	
			Existence of graphs or other visual tools to synthesise the information	0	1	2	2	0	2	1	1	1	1	1		2	2		1	1	1	0		2	<b>59</b>

SUB-TOTAL %			20	20	60	60	40	60	70	30	30	40		30	50		30	30	50	70		90	46
Commissioners/ Members of the EP/ Stakeholders	Information is organised	Conclusions are organised along logical structure	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2		2	2		1	2	1	2		2	88
		Lessons learned are identified	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0		0	0		1	0	0	0		2	15
		Recommendations are prioritised and organised along criteria such as general, implementation ...	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		1	2		1	2	1	0		2	85
SUB-TOTAL %			50	67	67	50	67	100	67	67	67	67		50	67		50	67	33	33		100	63
TOTAL			43	57	80	73	63	83	77	60	60	67		60	73		60	57	53	63		93	66
GROUPE 3			68%	74%	89	86	71%	86	73%	70%	71%	76%		74%	83		73%	70%	70%	59%		92	

## **ANNEX 7 - TABLE OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Each conclusion and recommendation of the “recent and conform” reports have been summarised and given a code as follow:

- First column: number of the report as defined during the inventory
- 2<sup>nd</sup> column: three letter for the country or region
- 3<sup>rd</sup> column: date for the year the evaluation was finalised
- 5<sup>th</sup> column: number for the conclusion (C1, C2 etc.) and for the recommendation (R1 ...)
- 6<sup>th</sup> column: number of the cluster (see codification below)

### *Codification for clusters*

1. Strategy
  - 1.1. relevance / adequacy to the needs
  - 1.2. continuity of the strategy and consequences
  - 1.3. quality of the strategy
2. Coherence / coordination
  - 2.1. Dialogue with beneficiaries
  - 2.2. Coordination / complementarity with donors
  - 2.3. Coordination within the EU
  - 2.4. Coherence with European policies
  - 2.5. Complementarity at the regional and national level
3. Sectors
  - 3.1. Private sector
  - 3.2. Macro economy / Public finances
  - 3.3. Governance / decentralisation
  - 3.4. Rural development rural
  - 3.5. Transport
  - 3.6. Water and sanitation
  - 3.7. Social sectors
  - 3.8. Regional integration
4. Cross-cutting issues
  - 4.1. gender
  - 4.2. environment
  - 4.3. general
5. Implementation
  - 5.1. Aid modalities
  - 5.2. Complementarity of tools
  - 5.3. Monitoring and evaluation
  - 5.4. Focus and impact
  - 5.5. Delays
  - 5.6. Other
  - 5.7. Measures taken to improve implementation
6. Specific
7. Not classified

## EVALUATIONS WHICH CONFORM: CONCLUSIONS

Nb of the report	Name of the report	Year of publication	Summary of the conclusion	Nb of the conclusion	Code
30	TNZ	06	The stated EC <b>strategy was aligned</b> by design on the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy, both in terms of objectives and priority sectors/areas	C1	11
44	CHI	07	EC cooperation approach to China is <b>relevant</b> to the Chinese policy context and needs and is <b>consistent</b> with long-run EU policy goals	C1	11
28	AL	05	Manque de <b>précision</b> et d' <b>adaptation</b> au contexte <b>du nouvel objectif</b> de cohésion social.	C16	12
28	AL	05	Champ d'action et éléments de la <b>stratégie insuffisant</b> pour <b>véhiculer les principes</b> politiques, économiques et sociaux de la CE <b>dans la région</b>	C2	13
28	AL	05	Impact : <b>augmentation lien commercial et politique</b> important mais perçu que la CE n'a <b>pas de stratégie intégrationniste</b> claire	C12	13
28	AL	05	<b>Impacts</b> des actions pour diminuer la pauvreté en AL sont <b>incertains</b> , surtout au niveau régional-continental. Stratégie de la CE <b>manque d'une vision globale de la pauvreté</b> au niveau régional.	C15	13
30	TNZ	06	The <b>new overall objective</b> of poverty reduction <b>has not been clarified enough</b> and remained implicit.	C2	13
44	CHI	07	<b>Poverty and the theme of "winners and losers"</b> had been well integrated into environment and governance projects, but not into projects relating to economic and social reform or trade	C8	13
28	AL	05	<b>Manque de structures institutionnelles</b> au niveau régional en AL implique que l'on ne peut établir de consensus entre AL et CE, et que la CE assume <b>seule la responsabilité de programmation</b>	C3	21
28	AL	05	Amélioration du <b>dialogue insuffisante</b> pour un haut degré d'association CE/AL. Ex : pas de positions communes sur les grandes questions internationales	C14	21
44	CHI	07	<b>Impact</b> of dialogue on the cooperation programme but much weaker in the other direction	C6	21
44	CHI	07	No <b>joint formal thinking</b> about how, in concrete terms, to accelerate the new relationship with China	C9	21
28	AL	05	<b>Faible coordination</b> avec les autres bailleurs mais peu de duplications (peu d'acteurs complémentaires)	C22	22
30	TNZ	06	The Tanzanian innovative approach to <b>harmonised policy dialogue</b> is unquestionably <b>effective</b> , but it is still too early to qualify it as a success story	C8	22
44	CHI	07	<b>Coordination</b> strong in form but weak in substance (competition to win commercial advantages)	C5	22
28	AL	05	Politiques de dimension internationale de la CE considérés comme <b>incohérentes avec les objectifs régionaux</b> cf politique agricole	C20	24
28	AL	05	Le degré de <b>coordination</b> de l'activité <b>régionale</b> avec les programmes bilatéraux et <b>sous-régionaux</b> a augmenté, mais demeure <b>insuffisant</b> : organisation parcellaire, gestion indépendante des programmes,	C19	25
37	AfC	06	<b>Gouvernance</b> : pas de mise en œuvre alors que dans l'analyse vu comme primordiale, faible complémentarité entre les différents projets, faible appropriation	C8	33

44	CHI	07	Successes at the level of <b>policy processes and</b> regimes (legislation, standards, and regulations), concrete results limited by problems at the level of policy administration, implementation and enforcement	C2	33
30	TNZ	06	The Commission's approach to <b>strategy-making</b> has been <b>disappointing</b> : no expected benefits in terms of concentration, coherence and predictability	C3	13 & 21
30	TNZ	06	<b>Large impacts of road investments</b> in terms of poverty reduction, especially through "equitable access to basic services". Individual road projects did not reach such impact.	C7	35
37	AfC	06	Décision appui <b>transport</b> correct même si bénéfiques par encore répartis sur toute la population	C11	35
37	AfC	06	A contrario, la <b>construction/réhabilitation des routes et des ponts</b> dans la région constitue une <b>contribution majeure au développement économique et social des pays pour l'intégration régionale</b>	C12	35
37	AfC	06	<b>Désenclavement des pays</b> sans littoral de la région et insertion de la région au marché mondial encore limité, potentiel dépend d'investissement futur.	C13	35
37	AfC	06	<b>Impact des routes sur accessibilité</b> services de base, création d'emplois et d'activités dans les zones des projets et en termes socio-économiques <b>est positif. Impact sur le trafic des poids lourds est faible.</b>	C14	35
28	AL	05	<b>Programmes horizontaux : insuffisance ressources</b> financières et humaines, bénéfiques limités aux pays et non à la région, <b>pays les mieux prédisposés sont favorisés</b>	C4	38
28	AL	05	Traitement isolé des programmes horizontaux	C6	38
28	AL	05	Actions <b>positives</b> des programmes au <b>niveau des pays, moins au niveau régional</b> : concentration excessive des activités dans les pays les plus développés + peu d'impact au sein des PMA	C8	38
28	AL	05	Contribution liens et rapprochement entre les 2 régions. <b>Impact positif</b> pour <b>échanges commerciaux, intégration intra-régional</b> mais <b>augmentation pauvreté, faiblesse institutions régionales</b> , faible participation <b>société civile, coopération bilatérale</b> parfois préférée	C11	38
28	AL	05	Degré de lien institutionnel → importantes avancées pour <b>intégration</b> , essentiellement <b>sous-régionales</b> mais <b>manque d'institutions régionales autonomes</b>	C13	38
28	AL	05	<b>Forte participation technique</b> des bénéficiaires des programmes horizontaux mais <b>faible auto-durabilité</b>	C18	38
37	AfC	06	Caractère flou de la <b>définition de la région</b> de l'Afrique Centrale constitue sans doute un obstacle à <b>l'institutionnalisation du cadre régional</b>	C1	38
37	AfC	06	Intention pour une <b>intégration régionale</b> sont clairement affichées mais trop tôt pour se positionner sur la durabilité de ces intentions.	C5	38
37	AfC	06	<b>Elargissement zone</b> à la RDC peut introduire une dynamique dans la dynamique d'intégration régionale par une augmentation de la <b>complémentarité entre pays</b>	C6	38
37	AfC	06	<b>Ecart</b> important entre <b>l'ordre juridique</b> existant et l'état de <b>l'application des décisions</b> communautaires par les Etats. Pas de véritable <b>complémentarité des outils et des moyens</b> de production.	C2	38
30	TNZ	06	Efforts to mainstream <b>cross-cutting issues</b> have taken place at the right level (environment and budget support, gender and education, gender and roads) and <b>significant successes</b> have been achieved. In other instances high priority has not been fully demonstrated.	C4	40
28	AL	05	Politique <b>environnementale cohérente et appréciée</b> mais actions et liens avec les politiques de développement <b>insuffisantes</b> .	C21	42

37	AfC	06	<b>Ressources naturelles</b> : secteur pertinent mais faible contribution pour insertion à l'ordre du jour des organisations régionales et des gouvernements nationaux	C15	42
37	AfC	06	<b>Ressources naturelles</b> : faible intérêt des institutions régionales et faible financement des gouvernements nationaux donc faible durabilité	C16	42
37	AfC	06	Les programmes de Commission se sont <b>concentrés sur l'environnement vert</b> au dépend de l'environnement bleu, gris, brun et noir	C17	42
30	TNZ	06	Contribution to progress thanks to <b>general budget support</b> and mix of <b>sector policy dialogue</b> and substantial financial support in sectors like education and transport	C6	51
30	TNZ	06	The movement towards sector <b>policy reforms</b> has generally been <b>slow</b> , which delayed the introduction of the sector budget support. Dialogue under-effective in areas like education and agriculture.	C9	51
30	TNZ	06	The more flexible approach of " <b>variable tranche</b> ", as applied to general budget support over the last two years, is likely to be an <b>effective</b> alternative.	C11	51
30	TNZ	06	<b>General budget</b> support has been the <b>best funding modality</b> particularly as regards improving predictability, Government ownership, and promoting democratic accountability. General budget support and the "variable tranche" mechanism offer a good compromise between the need to increase financial aid and the principle of progress-related support.	C12	51
30	TNZ	06	<b>Stand-alone projects</b> have major <b>limitations</b> : (1) they are disconnected the harmonised policy dialogue, (2) they may attract limited human resources away from strategic priorities, and (3) they depend on wider policy reforms and local integrated development in order to fully achieve their potential impacts	C13	51
30	TNZ	06	Choices are matter of setting up an adequate mix and/or sequence of funding modalities	C14	51
37	AfC	06	<b>L'approche projet toujours dominante est une contrainte pour la durabilité</b>	C18	51
30	TNZ	06	The best <b>contribution to poverty reduction</b> is achieved through a <b>mix of substantial financial support and policy reforms</b> initiated through sector policy dialogue	LL3	52
37	AfC	06	Avantage théorique de la <b>complémentarité des instruments</b> via la boîte à outil suffisamment large et pratique.	C9	52
37	AfC	06	Avantage théorique de la <b>complémentarité des instruments</b> de la Commission n'est pas été suffisamment traduit en réalité : faible lien objectifs PIN/PIR, faible coordination interne	C10	52
30	TNZ	06	The system does not deliver <b>impact information</b> with a satisfactory level of <b>punctuality, quality and relevance</b> . In particular, the poverty monitoring system is still unable to deliver adequate information	C15	54
30	TNZ	06	Comparatively, efforts towards <b>learning from available impact</b> information have not been sufficient.	C16	54
44	CHI	07	Post-implementation project <b>follow-up</b> is weak	C7	54
28	AL	05	<b>Intervention appropriée</b> et évaluée positivement mais peu pertinente car <b>fragmentée</b>	C1	55
37	AfC	06	Afrique Centrale éclatée entre plusieurs institutions communautaires : <b>dispersion des efforts</b> et l'émiettement des ressources	C3	55
30	TNZ	06	Slow progress in policy dialogue → part of the support <b>delayed</b> : financial support and policy reform often connected in an " <b>all-or-nothing</b> " way.	C10	56
30	TNZ	06	If EC country strategies are <b>implemented</b> in a loose and lengthy way, they are unlikely to deliver the benefits which would compensate for the <b>transaction costs</b> borne by the Government that has to deal with <b>multiple</b>	LL2	56

