Effective statebuilding?

A review of evaluations of international statebuilding support in fragile contexts
Evaluation Study

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June 2012

Jörn Grävingholt
Julia Leininger
Christian von Haldenwang
German Development Institute

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Executive Summary

Statebuilding has become a major concern of OECD donor countries in recent years. However, our conceptual and empirical knowledge is still rather limited as to which approaches and instruments work and which do not. A growing stock of research and evaluation studies should provide urgently needed information, enabling donors to learn from past experiences in order to improve the effectiveness of their interventions in the future.

The present evaluation study suggests that the current body of research and evaluation documents does not yet fulfil this task. The study surveys existing knowledge on the experiences with assistance to statebuilding in fragile contexts. For the period under review (2005-2011), the study identifies some 100 documents that assess international activities which are explicitly and primarily aimed at addressing issues of statehood/fragility, peace and security or governance. Some 40 studies were selected for in-depth analysis, either major (cross-country or multi-donor) evaluations or outstanding case studies. In order to allow for the triangulation of findings, the universe of available case studies was narrowed down to eight countries: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (including South Sudan) and Sri Lanka.

Methods

As a general observation, we feel that the “conventional approach” to evaluation has to a certain extent reached its limits. Many studies analysed in this report attempt to establish credible findings and recommendations, but very few meet the standards of academic scrutiny. Most studies fail to establish a transparent link between the information presented and the conclusions drawn from that information. Given the considerable effort evaluators put into data collection, it is surprising how little truly comparative information is generated, especially in the context of cross-country or multi-donor evaluations.

The vast majority of documents assessed for this report rely on qualitative methods for data collection and analysis, rather than advanced statistical methods. Some major evaluations are based on cross-country (small-N) comparisons with up to ten countries. These studies are typically confronted with a large diversity in terms of the quality and quantity of project documentation, strategic outlines and data sources, making comparisons between cases or specific approaches difficult. As a consequence, most cross-country evaluations do not exhaust the opportunities for a truly comparative analysis of the cases. The selection of countries or projects is hardly ever based on a concise conceptual or methodological argument.
Few studies address the key issues raised by the current international debate on evaluation design and methods. Above all, there is virtually no reference at all to the attribution gap between specific donor interventions and observed developments in statebuilding. Also, basic features of scientific research, such as the replicability of results, the validity of data, the isolation of variables in complex causality chains or the construction of counterfactuals and baseline data are hardly ever mentioned. As a result, this type of evaluations has an in-built tendency to be rather mainstream-oriented and overly focussed on the views and opinions of the development expert community (including evaluators) and their immediate counterparts.

Some studies analysed in this report, however, clearly suggest that innovation is possible, especially if additional efforts are dedicated to (i) tapping local knowledge sources and intensifying exposure in the field, (ii) employing rigorous methods, (iii) supporting methods-sensitive terms of reference and project documentation and (iv) ensuring comparability.

Key lessons for statebuilding assistance

With the methodological qualifications mentioned above, several major lessons can be derived from the existing body of knowledge:

**Prioritisation and sequencing:** Donors widely acknowledge the need to prioritise and sequence their activities, but they do not seem to rank their different objectives in a strategic and successive manner. One major challenge – for evaluators and donors alike – is the lack of a convincing theory of change.

**Donor coordination, interdepartmental cooperation and aid modalities:** Several studies point out that the transaction costs and the loss of flexibility resulting from donor coordination may outweigh its benefits, especially in situations where quick action is needed. Few authors, however, question the benefits of joint conflict analyses and political assessments as a means to enhance effectiveness in donor interventions.

**Political settlements:** Our review shows an increasing awareness of the need to analyse and understand the political foundations upon which statebuilding occurs. Those (few) studies which employ a political settlement lens report strong evidence concerning the importance of this factor for the success of statebuilding support.

**Incentives and coercion:** The conditionality of ODA flows in the context of state fragility and violent conflict is a widely debated issue. Yet the evaluations surveyed neither provide a systematic analysis of how incentives and coercion might impact on statebuilding nor do they report on donor attempts to set incentives or put pressure on relevant actors.

**Political and social context-sensitivity of interventions:** It is a common finding in evaluations and research studies that interventions fail to address the “root causes” of conflict, employ flawed analytical concepts and do not account for the specific conditions
of their political and social environment. At the same time, many studies do not even pay lip service to domestic ownership, let alone evaluate interventions from this perspective.

In sum, donors need to be more pro-active and innovative with regard to evaluations. Basic aspects of project planning and implementation, such as the formulation of objectives and indicators, the collection of baseline data and the elaboration of reports, should be reviewed with a view to facilitating future evaluations. Donors could also encourage evaluators to make use of robust statistical methods and observe the standards of sound qualitative analysis.
1 Introduction

Statebuilding has become a major concern of OECD donor countries in recent years. Several conceptual studies and guideline documents have been produced within the DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). The World Development Report 2011 confirmed the urgency of effective statebuilding in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence. The report called for legitimate and inclusive institutions able to provide citizen security, justice and jobs (WDR 2011).

On 30 November 2011, at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (HLF4), the debate was taken to a new level with the adoption of a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”. The document was supported by both donor and affected-country governments and had been prepared in the framework of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The parties agreed on five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals to guide their work in fragile and conflict-affected states: These include (1) legitimate politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations and (5) revenues & services. The work undertaken in the International Dialogue emphasised the necessity to improve the effectiveness of statebuilding support. This has also been underlined by the 2011 Fragile States Principles Monitoring Survey conducted on behalf of the INCAF (OECD 2011a).

In Denmark, as well as in the donor community in general, there is a wish to learn from past experiences in order to improve the effectiveness of aid in the field of statebuilding. The present evaluation study, which has been commissioned by the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, surveys existing knowledge on the experiences with assistance to statebuilding in fragile contexts with a view to facilitating such learning. Synthesising an extensive body of literature, the study provides insights on three dimensions:

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1 The most notable OECD publication is the 2011 Policy Guidance on Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility (OECD 2011b). See the INCAF website for a full list of relevant OECD publications: http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf.

2 The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding comprises the g7+ group of 19 fragile and conflict-affected countries as well as major development partner governments and international organisations. As of 2 December 2011, 32 countries and 5 organisations were reported to have officially endorsed the New Deal document. They include Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, France, Germany, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Ireland, Japan, Liberia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, the United Nations Development Group and the World Bank. (Source: http://www.g7plus.org/new-deal-endorsement).
First, it presents an overview of major evaluation and research findings on factors of success or failure of statebuilding support.

Second, it analyses to which degree existing evaluations and research confirm or challenge major assumptions about good practice of international support to statebuilding.

And third, it gives a summary assessment of the quality of the findings – i.e., the robustness of the evidence –, and the methodological design of the evaluations reviewed.

This latter part serves a double purpose: it puts the reported findings in perspective by reflecting on their reliability and generalisability; and it helps identify opportunities of improving the ways in which we learn from experience in the difficult area of statebuilding in fragile contexts.

The report proceeds in five parts (chapters 2 to 6). Following this introduction, chapter 2 explains some of the most relevant concepts used throughout the text. They include the terms “statebuilding”, “fragile contexts”, “international support to statebuilding” and “peacebuilding”. More terms are relevant and not necessarily self-explaining, but where required, we explain them upon their first main occurrence.

Fragile states are not a uniform category. All research concurs that a differentiated approach to this diverse “group” of countries is a necessary precondition for successful international engagement. Consequently, learning from experience of statebuilding support, too, needs to be based on a differentiation of fragility contexts. Yet research on how to best differentiate fragile states beyond the truism of “every country is unique”, is only in its initial stages. A research team at the DIE has recently developed a multidimensional, data-driven typology of state fragility. It differs from earlier contributions to the debate by taking empirical data, rather than theoretical assumptions, as the main factor to drive the identification of “types” of fragility. The discussion of the term “fragile contexts” in chapter 2 includes a brief introduction into this approach. Based on its findings, we suggest distinguishing three different types of fragility contexts, and thus of statebuilding environments, for the purpose of this study. In doing so, we hope to identify patterns of international statebuilding support with regard to different fragility contexts. In the absence of such differentiated patterns we would have to conclude that donors seem not to adapt their activities to specific fragility contexts.

Chapter 3 discusses the scope of this review. It presents the universe of studies identified as potentially relevant and the selection criteria applied to produce a sample of especially meaningful documents for in-depth assessments.

As the robustness and reliability of the findings reported in evaluations and academic studies determines the degree to which learning from them is indeed useful (and reasonable), chapter 4 continues with a discussion of the approaches and methods employed in the studies surveyed before we turn to the findings conveyed by these very
studies. Besides assessing the studies against common evaluation standards, the chapter
discusses how they address the typical challenges distinctive of evaluating statebuilding
support in fragile contexts. These include, inter alia, the problem of data collection, as
access to areas, respondents or reliable statistics is often severely limited; the extraordinary
dynamics of political contexts, which sets limits to the possibility to make inferences by
constructing plausible counterfactual scenarios (with/without intervention) for
comparative purposes; and a tremendous attribution problem as international involvement
comes in many forms, of which aid is only one – and not necessarily the most influential –
while other instruments (military, diplomacy etc.) play an important role, too. One salient
question thus is how to delineate and measure support in the first place.

In chapter 5 we present an overview of the most important findings reported in the studies
reviewed. The chapter addresses several crucial problems of statebuilding in fragile
contexts. The first issue to be examined is prioritisation and sequencing. Here we discuss which
areas of engagement are evaluated favourably when prioritised in programming, which ones
are of doubtful use, and which have even been found to be counterproductive. The chapter
looks also into whether research and evaluations recommend a certain sequencing of goals
and instruments as one way of solving the prioritisation puzzle. From there, we turn to a
second issue, namely findings on donor coordination, cross-departmental cooperation and aid
modalities. Although these topics are rather distinct fields of study, they are closely
interrelated. Above all, they are tied together because they all deal with the ways in which
foreign engagement meets actors and institutions in fragile countries. The third area deals
with findings on the quality of political settlements. Settlements can vary greatly, but it is now
commonly assumed that they are a crucial element of a peaceful statebuilding process and
thus a major determinant of success. We analyse to what extent existing studies support
this assumption. A fourth area, finally, is findings on incentives and coercion. The guiding
question here is whether evaluations and research studies on statebuilding activities give
reason to support the use of “carrots or sticks”, i.e. conditionality and sanctions, to increase
leverage beyond the narrow boundaries of foreign aid.

The chapter discusses the degree of consensus or contention among the studies on any of
these major issues, and highlights where certain findings seem to hold true only for
particular types of fragile states.

Chapter 6 discusses the degree to which the reported findings support generally held
propositions on what constitutes good practice for international engagement in fragile
contexts. Summarised in a nutshell, these propositions state that statebuilding support (i)
must be extremely well-adapted to the respective political and social context; (ii) must
address the broader state-society relations rather than focusing on the state alone; (iii) must
deal with the state in its security, legitimacy and capacity dimensions; (iv) must cover all
sectors of donor activity in a coordinated way; and (v) must reflect the recognition that
statebuilding is first and foremost an endogenous process with clear limits as to what external support can achieve.³

The concluding chapter 7 derives recommendations about how donors might consider addressing blind spots in the current practice of evaluations in the area of statebuilding support.

³ This is a schematic summary of the most prevalent issues highlighted in two recent international documents: the OECD Fragile States Principles (OECD 2007) and the OECD Policy Guidance on Statebuilding (OECD 2011b). It is also compatible with the “New Deal” document endorsed at the HLF4 in Busan in November 2011.
2 Key terms and concepts

Before we enter into the analysis of relevant studies, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of several key concepts which form the basis of this review and are widely used in the literature upon which we rely. Two concepts stand out as lying at the core of the analysis: statebuilding and fragile contexts. In addition, we need to make clear what constitutes international support to statebuilding for the purpose of this study. Due to the high number of fragile states that experience (or have recently experienced) major violent conflict, peacebuilding is another major concept used to summarise a broad range of international engagement. Historically, the concepts and practice of statebuilding and peacebuilding evolved in rather distinct communities. It is only in recent years that the two have been increasingly addressed as closely interrelated. In this chapter, we will therefore focus on the question of how statebuilding in fragile contexts relates to peacebuilding in (post-)conflict settings.

As should be expected in a field of study that has attracted attention from a large variety of organisations and individuals, no single undisputed definition exists for any of the terms that are of interest here. For the purpose of official development cooperation, however, the work that was done in the INCAF over the past years has contributed valuable conceptualisations that hold the additional advantage of reflecting a general consensus among DAC members.

