




EVALUATION OF DANISH REGIONAL SUPPORT  
TO PEACE AND SECURITY, REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
AND DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

evaluation

2008.07





**Evaluation of Danish  
Regional Support to  
Peace and Security,  
Regional Integration and  
Democratisation  
in Southern Africa**



**Kabell Konsulting ApS**  
Managing for results

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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the evaluation team and should not be ascribed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida or any other with whom the team met.

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# Table of contents

Acknowledgements	3
Acronyms and abbreviations	5
Executive Summary	7
1. Introduction	12
2. Evaluation framework	14
3. The regional context	17
3.1 Recent developments in Southern Africa	19
3.2 The rationale for African regional cooperation and integration	21
3.3 Challenges to regional cooperation	22
3.4 SADC as an institution promoting regional cooperation and integration	25
3.5 Challenges for the region	26
3.6 Challenges for Danish support	29
4. The policy and aid management framework for Danish regional assistance	31
4.1 Strategic focus areas	33
4.2 Principles and aid modalities	36
4.3 Challenges for future Danish support	38
5. The portfolio and partner institutions	40
5.1 No explicit programming framework	41
5.2 Similar types of projects	42
5.3 Different aid modalities	43
5.4 Sufficient management capacity at embassy level?	43
5.5 The partners	44
6. Conclusions and recommendations	52
6.1 Introduction	52
6.2 Major recommendations	52
Annex 1: Terms of Reference	57
Annex 2: List of projects included in desk study and in-depth review	61
Annex 3: List of persons consulted	64

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

<i>AMG</i>	Aid Management Guidelines
<i>AU</i>	African Union
<i>CDSM</i>	Centre for Defence and Security Management
<i>CCM</i>	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
<i>CCR</i>	Centre for Conflict Resolution
<i>CPS</i>	Centre for Policy Studies
<i>CSO</i>	Civil Society Organizations
<i>COMESA</i>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<i>DAC</i>	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
<i>DKK</i>	Danish Krone
<i>DRC</i>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<i>EAC</i>	East African Community
<i>EISA</i>	Electoral Institute of South Africa
<i>EPA</i>	Economic Partnership Agreements
<i>FDI</i>	Foreign Direct Investment
<i>GDP</i>	Gross Domestic Product
<i>ICP</i>	International Cooperation Partners
<i>IOC</i>	Indian Ocean Commission
<i>IDASA</i>	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
<i>IEC</i>	Independent Electoral Commission
<i>IGAD</i>	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
<i>IWPR</i>	Institute for war and Peace Reporting
<i>NEPAD</i>	New Partnership for Africa's Development
<i>MDG</i>	Millennium Development Goal
<i>MFA</i>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>ODA</i>	Official Development Assistance
<i>OAU</i>	Organisation of African Unity
<i>RECs</i>	Regional Economic Communities
<i>RSA</i>	Republic of South Africa
<i>SACU</i>	South African Customs Union
<i>SADC</i>	Southern African Development Community
<i>SADDC</i>	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
<i>SADSEM</i>	Southern African Defence & Security Management Network
<i>SAIIA</i>	South African Institute of International Affairs
<i>Sida</i>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<i>SSA</i>	Sub-Saharan Africa
<i>ZAR</i>	South African Rand





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# Executive Summary

## Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation of Danish regional support to peace and security, regional integration and democratisation in Southern Africa, covering the period 2003-07. The overall objective of the evaluation is twofold:

- To assess the extent to which the activities financed through the regional cooperation have contributed to the achievement of Danish priorities and objectives for Southern Africa, and
- To formulate recommendations for the future Danish assistance to the region within the areas of peace and security, regional integration and democratisation.

Denmark's cooperation with Africa is a long-standing partnership, takes various forms and covers a number of sectors and themes. Regional assistance is one of the cooperation modalities and an evaluation was undertaken in 2003 of Danish Regional Assistance to Southern Africa. Since then, however, the international development assistance paradigm has further evolved, not least as a result of the signing of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The Paris Declaration heralded an accelerated focus on partnership and included a number of commitments for both donor and partner countries, based on five key principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability. There is also an accelerated focus on and commitment to Africa internationally, and a clear evolution in African governance structures, democratic institutions and practices. Taken together this means new opportunities and roles for donors and for African countries, including major countries such as the Republic of South Africa.

The above, combined with adjustments and changes in the Danish policy environment, especially the elaboration of two new strategies for Danish assistance to Africa in the above-mentioned period, the establishment of the Africa Commission in 2007<sup>1)</sup>, and the continuation of a major Program for Peace in Africa, has led to a wish to re-assess the Danish Regional Support to Southern Africa. In view of the programming cycle for Danida funds, it was decided to undertake the evaluation in a fairly short timeframe, so as to ensure that it would feed into a programming exercise, planned for the autumn of 2008.

While the project scope covers the three areas of peace and security, regional integration and democratisation, projects actually implemented during the period covered were all in the areas of peace and security and democratisation; no projects could be categorised as having an objective related specifically to regional integration.

1) [www.africacommission.um.dk/en](http://www.africacommission.um.dk/en).

The evaluation was carried out in four phases: i) agreement on scope and approach as well as preparation of a methodological paper, ii) a desk review, iii) a field study in South Africa where all the key institutions and donors were interviewed, and lastly iv) the finalisation phase, which was conducted in Copenhagen.

The desk review and initial discussions during the field study resulted in a slight modification to the methodology, so that more weight was being given to the assessment of the implementing partners; better knowledge of the partners is indeed crucial for future assistance, hence this slight change.

Two key constraints to the evaluation should be noted: i) assessments in the evaluation build on information from the institutions themselves; no interviews have been made with direct beneficiaries, and ii) as the SADC Secretariat and many key donors are based in Gaborone, further interviews with these stakeholders may warrant consideration. It would be particularly important to discuss issues related to division of labour and delegated authority among donors, and direct support to SADC institutions and Secretariat.

### **Summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations**

The most striking finding, and one that Danida should take to heart, is that Denmark has a political capital in the region that is important to maintain and nurture. It is a capital that can be ascribed to the basic philosophy of Danish assistance, that of long-term mutually committing partnerships. Indeed, partner institutions talk about funds received from Danida as *“money given in trust”*, meaning that Danida is perceived as a trusted and transparent partner, who provides funds without strings or overly bureaucratic procedures. To maintain this capital, a number of adjustments may need to be made. And in order to ensure that it is also *“money well spent”*, there is a need to re-examine and further develop the policy and aid management framework.

#### **Applying a regional approach to Southern Africa**

Denmark’s commitment to Africa is a long-time commitment, and Southern Africa has been a priority area over decades, with a particular political dimension in the apartheid years. Since then, the South African context has changed and regional development has changed with it, opening up for new opportunities.

For analytical purposes regional approaches can be placed along a continuum from loose towards firm arrangements. What is feasible and appropriate depends to a large extent on the capacity of the regional institutions, in this case SADC, which is considered a rather weak institution. It also depends on the substantive area. The areas of focus of Danish assistance (peace and security, regional integration and democratisation) lend themselves well to regional approaches, loose as well as firmer types of cooperation. They are also highly relevant to the needs of the region, and well in line with Danish policy priorities as articulated in the current policy framework

Applying a regional approach carries several advantages but needs a long-term perspective and innovative thinking to ensure its effectiveness. SADC’s capacity needs to be strengthened to enable it to assume leadership in key areas that are central in Danish development cooperation. A number of constraints exist in working with SADC directly, and therefore donors have worked through a selective range of individual institutions with a regional focus. This has contributed to building regional capacity in key areas,

such as security and peace and democratisation outside of formal SADC structure. It has also contributed to deepening the understanding and knowledge of these complex issues, sharing best practices among SADC countries and to promoting broader regional processes.

### **The policy and aid management framework**

Fundamentally, Danish assistance has always, and since 2000 explicitly, been based on a principle of partnership as expressed in several policy papers and strategies over the years, including in “A World for All”<sup>2)</sup>(2007). The latter outlines how Danish development assistance can address dynamic change, while at the same time maintaining continuity and perseverance, in a mutually binding partnership approach: “The core of the Danish development policy is long-term and binding cooperation with the developing countries – a long and sustained effort to advance the priorities that are continuous from year to year”. This is precisely what many of the recipient institutions have appreciated; they see the relationship with Denmark as one building on trust, something which has gained Denmark considerable political capital in the region.

Notwithstanding the principles described above, Danish assistance is, as is that of other donors, also subject to changing political priorities that need to be taken account of. Curiously, despite the recognised role of regional assistance, this has not been a priority in itself. It has, however, been included as one element in various geographical strategies, including the “Regional strategy for Southern Africa” (1997), and was also mentioned briefly in the latest “Strategy for Africa: Denmark in Africa, a continent on its way” (2007). In the latter, emphasis is on strengthening the institutions that are in place to manage regional challenges.

The most important policy evolution over the period is a move to more outcome-focused and less directive policies. A shift has taken place from focus on input and activities – what to do – to a focus on outcomes – what to achieve. Such a shift, to be effective, needs to be accompanied by a clarification of the aid management framework, something that still needs some improvement. Indeed, the evaluation shows that there is a need for a better guiding framework to help make decisions on aid modalities, for criteria and assessment methodologies to choose the institutions that should receive support, and for developing performance baselines to be able to measure goal achievement.

The evaluation shows that there is also scope for improving the effectiveness of the assistance, for example in terms of actively supporting the principles and commitments of the Paris Declaration. In Southern Africa, the 2006 Windhoek Declaration<sup>3)</sup> on a new partnership between SADC and the International Cooperating Partners is the sub-regional operationalisation of these principles. Therefore it may be pertinent to examine what role Denmark could play in further promoting this Declaration as an instrument for more effective development assistance. Also, there are other measures that can be implemented from Pretoria together with other donors, including better exchange of information, more joint work and use of practices such as lead donor and delegated cooperation.

### **The portfolio of projects and the implementing partners**

Despite weaknesses in systematically and comprehensively tracking and documenting impact, the overall assessment is that the portfolio consists of relevant projects, which

2) [www.netpublikationer.dk/um/8299/index.htm](http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/8299/index.htm).

3) [www.sadc.int/icp/windhoek\\_declaration/index.php](http://www.sadc.int/icp/windhoek_declaration/index.php).

have produced a large number of specific outputs. These include, inter alia, training, workshops, conferences, research publications and advocacy material. In the absence of systematic impact assessments of the projects by the partner institutions, only a general impression of the impact can be given. However, anecdotal evidence shows that in several cases the projects have contributed to building capacity, influencing important policies, including setting regional standards, and increasing awareness of key issues in democratisation and peace and security. It is the impression of the evaluation team, that with some modest guidance and assistance, most of the institutions would be able to improve results tracking and document impact in a more systematic manner.

The support provided has helped strengthen institutions and networks that are, for the most part, recognised as important players in generating and sharing knowledge about governance in Africa and the African security architecture. Through this channel, Danida has had opportunities to contribute to developing and furthering agendas that are of key importance to progress in the region, and that it would not have been able to influence through direct bilateral support.

This being said, the portfolio is also quite large, with many individual projects, different types of modalities, and different financing sources and accountability frameworks. Furthermore, the lack of clarity of management arrangements and shared responsibility between the embassy and headquarter staff adds to the burden; it bears the risk of inconsistent treatment where one level may turn down a project and another approve it. Addressing these issues would increase effectiveness and efficiency of the individual projects and of the project portfolio as a strategic instrument to achieve Danish development objectives. Chapter 6 includes specific findings and recommendations to address these key issues.

The present evaluation thus has the following conclusions and recommendations, which are further elaborated in Chapter 6. The support given:

- Is relevant to the needs and development priorities in the region, and consistent with Danish priorities. Needs remain, however, in the region especially in terms of capacity development.
- Has contributed to the development of loose types of cooperation in the form of a vibrant web of institutions generating knowledge, exchanging good practices, and developing capacity with respect to peace and security and democratisation.
- Has supported a wide range of projects with relevant objectives and recorded outputs in terms of workshops, research papers, training and advocacy.
- Seems to have made significant contributions to broader regional processes with firmer commitment among partner countries, through the support to some key institutions. However, this is difficult to prove by anything but anecdotal evidence, and attributing these processes to only Danish support is not possible.
- Does not have, as yet, a sufficiently well-developed results tracking system to make firm conclusions about impact.

For the future, Danida should:

- Re-examine the policy framework, especially clarify the rationale and approach to regional cooperation in the Southern African region.
- Develop a clear and transparent strategy to guide the move away from ad hoc projects to a large number of institutions to more strategic and focused support to fewer institutions, including shifting weight to core support.
- Develop an appropriate aid management framework that can support a process of implementing principles of selectivity and complementarity, including choice of partners and aid modality.
- Initiate a dialogue with other donors to devise ways of collectively improving effectiveness through division of labour and delegated authority, and sharing information, guidelines and assessment templates for the institutions.
- Consider ways of supporting SADC as an institution, consistent with commitments in the Windhoek Declaration and given South Africa's role, think innovatively of how to support South Africa as a main locomotive promoting regional development; including through support to specific government departments.

---

# 1 Introduction

Denmark has a long-standing interest in and commitment to Africa, and has supported the continent in various ways over the years. Denmark is also traditionally among the donors who regularly review and evaluate development efforts and strive to innovate and adjust the assistance as experience grows and new aid modalities and development issues emerge. An example of this is Danish regional assistance to Southern Africa.

Denmark's cooperation with Africa is a long-standing partnership. It takes various forms and covers a number of sectors and themes. Regional assistance is one of the cooperation modalities and an evaluation was undertaken in 2003 of Danish Regional Assistance to Southern Africa. Since then, however, the international development assistance paradigm has further evolved, not least as a result of the signing of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The Paris Declaration heralded an accelerated focus on partnership and included a number of commitments for both donors and partner countries, based on five key principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability. There is also an accelerated focus on and commitment to Africa internationally, and a clear evolution in African governance structures, democratic institutions and practices. Taken together, this means on the one hand new opportunities and roles for donors, and on the other new responsibilities and prospects for African countries, including major countries such as the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

The above, combined with adjustments and changes in the Danish policy environment, has led to a wish to re-assess the Danish Regional Support to Southern Africa. The most important changes in the Danish policy environment relate to the elaboration of two new strategies for Danish assistance to Africa in the above-mentioned period, the establishment of the Africa Commission<sup>4)</sup>, and the development and implementation of a major Program for Peace in Africa. In view of the programming cycle for Danida funds, it was decided to undertake the review in a fairly short timeframe. This would help ensure that it could feed into a programming exercise planned for the autumn of 2008.

The overall objective of the evaluation is twofold:

- To assess the extent to which the activities financed through the regional cooperation have contributed to the achievement of Danish priorities and objectives for Southern Africa, and
- To formulate recommendations for the future Danish assistance to the region within the areas of peace and security, regional integration and democratisation.

The evaluation covers the period 2003-07 in the areas of peace and security, regional integration, and democratisation. However, projects actually implemented during that period were all in the areas of peace and security and democratisation; no projects could be categorised as having an objective related specifically to regional integration.

4) [www.africacommission.um.dk/en](http://www.africacommission.um.dk/en).

The evaluation has five distinct outputs/deliverables:

- A short paper describing the approach and methodology for carrying out assessments and evaluations of the individual regional projects/programmes.
- An assessment of the regional context with a particular focus on the development since the last evaluation in 2003, in terms of peace and security, regional integration, and democratisation.
- An assessment at the strategic level of the continued relevance of Danish regional assistance to Southern Africa in view of the described context.
- An assessment and evaluation of Danish-supported activities with a particular emphasis on peace and security, regional integration and democracy, consistent with the methodology agreed.
- A final assessment with forward-looking strategic recommendations.

