REVIEW OF THE UK GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

AND SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM UK GOVERNMENT FUNDED PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS 1997-2001

CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOINT *UTSTEIN* STUDY OF PEACEBUILDING

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JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY ON PEACEBUILDING

PART I

REVIEW OF UK GOVERNMENT

APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

Simon Lawry-White

PREFACE

The Department for International Development (DFID) commissions a number of independent evaluation studies each year. The purpose of DFID's evaluation programme is to examine rigorously the design, implementation and impact of selected projects and to learn lessons from them so that these can be applied to current and future projects and programmes, and also to help strengthen DFID's accountability. It should be borne in mind that the projects examined are the products of their time, and that the policies they reflected and procedures they followed have often changed in the light of DFID's developing knowledge.

The Evaluation Department (EvD) of DFID is independent of DFID's spending divisions and reports to the Management Board through the Director General (Corporate Performance and Knowledge Sharing).

This report constitutes one of four papers commissioned as a joint Utstein study on peacebuilding. The 'Utstein Group' is a group of Ministers responsible for development cooperation, working together to drive the development agenda forward, focusing on implementing an international consensus on development cooperation. When this study began the core group consisted of the respective development Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom – the Utstein Four. Hence, this study reflects the make-up of the group at that time. The evaluation departments of these development agencies have been collaborating on a number of joint studies of which this study on peacebuilding is one.

The aim of the UK and other country reports in this peacebuilding study is to assess current government approaches to peacebuilding and to provide an overview of lessons learned from existing documentation, to contribute to the synthesis report. The objective is to synthesise these country reports to provide a study of current practice in peacebuilding and to provide guidelines for what works and does not work, raising issues for future policy, evaluation and research agendas.

The research was managed by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. Under PRIO's research framework, the respective government evaluation departments in each country managed their own country level studies. The outputs are discrete studies on peacebuilding for each of the four countries and a synthesis report.

The report on the UK approach to peacebuilding has three parts:

1. A review of UK government approaches to peacebuilding
2. A synthesis of lessons learned from UK government funded peacebuilding projects 1997-2001
3. A survey of UK peacebuilding activities from 1997-2001

The UK report concludes that confusion over terms such as peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and lack of consistency in using policy markers, can lead to under estimating the extent of the UK government's efforts in this area. Further, the paper notes that the links between strategies and projects are often unclear leading to difficulties in analysing vertical cohesion, though this situation has improved since the advent of the Conflict Prevention Pools. Finally, the paper notes that creating the conditions for peace and engaging in peacebuilding work are not the same but are sometimes conflated, with implications for achieving objectives of security and sustainable development.

The UK synthesis of lessons learned draws out a number of key lessons that include the need to constantly update and contextualise the origins and dynamics of individual conflicts with particular reference to key players in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres; the

need for improved donor cooperation and collaboration; the need to directly link peacebuilding and development interventions; and the need for a long term commitment to peacebuilding processes.

The UK survey of peacebuilding activities provided the data for the aforementioned reports and describes in detail the conditions and process of this research.

The synthesis report was prepared, drawing upon the reports of Germany, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. The overall findings of the synthesis report centre on challenges presented in defining policy terms, articulating goals, key concepts and vocabulary in peacebuilding. A key finding is that a major strategic deficit exists between the articulation of policy and efforts to translate this policy into practice. Major questions have arisen with regard to how the impact of peacebuilding interventions can be assessed.

The study will be presented at a Peacebuilding Seminar in Oslo (December 2003) to give policy makers and practitioners the chance to consider and formulate future policy, evaluation and research agendas based on the findings of the study.

This report was prepared by Simon Lawry-White, a consultant attached to the Performance Assessment Resource Centre (PARC), who carried out the research with the assistance of Janey Lawry-White. The study was managed by Mary Thompson and Dale Poad, and edited for printing by Cluny Sheeler.

The reports of the Utstein Peacebuilding Study may be found on the following web-sites:
Germany - http://www.gtz.de/crisisprevention/download/utstein.pdf
Norway - http://www.prio.no/files/file44564_norwegian_nationalpaper.pdf
The Netherlands - http://www.euforic.org/iob/en/index.html
United Kingdom – http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/total_utstein.pdf
Synthesis Report - http://www.prio%20.no/files/file44563_getting_their_act_together.pdf

Evaluation reports can be found at the DFID website
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/PolicieAndPriorities/files/ev_home.htm

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The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for International Development

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ACPP	Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AGHD	Africa Greater Horn Department, DFID
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
DAT	Defence Advisory Team
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (or combatants)
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EVD	DFID Evaluation Department
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GFN	Global Facilitation Network
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IDT	International Development Target
ILO	International Labour Office
ISP	DFID Institutional Strategy Paper
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-government organisation
OCHA	Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPR	Output to Purpose Review
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCR	Project Completion Reports
PIM	Policy Information Marker
PRIO	Peace Research Institute, Oslo
PRISM	Project Reporting Information System for Management (DFID)
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans
SALW	Small Arms Light Weapons
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper provides an overview of the UK government approach to peacebuilding. It has been prepared as part of a joint Utstein countries study on peacebuilding. The study is being project-managed by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is taking the lead on behalf of the Utstein member countries.

The overall aim of the study is to provide implementation guidelines for what works and what does not work in peacebuilding. This paper forms one of three components of the initial Survey phase of the study – the other two being a database of UK funded activities in nine target conflict-affected countries, and 57 summaries of learning from selected peacebuilding projects[1]. The target countries were Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Sri Lanka. The Survey period was 1997-2001, apart from Afghanistan where activities since 2001 were reviewed.

Peacebuilding activities in the survey database of activities were identified as peacebuilding using key word searches, and not just from the more restricted set of data marked as Conflict Handling[2]. All the 1000 plus project records for the target countries were scrutinised for 'peace-building intent'[3]. A separate Addendum (Part III of this document) summarises the selection and analysis process for the database and project summaries.

The paper summarises the evolution of the UK Government conflict-reduction and conflict-prevention strategy since 1997 and describes underlying principles, and the main conflict prevention strategies and mechanisms in use.

Key steps in the development of UK conflict-reduction and prevention strategies include the publication of 1997 and 2000 White Papers *Eliminating World Poverty*, the 1998 MoD Strategic Defence Review, and the launch of the joint Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) in 2001.

The UK does not have a peacebuilding strategy as such. Peacebuilding falls under the headings of Conflict Reduction and Conflict Prevention. Work on conflict was initially brought together under the heading of conflict reduction and later under conflict prevention. From 1999 onwards, a set of thematic and geographical conflict reduction strategies have been developed, many of which include peacebuilding elements.

The UK's approach to conflict prevention appears to be based on underlying principles, including:
- there is a negative correlation between violent conflict and sustainable development
- personal safety is a precursor to development
- democratic and representative systems of government and rights-based society are a necessary condition of conflict prevention
- coordinated interventions are required at multiple levels – from intergovernmental to grass roots – and with a key role for the United Nations
- the delivery of UK conflict-prevention goals relies on partnership with a variety of institutions
- front-loading of post-conflict investments reduces the chances of conflict recurring.

The elimination of poverty is DFID's principal goal and conflict prevention is a means to that end. The FCO's main objective is a secure UK within a safer and more peaceful world, with

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[1] The 57 fall into the following categories: Reconciliation 34%, Security 32%, Political 16%, Socio-Economic 4%, Other 14%.