			<b>donors' strategy-making processes</b> at multiple points in time		
37	AfC	06	<b>Nombreux délais</b> : faible capacité formulation/mise en œuvre commission et organisme régionaux + lourdeur des procédures	C21	56
44	CHI	07	Impact and effectiveness have been adversely affected, albeit not fatally, by <b>delays in project implementation</b> : difficulty in meeting minds on objectives and means between China and EC	C3	56
28	AL	05	<b>Rigidité des normes</b> , procédures et règlements qui régissent les programmes horizontaux, empêche les projets régionaux d'acquiescer un plus haut degré d'adaptabilité. <b>Ressources humaines insuffisantes</b> par rapport au volume de travail et à la complexité de leurs actions.	C5	57
37	AfC	06	<b>Définition variable de la région</b> se reflète par le choix variable et inconstant des institutions régionales à mandater dans le cadre de la coopération	C19	57
28	AL	05	Niveau élevé d'utilisation des ressources, réseau = dispositif efficace et pertinent	C7	58
28	AL	05	<b>Prise en compte C8</b> dans certains programmes et mesures de correction	C9	58
28	AL	05	<b>Présence de changements en termes d'approches, de modèles, et de structures</b> , qui permettent de rendre l'utilisation et la gestion des ressources plus <b>performantes</b>	C10	58
37	AfC	06	<b>Stratégie régionale</b> est passée de sectorielle (8ème FED et avant) à intégrée, focus sur intégration économique dans l'économie mondiale. Eradication de la pauvreté indirecte et vient en second lieu.	C7	60
44	CHI	07	EC has done well in <b>moving away from traditional development assistance to an engagement</b> in which European depth of expertise can be matched to Chinese depth of financial resources available to implement projects	C4	60
30	TNZ	06	<b>Most expected progress has occurred</b> , with exceptions in two areas: quality of education, and corruption	C5	70
37	AfC	06	<b>Coordination interne</b> difficile : plusieurs ordonnateurs, ressources humaines limitées	C20	23 & 50
28	AL	05	Faible durabilité des bénéficiaires: <b>manque de ressources</b> et <b>faible volonté politique</b> des participants et des gouvernements	C17	53 & 21 & 13

## EVALUATIONS WHICH PARTIALLY CONFORM: CONCLUSIONS

Nb of the report	Name of the report	Year of publication	Summary of the conclusion	Nb of the conclusion	Code
26	GH	05	Some areas of the process through which budget support is channelled to beneficiaries so as to produce expected impacts (intermediate level) are less represented in the policy dialogue and monitoring than others (high level and end of process).	C18	10
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions have a <b>pro-poor orientation</b> which <b>varies</b> across sectors of interventions	C2	11
26	GH	05	<b>Contribution to pro-poor reorientation</b> of the GoG's social programmes	C23	11
26	GH	05	<b>Donor support</b> to Ghana (including EC support) responds well to <b>priority areas</b> identified by <b>GoG</b>	C37	11
32	COM	06	Interventions ont répondu <b>aux besoins</b> et en accord avec <b>priorité du gouvernement</b> sauf en période de troubles.	C1	11
33	MRC	06	Interventions <b>répondent aux besoins</b> de croissance et aux exigences de la lutte contre la pauvreté et sont convergentes avec les <b>priorités du gouvernement</b>	C1	11
34	SEY	06	Interventions <b>répondent aux besoins</b> de croissance et aux exigences de la lutte contre la pauvreté et sont convergentes avec les <b>priorités du gouvernement</b>	C1	11
36	TAC	06	<b>High relevance of TACIS</b> vis-à-vis the European strategic priorities in the region.	C1	11
36	TAC	06	TACIS has responded only partially to the <b>diversification</b> occurring in the region and to the different EU priorities vis-à-vis the partner countries. <b>Rigidity of the project approach</b> has increased the difficulties of such adaptation	C8	11
39	PNG	06	Opposed <b>directions of shifts of emphasis</b> won't be effective in the medium and long term as ownership of partners is likely to recede, and with this the sustainability of the measures.	C8	11
27	CRB	05	Overall there has been continuity <b>in the strategy</b> . In some respects the strategy has been capable to respond to evolving needs, but in other areas its adaptation was more limited.	C8	12
39	PNG	06	<b>Shifts from EDF 8 to EDF 9</b> increasingly direct the Commission's support towards contributing to the MDGs, and in particular the MDS indicators relative to education and gender equity	C1	12
39	PNG	06	Observed <b>changes of emphasis</b> are only partly in line with the directions of GoPNG strategies	C7	12
26	GH	05	<b>Strategy</b> is broadly <b>relevant</b> to the general objective (growth and poverty reduction) but the extent to which it is based on an <b>in-depth analysis</b> and prioritisation of objectives is <b>unclear</b> .	C1	13
26	GH	05	<b>Intra-sectoral allocations</b> and budget shares allocated to social sectors can sometimes <b>fail to connect</b> with the Commission <b>priorities</b> . Ex: relative allocation to tertiary and basic education.	C25	13
27	CRB	05	The Commission's programming documents do <b>not discuss</b> the extent to which the constitution of a <b>regional integrated space</b> is likely to <b>address</b> the main <b>developmental needs</b> of the Caribbean region	C3	13
27	CRB	05	There is a <b>lack of analytical foundation</b> for the rationale behind the identification of the <b>focal sectors</b> and areas of concentration in the indicative programmes	C4	13
27	CRB	05	Whilst each individual intervention was meant to <b>contribute to the strategic objectives</b> , there was <b>little analysis</b> of how it would do so and attempts to <b>maximise</b> the <b>combined contribution</b> of complementary	C5	13

			interventions were <b>lacking</b>		
27	CRB	05	The <b>design of the strategy</b> and of several major interventions does <b>not</b> pay sufficient attention to <b>Caribbean specificities</b>	C6	13
27	CRB	05	<b>Use of analyses</b> conducted by other donors and institutions can produce <b>positive effects</b> , but it is <b>not generalised</b>	C12	13
29	ARM	06	During the period covered by the evaluation, Commission interventions in Armenia <b>lacked a clear country-specific strategy</b>	C1	13
31	MAL	06	La réduction de la pauvreté = objectif global des coopérations communautaire et française mais le <b>ciblage</b> est <b>insuffisant</b> (lien croissance pauvreté, interactions et prise en compte systématique).	C1	13
32	COM	06	Définition de la <b>stratégie</b> repose sur <b>une analyse insuffisante</b> à cause d'un manque de ressource.	C3	13
32	COM	06	Amélioration des <b>documents de planification</b> stratégique mais faible prise en compte des documents de politiques sectorielles	C36	13
33	MRC	06	Définition de la stratégie repose sur une <b>analyse insuffisante</b> à cause d'un manque de ressource.	C3	13
33	MRC	06	Amélioration des <b>documents de planification</b> pays	C29	13
33	MRC	06	<b>Principes formulés</b> par les politiques générales et concepts sectoriels non pris en compte au niveau de la <b>planification</b> des programmes	C30	13
34	SEY	06	Les <b>processus et les produits</b> de l'analyse stratégique et de la programmation ont <b>primé sur le sens et les résultats</b> , déficit de partenariat.	C2	13
34	SEY	06	Définition de la stratégie repose sur une <b>analyse insuffisante</b> à cause d'un manque de ressource.	C3	13
39	PNG	06	No clear strategy regarding <b>institutional capacity building and governance</b>	C19	13
29	ARM	06	The Commission was not actively involved in the <b>PRSP</b> preparation process	C9	21
29	ARM	06	<b>Linkage between policy dialogue and co-operation is in progress</b> : imply that policy dialog is complemented by more permanent and closer dialogue between the Delegation and government agencies	C19	21
31	MAL	06	La <b>capacité des interventions</b> de la Commission et de la France à produire des résultats durables est significativement affectée par la <b>qualité du partenariat</b> avec les autorités maliennes	C10	21
32	COM	06	Les <b>processus et les produits</b> de l'analyse stratégique et de la programmation ont primé sur le <b>sens et les résultats</b> , déficit de partenariat.	C2	21
33	MRC	06	Les <b>processus et les produits</b> de l'analyse stratégique et de la programmation ont <b>primé sur le sens et les résultats</b> , déficit de <b>partenariat</b> .	C2	21
36	TAC	06	TACIS action programmes (APs) <b>reflect the priorities</b> set out in the CSPs, RSP, NIPs, and RIP. But CSP are results of a discussion, not a negotiation: <b>reduce partnership</b> . Adaptation of project design so as to increase relevance after the contract has been signed reduces the link between the project and the overall TACIS objective, thus <b>affecting the underlying intervention logic of the CSP</b> .	C2	21 12
36	TAC	06	General perception on the part of partner States that <b>dialogue</b> has not been conducted in the manner envisaged in the Regulation which has limited ownership in some cases	C11	21
36	TAC	06	Support to <b>Cross-border Co-operation</b> has sought to address the concerns of Member States but <b>low partner commitment</b> in combating organised crime and problems of border areas. - specific	C17	21

26	GH	05	There is <b>strong donor coordination</b> and <b>synergies</b> at <b>programming level</b>	C34	22
27	CRB	05	When a <b>constructive policy dialogue</b> has engaged between a group of donors and the partner, with the full commitment of the latter, it has been a major contributing factor to <b>effectiveness</b>	C15	22
27	CRB	05	<b>Coordination with other donors</b> faces particular <b>difficulties</b> in view of the geography of the region but for some large programmes it has led to a <b>fruitful policy dialogue</b> and was a factor in instances of success.	C24	22
29	ARM	06	Donors <b>co-ordination</b> remains <b>unsatisfactory</b> because of lack of leadership by government	C22	22
31	MAL	06	Les <b>complémentarités</b> entre les actions de la Commission et de la France sont nombreuses et diverses mais essentiellement de type <b>intra-sectoriel</b> (agriculture, décentralisation, appui macro-économique)	C3	22
31	MAL	06	<b>L'articulation entre coordination et complémentarité</b> n'est <b>pas systématique</b> et les facteurs expliquant un haut degré de complémentarité entre les actions de la Commission et de la France sont difficiles à identifier	C4	22
31	MAL	06	<b>Coordination</b> a substantiellement augmenté. Elle n'est cependant pas encore suffisamment généralisée pour maximiser les <b>complémentarités et les synergies potentielles</b> entre les coopérations	C5	22
31	MAL	06	La <b>coordination et/ou la complémentarité</b> de la Commission et de la France, et plus généralement des PTF, est facilitée dans les secteurs et/ou domaines où il existe (i) un <b>cadre de politique cohérent</b> et (ii) un <b>dialogue politique</b> où s'exprime l'ensemble des parties prenantes	C6	22
31	MAL	06	Les instruments utilisés par les coopérations communautaire et française sont complémentaires mais cette complémentarité n'est pas suffisamment exploitée	C11	22
32	COM	06	Faible <b>coordination des bailleurs</b> au niveau national	C37	22
32	COM	06	Bonne <b>coordination</b> au niveau des <b>programmes</b>	C38	22
33	MRC	06	La Délégation a bien mis en place une forme de <b>coordination</b> adaptée au positionnement à Maurice des autres <b>bailleurs</b> de fonds	C31	22
33	MRC	06	Le dispositif de <b>coordination</b> dans son ensemble participe d'une couverture adaptée des <b>secteurs prioritaires</b>	C32	22
33	MRC	06	<b>Coordination de la BEI</b> avec l'aide programmable même si autonome et sur un ordre de priorités différent	C36	22
33	MRC	06	<b>Coordination BEI /aide programmable</b> pas généralisée mais se fait au cas par cas	C38	22
34	SEY	06	Forte <b>coordination CE France</b> , absence d'autres bailleurs multilatéraux réduit l'impact	C23	22
34	SEY	06	<b>Coordination BEI /aide programmable</b> pas généralisée mais se fait au cas par cas	C30	22
39	PNG	06	<b>Sectoral cooperation</b> exists and should be reinforced	C15	22
34	SEY	06	Structuration de la CE crée des centres de décision par <b>instrument</b> avec une importante marge d'autonomie : <b>coordination possible mais plus par coïncidence</b>	C28	23
36	TAC	06	Encouraged regional and sub-regional cooperation and cross-border cooperation but problems with achieving <b>synergy between different EC-funded programmes</b> operating on each side of the borders and also with commitment from partner States.	C5	23
26	GH	05	There is <b>no</b> clear evidence of <b>conflict or incoherence</b> between <b>Commission support</b> and <b>EU policies</b>	C35	24
27	CRB	05	Several aspects of <b>EU domestic policies or international arrangements are hurting the Caribbean countries</b> and ad hoc measures are proposed to mitigate their consequences.	C25	24
33	MRC	06	Pas d'actions visant effectivement la <b>convergence ou la complémentarité</b> entre des retombées du protocole	C37	24