The report is divided into five chapters summarising the findings from individual papers: Chapter 1 outlines the background, Chapter 2 describes the evaluation framework, Chapter 3 sets the regional context, and Chapter 4 analyses the Danish strategic framework. Chapter 5 contains the portfolio analysis and brief assessment of the partner institutions. The final chapter, Chapter 6, contains findings, conclusions and forward-looking recommendations.

While Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the overarching policy framework for regional support, Chapter 5 is the “core” of the report – it is the result of numerous interviews and reflections on the challenges and potential of regional assistance and the specificities of Danish assistance to Southern Africa. This chapter, therefore, includes relatively more of the underlying evidence and information than the other chapters, and is consequently somewhat longer.

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## 2 Evaluation framework

The evaluation has a user-focused approach and strong efforts have been made to ensure that the process, as well as the report, responds to the policy and programming needs of Danida. The timing and duration of the evaluation were adjusted to align with the programming cycle, so as to ensure that findings would feed into a new programming exercise. This, however, meant a fairly compressed mission schedule and limited the extent of travel and consultation with stakeholders, especially outside South Africa.

The evaluation was carried out in four phases: (i) an inception phase where methodological issues, scope, evaluation approach and organisation were decided in consultation with Danida staff; (ii) a desk review phase in Copenhagen, which included document reviews and conducting interviews with key informants; (iii) a field visit to Pretoria and Johannesburg, which benefited from the support and participation of embassy staff very familiar with the institutions, projects and issues, and also enjoyed the participation of the Head of Danida's Evaluation Department; (iv) and finally a drafting phase in Copenhagen.

In terms of methodology for the portfolio review, the assessment and evaluation of Danish-supported activities has a dual perspective: the perspective of the Danish-funded project, and of the implementing institution. Due to limited evidence on outcome and impact of individual projects (very few reviews, evaluations and documented results), the main emphasis has been on assessing the portfolio as such and drawing some generic and programmatic lessons, rather than attempting an assessment of the outcome or impact of individual projects.

The assessment of the implementing institutions and aid modalities has received high priority, as these are issues that need to be seriously considered in the upcoming programming exercise. This assessment has also benefitted from a Swedish evaluation of a number of the same institutions<sup>5)</sup>, which came to largely the same conclusions and effectively functioned as a validation of findings. The Swedish evaluation was a more thorough exercise where a team of specialists spent several days with each institution.

The assessment is built around a descriptive and an analytical part. The descriptive part is based on publicly available reports and documents from Danida in Copenhagen and the embassy in Pretoria. It maps and describes the types of projects, modalities, partners and focus areas. However, as work progressed, it became clear that the document base for the project assessment was rather weak. The document bases both in Copenhagen and in Pretoria have been mined for information, but very little in terms of assessments and evaluations was available. This rendered an assessment of outcome and impact very difficult.

5) *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Institute for Security Studies and South African Institute of International Affairs.*



The qualitative and analytical part included gathering, assessing and validating information through interviews in Copenhagen and in the Republic of South Africa. Primary informants have been representatives from the implementing institutions, from the Danish embassy in Pretoria, as well as other key donors providing regional assistance through the same institutions.

All institutions have been very forthcoming and took time to meet the evaluation team, who met with 10 institutions over five days. Danida has also been very supportive in terms of providing access to available files and documents. The time available for the evaluation did not allow, however, for interviews with other partners, beneficiaries and end users of the project outputs and outcomes; hence all assessments are based on information provided by the institutions themselves or available in Danida files or in the public space. An informal discussion among the heads of all the institutions, organised by the embassy, did however provide an excellent opportunity for discussion and validation of some of the key issues and conclusions. Furthermore, many findings are consistent with findings from the recent Swedish evaluation of a number of the institutions.

The most important limitation, in the view of the evaluation team, relates to the field study and the gathering of information from a SADC perspective. A visit to Gaborone to meet the SADC Secretariat and talk to the International Collaboration Partners could have enhanced the pertinence of the assessment and made it possible to make more specific recommendations relating to the role of SADC and the opportunities for Danish support to the organisation and the Secretariat.

The evaluation uses the “classical” DAC criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact. The evaluation team therefore has kept these aspects in mind for all project reviews and during interviews with the institutions. Due to the limited documentation available for several projects, these have however not been applied stringently for each project, but served more to guide the assessment of the portfolio as such.

The institutional analysis is based on a balanced scorecard approach, grounded in organisational analysis. It examines strengths and weaknesses of the institutions related to five key areas: type of institution, (government, NGO, membership based, academic etc.), governance and “regionality” (regional board and staff, field offices etc), financial situation and dependence on Danida funding, clarity of comparative advantage and core capacity, and the solidity of results tracking and measurement. These five aspects have been chosen as they shed light on the institutions’ relevance and their capacity to carry out projects and programmes in a manner that meets the DAC criteria.

The desk study, carried out in Copenhagen, included 19 projects and covered 13 institutions:

Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM), Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Regional Human Rights Clinic, SADC Youth Movement, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA), Gender Links, Brenthurst Foundation, Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and Centre for Policy Studies (CPS).

This constituted the entire portfolio of projects in the three focus areas for the period covered by the evaluation. After consultation with the embassy in Pretoria it was decided to focus on 10 institutions for the field study. The 10 institutions were: CCR, SADSEM, ISS, EISA, Gender Links, Brenthurst Foundation, IDASA, IEC, SAIIA, and CPS. These institutions together implemented 15 projects.

The evaluation thus covers fairly comprehensively the entire portfolio of relevant projects. Findings and insights have been validated and nuanced through a meeting with key donors, discussions with international consultants with experience of the organisations, and through a joint, informal session with all the key institutions.

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### 3 The regional context

As a region, Southern Africa is brought together by a complex web of shared historical experience, economic exchanges and cultural features. It is important to appreciate that there is as such no “objective” or “scientific” way in which to once and for all identify its boundaries vis-à-vis neighbouring regions. Historically, countries in Southern Africa all share a colonial experience. However, this obviously varies considerably across countries such as Swaziland and Angola, let alone the unique history of South Africa. The current SADC members had no less than six colonial masters: Netherlands, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Portugal and Germany.

Between 1974 (the independence of Mozambique and Angola) and 1994 (the end of apartheid in South Africa), the shared regional identity was to a large extent influenced by the struggle for democratic changes in South Africa. Therefore, the issues of peace and security and democratisation have been fundamental in shaping an agenda for regional cooperation and integration. They are thus also eminently important issues for a donor such as Denmark to support.

Regional boundaries continue to be shaped by shifting alliances and a changing geopolitical outlook. This is for example demonstrated by the recent SADC membership obtained by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Likewise, a growing momentum of East African regional cooperation has resulted in a relative change in Tanzania’s orientation since the mid-1990s. This provides another illustration of regional blocs and alliances being flexible arrangements that are adapted to changing needs of member states.

Yet, despite such historical and current variations the region does share a number of common characteristics; interestingly the same features simultaneously serve as unifying as well as separating factors in shaping the opportunities and constraints for further regional integration in Southern Africa. This is illustrated in the box below:

#### **Southern Africa - Common and uneven grounds**

	<b>What pulls together</b>	<b>What pushes apart</b>
1	South African economy dominates the region: holding more than 70% of GDP	Considerable wealth disparities across countries: some middle income, others least developed
2	Several countries share transport networks and require constant collaboration for these to function effectively	Some countries are landlocked and experience a significant premium being placed on their external trade

	<b>What pulls together</b>	<b>What pushes apart</b>
3	Apart from Swaziland all countries have multi-party systems and competitive electoral systems	Across the region there are stark variations in the viability of democratic institutions for example from the situation in Zimbabwe over Botswana to the situation in South Africa
4	Unlike several other African regions all Southern African countries share memories of a colonial past	There are considerable differences in colonial legacies, e.g. differences between Lusophone and Anglophone countries
5	The region remains characterised by considerable labour mobility	Employment patterns vary considerably across countries
6	All countries are members of SADC, an institutions whose membership has continued to grow	Several SADC members are also part of other regional groupings, e.g. Tanzania EAC, Mauritius IOC
7	Across the region exports are dominated by minerals and agriculture products, making up more than half of the region's exports	In agriculture land tenure is characterised by overlapping jurisdictions, shaped by a variety of historical experience, underlying the need for local and national approaches rather than grand regional schemes
8	In recent years the region has witnessed new levels of relative stability compared to a trajectory of violent and devastating conflicts	However, peace in DRC remains fragile and the political crisis in Zimbabwe causes concerns across the region

In an international perspective Southern Africa draws attention for a variety of reasons. However, the justification for a regional engagement obviously varies across different international development partners and motives will also change over time. But currently the following issues seem to be the more pertinent (though not in any order of priority).

- *40% of the population below the USD 1/day level:* Given the poverty reduction focus of most donor agencies, the region's extensive and deep poverty provides compelling arguments for international support<sup>6)</sup>. The seriousness of the HIV/AIDS pandemic with Southern Africa being the most affected region globally (on average one of every six adults is infected) falls within the same category.

6) *Of Africa's seven middle-income countries, five are SADC members: South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and Swaziland (the remaining being Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) (World Bank 2008).*

- *Responding to post-conflict situations:* On the whole, in a post-independence perspective governance has improved. Yet, the region is not enjoying stability and security. There is concern that civil strife and conflicts in individual countries can easily spill over and create instability. In recent years such fears have enhanced the interest in enhancing the capacity of African institutions to address security agendas.
- *Foreign trade and investments:* globalisation has implied a search for new exports markets as well as a quest for commodity supplies. Countries outside of Africa look to Southern Africa for access to mineral resources and other commodities while also seeing South Africa as an access point to wider markets in neighbouring countries.

### 3.1 Recent developments in Southern Africa

#### Regional integration

The launch of the African Union (AU) in 2002 provided a new impetus to hopes of renewed cooperation and integration across the African region. While a good deal of this has occurred at the continental level of the AU itself, sub-regional entities (often referred to as regional economic communities, RECs) have been seen as building blocks for a wider African economic and political integration. Existing RECs in the region include COMESA, EAC and SACU in addition to SADC. These differ markedly in size, mandate and capacity. Yet, neither at the level of the AU or among international development partners have approaches to RECs been differentiated to take account of these differences.

In relation to Southern Africa the following trends should be taken note of:

- As argued above, South Africa remains a political and economic giant, yet the country has been reluctant to use its muscles to act as a strong hegemony pushing for enhanced regional integration. This may however be changing as evidenced by the 1996 SADC protocol on trade, which has to date been ratified by 12 of 14 SADC countries, including South Africa.
- Whereas in other regions (notably the EU) regional integration has been driven by economic interests and trade policies cutting across national boundaries, the Southern African region in this regard is not a unitary actor with clear common interests. In 2006-07 this was for example manifested in the complex negotiation processes relating to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and groupings of developing countries.
- Together with Nigeria and Senegal, South Africa has played a lead role in promoting the 'New Partnership for Africa's Development' (NEPAD) as a home-grown Africa-wide call for good governance, economic reforms and peace and stability. South Africa has opted to invest substantial foreign policy resources in promoting NEPAD (and the African Union) across the continent while apparently putting less emphasis on SADC as an instrument to further regional integration<sup>7)</sup>.

7) *South Africa hosts the Pan-African Parliament and the NEPAD Secretariat, as well as playing a lead role in the Peace and Security Council of the AU. A 2005 CMI report – SADC's restructuring and emerging policies – notes that the strong RSA involvement with the AU and NEPAD has effectively meant less capacity to engage in a similar fashion with SADC.*

#### **Peace and security**

With the end of civil wars in the DRC and Angola, Southern Africa has been enjoying a period of relative peace and stability in recent years. Nationally, SADC members have seen few abrupt regime changes and inter-state conflicts are few and confined. In this context the political and social crisis in Zimbabwe stands out as a major factor, which can cause concern with regard to peace and security across the region although it must be noticed that the situation in the DRC is far from stable.

A resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis, however, calls for measures that challenge basic principles of sovereignty; something for which existing regional institutions are ill equipped (see also Section 3.5). States in Southern Africa have indeed remained reluctant to transfer national sovereignty to a regional security structure with binding rules. Aggravating the situation is SADC's lack of institutional capacity (four staff working in the SADC office responsible for peace and security). This is also a reflection of the economic and administrative limitations of member states' capacity to engage in joint peace building engagements. Furthermore, at the political level, SADC has been reluctant to receive funding from donors to the areas of peace and security, despite a willingness from donors to support these areas.

The crisis in Zimbabwe has moreover brought to the fore the complex relationship between Zimbabwe and South Africa dating back to Zimbabwe's positions during the anti-apartheid struggle. There are thus a number of different reasons why South Africa remains vary of championing peace and security interventions in the region.

#### **Democracy**

In Southern Africa multi-party systems would appear to have become the order of the day. Introduced in many of the countries during the 1990s, these have indeed taken root but it is nevertheless significant that political processes and institutional configurations remain largely driven by 'national logics'. However, across the region a number of shared phenomena are conspicuous:

- Succession politics: in countries such as Malawi, Namibia and Zambia incumbent presidents and their wider political strongholds have challenged constitutional stability to extend their stay in power. And in South Africa struggles for leadership of the ruling party have displayed deep rifts and uncertainties regarding political processes. In recent years the basic viability of multi-party systems has not been aggressively challenged, but such infighting among ruling elites raises questions about competitive political arrangements and their resilience to leadership transitions.
- One-party dominance: with the notable exception of Zimbabwe, Southern Africa has experienced how party-based political opposition has generally become a regular and tolerated feature of parliamentary decision-making. Yet, the region also witnesses how multi-party systems accommodate ruling parties' claim for continued power and control, as illustrated by CCM in Tanzania and FRELIMO in Mozambique.
- Local governance: whereas democratic-oriented national institutions have taken root gradually in the region, democratic practices are still not so deepened in most countries that they extend to levels of local government. While decision-making power has been moved from central to local level, these levels have not yet

developed democratic practices such as transparency and accountability, and budgets at this level for example are still often not made public. Locating political decision-making and budgetary discretion at levels close to local communities has thus happened to a certain degree, but providing local communities with access to democratic influence on public service delivery still remains an ambition rather than a regular practice.

- **Accountability:** balancing executive powers with judicial control and legislative oversight remains a thorny issue throughout the region as the recurrent debates on constitutional amendments in Zambia illustrate.
- Civil society has become a regular actor mobilising community members, engaging in a variety of development programmes and campaigning for civic education and good governance. Yet, its roles and capacities vary considerably among countries in the region.

### 3.2 The rationale for African regional cooperation and integration

A certain number of reasons to engage in regional cooperation and integration can be identified:

- Since independence, political leaders across Africa have been pushing for enhanced cooperation among governments of the region<sup>8)</sup>. This has been borne out of a belief that a common historical trajectory unites African countries, but has also been based on a realisation that most African countries do not yield much influence on the global arena. This is due to their sheer size and because of resource and capacity constraints. This drive for regional (or even continental) unity has taken many shapes in the past decades from Nkrumah's pan-Africanism and the formation of the OAU to the current proliferation of regional trading arrangements. Indeed, Africa can boast of 14 of these, many of which with overlapping membership and mandates<sup>9)</sup>. There is an underlying wish to enhance collective bargaining power in order to be among the rule makers and not merely the rule takers.
- The belief that 'size matters' seems particularly strong when it comes to *economic arguments for regional cooperation*: many countries are too small and have too modest an economic potential to make up significant markets in their own right, and this has led governments to propose harmonising regulatory regimes, border controls etc. This has been based on the assumption that it would facilitate growing Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) if, e.g., the Southern African region could offer foreign investors access to a larger regional market in contrast to fragmented national markets driven by each their own logic.