[2] The database of allocations for the target countries was searched using keywords other than 'peacebuilding', including: peace, confidence measures, conflict reduction, conflict prevention, and reconciliation.

[3] This was a key concept as defined within the approach to be adopted in the study. Only those activities with explicit objectives clearly identifiable as broadly contributing to peacebuilding were taken as peacebuilding projects. Project records were scrutinised individually and the categorisation was not constrained by their sectoral classification or whether or not they were funded from the CPPs.

human rights and good governance as key themes. Security is the MoD's key concern, with defence diplomacy as one of its eight missions.

While the UK recognises a wide range of security, political and social initiatives that can contribute to conflict prevention, in practice UK interventions are governed by a limited set of strategies:
- governance, seen as an overarching issue
- related security initiatives in Security Sector Reform; Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation; Defence Diplomacy; Small Arms and Light Weapons; and Humanitarian Mine Action
- Tracks I, II and III peace processes

Other priorities include the establishment of independent media, making the international system more effective in resolving conflicts, improving the role of international business and international financial institutions, and addressing wars of abundance fuelled by the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

Cross-cutting themes underpinning conflict strategies include HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and Gender and Conflict.

The Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) was established in 1997 and has spearheaded DFID's conflict related strategy and programming. Conflict analysis is now being mainstreamed into DFID geographic departments and country programmes. The UK government recognises that each conflict is unique and DFID has developed a Conflict Assessment Methodology, which has now been applied to ten conflict situations. The Conflict Prevention Unit in the FCO was expanded in 2002 in order to enhance Conflict Prevention resource management and to assist in the mainstreaming of CP within the FCO. The Africa Conflict Unit in DFID has doubled its personnel over the past three years, partly in order to support activities under the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.

While security and reconciliation activities make clear links to peacebuilding, major investments in post-conflict socio-economic and reconstruction projects in particular typically record no overt peacebuilding intent. As a result they are unlikely to be evaluated for their peacebuilding effects.

The guidelines supplied for this paper by PRIO ask for a comment on horizontal and vertical consistency between policy and practice. The emphasis placed by the UK on coordination between actors and giving the UN a central role indicates that the UK is striving to achieve horizontal consistency between actors. The UK also seeks to act as a catalyst to international coordination. Interviews indicate that the Conflict Prevention Pools (CPPs) may have both facilitated and obliged a greater consistency in strategy between the government departments involved and also improved vertical consistency between strategy and in-country programming[4].

The Global and Africa CPPs seem to have been instrumental in the development of more focused thematic and geographical conflict prevention strategies and have fostered a degree of interdepartmental coordination that would not otherwise have been achieved. The paper highlights some of the challenges in implementing CPP mechanisms. A mid-term external evaluation of the operation of the Pools is due before the end of 2003.

In order to report progress made against conflict-prevention strategies, better information management is likely to be needed. Current data management arrangements for the individual CPP strategies will not allow the CPPs to be properly reviewed.

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[4] The CPPs came into operation in 2001, so covering only one year of the study period.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of UK government approach to peacebuilding. It has been prepared as part of a joint Utstein countries study on peacebuilding. The study is being project-managed by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is taking the lead on behalf of the Utstein member countries. The overall aim of the Study is to find out what works and what does not work in peacebuilding and to generate implementation guidelines for government officials.

The April 2002 *Terms of Reference for the Study* give the objective as:
'Create a policy agenda of peacebuilding based upon an analysis of the experiences of the four Utstein countries. The Study will produce policy advice, and input to possible guidelines that can help direct future activities in peacebuilding', with the two main components being:
* A policy oriented study of peacebuilding, based on a typological survey of the four countries' experiences in support of peacebuilding activities over the last five years, drawing on existing documentation.
* An international seminar, currently scheduled for November 2003, to present and discuss the policy advice of the study in the context of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee members and with participation from non-governmental organisations[5]

The main elements of the survey phase of the study are:
* The compilation of a database of peacebuilding activities 1997–2001[6] and an analysis of spending under four major categories – Security, Socio-Economic, Political and Reconciliation. For the UK, the countries selected were Bosnia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and Sudan, plus Afghanistan since September 2001.[7]
* A survey of peacebuilding activities from 1997-2001 in nine selected countries, with two-page summaries of selected projects and programmes, providing learning material from the selected projects in terms of what was seen to have worked or not worked in peacebuilding.
* A 'national paper' on the UK government approach towards peacebuilding.
* A Lessons Learned synthesis paper.

The three survey elements provided will be used by PRIO to create a synthesis of strategy and learning on peacebuilding across the Utstein partner countries. A separate Addendum (Part III of this document) describes the Survey process and the statistical analysis, and includes the Survey design as set out by PRIO.

This document forms the third component of the Survey. Each Utstein partner country has been free to determine the format of their National Paper although the project manager has included some guidance on content, attached as Appendix 1. The DFID Evaluation Department contracted the consultant to undertake the UK part of the Survey.

This paper has drawn on official strategy papers, speeches by ministers, and interviews with staff from DFID, the FCO and the MoD. A schedule of key documents is included as Appendix 2 and a list of informants forms Appendix 3.

The consultant has had much fuller access to DFID than the other two ministries and the report reflects this[8]. Given the advent of the two CPPs, this is less of a hindrance to describing

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[5] Utstein Partner countries, *Joint Study of Peacebuilding Terms of Reference*, April 2002.
[6] Taken in the UK case to be from April 1997 to March 2002, to match with UK financial years.
[7] Countries were selected to provide a cross-section of regions, countries where donors had provided funding, countries in which a number of Utstein partners had an interest (5 of the 9 are being surveyed by all partners). Not all donors selected the same countries but to achieve a level of consistency, all partners selected five countries in common: Bosnia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan.
[8] DFID has relatively well developed project management systems. Some FCO and MoD activities are more sensitive by nature. FCO and MoD were less forthcoming in the provision of information to the consultant than DFID, perhaps in part because the consultant was contracted by DFID.

the overall government approach to peacebuilding than it would otherwise have been, given that the CPPs now provide for joined-up strategies between the three Departments. (CPPs are discussed more fully below.) While much of the UK government's conflict related initiatives are not funded from the CPPs, all conflict reduction/prevention work should be consistent with CPP strategies.

This report is designed as a readable summary of UK strategies for the benefit of Utstein partners and not as a comprehensive analysis of UK government activity in conflict prevention. It is not an evaluation of UK peacebuilding activities. The observations made on the UK approach and practice draw on discussions with officials but any commentary included here is the responsibility of the author[9] and does not represent official UK policy.

The paper does address the issue of vertical consistency between policy/strategy and implementation, but does not explore horizontal consistency to any extent. Establishing the quality of policy and operational links between the UK government and other actors with regard to peacebuilding has not been possible within the scope of this study and would justify an evaluation of its own.

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[9] The author is an independent consultant and associate with the Performance Assessment Research Centre (PARC).

2. BACKGROUND TO UK PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY

2.1   Labour Government

The 1997 election of the Labour government heralded a significant shift in the government approach towards international development. A new department was created, the Department for International Development (DFID) with a Secretary of State represented at Cabinet level. Until 1997, the Overseas Development Administration was part of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

In 1997, the British Aid programme was worth £2.2 billion (€3.3 billion). Since then, it has substantially increased and is set to reach £4.9 billion (€7.5 billion)[10] by 2006, or 0.4 per cent of the country's GNP.