Statebuilding, according to the Policy Guidance document that has resulted from the INCAF process, refers to “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations”. Hence it is “primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited” (OECD 2011b: 20).

Against this background, a fragile context is an environment characterised by fragile statehood, i.e. a state that “has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society,” resulting in low trust and weak mutual obligations between the state and its citizens (OECD 2011b: 21). On the opposing end, states that perform relatively well on all of these aspects are deemed “resilient” (WDR 2011, chapter 3).

Yet fragile contexts differ greatly in the degree to which the definitional characteristics of fragility are in place (or absent). External support needs to be geared towards this diversity of environments. This is why efforts to measure statehood with quantitative means have gained so much popularity over the past decade. Yet most of the popular indexes of state
fragility map the diversity of fragility contexts onto one-dimensional scales that claim to reflect lower or higher degrees of fragility but obscure important differences in kind between seemingly “similar” countries or inflate the difference between mostly similar countries that diverge strongly on only very few indicators (for details see Fabra Mata & Ziaja 2009).

Instead, more recent academic research has begun to develop tools that take fuller account of the multidimensional nature of state fragility (Call 2011). Following a new methodology developed by Grävingholt, Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012) it seems empirically justified to group developing countries in various “fragility types”. In line with a major strand in the academic and policy-oriented literature, the approach is based on a concept that refers to three dimensions – authority (i.e., the monopoly of violence), capacity and legitimacy – as the fundamental components of statehood and hence, depending on their degree and interaction, of resilience or fragility. Three fragility types include most of those countries that are widely thought to be “fragile” in a general sense (see Table 1).4 With some degree of simplification, they can be characterised as “failed” states (extremely low levels in all three dimensions), “weak” states with multiple challenges (mostly very low levels of capacity but also relatively low on authority and diverse in legitimacy) and “challenged performers”, who are quite capable in administrative terms yet display high levels of violence.

This study will refer to these three types of state fragility contexts if and when findings from evaluations suggest that statebuilding activities and/or results differ between the three groups. The underlying assumption is that the impact and success of statebuilding activities depend not only on their “objective” quality, but also on their level of adaptation to different types of environment. Accordingly, the fragility typology will be most relevant when analysing the objectives and specific instruments of external support (chapter 5.1).

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4 Two additional groups, which are irrelevant in the context of this study, are developing countries that either feature a relatively well-functioning state monopoly of violence despite serious capacity gaps in other areas of state activity or that are relatively capable but often display serious legitimacy deficits, typically coupled with low levels of readiness to tolerate foreign advice on domestic political issues (For details see Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum 2012).
Table 1: Types of state fragility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group (typical countries)</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Priority goal</th>
<th>Character of external support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failed states (Chad, DR Congo, Sudan etc.)</td>
<td>Extremely low levels in all three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy</td>
<td>Focus on the provision of basic security first. Then bring quick socioeconomic gains and/or establish the basics of legitimate politics (debated)</td>
<td>Broad-based international engagement; peacebuilding and statebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak states (Rep. Congo, Uganda, Kenya etc.)</td>
<td>Mostly very low levels of capacity but also relatively low on authority; diverse, though mostly at the lower end, on legitimacy</td>
<td>Improve capacity, but combine it with strengthening legitimacy.</td>
<td>Offer support for capacity, yet encourage (or demand) better governance based on broader legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenged performers (Algeria, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic etc.)</td>
<td>Decent capacity, yet high levels of violence</td>
<td>Prevent violence; invest in constructive state-society relations</td>
<td>Statebuilding and governance support based on meaningful political dialogue; coordination essential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum 2012; based on country data for 2007-2009.

International support to statebuilding for the purpose of this study refers to international actors’ strategies and projects which by design or by their nature are expected by those actors to assist the endogenous process of statebuilding. In particular, these activities have to be ODA-eligible under the OECD reporting scheme. Activities span a broad range of instruments and sectors because they reflect the full scope of state responsibilities that are, for example, implicitly contained in the set of “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals” agreed on in the Busan “New Deal”. They also vary according to the individual donor’s understanding and priorities of state functions.

Activities include the physical rebuilding of infrastructure, massive assistance to uphold basic state services (such as health care, water and sanitation, food supply etc.) or the provision of public sector salaries in (usually post-war) environments where the state had ceased to exist and needs to be revitalised; they can come as capacity building programmes in the area of public administration, placements of experts to advise on necessary reform policies or technical assistance to improve their implementation; other forms of statebuilding support concern the safeguarding of peace agreements, the demobilisation of combatants and the formation of legitimate, accountable security forces or processes of post-conflict justice and reconciliation; and many programmes include deliberate components to improve democratic governance, civil and political rights, gender equality and the general human rights situation – both as values in and of themselves and as a presumed contribution to more sustainable peace and stability.
In the related area of peacebuilding, the “Utstein Palette”, a framework of activities introduced in the 2004 multi-donor “Joint Utstein Study”, has graphically illustrated how many different kinds of support can be counted towards this field, provided they are adequately devised (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). In the case of statebuilding it is telling that the 2011 OECD Policy Guidance has not even made a similar attempt to map the field of eligible activities – such a list would have been even longer and still incomplete.

**Peacebuilding** as a type of regular international engagement dates back to at least the 1980s and became an established area of engagement for development agencies during the 1990s. Statebuilding, by contrast, evolved into an area of engagement about one decade later as a response to the felt increase in cases of state collapse. In most cases, however, state failure occurred also in the face of civil war or externally induced violent conflict and was followed by some kind of international tutelage and thus a responsibility to promote the emergence of sustainable state institutions.

Initially many development actors perceived the concepts of peacebuilding and statebuilding as being at odds with each other. While peacebuilding would focus on the immediate needs arising from the proximity to violent conflict, thus seeking to prevent an outbreak or a return to violence and supporting peace processes in society, statebuilding, by contrast, would emphasise the longer-term developmental goal of an effective and responsive state (Grävingholt, Gänzle & Ziaja 2009: 1-2). Trade-offs were identified, e.g., between reconciling formerly warring parties and the strengthening of state institutions that sometimes represented only one of those parties. Peacebuilders were presumed to put most emphasis on the inclusion of civil society actors and to be suspicious toward the state. Statebuilders, on the other hand, were criticised for their alleged fixation on state institutions at the expense of civil society.

Recent discussions in the field have largely settled this dispute. At least among OECD donor governments, a broad consensus exists today that peacebuilding and statebuilding are interrelated processes that address similar underlying problems as well as a common overall purpose, and that neither the diverse interests existing within each society nor the functioning of the state must be neglected (OECD 2011b: 21). Existing dilemmas or trade-offs cannot be resolved theoretically but need to be addressed politically in every given context (Grävingholt, Gänzle & Ziaja 2009: 4).

Therefore, for the purpose of this study, activities labelled as “peacebuilding support” qualify to be included wherever they are intended to contribute to the “endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations” (our definition of statebuilding). To the best of our knowledge, the totality of evaluations of peacebuilding activities included in our analysis have such a broad focus.
3 Relevant evaluations and research

This chapter describes the scope of studies identified and analysed for the present review. It explains the usage of the terms “research study” and “evaluation”, the criteria employed to identify the “most relevant” studies and the choice of a limited number of country cases that we use to be able to cross-check the validity of findings across studies.

Research studies for the purpose of this review are systematic empirical studies that assess the impact of international activities to support statebuilding (and of their concomitant modes of action) on the process and outcome of statebuilding, thereby making use of social science research methods. With one exception, our survey covers studies published in the period from 2005 to 2011.5

Evaluations are studies initiated by a donor or group of donors to learn more about the impact of their interventions, and conducted by independent evaluators with the consent and support of those donors, ensuring maximum access to relevant programme information; relevant parts of broader country programme evaluations also count in this category. Insofar as evaluations employ scientific methods for data collection and analysis they also qualify as research studies. In fact, only very few research studies identified as highly relevant for this study are not evaluations. However, quite a few evaluations would not, in our view, qualify as research studies, as will be shown in the following chapter.

A vast body of academic literature deals with statebuilding and peacebuilding in a general manner. Analyses comprise theoretical reflections about the content, preconditions and effects of (un)successful international support to statebuilding and peacebuilding. Some of these studies offer an empirical analysis of international interventions in specific country cases. But only a limited number of these case studies take a systematic empirical look at the dependent variable (i.e., the country situation) and the independent variable (i.e., donor interventions). These studies do therefore not satisfy the requirement of being systematic and empirical in a way that would allow learning from experience.

These definitions translate into the first step of our selection procedure. Studies must

- assess international activities which are explicitly and primarily aimed at addressing issues of statehood/fragility, peace and security or governance,
- be based on empirical data collection, and

5 The one exception is the 2004 “Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding” (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). This document was included because of its multi-donor, cross-country character and the international attention it received.
analyse their data according to a methodology that is made explicit.

In addition, studies that summarise findings from evaluations and turn them into general policy recommendations for development assistance in fragile states (i.e., lessons-learnt studies) were also included in the sample.

This approach yielded a collection of some 100 documents that form the general background of this report (see Appendix B). For an in-depth analysis, we applied a second step that narrowed this large sample down to some 40 studies by identifying two different sub-types:

(i) thematic studies based on cross-country, comparative research and evaluation (including lessons-learnt studies that summarise findings from such studies); and
(ii) case studies from countries that have received a high degree of international attention in recent years so that individual studies can be triangulated with studies by other donors or on other sectors in the same country so as to allow for a more complex picture and the cross-checking of findings.

This rationale follows the observation that only few studies address the issue of statebuilding impact head-on. Findings on individual sectors or aspects of statebuilding will therefore have to prove their reliability and usefulness against the background of the broader country context. This way, we aim to avoid the typical micro-macro fallacy of seemingly successful “projects” without measurable systemic impact.

Judging from the relevance of statebuilding and the breadth of donor engagement reflected in individual and cross-country evaluations, we found about 15 country cases that would have qualified for in-depth analysis. Given Denmark’s particular engagement and/or interest in some of these countries and with a minimum requirement of two relevant studies on any one country in mind, the following eight country cases were chosen: Afghanistan, DR Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (including South Sudan) and Sri Lanka.

The selected country cases represent different types of state fragility (as introduced in chapter 2). Using data from Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum 2012 for 2007-2009, Afghanistan, DR Congo, Somalia and Sudan represent the group of “failed” states. Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone fall into the “weak” state category. Sri Lanka is the case of a “challenged performer”. It is important to note, however, that the three “weak” states mentioned above had other periods in their recent history that placed them far closer to, if not in, the “failed” category. In part, the programming of statebuilding support that is evaluated in the studies reviewed here reflects this changing environment, and our analysis will be careful to account for such changes in context.

About 25 out of these 40 studies are of such general relevance that we list them in a separate appendix (see Appendix A below). The rest are case studies that illuminate country contexts.
4 Methods used in evaluations and research

In this chapter we assess the conceptual and methodological quality of the evaluations and research studies surveyed. From a meta-perspective it is necessary to find out how authors generate their findings, whether they use sound methods which meet international standards in research and evaluation and what lessons can be learnt for future research and evaluations. The following questions guide the methodological assessment:

– Which methods and research techniques are used (quantitative, qualitative, comparative, case study, standardised interviews etc.)?
– What is their respective potential, what are the limits, both theoretically (how is attribution established?) and in practical terms (availability and reliability of data, access to populations etc.)?
– How well are they used?
– What are differences and similarities of findings between comparative and single-case studies (general versus country-specific results)?
– Any general statements to be made about evaluations as opposed to other empirical research studies?
– Any innovative, promising avenues to be identified?

Besides assessing the analysed studies against common evaluation standards, we place particular emphasis on how they address the typical challenges distinctive of evaluating statebuilding support in fragile contexts. At least the following three challenges call for attention:

– Fragile contexts complicate the gathering of data as access to areas, respondents or reliable statistics is often severely limited. 7
– Highly dynamic political contexts complicate the task of constructing plausible counterfactual scenarios (with/without intervention) for comparative purposes and make valid inferences.
– Attributing changes in state fragility or resilience to concrete donor interventions is per se notoriously difficult. In most cases international involvement in fragile contexts comes in many forms, of which aid is only one – and not necessarily the most

7 The WDR 2011 underlines this problem stating that “[o]ne of the greatest challenges in researching lessons on violence prevention and recovery is the lack of available quantitative and qualitative data, due to challenges of security and access, along with low statistical capacity. Even in the World Bank’s comprehensive data sets, countries most affected by violence often register empty data columns. Polling, household surveys, and evaluations of the impacts of policies and project interventions are also limited in violence-affected countries and regions.” (WDR 2011: xix)
influential. With other instruments (military interventions, diplomacy, etc.) playing an important role, the question arises of how to delineate and measure support in the first place.