8) *This and the subsequent section draw on DfID: Southern Africa Regional Plan (February 2006); The World Bank: The Development Potential of Regional Programmes. An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multi-country Operations (February 2007), and The World Bank: Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (March 2008).*

9) *Rehabeam Shilimela: Monitoring economic integration in SADC, 2006/2007. Overlapping Memberships of Regional Economic Arrangements and EPA Configurations in Southern Africa. Gaborone 2008.*

- Regional cooperation would also appear to enhance opportunities for ‘*regional public goods*’, notably in the field of *infrastructure*, which indeed was a major motivating factor behind the creation of SADCC in 1980<sup>10</sup>). Another such field of ‘public goods’ is management of shared natural resources.
- Opportunity to *enhance effectiveness by sharing experience* has also been marketed as among the attractive features of regional cooperation. Across Africa many social problems are shared and countries could benefit from drawing on experience developed by their neighbours with associated economies of scale.
- In recent years African nations as well as the international community have increasingly looked for regional solutions to promote *peace and security*. This involves both elements of peace-keeping and expectations that regional institutions per se promote confidence building among rival nation states.
- Challenged by *globalisation*, African states have perceived regionalism as a relevant response to Africa’s marginalisation in global trade and international politics.
- African governments as well as donor agencies have perceived regional institutions as ways of *minimising transaction costs* when preparing funding for larger interventions. Channelling support through a regional organisation would enable donors to engage with a higher number of countries, and countries in the region would see regional institutions as an effective way of getting access to growing amounts of international assistance.
- Regional arrangements can provide mechanisms to ensure policy lock-in and the fulfilment of mutual obligations, hence reducing the risks of costly policy reversals.

Support for regional cooperation often draws on a mixture of justifications often however without providing a more explicit causality of how these general objectives are linked to actual intervention modalities.

### 3.3 Challenges to regional cooperation

While the relevance of regional approaches has indeed been demonstrated over the years, it seems important to emphasise that a commonality of issues and challenges across national boundaries does not in itself mean that regional programming provides an effective response.

- Engaging mutual actors around a joint agenda requires the existence of common interests unifying stakeholders which may otherwise pursue quite diverse concerns. There must be “*a minimum threshold of political congruence for a successful regional organisation, below which the organisation lacks cohesion and its members are unable to adopt common policies*”.<sup>11)</sup>

10) *Out of Africa’s 15 landlocked countries six are located in Southern Africa and hence have an inherent need for stable regional transport arrangements.*

11) Laurie Nathan, “*The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003*” July 2004, p. 15.



- Regional cooperation must contain mechanisms for its benefits to be *fairly shared* across participating nations.
- Regional cooperation also requires that participants must all possess *capacities to participate* in decision-making and implementation of joint agreements.
- As regional cooperation engages actors with widely differing capabilities *complex institutional configurations* are often required to ensure the above concerns: distribution of benefits, and opportunities to advance a variety of interests finding ways to identify common agendas. *Accountability* also easily becomes a major concern: to whom would regional institutions report: national legislative assemblies or the executive branch of member states etc.
- Because of the institutional configurations and the nature of public goods *immediate benefits* may be *intangible* and could often take quite a while to materialise.
- Language and other cultural and political barriers can imply significant transaction costs for participating member states.
- International *donors have been reluctant to fund* regional cooperation with preference to larger multilateral schemes (multilateral development banks, the UN agencies and specialised organisations) or national programming<sup>12</sup>).

There are also specific challenges for donors when wishing to support regional programmes and projects. The World Bank, in its recent regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2008:27) identified the following seven factors as making up a rather complex operating environment for donor agencies engaging to support regional projects and programmes: low capacity, country ownership, coordination challenges, legal safeguards, and procurement and financial management issues. Lastly, and importantly, monitoring and evaluation systems across countries and regions often differ greatly, and in some cases render measuring and monitoring outcomes difficult if not impossible.

In light of the above, regional approaches in Southern Africa can be categorised along a continuum of choices:

- **Networks to share experiences** and draw lessons from how neighbouring countries have responded when faced with similar challenges. Intended outcomes would often involve greater awareness of regional commonality and a sharper focus of available policy options for national decision-making. Benefits from such interaction would typically be accrued by national institutions with established legitimacy to distribute gains among existing stakeholders. This approach is often characterised by activities promoting peer reviews and lesson learning: workshops, exchange programmes, research initiatives etc.
- A second option involves **regional cooperation to harmonise approaches and policies** according to joint standards and programmes but maintaining sovereignty.

12) DFID 2006. *Department for International Development: Southern Africa Regional Plan London February 2006.*

Institutionally this would often involve voluntary arrangements to establish new organisations working parallel to or in tandem with national agencies. Benefits would still mainly be derived at national levels.

- **Regional integration** involves transferring decision-making authority to joint institutions thereby forfeiting national sovereignty. Regional institutions in this scenario would often supersede or provide a regulatory framework for national institutions. Benefits could still be widely enjoyed by diverse stakeholders across the region but their location and identity might be less 'national'. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is among the very few examples of this approach to cooperation.

Moving along this continuum implies both growing demands on institutional capacity as well as politically contested choices. In the context of international donor support for regional cooperation it is important to locate individual interventions along the continuum described above. Both donors and SADC member states need to consider at the strategic level what type of cooperation they aim for. At one end there is the looser type of cooperation that may indeed be multi-country rather than truly regional in as much as it focuses on exchange of information and best practices on issues that are common to those countries. At the other end of the spectrum are the interventions that are designed explicitly to support and complement each other across borders so as to create synergies.

In institutional terms, similarly, there is a need for clarity with regard to the type of arrangement aimed at. How binding should it be? What is the aim? Is it supranational fora and binding regulations or loose arrangements with exchange of knowledge and information? And do involved stakeholders (member states, research institutions, civil society organisations etc.) have a common understanding of the rationale for their interaction and cooperation? Have they devised appropriate institutional structures to sustain the efforts? Examples from the existing portfolio include the SADC protocol on gender and development pioneered by Gender Links, or the African Charter promoted by IEC at one end, and the trilateral work of IDASA for example, at the other (see Chapter 5 for details).

These are important issues for donors to be clear about when providing support to regional institutions because they will shape the type of organisation targeted, and the modality used.

In Southern Africa – and in particular in South Africa – a good number of South African NGOs and research institutions appear to have embarked on regional programming as an opportunistic strategy to continue attracting donor funding in a situation when such resource flows to South Africa were drying out. Indeed, the increasing GDP/capita figures for South Africa resulted in diminishing ODA. Interestingly, a number of government institutions who used to benefit from bilateral donor support have also opted for this strategy and they are now 'exporting' their 'technical competencies' to neighbouring countries financed by Western ODA programmes (trilateral cooperation). A recent estimate indicates that half of national government departments engage in 'development projects' across the continent<sup>13)</sup>. There is, however, no comprehensive programmatic and

13) SAAlA, *South Africa in Africa*, (2007).

budgetary framework for this engagement in support of other countries across the continent; individual government departments budget for and execute such programmes in their own right.

SADC member states have received approx. 70% of South African ODA (2004 figures, excluding transfers relating to SACU), but the funds are channelled on a bilateral basis, not through SADC programmes (SAAIA 2007). New moves to enhance the role of the Renaissance Fund and the recent decision by the ANC that South Africa should establish an aid agency signal, however, a wish to provide more substance and direction to such donor efforts.

### 3.4 SADC as an institution promoting regional cooperation and integration

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) currently has a total of 15 members. It can draw its history back to 1980 when nine governments in the region formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Based on the experience since the mid-1970s of working together in the group of Frontline States to coordinate positions in the support for democratic changes in South Africa, member states felt a need for a more regular institutional structure to further their collaboration. Following political changes in South Africa, this country joined the grouping in 1992. This corresponded with a reorientation of its mandate and structure and a resulting name change from SADCC to SADC.

#### Mandate

While new countries have joined the regional grouping over the years (South Africa, Namibia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and the DRC) only one country<sup>14)</sup> has opted not to remain a member<sup>15)</sup>. As an institution, SADC has displayed a remarkable resilience over the years despite very turbulent developments in Southern Africa as such and within individual member states. It is important to note that the move from SADCC to SADC in three main areas represented a departure from the previous configuration:

- SADC came to include the region's economic super power South Africa in stark contrast to the previous situation when SADCC defined its identity as opposing South African dominance.
- The institution's objective moved beyond economic cooperation to include regional integration, cf. the continuum presented above.
- Its mandate now embraces political and security matters.

However, given the dismal progress in the fields of regional integration as well as matters relating to political and security cooperation, SADC of 2008 retains much of the 1992 aspects in regard to its basic mandate and objectives.

14) *Seychelles.*

15) *Seychelles rejoined SADC in 2007.*

In 2001 a substantial review and administrative restructuring of SADC was undertaken. The previous structure favoured a decentralised sector-based approach where member states were delegated responsibilities of promoting regional development within respective sectors. This 2001 review transformed the 21 existing sector coordination units (located in 12 different countries) into four directorates located in the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana (Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Social & Human Development and Special Programmes).

The 2003-07 period under review for the purpose of this evaluation has seen few institutional changes to SADC's structure. Emphasis has been placed on getting the new structure to work, but one particularly important change for Danida relates to the 2003 decision to establish a more regular structure for the SADC Secretariat's collaboration with International Collaboration Partners (ICPs). The ICPs are represented by a core group of agencies with a permanent representation in Gaborone (EU, Sweden, France, Germany, UK, UNDP, and USAID)<sup>16)</sup>. A further strengthening occurred through the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration on a new partnership between SADC and its partners: "Lessons learnt from the past and current practices of managing cooperation between SADC and the ICPs as well as the changes on both the regional and international levels, call for a new partnership that would: (i) establish a structure for dialogue on the political, policy and technical levels; (ii) create an environment for more and better aid for greater development impact in the SADC region." The declaration includes specific commitments from both SADC and the ICPs, including a commitment from the ICPs to "Respect SADC leadership and help strengthen SADC's capacity to exercise it at regional and national levels."<sup>17)</sup>

SADC does not maintain institutional mechanisms for dealing with civil society organisations of the Southern Africa region. In recent years a number of CSOs have campaigned for the annual SADC Heads of State summits to address civil society concerns although lacking regular access to dialogue with SADC officials and decision-makers<sup>18)</sup>.

### 3.5 Challenges for the region

SADC remains confronted with a number of challenges whose resolution will determine the future relevance and effectiveness of the institution. The following challenges are particularly important to consider for future Danish assistance:

16) *The Windhoek Declaration (2006) proposes partnership modalities to be applied by SADC and ICPs. These are designed with reference to Paris Declaration principles. Tjønneland (2008) (cf. footnote 25) finds that the Declaration is "weak on the implications for regional support and the commitments required to ensure alignment between SADC regional development objectives and national development efforts, and between the regional and country-level support provided by donor agencies."*

17) [www.sadc.int/icp/windhoek\\_declaration](http://www.sadc.int/icp/windhoek_declaration).

18) Cf. Kristy Barnet & Clare Maguire (2007): *Towards a people driven African Union, for a general continent-wide assessment of the scope for citizen interaction with African intergovernmental bodies.*

### Peace and security<sup>19)</sup>

The DRC and Zimbabwe continue to pose formidable challenges to regional peace and stability. SADC member states (notably Zimbabwe and Angola) engaged heavily in the military conflict in the DRC from 1998 (one year after the DRC had joined SADC), but as a regional bloc SADC could not agree to a unified approach to the crisis in the DRC. Legacies of the DRC conflict have continued to constrain a more active role for SADC even after the 2002/03 DRC peace agreements. It is worth noting that South Africa has been heavily engaged in efforts to sustain the peace process, but this has largely taken place outside the context of the SADC framework.

The deepening crisis in Zimbabwe has further highlighted deficiencies and weaknesses of the current SADC security architecture. States in Southern Africa have remained reluctant to transfer national sovereignty to a regional security structure with binding rules (CMI 2005). And SADC's lack of institutional capacity (four staff working in the SADC office responsible for peace and security) in turn reflects economic and administrative limitations of member state capacities to engage in joint peace building engagements.

Within the wider African region, expectations have been placed on SADC as one of the RECs to shoulder major responsibilities in relation to peace and security. However, SADC's ability to rise to these expectations is limited by the conflicting expectations among some of the member states. For example, South Africa and Tanzania have placed emphasis on the AU providing mandate and wider legitimacy for SADC security forces to play a peace-keeping and peace-making role<sup>20)</sup>, while Zimbabwe and Angola on the other hand have pushed for SADC to engage directly in conflict situations.

### Democratisation

Donor agencies have been promoting regional cooperation as a means to further democratisation efforts, e.g. through experience sharing and network building, but such regional interventions are hampered by the absence of fora and institutions with legitimacy and mandates extending beyond national boundaries.

Moreover, dynamics of multi-party arrangements have also implied that political cultures in Southern Africa in recent years are not aligning around common patterns and features. Ironically as competitive political systems have become the order of the day, the outcome has been one of greater diversity among national democratic systems. It should also be noted that while SADC's mandate includes both developmental, trade and security related agendas, actual *political* integration is conspicuously absent from SADC objectives and modalities. While international development partners are keen to support democratisation related efforts at a regional level, this situation leaves them with few other options than the "experience sharing and lessons learned" approach presented above.

### Institutional issues

From a governance perspective, the 2001 administrative reforms rationalised and streamlined the functional cooperation of SADC member states. Up to 2001 most SADC insti-

19) See Laurie Nathan: "The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003". (July 2004).

20) South Africa has supported the "African standby force" as a prerequisite for an active AU role in peace keeping across the continent.

tutions had been managed by individual member states implying gross variations in approach and resources in regard to regional cooperation. But a more streamlined and centralised operation also brought into the open the actual recurrent costs of regional cooperation as the various SADC sectoral bodies had often been largely nationally managed and funded<sup>21)</sup>.

Based on decisions in 2001-03 the annual Heads of State summits in recent years have come to form a regular and important feature of regional policy coordination and the SADC Secretariat seems better equipped than IGAD and EAC (i.e. relatively speaking). Yet contributions by member states are limited and SADC remains dependent on donor support to finance the Secretariat and carry out its regional programmes (donor support as a share of total income is estimated at approx. 60%)<sup>22)</sup>. Estimates suggest that because of funding constraints as many as 25-30% of regular professional positions in the SADC Secretariat remain vacant for substantial periods of time as there are insufficient resources to fund recurrent costs.

The current staffing of the Secretariat remains to a large extent a legacy of SADC's functional focus during the 1980s and 1990s, whereas areas such as security and trade policy remain severely underfunded. Furthermore, effective collaboration in the trade and security 'sectors' requires regional integration involving hard choices and questions of sovereignty rather than softer networking and cooperation as argued above. This also has important implications for official donor agencies that are not well positioned to engage in direct inter-governmental relations.

Institutional reforms undertaken in 2001-03 provided more consistency to decision-making. It also brought an end to uncertainties regarding whether the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security would enjoy a semi-autonomous status or be subjected to getting its proposals sanctioned by the summit. Accordingly, a clearer and more hierarchical structure is now in place formally locating the organ under the overall control of the summit.