2.2   White Papers

In 1997, the UK Government produced a White Paper[11], *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. This was the first White Paper on international development for 22 years and set poverty alleviation, and especially the International Development Targets, as the priority for the newly formed DFID. While the negative impacts of violent conflict on poverty reduction had been recognised by the UK government before 1997, the White Paper clearly brought violent conflict within the development frame, 'Understanding the causes of conflict, and helping build the will and capacity of state and civil society to resolve disputes non-violently will be central to our international policy '.

A second White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor* was published in 2000. This further outlined the government's case for the link between conflict and poverty, for example, 'Conflict prevents development and increases poverty ', 'Promoting effective and inclusive systems of government, including an accountable security sector, is an essential investment in the prevention of violent conflict ', and 'Violent conflict is one of the biggest barriers to development in many of the world's poorest countries. '

Addressing conflict is seen as a necessary stepping stone towards sustainable development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, the ultimate aim, with improved livelihoods as the community level goal. All the UK's aid contributions and related activities are governed by the UK Overseas Development and Cooperation Act, which was updated in 2002 to strengthen the focus on poverty reduction. The debate now appears to have moved on still further since substantial resources have been put into backing peace agreements in conflict countries. While the poverty reduction agenda remains primary, DFID programme managers also report that they are under pressure to show the benefits of DFID's investment in peace.

While DFID has focused on poverty reduction, the Ministry of Defence went through its own Strategic Defence Review process in 1998[12]. One of the missions of the MoD was defined in the spending review as Defence Diplomacy. The mission aims to '…dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to conflict prevention '.

As part of the 2000 Spending Review, a governmental cross-cutting review undertaken for the FCO, MoD and DFID set the stage for the formation of the CPPs. DFID published a Framework Document for the Africa Pool 'The Causes of Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa'. A framework publication for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool is due in summer 2003.

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[10] For context, defence spending is set to increase by £3.5 billion between 2002-2006.

[11] A White Paper sets out policy, having been preceded by a Green Paper, which is a form of consultation document.

[12] *The Strategic Defence Review: New Chapter* (July 2002) has updated the 1998 review in the light of 9/11/01, and concluded 'the Armed Forces can play a role as part of a cross-Government and international effort to counter the threat from international terrorism at home and to engage it overseas'.

2.3 Geographical Focus

Historically, UK engagement has been greatest with Commonwealth countries but the new emphasis on poverty reduction brought in with the 1997 White Paper and the changing nature of security threats globally have changed the criteria for targeting assistance. For example, in recent years, the government has been actively engaged in peace initiatives in several African countries, including Angola, Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, all countries where the UK has not been particularly active in the past.

DFID places particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa because it is the poorest region in the world, with a recent history of violent conflict. In 2000, half of the countries in the region were affected by armed conflict[13] and 10.6 million people are internally displaced[14], the majority of them uprooted by war. The MoD, by contrast, is currently focused on security issues in the former Warsaw Pact countries and the former Yugoslavia. DFID has a more global and thematic focus, while its current geographic priorities are Afghanistan and the Balkans.

2.4 Public Service Agreement/Service Delivery Agreement

Based on the 2000 White Paper, a Public Service Agreement (PSA) has been agreed for the period 2001–4, with a joint target set for three government departments, DFID, FCO and MoD: 'Improved effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict where the UK can make a significant contribution '.

The PSA technical note acknowledges the difficulties in assessing progress against the target: 'There is a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the reliability of data for this target.'[15] While numbers of conflict related deaths in 2001 fell significantly, 'quantitative assessment of conflict reduction is problematic because of difficulties in isolating the UK's distinct contribution from that of other international actors '[16]. Despite this, in a DFID update on progress against the 2001–2004 PSA, the objective of reduced numbers of deaths from violent conflict was said to be 'on course ', and highlighted the UK's contribution to 'a more effective approach in securing peace in Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes, Sudan and Angola, while contributing to 'ensuring that conflict prevention received a high priority within the G8 and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) '[17].

The UK government also sees itself as playing an effective role in peacebuilding. A review of DFID achievements in 2002 posted on DFID's Intranet states that 'With FCO and MoD, [DFID] played a pivotal role in helping to re-establish stability in Sierra Leone, and supported efforts to promote peace in Angola, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Secretary of State Clare Short participated in signing of peace treaty between DR Congo and Rwanda'.[18]

2.5 Conflict Prevention Pools

The UK's Modernising Government agenda has picked up pace since the 1997 election and has led ministers to increase joined-up working between government departments. Discussions on common funding between DFID, FCO and MoD began in 1999 but only came to fruition in April 2001, with the establishment of two CPPs, one for Africa and the other

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[13] *The Causes of Conflict in sub Saharan Africa*, DFID, October 2001

[14] *State of the World's Refugees*, UNHCR, Geneva, 2000

[15] To be based on figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

[16] Number of deaths decreased significantly in DRC (from 16,000 to 4,000), Angola (6,000 to 1,000) and Sierra Leone (3000 to less than 50).

[17] See http://insight/dpd/csu/PSA-SDA/October2002_PSA_Progress.doc.

[18] See http://insight/spotlight/2002_achievements.doc.

Global (rest of the world). Each Pool is managed on a day-to-day basis by a steering committee comprising members of FCO, MoD and DFID. These are overseen by Ministerial sub-Committees comprising Ministers from each Department. The Global CPP is chaired by FCO at both official and ministerial levels. The Africa CPP is chaired by DFID.

The Pools are not in themselves a strategy for conflict prevention, but rather a tool for joint analysis, financing and coordination. At the same time, the Pool system has led to new ways of doing business in government, especially in joint strategising, the goal being to create synergies and make the efforts of the three ministries 'greater than the sum of the parts'. From a peacebuilding perspective, the CPP mechanism allows the three ministries with the joint PSA target for reduction of violent conflict to align their key policy drivers – Poverty Reduction (DFID), Human Rights and International Security (FCO), and Defence (MoD) into a common approach. (See Section 5 for more on CPP mechanisms).

The Pools are involved in both conflict reduction programmes and peacekeeping activities. The establishment of the CPPs meant that for the first time all types of peacekeeping operations and conflict reduction programmes were brought together. While there is a separate budget for peacekeeping, both conflict prevention initiatives and peacekeeping are reviewed by the CPP committees, allowing the links to be made between them.

The CPPs are designed to fund activities where joint strategising between the three ministries can add value. Other conflict related initiatives are funded from individual departmental budget lines. All conflict initiatives should be consistent with UK policy whatever their budget source but may not necessarily be consistent with individual Pool strategies.[19]

2.6   Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department

In 1997, DFID set up its Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), bringing together in one department DFID's work on humanitarian policy and response with its relatively new work on conflict reduction. CHAD has acted as a focus of expertise on conflict-reduction issues and continues to be largely responsible for the development of DFID conflict-related policy. Since 2000, there has been a move to 'mainstream' conflict analysis and initiatives both to DFID's geographic departments in London and within country-level programming. (See Section 5 for more on CHAD).