As a **main message** of this chapter, we find that many studies analysed in this report attempt to establish credible findings and recommendations, but very few meet the standards of *academic scrutiny*. Most studies fail to establish a transparent link between the information collected by the authors, and the conclusions drawn from that information. Given the considerable effort many evaluators put into data collection (which often consumes a lion’s share of the budget), it is surprising how little truly comparative information that would allow to compare contexts, interventions and outcomes within or across cases is generated, especially in cross-country or multi-donor evaluations.

The vast majority of documents assessed for this report rely on qualitative methods for data collection and analysis. However, they do so in a very limited way. A thorough study of the relevant **project documentation**, for instance, is obviously a necessary component of all evaluations. It provides, for instance, information on the linking of donor activities to conflict assessments or strategy papers. However, evaluations of specific donor (or international organisation) programmes are often exclusively focused on the documents and strategic guidelines provided by this individual country or organisation. As a case in point, ADE’s evaluation of the European Commission support to conflict prevention and peace building does hardly account at all for activities, conceptual or strategic papers by other donors and international organisations – even though it acknowledges that “the Commission channelled half of its total financial support to CPPB [conflict prevention / peace building] through international organisations” (ADE 2011: 56). In addition, a majority of the evaluations abstains from systematically exploring the available academic literature, which might reflect terms of reference that fail to explicitly ask for such an overview.

Only few studies report results obtained with quantitative methods (randomised sample selection, standardised interviews or surveys, standardisation of qualitative data, statistical analysis of quantitative data provided by governments or third parties), and most of them are based on descriptive statistics, whereas advanced statistical methods are a rare exception. Some studies employ **questionnaires** and **surveys** to collect information at project or country level. Only few studies, however, raise this kind of information at the level of target groups. In a majority of cases, surveys are conducted among project staff in the field. As a positive aspect of this limitation, though, return rates are usually quite high (above two thirds in most cases).

**Interviews** are regularly conducted with desk officers from headquarters, project staff, delegates from other donors and international organisations and local or national

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8 One such exception is Böhnke, Kochler & Zürcher 2010.

9 For instance, see Böhnke, Kochler & Zürcher 2010; UNDP 2010a; ADE 2011; OECD 2011a.
authorities from partner countries. In most evaluations, teams apparently develop semi-standardised interview outlines, but not all reports include them in the annex. Sometimes, evaluators visit individual academic institutions, civil society organisations or target groups, but as a general observation, it does not appear to be common practice to systematically explore local knowledge sources.

Field trips are an essential part of all major evaluations. They are, of course, often affected by the specific challenges attached to travel in conflict-ridden or extremely fragile settings where security issues tend to play an important role. In many cases, however, the duration of field trips in evaluation missions was very limited, although exposure to project reality is crucial for an evaluator’s ability to gain sufficient in-depth knowledge and to discover alternative causality paths. While the practice of extended or repeated field research common in some areas of the social sciences – with stays of several months or even years \( ^{10} \) – may be beyond the scope of most aid programmes, the average evaluation mission leans quite towards the other extreme. Even though budget and time constraints cannot be ignored, more thought should be given to the issue of adequate programme context exposure for evaluators.

In contrast to many individual country case studies, some major evaluations are based on cross-country (small-N) comparisons with up to ten countries under scrutiny. \( ^{11} \) These studies employ common terms of reference and a common research or evaluation design. At the same time, they are typically confronted with a number of important challenges: (i) A large diversity in terms of the quality and quantity of project documentation, strategic outlines and data sources makes comparisons between cases or specific approaches difficult. (ii) This is aggravated by the fact that country case studies are often carried out by local teams, sometimes under the direction of one member of the core evaluation team, but with limited contact to other country teams. As a result, most cross-country evaluations do not exhaust the opportunities for a truly comparative analysis of the cases. (iii) Almost none of the studies we found bases the selection of countries or projects on a concise conceptual or methodological argument. \( ^{12} \) The most common rationales refer to data availability or access to information, while a few studies mention the need to cover a certain range of situations and conditional factors. In other cases, the objects of evaluation are selected by the donors themselves.

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\(^{10}\) Morton Boås’ work on Liberia could be taken as an example for this kind of research. See for instance Boås & Stig 2010. Many masters’ or PhD theses are based on extended field research stays in fragile or post-conflict settings. Yet, evaluations, as a rule, do not follow this approach.

\(^{11}\) Examples include ADE 2011; Chapman & Vaillant 2010; OECD 2010a; OECD 2011a; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004.

\(^{12}\) Exceptions are Böhnke, Koehler & Zürcher 2010, discussed below, who evaluate the impact of development cooperation in Afghanistan, and a review carried out by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) on the Bank’s support to low-income countries under stress (IEG-World Bank 2006), which relies on random sampling of projects in parts of the review.
Several documents report on meta-evaluations, screening the (internal and external) evaluations that have been produced in the past. They mostly refrain from criticising the methodological or conceptual approaches they find, but rather summarise the main results and recommendations. Chapman et al. (2009), however, analysing 28 project evaluations in Sri Lanka, observe: “Most evaluations studied fail to properly assess the attribution gap. Most evaluations lack baseline information and conflict analyses. Only few evaluations explicitly test theories of change.” From our observation, this judgement could be extended to the whole field of statebuilding and peacebuilding evaluations, even though there are, of course, cases of good practice (such as Bennett et al. 2010, Chapman et al. 2009).

We have identified many evaluations that use the methods outlined above in a fairly reflected and well-designed manner. However, only few studies address the key issues raised by the current international debate on evaluation design and methods (see Garcia 2011). Above all, there is virtually no reference at all to the attribution gap between specific donor interventions and observed developments in statebuilding or peacebuilding. Also, basic features of scientific research, such as the replicability of results, the validity of data, the isolation of variables in complex causality chains or the construction of counterfactuals and baseline data are hardly ever addressed. In most cases of comparative research, sample selection is done on an ad-hoc basis and without applying methodological, academic standards. To sum up, we find astonishingly few studies that are able to make truly convincing statements about the positive impact of development assistance on statebuilding and peacebuilding. Studies are much stronger in pointing out negative effects – i.e., what donor interventions fail to do or achieve – but they are rarely able to draw convincing conclusions about better alternatives as findings are held against a standard of an assumed intervention logic rather than positive empirical evidence.

In general terms, we feel that the “conventional approach” to evaluation – reflected in the methodological observations made above – has to a certain extent reached its limits (see Box 1). Data gathering can take up to six months, even though actual field research tends to be much shorter, usually in the range of 4 days to three weeks (including days spent in the partner country’s capital). Most evaluations are designed with reference to the OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2007) and we found various studies with a sound conceptual basis, especially those that referred to the Working Draft Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (OECD/DAC 2008), such as Bennett et al. 2010 and Chapman et al. 2009. Sometimes, evaluation designs are tested with pilot case studies. Credibility of findings and recommendations is established through extensive triangulation, mostly by means of expert interviews and internal workshops with the team. We have identified several major evaluation studies where teams of up to 20 experts combine the different methods described above. With all this, however, we still observe major problems regarding the attribution gap and the systematic exploration of causality chains.
Box 1: Taking the conventional approach to evaluation to its limits

The “Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010” (Bennett et al. 2010) is an example for the methodological strengths, but also the weaknesses of conventional approaches to evaluation.

A team consisting of 16 international and Sudanese experts carried out (i) a conflict analysis (by means of a literature review), (ii) an analysis of the aid portfolios and policies of the donors who have commissioned the evaluation, combined with preliminary interviews, and (iii) an analysis of existing evaluations. This was followed by (iv) field verification work in Southern Sudan, covering 7 of the 10 States (but not representative in statistical terms) and using semi-structured interviews as well as some focus group discussions. Findings were triangulated and cross-referenced according to a work plan outlined in the report. Also, quality management has been extensive, with draft reports being presented to a reference group in Southern Sudan as well as to a group of three independent academics.

The evaluation belongs without any doubt to the top tier in terms of methodological soundness. It is also fairly transparent regarding its limitations, for instance by mentioning the limited extension of field trips. There is no reason to call the professional judgement of team members into question. Still, it remains difficult for the reader to trace findings and recommendations back to specific empirical observations, and the question arises whether the wealth of information generated by the team could not have been collected and analysed more systematically.

As a result, this type of evaluations has an in-built tendency to be rather mainstream-oriented (reproducing the conventional wisdom) and overly focussed on the views and opinions of the development expert community and their immediate counterparts. The extent to which evaluations on countries as diverse as Haiti, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka or Sudan resemble each other in terms of evaluation design, major findings and recommendations is striking. In addition, we have some doubts concerning the cost-efficiency of this approach, as it tends to consume remarkable resources without always generating an adequate amount of substantial new knowledge.

Interventions geared toward statebuilding and peacebuilding are without any doubt hard cases for rigorous impact evaluation, as they usually occur in very weak institutional settings where access to data and information is limited. Some studies analysed in this report, however, clearly suggest that innovation is possible. In our opinion, dedicating additional efforts to the following aspects would be particularly useful:

Tap local knowledge sources: We found that many evaluations were almost exclusively focused on the donor side of development assistance. As a remedy to this shortcoming, evaluations could, firstly, rely on results of research projects, which tend to develop more interest in raising information at the target group level of interventions. Secondly, evaluations could provide for extended field trips and intensive exchange with local academic institutions and civil society organisations. This could be enhanced by employing more local staff – wherever possible. Also, a more extensive use of target group surveys could be useful to raise information on the impact of interventions. Many evaluations consider those approaches, but discard them as not being feasible in fragile and conflictive settings. This, however, may be all too quick an excuse, as the following example shows.
Box 2: Using surveys to explore the impact of aid: The case of Afghanistan

In the context of a joint research project of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Free University (FU) Berlin, Böhnke, Köhler and Zürcher (2010) developed a method for assessing the impact of development cooperation in conflict zones, which is then applied to North East Afghanistan. They conducted two mass surveys at target group level in 2007 and 2009, with around 2000 Afghan respondents from 80 villages. The report uses innovative instruments to measure the spatial distribution of aid, based on a mix of donor-generated data and household surveys.

The approach has its strength in looking at the input-impact relation from a highly aggregated (although geographically limited) perspective. The measures are ambitious but acceptable. As a consequence of the aggregate perspective, however, it is not possible (and not intended) to attribute aid interventions (and, consequently, impact) to individual donors. Also, the approach can not easily be scaled up geographically as it requires broad resources in terms of time and interviewers involved. However, it could be joined up with evaluations of other instruments and objectives, thus producing economies of scale. This could generate additional insights in the impact of aid in specific areas of intervention.

Employ rigorous methods: From several comparative evaluations one gets the impression that the information would lend itself to more rigorous analysis with only a little more effort dedicated to sample selection, data collection, reporting and systematisation. To give an example, Bennett et al. 2010 gather a wealth of information from nine donors plus several international organisations operating 436 projects in Sudan in 2009. Despite their highly instructive report, major open questions concerning attribution and counterfactuals remain. Had the authors devoted some additional efforts to the gathering and, above all, classification of data, they would have had the opportunity to employ more rigorous techniques of statistical within-country comparison and, thus, generate even more valuable knowledge regarding donor interventions in Sudan.

Support method-sensitive terms of reference and project documentation: The case of Bennett et al. 2010 cited in the previous paragraph is particularly illustrative since it shows that evaluators are not always responsible for the methodological shortcomings of their reports. In many cases, a more elaborated analytical path is not pursued in the evaluation because the terms of reference do not support such an approach. Also, as part of the problem donors and international organisations do not always appear to be overly interested in ensuring the comparability of their project data and documentation. Hence, sound methodological work is already made difficult at the point where the original data and information is generated.