			sucre et les interventions communautaires de niveau national		
34	SEY	06	Peu de <b>complémentarité et convergence</b> avec les <b>autres politiques européennes</b>	C29	24
26	GH	05	<b>Links</b> between the Commission's regional <b>and national strategies</b> do <b>not</b> appear to be <b>well developed</b> or clearly stated although there is no conflict apparent	C36	25
27	CRB	05	The <b>National Indicative Programmes</b> tend to pursue <b>national priorities</b> without reference to regional strategic objectives	C22	25
29	ARM	06	Despite the lack of a clear co-operation <b>strategy</b> , interventions <b>addressed the main issues</b> involved in the transition of Armenia to a market economy. But they targeted a <b>large number of sectors</b> or issues with <b>limited resources</b> and <b>lack of continuity</b>	C2	13, 12 55
32	COM	06	Analyse complémentarité PIN/PIR récente	C39	25
32	COM	06	<b>Cohérence et complémentarité PIR/PIN limitées</b> car les objectifs sont différents : priorités régionales/nationales	C40	25
32	COM	06	Pas de <b>chevauchements pertinents entre programmes nationaux et régionaux</b>	C41	25
32	COM	06	Effets de <b>synergie des programmes régionaux</b> mais participation dans cadre élargi de coopération pas évidente	C42	25
33	MRC	06	La <b>cohérence</b> entre les documents de <b>planification régionale et nationale</b> s'est améliorée	C33	25
33	MRC	06	Bonne <b>complémentarité conceptuelle</b> entre les niveaux régional et national pour la grande partie des domaines d'intervention à Maurice	C34	25
33	MRC	06	Pas d'indications de recoupement ou d'influences négatives entre les programmes des deux niveaux ni de <b>complémentarité</b> dans la <b>mise en oeuvre</b>	C35	25
34	SEY	06	<b>Correspondances entre les objectifs</b> des programmes régionaux et ceux de la programmation communautaire mais degré relativement <b>faible de concentration</b> des interventions régionales	C25	25
34	SEY	06	Les <b>programmes régionaux</b> fonctionnent sur leur logique d'exécution propre avec des <b>impératifs de performance</b> qui peuvent être <b>incompatibles</b> avec une démarche de mise à niveau des <b>pays les moins dynamiques</b> ou avec des capacités d'absorption limitées.	C26	25
34	SEY	06	La recherche de <b>la cohérence entre PIR et PIN</b> pas suffisamment <b>systématique</b>	C27	25
27	CRB	05	<b>Sustainable involvement</b> in profitable production and trade activities <b>by the productive sectors</b> benefiting from Commission assistance is generally <b>not guaranteed</b> .	C20	30
26	GH	05	The importance of <b>Private Sector Development</b> has been steadily <b>decreasing</b> in the Commission's <b>strategy</b> .	C6	31
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions in the area of <b>Private Sector Development</b> have globally been <b>successful</b> in achieving their respective objectives	C19	31
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions <b>have focused on private operators</b> rather than on the legal and regulatory framework.	C20	31
26	GH	05	The <b>main constraints</b> of the private sector are <b>institutional</b> : macroeconomic instability, weak infrastructure, low productivity, lack of local business partners and inefficient banking and financial system but also the lack of a sound regulatory framework	C21	31
26	GH	05	<b>Impact</b> against the objective of developing the <b>private sector</b> and contributing to the <b>diversification of the</b>	C22	31

			<b>production/export base is weak</b>		
27	CRB	05	Important <b>weaknesses</b> are observed in the capacity to <b>consult</b> and <b>deal with</b> the <b>private sector</b>	C11	31
29	ARM	06	Commission interventions have made a <b>positive contribution to the development of the private sector</b> : assistance to design and implementation of legal reform and direct support to SME	C4	31
32	COM	06	Impact appui au <b>secteur privé minime</b> surtout faute de propositions de projets par les entreprises	C26	31
32	COM	06	La présence sur place d'une équipe d'AT et d'une représentation de la CE n'a pas empêché les <b>irrégularités de gestion</b> et d'octroi de crédit.	C27	31
33	MRC	06	Les interventions de la CE ont bien appuyé des <b>PME</b>	C16	31
33	MRC	06	Renforcement des <b>PME</b> : proposition <b>appui-conseil</b> ciblé très appréciée sauf quand rétribution demandée	C17	31
33	MRC	06	Renforcement des <b>PME</b> sur un marché très concurrentiel <b>non pertinent</b>	C18	31
34	SEY	06	<b>PME : capitalisation de l'expérience</b> impossible faute d'une mauvaise gestion des archives	C12	31
34	SEY	06	Echec projet soutien <b>PME</b> : dysfonctionnements liés à la <b>gestion des lignes de crédits</b> .	C13	31
34	SEY	06	<b>Convergence</b> évolution projet PME / évolution politique gouvernementale du à une coïncidence d'agenda	C14	31
36	TAC	06	Support to <b>economic and private sector development</b> has tended to reflect the different stage of socio-economic development and transition of the countries of the region and has been successful	C14	31
26	GH	05	<b>macroeconomic support</b> and <b>public finance management</b> : interventions are <b>relevant</b> to address the needs and constraints of the economy	C5	32
26	GH	05	Interventions in <b>macroeconomic support</b> and <b>public finance management effective</b> in delivering their results although their <b>impact</b> in some areas (GPRS and social sector) is relatively <b>weaker</b> .	C16	32
26	GH	05	The <b>effectiveness</b> of the interventions in the area of <b>macroeconomic support</b> and public finance management has been adversely affected by the <b>poor programme design</b> : problem in implementation modalities, disbursement but progress in programme formulation.	C17	32
29	ARM	06	Commission interventions supported the implementation of <b>macroeconomic</b> and sectoral policies favouring <b>sustainable economic growth</b>	C14	32
26	GH	05	Commission interventions have directly and indirectly <b>contributed to good governance</b> to a significant degree.	C30	33
29	ARM	06	Transition of Armenia to a democratic society governed by the rule of Law has not been a priority of the Commission's interventions	C3	33
29	ARM	06	<b>Deficiencies in enforcement of the legal environment</b> (corruption and deficiency in the judiciary system) have not been addressed	C5	33
29	ARM	06	Support to <b>democratic institutions</b> can deliver positive and sustainable results if they promote a <b>participatory approach</b> to policymaking at regional level, and if the decentralisation process leads to the formation of elected regional governments	C7	33
29	ARM	06	The volume and effectiveness of interventions aimed at strengthening <b>Civil Society</b> have been <b>limited. Lack of</b>	C8	33

			<b>co-ordination</b> between the micro-projects = limitation on their global impact		
32	COM	06	Focus sur la <b>gouvernance</b> alors que ne fait pas partie des <b>documents de stratégie</b> et de programmation ce qui handicape son développement à long terme.	C5	33
32	COM	06	<b>Décentralisation</b> : manque de <b>consultation</b> des acteurs	C35	33
32	COM	06	<b>Déséquilibre</b> place accordée à la <b>gouvernance</b> dans les documents de <b>stratégie</b> et de programmation et son rôle réel dans la mise en oeuvre	C46	33
32	COM	06	L'appui au <b>développement local</b> , étant donné son budget élevé pourrait atteindre <b>une masse critique</b> pour déclencher un processus de développement local et produire des impacts mesurables et durables sur la population	C29	33
33	MRC	06	Problèmes de <b>gouvernance</b> ne justifient pas de financements spécifiques.	C39	33
34	SEY	06	Problèmes de <b>gouvernance</b> ne justifient pas des financements spécifiques. L'inscription de cette composante dans la programmation communautaire remet en cause sa nature partenariale	C31	33
36	TAC	06	TACIS has provided significant support to <b>Civil Society</b> in a broad range of areas such as the social and environmental sectors but the political framework within which CSOs have to operate remains volatile	C6	33
36	TAC	06	Broad support to <b>the social consequences of transition</b> but slow the level of implementation and contracting → impact on relevance and of momentum in the commitment of counterparts.	C15	33
39	PNG	06	Introduction of <b>institutional capacity building and governance</b> following recommendations from EDF	C6	33
26	GH	05	<b>Rural development</b> : results in tackling <b>rural poverty</b> but <b>less</b> to foster <b>economic growth</b> .	C3	34
26	GH	05	<b>RD projects</b> have been <b>less effective</b> in improving <b>productive systems</b> and diversifying the <b>agriculture</b>	C8	34
26	GH	05	Many interventions in the area of <b>Rural Development</b> are likely to be <b>sustainable</b> (generation of operational funds, ownership, capable institutions)	C10	34
29	ARM	06	<b>Agriculture: positive contribution</b> - creation of an agricultural credit bank, agricultural land market and mortgage credit, improvement in the management of public finance, contribution to the elaboration of an agricultural strategy	C6	34
29	ARM	06	Commission interventions addressed the issue of <b>rural poverty</b>	C13	34
32	COM	06	Le support du <b>secteur vivrier</b> a eu des résultats ambigus : augmentation production des vivres, écoulement de la production facilité, dynamisation secteur rural mais pas de réduction des importations.	C22	34
32	COM	06	<b>Secteur vivrier</b> : appui à la filière positif mais si lenteur au démarrage et insuffisances dans le transfert de résultat et d'expérience	C23	34
32	COM	06	Absence du volet planning familial dans le secteur du développement rural alors que jugé nécessaire pour la durabilité	C24	34
33	MRC	06	<b>Secteur agricole : contribution restreinte</b> a l'amélioration des revenus et création d'emplois	C19	34
33	MRC	06	<b>Secteur agricole</b> : amélioration des systèmes de production pas au degré espéré : faible diversification et viabilité non assurée	C20	34
33	MRC	06	<b>Secteur agricole a Rodrigues</b> : contribution au renforcement du secteur agricole. Réponse partielle aux problèmes de l'eau du a des effets trop ponctuels et extension limitée des mesures.	C21	34

37	AfC	06	Le <b>dialogue politique</b> se met en place à plusieurs niveaux régionaux en fonction des objectifs	C4	21 & 13
39	PNG	06	<b>Rural development:</b> capitalisation of experiences and lessons from previous EDF. Excellence of EC support.	C4	34
39	PNG	06	Substantial potential within <b>rural communities</b> to create income opportunities and to achieve economic sustainability through rural development.	C9	34
39	PNG	06	Well being of <b>rural communities</b> - both in education and in rural development - will not be sustainable without sufficient cash being generated at community levels	C14	34
39	PNG	06	Partnership with NSA in the sector of rural community development is relevant	C16	34
39	PNG	06	Achievements made in <b>rural community</b> development require further support	C18	34
39	PNG	06	Efforts to improve the well being of <b>rural communities</b> improve access to water and better sanitation and thus help to achieve MDGs, but do not enable the communities to start self-help activities and leave them in a position dependent on external aid and outside interventions	C24	34
39	PNG	06	Initiation of <b>market oriented production</b> and creation of nuclei of a cash economy in rural areas are step for poverty reduction	C25	34
26	GH	05	<b>Transport:</b> rehabilitation and upgrading of trunk and feeder roads, institutional support, prioritisation and programming of sector programme have all contributed to the objective of <b>enhancing economic growth</b> . However, <b>sustainability</b> of all components is seriously <b>in doubt</b> .	C4	35
26	GH	05	<b>Transport:</b> contribution to the enhancement of the <b>institutional framework</b> has been <b>limited</b> . <b>Capacity, ownership and management</b> issues remain to be addressed.	C12	35
26	GH	05	<b>Transport:</b> interventions have contributed to <b>significantly facilitate rural access to markets, services and social facilities</b> but <b>not</b> in the <b>most deprived areas</b> .	C13	35
26	GH	05	The achievement of the interventions in the area of <b>transport</b> is hampered by <b>resource limitations</b> and <b>persistent maintenance backlog</b>	C14	35
26	GH	05	Weaknesses in <b>maintenance</b> impact on the <b>sustainability of interventions</b> (road)	C15	35
29	ARM	06	Support to the development of <b>energy</b> and <b>transport infrastructure effective</b>	C15	35
32	COM	06	<b>Transport</b> : durabilité réduite par absence d'entretien par l'Etat et pression humaine croissante	C20	35
32	COM	06	Options techniques et choix politique de l'Etat ont réduit l'ampleur et l'efficacité des interventions	C21	35
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : pas de dimension sectorielle (prestation AT, conflit avec gouvernement et instabilité)	C14	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : plan d'urgence efficace mais non durable	C15	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : flexibilité dans les allocations de budget	C16	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides:</b> modifications mieux adaptées au contexte et meilleur calendrier	C17	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides:</b> dysfonctionnement dans la mise en œuvre n'ont pas été identifiées et n'ont pas donné lieu à des actions correctives	C18	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : <b>approche sectorielle</b> a permis un certain degré de <b>mobilisation</b> du gouvernement sur des aspects clés. Limite à cause d'une <b>mauvaise analyse des risques</b>	C12	36