#### **The role of South Africa in SADC**

As argued above, South Africa has played a decisive role in the formation and evolution of SADC as an institution. Serving initially as the *raison d'être* (albeit from a distinctively negative point of view) for SADCC, post-apartheid South Africa has emerged as the 'sine qua non' of SADC. Given its economic resources and political muscle there is no doubt that SADC remains heavily dependent on continued support from South Africa.

21) *An external evaluation of EU support to SADC in 2007 pointed out that SADC as an institution has emerged considerably weakened from the centralisation process [of 2001, LU], certainly as regards procedures. Where Directorates were formerly housed in host countries and benefited from considerable institutional support, from additional funding and from additional staff, the Secretariat in Gaborone is understaffed and under-funded, and has yet to develop clear and simple procedures. This makes it difficult for any ICP to use the organisation's institutional framework and procedures. Evaluation of the Commission's regional support to SADC. Annex 6: Background to the region. October 2007.*

22) *No estimates have been available to the team regarding the distribution of donor support on the various programmes undertaken by SADC.*

Yet, South Africa does not play the role one could expect in SADC. Using a formula based on member state GDP, South Africa pays 20% of all contributions coming from the 15 countries making up the regional body<sup>23)</sup>. This is still significantly below the South African share of regional GDP and thus an indicator that South Africa is not willing to invest as much in regional cooperation as its economic weight might suggest, and prefers bilateral (or trilateral) relations.

Furthermore, because salary levels in the SADC Secretariat from a South African perspective are not attractive, South Africa does not fill its staff quota and hence the professional competencies available in South Africa are not made fully available to SADC.

Politically South Africa has opted for a rather subdued positioning within SADC, anxious not to be perceived as a big brother and conscious to be seen as a *primus inter pares*<sup>24)</sup>. Recalling the anti-apartheid struggle, South Africa has maintained its political support for SADC, but it has not in any sense used SADC to pursue integrationist agendas. Rather than using its resources and competencies to enhance regional cooperation, South Africa has in recent years engaged in what has been termed 'trilateral cooperation'. This involves combining donor funds and South African technical competencies to provide support for development interventions in the poorer member states in the region, an example being IEC assisting to conduct DRC elections.

In 2000 the parliament passed the act of the African Renaissance and International Development Fund Act. While funding for this institution grew to around ZAR 300 million in 2006/7, it played only a marginal role relative to rather substantial funding managed by other government departments during the period under evaluation in this report. Recently, however, the government has announced that over the next three years a total of ZAR 1.3 billion will be spent to assist African countries in achieving the MDGs, an annual average increase of 44%. It is uncertain whether the government will adopt a more unified approach to aid management or whether a multitude of individual government departments will continue to be involved. However, the ANC has in 2008 called for the establishment of an actual aid agency. This leaves a large potential for Danish support, but also calls for a great deal of flexibility to be able to adjust to changing circumstances.

### 3.6 Challenges for Danish support

While Danish regional support in Southern Africa may well be considered relevant as a broad range of issues lend themselves to regional approaches, it requires careful choices of intervention modalities and institutional anchorage to provide effective support for ongoing processes of regional cooperation and integration. And it requires good cooperation among donors.

23) Ariane Kosler: *The Southern African Development Community and its Relations to the European Union: Deepening Integration in Southern Africa? ZEI Discussion paper, (2007).*

24) SAAIA: *South Africa in Africa. (2007).*

In this context the Windhoek Declaration adopted in 2006 may provide guidance for Denmark and other development partners, as it aims to provide a platform for cooperation between SADC and its international cooperation partners drawing on the principles of the Paris Declaration. However, a number of challenges remain for this cooperation to become more effective<sup>25)</sup>.

The Windhoek Declaration may facilitate cooperation with donors regarding a regional integration agenda. However, as long as SADC's institutional capacity remains weak this will have little bearing on regional cooperation as such. SADC member states must provide and delegate more support, resources and authority to SADC as an institution in order for the Windhoek Declaration to have any effect.

Donors currently channel the bulk of their support to regional cooperation in Southern Africa outside of the SADC institutional structure. This is explained by the fact that donors would like to enable regional networks (including among others private business, civil society and professional associations) to complement governmental cooperation. Moreover, donor agencies have expressed concern about SADC's capacity to implement externally funded interventions. However, this means that neither SADC nor any other institution has a full picture of the extent and objectives of such assistance, and SADC is therefore ill-placed to provide strategic direction and advice to international partners.

Motivated by the Paris Declaration, donor agencies may move towards stronger harmonisation of their respective interventions, while SADC ownership remains weak. This limits prospects of donor support being effectively aligned around a cohesive SADC policy and institutional framework. As has been seen elsewhere<sup>26)</sup>, harmonisation may indeed be the enemy of alignment, and stronger donor support may be needed in terms of building SADC capacity to avoid this.

The Windhoek Declaration does not effectively address shortcomings in collaboration modalities. Donors and SADC institutions have aimed at optimising collaboration efforts by instituting a number of *thematic groups* (e.g. in the field of HIV/AIDS), but there is for example no group on peace and security. In the absence of effective coordination and leadership by the SADC Secretariat and its directorates this may, in any event, possibly spur further fragmentation rather than harmonisation and alignment. Furthermore, new partners (such as China, India and Brazil) are increasingly active in the SADC region. However, the Windhoek Declaration has remained a framework for the conventional aid donors; these new and major actors need to be brought on board to make donor coordination and collaboration effective.

Applying a regional approach thus seems to carry several advantages but needs a long-term perspective and innovative thinking to ensure its effectiveness in the face of a relatively weak institutional framework, particularly of SADC, its institutions and the Secretariat.

25) *The following points draw on Tjønneland: From aid effectiveness to poverty reduction. Is foreign donor support to SADC improving? Gaborone February 2008.*

26) *Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, Synthesis Report (2008).*



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## 4 The policy and aid management framework for Danish regional assistance

Fundamentally Danish assistance has always, since 2000 explicitly, been based on a principle of partnership as expressed in several policy papers and strategies over the years, including in “A World for All”<sup>27</sup>). Here it is outlined how Danish development assistance can address dynamic change while at the same time maintaining continuity and perseverance in a mutually binding partnership approach: “The core of the Danish development policy is long-term and binding cooperation with the developing countries – a long and sustained effort to advance the priorities that are continuous from year to year”. This is precisely what many of the recipient institutions have appreciated and see as a relationship building on trust, something which has gained Denmark considerable political capital in the region.

Another fundamental aspect of Danish assistance is the aim to focus bilateral development cooperation on a limited number of programme countries, which may give impetus to regional programming. In a context where country focus is being streamlined and programming made more selective, regional support provides an opportunity both to engage in countries outside of the narrower list of programme countries, and to exploit cross-border synergies. However, while regional assistance has indeed been a long-time feature of Danish assistance and has a recognised role, this has not led to the articulation of a clear policy or strategy. As shown above, there are several different approaches that would be appropriate to achieve specific priority outcomes (ref. the “continuum” referred to in the previous chapter). Indeed, the evaluation of the 1997 strategy for regional support to Southern Africa recommended, among other things, that a clear policy be developed, a recommendation that remains valid today.

While Danish assistance is guided by a comprehensive set of policies and strategies, including thematic strategies, this evaluation has focused on the annual 5-year policy papers, and the two Africa-specific policies: “Denmark in Africa – A continent on its way” from 2007 and “Africa – development and security” from 2005. In addition, because several of the projects were designed in the late 1990’s, the “Regional strategy for Southern Africa” from 1997 is considered part of the guiding framework. Lastly, also the “Africa Programme for Peace” from 2004 is included, although it is not an independent strategy in its own right; it is a major programme backed with substantial funding, guidelines and activities with a very well-developed regional thinking and clear objectives.

Overall, that Africa is a priority is clear from these documents. The Africa Commission and a spending commitment further testify to this:

“It is the Government’s aim that two out of three DKK given in assistance will ultimately go to Africa. At the same time, Denmark will concentrate its assistance in Africa on fewer, but larger initiatives”.<sup>28</sup>)

27) [www.netpublikationer.dk/um/8299/index.htm](http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/8299/index.htm).

28) “Denmark in Africa – A continent on its way”, *Danida*, (2007), pages 11-12.

It is noteworthy, however, that an aim to further focus the assistance on fewer and larger initiatives is also announced i.e. more selectivity and focus.

Historically, in terms of development assistance to Africa, Danish assistance has focused on Southern Africa. A key regional aspect since 1980 focused on supporting the fight against apartheid via support for the sub-regional institution SADC<sup>29)</sup>. Countries in Southern Africa were seen to experience common development constraints because of the regime in South Africa, and Denmark actively promoted enhanced political and economic cooperation in the region as an effective response to the difficulties posed by the apartheid regime and the fight against same. A regional programme therefore could work across country borders addressing issues not narrowly confined to a single country situation, but positioned at various stages of the continuum of regional approaches outlined in the preceding chapter.

Given the region's history, the issues of peace and security, and democratisation have been defining elements for the regional identity (Mozambique 1974, South Africa 1994) and regional cooperation, including through SADC, seen as one way of addressing these issues. Focus in these areas thus truly reflects the needs of the Southern African region.

The underlying rationale for Denmark to be engaging in regional activities has remained steady during the past decade: i.e. the support and promotion of political stability and the mutual economic benefits and opportunities which such cooperation can generate. Partners in this context are primarily identified within the region but the focus has expanded during the period 2003-07 to include an effort to ensure that Africa as a continent takes part in the globalisation process. In this context partners are also to be identified within and outside the region e.g. the AU, EU, UN and WTO, as expressed in the 2007 Africa strategy.

The regional dimension is still relevant, however, and there is a clear commitment to strengthen the institutions that are in place to manage regional challenges, including sub-regional organisations.

Regional cooperation and regional institutions thus are important for achieving other development objectives; the 1997 Regional Strategy for Southern Africa is an example of this. It was launched in the wake of the changes in South Africa in 1994 and heralded a shift in focus from supporting the fight against apartheid to working directly with South Africa in new forms of regional cooperation: "After the elimination of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, the situation has changed remarkably. The conflicting relationship characterising the region has changed significantly and the regional cooperation has attained a new form"<sup>30)</sup>. The 1997 strategy has never been updated and there is today no specific strategy for Southern Africa.

While there is a reference to "regional institutions" in the latest Africa strategy, there is no specific mention of SADC. Reference is, however, made to regional development in relation to South Africa: "In South Africa, development cooperation will gradually be scaled down and adapted to specifically Danish priorities or initiatives aimed at

29) *SADCC: Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. After South Africa joined in 1992 the organisation changed to SADC: Southern African Development Community. Danish Regional Strategy for Southern Africa, Danida (1997).*

30) *Danish Regional Strategy for Southern Africa, Danida (1997).*

strengthening South Africa's regional engagement"<sup>31</sup>). Given the weakness of SADC the emphasis that has been put on the AU and NEPAD in recent years is hardly surprising. And the changing role of South Africa accentuates this, simply reflecting the changing realities, also described in the preceding chapter.

The 2007 Africa strategy stresses that the Danish Government will work towards: "Strengthened political dialogue with South Africa and other major regional powers on a range of questions of importance to Africa as a whole, with a sharpened focus on initiatives capable of promoting a positive role for them on the continent"<sup>32</sup>). Hence there is a strong focus on institutions, but the policy is not as explicit on which institutions and how to provide support as the 1997 strategy. This stated that Danish regional development cooperation should be channelled via research and training, capacity building and financial support to regional institutions and initiatives.<sup>33</sup>) This guidance is clearly reflected in the composition of the portfolio of projects analysed for the evaluation (see Chapter 5).

The difference between the two strategies also reflects a general shift in Danish development policies from being focused at activity/intervention level towards broader policy issues and outcome and impact. However, this requires an accompanying framework to help operationalise strategies, something that Danida has yet to develop in the area of regional support.

#### 4.1 Strategic focus areas

Consistent with the overall focus and priorities for Danish development cooperation, and considering the history and needs of the region as well as past assistance, the evaluation focuses on projects in the areas of democratisation, security and peace, and regional development. These are areas of prime importance for the region and also areas in which Denmark is traditionally a strong donor.

##### Peace and security

The rationale for providing strong and continuous support towards a process ensuring peace and security is evident, and cuts across all the existing strategies. At the continental level, the Africa Programme for Peace is designed to help strengthen Africa's own organisations so they are better able to deal with the challenges; the 2007 Africa Strategy recalls the government's commitment to strengthen the African security architecture.

From a regional perspective it is apparent that instability in one or several countries in the region may spill over and impact the entire region. The situation in Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe during the period illustrates this e.g. in terms of refugees, and the recent xenophobia surge in South Africa<sup>34</sup>).

31) *Africa Strategy*, Danida, (2007), page 13.

32) *Africa Strategy*, Danida, (2007), page 15.

33) *Danish Regional strategy for Southern Africa*, Danida, (1997). Page 17. The reference to the AU and NEPAD is from: "Denmark in Africa – a continent on its way", Danida, (2007).

34) *The Centre for Policy Studies highlighted this issue while being interviewed on 4 June, 2008 as well as the Centre for Conflict Resolution on 5 June, 2008.*

There is a shift in institutional focus in the policies and strategies over the period, from a commitment to work with SADC and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and to a limited extent the OAU – the predecessor to the AU – towards the AU and NEPAD in later strategies. However, it is difficult to conceive effective regional cooperation without examining what role SADC can play, or may be able to play if the right capacity is developed.

Strengthening the capacity of SADC in the area of peace and security could, as explained in Chapter 2, be one important component of regional support. However, given the differences in perception among member states on the appropriate role of SADC in this field, there are limits to how effective this can be. Therefore, support to other confidence-building interventions, such as the work of CCR and SADSEM for example, would be equally important. Or the work that enhances the knowledge and insights into the dynamics of peace and security, such as work by SAIIA or ISS.

### **Democratisation**

Good governance, democracy and human rights are basic pillars of Danish development assistance and an area of focus in the 5-year plan for 2008-12 “A World for All”. Consistent with this, the 2007 Africa strategy thus commits the government to “work for the creation of better frameworks for democratic participation in the development process within the parliamentary systems and in the direct interaction between state and civil society”.

A number of the organisations interviewed for this evaluation do indeed work towards increased democratisation in various ways (IEC, EISA, and IDASA). While all these are civil society organisations their aim is to contribute to regional development and to work directly with SADC on issues such as elections and ensuring common grounds on parliamentary work. Given the increasing diversity among national democratic systems in the region, as pointed out earlier in this evaluation report, these are important functions that merit support. The aim towards regional standards that some of the institutions promote seems particularly successful and can be placed at the “firm” end of the continuum of approaches set out in Chapter 3.

Furthering democratisation and political stability is an essential element of peace and security in the Southern African region. Perhaps surprisingly the region has not suffered from the same number of military coups as has been seen in other parts of the continent<sup>35</sup>). The apparently rather stable situation with no military unrest is, however, not in itself an indicator of a healthy process towards increased democratisation as known from the western hemisphere. As pointed out earlier, several countries have essentially been ruled by one-party systems with limited possibility of multi-party engagement thereby limiting the possibility of a democratic development as the executive is rarely challenged. Furthermore, succession politics are an issue in several countries as is the balance between the executive and the judicial control and legislative oversight.