Ensure comparability: Evaluations conducted on behalf of individual donors or international organisations, are not, as a rule, linked to the activities of other donors and organisations, even where they have a comparative focus. Except from some meta-evaluations mentioned above, findings are rarely put in a broader learning context. Again, this means that evaluators and researchers do not make, or may not see themselves encouraged to make, full use of the information they generate. One possible solution could be to strengthen peer review approaches (including local actors). Another one would be to systematically link individual evaluation results to the broader context of impact assessment in each country or group of countries.
5 Synthesis of experience with statebuilding assistance to fragile states

Chapter 5 provides a systematic overview of the evaluations’ findings on statebuilding support in fragile states. The synthesis proceeds in four parts which discuss different dimensions and aspects of statebuilding. First, we assess whether donors prioritise and sequence their goals of their support to statebuilding and peacebuilding and, if so, how this affects domestic processes of statebuilding (5.1). Second, we provide a synthesis of findings about the relevance of donors’ coordination and aid modalities in fragile contexts (5.2). Third, we discuss the findings about donors’ support of political settlements in the context of statebuilding (5.3). Fourth, we provide the findings on incentives and coercion in international statebuilding support (5.4). Each of these sub-chapters assesses general findings and—in particular with regard to prioritization and sequencing—results that are specific for one or more country groups (compare Table 1); e.g. countries with challenged statehood across all dimensions; countries with very low capacity and challenged authority; countries with decent capacity yet high levels of violence.

5.1 Prioritisation and sequencing

In this chapter, we assess whether evaluators identify successful examples of prioritised and sequenced areas in international support of statebuilding. This is in line with the OECD Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States, where donors emphasise the need to prioritise and sequence their activities (OECD 2007). Prioritisation takes place if a donor judges at least one area of support to be more important for statebuilding than another area. In other words, the formulation and implementation of one statebuilding objective occurs at the expense of another objective (Leininger, Grimm & Freyburg 2012). This does not necessarily lead to the complete abandonment of other activities but is reflected in the distribution of the aid budget as well as the number and focus of activities. Sequencing presumes the prioritisation of objectives and contains an element of timing. We talk of sequencing when donors rank various objectives of statebuilding support in successive order (Leininger, Grimm & Freyburg 2012).

According to the evaluations under study, the identification of patterns of donors’ priorities in the three fragility groups faces two main challenges. First, the majority of the evaluations does not systematically focus on the effects of statebuilding activities in diverse fragility contexts. Rather, their authors identify areas of intervention, reflect on specific instruments and present assumptions about possible effects. Second, the heterogeneity of evaluation objectives, scope and contents (see chapter 4) makes it difficult to categorically compare
the results of evaluations and generate a ranking of priorities. Nevertheless, we find repeated and relevant hints about donor engagement in fragile contexts and in specific country groups.

We identified seven areas of development assistance that might affect statebuilding, namely measures of quick impact (e.g. rebuild infrastructure, provide salaries etc.), provision of basic services (e.g. health, water and sanitation, food supply etc.), guaranteeing security (e.g. peace agreement, DDR etc.), building legitimacy (e.g. of political process, good governance, justice, anti-corruption etc.), establishment of administrative capacity (e.g. fiscal governance, administrative decentralisation etc.), fostering economic capacity (e.g. job creation, financial system etc.), and rights-based approaches (e.g. human rights, political rights, gender equality etc.). Moreover, we analyse whether donors focus on specific territorial units.

Experiences of prioritising and sequencing these areas of intervention are discussed in the following paragraphs with special regard to our country groupings. Evaluations also inform about potential factors within certain areas of support that might foster or hinder statebuilding in fragile contexts. Results of the analysis are subsequently presented according to each area of intervention.

General findings on prioritisation and sequencing

We find no common pattern of prioritising and sequencing in statebuilding support in fragile contexts. Apparently, donors did not develop role models for successful support strategies. However, a lack of attention to security issues in development assistance seems to be a common feature following peace or ceasefire agreements, including international statebuilding engagement in “failed” states. Regardless of the level of authority, capacity and legitimacy in supported countries, donors seemed to generally prioritise basic service delivery, technical quick impact measures and the support of administrative capacity. By contrast, only the support of economic capacity seems to be more adapted to the respective country context. Countries with sufficient institutional capacities to absorb economic assistance receive this type of support. Accordingly, economic assistance appears to be strongest in Sri Lanka, a “challenged performer” with high capacity and incidences of massive violence. Regardless the fragility degrees, economic assistance seems to be more relevant in resource-rich countries, in particular in the failed state DRC (ADE 2010; UNDP 2006). International support to legitimacy was only indirectly addressed in evaluations. It is worth noting that evaluators identify a lack of focus on justice systems and the rule of law (see chapter 5.1.2).

Evaluations indicate that prioritising goals in international support in fragile states is a learning process over time for most donors. Evaluations suppose that prioritising sectors turned out to be difficult if not impossible at the outset of international engagement in fragile contexts. Enormous reconstruction needs and “weak or still undefined donor presence in post-conflict countries” (Chapman & Vaillant 2010: 24) make it difficult to
identify the most promising entry points for an international intervention. In these complex settings, donors tend to react with the formulation and establishment of comprehensive programmes that cover issues ranging from stability and peace, infrastructure and legitimacy to administrative capacity at the beginning of their engagement. Only in subsequent programme cycles, donors narrow down their broad programmes. It seems that harmonisation of donor activities and joint funding mechanisms tend to foster prioritisation of individual donor programmes and the international engagement in fragile states (see chapter 5.3 on aid modalities). Overall, context-sensitive prioritisation of goals in development assistance seems to be missing in international development assistance in many fragile states. For instance, overambitious targets are frequently set as a consequence of a lack of context-specific knowledge (Vaillant et al. 2010).

Evaluations identify four main reasons for the low level of prioritisation in programming international support to statebuilding:

- **Complexity** of fragile contexts, especially after violent conflict
- **Lack of theories of change** that inform strategies of international support
- Lessons learnt often not transferable because of **focus on specialised instruments, programmes, and preferences** of individual donors
- Willingness to share positive lessons learnt but **limited institutional knowledge about negative experience**

Prioritisation is a precondition for sequencing. If prioritisation does not take place strategically, it is difficult to establish a sequenced strategy to support state-building in fragile states. Most evaluations show a lack of sequencing strategies characterising international support to statebuilding. Despite the unanimous acknowledgement of the need to prioritise and sequence specific areas of statebuilding support, donors do not seem to rank their different objectives in a strategic and successive manner. Accordingly, we find no evidence of effective sequencing efforts. Instead, evaluations are dominated by ex-post presumptions about the field of activity that donors *should have* prioritised and addressed before an already established measure. The most important recommendations for countries with extremely low levels of authority, legitimacy and capacity refer to the need to prioritise security (Böhnke, Koehler & Zürcher 2010: 5). One major challenge – for evaluators and donors alike – is the lack of a convincing theory of change (Bennett et al. 2009; Chapman et al. 2009, see also chapter 4).

**Findings on potential factors of success and problems of international support to statebuilding**

*a) Quick impact*

As a common sense, quick impact measures refer to activities of donors that are visible and aim at the immediate solution of specific problems. These measures can be purely technical, such as, for instance, road reconstruction or salary payments to public officials;
but they can also address social and political situations that require certain action to be taken, such as the provision of food or health care in humanitarian crises.

Some evaluation studies observe a tendency to use a technical approach in the programming and implementation of quick impact measures. Donors perform well in building infrastructure in post-conflict settings (ADE 2011). They react quickly to humanitarian crises (OECD 2011a: 41). But they make limited use of quick impact measures to prevent emerging violence in countries with challenged statehood in all dimensions (“failed states”) or with high level of violence (“challenged performers”). This also includes former “failed” states which are presently categorized as “weak”, in particular Liberia and Sierra Leone. The studies argue that overly technical approaches make it difficult for donors to intervene in situations driven by social and political factors. Especially in the cases of Afghanistan and Somalia, evaluators point out that development cooperation does not put enough weight on quick impact measures which address situations of violence and volatility (Paffenholz et al. 2011a).

Long term engagement is perceived as a crucial factor for effective statebuilding by most evaluators. However, many studies recommend – in accordance with the ninth OECD principle13 – stronger immediate action of development cooperation. Whereas they highlight good ad hoc-performance of UN peacekeeping missions, they criticise that development assistance often lacks the capability to adapt their programmes to unforeseen situations (compare chapter 5.3 on aid modalities). However, studies also underline that visible quick impact measures should not be planned and implemented in isolation and only if possible consequences are well-understood (GTZ 2008; ADE 2010).

b) Basic services

It is common knowledge that states with low capacities deliver poorly on basic services for the population, in particular states emerging from war. Access to water and sanitation, food security and health is severely limited and must often be provided by international donors and NGOs to meet the needs of the population. “Challenged performers” with high levels of capacity but low authority are not the main recipients of this type of aid.

Evaluations state that support to the provision of basic services counts for the largest part of development assistance in the immediate period after humanitarian assistance. Donor interventions, however, do not always meet expectations at target group level. For instance, in Afghanistan donors focused on the health sector but failed to meet the high expectations they helped to raise (OECD 2009). Where assistance to basic service provision improved the situation of the population – at least on the community level – no particularly favourable effects on statebuilding were observed by evaluators; neither in “failed”, nor in “weak” states (Poate et al. 2008; UNDP 2006; IEG-World Bank 2006; Vaillant et al. 2010).

13 OECD Principle No. 9 for Good International Engagement in Fragile Situations reads “Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance” (OECD 2007, 1).
Some studies even argue that internationally financed programmes on basic service delivery could hinder the development of a legitimate state.\textsuperscript{14}

c) Security

“Security first” in situations of conflict and in the immediate phase after a peace agreement has become a widespread credo of scholars and practitioners in statebuilding. Accordingly, many evaluations reflect a common sense that security must be the first priority in states with extreme low levels of statehood (“failed states”). Indeed, donors opted for short-term measures to stabilise the state in phases of high violence. But once a peace agreement was signed, they apparently prioritised basic service delivery and capacity building at the expense of security. Instead of prioritising or at least integrating the security sector in other areas of statebuilding support, donors address assumed root causes of conflict and fragility. Overall, they seem to shy away from supporting broad security sector reforms (Bennett et al. 2009).

Some authors conclude that an approach that prioritises basic service delivery and capacity building is unfavourable for guaranteeing security and that “aid does not reduce threat” in fragile contexts (Böhnke, Koehler & Zürcher 2010: 10). In the case of South Sudan authors showed that long-term support of basic service delivery and capacity-building did not address local conflicts, which continued to erupt after the 2005 peace agreement (Foster et al. 2010). Sierra Leone is mentioned as a positive exception from this pattern. Combined, broad peace- and statebuilding efforts of the government and international donors between 2002 and 2007 are evaluated positively. They introduced a security architecture, and a joint civilian and military Ministry of Defence (Poate et al. 2008). Effects on statebuilding seemed to be favourable in that case but the authors give no further explanation for their ranking of Sierra Leone as a statebuilding success.

d) Legitimacy

In accordance with our understanding of fragile states, legitimacy is at the core of a functioning state. Only if the people perceive the state as the legitimate entity to provide public goods and make use of its monopoly of force, a newly created or re-constructed state will survive and develop. International support to foster legitimacy in statebuilding should address state-society relations (see OECD 2011a: 60). These measures focus on strengthening capacities and institutions that guarantee access to the state and provide public goods. Most programmes to create or promote legitimate state-society relations focus on good governance, including elections, the rule of law, justice, anti-corruption, and political decentralisation.

\textsuperscript{14} For further information on the tension between legitimacy and donor engagement see general findings in chapter 5.1.1 as well as the following section.
Although support to enhance legitimacy is particularly needed in weak states, we cannot identify common patterns of legitimacy support for a certain group of fragile states because of the sporadic and unsystematic evaluation of the legitimacy dimension in the analysed studies.

Counterproductive practices of donors that might undermine the establishment of legitimate state-society relations are prominently represented in evaluations. However, most findings are based on theoretical assumptions which are not empirically proven (compare chapter 4).

- Inadequate cooperation with marginalisation of relevant actors. For instance, the Sierra Leonean Women movement, important during the peace process, was not integrated in the political post-conflict process and consequently threatened to delegitimise that process (UNDP 2006);
- Formal and informal legitimacy patterns between state (or informal authorities) and society are not taken into account because donors ignore local power relations (OECD 2010a: 11).
- Donor engagement in basic service delivery might undermine a young and still weak state’s legitimacy in the population (UNDP 2006).

The analysis of positive effects of international support on legitimacy is not systematically integrated in the evaluations under review. Although recent studies do mention the importance of legitimacy in statebuilding, calling for the integration of both state and civil society in donor programmes (GTZ 2008), they do not link their analysis to issues of legitimacy and its relevance for successful statebuilding. In addition, they often presume that elections are the main instrument to generate legitimacy. For instance, in the case of DRC, authors emphasise the importance of supporting local elections to guarantee legitimacy (Vaillant et al. 2010: 19; 66).