33	MRC	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : Contribution appui budgétaire sectoriel à l'adoption d'une approche sectorielle et augmentation du traitement des eaux. Point faible : capacité et efficacité de l'agence. Pas d'incitation à des actions décisives de la part du gouvernement. Prévalence des intérêts à court terme dans les pratiques politico-administratives	C5	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : cadre institutionnel encore insuffisant	C13	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : efficacité financière repose sur le renforcement des capacités de l'agence d'exécution	C14	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : Contribution appui budgétaire à l'adoption approche sectorielle et augmentation du traitement des eaux. Point faible : capacité et efficacité de l'agence. Pas d'incitation à des actions décisives de la part du gouvernement. Prévalence des intérêts à court terme dans les pratiques politico-administratives	C5	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : intervention de la CE, qui relève de l'appui sectoriel, a été mis en place sans définir des <b>conditionnalités fortes</b> qui auraient permis de mieux maîtriser l'atteinte <b>des résultats</b> attendus	C15	36
34	SEY	06	Le second plan de <b>gestion des déchets</b> reprend la stratégie du premier plan alors que les études complémentaires contredisent l'orientation maintenue.	C16	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : projet a atteint ses objectifs	C17	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : augmentation des capacités de production n'est pas suivie d'une amélioration suffisante du réseau de distribution	C18	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : évaluation de la ressource au captage ne garantit pas que l'objectif de production soit maintenu en période d'étiage	C19	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : niveau technique des équipements de pompage fournis n'est pas adapté au contexte d'usure	C20	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : l'augmentation qualitative et quantitative de la distribution d'eau potable n'a pas été accompagnée d'une campagne spécifique de communication auprès des consommateurs	C21	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : les études d'impact et de risque n'ont pas couvert tous les aspects à prendre en compte	C22	36
26	GH	05	<b>RD projects</b> have been <b>effective</b> in increasing access to safe <b>water and sanitation</b> , and to <b>basic economic and social facilities</b>	C7	37
26	GH	05	<b>TA</b> has been a <b>relevant</b> and <b>effective</b> instrument in support of the interventions in <b>social sectors</b> .	C26	37
29	ARM	06	Projects <b>health sector, social security</b> and <b>employment services</b> not fully deliver <b>expected outcomes</b> : institutional instability, lack of ownership, limited resources and lack of continuity in the Commission's interventions.	C10	37
29	ARM	06	Support to <b>education</b> : positive results, <b>sustainability</b> is however not fully ensured	C11	37
29	ARM	06	Support to the <b>social assistance</b> policy have been <b>effective</b>	C12	37
32	COM	06	Faiblesse du PPMR : manque d'une réelle stratégie <b>d'animation participative et de renforcement des capacités</b> . Pas de prise en compte de l'évolution du contexte dans l'élaboration d'une nouvelle stratégie.	C28	37
32	COM	06	Nécessité d'améliorer la <b>gestion et qualité de l'enseignement</b>	C32	37

39	PNG	06	<b>Education</b> : excellence and innovation of EC support	C3	37
39	PNG	06	The community based projects supporting <b>education and water and sanitation</b> risk not achieving their objectives without cash income being generated to sustain these services	C11	37
27	CRB	05	The strategic approach of the Commission has gradually and continuously supported the <b>construction of a regional integrated space</b>	C1	38
27	CRB	05	In supporting <b>regional integration</b> in the Caribbean the Commission has <b>not</b> made use of its <b>comparative advantage</b> in this area	C2	38
27	CRB	05	The support to the PU of the CARIFORUM secretariat has created a <b>technical capacity</b> and has permitted to develop <b>regional mechanisms</b> for consultation and programming, and it provided appreciated support for the implementing agencies and the DRAOs	C10	38
27	CRB	05	The majority of projects and programmes interventions supported by the Commission have made an <b>impact in creating a regional identity</b> across a broad range of sectors.	C13	38
27	CRB	05	<b>Regional institutions</b> generally deliver <b>positive results</b> but their benefits are often <b>limited to the country</b> in which they are operating	C16	38
27	CRB	05	The <b>impact</b> of the Commission's interventions on the evolution of <b>regional trade flows</b> and on the <b>regional institutional setting is difficult to assess</b>	C17	38
27	CRB	05	<b>Cross cutting issues</b> , in particular poverty and gender issues in relation to the negative impact of regional trade liberalisation, <b>have been insufficiently addressed</b> .	C21	40
26	GH	05	Interventions have made only a <b>limited contribution to promotion of equal participation</b> of men and women in political, economic, social and cultural life	C31	41
32	COM	06	La dimension <b>genre</b> est très peu présente dans les DSP et PIN et est analysée <b>superficiellement</b>	C13	41
32	COM	06	Dimension <b>genre</b> très <b>peu présente</b> dans les DSP et PIN. Les programmes du 9 <sup>eme</sup> FED prennent mieux en compte cette dimension, mais doivent encore préciser et concrétiser les activités et indicateurs s'y référant.	C48	41
33	MRC	06	La question du <b>genre</b> se pose à Maurice de manière trop spécifique pour pouvoir y appliquer la démarche usuelle.	C41	41
34	SEY	06	La question du <b>genre</b> se positionne de manière suffisamment spécifique pour ne pas pouvoir y appliquer la démarche usuelle. Veille plus justifiées qu'action transversale.	C33	41
26	GH	05	<b>no</b> evidence of any interventions having <b>negative environmental impacts</b> , some are positive	C32	42
29	ARM	06	An <b>improved environment</b> , but also changes in the <b>implementation modalities</b> of the Commission's interventions, impacted positively on their <b>effectiveness and sustainability</b>	C20	42
32	COM	06	<b>Environnement</b> secteur clé dans les documents de stratégie et de programmation mais ses effets positifs sur sa protection <b>sont limités</b>	C47	42
33	MRC	06	<b>Objectif environnemental</b> des projets dans le secteur de l'assainissement est souvent passé au <b>second plan</b> (manque d'indicateurs de performance environnementale).	C15	42
33	MRC	06	<b>Environnement</b> apparaît dans certaines actions de développement rural mais les acquis en termes de <b>mobilisation du gouvernement</b> sont relativement faibles alors que les enjeux environnementaux sont	C40	42

			stratégiques à long terme.		
34	SEY	06	La dimension transversale de l' <b>environnement</b> n'apparaît pas du fait du nombre restreint de projets hors secteur de concentration	C32	42
36	TAC	06	<b>Environnemental protection</b> : regional and sub-regional projects suffered from constraints limiting adequate dialogue with the many partner institutions. Lack of political support for environmental issues and limited EC political leverage: focus on outputs and little contribution to the overall objectives.	C16	42
39	PNG	06	High potential to derive substantial income in an <b>environmentally</b> and ecologically sound way from fishery, forestry and agriculture. The sustainable use and management of these natural resources can be used to generate cash income	C10	42
26	GH	05	Although taken into account in specific interventions there does <b>not</b> appear to be any <b>overall strategy</b> to ensure consistent coverage of <b>cross-cutting issues</b> in the Commission's programmes	C33	43
36	TAC	06	<b>Environmental</b> issues have not been systematically integrated into TACIS assistance. <b>Gender</b> equality has been overlooked seen more as female employment issues than gender role.	C7	43
26	GH	05	Concrete <b>improvements</b> are visible in terms of <b>social status</b> , but <b>implementation issues remain</b> : budget preparation, share of the national budget allocated to social sectors and to deprived localities, and delays in disbursing funds.	C24	50
26	GH	05	<b>Delays</b> at various levels are the most important factor compromising <b>efficiency</b>	C27	50
26	GH	05	The main sources of <b>delays</b> are <b>administrative procedures</b> and <b>poor project/programme design</b>	C28	50
26	GH	05	<b>Technical assistance</b> positively <b>affects design and implementation</b> of the interventions funded.	C29	50
32	COM	06	<b>Mauvaise coordination entre le niveau central et le niveau régional</b> notamment pour les administrations insulaires	C31	50
32	COM	06	Faible lien entre les pratiques et les acquis communautaires (mauvaise maîtrise des connaissances sectorielles)	C12	50
32	COM	06	<b>Longs délais d'instruction et de démarrage</b> des interventions mais bien acceptés.	C6	50
32	COM	06	Les règles de durée de vie des projets et les délais d'instruction et démarrage raccourcissent la <b>période de mise en œuvre</b> d'activités généralement trop ambitieuses. Taux de décaissement satisfaisants	C7	50
32	COM	06	<b>Principes</b> de base de l'aide programmable ont été systématiquement <b>présentés</b>	C11	50
33	MRC	06	Longs <b>délais d'instruction et de démarrage</b> des interventions mais bien acceptés	C6	50
33	MRC	06	Les règles de durée de vie des projets et les délais d'instruction et démarrage raccourcissent la <b>période de mise en œuvre</b> d'activités généralement trop ambitieuses. Taux de décaissement satisfaisants	C7	50
33	MRC	06	La <b>durée des projets trop courte</b> : concentration des investissements intensifs en capitaux, augmentation des coûts de transfert des services et faible réponse aux besoins de sensibilisation, d'analyse et d'adaptation des mesures et de la diffusion à large échelle, empêchant ainsi des impacts important	C22	50
33	MRC	06	Le <b>démarrage</b> inopérant des programmes paraît être un élément quasi structurel de la coopération qui se répète	C27	50
33	MRC	06	<b>Principes de base</b> de l'aide programmable ont été systématiquement <b>présentés</b>	C11	50
33	MRC	06	Mise en œuvre du PCD via des appels à proposition → forte participation des acteurs non étatiques. Mais	C23	50