Danish support towards establishing an enabling environment for democratic development must therefore be seen as essential and highly relevant. Continued engagement with and support via a range of regional actors including NGOs, regional research, policy and

35) *An attempted military coup took place in Lesotho 1998. Besides that no other military coups have happened.*

training institutions and universities is seen as critical to ensure a peaceful political development in the region. Indeed, several of the institutions benefitting from Danish support under the present portfolio focus on issues related to democratic processes, from a university base (SADSEM, CCR, SAIIA), or are recognised research, policy or training institutions (IDASA) and others have a proven record in favouring important regional standard-setting processes (Gender Links, EISA).

### **Regional integration**

Regional economic cooperation has remained a key priority of Danish development cooperation in the period and region according to policy documents; nevertheless no projects in this thematic group were identified for the evaluation.

According to the existing strategy, a key element to further regional integration is by promoting the role of South Africa<sup>36)</sup>.

South Africa's economic weight in the region is perhaps most aptly illustrated by a recent IMF study which estimates that a one-percentage point slowdown in the South African growth rate leads to a one-half to three-quarter percentage point slowdown in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>37)</sup>. Danish support for South Africa as a locomotive for the entire region seems in this regard evident and merits further strengthening. Furthermore, the large-scale investments undertaken by South African companies in the region underline the importance of these companies, and thereby South Africa. More than 50% of FDI in the region derives from South African companies and more than 80% of intra-regional trade originates from South Africa. Thus, providing further support for South Africa's regional role and thereby further regional development may be crucial to ensure wider regional integration.

### **Trend analysis**

To situate the portfolio of projects evaluated in the historic context may help explain some of the findings. Thus, comparing the 1997 strategy with the two more recent strategies reveals some important trends:

- i) Few changes are evident in terms of relevance of the thematic areas as the core areas in need of support identified a decade ago still remain central and are deemed highly relevant to support.
- ii) A change in policy approach, however, is more apparent; a shift has taken place from direct engagement at the project and institutional level to an interest in furthering high-level policy dialogue, in other words a shift from an input to an outcome focus. The 1997 strategy as well as the Africa Programme for Peace both have very clear regional objectives and mandates, whereas the strategies from 2005 and 2007 focus on continental Africa and look at Africa in a globalised perspective. This indeed also shifts focus to other institutional arrangements like the WTO i.e. broadening the scope for possible solutions to regional problems.

36) *“Denmark in Africa – A continent on its way”, Danida, (2007), page 13.*

37) *SAIIA, South Africa in Africa, (2007), page 9.*

Strategy	Themes identified	Institutional focus	Approach	Project portfolio
<b>1997 &amp; Africa Programme for Peace</b>	Peace & security, regional integration, democratisation.	SADC, CSO, NGO, local research.	Identify activities and partners and support project interventions, Dialogue; hands-on; small and mid-size institutions. Was primarily operationalised from central quarter i.e. MFA in Copenhagen.	Projects with direct funding; core and non-core resources; some hands-on/off.
<b>2003-07 priority papers &amp; strategies from 2005 and 2007</b>	Peace & security, regional integration, democratisation. The main shift is seen in the increase of new thematic areas.	WTO, AU, EU, UN, “subregional organisations“	Identify results and outcomes. Policy, Institutional dialogue, hands-off, mainly policy level institutions. Is primarily operationalised in a decentralised manner, but also by central actors.	Project funding primarily non-core; less hands-on.

## 4.2 Principles and aid modalities

The principles for Danish development cooperation, of relevance to regional support, include:

- *Partnerships*<sup>38)</sup> are a vital element of successful Danish development cooperation. Long-term partnerships are established primarily with governments, but increasingly also with civil society organisations, private sector representatives and research institutions.
- *Actively supporting the Paris Declaration* is an essential element of Danish development cooperation as outlined in several strategy and priority papers and the Aid Management Guidelines.
- *Focus and complementarities*<sup>39)</sup> are considered key aspects of Danish development cooperation ensuring an added value and avoiding donor crowding where donors are active in the same areas setting up parallel structures and programmes. Three approaches are identified:
  - *Donor concentration i.e. some donors withdrawing from a specific sector*
  - *Lead-donor i.e. one donor represents other donors in all day-to-day operations*
  - *Delegated cooperation i.e. where all management of funds and dialogue with the partner country is delegated to one donor.*

38) *Modalities for the management of Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation – June 2005.*

39) *Modalities for the management of Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation – June 2005.*

These approaches are all defined and articulated in the Aid Management Guidelines (AMG) as government-to-government support and not linked to cooperation with e.g. research institutions or civil society organisations. However, based on the analysis of the portfolio, they seem to be just as pertinent and relevant for regional support as the one provided by Danida in Southern Africa.

In terms of partnerships, the regional support as currently implemented is highly rated among participating institutions, and Danida should be applauded for applying this principle also to the cooperation that is not a government-to-government partnership.

In terms of actively supporting the Paris Declaration, the Windhoek Declaration is the sub-regional operationalisation of these principles. Little, however, seems to be known on how this is implemented and how other donors are involved.

Lastly, donor cooperation around regional approaches and support to the institutions in South Africa seems fairly weak. A number of different likeminded donors have regional activities and regional strategies like UK, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland and more coordination and concertation are needed. One example of this is the fact that Sweden has decided to restructure its assistance to provide more core funding to fewer institutions. To do so Sida has commissioned an assessment of a number of organisations also receiving Danish support. Sweden has thus during the past six months undertaken an assessment of five organisations working with regional activities of which three (CCR, ISS and SAIIA) are receiving support from both Denmark and Sweden. The Swedish evaluation has been more in-depth than this evaluation. It has included on the one hand an assessment by Price Waterhouse Coopers of the financial and audit capacity, and on the other an evaluation of substantive outputs and outcomes. To fully leverage the knowledge generated, a close dialogue with Sweden would therefore be essential for any future Danish decisions on engagement with these institutions.

The principle of focus and complementarity, and the policy directive of larger and more selective interventions, implies in this context a need for developing criteria and assessment templates and processes for partner selection. Such criteria would be essential to ensure strategic focus and relevance to policy objectives for the region. These should, given the discussion above on the Paris Declaration principles, be discussed and harmonised among donors.

A key issue raised in this evaluation and one that is yet to be fully covered by the AMG is aid modalities, as evidenced from the next chapter containing the portfolio analysis. However, the AMG on aid modalities date from June 2005 and are scheduled for revision. They do not provide guidance on issues such as how and when to provide core support, or under what conditions. Yet, this has been one of the contentious issues among partner institutions.

Denmark has indeed provided core as well as non-core support for the institutions with an overweight leaning towards non-core, project or programme funds. From a recipient institutional perspective, receiving core funding<sup>40)</sup> is preferred as it promotes flexibility in terms of interventions, helps ensure financial sustainability and predictability, and hence allows for long-term planning. Handling non-core resources has higher transaction costs,

40) *Although budget support is defined as funding directly to the treasury, core funding for an organisation or institution resembles this approach.*

including more frequent results and financial reporting to several different donors. Finally, project funding may jeopardise an institution's core capacity as it makes long-term staff engagements difficult.

From a donor perspective, in order to be providing core resources, a certain level of trust must be institutionalised and established in terms of the recipient organisation on several areas: financial and narrative reporting systems must be in place and of sufficient standards, including aspects of human resource management, procurement and tendering. On a more substantial aspect the long-term strategy and policy of the recipient organisation must be known and adhered to and agreed upon with the donor, which requires a great deal of engagement with the donor on a routine basis and is often seen as a long-term partnership. A risk implied with providing core funding is that other donors "free ride" as the core-funding serves to pay for facilities and services that the projects also benefit from.

The AMG stress that the ambition is to be less involved in specific activities, but more strategically involved. This speaks in favour of core funding, as this is always based on a comprehensive dialogue with the institution, and is also in line with the basic Danish principles of a long-term trusted relationship.

However, a number of factors seem to temper this. Providing ear-marked project assistance is indeed often easier to administer for the donor as it requires less engagement with the recipient institution. It also facilitates more ad-hoc relationships that are less binding and thus less committing if the institution is not well known or there are uncertainties with respect to its capacity to manage core funds. Furthermore, the requirement to demonstrate results and to be able to attribute these to specific interventions favours project funding.

Indeed, funding for regional activities comes from different sources and budget lines, each with their results and accountability framework. This sometimes means that there is a need to try to attribute specific results to a specific financial contribution, something that is easier with project funding, or earmarked funding.

### **4.3 Challenges for future Danish support**

Given the regional context described in Chapter 3, Danish regional assistance towards Southern Africa seems highly relevant from a strategic perspective. The focus areas – peace and security, democratisation and regional integration – are relevant and a regional approach to solving them is also pertinent. However, the evaluation revealed a bias in the portfolio towards peace and security and democratisation. As regional integration is clearly also very relevant as demonstrated in Chapter 3, more efforts may have to be deployed to devise appropriate interventions in the areas of regional integration.

The regional approach is in line with Danish policy on focus and selectivity in bilateral development assistance which limits assistance to a narrow set of countries, but opens up for other types of assistance and modes of engagement with non-programme countries. However, thought needs to be given to what type of regional cooperation is desirable and feasible in the priority areas of focus. Danida has successfully supported both loose networks and firmer, more binding types of regional cooperation and hence has experience to draw on when planning further assistance.



Examining the policy framework that has guided Danish development assistance reveals a certain void with respect to regional assistance. The absence of an explicit policy and strategy puts the onus on the embassies to try to programme such assistance so that it is consistent with overall Danish policy objectives while relevant to regional needs.

Furthermore, general principles and available modalities do not explicitly cover regional development, although they could very well be applied, possibly with some adjustments.

A policy change over the period towards more outcome-focused policies has accentuated the need for a clear guiding framework to help operationalise the general principles and policy objectives in the specific regional context. This would in particular mean more explicit criteria for partner selection, a clear methodology for assessing new and existing partners, and principles to help guide aid modality choices.

Lastly, a concerted effort is needed to apply the Paris Declaration principles, in particular in respect of using aid modalities with low transaction cost (core support), and ensuring transparency and coordination among the donors. More joint activities and possibilities of using the practices of lead donor or delegated cooperation also deserve attention. This is likely to mean a change in the way embassy staff time is spent, from spending time with the partner institutions on a one-on-one basis, to spending time among donors, or in collective discussions.

## 5 The portfolio and partner institutions

The portfolio review showed that, in fact, the majority of projects included in the evaluation were to be found in the twin areas of peace and security, and democratisation, as is shown in Table 1. Some projects, initially grouped under regional integration, proved to have such a strong focus on either democratisation or peace and security that for analytical purposes they belonged to this group. Considering the portfolio of projects in the light of the regional context, as described in Chapter 3, it is clear that these two areas are absolutely essential for the development of the region, and the relevance of the portfolio as such therefore confirmed.

**Table 1: Projects covered by the evaluation**

<b>Security</b>	
<i>Description</i>	<i>Institution</i>
Africa Programme for Peace: SADC component	CCR, SADSEM, ISS
Human Rights and Conflict Management in Southern Africa	CCR
Human Rights and Conflict Management in Southern Africa	Regional Human Rights Clinic
Support to Institute for War and Peace Reporting	IWPR
Institute for Security Studies Activities	ISS
Defence Management Training	SADSEM
Cadet Journalist Training Scheme	IWPR
Conflict Prevention Southern Africa	Brenthurst Foundation
Security and Terrorism in Africa	SAIIA
<b>Democracy</b>	
<i>Description</i>	<i>Organisation</i>
Support to SADC Youth Movement	SADC Youth Movement
Support to Gender Link's activities on equal rights and good governance	Gender Link
Support to a process of Sustained Dialogue at Universities in Zimbabwe	IDASA
Capacity Development project for CSO's in Swaziland	IDASA
The Tswalu Dialogue 2006-08	Brenthurst Foundation
Democracy in the SADC countries	EISA
Multiparty Elections in the DRC	IEC
Centre for Policy Studies	CPS

Chapter 3 dwells on some of the reasons to support regional development and one key rationale highlighted is the potential for enhancing development effectiveness by sharing experience. More specifically, looking at Southern Africa, Chapter 3 also concludes that for a number of reasons donors wishing to support the democratisation process in Southern Africa have few options, but “the experience sharing and lesson learned approach”. The portfolio analysis shows that that is also the Danish choice.

Support has indeed been provided to important institutions, policy think-tanks, academic institutions, advocacy NGOs and other independent, analytical or training institutions, who contribute to generating and sharing knowledge about the governance in Africa and the African security architecture, and who have, in some cases, contributed to shaping the agendas and the policies in the region and internationally. The purpose of most of the projects is indeed capacity development, knowledge sharing and advocacy targeted at the policy level, and the activities funded are training and workshops, conferences and research.

Chapter 3 presents an analytical frame through which institutions can be placed in a continuum of regional cooperation from loose networks to firmer types of regional integration. The portfolio review shows that the institutions receiving support are mainly in the form of networks such as SADSEM or firmer types of regional cooperation such as the Independent Electoral Commission which has contributed to the development of regional standards, and various forms in between. Direct support to SADC institutions is conspicuously absent, which is not just a Danish phenomenon. Indeed, donors channel the bulk of their assistance to regional cooperation through other channels. With the signing of the Windhoek Declaration in 2006, however, a door seems to be open to focus on capacity building inter alia, a door that Danida may want to think of how to approach, although this is probably better done from Gaborone, as it would require close contact with the SADC Secretariat and the donor community based there.

Some of the institutions and projects funded are truly regional in that they have a Board and staff including nationals of various SADC countries such as SADSEM, CCR or Gender Links. Others have a certain regional focus, but a South African Board and staff and activities that tend to be more multi-country than regional. Examples here include the Independent Electoral Commission, which is a South African Institution, and IDASA.

## **5.1 No explicit programming framework**

The desk review shows that the portfolio is made up of a mix of small projects and, to a lesser extent, core funds to specific South African based institutions. There is no evidence of multi-year strategy or a regular programming exercise for use of funds, which leads to the conclusion that it is an “opportunistic” programming approach. By this is meant that projects are developed on the initiative of individuals, or the implementing institutions, or when various events call for new initiatives. An example is the support to Gender Links which came about as a result of a renewed focus on gender in Danish aid policy. The implication of this approach is that the portfolio is made up of ad hoc projects and support. Furthermore, funding comes from a variety of sources including the African Programme for Peace, the human rights and democracy frame, a specific budget line for gender activities, and the local grant authority, each of which has its own overarching results and accountability framework.

This has great advantages in terms of flexibility to seize opportunities, and in terms of “on-time response” or “rapid response” capacity to deal with urgent, emerging issues. It bears two key risks, however, that of proliferation and ensuing high administrative costs, and that of reduced impact due to lack of consistent strategic direction.

Consistent with Danish policy-principles of mutually committing partnerships, cooperation with most institutions spans several years and a variety of different projects and aid modalities. This has the advantage of building up knowledge about the institution and of a trusted relationship; interviews did show a strong appreciation from many of the institutions for Danida's long-standing, consistent engagement and flexibility in providing assistance and adjusting to changing needs. The approach suffers, however, from a lack of clear selection criteria, and hence strategic direction and explicit link to Danish policy priorities. Several partner institutions manage more than one project and have received both project and core funding. It has not been possible to identify any corporate guidance on when to use core funding and when to use project funding, and it thus seems to be at the discretion of embassy staff. This carries as risk of uneven treatment of institutions based on fortuitousness.

A close look at the project documents shows that projects are seldom justified taking as a point of departure an explicit Danish policy/strategy. Many project documents are very short and objective statements very broad. Typically, they include a generic statement linked to poverty, security, democratic governance etc. and a description of the implementing institution, and then describe project inputs and outputs. A few do have "log-frames" describing the project logic from inputs to expected outcomes. They typically do not contain outcome indicators. The format for these documents, however, does not require that and so does not encourage a clear results-oriented presentation of the project, in as much as it has as mandatory information only objectives and output, not outcomes. Although a section is supposed to contain indicators for both objectives and outputs, such indicators are more often than not limited to output indicators.