2.7   Principles Underlying Strategy

From a review of policy and strategy documents as well as discussion with officials, the UK approach to conflict prevention appears to be based on the following underlying principles.

2.7.1   *Conflict is linked to Poverty*

The link between poverty and conflict is made in several policy documents. For example, 'Violent conflict is a major cause of poverty and a key barrier to development in many poor countries. Clearly, the Millennium Development Goals, to which DFID is committed, will not be reached unless the negative impact of conflict is reduced. Poor people place a high priority on security and order because without this it is impossible for them to improve their lives. Conflict often directly leads to poverty. Poor countries often have less capacity to manage conflicts peacefully ', from *Conducting Conflict Assessments* (2002). In making the link between poverty and conflict, the UK is drawing on evidence from its own country experience and from elsewhere, for example, from the World Bank, which has estimated that violent conflict reduces economic growth in Africa by 2 per cent per year.

2.7.2   *Personal Safety*

The Government emphasizes the importance of personal safety, which depends on the right

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[19] Whether or not this is the case could usefully be included in the TOR for the coming mid-term evaluation of the CPPs.

connections being made between security, justice and rights. 'DFID's commitment to safety, security and accessible justice for all is part of our central aim of eliminating world poverty '. Improving livelihoods is facilitated by 'adequate personal safety, security for property and access to an honest and effective legal system '[20]. Threats to personal safety are viewed as a form of deprivation.

2.7.3 *The role of Democratic Political Systems*

The UK approach to conflict prevention assumes both that violent conflict is bad for development and that vulnerability to violence is reduced where economic and political systems are inclusive. The underlying principle is the development of democratic and accountable institutions as a key to reduced risk of conflict and the foundation for sustainable development. As a result, Improved Governance is a theme running through all state-level interventions by the UK government in conflict-prone countries, with democratic control of the security sector having particular importance for peacebuilding.

2.7.4 *Multilevel Interventions*

DFID has come to the view that national-level security issues and political processes must be addressed for conflict prevention to be effective, as a piecemeal, project approach cannot address long-term systemic problems. This has led to a more integrated approach to tackling governance, security, justice and development[21].

The UK has recently taken a more prominent role in Track I peace processes[22] but the portfolio of UK conflict related activities includes support to peacebuilding at international, regional, national and local levels. Examples of the UK's multilevel approach include:

- International – improving the international community's response to conflict by strengthening the UN Conflict Management capacity, especially the UN Secretariat's Department for Political Affairs (DPA), the UN home for peacebuilding, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP.
- Regional – institutional support for the Organisation of African Unity's (now African Union) Conflict Management Centre and for specific activities with sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS.
- National – support to the Loya Jirga, Afghanistan.
- Local – community level peacebuilding initiatives with local and international NGOs in DRC, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.

2.7.5 *Partnership*

The UK government sees the origins of conflict as complex, requiring a systematic and joined-up approach at country level that draws in a variety of actors to develop solutions in partnership. 'Successful delivery [in conflict prevention] depends on governments, donors, international bodies, civil society groups, the private sector and others co-operating closely'.[23]

Making government work for poor people includes a strong critique of the current situation: 'For years, donors have supported a fragmented proliferation of individual activities in developing countries… they also insist on a multiplicity of unique procedures'. So while the UK government is acting to make its own actions more integrated, it is working to influence other donors to do the same. There is a special emphasis on international, regional, national and local actors working together to resolve conflicts. DFID's Conflict Assessment Methodology

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[20] Quotes from speech by Clare Short, 15 April 1999.

[21] The UK's move away from the 'project approach' is in line with a general trend in international aid but was seen by some interviewees to be in contrast with the approach of some other bilateral donors. A number of DFID officials referred to its 'moving away from a project approach', which is not well understood by some outside government. No document has been located which explains this change, but from discussions, it appears that this represents a shift to: more state-level intervention; funding to budget support, that is direct to developing country governments for agreed priorities; funding through the UN and multilaterals; funding via strategies (eg Conflict Pool, or country specific reconciliation strategies); new framework funding partnerships with NGOs. None of this should be taken to mean that DFID is about to abandon its project management systems. It is recommended that DFID finds clearer ways of explaining what 'moving away from a project approach' means in practice.

[22] Peacebuilding 'tracks' = Track I (official), Track II (non-official) and Track III (indigenous) initiatives.

[23] From the DFID Service Delivery Agreement, 2001–2004.

includes the mapping of the policies and responses of international actors, which then provides background information with which to influence better coordination.[24]

The UK aims to influence the policy of other G8 members towards conflict prevention, to strengthen the role of the UN and to create linkages between peacebuilding and World Bank/IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans (PRSPs).

This paper is asked to look at 'horizontal consistency', that is the level of coordination with other donors. The emphasis on partnership and international coordination of conflict prevention efforts, and the way in which the UK is consistently deploying its funds in conflict-affected countries through multilateral and coordinated channels as far as possible, indicates that the UK is achieving a degree of horizontal consistency.

2.7.6   *Front-loading for Practical Change*

The UK government has been influenced by research findings which show that countries are most vulnerable to slipping back into conflict within the first five years after a peace settlement. The government is therefore working to the principle that assistance should be 'front loaded' to ensure that the practical implementation of peace agreements is given the best chance of success. This is why the UK has already allocated a third of the £200 million (€300m) five-year funding package to Afghanistan pledged at Tokyo[25]. For the same reason, the UK is providing considerable support to Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Rehabilitation processes in many parts of the world (see 2.10 below).

2.8   Terminology

The short answer to the question 'What is the UK government's strategy on peacebuilding?' is that there is no overall strategy. A fuller answer takes up the rest of this paper. Peacebuilding[26] has not been a term in frequent use in UK government strategy or project documentation related to violent conflict, though it does appear more often from 2001 onwards. Attempting any definition of peacebuilding is a challenge because this is a very fast moving field, with concepts changing their meaning over time.

The UK government dialogue has evolved since 1997, first under the heading of Conflict Reduction. DFID's *Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance Policy* 1999[27] makes Conflict Reduction the overarching concept that refers collectively to a range of activities, encompassing:

- Conflict Management: activities undertaken to prevent the intensification or spread of existing violent conflict.
- Conflict Prevention: activities undertaken over the short term to reduce tensions and prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.
- Conflict Resolution: activities undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict.
- Peacebuilding: refers to action undertaken over the medium and longer term to address the factors underlying violent conflict.

Specifically, the policy states, 'We aim to support post-conflict peacebuilding through: providing timely and adequate support for implementing peace agreements; encouraging multilateral institutions to respond more quickly and flexibly to sustain peace processes and; supporting the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants, and re-integrating them into society '. Conflict Reduction remains part of the current discourse, at least in DFID[28], but the government has taken its cue from the UN Secretary General in moving the dialogue on from Conflict Reduction to Conflict Prevention. The UK has endorsed his call for the

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[24] See 4.2 for more on Conflict Assessments.

[25] Front-loading of the assistance to Afghanistan has been only partially successful to date, as progress has been slow on several fronts, including disarmament and demobilisation, reform of the army and penal reform.

[26] Also sometimes referred to as 'peace-building', and occasionally 'peace building'.

[27] Figure 1 below summarises the 1999 Policy.