			<b>participation</b> différent d'1 <b>démarche participative</b> au niveau des populations bénéficiaires		
34	SEY	06	Faible lien entre les pratiques et les acquis communautaires (mauvaise maîtrise des connaissances sectorielles)	C11	50
34	SEY	06	<b>Longs délais d'instruction</b> et de démarrage des interventions mais bien acceptés	C6	50
34	SEY	06	Les règles de durée de vie des projets et les délais d'instruction et démarrage raccourcissent la <b>période de mise en œuvre</b> d'activités généralement trop ambitieuses. Taux de décaissement satisfaisants	C7	50
34	SEY	06	<b>Principes de base de l'aide programmable</b> ont été systématiquement présentés	C10	50
36	TAC	06	TACIS has opted for <b>heavy concentration</b> at country level but no evidence that such concentration has enhanced either the <b>relevance or the effectiveness</b> of the Programme	C4	50
36	TAC	06	Relevance and sustainability are jeopardised by an inadequate <b>delivery mechanism focused on projects</b> rather than policies and programmes	C9	50
27	CRB	05	The <b>insufficient link of individual interventions</b> with the <b>strategic priorities</b> has limited the <b>efficiency of</b> several regional <b>projects</b>	C9	51
32	COM	06	Les unités de gestion des projets n'ont généralement pas la capacité de faire obstacle à une dénaturation du <b>sens du projet</b> ou de ses procédures par l'environnement politique	C8	51
32	COM	06	Les projets souffrent d'un <b>manque de continuité</b> pour dépasser des effets ponctuels, absence de capitalisation et d'ancrage dans les institutions locales	C25	51
32	COM	06	Amélioration de <b>la gestion</b> tâche principale pour préparer les structures à une <b>approche sectorielle</b> avec la perspective d'une aide budgétaire	C30	51
33	MRC	06	Les unités de gestion des projets n'ont généralement pas la capacité de faire obstacle à une <b>dénaturation du sens du projet</b> ou de ses procédures par l'environnement politique	C8	51
34	SEY	06	Les unités de gestion des projets n'ont généralement pas la capacité de faire obstacle à une <b>dénaturation du sens du projet</b> ou de ses procédures par l'environnement politique	C8	51
36	TAC	06	Seeking for individual <b>stand-alone projects</b> limits TACIS results mainly in two areas: building the capacity development process in the recipient institutions; and responding with flexibility and appropriateness to the changes in the context and the requests of the partners	C10	51
36	TAC	06	<b>Weaknesses of project-based approach:</b> weak policy analysis, harmonisation and alignment with international and national partners, mechanisms for ownership and sustainability, too short-term an approach, an input-driven nature, focus on outputs rather than outcomes and longer term objectives, high transaction costs	C12	51
39	PNG	06	<b>Implementation modalities</b> : shift from projects to support through a programme approach may lead to improved relevance and sustainability	C2	51
27	CRB	05	The <b>variety of instruments</b> offered in the context of the Commission's assistance is a potential <b>source of flexibility</b> and adaptability to need that is <b>not exploited</b> to that end.	C23	52
29	ARM	06	The Commission managed relatively well to <b>use</b> the various <b>financing instruments</b> at its disposal in a complementary manner	C21	52
32	COM	06	Pas de conclusion possible sur les questions de <b>cohérence des instruments</b>	C43	52

32	COM	06	Peu de relations directes entre les différents <b>instruments</b> et peu de recoupements	C44	52
39	PNG	06	<b>Long term institution and capacity building</b> activities are required to overcome weaknesses of governmental organisations. Substantial TA and a long duration or interventions are needed if sustainability is to be achieved this is a recommendation.	C20	53
31	MAL	06	l' <b>impact</b> sur les objectifs intermédiaires et globaux est <b>mal mesuré</b> (pas de système de suivi) et l'hypothèse qu'il soit limité peut être sérieusement envisagée	C2	54
32	COM	06	Manque d'une <b>gestion par résultats</b> . Pas de programmation pour l'entrée dans de nouveaux secteurs ou pour le désengagement.	C4	54
32	COM	06	<b>Dispositif de suivi est faible</b> . Dysfonctionnement dans système d'alerte et mesure des effets.	C9	54
32	COM	06	L'absence temporaire d'une <b>représentation permanente</b> de la Délégation aux Comores a constitué un facteur aggravant pour les <b>dérives des projets</b>	C10	54
32	COM	06	L' <b>accès aux informations</b> des différentes institutions de la CE dans le cadre des évaluations des stratégies pays n'est pas encore clairement réglé au sein des institutions européennes	C45	54
33	MRC	06	Manque d'une <b>gestion par résultats</b> . Pas de programmation pour l'entrée dans de nouveaux secteurs ou pour le désengagement.	C4	54
33	MRC	06	<b>Dispositif de suivi est faible</b> . Dysfonctionnement dans système d'alerte et mesure des effets.	C9	54
33	MRC	06	L'absence temporaire d'une <b>représentation permanente</b> de la Délégation aux Comores a constitué un facteur aggravant pour les dérives des projets	C10	54
33	MRC	06	<b>Impact</b> des projets ANDE limités du a un manque de <b>visibilité et de suivi</b>	C24	54
34	SEY	06	Manque d'une <b>gestion par résultats</b> . Pas de programmation pour l'entrée dans de nouveaux secteurs ou pour le désengagement.	C4	54
34	SEY	06	Une <b>structure permanente</b> est un garant de continuité et de capitalisation des acquis, voir de transfert d'enseignements et de pratiques adaptées au contexte d'un projet à l'autre, ou d'une équipe à l'autre	C9	54
36	TAC	06	<b>Poor institutional memory</b> : turnover of staff, no clear paper trail for non-financial issues and weakness in disseminating its results	C18	54
36	TAC	06	The <b>MONIS system</b> useful for monitoring at project and output levels but is not able to determine if committed funds may be at risk or to determine how monies are best allocated within and between programmes. There does not appear to be the necessary linkages between MONIS and CRIS as a <b>management tool</b> .	C19	54
36	TAC	06	Pgmes and projects suffered from the non-existence of <b>internal monitoring systems</b> that if internalised enable partner institutions to monitor impact.	C20	54
27	CRB	05	The <b>organisational framework</b> and the responsibilities for managing the regional programme are <b>insufficiently clear</b> and this constitutes an obstacle to <b>efficiency</b>	C7	57
27	CRB	05	There have been a number of significant achievements, but notwithstanding these there <b>needs</b> to be <b>more strategic analysis</b> in the <b>selection</b> of interventions.	C14	57
33	MRC	06	L' <b>approche</b> visant la <b>réduction de la pauvreté</b> à Rodrigues doit être différente de celle à Maurice	C28	60
33	MRC	06	La <b>concertation</b> avec les autres programmes de lutte contre la pauvreté a été peu développée, absence d'un <b>cadre formel local</b> pour l'instruction et la sélection des projets	C26	60
39	PNG	06	CSP is building a <b>conceptual bridge</b> that links rural education and rural community development but no functioning corresponding link between the two within government structures	C17	60

27	CRB	05	A number of the <b>institutions</b> developed with Commission assistance <b>are still very fragile</b> and <b>depend on foreign assistance</b> to continue delivery of their expected services	C18	53 & 13
27	CRB	05	Whereas institutional sustainability is an objective of the Commission's interventions, the projects are <b>not designed</b> with a clear view of the <b>longer term perspective</b> and of how support may be provided beyond an ongoing project	C19	53 & 13
29	ARM	06	Commission interventions <b>effectively supported</b> the development of <b>trade</b> (support accession to the WTO)	C17	31 & 38

### EVALUATIONS WHICH CONFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS

Nb of the report	Name of the report	Year of publication	Summary of the recommendation	Nb of the recommendation	Code
28	AL	05	Développer, au sein de ce document stratégique une <b>stratégie</b> spécifique pour la coopération au développement, structurée <b>en trois niveaux d'intervention</b> (pays ou bilatéral, sous-régional et régional-continentale) prenant en compte les asymétries	R2	13 38
28	AL	05	<b>Le RSP</b> doit dépasser son caractère restreint et marginal actuel et devrait élargir ses activités à des <b>thématiques transversales</b> . Devrait avoir pour rôle d'établir une <b>programmation stratégique du budget</b> destiné aux actions régionales-continentales _ spécifique	R4	13 38
30	TNZ	06	Support an innovative <b>outcome-based approach to strategy-making</b>	R3	13
44	CHI	07	Mainstream poverty and the theme of losers from reform more thoroughly in all sectors*	R6	13
28	AL	05	Renforcer le <b>processus de</b> consultation auprès des institutions en AL faisant preuve d'expérience et de connaissance en matière d'intégration.	R6	21
28	AL	05	Un meilleur niveau de <b>coordination et de consultation</b> augmenterait la <b>cohérence et la synergie</b> entre politiques et programmes.	R12	21 23
28	AL	05	Étendre le processus de <b>consultation</b> à des <b>acteurs de la société civile</b> afin de légitimer les actions régionales et d'augmenter la crédibilité et la visibilité de la stratégie et de ses postulats en vue d'une meilleure intégration et une meilleure association avec l'AL	R3	21
37	AfC	06	Améliorer la cohérence, la complémentarité des instruments et la coordination des activités : le <b>dialogue politique</b> doit être plus étroitement lié au cycle de programmation et de mise en œuvre, meilleure <b>coordination des activités</b> et un <b>renforcement du personnel</b> des délégations en termes de commerce et intégration régionale	R4	21
37	AfC	06	Réfléchir sur les mandats des ordonnateurs régionaux	R5	21 38
44	CHI	07	<b>Insist on equal partnership***</b> : provide expertise not infrastructures or project operating expenses	R2	21
28	AL	05	Améliorer l' <b>information</b> et la <b>coordination structurelle</b> et opérationnelle.	R13	23
28	AL	05	Élaborer une <b>stratégie explicite et unique</b> de la CE en AL, qui articule toutes les actions de la CE dans la région (différentes DG, différents niveaux territoriaux, lignes d'activités)	R1	24
28	AL	05	<b>Améliorer la cohérence avec les objectifs généraux d'intégration et de développement.</b>	R10	24
28	AL	05	Stimuler la <b>coordination et la complémentarité</b> des programmes <b>horizontaux avec les autres initiatives</b> de coopération de la CE	R11	24
37	AfC	06	<b>Réaliser une réelle complémentarité entre le PIR et les PIN</b> dès la conception de la stratégie de coopération régionale Pour assurer cette complémentarité, le PIR devra être élaboré avant les différents PIN.	R11	25
30	TNZ	06	Mainstream governance	R5	33
37	AfC	06	la <b>gouvernance</b> doit être au <b>centre de la nouvelle programmation</b> , développer un système de suivi, mener un dialogue politique, tirer les conséquences du non respect du calendrier de mise en œuvre.	R3	33
44	CHI	07	Mainstream good governance***	R5	33

37	AfC	06	Poursuivre la politique d'aménagement des routes à vocation régionale	R7	35
37	AfC	06	Développer l'inter-modalité rail-route, à l'échelle régionale	R8	35
37	AfC	06	Diversifier les voies d'accès maritime des pays enclavés	R9	35
37	AfC	06	Poursuivre l'appui à l'entretien routier au niveau des Etats	R12	35
37	AfC	06	Poursuivre la lutte contre les surcharges des véhicules de transport de marchandises	R13	35
37	AfC	06	Renforcer les capacités de la CEMAC	R14	35
28	AL	05	La stratégie de coopération de la CE doit <b>renforcer l'intégration sous-régionale</b> en tant qu'objectif intermédiaire vers l'intégration régionale→ spécifique	R5	38
28	AL	05	<b>Appliquer critères de sélection</b> pour augmenter la participation des pays les + pauvres, équilibrer les asymétries et augmenter l'efficacité des actions : redistribution des ressources au niveau géographique ou introduction de critères sociaux de participation et poser des limites au concept actuel du « demand driven »	R7	38
30	TNZ	06	<b>Highlight two cutting-edge issues:</b> technical barriers to trade and vulnerability	R6	38
37	AfC	06	<b>Réfléchir sur les principaux axes pour l'intégration économique régionale</b> : soutien au renforcement du processus d'intégration régionale, à l'articulation du marché avec le marché européen, à la cohésion et solidarité économique entre les pays, prise en compte dans la programmation des besoins en appui au renforcement des secteurs productifs	R1	38
37	AfC	06	<b>Renforcer les relations</b> de la CEMAC et la CEEAC avec la CEDEAO, la SADC et d'autres organisations régionales africaines	R2	38
37	AfC	06	L'intégration de l' <b>environnement</b> dans toute action de coopération de la Commission dans la région Afrique centrale doit se faire de façon <b>systématique</b>	R15	42
37	AfC	06	<b>Ressources naturelles</b> : réfléchir sur le choix de l'ordonnateur régional	R16	42
37	AfC	06	<b>Améliorer coordination interne</b> : mise à disposition de toutes les délégations tous les documents, mise en circulation des exemples de bonnes pratiques, intensification des échanges entre les spécialistes sur le terrain et ceux des Bruxelles, organisation de séminaires régionaux	R19	50
30	TNZ	06	Increase the share of budget support (either sector or general)	R8	51
30	TNZ	06	<b>Coordinate</b> with development partners on <b>progress-related mechanisms</b> similar to the "variable tranche"	R9	51 54
30	TNZ	06	<b>Use the project modality when justified:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• open pathways into new areas of cooperation</li> <li>• strengthen the capacity of the Government</li> <li>• strengthen the capacity of Non State Actors</li> <li>• pave the way towards sector budget support.</li> </ul>	R11	51
28	AL	05	Les <b>programmes horizontaux</b> doivent générer des <b>statistiques</b> agrégées, non seulement sur les processus et l'utilisation des programmes, mais aussi sur <b>les résultats obtenus</b>	R8	54
28	AL	05	Systématiser et amplifier la <b>diffusion de l'information</b> , ainsi qu'étudier et envisager d'autres modèles	R9	54