### **5.2 Similar types of projects**

The purpose of most of the projects, although they were in different subject areas, is very similar with a strong concentration around policy influence, capacity development and advocacy. The target audience is the policy level, and activities are for almost all projects centred on workshops and training, conferences and advocacy, and applied research.

Such similarities across projects would have favoured the application of standard assessments across a range of different implementation partners. However, there is no evidence of the use of a generic methodology or template for assessment and appraisal of projects, many of which are very small and do not benefit from the comprehensive review process prescribed in Danida's Aid Management Guidelines. The fairly large number of projects in a similar field of intervention would lend themselves well to a programmatic approach using common assessments and performance indicators.

Indeed, there is no lack of evidence of outputs in terms of workshops, seminars, books and training material for example, and in some of the institutions these activities are linked through a healthy results chain where applied research forms the basis for developing training curriculums and programmes, as well as policy-oriented advocacy material. It is common to all the projects that outcome and impact of this type of intervention is difficult to measure and assess. All institutions did have some focus on monitoring and evaluation, but often seen as a reporting requirement to donors rather than a management tool; clearly a results culture is yet to be fully developed in the institutions. Some were showing healthy innovative approaches to results, measurement and reporting, trying to go beyond the output level. Several partners were able to provide anecdotal evi-

dence of influence on various policies and contributions to important regional processes both UN-sponsored and within the African Union and the African Regional Economic Communities.

### **5.3 Different aid modalities**

The aid modalities applied in the Danish portfolio are a mix of project assistance and core support, sometimes with earmarked funding, but with most of the assistance provided as project aid. Generally, in the international aid modality discussion, project aid is seen as having serious drawbacks, leading donors to look for other types of modalities that will increase effectiveness and lower transaction cost for the recipient, be it a country or an institution. As the section below shows, taking the perspective of the institutions, project assistance is not the preferred modality for the partner institutions in South Africa, who prefer core funding.

In the absence of an explicit programming exercise and guidance on the issue, it is not possible to determine what trade-offs have been considered, when decisions on modalities have been made and why some institutions have received core funding and others have not; it is to some extent a consequence of the “opportunistic” programming approach. Yet, core funding clearly is the preferred modality for the organisations. It would enhance effectiveness, strengthen the partner institution, and would also alleviate management burden at embassy level. It requires a more thorough assessment of the institution including its financial, accounting, auditing and oversight functions, however, as well as a better coordination among the funding donors. Indeed, there is a risk of “free riding”, in the sense that donors contributing core funds may be subsidising the projects if overheads for projects do not fully pay for the general services and facilities enjoyed by projects.

As long as the portfolio comprises such a large number of institutions, this option therefore is not realistic for all institutions. However, if a more strategic and programmatic approach was developed with more selectivity in the choice of partner institutions it would also be possible to link the modality issue to a standard assessment, much like what Sweden has done for its regional assistance. This could result in a handful of institutions receiving core support based on a thorough organisational assessment, and identification of clear outcome targets, preferably as a joint donor exercise.

Project funding would still be justified in some cases. Accountability for specific results is easier to establish with project funding, which is often why this is preferred by donors. There can be “one off” projects where an opportunity arises to support an event or a process that is in line with Danish priorities for the region or globally, and it could be used selectively in the “sunset period” where Danida may be winding down support to some of the institutions, if indeed a decision is made to limit the number of recipients of Danish regional funds.

### **5.4 Sufficient management capacity at embassy level?**

Looking at programming and implementation, it must be recognised that supporting such a variety of institutions with so many individual projects and different modalities and financing arrangements requires resources and a strong management capacity. Interviews both in Copenhagen and in Pretoria indicated that the administrative burden

is perceived as excessive. Indeed, the resources at embassy level are limited and regional development does not feature prominently in the performance contract of the embassy.

Other donors, such as Sweden, have a narrower focus on few selected institutions, with which they have closer cooperation. This also opens up for possibilities of “division of labour” practiced more and more under the effectiveness agenda of the Paris Declaration and reaffirmed under the Accra Agenda for Action. It is also consistent with the Danish Aid Management Guidelines, as explained in Chapter 4. Using these principles, donors would not all be closely involved in the same institutions, but would appoint a lead donor and accept a certain delegated responsibility, whereby all donors would remain informed, but only lead donors would be closely involved.

Thus, for Danida to reduce the workload on embassy staff, while remaining involved in key institutions and generally well informed, there are several options, or a combination of options, the three key options being:

- Stronger focus, with fewer institutions selected on clear criteria
- Delegated cooperation with other donors as is indeed promoted in the Nordic Plus group
- Use of multi-year core funding rather than annual project funding

One issue frequently raised both in Copenhagen and Pretoria is a certain lack of clarity of responsibility between Pretoria and Copenhagen. This opens up for inconsistency in treatment of partners and adds to the burden of an already complex management. Indeed, there are cases where lack of response to a funding request at one level has led the institutions to seek funding in the other, sometimes with more success. Thus there is a need to clarify the accountability matrixes of the units involved.

### 5.5 The partners

Looking at the institutions, Danida has supported a variety of institutions with different degrees of “regionality”, size, strength, governance structures, reputation and focus, as can be seen from the description below. A common feature is that many have started up as “domestic” South African focused institutions and have later on, in the face of the changing political environment in South Africa and donor demands, expanded their focus and activities to become more regionally oriented (see also Chapter 3). They span many different types of institutions from networks to recognised academic institutions and think-tanks, over smaller advocacy organisations, to government institutions with regional activities. Taken together they form a “web” of support to important processes and knowledge sharing that contributes to a deeper understanding of conflict, human security, democratisation and regional development in Southern Africa.

While representing considerable collective intellectual and operational capacity, at the individual level most of the institutions face some degree of leadership and management challenges. They deal more or less well with issues linked to financial dependence, changing donor priorities, competition and comparative advantage, results measurement and documentation, projectisation and ensuring problems of silo structures, staff turnover and difficulty of creating and maintaining a core capacity in clear focus areas. The strengths and weaknesses are different across the institutions, but most would benefit from support to strengthen various aspects of their management.

While most of the institutions received support in terms of project funding, some did benefit from core funding both from Denmark and other donors. This is indeed the most effective way to give the “space” necessary to the institutions to grow and develop. It reduces transaction costs and increases flexibility, but also requires a certain demonstrated management capacity in the institutions for donors to agree to this, and good donor coordination. Sweden has as mentioned recently undertaken an in-depth evaluation of five institutions of which the mission visited three.<sup>41)</sup> The aim of the Swedish assessment was to examine the institutions’ capacity to receive core funding as this is considered the preferred aid modality both for the organisations and for Sida. Some institutions also use the concept of “core programmes”, which is another way to overcome the difficulty of projectisation. It helps clarify the institutions’ areas of core capacity while providing flexibility in funding within the individual core programmes.

The weakest institutions are also those most projectised with a heavy donor dependence. While some institutions have indeed received core funding from Danida, others have received repeated project grants. Little evidence is found of assessments of the institutions and their comparative advantage or of evaluations before extending or renewing support from Danida, or deciding on the most appropriate type of funding.

For the institutions that are dealing with multiple donors, aid modalities and harmonisation are key issues. Many of the problems, today addressed by the Paris Declaration, seem to exist in the “micro-environment” in which the donors and the institutions evolve, i.e. in their day-to-day interaction. The regional institutions in South Africa struggle with multiple donor reporting requirements, with duplication of efforts, with uncoordinated policy dialogues, with changing donor priorities; these were issues unanimously raised by partner organisations.

On the donor side regrets were expressed that institutions do not sufficiently “manage for results”, i.e. are able to demonstrate outcomes and impact, that their comparative advantage was not always clear and focus sharp enough. This may be a result of history as a number of South African NGOs and research institutions embarked on regional programming as an opportunistic strategy to continue attracting donor funding in a situation where such resource flows to South Africa were drying out. They thus need to find, develop and refine their niche and comparative advantage. Indeed, a general impression was that many of the institutions tended to spread their activities and do very many things. Some therefore might need to think through what is their niche/comparative advantage and align capacity and organisational structure accordingly. Some of the institutions have developed good and explicit synergies between the different types of activities and outcomes, but several could benefit from facilitation to think through their results frameworks. They tend to focus on and document the output level. Outputs may inform the work they do on networking and influencing policy processes, but the link is not often made clear and outcomes documented.

Several donors support the same institutions; indeed there is to some extent a sense of “the usual suspects” when looking at the funders of the different institutions. There is thus a strong basis for better exchange of information and coordination among the

41) CCR, ISS and SAILA.

donors, and for moving towards more formal cooperation agreements such as “Division of Labour” or delegated cooperation. At present, there appear to be no formal structures of cooperation among donors involved in regional cooperation in South Africa, although donors have more formal structures in Gaborone related to their support to SADC.

Donors recognise that they themselves put a strain on institutions with shifting political priorities. Indeed, this is an issue of some concern both to donors and to the recipients where “the competitive donor funding environment” was seen as a challenge for all institutions. After a historic period of easy access to funding, all institutions have had to re-focus and sharpen their profile and improve their management. Some have met these challenges better than others, but a clear need still exists for support to develop the management capacity of the institutions. This is particularly the case in highly projectised institutions where changing donor priorities sometimes jeopardise the survival and consolidation of the institutions. Indeed, the issue of core-funding was seen as a key issue for the institutions, as this would alleviate the management strain and financial uncertainty and enable the institutions to build up a solid capacity in core areas of comparative advantage.

Also, there was a universal wish from the institutions for better communication and harmonisation among donors so as to alleviate audit and reporting burdens and parallel dialogues on similar issues.

In terms of sustainability, several of the institutions were still “first generation” with leadership that had brought much to the institutions and remained very visible. However, as the institutions mature, they should no longer be identified with only one man/woman, but be recognised for the collective capacity of the organisation. There is thus a need for leaders of the institutions to delegate more and think of succession.

The following has a brief assessment of each of the 10 key institutions:

### **Brenthurst Foundation**

Brenthurst Foundation is a private philanthropic fund which aims to explore ways of achieving higher levels of growth in Africa. It is guided by a number of clear principles, which include: working at the highest political level of countries, only to work on invitation from this level, never to work where there may be a conflict of interest with the business interests of the Oppenheimer Family, to make use of specialist expertise and to work with a broad range of partners. It has an advisory and governance Board of 12 persons, mainly from South Africa and representing various interests. Its management Committee meets monthly and includes the Oppenheimer Family and the Director, Dr. Gregg Mills. The foundation is funding various initiatives in Mozambique, Lesotho, Rwanda, Botswana and Liberia, but does not have a regional perspective per se. It has received a small core grant from the local grant authority, and has also received several grants for various activities, some funded from Copenhagen, some from Pretoria. Danida is the principal external funder.

The Foundation has many parallel initiatives, including an annual event, the “Tswali Dialogue”, that is held at the family-owned resort in the Kalahari Desert. It has a high-profile, well-connected leadership and a staff complement of three, adding capacity through the engagement of technical consultants. No external evaluation or review has been made of the Danish-funded activities, or other activities of the Foundation, and no monitoring reports could be found. There is very little documentation available in



Danida files and no information available from the website on financing or governance of the Foundation. The Foundation publishes widely, both research papers and newsletters, and reports are also commissioned from a variety of other organisations. The Tswali Protocol, which outlines a set of guidelines relating to peacekeeping and peace-building missions, is also a Brenthurst initiative.

#### **Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)**

A not-for-profit organisation,<sup>42)</sup> (Section 21 under South African law) CCR has however a distinct academic anchorage and network; it was established under the University of Cape Town and is still located on campus premises, although this may change in the future. Its Board of Governors is primarily South African, but includes US and Nigerian nationals. Its work programme is pan-African. A Section 21 institution is not allowed, under South African law, to generate more than 15 % of its own funding and hence relies on a large number of donors and partners; it receives funding from 15 international donor agencies, bilateral and multilateral. It receives both project and core funds from Danida and some other donors, including Sida and the Netherlands, although the funding is seen as core for a particular programme, a common donor pool, not as core for the institution as such. DFID provides 60 % of the funding. It has 32 staff, but only a third is academic staff, the rest being support staff. Donors have expressed concern over the large overhead and a rapid turnover of staff, issues that are being addressed.

The Centre focuses on democratisation, governance and policy evaluation. It has a soundly linked “product range” in that it carries out applied research, which is used for training curriculums and development as well as advocacy. It sees itself not as an academic institution or think-tank, but with a clear niche in training, policy development and research. Several progress reports and other documents are available, and an evaluation was carried out by consultants in 2005, which pointed for a need to strengthen and clarify the niche and objectives and reporting on results. A mid-term evaluation reconfirmed recommendations to better match activities with capacity, strengthen focus and ensure better synergy among the different components of the work programme. A comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan has been developed, but may be difficult to use effectively if the high number of goals (8) and programmes/activities are maintained.

#### **Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)**

A not-for-profit organisation (Section 21), CPS is a policy think-tank for domestic and foreign policy. It has a South African Board, and 13 South African staff. It does not receive core funding from any international donors, although Sweden has in the past provided core funding. It has relatively few large donors, but Denmark and Belgium support project as do a range of private foundations. The Centre has a stated focus on governance, democracy and civil society, with a niche in “Africa’s Progressive Governance Architecture”. Interviews revealed an opportunistic approach to planning and programming, something which may undermine its ability for strategic positioning. It sees its own comparative advantage in the openness of its intellectual work, as researchers have different political leanings. This, however, reinforces the impression of a lack of clear focus and consistent approach and orientation. CPS operates both nationally and regionally, but not with any strategically determined balance between the two, and thus at times it is more

42) *Referred to in RSA legal terms as a Section 21 institution meaning that 85% of all funds must be donations and not more than 15% can come from remunerated activities.*

nationally oriented, depending on availability of funding for projects. In this respect, CPS deplors the change in the funding environment that took place in 1994. It does not have a funding strategy, and simply approaches different donors for different projects. There are very little results reporting and no impact assessments, but a range of outputs in terms of policy briefs and research papers available on the website.

### **Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA)**

EISA is also a “Section 21 institution”, and Danida has a special position in EISA as the institute was started on a Danida grant, and has continued to benefit from Danish funding. It is truly regional with nine Board members from SADC countries and two international Board members. It receives funding from 12-15 different donors, DFID being the largest, but no core funding. It has regional programmes working with political parties to bring comparative experience, but also wants to carry out specific interventions in individual countries: the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. It has three large and three smaller field offices and expects to expand to possibly 15 offices. Its focus is on elections, and the SADC Election Commissioners Forum. It helps build capacity in the region and to develop and spread principles and good practices on electoral work and election management, including supporting elections from civil society. Its staff complement is about 40, including field-based staff. All are core staff and hence permanent staff as long as funds are available. Its primary result has been the African Charter on democracy, elections and governance, and EISA has been commissioned to further develop the Charter. It has also prepared a Compendium on elections in southern Africa and “Principles for elections management” – used for assessing election management and elections. Its comparative advantage vis-à-vis IEC is its research capacity and NGO status.

The Institute is a fast-growing and dynamic institute. Relatively little information was available in Danida files, but the institute maintained a complete set of financial records and narrative progress reports, which in some cases were joint reports to both Danida and Sida.