[28] DFID uses Conflict Handling within its system of Policy Information Markers (PIMS) used to classify projects.

international community to move from a culture of resolution to a culture of prevention – hence Conflict Prevention Pools not Conflict Reduction Pools. Notably, there is no one overall Conflict Prevention Strategy, only component strategies under the Africa and Global Conflict Pools. More recently, the DFID Secretary of State has been encouraging officials to strategise around Conflict Resolution, perhaps in recognition that the UK has not been able prevent several current conflicts. The Prime Minister has also used the term but there is no wholesale shift to use Conflict Resolution as an overarching theme.

According to DFID's Africa Conflict Network website, peacebuilding includes 'mediation, DDR, post conflict justice and reconciliation, civic education on the causes of conflict, constitutional reform, and election monitoring'.[29] Whether the UK sees peacebuilding as just post-conflict or pre, during and post conflict, as other actors including the UN increasingly do, is not clear. Interviews with MoD personnel indicated that the MoD is comfortable with a wider view, partly as this reflects the NATO definition. The DFID *Conflict Strategy* 1999 defined peacebuilding as post-conflict but interviews show that DFID staff are now taking a broader view.

The MoD works with agreed NATO definitions of peace operations and sees it as an achievement that these definitions have been agreed across NATO. Under these definitions, peacebuilding relates to 'the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people' and 'requires a commitment to a long-term process'.[30]

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[29] The UN Department of Political Affairs defines peacebuilding as 'assisting nations to cultivate peace after conflict'. At the same time the DPA also refers to Preventive Peacebuilding, a term not in the use by the UK government.
[30] See Appendix 5

Figure 1
From DFID Policy Statement on Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance, 1999

UK CONFLICT REDUCTION STRATEGIES

LIMIT MEANS OF WAGING WAR

- Reduce inappropriate military spend in poor countries
- International cooperation on illicit trafficking, proliferation and responsible supply of small arms and light weapons
- Humanitarian mine action, including improving capacity of international organisations and technologies

POST-CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING

- Support to peace agreements
- Encouraging improved response of multilaterals to sustain peace processes
- Supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants

INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS

- Strengthening UN mechanisms
- Stronger peacebuilding for the Commonwealth and regional structures
- Rich/poor country cooperation in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peace-support
- Coordinated EU policy on prevention including Lomé

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

- Adherence to IHA, working with ICRC
- Promoting and protecting HR through civil society groups
- Strengthen UNHCHR
- Measures against use of child soldiers
- Protection measures for children affected by conflict
- Compliance with laws protecting refugees, working with UNHCR
- Encouraging an effective start to the ICC

SOCIAL COHESIVENESS AND INCLUSION

- Building local and national capacity to resolve disputes
- Promote mediation/negotiation through civil society
- Protection of the rights of minorities
- Expanding the use of objective media
- Encourage responsible behaviour from business

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

- Security risk assessments and appropriate and affordable armed forces in poor countries
- Accountability of security services to civilian democratic authorities
- Transparency in security sector spending
- Training of security forces to respect human rights and humanitarian law

The DFID policy statement, *Making Government Work for Poor People* (DFID, 2001)*,* sets out seven 'Key Capabilities for Governance'.[31] Of these, principles five to seven have a direct bearing on the responsibilities of government towards security, safety, and justice – all seen by DFID as preconditions for development:

- to ensure personal safety and security in communities with access to justice for all
- to manage national security arrangements accountably and to resolve differences between communities before they develop into violent conflicts
- to develop honest and accountable government that can combat corruption

The relationship between sound governance and conflict prevention is seen as particularly pertinent to Africa: 'unless the problem of weak states in Africa is robustly addressed through the promotion of accountable, capable, inclusive and democratic government, violent conflicts will remain a constant feature of the African political landscape ' from *Understanding the Causes of Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa*, 2001).

While the Government is committed to the establishment of sound governance as a foundation for conflict prevention, the consultant was not able to locate any UK analysis of the extent to which democratic systems contribute to peacebuilding. Chakrabarti[32] cites evidence from elsewhere that has led to the questioning of the positive contribution of, for example, multi-party elections to long-term peace and stability.

2.9   Security Sector Reform

Over the past five years, Security Sector Reform (SSR)[33] has become a major plank of the UK government's strategy for conflict prevention and a GCPP Strategy[34]. 'Reform of the military is often necessary in conflict situations, making the military more efficient and fully accountable to the civil authorities', from *Making Government Work for Poor People*, (DFID, 2001). The government believes that peace and stability are indispensable if countries are to attract investment and trade, and promote pro-poor development. The UK further considers that 'unaccountable, ill-disciplined and repressive security forces are a major source of insecurity and human rights abuse'. (2000 White Paper).

As a significant military power, the UK could be said to be well equipped for involvement in SSR and the MoD is further developing the contribution the UK armed forces make in this area. In SSR, the perspectives of MoD and DFID overlap. According to DFID, the main reason the UK government should emphasise SSR is that security is what poor people want.

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[31] 1 Political systems 'To operate political systems which provide opportunities for all people, including the poor and disadvantaged, to organise and influence state policy and practice '

2 Macro-economic management - 'To provide macroeconomic stability and to facilitate private sector investment and trade '

3 Public financial management & accountability - 'To implement pro-poor policy and to raise, allocate and account for public resources accordingly '

4 Service delivery - 'To guarantee the equitable and universal provision of effective basic services '

5 Safety, security & access to justice - 'To ensure personal safety and security in communities with access to justice for all '

6 Conflict - 'To manage national security arrangements accountably and to resolve differences between communities before they develop into violent conflicts '

7 Anti-corruption - 'To develop honest and accountable government that can combat corruption '

[32] *Compiling Lessons about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, Discussion paper, Evaluation Department, DFID, 2002.

[33] The security sector is taken to include:

Core security actors

armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).

Security management and oversight bodies

the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

Justice and law enforcement institutions

judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

Non-statutory security forces

liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias.

[34] SSR is also the subject of another joint Utstein initiative.

'Participatory poverty assessments show clearly that the poor of the world place a high priority on security, justice and order. And for the simple reason that without this it is impossible to improve their lives '. Development requires 'a stable, predictable environment'.[35]

However, as the DFID funded *Review of Security Sector Reform* (King's College, London, Sept 1999) pointed out, 'The key challenge is to demonstrate the value-added to regular development activities of integrating a security sector reform perspective'. The Government's response was to clarify its rationale for engagement in SSR in *Poverty and the Security Sector* (1999). The paper pointed out that while the OECD Development Assistance Committee has produced guidelines on conflict, peace, and development cooperation, few Development Ministries have focused directly on SSR, perhaps because officials with a development focus are unfamiliar or uncomfortable with what could be seen as support for military activity.

SSR is a priority because an unreformed security sector may:
*   fail to prevent conflict
*   cause violent conflict which leads to increased suffering and poverty
*   have a direct and negative effect on economic development
*   divert resources from development through excessive or inefficient spending or
*   use power to gain advantage, thereby promoting or protecting corruption
*   cause a loss of confidence on the part of domestic and international investors and create a barrier to debt relief.

The key document setting out the UK government strategy on SSR is *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform* (2002). This document has been agreed jointly between DFID, FCO and MoD and sets out an integrated approach to technical solutions as well as legal reform and oversight mechanisms. The strategy recognises the need to address the two areas firstly of quality of governance – the clarity, openness and responsiveness of the relationships between security sector institutions, the wider government apparatus, and the general public and, secondly, of technical competence – the human resource capacities and the institutional structures and processes that underpin the functioning of the security sector.