			alternatifs de gestion		
30	TNZ	06	Periodically <b>reflect on cutting-edge issues</b> with development partners	R7	54 21
30	TNZ	06	Promote learning from impact information	R10	54
37	AfC	06	<b>Améliorer la qualité des études de faisabilité</b> : s'assurer que le budget et le temps prévus sont suffisants, donner plus de poids aux critères de compétence technique et des partenariats, actualiser l'étude de faisabilité si nécessaire	R10	54
44	CHI	07	Improve knowledge flow from cooperation programme to sector dialogues *	R3	54
44	CHI	07	Improve replication and roll-out of EC-supported projects***	R4	54
30	TNZ	06	Prioritise <b>governance as a cross-cutting</b> issue especially regarding fight against corruption and support to non-state actors and local authorities	R4	55 33
37	AfC	06	Renforcer les capacités des acteurs non étatiques	R6	57
37	AfC	06	Adopter des modalités de mise en œuvre et d'utilisation de <b>l'assistance technique</b> qui garantissent moins de dépendance et plus de continuité : passer de l'approche projet à l'approche programme	R20	57
37	AfC	06	<b>Renforcer les capacités des Délégations</b> notamment sur le thème de la gouvernance et les secteurs de concentration	R21	57
30	TNZ	06	<b>Concentrate funds</b> on road network and basic education	R1	60
30	TNZ	06	<b>Concentrate efforts</b> on access to markets and equitable access to basic services	R2	60
37	AfC	06	<b>Ressources naturelles</b> : réfléchir sur les conséquences du grand <b>délai de démarrage</b> du programme ECOFAC IV et intégrer réflexion sur <b>durabilité</b> et pérennisation des actions	R17	60
37	AfC	06	Réfléchir sur un contexte ECOFAC IV élargie (intégration des populations, actions au niveau continental)	R18	60
44	CHI	07	Plan for the <b>phasing-out</b> of traditional development cooperation and initiate discussions with the partners*** (external assistance must end)	R7	60
44	CHI	07	<b>Continue development cooperation with China *** but decreasing cooperation tools.</b> EC and its Chinese partners should start to plan explicitly for the eventual phasing out of development cooperation altogether	R1	60
44	CHI	07	Move from formal coordination to substantive coordination with EU MS and major Multinationals**	R8	60

## EVALUATIONS WHICH PARTIALLY CONFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS

Nb of the report	Name of the report	Year of publication	Summary of the recommendation	Nb of the recommendation	Code
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions in the area of <b>PSD</b> should support the <b>GoG reform agenda</b>	R16	11
36	TAC	06	<b>Complete the review priorities</b> with the region and implementation instruments, according to the ENP and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and the Commission's Central Asia strategy	R1	11
36	TAC	06	In Central Asian poor countries, it is recommended that the main <b>focus</b> be on <b>global and sectoral</b> support to government-led <b>poverty reduction strategies</b>	R4	11
36	TAC	06	Consolidating and strengthening the relevance. Future assistance in TACIS countries should build on <b>past experience</b> . On the other hand, the relevance vis-à-vis the State partners' priorities should be strongly improved through adoption of programme-based approaches to increase partners' <b>ownership and leadership</b>	R11	11 51
26	GH	05	The Commission should continue to base its <b>strategy</b> on the areas that are currently selected as <b>sectors of intervention</b> but should seek to <b>improve performance</b> in targeted areas.	R1	12
33	MRC	06	L'élaboration de la programmation doit faire apparaître dans son <b>argumentaire de choix de changement de secteur de concertation</b> l'atteinte des résultats attendus ou l'impossibilité de les atteindre sur la base des résultats du dispositif de suivi-évaluation	R2	12 13 55
39	PNG	06	Decision on the new approach should be taken rapidly and be reflected in the decision taken by the Institutional Capacity Building and Governance programme	R8	12
39	PNG	06	Encourage <b>continuity of planning</b> for sustainability	R20	12
26	GH	05	The Commission should base its strategy on an <b>in-depth and comprehensive analysis</b> of the country's main developmental issues	R2	13
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions should ensure that the <b>pro-poor orientation</b> included in its strategy is effectively reflected in the implementation of its programmes	R4	13
27	CRB	05	in the design of its interventions, the commission needs to take into account, particularly for the purpose of establishing monitoring baselines, the development asymmetries between the caribbean countries and the specific geographical constraints.	R7	13
27	CRB	05	<b>Sustainability</b> needs to be built into the <b>design and implementation</b> of the interventions	R11	13 53
29	ARM	06	Ensure full <b>consistency</b> between the <b>PRSP priorities</b> and the Commission's <b>cooperation strategy</b>	R1	13
29	ARM	06	Integrate <b>all financing instruments</b> in the Country Strategy and in the National Indicative Programme and Action Programmes	R3	13 51
31	MAL	06	Procéder à une <b>analyse</b> approfondie de la relation entre <b>croissance et réduction de la pauvreté</b>	R1	13
31	MAL	06	Poursuivre et renforcer les <b>appuis à la préparation et à la mise en œuvre du CSLP</b> .	R3	13

31	MAL	06	Aborder la question du <b>cadre temporel</b> dans lequel s'inscrivent les stratégies de coopération communautaire et française et <b>hiérarchiser les secteurs d'interventions</b> en conséquence	R2	13
32	COM	06	L'effort de <b>visibilité sur les principes fondateurs</b> de l'aide communautaire doit être renforcé et pour cela nécessite d'être géré de manière spécifique	R8	13
32	COM	06	lien entre les interventions de la CE et les orientations sectorielles doit être considéré comme une étape de la conception de la programmation de la stratégie-pays et de la conception de chacun des projets. Un indicateur de <b>cohérence verticale</b> devrait figurer dans le cadre logique des projets au niveau de l'objectif spécifique	R9	13
32	COM	06	Il faudrait accorder dans les prochains DSP et PIN à la dimension de la <b>gouvernance</b> la place qu'elle a de fait dans la coopération avec les Comores depuis de nombreuses années.	R3	13
33	MRC	06	lien entre les interventions de la CE et les orientations sectorielles doit être considéré comme une étape de la conception de la programmation de la stratégie-pays et de la conception de chacun des projets. <b>Un indicateur de cohérence verticale</b> devrait figurer dans le cadre logique des projets au niveau de l'objectif spécifique	R8	13 23
33	MRC	06	Mettre plus en <b>évidence les stratégies et concepts sectoriels</b> existant dans la planification des programmes.	R22	13
33	MRC	06	La <b>programmation</b> quinquennale doit être le moment privilégié <b>d'échange d'informations</b> et de cadrage général des interventions des instruments en amont de la définition du DSP et du PIN	R27	13
34	SEY	06	L'effort de <b>visibilité sur les principes fondateurs</b> de l'aide communautaire doit être renforcé et pour cela nécessite d'être géré de manière spécifique	R8	13
34	SEY	06	La phase d'indentification et d'instruction des projets de niveau national doit développer une <b>analyse approfondie des convergences et divergences</b> potentielles avec les <b>programmes régionaux</b>	R20	13 51
34	SEY	06	La <b>programmation</b> quinquennale doit être le moment privilégié <b>d'échange d'informations</b> et de cadrage général des interventions des instruments en amont de la définition du DSP et du PIN	R21	13
36	TAC	06	Various countries may need a <b>mix of priorities and approaches</b> depending upon their specific processes and their particular relations with the EU	R5	13
39	PNG	06	Involving the NAO in the planning of interventions	R11	13
39	PNG	06	The <b>definition of the impact</b> that can be achieved through CSP interventions is therefore essential	R19	13
32	COM	06	Chercher une <b>cohérence</b> entre la démarche d'appui des institutions politiques locales émergentes (notamment les communes), l'appui des populations au niveau des villages dans le cadre des associations communautaires et le souci d'atteindre les couches les plus vulnérables	R26	14
26	GH	05	The <b>policy dialogue</b> that takes place within the context of the Commission's budget support programmes should be <b>widened in scope</b>	R15	21
27	CRB	05	Deepen and extend the <b>policy dialogue</b> to be pursued on the regional objectives, to one of identifying the major constraints to be overcome and the priority actions to be taken; and from there exploit fully the comparative advantages of the Commission in playing a proactive role in this dialogue	R2	21
29	ARM	06	Strengthen the link between <b>policy dialogue and co-operation</b>	R11	21
32	COM	06	voir les possibilités d'une certaine <b>adaptation des conditions d'accès</b> selon la capacité des pays pour	R37	21

			faciliter l'accès aux pays les plus pauvres du groupe		
36	TAC	06	IPs should contain a <b>broad identification of the cooperation priority areas</b> , based on political dialogue, and supported by high demand and commitment from the recipient countries. The financial allocations should address such broad areas as a whole, avoiding detailed project or action lists	R7	21
36	TAC	06	<b>Dialogue</b> should be improved, along the lines currently adopted in the ENP processes and thereby strengthen the alignment with government systems and improving international partners' harmonisation	R10	21
36	TAC	06	Based support to the <b>social consequences of transition</b> on a programme approach focusing on <b>priority reform</b> themes that are <b>agreed with partner States</b> and are part of their sectoral priorities	R19	21
39	PNG	06	EC and GoPNG should improve on the quality of <b>participatory planning</b>	R9	21
29	ARM	06	Adopt a pro-active attitude on the issue of <b>donor co-ordination</b>	R14	22
31	MAL	06	<b>Systématiser la recherche de complémentarités</b> entre les interventions de la Commission et de la France au niveau des stratégies	R7	22
31	MAL	06	La recherche systématique de <b>complémentarités</b> entre les interventions de la Commission et de la France doit conduire à exploiter le plus possible les <b>potentialités existantes</b>	R8	22
32	COM	06	Les <b>expériences de coopération</b> inter-bailleurs dans les deux Fonds Fiduciaires devront être capitalisées afin de servir de « good practice » pour d'autres projets	R32	22
32	COM	06	<b>Coordination-complémentarité</b> : renforcer le <b>rôle du gouvernement</b> dans la coordination	R35	22
33	MRC	06	Proposer un appui pour qualifier et <b>éventuellement formaliser le leadership de la coordination</b> par le gouvernement	R25	22
36	TAC	06	NCUs: explore mechanism for using <b>nationally owned mechanisms</b> for aid coordination, in particular to strengthen the capacities within the priority ministries.	R25	22
36	TAC	06	Build on and <b>deepen collaboration</b> with Member States on JHA and cross-border collaboration	R21	22
36	TAC	06	<b>ENP</b> : focus should continue to be on building <b>inter-institutional partnerships</b> for medium-term sectoral (or thematic) joint action	R3	22
39	PNG	06	Community development projects of one donor should be closely <b>coordinated with interventions of other donors</b> that impinge on the regulatory framework for community projects and be integral part of government planning	R6	22
39	PNG	06	The <b>dialogue</b> between cooperation partners leading to the identification of a suitable intervention should have high priority	R7	22
39	PNG	06	<b>Synergies</b> should also continue to be strengthened among <b>similar projects</b> supported by several donors.	R18	22
33	MRC	06	Veiller à ce que les <b>programmes complémentaires</b> aient des <b>échanges actifs</b> visant plus d'actions conjointes dans leur mise en œuvre	R26	23
34	SEY	06	lien entre les interventions de la CE et les orientations sectorielles doit être considéré comme une étape de la conception de la programmation de la stratégie-pays et de la conception de chacun des projets. Un <b>indicateur de cohérence verticale</b> devrait figurer dans le cadre logique des projets au niveau de l'objectif spécifique	R9	23
36	TAC	06	The design and management of Cross Border Programmes should be improved by ensuring better <b>complementarity and integration between the EC funded programmes</b>	R14	23
26	GH	05	The Commission's interventions in the area of <b>PSD and trade</b> should be closely <b>articulated</b>	R17	24