It is noteworthy in the context of legitimacy issues that evaluators repeatedly underline the lack of justice and rule of law programmes in donors’ portfolios. They assume that donors prioritise support to build technical capacities of the state at the expense of justice. For example, although rule of law was identified as an important field of engagement in DFiD’s needs assessments of fragile contexts, it was not put on the agenda (Bennett et al. 2009; IEG-World Bank 2006).

e) Administrative capacity

Administrative capacities are a basic feature of a functioning state. Donors acknowledge the need to support the creation and promotion of capable administrations. Programmes on administrative capacity generally focus on issues such as fiscal governance and administrative decentralisation. In fragile contexts, in particular in “failed” and “weak” states, administrative capacities are low. Although administrative capacities are relatively higher in cases of “challenged performers”, there is still a need to improve state capacities.
In (post-)war situations they might be almost inexistent, as illustrated in the cases of South Sudan or Somalia.

Evaluations often identify donor engagement in institutional capacity-building. Support usually kicks in after a peace agreement was reached and the most urgent security issues were resolved. However, donors frequently seem to underestimate post-war settings (Foster et al. 2010). As a consequence, evaluations often focus on counterproductive effects of support to administrative capacity on statebuilding, concluding that donors substitute state institutions rather than enhancing administrative capacities. The most common reason given for this assumed effect is that donors seek to improve short-term conditions for their own support activities. Moreover, evaluators repeatedly criticise that centralised programmes rely on small circles of state officials (USAID 2011). They also find that the brain-drain of professionals from public sector posts to donors agencies as well as corruption in international engagement (international actors fuelling corruption or insufficiently preventing it) limit the options to strengthen state capacities (UNDP 2006; OECD 2011a).

Given the extremely low levels of capacity in “failed” and “weak” states, donors have difficulties to identify entry points to support administrative institutions and processes. They face the persisting dilemma that they need functioning structures to implement their programmes but cannot rely on domestic institutions in partner countries. Some evaluations assume that the establishment of parallel structures undermines statebuilding in the long run. A comparative evaluation from the year 2006 reports that many donors, including non-governmental actors, use parallel mechanisms to implement their programs (UNDP 2006). Recent evaluations rarely mention the establishment of parallel institutions.

Decentralisation of state functions is high on the agenda of international donors who aim at improving administrative capacities in fragile settings (GTZ 2008). According to some evaluators, a lack of clear decentralisation strategies seems to hinder effective assistance to capacity-building at different state levels. For instance, unsuccessful administrative decentralisation has been a major problem in the DRC (OECD 2011a: 43). Deconcentration of financial resources to sub-national levels was hard to achieve because of centralised state structures. It is expetected that direct funding of sub-national entities – instead of channelling aid through the central level – will increase donors success in their support to decentralisation in DRC.

Against the background of weak public sectors, donors focus their support on institutional approaches to state capacities. In contrast, efforts to encourage domestic revenue mobilisation and job creation are rarely found on the donor agenda (OECD 2011a). But in these supposedly rare cases, international support to the creation and consolidation of tax systems in Afghanistan, DRC and Sierra Leone was considered to be a positive contribution to statebuilding (OECD 2010a: 21; Bennett et al. 2009: 62). However, an increase in tax revenues does not necessarily establish a social contract between state and
society. Some authors warn that “taxation without representation” might foster the image of a predatory state and undermine efforts to legitimise the state (Bennett et al. 2009: x).

f) Economic capacity

Generally, economic capacity refers to structural preconditions that enable the development of the private sector and allow the state to promote socio-economic development, for instance through job creation or the establishment of financial systems. In contrast, short-term programmes addressing social welfare are important but cannot substitute central functions of the state or infrastructure needed for the private sector. They might even slow down or even hinder the development of state structures in fragile settings.

The prioritisation of international support to economic growth seems to vary with regard to the fragility context. States with decent capacity (here: Sri Lanka) are most likely to receive assistance for strengthening economic capacity because they are able to manage more complex cooperation programmes. Still, even in these contexts prioritising support to economic capacity might have doubtful or even counterproductive effects. Goodhand and Walton argue that it is not possible to “buy peace” in Sri Lanka because the incentives driving conflict are non-economic (Goodhand & Walton 2009: 317). In cases with very low levels of state capacity (here: Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone) it is even more difficult to strengthen economic capacity, which, however, still remains a goal for many donors. Under extreme conditions in “failed” states donors stress the need for economic capacity support but seem to be more hesitant to plan and implement it. In the case of the two resource-rich countries DRC and South Sudan, building economic capacity was put on the agenda shortly after the peace agreement.

Authors state that bilateral programmes had a positive impact on public welfare in some countries, such as DRC or Sierra Leone (Vaillant et al. 2010: 53). But evaluations rarely analyse international support to improve economic capacity, even in those cases where it is on the donor agendas (IEG-World Bank 2006). Accordingly, they present no evidence that support of economic capacity and welfare contribute to statebuilding. Nevertheless, donors frequently base their programmes on the assumption – apparently shared by some evaluation studies – that an increase in welfare should foster the legitimacy of the state and contribute to statebuilding. In Liberia, the opposite seems to be the case (Andersen 2010: 147). Shared responsibility between the Liberian government and donors in the Economic Governance Steering Committee made it difficult for the population to assign the economic success between 2006 and 2008 to the Liberian state. High donor influence thus tended to weaken state-society relations.

g) Rights

In international development assistance, a focus on rights refers to a system that guarantees human rights, civil rights, rule of law, access to justice and gender equality. A state needs
the capacity to guarantee rights, the authority to enforce rights and the legitimacy to realise both. In the context of low state authority and capacity institutions to protect and guarantee human and political rights are weak. This holds especially true for countries emerging from violent conflict. A rights-based approach is one possible entry point to strengthen the three dimensions of the state.

The evaluations reviewed in this study do not mention rights-based approaches in international statebuilding efforts. Some evaluations highlight that donor portfolios lacked the integration of human rights (Bennett et al. 2009: x; Goodhand & Walton 2009; Chapman et al. 2009). Others observe attempts to strengthen the judicial system. In these cases, donors face the problem that informal judicial systems are often already in place while they aim at supporting formal systems based on the logics of common law and civil law (OECD 2009: pp. 21). Given these challenges, the results are mixed. In some fragile states, such as Sierra Leone, donors appear to have successfully integrated traditional and modern institutions and networks by investing in infrastructure and training in the legal sector (OECD 2010a: 19). In contrast, the balance is more negative in large countries such as the DRC or in contexts with strong opposition to donor engagement such as Afghanistan. For instance, the Afghan Taliban have effectively established judicial structures while donors were still asking themselves how to integrate formal and informal mechanisms.

b) Regions and territorial units

Evaluations do not report whether a focus on regions and territorial units affects statebuilding. Instead, they underline two territorial aspects. First, some authors argue that statebuilding could be enhanced by a multilevel approach that includes the local, regional and national levels of government (Paffenholz et al. 2011c). Cambodia is taken as a positive example where international support covers three state levels and seems to be favourable for statebuilding.15 Haiti is seen as another example for the successful integration of the sub-national level. UNDP and the UN Peacekeeping mission developed a community-based DDR programme which prioritised the sub-national level. According to the evaluators, the focus on the sub-national level led to an improved security situation and stabilised the country (UNDP 2006). Second, evaluators expect that regional programmes with neighbouring societies and governments might help to effectively support statebuilding (UNDP 2006).

5.2 Donor coordination, interdepartmental cooperation and aid modalities

This section addresses the question of how the ways in which donors provide their statebuilding support impacts on its effectiveness. The three aspects that are mostly

15 The example of the Cambodian case cannot be explored further because the evaluation does not provide the individual country case studies.
referred to in the studies under review are donor coordination, cooperation across government departments and the technical modalities of aid. These three aspects seem to be important in “failed” and “weak” states as well as in contexts of comparatively high state capacity but challenged authority.

The coordination – or lack thereof – of a multitude of donor governments and agencies in statebuilding environments has been a subject of intense debate for many years. Despite repeated international commitments to greater coordination, donors have always been accused of not being too serious about these statements. On the other hand, fragile states obviously pose additional difficulties for effective coordination, and most cases of international post-war engagement for peacebuilding and statebuilding in the past decade have seen multi-donor approaches in one way or the other. The studies under review acknowledge this development but many criticise that coordination does not extend beyond the exchange of information and, less frequently, some general division of labour. What is found missing in most cases is a common vision based on a joint analysis of the statebuilding context and one shared theory of change.

The multi-donor evaluation of CPPB activities in South Sudan is a case in point. Here the evaluators concluded that “[d]espite the existence of donor coordination mechanisms, these tend to be limited to sharing information rather than promoting a joint donor approach based on shared analysis and consensus” (Bennett et al. 2010: xiv).

The 2011 OECD Monitoring Survey on the implementation of the Fragile States Principles reaches a similar finding at a more general level. The report states that “[d]evelopment partner co-ordination remains informal in most countries and is almost entirely absent in some” (OECD 2011a: 16). External support to the DR Congo is cited as a positive exception. Here, donors were found to be trying to formalise their coordination (OECD 2011a: 37). In other cases, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the extent to which donors undertook joint analytical work was even found to have decreased since 2009 and in South Sudan donors seemed to be reverting to bilateral engagement. A similar development has been observed in Sri Lanka post-2005, where a previously well-established donor coordination body lost momentum because of different views on the conflict and the role of the government (Chapman et al. 2009).

While it is difficult to assess the exact impact of such negative developments (if measured against the donors’ own commitments) on the process of statebuilding, all authors agree

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16 The most prominent examples are the 2007 Fragile States Principles which in turn refer to the general commitments contained in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and are echoed in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.

17 The 2006 World Bank LICUS evaluation has also deplored the lack of common vision and purpose among donors in many cases. Where harmonised objectives did not seem to be within reach, the report recommended at least complementarity of activities. In the case of Afghanistan, Bennett et al. (2009: xx) highlight the fact that the division of labour was “driven largely by political bargaining among donor countries” rather than by comparative advantages and an approach of complementarity.
that a multiplicity of international actors without a joint approach is a heavy burden on a weak state’s administration, a potential source of rent-seeking from many quarters inside a recipient country and an unlikely contribution to a sustainable path of stabilisation.\(^\text{18}\) In countries such as Sri Lanka with decent levels of state capacity but significant challenges to the state monopoly of violence, uncoordinated donors offer first and foremost an opportunity to be played against each other.

Similar to the dilemmas of international coordination, many donor governments struggle with the internal coordination of their own contributions across government departments. The issue of political coherence is particularly salient in fragile contexts because of the complex, cross-departmental character of statebuilding support that often involves such diverse actors as development workers, experts with a background in the diplomatic or other government service, and security forces – including the military, but also police. Donors have committed themselves to pursuing “whole-of-government” approaches instead of having each department act according to its own logic.

Most evaluations and other studies demonstrate, however, that in practice, despite progress in many areas, much remains to be done to avoid the negative impact of mixed signals and contradicting incentives emanating from the same donor government. Moreover, joint cross-departmental approaches are also associated by some with the risk of development concerns being sidelined by a donor’s competing national security interests.

The 2011 EU CPPB evaluation, for example, finds that “[t]he Commission took initiatives to enhance coordination at different levels, but this generally resulted more in exchange of information than in enhancement of complementarities” (ADE 2011: iii), a mirror image of the situation cited above on donor coordination.

UNDP’s 2006 evaluation of support for conflict-affected countries observes that in the weakest country contexts (like in the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Haiti and Togo), limited evidence exists of development partner efforts to implement whole-of-government approaches in any form. In such cases, links between humanitarian, development and security engagement, for instance, were found to be weak or wholly absent (UNDP 2006).

In the case of Germany’s Civil Peace Service, a government-funded programme implemented jointly by one governmental and several civil society organisations, the evaluators identified the lack of country strategies owned by the whole group of implementing organisations as a deficit. While many civil society organisations are particularly concerned that too close a relationship with government agencies might mar their independence, the evaluators found that in the absence of a jointly agreed country

\(^{18}\) Such assessments are supported by quantitative research showing that greater donor fragmentation in a recipient country has a significantly negative impact on its prospect of becoming more democratic or more stable (see Faust, Leiderer & Schmitt 2012).
strategy, individual organisations tended to choose their approach to peacebuilding not so much on the basis of an analysis of needs but rather based on preconceived opinions about how conflicts should be addressed (Paffenholz et al. 2011a: xvii). Joint country strategies are thus expected by the evaluators to be an instrument that helps not only enhance the leverage of programmes – the usual argument for coordination – but also, if not predominantly, improve their relevance and quality.