UK experience has shown that if demand for reform is purely prompted from outside, it tends to fail but post-conflict scenarios can provide a window of opportunity for reform where the security sector is no longer regarded as legitimate by civil society.

SSR requires an integrated response from UK government ministries. For example, in Sierra Leone, UK-funded SSR combined development, military, police, and diplomatic activities, that involved DFID (civilian control of the security sector), MoD (restructuring and training of the national army), and FCO (military education and training and support to Sierra Leone's peace process).[36]

A new initiative arising from GCPP SSR Strategy is the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) based at Cranfield University, which will provide a resource for academic studies and policy development, as well as an interactive IT-based website for SSR.

2.10 Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation

Closely allied to Security Sector Reform – and often a necessary precursor – the UK government supports programmes in Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation

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[35] From a speech by Clare Short, November, 1999.
[36] Paraphrased from the *FCO Human Rights and Conflict Report,* 2002. The UK has been by far the largest bilateral actor in Sierra Leone over the past five years, especially since the UK action to stabilise the security situation following the near failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in 2000.

(DDR).[37] Major investments by the UK in DDR initiatives include 1) core funding to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (the UNDP home of conflict prevention), and 2) the multi-donor programme for DDR in the Africa Great Lakes region led by the World Bank. The UK is contributing £25 million (€38m) to this latter initiative over five years.

The government has learnt that the rehabilitation component of DDR tends to be both underplayed and the most difficult. Where there have been overruns on expenditure on incentives for the surrender of weapons, the rehabilitation budget may be cut to make up for the shortfall. While Sierra Leone and Afghanistan have seen the largest allocations to rehabilitation, investments have also been made in DRC, Angola, and Rwanda.

The management of rehabilitation of ex-combatants requires different skills and actors from demobilisation, so that concerted effort is required to make the D, D and R elements join-up smoothly. Demobilisation and disarmament require inputs from military advisers, while reintegration is more akin to community development – longer term, lower profile and with less easily quantified outcomes.

2.11 Accessible Justice

The UK recognises that during conflict, the rule of law is often ignored or abused. Alternative systems of justice may emerge based on 'might is right'. Any or all of the following problems may arise in developing countries, and are likely to be exacerbated by conflict:

- inefficient, under-funded, uncoordinated institutions
- corrupt judiciary or court officers favouring the highest bidder
- delays: 'Justice delayed is justice denied '
- courts are too few, remote or congested
- inappropriate legal procedures
- ineffective enforcement
- lack of alternatives to courts within the state system.

The UK response is to favour interventions that promote pro-poor justice systems. DFID's strategy document *Safety Security and Accessible Justice* (2002) recognises a number of activities which may strengthen the justice sector post-conflict but encourages a critique of proposals to ensure they are pro-poor and cost effective, for example:

- *Support to legal aid*. Comparative experience shows that legal aid can be both expensive and unsustainable. The supply of legal services should be considered for civil cases as well as criminal trials.
- *Judicial training*. A critical question is what real impact this may have for the poor. Provision of in-country training in the lower courts on topics and processes directly relevant to the poor is likely to be most cost effective.
- Support to 'traditional' justice. Given the patriarchal nature of many traditional systems, fair treatment for women and children becomes a challenge. At the same time, traditional systems have the advantage of combining social support and social control.

2.12 Defence Diplomacy

Defence Diplomacy is one of eight missions of the MoD. The MoD offers partner countries military assistance and training to facilitate the development of human rights and democratic principles. British military training teams have been active in West, South and East Africa in training on peace-support operations, democratically accountable armed forces and building peace-support capabilities.[38] The UK has been working with the South African defence forces since 1994 to help with the integration of the armed forces and has further assisted them with

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[37] Sometimes also referred to as DDRR, with an extra R for Resettlement.
[38] In most cases through British Military Assistance Training Teams (BMATTs).

peace-support assignments in DRC and Burundi as well as with training in conflict resolution.

Students from 40 countries have completed a Defence Diplomacy scholarship course in the UK, with a shorter version of the course conducted in Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Singapore and Ethiopia. (The Defence Advisory Team is part of the Defence Diplomacy Mission – see 5.4 below.) Defence Diplomacy is funded from the GCPP.

There are nine separate Defence Diplomacy initiatives in Africa alone, including Uganda and Ghana, which unlike Sierra Leone, are not post-conflict situations. Rather, these initiatives take a longer-term development perspective focusing on accountability, rationalising of defence spending, transparency, and professionalisation of defence forces.[39]

2.13 Small Arms and Light Weapons

The issue of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)[40] has been high on the UK government's agenda for at least four years and has become one of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool thematic strategies, with an agreed objective to 'facilitate the implementation of international agreements through practical control and reduction programmes, to strengthen international efforts to build consensus and agree standards on small arms proliferation and to conduct research and analysis. '

Small Arms and Light Weapons – A UK Policy Briefing, 2001, sets out the UK government analysis. An estimated five million people have died in armed conflicts in the last decade – the vast majority of them civilians killed by small arms. Small arms and light weapons have become the weapons of choice for criminals and combatants alike. They are cheap, durable and robust. In many parts of the world, weapons are exchanged for the spoils of the illegal exploitation of natural resources, such as gemstones and timber. In response, 'attempts to control and reduce the number of weapons in circulation require a comprehensive and sustained response from the international community '.

There are three broad policy objectives for SALW: 1) combating illicit trafficking, 2) pursuing a responsible and transparent policy on legal transfers, and 3) promoting the removal and, where possible, destruction of surplus weapons.

DFID, FCO and MoD are working to secure controls on the transfer, possession and use of small arms through a joint £19.5 million (€29.4 m) Small Arms and Light Weapons Reduction Programme managed by CHAD. The funds are being allocated to UN agencies, regional organisations, governments and NGOs. (One UNDP and three NGO SALW projects have been included in the Survey project summaries). DFID is also working on the supply, demand and availability of small arms.

Since 1997, HM Customs & Excise, MoD, the Home Office, DFID, the Department for Trade and Industry and other agencies have met as the UK Small Arms Policy Committee, chaired by the FCO, to ensure the coherent and coordinated implementation of the UK small arms policy.

2.14 Humanitarian Mine Action

DFID launched a Humanitarian Mine Action Strategy in October 1997. According to the strategy, 'humanitarian mine action contributes towards DFID's fundamental goal, the elimination of poverty'. The UK committed itself to raising annual bilateral spend on humanitarian mine action from £5 million (€7.5 m) in 1997/98 to £10 million (€15 m) in 2000/01. Actual commitments exceeded the target, totalling £15 million (€22.5 m) in 1999/00,

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[39] Including in Uganda: scoping study, identification of needs, assistance with defence efficiency, defence diplomacy course, and assistance with a defence review. And in Ghana: joint scooping study, and identifying the need for assistance with strengthening civilian capacity and processes within the MoD. Other initiatives in Africa include Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Swaziland.

[40] SALW may include revolvers, pistols, machine guns, light antitank weapons, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.

including £6.4 million (€9.7 m) for Kosovo. In addition, the UK share of EU expenditure was £3.3 (€5.0 m) million in 1999.