### **Gender Links**

A truly regional NGO, Gender Links has a Board composed of members from nine SADC countries and its 15-20 staff come from within the region. Gender Links carries out training and advocacy on a regional scale and has a well-respected Gender and Media Diversity Centre. It was for a period very dependent on Danish project funds, which constituted 50% of its funds; this is however changing as the institution is gaining recognition. It has received considerable funds from DFID and is also trying to persuade donors to pool funding into common arrangements through more programme-based modalities. Danida has funded two projects with Gender Links; the first Danish grant ever to Gender Links was approved in January 2007, the second was approved in November 2007. Funding comes from a separate budget line for regional NGOs working on gender equality rather than from funding aimed at regional cooperation, and is thus an example of the diverse funding arrangements for regional assistance. It has a clear niche and a recognised capacity in gender and media, but also has qualified staff and networks in other areas of the gender agenda, including governance and justice. A key outcome of its work has been the SADC protocol on gender and development, but the institution can document both output and outcomes in several areas. Gender Links works with an annual work plan, and output and outcomes are assessed and included in the annual report. Gender Links is notable in its innovative efforts at measuring and reporting on results.

**Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)**

IDASA is a Section 21 institution as well. All 23 Board members are South African, elected by “company membership” which is regional and consists of the IDASA founders. IDASA started out as a “domestic”-oriented institution and became regional in 2000. It is Johannesburg based with a small office in Zimbabwe. It is multi-country with common objectives rather than regional and retains a domestic programme. It does not strive to become a regional institution, or develop regional programmes. Funding comes from the Nordics, various foundations, the EU, Germany and USAID, as well as other European countries. There is a deliberate diversification strategy to avoid dependence on one source of funds. While Norway has in the past provided core funding, all funding is today project based. Danida has provided funds for four projects, one of which was in Swaziland.

IDASA’s focus is on legislators rather than the executive – political rather than developmental. In terms of core areas, it has focus on political and economic governance, HIV/AIDS, and migration. IDASA has an opportunistic rather than strategic approach to programming, and tries to align to changing donor interests, resulting in around 30 simultaneously ongoing projects, with a total of around 80-100 staff of which roughly 40 are project coordinators. This is, however, recognised as sometimes (being) “a wasteful process”, yet necessary for survival. It has an interesting experience with trilateral cooperation in the DRC around police reform: British funding, DRC government, South African police force and IDASA as implementing agent. Given the dependence on project funds, the substantive capacity may be somewhat fragile as staff posts depend on project funding; this gives incentives to try to engage staff with generic skills in training, facilitation and policy research rather than specialists in core areas, as generalists are easier to move from project to project. Relations to Danida are stronger with Copenhagen than with the embassy in Pretoria. Monitoring and evaluation is reported to be written into projects, but is not strong enough at corporate level to document and publish corporate results. The Afrobarometer is used to assess impact, and there is anecdotal evidence and examples of specific policy influence.

**Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)**

IEC is an independent (constitutionally established) national body with a Board of five Commissioners and a staff of 300 core staff throughout South Africa. It is focused on domestic electoral issues, but has also tripartite arrangements to support other countries, such as the DRC, and is active in the SADC Electoral Commissioners Forum. IEC does not have a regional approach, but multi-country (Lesotho, Comoros, Swaziland, DRC, Namibia on IT, Zambia came directly to IEC on IT security and hacking, Rwanda and Malawi). IEC is never directly approached; requests for support go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who will then contact IEC. The key regional dimension consists of exchange of experience based on visits, and is more of a multi-country than a truly regional dimension. IEC is government funded and receives project funding from South Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs as extra-budgetary funds and from various donors. There is an appreciation of Danish funding because it is “money given in trust”: it is fast disbursing, no strings attached, no hidden agendas, no separate accounting; Denmark is considered a neutral and very supportive donor. In terms of results and impact, one of the Danish-supported activities, a conference in 2002, led to the development and later ratification of the African Charter ratified in 2007. The other, support to elections in the DRC resulted in concrete outcome and impact in terms of strengthened democracy. IEC has conducted a self-evaluation of the projects.

### **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)**

ISS registered as a non-profit trust fund in South Africa, a research association in Ethiopia and a company in Kenya. In terms of governance, the ISS has two external trustees and one internal trustee. It is a large, well respected, independent research institution focusing on human security in Sub-Saharan Africa, and with a strong professional credibility. It has offices in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and two offices in South Africa and an international Board. The Institute also engages on a collaborative basis with state institutions at national, regional and continental levels in Africa. Its 117 staff members are regional and the focus is on the policy level, but it also works directly with the operational level. ISS has a programme-based management approach with 75% of work done on a long-term basis, and only 25% project based. The Institute is supported by a group of approximately 25 large donors and is rapidly expanding; it has in fact doubled its funding over the past year. Several donors provide core funding, including the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.

ISS conducts morning briefs on various security issues which are very well attended and many donors draw on ISS when visiting missions need a briefing on an issue within its focus area. Also its website is well respected and one of the monitoring indicators used is the number of hits which is impressive. Activities are moving towards capacity building at a senior level, including expert workshops, assistance with policy development and the monitoring of policy implementation. It is guided by a clear strategic plan, discussed with donors. It has a large number of areas of intervention: 33 in the strategic plan covering 2008-11. A balanced scorecard approach is proposed for future results tracking and institutional performance. Monitoring and evaluation is also expected to be strengthened, with a full evaluation planned for 2010. Donors have expressed concern about overheads, and this and other issues are discussed in a well-functioning donor forum "Friends of the ISS".

### **The Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)**

SADSEM is unique in that it is a regional network, although it started as a nationally focused institution. It has an Advisory Board with representation from institutions from all SADC member countries, and an Executive Committee. The SADSEM network is co-ordinated by Prof. Gavin Cawthra, Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Management (CDSM) in the Graduate School of Public and Development Management of the University of the Witwatersrand. CDSM provides the network with management and administrative support. Network activities are overseen by a steering committee comprising representatives of all network partners, which meets four times a year. Oversight is provided by an Advisory Board comprising representatives of all SADC governments, which meets annually. SADSEM receives funding from a small number of donors, mainly as project funding. It has received core funding from Danida but also receives extra budgetary funds to fund research, policy work and capacity building. Danida and DFID are the only core funders, and the organisation at the time of the mission still lacked a clear funding strategy, although this was one of the key recommendations from a review in 2006.

The focus of SADSEM is on training and education in the security sector for mid-level managers at strategic level, not operational. Course participants are, according to figures given during the interview, 50% military, 30% government/legal, 20% civil society (approximate figures provided during the interview). It carries out joint programmes with partners who are credible, independent academics/academic institutions who have formal agreements with governments. There is a twinning arrangement with DIIS. Service pro-

viders of similar services include programmes from the US, France and the UK. There is no systematic results tracking or impact assessment, despite requests in 2006, but there is anecdotal evidence of policy impact including on SADC and support to build other networks. DFID is carrying out a review later this year, and SADSEM is also initiating an impact evaluation and a tracer study. A number of annual reports, review mission reports and a completion report for assistance provided in 1999-2003 are available.

### **South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)**

SAIIA is a membership-based, non-governmental, professional institution with corporate, institutional, individual and diplomatic members and with six branches in South Africa. All Board members and members of the executive committee are South African. The regional dimension is clearest, through the targeting of the African policy-making community, and help to build research capacity in the region. SAIIA receives funds from public and private funders, mainly project funds, except from Sida which provides core funding, and had carried out an extensive review of the institution shortly before the mission. Using the “core programme” approach has resulted in some core funding of specific programmes, such as the Dutch on governance. SAIIA has four programmes funded by Danida. Funders are not only appreciated for the funds, but also because they can help strengthen networks and enhance capacity. The management structure is a structure with clusters with project administrators to manage so staff can move from project to project. SAIIA has six core research areas where SAIIA has a niche compared to other institutions. In terms of programming, SAIIA has a strategic approach to programming where 90% of the ideas come from SAIIA, with 10% from donors. There is evidence of input into major policy processes, national, regional and international, including UN, AU, NEPAD, and EU processes.

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## 6 Conclusions and recommendations

### 6.1 Main conclusions

The evaluation has examined the Danish support for regional development from various perspectives: the regional context, the Danish policy and management framework, the project portfolio and the partner institutions.

The overall conclusion is that support has been relevant to the needs of the region and that it has generated an important political outcome in terms of trust and appreciation from the collaborating partners, something which emanates from the partnership approach which is so fundamental for Danish development assistance. The evaluation also shows that Danish regional support has addressed some very relevant focus areas: namely peace and security and democratisation, and that a large number of outputs have been produced, mainly in terms of workshops, conferences, papers and training courses. Intermediate outcomes include enhanced knowledge and capacity, and sharing of best practices.

However, what the evaluation also reveals is that there is scope to further improve the support. In particular there is a need for a clearer policy on regional development, for a more comprehensive aid management framework, for innovative aid management practices, and for more systematic results tracking. The recommendations below are crafted to help ensure that results of future assistance maintain the important element of trust that has emerged from past cooperation, but that assistance is given with equal regard for aid effectiveness.

### 6.2 Recommendations

#### The regional context

While there is good justification for applying a regional approach to the key issues of peace and security, democratisation and regional integration, one of the main constraints to effectiveness is the weak capacity of the region's most important institution, SADC. As SADC remains key to solving the region's problems and exploiting its potential, helping build up this capacity is a worthwhile objective to support. There are, however, various obstacles, in particular in terms of finding effective ways of supporting peace and security within the SADC structure. Therefore, one possible answer to consider could well be a two-pronged capacity development strategy. The first strand of support would be to help SADC and its institutions assume leadership in key areas that are central to Danish development cooperation, where this is politically feasible. The second strand would be continued engagement with and support via a range of regional actors including NGOs, regional research, policy and training institutions and universities that are able to generate knowledge, and also support firmer types of regional development, outside of formal SADC structures. The objective – keeping the continuum of regional cooperation, explained in Chapter 3, in mind – should be to contribute to understanding and knowledge, to promoting broader regional processes where possible, and to sharing best practices. Taking into account South Africa's considerable potential as a strong regional actor, the evaluation also concludes that with South Africa's heavy involvement in both economic and political processes across the region, attention to the emerging regional programmes of

several government departments and independent South African institutions are important. These are worth supporting with Danish funding.

Danish regional interventions could be designed at three levels:

- Engaging with SADC as an institution, directly or indirectly through other institutions, with a focus on organisational and capacity development to help implement the Windhoek Declaration and ensure a stronger leadership role for SADC.
- Continuing the support and dialogue with key South Africa-based research institutions, think-tanks, training and media centres etc. to maintain and reinforce existing capacity for critical and constructive dialogue and understanding of the complex issues of peace and security, democratisation and regional integration.
- Engaging with and supporting a constructive role for the Government of South Africa and South African government institutions who engage in regional or trilateral cooperation with other SADC countries.

#### **The Danish policy and aid management framework**

Fundamentally, the core of the Danish development policy is long-term and binding cooperation with the developing countries; this has earned Denmark considerable political capital in the region and among collaborating institutions. One weakness, however, when looking at regional support is the absence of a clearly expressed policy and approach to regional development, including a guiding framework to help shape programmes and ensure that they are in line with policies and achieve the desired policy outcomes. This framework should consider also how strategic programming may best be conducted where several embassies support regional programmes in the same region, and how regional programming relates to the country focus now guiding bilateral development assistance.

A policy change over the period towards more outcome-focused policies has accentuated the need for a clear guiding framework to help operationalise the general principles and policy objectives in the specific regional context. This would for example mean more explicit criteria for partner selection, a clear methodology for assessing new and existing partners and principles to help guide aid modality choices.

Sound principles for aid management covering bilateral cooperation are in place, and could very well be extended to also cover regional support. The most pertinent ones for future assistance are the principles concerning focus and complementarities, meant to ensure added value and avoid donor crowding where donors are active in the same areas setting up parallel structures and programmes. Of the three approaches identified in the AMG, two seem particularly appropriate in this case: (i) the practice of lead-donor, i.e., one donor represents other donors in all day-to-day operations; and (ii) delegated cooperation, i.e., where all management of funds and dialogue with the partner country is delegated to one donor.

The policy framework needs to be clarified and clearly articulated to better support regional development. The following issues need to be considered when drawing up a revised framework:

- Clarify the rationale and approach to regional cooperation in the Southern African region.
- Articulate how bilateral and regional support can be mutually supportive.
- Develop a comprehensive programming framework for all regional assistance to the region.

### **The portfolio**

The portfolio consists of projects that are relevant to the needs of the region and have produced a large number of specific outputs in the form of training, workshops, conferences, research publications and advocacy material, inter alia. Anecdotal evidence shows that in several cases these have contributed to building capacity, influencing important policies, including setting regional standards, and increasing awareness of key issues in the areas of democratisation and peace and security. However, more efforts need to be deployed to improve results tracking and documenting impact in a more systematic manner.

A number of constraints need to be addressed, however, to enable the assistance to achieve its full potential and have a larger impact. First among those is the fact that the portfolio is quite large and diverse, with many individual projects, different types of modalities, and different financing sources and accountability frameworks.

Both the desk review, and the field study and the interviews revealed that there is a clear scope to improve the programming of the regional assistance. The policy framework, as mentioned above, lacks sufficient clarity to guide the programming of funds, and programming has been “opportunistic”, i.e. responded to ad hoc requests or specific situations, rather than being strategic and based on a clear vision and strategy for what Danida wishes to achieve with the regional support. This has resulted in a certain project proliferation, which has been a strain on the embassy. There is therefore a need for a stronger focus and selectivity in the future, with programming focused on policy outcomes consistent with the general shift towards focusing on outcomes and not activities and output.

Aid modality emerged as a key issue. The dominant modality in the portfolio is project assistance, an onerous aid modality by any accounts. For the institutions, it is difficult to deal with different projects, with different time frames, varying reporting requirements and accountability frameworks, sometimes conflicting consultative processes, and changing donor staff. For donors, each project has its own administrative requirements; the more projects the more administration. Projectisation is thus clearly a problem on both sides and hence core funding should be the preferred modality, where feasible.

For less strong institutions, projects may still be relevant, but thought should be given to how to help build the capacity of the institution to manage core fund in due course.

In order to improve selectivity and focus, and enhance the likelihood of significant sustainable outcomes it is recommended to:

- Clarify what regional development outcomes the Danish support should aim to achieve.
- Develop a strategy to move away from ad hoc projects to a large number of institutions to more strategic and focused support to fewer institutions.



- Develop principles to help make decisions on types of aid modality – project or core funding.
- Strengthen monitoring and evaluation for all projects.
- Where project assistance is still relevant, consider ways of strengthening the institution.
- Consider the establishment of a capacity development Trust Fund to join hands with other donors to support the organisational development of the key partners.

### **The regional partners**

The support provided has helped strengthen institutions and networks that are, for the most part, recognised as important players in generating and sharing knowledge about governance in Africa and the African security architecture. Through this channel, Danida has had opportunities to contribute to developing and furthering agendas that are key for progress in the region, and that it would not have been possible to influence through direct bilateral support.

However, support to fewer institutions, selected based on a set of clear criteria and a solid performance assessment would enhance the likelihood that Danish funds would make a significant, measurable contribution. Hence, exit strategies or innovative strategic engagement are needed for others.

A strategic engagement with some of the institutions needs more thought. It could involve support to the institutions to improve management, setting up twinning arrangement with Danish institutions helping shape and develop networks, providing support for example in the form of Danish experts for capacity building, or inviting them to be part of various communities of practice in Denmark on a regular basis. Many of the institutions need to strengthen management capacity; and there is a clear area here where the reputation of Danida opens up for opportunities to make a very significant capacity building contribution. Trust is needed for this type of support, and trust is one of the key assets of Danida in the region.