27	CRB	05	<b>Outcomes</b> of future but foreseeable trends of liberalisation, or changes in EU policies, should be systematically <b>anticipated and response strategies identified</b> in collaboration with partners in the region	R13	24
32	COM	06	<b>Harmonisation avec les politiques communautaires</b> : mettre plus en évidence les stratégies et concepts sectoriels existants dans la planification des programmes	R34	24
26	GH	05	The Commission should make <b>explicit linkages</b> between <b>its regional and national strategies</b>	R25	25
32	COM	06	L'élaboration de la programmation doit faire apparaître dans son argumentaire de <b>choix de changement de secteur de concertation</b> l'atteinte des résultats attendus ou l'impossibilité de les atteindre sur la base des résultats du dispositif de suivi-évaluation	R2	12, 13, 54
32	COM	06	<b>Cohérence PIR/PIN</b> : planifications futures au niveau du pays doivent <b>analyser la cohérence entre actions régionales et nationales</b> pour assurer une cohérence additionnelle	R36	25
26	GH	05	The Commission's strategy should incorporate <b>Private Sector Development as a transversal sector</b> of intervention	R3	31
27	CRB	05	<i>5.2.4.1.1 IMPROVE THE CONSULTATION PROCESS WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR.</i>	R4	31
31	MAL	06	Accorder une attention plus grande à la problématique du développement du <b>secteur privé</b> .	R4	31
32	COM	06	<b>PME</b> : appui doit être précédé d'une refonte du cadre réglementaire et institutionnel	R21	31
32	COM	06	<b>PME</b> : programmation suppose identification précise de la demande d'appui. La gratuité du conseil est à proscrire	R22	31
32	COM	06	<b>PME</b> : exécution du projet doit être immédiatement précédée d'un diagnostic rapide pour confirmer la pérennité des caractéristiques identifiées de la demande des entreprises	R23	31
32	COM	06	Relier les programmes de microprojets à une <b>stratégie de renforcement des capacités</b> par la formation et le suivi en confiant au maximum la mise en œuvre des projets aux communautés concernées. Intégrer l'identification des microprojets dans une démarche de planification locale participative	R25	31
33	MRC	06	<b>Renforcement des PME et diversifications des activités</b> : cibler une branche ou un métier et concerner des appuis technologiques	R13	31
33	MRC	06	<b>Renforcement des PME et diversifications des activités</b> : se porter vers la réforme de l'Éducation et de la formation professionnelle	R14	31
34	SEY	06	L'introduction de <b>partenariats public-privé</b> , doivent conduire à mobiliser des appuis externes adaptés pour une régulation du marché en amont du processus	R7	31
34	SEY	06	<b>PME</b> : Les données structurelles de la gestion publique doivent être analysées à la lumière des facteurs qui ont conduit le précédent projet d'appui aux PME à l'échec avant de considérer tout nouvel appui de ce type	R10	31
34	SEY	06	<b>PME</b> : Un projet d'appui aux initiatives privées ne deviendra envisageable que lorsque les principales contraintes macroéconomiques et de pénurie de devises auront été levées.	R11	31
36	TAC	06	Strengthening the Commission's capacity to <b>facilitate private and public investment</b>	R18	31
29	ARM	06	Make democratic progress, respect for human rights and enforcement of the rule of the law a <b>priority</b> of the	R2	33

			Commission's co-operation <b>strategy</b>		
29	ARM	06	<b>Streamline democratic progress</b> into the Commission's interventions and support the structuring of Civil Society	R5	33
32	COM	06	Soutenir <b>l'organisation électorale</b> via : amélioration du système de mise à jour des listes, mettre en place des structures indépendantes de gestion, sensibiliser la population aux systèmes politiques, droits et devoirs	R29	33
32	COM	06	La <b>Gouvernance</b> devra être un <b>axe central</b> des interventions 10ème FED	R31	33
32	COM	06	PIC devra accompagner de manière étroite et durable le processus de <b>décentralisation</b> et la mise en place des communes	R33	33
32	COM	06	Accorder à la promotion de <b>l'État de droit</b> , la place qu'elle a de fait dans la coopération avec les Comores	R39	33
34	SEY	06	<b>L'identification précise des limites du gouvernement</b> et de la fonction publique en termes de bonne gouvernance doit être menée sur une <b>base indépendante</b>	R24	33
36	TAC	06	The design and management of <b>Civil Society</b> support programmes should be improved	R15	33
36	TAC	06	Mainstream Commission assistance into the <b>sectoral and reform priorities in partner States</b> : mainly legal and administrative reform	R17	33
26	GH	05	<b>Rural development</b> : It is recommended that baseline surveys be conducted to <b>establish benchmarks</b> against which to measure future progress on a range of indicators, including those at the impact and outcome levels	R5	34
26	GH	05	The Commission should support programmes targeting the main constraint of the <b>agricultural sector</b> and in particular seek to increase <b>productivity</b> in this sector.	R6	34
29	ARM	06	<b>Agriculture and rural development</b> : frame Commission interventions in the sector in <b>a policy dialogue</b> with the government	R7	34
32	COM	06	<b>Développement rural et gestion des ressources naturelles</b> : démarrage des mesures complexes est seulement s'il reste suffisamment de temps pour que le projet puisse accompagner et – si nécessaire – ajuster l'intervention	R17	34
32	COM	06	<b>Développement rural et gestion des ressources naturelles</b> : Assurer que le milieu rural fasse parti des priorités notamment (i) transfert de plus responsabilité aux acteurs locaux pour prendre en charge les investissements économiques et leurs structures professionnelles, (ii) meilleure capitalisation, utilisation et diffusion des expériences des projets passés et actuels.	R18	34
32	COM	06	Développement rural et gestion des ressources naturelles : intégrer des aspects de gestion géographiques	R19	34
32	COM	06	Développement rural et gestion des ressources naturelles : appliquer le système de gestion accès sur les résultats	R20	34
33	MRC	06	<b>Amélioration des systèmes agricoles</b> : meilleure prise en compte de la rentabilité économique des solutions proposées	R16	34
33	MRC	06	<b>Amélioration des systèmes agricoles</b> : planifier une durée plus longue des programmes cherchant l'amélioration des systèmes et un changement des habitudes	R17	34
39	PNG	06	Involve NSAs and private organisations being key actors, supplying services and support directed at facilitating <b>community based rural economic development</b>	R1	34
26	GH	05	The Commission should continue support <b>to trunk road rehabilitation</b> , but analyse economic benefits of	R9	35

			major upgrading or new construction.		
26	GH	05	It is recommended to <b>use specific conditionality for release of the Commission funds</b> linked to time bound delivery of government commitments as set out in Letters of Sector Policy or subsequent statements of commitment	R10	35
26	GH	05	The Commission should develop further <b>institutional support</b> in the <b>transport sector</b>	R11	35
32	COM	06	<b>Infrastructures de transport</b> : Les orientations à retenir devront s'adapter au statut d'autonomie des trois îles et à la décentralisation en cours	R15	35
32	COM	06	<b>Infrastructures de transport</b> : La qualité du contrôle des travaux doit être considérée comme une priorité absolue pour garantir l'efficacité des interventions dans le domaine des infrastructures	R16	35
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : Mettre en place un mécanisme de <b>capitalisation des initiatives</b> soutenues par le programme de coopération décentralisée en matière de déchets pour identifier et progressivement institutionnaliser une <b>approche sectorielle</b>	R11	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : Renforcer les capacités et le cadre réglementaire de la <b>délégation de service public</b> au niveau communal pour promouvoir des initiatives de partenariat public-privé avec des GIE locaux.	R12	36
32	COM	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : Mettre en place au sein de la Délégation, de ses représentants et de l'ON un <b>système d'alerte</b> rapide ou préalable en cas de dysfonctionnement	R13	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Assainissement</b> : mise en place d'une <b>synchronisation des programmations</b> respectives et de la mise en commun des études et appuis en expertise au moins sur les éléments de diagnostic	R24	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Appui budgétaire au secteur de l'assainissement</b> : Assurer une <b>consultation</b> plus large et plus approfondie des parties prenantes en amont des projets et mieux définir les conditionnalités et indicateurs de performance et en assurer un suivi plus rapproché.	R9	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Appui budgétaire au secteur de l'assainissement</b> : Revoir le fonctionnement salarial du WMA et mettre en place des conditionnalités plus strictes à l'appui par une assistance technique	R10	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Appui budgétaire au secteur de l'assainissement</b> : s'assurer que l'étude tarifaire en cours se base sur des considérat° réalistes et socialement acceptables, prendre engagements solides et réalistes par rapport au MTEF, étudier possibilités réduct° des dépenses opérationnelles	R11	36
33	MRC	06	<b>Appui budgétaire au secteur de l'assainissement</b> : mettre sur pied une cellule de communication pour valoriser les différentes actions entreprises dans le secteur et appuyer le projet de système de monitoring environnemental	R12	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : nécessité d'apprécier l'opportunité d'appui dans le cadre de mobilisation de partenariat public/privé	R12	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Déchets solides</b> : mobiliser des moyens plus appropriés pour reconsidérer la pertinence des choix techniques retenus	R13	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : Appuyer les efforts entrepris pour réhabiliter le réseau de distribution d'eau potable	R14	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : Envisager un appui aux projets de collecte et utilisation de la ressource pluviale	R15	36
34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : Comparer la qualité des équipements fournis avec les prescriptions de l'appel d'offre	R16	36

34	SEY	06	<b>Eau</b> : Procéder à une analyse de risque particulière en ce qui concerne l'atelier de chloration	R17	36
29	ARM	06	<b>Social sectors</b> : frame Commission interventions in a <b>policy dialogue</b> with the government	R8	37
29	ARM	06	<b>Education</b> : Provide continuous support to the <b>renovation and development of vocational education</b>	R9	37
32	COM	06	Poursuivre le financement de l'appui à l'éducation	R27	37
32	COM	06	Renforcer l' <b>assistance technique</b> pour soutenir les Ministères de l'Éducation dans une stratégie de concertation et de préparation à l' <b>approche sectorielle</b>	R28	37
39	PNG	06	Or strengthen capacities of government institutions to supply better <b>public services</b> to the people of PNG, in public fields like education, health, infrastructure or administration	R2	37
39	PNG	06	create conducive <b>framework conditions for the supply of support services</b> through NSAs	R3	37
39	PNG	06	Define clear strategies to strengthen the role of the government	R4	37
39	PNG	06	<b>Develop exit strategy</b> notably regarding finance	R5	37 13
32	COM	06	L' <b>analyse genre</b> doit devenir un instrument de base pour la programmation et la mise en œuvre de la politique de coopération de la CE aux Comores.	R10	41
32	COM	06	L' <b>analyse genre</b> des programmes et activités planifiés doit devenir un <b>instrument de base</b> pour la programmation et la mise en œuvre de la coopération pour l'égalité entre les sexes de manière consciente et « suivable »	R41	41
32	COM	06	S'inscrire dans les possibilités de « <b>gender-mainstreaming</b> » donnée par le Programme de Coopération Décentralisé : prise en compte de la problématique des femmes dans les OSC, pérenniser leur position forte dans les communes	R42	41
32	COM	06	<b>Environnement</b> : renforcer la composante déchets solides, assurer un investissement sur des techniques simples et engager les associations communautaires dans le processus	R40	42
33	MRC	06	Tous les projets de la CE doivent, sauf incompatibilité par nature, participer à la <b>sensibilisation et l'éducation environnementales</b> pour contribuer sur le long terme à promouvoir des politiques environnementales	R30	42
36	TAC	06	<b>Environment and natural resources</b> : focus on national projects with a co-financing component	R20	42
26	GH	05	The Commission should <b>develop strategies and indicators</b> for more consistent mainstreaming of <b>cross-cutting issues</b> for all interventions and programmes of NIP	R24	43
27	CRB	05	Mechanisms needs to be established to ensure that the Commission's policies on <b>cross cutting issues are effectively monitored</b> in relation to implementation of the construction of the regional integrated space	R12	43
33	MRC	06	Mise en place d'un <b>dispositif de veille sur les priorités transversales</b> plutôt que d'interventions spécifiques ou de composante ad hoc	R29	43
33	MRC	06	Mise en place d'une <b>veille</b> ou des actions très ciblées sur des situations bien identifiées <b>d'exclusion ou de discrimination</b>	R31	43
36	TAC	06	improve the way EC assistance addresses <b>key cross cutting issues</b> through programmebased approach	R16	43