DFID supported mine action programmes are implemented through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, other international organisations, national Mine Action Centres, and NGOs. About 90 per cent of DFID funding is devoted to country-based programmes.

Within DFID, the humanitarian mine action programme continues to be supervised by CHAD, working with FCO and MoD. The long-standing DFID-funded mine action programmes in Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique have been evaluated and a selection of the related UN and NGO projects have been included in the Survey project summaries[41].

In summary, the objectives of DFID's humanitarian mine action strategy are:
- globalisation of the ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and support to the implementation of the Ottawa Convention
- humanitarian mine action in poor countries and strengthening of indigenous capacity
- strengthen the international community's response to the global challenge of landmines
- technological innovation in humanitarian mine action

Over the survey period, the UK further emphasised the UN's coordinating role in global mine action and increased its financial, political and technical support for UNMAS. Mine action NGOs, including HALO and Mine Action Group, have seen their UK government funding decrease as a result. This shift means that more of the administration is done by the UN, so saving DFID time, but whether this represents better value for money than previous arrangements has yet to be assessed.

DFID has supported the development of international standards for mine action through the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and has funded the development, testing and field trials of equipment, for example the Tempest vegetation clearance vehicle and the Pearson Tractor in Cambodia.

2.15 Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Financially, the major investments by the UK government in conflict situations have been in peacekeeping[42] and post-conflict reconstruction[43]. The UK government appears to view post-conflict reconstruction as a part of peacebuilding but policy documents do not articulate the contribution of reconstruction to peacebuilding, or to conflict prevention more generally.

In almost all cases, the UK government engages in post-conflict reconstruction as part of a coordinated international effort to maintain and build peace. There seems to be an assumption that by making financial commitments to an agreed peace 'package', including substantial financial investments by donor governments, the UK is making a contribution to the peace – if not directly to peacebuilding processes.

DFID's policy statement on *Conflict Reduction Policy and Humanitarian Assistance* includes the following on post conflict peacebuilding: 'Experience has shown that signing of peace agreements does not mark the end of conflict. It is essential to support post conflict peacebuilding by providing enough support in good time to implement agreements. This includes encouraging the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and others to respond

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[41] For more on this see the accompanying Lessons Learned paper.

[42] Peacekeeping is normally undertaken as part of a UN mandated and coordinated effort and involves financial commitments, or so called 'assessed contributions' to the UN. As one of five permanent members of the Security Council, the UK is expected and expects to make a substantial contribution in peacekeeping and may play a leading role, as in Sierra Leone and more recently in Afghanistan. Peacekeeping is clearly excluded from the survey categories and is not seen within the study as peacebuilding.

[43] Sometimes also covered under Recovery or Rehabilitation.

more quickly to sustain peace processes'.

Direct links to peacebuilding rarely come through in UK post-conflict reconstruction project or programme documentation for the 1997–2001 Study Period. Given that reconstruction projects may cost as much as all other peacebuilding initiatives put together, this should be a cause for debate[44]. There are no reconstruction projects included in the survey project summaries because no such projects were found that made any clear link to peacebuilding. Since the advent of the CPPs there is a greater link between reconstruction and peacebuilding. For example, the Quick Impact Projects in Afghanistan, which largely concern reconstruction, are now part of the UK conflict prevention strategy for that country.

2.16 Peace Processes

The UK government has supported a number of international, national and local peacebuilding initiatives at Track 1, 2 and 3 levels. Depending on the situation, the UK engages in Track 1 processes through the UN, EU, via regional organisations (e.g. African Union) or bilaterally. The UK supported the Facilitator's office under the Lusaka Peace Agreement to promote the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. In Burundi, the UK supported the Arusha process, which led to the creation of a transitional national government and worked with South Africa and Tanzania to secure a ceasefire with rebel groups. The UK's conflict prevention project portfolio 1997–2001 includes several grass roots peacebuilding initiatives via NGOs and conflict networks, some of which are included in the survey project summaries.

2.17 Education and Conflict

The UK government has no stand-alone policy statement on the role of education in conflict reduction, conflict prevention, or peacebuilding. DFID's strategy paper *The challenge of universal primary education* (2001) states; 'Education can be harnessed in conflict prevention, in mitigating the effects of conflict on children, and in reconstructing lives after conflict', and concludes that post-conflict reconstruction should include action to deal with the effects on children of rape, violence, psychological trauma, disability, and the rehabilitation of child combatants and bereavement.

DFID recently commissioned a paper on *Education, Conflict and International Development* (2003), which notes that conflict is undermining the MDG of the achievement of universal primary education by 2015. It also points out that education may be a factor in allowing conflict to take hold because it can be misused to reinforce prejudices. The paper supports the DFID view that there is potential for education to contribute to reconciliation and transformation as a part of post-conflict reconstruction. However, according to DFID, a policy on the relationship between education and conflict has yet to be fully developed.

Education is already considered a part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In Sri Lanka, for example, the UK is investing heavily in the development of primary Maths and English and these projects are included in a reconciliation strategy for Sri Lanka under the heading of fostering social cohesion through education. However, the project documents themselves do not show a clear link between the projects' objectives and peacebuilding.

2.18 Humanitarianism and Peacebuilding

The relationship between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding is not spelt out in UK government documentation. The DFID policy statement *Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian*

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[44] Future evaluations at a strategy level, rather than at programme level, could evaluate the peacebuilding effects of all activities included under the strategy, if the strategy set down appropriate indicators. Currently, indicators tend to be set at the project or programme level. CPP annual reviews are at an early stage of development and do not appear to include clear sets of indicators or reviews of progress against them.

Assistance, 1999 is in practice two statements, one on conflict reduction and one on humanitarian assistance, with little apparent interrelation between the two.

In 1998, DFID committed itself to a 'New humanitarianism', based around ten principles.[45] There is an ongoing debate within the humanitarian community around the impartiality of humanitarian aid. A recent ODI report highlights the main tension: 'The objectives of humanitarian assistance appear to be shifting from providing a palliative to the most vulnerable to embracing conflict reduction and developmental goals. This threatens humanitarian principles: humanitarian decisions are based less on need and more on political and developmental criteria.'[46] Through its ten principles, DFID is restating a commitment to impartiality in its humanitarian response.

While there is no documented link between humanitarian action and peacebuilding, a commitment to impartiality does not prevent UK officials from seeing a connection between the two. Humanitarian action may not have an overt peacebuilding agenda but officials recognise that the provision of humanitarian relief gives the UK influence with host governments when it comes to the longer-term renewal of governance structures or the democratic control of security forces. This has been clearly illustrated by the major humanitarian programme in Afghanistan, including so called Quick Impact Projects, largely short term infrastructure renewal projects, which are seen to contribute to stability and therefore long-term peace. This raises the possibility that the UK may now be seeing humanitarian action more openly as a peacebuilding tool.

2.19 Other Priorities

Other strategic priorities in conflict prevention include:
- *Media*. The role of the media in providing objective information and building understanding.
- *Business and Conflict*. Encouraging international business to behave responsibly in conflict situations
- *Ensuring the international system is more effective in resolving conflicts*. The UK has allocated €581,000 to 'Beyond Brahimi', a review of non-UN actors in all aspects of peace operations using Afghanistan, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone as case studies[47].
- *International Financial Institutions*. According to CHAD, the UK is working with International Financial Institutions on how to build conflict analysis and peacebuilding initiatives into PRSPs.