Given the capacity at the embassy, it is imperative to reduce the number of projects and institutions receiving support. When doing so, the following should be considered:

- Develop a set of guiding principles and criteria to help decide on the selection of the institution to be supported, taking account of the five dimensions: type of institution, governance, financial solidity, capacity, and demonstrated results.
- Consider exit strategies for the institutions that do not meet the criteria.
- Consider a range of options for strategic engagement including support to improve management, facilitating twinning arrangements with Danish institutions and helping shape and develop networks, providing support for capacity building or inviting the institutions to be part of various communities of practice in Denmark on a regular basis.

- Once support has been decided, agreement on harmonisation and alignment processes as well as jointly agreed performance benchmark should be sought with other donors.

Lessons and principles from work with the Paris Declaration are highly relevant to the above discussion and recommendations. Donors need to harmonise reporting and audit requirements and align consultation processes. Providing more core funding, as is proposed above, is one option, but holding a continuous joint dialogue with key institutions, possibly collectively, to discuss issues that are of importance to all of them, also holds potential of enhancing aid effectiveness.

### **Development cooperation partners (other donors)**

The Windhoek Declaration, despite its weaknesses, is a key policy instrument and donors should help SADC use it effectively. It builds on the five Paris Declaration principles, and thus should encourage donors to improve their harmonisation, consultation, and joint work, and consider delegating responsibility to lead donors. For the embassy, this does not necessarily mean spending less time on regional assistance, but it means spending embassy staff time differently. Experience has shown, that delegated cooperation and division of labour often mean that donors spend more time talking to each other, and less with the partner countries/institutions, but the gain is on the other hand: partner countries and institutions only have to deal with one lead donor and do one set of reports, rather than dealing with a large group of donors on a one-to-one basis.

Time, priorities and resources pose constraints on all sides. The lack of clarity of management arrangements in Danida adds to the burden, and therefore a clearer understanding and better communication processes need to be developed, also to enable effective collaboration with other development partners in South Africa.

It is vital that Denmark coordinates the proposals above for a more streamlined management process with other development partners. Specifically, this would mean:

- Review other donors' performance assessment methodologies and frameworks for the institutions, in particular the Swedish approach, when developing Danish methodologies.
- Initiate a dialogue with other donors to devise ways of collectively improving effectiveness through division of labour and delegated authority, and sharing information, guidelines and assessment templates for the institutions.
- Clarify responsibilities and management processes between the embassy level and Headquarters level in Copenhagen to ensure effectiveness, relevance of support given, and consistency in the dialogue with the partners.

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## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

104.A.1.e.84.

3 April 2008

### Evaluation of Danish Regional Support to peace and security, regional integration and democratisation in Southern Africa

#### Background

Africa has been prioritised over the last few years in international development efforts, as evidenced by various international initiatives. Denmark too has increased focus on Africa in its international development cooperation, and various strategies and initiatives have been initiated. Consistent with the overall focus and priorities for Danish development cooperation, these emphasise democratisation, security and peace, and regional development. Key documents articulating these priorities are *“Africa – Development and Security. The Government’s priorities for Danish cooperation with Africa 2005-2009”*, 2005 and *“Danmark i Afrika – et kontinent på vej. Regeringens prioriteter for samarbejdet med Afrika syd for Sahara”*, August 2007.

Denmark has considerable experience from past cooperation, including support to regional development in Southern Africa which has been provided since the 1980’s. The latest regional strategy from 1997<sup>43)</sup> aimed at political stabilisation and democracy; regional economic development; and sustainable environmental management. The strategy focused on the member states of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)<sup>44)</sup>, which remains a key institution for sound development in the region.

A Danish evaluation was undertaken of the strategy and the entire portfolio in 2003 covering the period since 1997. The evaluation concluded that the regional strategy was relevant to the needs in the region at the time and to Danish priorities within the thematic areas. The project portfolio was assessed to be generally effective, but it was recommended to review the strategy in light of the much changed political scenario since 1997. It was also recommended to develop a clear policy for the regional projects in support of conflict prevention and democracy/human rights, and review the balance between the support for governmental/ regional structures and non-governmental structures.

Since the evaluation in 2003<sup>45)</sup> approximately 30 regional projects have been funded by Denmark with total disbursements close to DKK 200 million. In addition to the strategy from 1997, the strategic framework has i. a. been the two Africa strategies from 2005 and 2007 and the Africa Programme for Peace from 2004. Thus, the latest Danish Africa

43) *‘Strategy of Danish regional assistance to Southern Africa’.*

44) *At the time of the regional strategy the member states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Later, SADC was expanded with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Seychelles.*

45) *More recent evaluations comprise an EC evaluation in 2007 and a World Bank evaluation from 2007.*

strategy from 2007 explicitly underlines the importance of regional integration in order to strengthen conflict resolution initiatives, trade relations, growth, and stability<sup>46</sup>). In this light but also as a consequence of political and institutional developments in the region and the planned next phase of the Africa Programme for Peace and plans for continued regional assistance, the Danish embassy in South Africa wishes to have an evaluation carried out of the regional assistance provided to Southern Africa, particularly vis-à-vis the support to peace and security, regional integration and democratisation.

Now, given the new international development assistance paradigm and the international focus on Africa, there is a wish to re-assess the experience of Danish assistance to SSA since the last evaluation and draw lessons for future assistance.

### **Objectives**

The overall objectives of the evaluation are to assess:

- The extent to which the activities financed through the regional cooperation have contributed to the achievement of Danish priorities and objectives for Southern Africa, and
- To formulate recommendations for the future Danish assistance to the region within the areas of peace and security, regional integration and democratisation.

### **Outputs**

The outputs will comprise:

- An assessment of the regional context with a particular focus on the development since the last evaluation in 2003 in terms of peace and security, regional integration and democratisation.
- An assessment at the strategic level of the continued relevance of Danish regional assistance to Southern Africa in view of the described context.
- A short paper describing the approach and methodology for carrying out assessments and evaluations of the individual regional projects/programmes.
- An assessment and evaluation of Danish-supported activities with a particular emphasis on peace and security, regional integration and democracy, consistent with the methodology agreed.
- Forward-looking strategic recommendations.

<sup>46</sup>) See *Africa Strategy 2007 section 3*.

## Scope of Work

Since an evaluation of the period 1997-2002 was carried out in 2003, the time scope will be 2003-07. To the extent that findings and recommendations from Danida's evaluation carried out in 2003 are still found to be relevant by the evaluation team, these will be carried forward into the new evaluation.

Regional assistance will for the purpose of this exercise be defined as bilateral support to regional institutions, or institutions with a regional perspective and focus in Southern Africa. In addition regional projects financed through the Human Rights frame will be included. Projects funded through the local grant facility will not be included, except where these have a clear strategic value and regional dimension. Support given through Danish NGOs and the environmental portfolio will be excluded. In total that amounts to approximately 30 projects of a total value of roughly DKK 200 million. A consolidated list of projects will be provided to the evaluation team by the Evaluation Department.

## Main Issues and Methodology

The methodology will be developed in more detail during the inception phase of the evaluation and will be described in a separate paper, but it will as a minimum include the following:

- To understand the context of the Danish regional support a brief overview of the political and institutional development in the region will be prepared with focus on the period since 2003. The overview will include a brief assessment of the main regional institutions and initiatives, including SADC. The overview will also contain a list of main international partners active in the South African region. This overview will primarily be based on a review of documentation, including recent evaluations. A few strategic interviews are envisaged both in Copenhagen and in South Africa, mainly for validation purposes.
- Based on the above review the evaluation team will assess whether the current strategic framework, which includes the regional strategy from 1997, the previous Africa strategy and the current one from 2007, and the Africa Programme for Peace from 2004, is still relevant compared to the needs of the region and the assistance of other main actors. The assessment will be based on issues brought out in the context review and is likely to include issues such as the composition of the regional assistance, main modalities, balance between government and non-government partners, management and effectiveness including alignment with government and regional institutions and harmonisation/division of labour with other international partners. A combination of reviews of available documentation and interviews will be conducted.
- From the list of Danish-supported regional projects a number of activities will be selected for (a) in-depth evaluations which include field visits (approximately 8-10 activities) , and (b) desk assessments to be undertaken in Copenhagen. The criteria for the selection of projects to be covered by the two modalities as well as the evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) will be outlined in a modalities paper to be agreed before the assessment work is initiated.

- The evaluation team will prepare recommendations on the future Danish regional assistance to Southern Africa. The recommendations will both include recommendations on an overall strategic and management level (modalities, composition of portfolio, partners etc.) and recommendations based on the conducted evaluations of individual projects.

### Composition of the Evaluation Team

The evaluation team will have experience of regional assistance through NGOs and public institutions, and the team leader should have extensive evaluation experience. The team will consist of 3-4 persons of which 2-3 persons will participate in the visit to South Africa.

### Organisation and Management

The evaluation will be managed by Danida's Evaluation Department. The Danish embassy in South Africa and the Africa Department will be invited to participate in a reference group for the evaluation. The reference group will be asked to comment on documentation prepared by the evaluation team.

### Timing and reporting

<i>April-May:</i>	Elaboration and finalisation of methodology including sampling criteria, collection and analysis of background material and preparation of field mission
<i>2-12 June:</i>	Field Mission.
<i>July-August:</i>	Drafting report
<i>15 September:</i>	Draft report
<i>October:</i>	Final report

### References

- Danida, "Strategi for dansk bistand til regionalt samarbejde i det sydlige Afrika", 1997  
Danida arbejdspapir, "Danmarks Regionalbistand – erfaringer og perspektiver", March 2000  
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European Commission, "Evaluation of the European Commission's Support to the ACP SADC Region", 2007  
Sida, "African Peace and Conflict Research 1997-2004 – Research on conflict, resolution and prevention within the Sida supported research networks in Africa", 2005  
World Bank, Joint Evaluation of "The Development Potential of Regional Programs", 2007

## Annex 2: List of projects included in desk study and in-depth review

15 May 2008

Project name, journal no.	Disburse- ments in the period 2003-07 Million DKK	Applicant Organization (according to PDB)	Desk study	Field visit In-depth	Grant Million DKK (PDB)
Africa Programme for Peace: SADC component 104. Afrika.11-3 (Component of 104.Afrika.11)	7				80
1. Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)	18	Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (Research Centre/NGO)		+	+
2. Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM)		SADSEM (Regional network of programmes and centres for defence management)		+	+
3. Institute for Security Studies (ISS)		Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (Regional research institute operating across sub- Saharan Africa)		+	+
Human Rights and Conflict Management in Southern Africa 104.SADC.65-8.	10.2	Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) (see above)		+	+
Support to Regional Human Rights Law Clinic 104. SADC.73.	3	Regional Human Rights Law Clinic (NGO)		+	-
Support to SADC Youth Movement 104.SADC.72	2.1	SADC Youth Movement		+	-
Support to Institute for War and Peace Reporting 104. Sydlige Afrika.3	2.9	IWPR (international network for media development)		+	-

ANNEX 2 LIST OF PROJECTS INCLUDED IN DESK STUDY AND IN-DEPT REVIEW

<b>Project name, journal no.</b>	<b>Disburse- ments in the period 2003-07 Million DKK</b>	<b>Applicant Organization (according to PDB)</b>	<b>Desk study</b>	<b>Field visit In-depth</b>	<b>Grant Million DKK (PDB)</b>
Institute for Security Studies Activities, Security Policy 104.Afrika.22.	12	Institute for Security Studies (see above)	+	+	12
Democracy in the SADC-countries 104.SADC.55-1.	3.8	Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA)	+	+	4.1
Support to Gender Link's activities on equal rights and good governance 104.Afrika.29.8 104.Afrika.29.14	4.6 + 4.8	Gender Link	+	+	9.4
Defence Management Training Programme 104.SADC.64	30.8	University of Witwatersrand, Faculty of Management (SADSEM)	+	+	31
Cadet Journalist Training Scheme 104.Sydafrika.1.MRD.4	0.5	IWPR	+	-	0.5
Prevention of Conflicts in Southern Africa – Brenthurst Foundation 104.Sydafrika.1.MRD.6	0.9	Brenthurst Foundation	+	+	1
Support a process of Sustained Dialogue at Universities in Zimbabwe 104.Sydafrika.1.MRD.3	0.7	Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)	+	+	0.7
Multiparty Elections in DRC 104.Sydafrika.5-46	4.9	Independent Electoral Commission	+	+	4.9
Capacity Development project for CSO's in Swaziland 104.Sydafrika.1.MRD.2	3	Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)	+	+	3.9
Security and Terrorism in Africa 104.Sydafrika.4.a.187	1.4	South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)	+	+	1.8



ANNEX 2 LIST OF PROJECTS INCLUDED IN DESK STUDY AND IN-DEPT REVIEW

Project name, journal no.	Disburse- ments in the period 2003-07 Million DKK	Applicant Organization (according to PDB)	Desk study	Field visit In-depth	Grant Million DKK (PDB)
The Tswalu Dialogue 2006-08 104. Sydafrika.4.a.204	1.2	Brenthurst Foundation (private foundation) research, studies, forums	+	+	1.7
Centre for Policy Studies 104.Sydafrika.5-47	1.5	Centre for Policy Studies	+	+	4.5
<b>Total: 19 projects</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13 organisations</b>	<b>19 desk studies</b>	<b>10 organisa- tions 14 activities</b>	<b>Approx 176 million DKK</b>

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## Annex 3: List of persons consulted

<i>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</i>	Martin Bille, Deputy Head of Department, Development Policy Ole Thonke, Deputy Head of Department, Africa Anne Meldgaard, Head of Section, Africa Fin Poulsen, Head of Section, Africa
<i>Royal Danish Embassy in Pretoria</i>	Dan Frederiksen, Ambassador Vibeke Pedersen, Counsellor Bokellang Khave, Programme Office
<i>IDASA</i>	Executive Director, Mr. Paul Graham Project Coordinator, Political Governance Programme, Naidoo Nyoni Strategic Support, Jaco Roets
<i>IEC</i>	Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of Electoral Commission of South Africa Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Mosotho Moepya
<i>SAIIA</i>	National Director, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos Director of Studies and Head Business in Africa Programme, Nuema Grobbelaar
<i>SADSEM</i>	Chair and Director, Prof Gavin Cawthra Centre Manager, Shirley Magano Prof. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk
<i>EISA</i>	Executive Director, Denis K Kadima Senior Advisor, Research, Dr Khabele Matlosa
<i>Brenthurst Foundation</i>	Via Telephone Director, Dr. Greg Mills Deputy Director, Steve Stead
<i>Center for Policy Studies</i>	Director, Thabo Rapoo Senior Researcher, Ebrahim Fakir Senior Researcher, Francis Kornegay Administration and Finance Manager, Stella Tshona
<i>Gender Links</i>	Executive Director, Colleen Lowe Morna
<i>Institute for Security Studies (ISS)</i>	Respective Programme Heads, Paul-Simon Handy Dr. Naison Ngoma, Mr Guy Lamb and the Director of the Pretoria Office, Len le Roux
<i>Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)</i>	Executive Director, Adekeye Adebajo Senior Project Officer, Noria Mashumba Senior Manager, Finance, Paul Bradnum
<i>Donors</i>	Sweden, First Secretary, Anders Ronquist, Finland, Programme Coordinator, Tsakane Bok
<i>Others</i>	Julian Brett, COWI



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