27	CRB	05	Review the <b>organisational process and procedures governing the management of the regional programme</b> so as to increase efficiency of implementation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- clearly <b>identify responsibilities</b> for the management of regional programme and transmission of information</li> <li>- strengthened the <b>institutional character</b> of the PU</li> </ul>	R6	50
27	CRB	05	To improve the regional impact of interventions, mechanisms should be put in place to <b>increase regional ownership</b> throughout the project cycle and at termination.	R10	50
26	GH	05	The Commission should continue to implement its interventions in the area <b>of macroeconomic support</b> under the form <b>of budget support</b>	R13	51
26	GH	05	The Commission should take measures to <b>increase the predictability of the assistance</b> provided through <b>budget support</b>	R14	51
26	GH	05	It is recommended to systematise <b>linkage</b> between <b>budget</b> support and sector support <b>programmes</b>	R19	51
27	CRB	05	Inception reports and work plans for individual interventions should <b>indicate</b> how the intervention will <b>support similar or complementary activities</b> .	R9	51
29	ARM	06	Evolve from FSP to full-fledged sectoral approach <b>and budget support</b>	R12	51
31	MAL	06	Tendre à la mise en place d'un <b>système d'appui budgétaire</b> où les programmes macroéconomiques et les programmes sectoriels s'articulent et se complètent.	R5	51 23
31	MAL	06	<b>Compléter l'appui budgétaire par des aides projet et des actions de proximité</b> , en particulier dans les secteurs visant directement les segments les plus pauvres de la population.	R6	51
33	MRC	06	L'approche de <b>l'appui sectoriel doit être privilégiée</b> , voire rendue obligatoire, dans le secteur de concentration unique des PIN : <b>aide budgétaire</b> outil à utiliser	R3	51
34	SEY	06	L'approche de <b>l'appui sectoriel doit être privilégiée</b> , voire rendue obligatoire, dans le secteur de concentration unique des PIN : aide budgétaire outil à utiliser	R2	51
36	TAC	06	The <b>project-by-project approach should be gradually abandoned</b> and projects should be better integrated into programme-based approaches at sectoral or thematic level	R6	51
36	TAC	06	Action Programmes should include <b>strategic programmes rather than stand-alone projects</b> , with the possibility of coordinating the use of various implementation instruments	R8	51
36	TAC	06	Implementation should take place mainly through <b>flexible instruments</b> , such as: general or sectoral budget support at national or state level; service facilities run by EU institutions, foundations...	R9	51
39	PNG	06	Identify sources of subsidies and define a system to channel subsidies to service suppliers needs	R21	51
26	GH	05	It is recommended that the Commission <b>systematise ex-post evaluations</b> as a means of learning key lessons about programme approaches that contribute to sustainability	R8	54
27	CRB	05	Improve <b>capacity to monitor the strategy and interventions</b> so as to assess progress and results	R5	54
32	COM	06	la fonction de <b>suivi-évaluation doit être spécifique</b> en positionnant en Délégation un responsable du suivi-évaluation, éventuellement fonctionnellement rattaché à l'Unité d'évaluation au siège de la CE. Mettre en place un dispositif de contrôle de la qualité du cadre logique et du caractère viable et cohérent avec la finalité du suivi-évaluation des indicateurs proposés	R6	54

32	COM	06	Informers les institutions de la CE intervenant dans un pays du <b>rôle de l'Unité d'Évaluation</b> et clarifier les formalités de la mise à disposition des informations et le mandat des missions d'évaluation de niveau national	R38	54
33	MRC	06	<b>Fonction de suivi-évaluation doit être spécifique</b> : 1 responsable du suivi-évaluation par délégation, éventuellement rattaché à l'Unité d'éval au siège de la CE. Mettre en place un dispositif de contrôle de la qualité du cadre logique et du caractère viable et cohérent avec la finalité du suivi-évaluation des indicateurs proposés	R6	54
33	MRC	06	Mettre en place au niveau de la Délégation un <b>dispositif de concentration des informations</b> relatives aux décisions prises au niveau de chacun des instruments	R28	54
34	SEY	06	<b>Fonction de suivi-évaluation doit être spécifique</b> : 1 responsable du suivi-évaluation par délégation, éventuellement rattaché à l'Unité d'éval au siège de la CE. Mettre en place un dispositif de contrôle de la qualité du cadre logique et du caractère viable et cohérent avec la finalité du suivi-évaluation des indicateurs proposés	R5	54
34	SEY	06	Mieux prendre en compte dans <b>indic de performance</b> des projets régionaux les résultats attendus des interventions de niveau national et leçons des anciens projets.	R19	54
34	SEY	06	Mettre en place au niveau de la Délégation un <b>dispositif de concentration des informations</b> relatives aux décisions prises au niveau de chacun des instruments	R22	54
34	SEY	06	Mise en place d'un <b>dispositif de veille sur les priorités transversales</b> plutôt que d'interventions spécifiques ou de composante ad hoc	R23	54 43
36	TAC	06	<b>Anticipate the main ENP policy changes</b> , and identify and test new approaches and delivery mechanisms	R12	54
36	TAC	06	Improve the current <b>monitoring system</b> so that it is better equipped to monitor outcome achievement and above all to better assist evaluations	R22	54
36	TAC	06	Improve the paper trail of non-financial issues as part of improving the <b>institutional memory</b> of the Commission and Delegations: clear reference to stakeholders consulted and include the mechanisms introduced to engage in national dialogue on crosscutting issues	R23	54
36	TAC	06	Improve <b>visibility and access to results</b> between different actors and stakeholders	R24	54
39	PNG	06	<b>Impact oriented planning and monitoring</b> should be introduced	R10	54
27	CRB	05	A <b>criterion</b> for the selection of areas and <b>sectors of concentration</b> under the RIP should be that enough evidence is presented on the contribution to the <b>construction of the regional integrated space</b> which is expected from activities programmed in those areas.	R3	55 12
29	ARM	06	<b>Restrict Commission interventions to a limited number of concentration areas</b> : Approximation of the Armenian legislation relative to economic activity and trade to that of the EU; Poverty alleviation through support to agricultural and rural development policy and to social policy; Education with a focus on vocational training.	R4	55 13
32	COM	06	L'élaboration conjointe de la stratégie de réponse aux contraintes du développement doit mobiliser des <b>moyens financiers et humains beaucoup plus importants</b> et sur une plus longue période	R1	55
33	MRC	06	L'élaboration conjointe de la stratégie doit mobiliser <b>des moyens financiers et humains beaucoup plus importants</b> et sur une plus longue période	R1	55
34	SEY	06	L'élaboration conjointe de la stratégie doit mobiliser <b>des moyens financiers et humains beaucoup plus importants</b> et sur une plus longue période	R1	55

36	TAC	06	The sectoral concentration criterion should not limit the wide existing opportunities for establishing <b>inter-institutional linkages</b> with State partners and synergies with international partners.	R13	55
26	GH	05	The Commission should take the necessary steps to <b>reduce implementation delays</b> (start-up delays and inappropriate project design)	R22	56
32	COM	06	<b>Anticiper et communiquer</b> sur les délais d'instruction	R4	56
32	COM	06	La <b>durée de fonctionnement des projets</b> doit être maintenue telle qu'elle a été prévue initialement, ce qui suppose que les 3 ou 5 ans initiaux doivent commencer à courir à partir du moment où le projet est opérationnel	R5	56
33	MRC	06	<b>Anticiper et communiquer</b> sur les délais d'instruction	R4	56
33	MRC	06	La <b>durée de fonctionnement des projets doit être maintenue</b> telle qu'elle a été prévue initialement, ce qui suppose que les 3 ou 5 ans initiaux doivent commencer à courir à partir du moment où le projet est opérationnel	R5	56
34	SEY	06	<b>Anticiper et communiquer</b> sur les délais d'instruction	R3	56
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39	PNG	06	Provide <b>simplified and targeted information</b> on EDF rules	R12	56 57
26	GH	05	The Commission should develop its support to the development of a <b>need-based budgeting procedure</b> along with a <b>resource based planning</b>	R18	57
26	GH	05	It is recommended to <b>set the level of beneficiary input</b> so as to maximise ownership while <b>minimising the strain on beneficiary resources</b>	R23	57
27	CRB	05	An easy to use <b>guide as to where information from other agencies can be located</b> should be prepared to assist those involved in design, implementation, monitoring and assessment of programmes.	R8	57
29	ARM	06	Enhance the <b>status</b> and strengthen the <b>capacity</b> of the <b>Delegation's Branch Office</b> in Yerevan	R13	57
32	COM	06	Une <b>représentation permanente</b> de la CE dans chacun des pays où elle met en œuvre des projets est incontournable	R7	57
33	MRC	06	L'effort de <b>visibilité sur les principes fondateurs</b> de l'aide communautaire doit être renforcé et pour cela nécessite d'être géré de manière spécifique	R7	57
34	SEY	06	Une <b>représentation permanente</b> de la CE dans chacun des pays où elle met en œuvre des projets est incontournable	R6	57
34	SEY	06	Possibilité de <b>relayer les problèmes de conflits d'intérêt</b> vers le siège pour obtenir un arbitrage efficace	R18	57
39	PNG	06	Provide <b>training</b> to the NSA for the implementation of EC supported cooperation programmes	R13	57
39	PNG	06	Use <b>intermediary organisations</b> as multiplier structures and managing contracts <b>for implementation</b> thanks to legal and administrative framework for such contracts	R14	57
39	PNG	06	Design programmes in a way that NSA has to manage small projects	R15	57
39	PNG	06	<b>Building capacities of the NAO</b> in donor coordination, training his staff and assisting to establish a functioning framework for donor coordination should be emphasised	R16	57

39	PNG	06	Interventions in the two focal sectors could be enhanced through <b>capacity building</b> under the ICBG programme	R17	57
26	GH	05	<b>Programme</b> should address possible <b>policy conflicts</b> /contradictions and programme management should not be expected to achieve conflicting aims	R7	60
26	GH	05	Improve the coverage of <b>HIV/AIDS</b> awareness and <b>road safety</b> measures in EDF contracts as well as in planned physical rehabilitation interventions	R12	60
26	GH	05	The Commission should promote <b>follow up of the NHIS together with the MOH</b>	R21	60
29	ARM	06	Support the National Programme for <b>implementation of the PCA</b> , and promote enforcement of the legal framework	R6	60
29	ARM	06	<b>Energy</b> : Pursue the dialogue on the Medzamor issue and support the GoA's endeavours to diversify energy supply sources and reduce the country's dependency on imported energy	R10	60
32	COM	06	<b>PME</b> : retenir principe de mobilisation d'entreprises ayant atteint les objectifs pour campagnes d'incitation pour projets pilotes.	R24	60
32	COM	06	<b>Gouvernance</b> : appuis et études réalisés au cours de la mise en œuvre du Fonds Fiduciaire devront d'abord être capitalisés lors d'une <b>évaluation finale</b> du projet prévue avant septembre 2006 pour décider des <b>nouvelles orientations</b>	R30	60
32	COM	06	<b>Transport</b> : réinvestir avec comme objectif global l'établissement de la continuité territoriale entre les îles	R14	60
33	MRC	06	<b>Coopération décentralisée</b> : Intégrer l'application d'une <b>démarche participative</b> avec le groupe cible comme un critère essentiel de sélection des projets de lutte contre la pauvreté	R18	60
33	MRC	06	<b>Coopération décentralisée</b> : renforcer l' <b>autonomie de gestion des programmes</b> de la CE à Rodrigues	R21	60
33	MRC	06	Faire attention à ce que <b>le renforcement des capacités organisationnelles et professionnelles</b> reçoive assez d'importance dans la planification par rapport aux mesures techniques	R23	60
33	MRC	06	<b>Amélioration des systèmes agricoles</b> : à Rodrigues, programme accentué de conservation des eaux et des sols	R15	60
36	TAC	06	<b>Extend the framework of principles and priorities</b> of the European Partnership Policy	R2	60
26	GH	05	It is recommended to maintain and <b>systematise technical assistance</b> , as a support to other interventions	R20	70
33	MRC	06	<b>Coopération décentralisée</b> : Contribuer au développement d'un <b>cadre de concertation régulière</b> entre toutes les organisations engagées dans la lutte contre la pauvreté	R19	70
33	MRC	06	<b>Coopération décentralisée</b> : Programmer systématiquement une phase de démarrage lent et allonger la durée des programmes complexes. Créer des mécanismes qui réduisent la domination de la logique budgétaire dans la mise en œuvre	R20	70
27	CRB	05	<b>Develop analytical tools</b> to formulate and monitor a strategy for the construction of a <b>regional integrated space</b> that maximises the development benefits for the region	R1	54 & 38