Yet DFID’s evaluation of its Afghanistan country programme reminds also of the risk that cross-departmental coherence can come at a significant cost in situations where a donor’s strong national security interests stand in the way of a convincing development strategy. The study implies that increasing cross-departmental “coherence”, meaning short-term support from development actors to areas and sectors important from a counterinsurgency perspective, resulted in a loss of strategic focus in the development and statebuilding portfolio (Bennett et al. 2009: xiii; Chapman & Vaillant 2010: x).

Donor coordination and the coherence of contributions are closely related to the ways in which development assistance is provided technically. Existing studies discuss several major issues concerning the modalities of aid. Two crucial ones are

(i) the utility of highly coordinated approaches to providing aid, such as multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) or other forms of pooled resources, versus the advantage of more agile bilateral activities with lower transaction costs; and

(ii) the respective roles of humanitarian and development assistance and the transition from the former to the latter.

In many cases of statebuilding, the pooling of resources in multi-donor trust funds, basket financing for sector-wide approaches (SWAs) in relevant sectors and the provision of substantial amounts of aid as budget support have been propagated as a means to enforce donor coordination, provide weak governments with substantial resources to build legitimacy through the provision of services and improve the alignment of statebuilding support with recipient government priorities (see, e.g., DFID 2010a: 46; Disch et al. 2007: 44; OECD 2011a: 36).

Against this background, the conclusions reached on the effectiveness of these instruments by several recent evaluations are rather mixed. In the case of Sudan, several long-term funding instruments, including one MDTF, were considered to be “largely inappropriate” to address the dynamics of conflict with sufficient flexibility, whereas bilateral interventions – notably the substantial US programme – were found to “have provided the most effective support, based on closer and more frequent monitoring” (Bennett et al. 2010: xvii-xviii). This finding is echoed in a 2011 USAID research paper on statebuilding. With a view to the situation in South Sudan, its authors agree with the call for substantial donor coordination in the face of weak recipient government capacities, but they caution explicitly against the use of pooled funding mechanisms for being overly bureaucratic and inflexible (USAID 2011: 23).
DFID’s synthesis evaluation of aid to fragile states finds both positive results of budget support and pooled funding and many drawbacks associated with these instruments. In the case of budget support, the decision to use this instrument was perceived as having “lacked robustness” with either suspension of the support or weak influence as the consequence. While pooled funding was perceived as a useful strategy to share risks among donors, this instrument is criticised as having “suffered from delays, high costs and weak management” (Chapman & Vaillant 2010: xiv). Pooled mechanisms received a particularly critical assessment in the case of Sudan (Foster et al. 2010).

For Afghanistan, by contrast, Bennett et al. (2009: xiv) conclude that the country’s Reconstruction Trust Fund was a successful mechanism. Similarly, the OECD Do-no-Harm study reports more generally that donor efforts to push SWAps “have made positive contributions to developing capacity within the state for development management” (OECD 2010a: 17).

Another area of concern is the transition from humanitarian to development assistance. According to OECD 2011a: 41, donors are usually “fast in response to humanitarian crises”. Yet these efforts are poorly linked with development assistance, giving rise to concerns in a number of countries cited in the report (Chad, DRC, Haiti, South Sudan and Togo).

The comparison of development aid with humanitarian assistance can also reveal a serious, though unsurprising, dilemma. The 2011 OECD Monitoring Survey, e.g., found that humanitarian assistance was often better coordinated than development assistance, yet its engagement with the national government tended to be limited – with possible negative effects on ownership and statebuilding (OECD 2011a: 16). Apparently, more donor coordination entails the risk of less recipient country ownership. At the same time, the use of weak recipient government capacities to organise donor coordination is perceived as an excessive burden on the shoulders of state institutions that are already barely able to cope (OECD 2011a: 16).

The general picture emerging on donor coordination, interdepartmental cooperation and aid modalities is rather mixed. Presumed “good practice” is often not observed, but not always is the claim plausible that this has negatively impacted the effectiveness of external support. In the absence of clear and easy operational guidance, aid workers responsible for the design and management of aid programmes have an increasingly diverse menu of modalities at their disposal. All of them have strengths and weaknesses, with the balance, as the studies under review appear to suggest, depending strongly on the individual country context. As a consequence, donor agencies rely more than ever on the high quality of their staff both at headquarters and inside the partner country to be able to monitor and, if necessary, reorient aid portfolios depending on changing contexts. As of now, however, evaluations report under-staffing of statebuilding programmes (Bennett et al. 2009: xiv, on DFID in Afghanistan) and the lack of a human resource policy for conflict interventions (ADE 2011: v, on EU CPPB activities).
5.3 Political settlements and political processes

If there is one conclusion on which academic research and the recent conceptual debate among donor governments agree after almost two decades of post-Cold War statebuilding support, then it is the recognition that all statebuilding is first and foremost a political undertaking. While for a long time statebuilding from a development policy perspective was largely defined by rather “technical” issues such as constitutional design, the capacity of institutions to act, human resources or hardware equipment, questions of power, interest and political feasibility where regarded either as secondary or, alternatively, as factors outside the sphere of external influence. The work done at the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility has gone a long way towards rectifying this perspective and integrating a “political economy” lens in the analysis and intervention logic of statebuilding.

The core of the argument is the proposition that “[t]he prospects for statebuilding ultimately depend on the terms of the political settlement upon which the state is founded” (OECD 2011b: 31). The analytical concept of “political settlement” refers to “the balance of power that exists and the bargains that have been struck between contending elites and social forces” (OECD 2010a: 10). Settlements may be shaped by the outcome of a singular event, such as a peace agreement, yet they may also reflect the tacit agreement shaped by extended processes of exchange and negotiation between elites (and their constituencies). Usually, political settlements are the result of power struggles. Ideally, and in a nutshell, they reflect “an elite consensus on the preferability and means of avoiding violence” (Brown & Grävingholt 2011: 9).

A “settlement lens” is therefore especially salient with respect to countries that experience high levels of violence, both in the most fragile categories (“failed and weak”) and in the more capable, yet violence-ridden group.

While the concept of political settlement is based on the assumption that elites play the decisive role in bringing about and perpetuating, but also in terminating this consensus, the character of the relations between the state and wider society is another crucial element. Although settlements may be highly exclusive in some cases, OECD donors will usually be interested to promote political settlements that are as inclusive as possible to see their own normative standards of democracy, human, civil and political rights observed. Usually (though not always) such inclusive settlements can also be expected to have a longer life-span.19

Political settlements are conceptually closely related to the issue of legitimacy. In both cases, the acceptance of rule exerted by the state is crucial. The settlement lens is more specific in that it presupposes that elites have a particular role to play when it comes to fostering, weakening, or changing the foundations of, legitimacy.

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19 See also Brown & Grävingholt 2011: 29-31.
For the purpose of this study, a cascade of three consecutive questions related to political settlements and the wider task of taking political processes into consideration emerges:

Firstly, do evaluations and studies on statebuilding address issues of political settlements and political legitimacy? Secondly, if so, do they support the proposition that political settlements are a crucial element of statebuilding? And thirdly, to what extent have donor activities to support statebuilding taken into account the issue of political settlements and political processes?

As to the first question, our review of studies shows an increasing awareness in the development community of the need to analyse and understand the political foundations upon which statebuilding occurs. Nonetheless, political settlements are not yet a standard perspective in evaluations. By contrast, they emerge more strongly, at least implicitly, from studies with an academic – usually “political economy” – background, such as the INCAF-sponsored study on “Do no harm” in statebuilding (OECD 2010a) whose lead author is a professor at the LSE. Among all donors, the British DFID is the only agency whose evaluations, from 2010 onward, make explicit reference to political settlements. This is not surprising as the concept as such is a relatively recent addition to the debate and DFID was the first donor agency to pick up the concept from academia and introduce it into INCAF discussions. Nonetheless references to the importance of legitimacy, elites and political process can be found in other studies too. All in all, however, they are relatively few in numbers and occur more regularly in recent documents. Apparently, the recognition of political processes as a crucial component of statebuilding engagement reflects a learning process that has taken place among development agencies.

Secondly, all of those studies which address political settlements as an explicit element in their analysis agree also on the crucial importance of a legitimate and inclusive settlement for the success of statebuilding support, especially in post-conflict situations. At the same time, and thirdly, almost all of these studies found the programming of donor support to statebuilding wanting with regard to the need to take the existing quality of a political settlement adequately into account.

Afghanistan is arguably the most obvious case to illustrate the importance of a political settlement in post-war statebuilding – and the deficit of donor attention for this issue. DFID’s 2010 Afghanistan country evaluation (Bennett et al. 2009) concludes that

“[t]he state building portfolio may have focused too much on building technical capacity, primarily in Kabul, while downplaying issues of political legitimacy, especially at the local level. … [S]ustainable impact is impaired by the inability of the government to establish national unity linked to political settlement; this cannot be addressed by the kind of technical and financial support provided by DFID to date.” [xvi]

20 The first INCAF document to refer to settlements (OECD 2010a) was mainly authored by James Putzel from the LSE, whose Crisis States Research Centre had run a multi-year research programme sponsored by DFID. A 2010 DFID “Practice Paper” on statebuilding introduced support for inclusive political settlements as one of four major goals (DFID 2010a).
In a similar vein, the authors of the Afghanistan case study for the above-mentioned “Do no harm” report highlight the crucial role of a political settlement – and the dire consequences emerging if donors fail to understand the true nature of a settlement (OECD 2009). In their view, the international engagement with the post-Taliban settlement suffered from two major deficits: First, they argue that the settlement did not stem “organically from the political equilibrium” inside the country but was “heavily driven by exogenous factors.” Second, they maintain that although the Bonn Agreement was not a peace settlement but only a roadmap towards peace, the international engagement treated it like a peace agreement, ignoring its limitations and, specifically, its non-inclusive character (OECD 2009: 3-4).

The authors conclude that this signifies an issue of general relevance: Donors needed to be wary about “the nature of ownership in a fragile state based on a political settlement that fails to bring on board all the factions” (OECD 2009: 17). Otherwise, the example of Afghanistan suggests, the sustainability of all statebuilding efforts is doubtful because excluded losing factions are provided with “every incentive to destabilise the country and attempt to alter the political settlement” (OECD 2009: 20). Given the crucial role of a viable political settlement for the success of statebuilding in the aftermath of civil war, the authors of the “Do no harm” synthesis study even recommend to make any statebuilding support conditional on the state’s willingness to address major existing deficits (OECD 2010a: 18):

“When the establishment of security within a state is barred by particular dimensions of a reigning political settlement, donors need to engage with state actors to examine ways these barriers can be addressed as a prerequisite to providing almost any other support to statebuilding.”

A cross-country study on multi-stakeholder security partnerships, based on the cases of Afghanistan, Kosovo and DR Congo, supports this conclusion. The report finds that in the area of security system reform the inclusivity of the process is of vital importance while non-inclusion of potential stakeholders risks producing spoiler dilemmas. The report differs from the usual focus on political settlements by emphasising that in many cases “it is the individual and social groups, which need to be protected rather than the state”, thus broadening the focus from competing elites to the “grassroots level”. Analysing donor practice in the three country cases, the study even concludes that “international actors seem to gradually abandon top-down approaches in exchange with bottom-up community-based security partnerships” (IFSH et al. 2010: 6-7). Nonetheless, the need for political settlements to be as inclusive as possible also in the area of post-conflict security provision emerges strongly from these cases.

Beyond cases of post-war and “failed state” contexts with massive international involvement the importance of inclusive political settlements is also supported by

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21 This critique of the “foreign-initiated and foreign-dependent statebuilding process” in Afghanistan is also echoed in academic studies such as Suhrke 2009 (quoted here from p. 243).
experience from Sri Lanka, a “challenged performer” case with far more capable state institutions yet also a record of high levels of politically motivated violence. In the absence of political will for peace among the major contending parties, signifying the absence of a negotiated inclusive settlement, an independent multi-donor evaluation of externally supported peacebuilding activities in this country found that they had “modest, if any, impact” (Chapman et al. 2009: vii). The evaluators conclude that under such conditions long-term socio-economic development programmes are not necessarily less effective in mitigating conflict than peacebuilding measures that emphasise security and dialogue.

Those studies which employ a political settlement lens for the analysis report strong evidence concerning the importance of settlements for the success of statebuilding support. They attribute the lack of discernible positive statebuilding impact from external support to fundamental flaws in the existing settlements. While this interpretation is entirely plausible, it suffers from methodological weaknesses. The robustness of findings would benefit greatly if they could be contrasted with results from the study of “successful” cases. In the absence of such cases, the conclusions rely on implicit counterfactuals that reflect the presupposed intervention logic – which may still be right or wrong. As we argued in chapter 4, greater attention to comparative designs that allow the testing of hypotheses and to the generation of credible counterfactuals would help address these shortcomings.

In addition, very few studies have already addressed the even more challenging question of how, if at all, international actors can hope to exert a positive influence on the evolution of flawed political settlements. A rare exception is DFID’s “Synthesis of Country Programme Evaluations Conducted in Fragile States” which devotes one and a half pages of text to the issue of “support for inclusive political settlements” (Chapman & Vaillant 2010: 19–20). Yet the chapter remains somewhat inconclusive with regard to generalised findings. Despite an upbeat assessment given in the lessons chapter of the report (“DFID’s support for inclusive political settlements – from peace agreement negotiations to the holding of elections – has successfully underpinned state-society relationships”), it does not emerge clearly from the document in how far “work with the media and support for civic participation (including women)” could really substantially contribute to the emergence of a viable political settlement. Nonetheless the authors conclude that there is a major potential for DFID to develop its role in this area in the future, “especially in building civic participation and in formal and informal dialogue” (Chapman & Vaillant 2010: 53).

5.4 Incentives and coercion

The success of international support to statebuilding depends on the receptiveness of the recipient country’s political elites and population. It is therefore essential for donors to identify incentives for local actors to engage in effective statebuilding in the long-run (OECD 2011b). In fragile contexts – and other political settings alike – donors are likely to encounter problems in achieving statebuilding goals because certain political elites, social groups, the military or non-state armed groups might veto state reforms. Against this
background donors and researchers assume that a mixture of incentives (for instance, capacity building, support to basic service delivery or financial assistance) and coercive measures (for instance, conditionality, sanctions) improves the likelihood of building an effective state. In conflict-prone or conflict-ridden situations, international actors will often use instruments beyond ODA and engage in other activities, such as direct security engagement and military assistance, in parallel to aid.

Recent research supports the proposition that successful incentives hinge upon the coherence of the incentive system created by external actors for the relevant actors in the respective fragile context (Faust, Leiderer & Schmitt 2012). A coherent and well-communicated incentive system generates consistent signals to the recipient country’s political actors, clearly indicating which actions provoke positive or negative sanctions and thus enhances the leverage of external actors’ measures to support statebuilding.

It is also reasonable to assume that different fragility contexts call for different levels and mixtures of incentives and coercion. In “failed” states with very low levels of capacity, authority and legitimacy, donor support starts from an extremely low basis of trust in institutions. Consequently, providing basic security with, if need be, coercive means, but coupled with material, institutional and reputational incentives that help break cycles of distrust and violence is likely to be the most useful approach for international statebuilding efforts in these contexts. In “weak” states with an overwhelming capacity gap, in turn, a focus of international support on capacity-building appears logical, yet interaction effects among the three dimensions of statehood would suggest that working towards better governance based on broader legitimacy should also be a priority. “Challenged performers”, finally, might receive incentive-based statebuilding and governance support which can be bound to political conditions (see Grävingholt, Ziaja & Kreibaum 2012).

Yet despite such a rationale the use of incentives and coercion and their interplay are virtually not addressed in the studies surveyed here. None of the evaluations under review provides a systematic analysis of how incentives and coercion might impact on statebuilding, nor does any of them report donor attempts to set incentives or put pressure on relevant actors to establish effective and legitimate state structures. References to coercion in the context of UN peacekeeping missions are an exception. This is remarkable given the fact that the conditionality of ODA flows in the context of state fragility and violent conflict, in particular with respect to budget support, is a widely debated issue in development policy and beyond.

Robust UN peacekeeping missions are sometimes considered a precondition for a successful and stable implementation of peace agreements. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Haiti, evaluators assume that the activities of UN peacekeeping missions facilitated the compliance with the respective peace agreements and limited human rights abuses (Kaldor & Vincent 2006).
In some cases, evaluators generally assume that setting incentives, and if necessary putting pressure on political elites, increases the likelihood that governments and other relevant actors comply with donor demands. Some evaluations argue that the provision of public goods, such as basic services and public administration, would be more successful if donors convinced the respective government to be more accountable to its citizens: “It is important for the donors to pressurise the government to be more serious about instituting vertical accountability links to Afghan communities” (OECD 2009: 26). In addition, as discussed in the previous section, an increasing awareness seems to emerge that establishing lasting political settlements amongst all relevant political actors is a precondition for sustainable security in fragile contexts. Some authors seem to expect that coercion might convince domestic actors to engage in bringing about a sound political settlement. Once more, these are assumptions that miss empirical verification. Effectively pressurising domestic actors is difficult. Making coercive mechanisms work requires donors to enjoy high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of political elites and the public in partner countries. What works and why, and what doesn’t, is still under-researched.
6 Statebuilding evaluations and the emerging “conventional wisdom”

Since the early conceptual debates on conflict prevention and peacebuilding at the end of the 1990s, international development partners have come a long way with regard to a joint perspective on the challenges posed by fragile states (see Grävingholt, Gänzle and Ziaja 2009). The progress made has become apparent in two major policy documents adopted in the framework of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. The first are the ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations (OECD 2007), the second is the Policy Guidance on Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict (OECD 2011b). These documents, with the latter building upon the former, contain a number of bold statements about fragile states, development out of fragility and the role that external actors can and should play in this context. The main innovative thrust of the 2007 Principles is captured in “three main propositions” about statebuilding that form the cornerstone of the 2011 Policy Guidance (OECD 2011b: 11).

Conceptual frameworks on statebuilding in fragile situations build from three main propositions:

• Statebuilding needs to be understood in the context of state-society relations; the evolution of a state’s relationship with society is at the heart of statebuilding.

• Statebuilding is a deeply political process, and understanding the context – especially what is perceived as legitimate in a specific context – is crucial if international support is to be useful.

• Statebuilding is first and foremost an endogenous process; there are therefore limits as to what the international community can and should do.

These statements are fully plausible and have, together with the 2007 principles, begun to form something of an emerging “conventional wisdom” of international statebuilding support. Yet there is no logical necessity for any of them to be entirely true. Rather, their validity and usefulness should be considered an empirical question. Lessons learnt from evaluations and other empirical investigations should therefore be utilised to either lend support to or qualify or even refute such propositions.

Against this background, this chapter synthesises the lessons that can be drawn from the evaluations and studies under review with respect to a set of five major propositions about successful international statebuilding support. These five propositions, which are summarised in Box 3, reflect both the three main propositions on statebuilding quoted above and two other aspects derived from the 2007 Principles, namely the necessity for donors to coordinate their activities within and across governments as well as a
disaggregation of the concept of the state with reference to its multidimensionality.22

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<tr>
<th>Box 3: Five major propositions about statebuilding support</th>
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<td>1. Interventions must be extremely well-adapted to the respective political and social context.</td>
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<td>2. Interventions must address the broader state-society relations rather than focusing on the state alone.</td>
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<td>3. Interventions must deal with the state in its security, legitimacy and capacity dimensions.</td>
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<td>4. Interventions must cover all sectors of donor activity in a coordinated way.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Interventions must reflect the recognition that statebuilding is first and foremost an endogenous process with clear limits as to what external support can achieve.</td>
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Source: Authors’ compilation based on OECD 2007 and OECD 2011b

In general terms, the evaluations under review seem to confirm the validity of these statements. At the same time, we identify a number of conflictive issues and innovative approaches that would deserve more attention from donors and academic research.

First proposition: Interventions must be extremely well-adapted to the respective political and social context.

Many evaluations name this as a key requirement of successful donor intervention in statebuilding and peacebuilding, but in most cases this acknowledgement is followed by critical statements. Adaptation to context should, in principle, find its expression in strategic planning, a transparent conceptual approach to the requirements of statebuilding in each particular case and in flexible responses to rapidly changing conditions.

Yet, it is a commonplace finding in evaluations and research studies that interventions fail to address the “root causes” of conflict, that they employ flawed analytical concepts and that they do not account for the specific conditions of their political and social environment. Although problems of this type had already received a lot of attention in the prominent 2004 Utstein Study (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 10-11) similar statements are repeated in more recent documents, indicating that little progress has been made over the last decade.23

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22 The two additional propositions refer to the 3rd, 5th and 8th principle in OECD 2007.

23 For instance, Chapman et al. 2009: 19-20, observe: “In response to major shifts in the political environment donor programmes often either carry on as normal or shift a little – few take a step backwards and rethink strategy and implementation” (ibid.: viii). Kurz 2010: 211, notes: “International statebuilders’ inability to grasp the deeper social and political dynamics and their propensity for imposing uniform prescriptions on all postconflict countries worldwide regardless of context indicates that there are deeper conceptual underpinnings that shape policy analysts’, policy makers’ and donors’ perceptions of political and social reality when it comes to state formation and failure”. OECD 2011a: 14, finds: “Development partners (…) neither conduct regular and systemic analyses, nor systematically share the ones they have undertaken, nor do they necessarily use the analysis as a basis for programming.”
Some studies explicitly distinguish between the national level and subnational (local) or supra-national (regional) levels: Even if donors are well aware of the political and social context at the national level, they need to take local conditions into account, especially in those countries where ethnic or religious fragmentation is high.24 Also, many conflicts affect more than one country. For instance, statebuilding efforts in (South-) Sudan need to keep the regional context at the Horn of Africa in mind (USAID 2011). Finally, some studies acknowledge the key role informal institutions (patrimonialism, etc.) and traditional authorities play in statebuilding and peacebuilding (for instance, see UNDP 2010b; USAID 2011). Donors insisting on transparency, merit-based staffing and professional conduct are well advised to take these factors into account (ibid.: 20).

As a consequence of these observations, several evaluations highlight the importance of tapping local knowledge sources, engaging in longer-term relations with local actors and maintain qualified field personnel on the ground (for instance, see Bennett et al. 2010: xx; OECD 2010a). Evaluations also include reports about the number of context analyses in donors’ portfolios. Overall, they conclude that the number of context analyses on political, socio-economic and security developments increased significantly since 2006 (OECD 2011a).

But context analyses do not necessarily make development assistance more context sensitive. The most recent OECD monitoring of international engagement in fragile states makes a strong point that donors rarely use these assessments of context conditions in fragile states for programming (OECD 2011a). Hence, context-sensitive prioritisation of goals in development assistance is missing in international development assistance in many fragile states.

Second proposition: Interventions must address the broader state-society relations rather than focusing on the state alone.

The way donor interventions address state and non-state actors is an issue discussed by several studies, but not always in the same manner. Evaluations of peacebuilding measures (for instance, Paffenholz et al. 2011a) tend to emphasise the inclusion of civil society and non-state organisations as an important prerequisite for successful implementation. Studies focusing on statebuilding interventions stress the importance of working with the government and strengthening the state.25

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24 See for instance UNDP 2010b; OECD 2011a. With reference to the case of Sudan, Bennett et al. 2010: 128 observe: “In this perspective, local conflict has been regarded as an ‘inconvenience’ which needs working around it rather than embracing a proactive and more holistic engagement and commitment to enhancing security for vulnerable local populations”.

25 To illustrate this point, Foster et al. (2010: 4: 4) note that peacebuilding has led DFID to by-pass the state in Sudan in order to provide basic services, usually through NGOs. This is changing, however, to the degree that statebuilding becomes more relevant. Following GTZ (2008: 14-15), donors should avoid “side-stepping” the state as long as possible to not impede statebuilding. To be sure, donors are also
Both approaches risk being overly one-sided: Analysing the case of Sri Lanka, Chapman et al. (2009: 20) observe that donors “over-emphasised the extent to which civil society and citizens could bring about transformation and peacebuilding.” However, the same authors also issue a warning against aligning donor interventions too closely to governments: “(T)here was little recognition of the political risks of (a) delivering aid through a ‘state’ that is a party to the conflict and (b) supporting the economic and political agenda of a government that represented only a portion of the political spectrum and was vulnerable to electoral defeat.” (ibid.: iv). Given that these observations are by no means limited to the case of Sri Lanka, donors addressing broader state-society relations should keep in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to do so.

Third proposition: Interventions must deal with the state in its security, legitimacy and capacity dimensions.

With regard to this proposition we find diverging approaches in the studies under review. In some cases, the underlying thinking appears to be that the three dimensions of the state behave largely in a parallel fashion. In this sense, strengthening state capacity should lead to better public services and hence, to higher levels of security and legitimacy. In contrast, other studies do account for possible conflicts and refer to issues of sequencing and prioritisation, as discussed in the previous chapter. For instance, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2010) highlights the importance of strengthening the checks and balances within political systems (parliament and judiciary). GTZ (2008: 13) contemplates working with lower tiers (local, regional levels) of government in cases where the policy implementation capacities of national actors are particularly weak.

In a more fundamental statement, USAID (2011: 21) refers to the idea of the nation state itself as “a challenged concept. Many people continue to see their identity first and foremost in terms of ethnicity, rather than as citizens in a nation state”. Consequently, building trust and matching citizens’ expectations with state capacity are key challenges for successful statebuilding.

Fourth proposition: Interventions must cover all sectors of donor activity in a coordinated way.

Even though several documents refer to this proposition, it is by no means uncontested. In particular, evaluations commissioned by DFID and USAID are sometimes rather critical with regard to donor coordination. Several studies point out that the transaction costs and the loss of flexibility resulting from donor coordination may outweigh its benefits, especially in situations where quick action is needed. Bennett et al. (2010: 46) illustrate the various obstacles to donor coordination in Sudan: “From the outset there was an inbuilt lack of coherence in the donor community, with USAID’s relatively large resources channelled bilaterally, most European donors opting for pooled funds and oversight through the Joint Donor Team (…), the European Commission having its hands tied by called upon to intensify interaction between state and society, but this should not lead to parallel structures (ibid.: 21).
the Cotonou Agreement and the necessity to work only through GoNU, and the wholly separate, yet substantial development assistance and loan programmes of China, some Arab States and India.”

Few authors, however, question the benefits of joint conflict analyses and political assessments as a precondition for the strategic planning of donor interventions and as a means to enhance effectiveness in humanitarian interventions (OECD 2011a). Also, there are references to the benefits of information exchange and transparency among donors as a means to prevent domestic actors from instrumentalising external interventions and manipulating individual donors (Goodhand & Walton 2009).

**Fifth proposition:** Interventions must reflect the recognition that statebuilding is first and foremost an endogenous process with clear limits as to what external support can achieve.

This is probably the least visible of the five propositions. Many studies do not even pay lip service to domestic ownership, let alone evaluate interventions from this perspective. Most evaluations are clearly focused on donor interventions and their logic, and they often share a rather optimistic (though not always explicit) view on what external interventions can achieve. Some studies explicitly call for donor ownership of interventions (for instance, see ADE 2011). According to Goodhand / Walton (2009: 306), the liberal peacebuilding approach sees civil wars as “internal problems with external solutions”. From a more pragmatic point of view, other authors point to the weakness of domestic actors (both government and NGOs) as a main reason for donor predominance in statebuilding and peacebuilding.  

Again, Chapman et al. (2009: 9) can be taken as an example for a more critical assessment, stating that “the belief that aid would be a strong driver of peace (…) was found to be false.” From a more academic perspective, Goodhand / Walton (2009: 315) see the risk of an “over-internationalisation” of the peace process. They observe “several key shortcomings of international actors’ peacebuilding strategies, most notably their tendency to swing between extremes of engagement and disengagement and to attempt to promote change by sending signals to conflict actors” (ibid.: 304) with unpredictable outcomes (because signals are easily misunderstood). Finally, the case of Afghanistan appears to trigger debate on the extent to which an external provision of basic public goods (such as security) can undermine endogenous efforts of statebuilding (Sherman 2008; Suhrke 2009; OECD 2009).

With regard to the five propositions, our results corroborate some findings presented in recent reports on lessons learnt in statebuilding and peacebuilding (DFID 2010a; OECD 2011a; GTZ 2008; International Dialogue 2010). In particular, there appears to be growing

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26 For instance, see Disch et al. 2007. For the relationship of national vs. international NGOs, see (Bennett et al. 2010: 103), who also remark that only 37 out of 339 projects reported in Sudan in 2008 were actually submitted to the government’s Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee.
scepticism about the ability and willingness of donors to refine their conceptual tools, improve their analytical work and, above all, link programme planning and implementation to concepts and analyses. As the OECD (2011a: 11) writes:

“The Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations seem to have stimulated relatively limited change in international engagement at the country level (...). According to the 2011 Survey, development partner practice has not improved significantly to achieve better results. (...) The key finding of the 2011 Survey is that most aid actors are neither set up to meet the specific challenges posed by fragile situations, nor systematically able to translate commitments made by their headquarters into country-level changes.”
Conclusion

Donor support to statebuilding and peacebuilding belongs to the most challenging areas of development cooperation. It is at the same time a field where our knowledge is still limited as to which approaches and instruments work and which do not. A growing stock of research and evaluation studies should provide urgently needed information, enabling donors to draw the lessons needed to learn for the improvement of their interventions.

The results presented in the preceding chapters show, however, that the current body of research and evaluation studies does not yet fulfil this task. As a key finding, we observe a high convergence of evaluation results and recommendations. We suspect this observation to reflect a common methodological weakness rather than the discovery of basic statebuilding rules and procedures, as evaluation results are often almost trivial and thus easy to agree with but unfalsifiable with the existing measurement instruments.

This is also reflected in the fact that we have not been able to identify specific priorities and approaches geared towards different types of state fragility. To be true, some issue areas can be found more easily in individual country groups. For instance, the strengthening of economic capacity in states which are more capable to absorb development assistance; or basic service delivery and quick impact measures in weak and failed states. The latter seem frequently to be formulated and implemented at the expense of security issues. Whereas donors prioritise security in the context of conflict, they seem to abandon it once a peace agreement has been achieved. Overall, there are no clear patterns of type-specific intervention discernible yet. In consequence, we can neither give evidence on donors’ intentions and abilities to systematically adapt support to statebuilding to differing fragility contexts nor can we identify general factors conducive to (or hindering) effective statebuilding. This is, of course, also a reflection of limited conceptual progress on these issues so far.

It should be noted, however, that to a certain extent the present report repeats the fallacies we observe in the evaluation and research studies under review: Since our study aims to assess the current practice in statebuilding evaluation by covering the relevant literature, there is an inevitable tendency to formulate synthesising statements and identify generalisable patterns at the expense of specific observations or particularly innovative approaches. In the preceding chapters we have tried to counterbalance this tendency by discussing disputed issues and citing what we think are examples of good practice. But we are well aware of the fact that we might not have done full justice to all the work out there in the field.
Still, the findings presented in this report allow us to draw some basic conclusions and formulate tentative recommendations with regard to future evaluations and (to a minor degree) research studies.

First and foremost, our report highlights the need for donors to be more pro-active and innovative with regard to evaluations. True, donor activities should be planned and implemented according to the problems and needs they are supposed to address in the partner country, rather than the exigencies of evaluation. At the same time, it is possible to combine both perspectives. Basic aspects of project planning and implementation, such as the formulation of objectives and indicators, the collection of baseline data and the elaboration of reports, can be done with a view on facilitating future evaluations. Also, donors could encourage evaluators to use robust statistical methods or to follow the rules of scientifically sound qualitative analysis. However, country expertise remains a key qualification for sound evaluations. Donors should therefore build teams consisting of both country experts and experts on methodological questions. Finally, allowing for longer periods of empirical field work and intensified exchange with local knowledge sources bears the potential of discovering facets of statebuilding outside the immediate reach of the development expert community.

As a second observation, some evaluations highlight that statebuilding is hard to achieve from the capital and by cooperating with national governments alone. Rather, a multilevel approach is required that accounts for local as well as trans-border dynamics of conflict, peacebuilding and public service delivery. While it is still quite difficult to get a clear picture of the impact caused by external interventions in statebuilding, we would suppose – as most research and evaluation studies do – that those approaches which account for the complexity of situations should generate superior results in terms of impact. Among other things, this implies that donors need competent staff on the ground for extended periods of time and ensure that accumulated knowledge is passed on, for instance by planning larger overlaps and extended briefing / debriefing periods for old and new field staff, and by activating local expertise.

A third point refers to the costs and benefits of donor coordination and alignment. With regard to this aspect, our report generates mixed results. On the one hand, we observe that many evaluations are overly focused on donor activities and the internal logic of development cooperation. Clearly, evaluations could dedicate more efforts to tapping local knowledge sources and generating knowledge beyond the sphere of development cooperation. They could furthermore focus more on assessing the interaction of domestic actors in the context of donor engagement. This would enable governments and donors to better assess the pros and cons of external interventions in statebuilding. On the other hand, we find rather strong messages referring to donor coordination, with a number of evaluations assuming a critical standpoint. High transaction costs, bureaucratic red tape and a critical lack of adaptability to changing conditions seem to be the results of excessive donor coordination, at least in some situations and in the eyes of some donors. In contrast, duplication of efforts, conflicting approaches, instrumentalisation of donors and a loss of
strategic focus are some of the outcomes related to the absence of donor coordination in other studies and referring to other situations.

In the light of these findings we see a need to rethink donor coordination. An across-the-board textbook implementation of the Paris agenda does not seem to be the appropriate approach in every case of statebuilding and peacebuilding. It may not always be possible to reach a broad donor consensus on necessary actions within a reasonable time frame, or to link these actions to government strategies and programmes. But there appear to be clear benefits attached to joint analytical work and strategy formulation, the exchange of information and a high degree of transparency among donors.
Appendix A: List of studies identified as most relevant for this review


—— (2011): International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?, Paris: OECD (Conflict and Fragility)

OPM (Oxford Policy Management), and IDL (theIDLgroup) (2008): Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study - The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations, London: DFID (Department for International Development)


Appendix B: Bibliography of all studies surveyed and additional literature cited


Baker, Bruce (2008): Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign Import or Local Solution?, in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2 (1), 23-42


DFID (Department for International Development) (2010a): Building Peaceful States and Societies, London: DFID (Department for International Development)


Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse (2007): The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building Santa Monica: RAND


Harris, Frank (2005): The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform, Pristina: OSCE Kosovo


— (2010a): Do No Harm: International support for statebuilding, Paris: OECD (Conflict and Fragility)
— (2011a): International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't we do better?, Paris: OECD (Conflict and Fragility)


OPM (Oxford Policy Management), and IDL (theIDLgroup) (2008): Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Thematic Study - The applicability of the Paris Declaration in fragile and conflict-affected situations, London: DFID (Department for International Development)


Piparinen, Touko (2007): Putting the Cart before the Horse: Statebuilding, Early Warning and the Irrationality of Bureaucratic Rationalization, in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1 (3), 355-78


Suhrke, Astrid (2006): The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan, Bergen: The Chr. Michelsen Institute


Published by:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Evaluation Department
Asiatisk plads 2
1448 Copenhagen K
Denmark
E-mail: eval@um.dk

The publication can be downloaded from:
www.evaluation.dk

ISBN: 978-87-7087-636-0
ISBN: 978-87-7087-637-7 (internet version)

Other Evaluation Studies
2008/1: Synthesis of Evaluations of HIV/AIDS Assistance
2008/2: Synergies between Bilateral and Multilateral Activities
2008/3: Assessing Multilateral Organisation Effectiveness
2008/4: Economic Empowerment of Women
2008/5: Public Private Partnership Programme
2009/1: Evaluating Aid Effectiveness in the Aggregate: Methodological Issues
2009/2: Addressing the Underlying and Basic Causes of Child Undernutrition in Developing Countries: What Works and Why?
2009/3: Experiences with Conducting Evaluations Jointly with Partner Countries
2009/4: Synthesis of Impact Evaluations of Microcredit
2009/5: Synthesis of Evaluations on Support to Business Development
2010/1: Evaluating Aid Effectiveness in the Aggregate: A critical assessment of the evidence
2010/2: Gender and Value Chain Development
2011/1: CCPA's Open Fun Football Schools Programme
2011/2: Agricultural input subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa
2012/1: The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS and HIV/AIDS interventions
2012/2: Economic development and service delivery in fragile states