Examples of projects from both media and business in conflict are included in the survey project summaries.

2.20 Cross-Cutting Themes

The UK government has developed analyses in other thematic areas, which, while not directly peacebuilding focused in themselves, provide a 'lens' with which to understand conflict situations and design peacebuilding activities.

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[45] Summarised in *Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance*

[46] 'Shifting sands: the search for 'coherence' between political and humanitarian responses to complex political emergencies', HPG Report #8, ODI, London by J. Macrae and N Leader (2000).

[47] The report from this study has recently been published. See http://ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/peaceoperationsreview. The report is entitled 'A Review of Peace Operations – A Case for Change' by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at Kings College, London. The report makes almost no mention of peacebuilding per se but emphasises; the need for improved coordination and planning, strengthening of public administration and governance, the need for a robust coordinated approach to the early strengthening of the Rule of Law and the justice sector, and the need for early establishment of the civilian oversight of the security sector. All these themes chime with the current direction of UK policy for post-conflict reconstruction.

2.20.1 *HIV/AIDS*

The UK recognises both that the spread of HIV/AIDS is fuelled by violent conflict and that HIV/AIDS weakens economies and governments' capacity to resolve conflicts. Military/civilian interaction is instrumental in spreading HIV/AIDS. Armed forces are highly mobile, and soldiers are known to solicit commercial sex, and to use rape as a weapon of war. HIV/AIDS is a particular cause for concern in sub-Saharan Africa.

2.20.2 *Human Rights*

The UK government increasingly takes a rights-based approach to conflict. The UK view is that where governments actively promote human rights, conflict is less likely to happen, while in conflict, human rights of all sorts are abused and violated. To quote the Africa Conflict Network briefing series, 'there is no reason why the 'rights-based approach' cannot be implemented even during the worst crises '.

Human rights are a priority for FCO. According to the FCO website, 'The Government … believes that the protection of human rights is key to securing other British interests, including the development of a peaceful, stable and prosperous world in which the UK's global interests can flourish '.

DFID uses a triangular rights framework based on: 1) Participation, involving poor people in decisions that affect them; 2) Inclusion, to ensure that no-one is discriminated against; and 3) Fulfilling obligations, identifying and strengthening those actors responsible for protecting and promoting human rights.

According to DFID, Conflict Assessments can be informed by human rights assessment, itself rooted in international human rights law, International Humanitarian law, refugee law, and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement[48]. Internationally defined rights to health, education and livelihoods provide further background.

2.20.3 *Gender and Conflict*

Gender dimensions of conflict are seen as part of the rights-based approach. The challenge is to ensure that conflict interventions are not gender blind. According to DFID's policy document *Poverty elimination and the empowerment of women*; women and children are frequently those most vulnerable to the effects of conflict; women may be marginalized from decision-making and peacebuilding processes; the majority of displaced people are women and children; women may be forced into sex work and be at greater risk of sexual violence and disease; women continue to play an important role in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.[49]

DFID has been helping the United Nations Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict protect children's rights, including girls vulnerable to abduction and rape, and is working with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to protect women against violence in refugee camps.

2.20.4 *Natural Resources and Livelihoods*

The UK government recognises that conflicts arise over natural resources in two distinct ways:
- wars of resource abundance, including the role played by extractive industries
- wars of resource scarcity, especially control over land and water rights

DFID has a number of projects addressing the underlying causes of wars of abundance but few related to wars of scarcity. For Africa, at least, DFID has decided that restricting the illegal transfers of funds related to oil, timber and diamond sales, especially in exchange for weapons, is the best way to undermine the fuelling of wars of resource abundance.[50] At the

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[48] In 1998, Francis M. Deng, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, presented a set of non-binding 'Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement' to the UN Commission on Human Rights.

[49] DFID's strategy is set out in its target strategy paper – 'Poverty Elimination and the Empowerment of Women', 2000.

[50] The UK is engaged in the Kimberley Process, an international negotiating process at ministerial level aimed at restricting the proceeds from the sales of diamonds extracted by rebel regimes.

same time, the UK is pressing for more transparency from mining and oil companies with regard to the revenues paid to governments.

A DFID Consultation Document *From Better Livelihoods for Poor People: the Role of Land Policy* (2002) states that 'well functioning property rights and land institutions underpin economic development and help reduce corruption and social conflict'. A DFID-funded paper by Kings College[51] found that environmental stress could be an important factor in conflict and that environmental conditions are deteriorating in certain regions. Nevertheless, UK funded activities on this theme appear to be limited. Initiatives aimed at conflicts related to scarcity and environmental degradation are taking a relatively low priority, at least from a CPP perspective.

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[51] Conflict Security and Development Group, *Linkages between Environmental Stress and Conflict*, 2002.

3. VERTICAL CONSISTENCY AND UK STRATEGIES

The guidance for the preparation of this paper requires that 'vertical consistency' be assessed – that is the strength and consistency of the link between donor policy on peacebuilding, strategy to each recipient country, and contents of the country portfolio. In the UK case, this has varied considerably between countries and for individual countries over the study period.

3.1 Vertical Consistency – Bosnia and Sierra Leone compared

DFID commitments to Bosnia for 1996–2001, not including MoD, totalled more than €35 million. Project documents were examined carefully for peacebuilding intent but none was found. In discussion with DFID officials, it was not possible to locate documents that linked the then UK aid programme in Bosnia with peacebuilding. This included the Bosnia Country Strategy Paper. At the same time, in discussion, it was said that 'the whole Bosnia programme was peacebuilding' and one of the infrastructure renewal projects was said to have been important in increasing inter-ethnic harmony. This seems to indicate that DFID had a peacebuilding intent, as part of the international community's post-conflict efforts in Bosnia, but this intent did not filter down either to formal strategy documents or associated projects. (One reconciliation and one demining programme from Bosnia have each been included in the Survey project summaries).

By contrast, Sierra Leone has a clearly developed, emerging, but unpublished, strategy for conflict prevention and project documents that make linkages between UK initiatives, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The UK has invested well over €150 million in Sierra Leone in the past two years. While conflict prevention strategy is clearly set out, the relative contributions to peacebuilding of military reforms, the rehabilitation of combatants, and the reconstruction effort are not examined.

3.2 Vertical consistency and the Conflict Prevention Pools

The issue of how to create vertical consistency has been addressed from 2001 onwards by the CPP strategies. Before 2001, there appears to have been much less overall consistency in the link between policy, strategy and country portfolios, largely because conflict related policies and strategies have only emerged in the last three years.

3.3 Vertical consistency in Target Countries

Table 1 below gives a brief overview of the evolution of a conflict prevention strategy for each of the survey target countries, plus a tentative comment on vertical consistency.

Table 1 – Conflict Prevention Strategy and Vertical Consistency, by Country

Country	Conflict Prevention Strategy	Vertical Consistency
Afghanistan (2001 on)	UK activity relating to Afghanistan before 2001 was largely confined to humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The UK government has made a commitment of some €400 million for 2002–2006. The Global Pool Strategy for Afghanistan emphasises DDR, SSR (army, police, and border guards), anti-narcotics, judicial reform, governance and the rule of law, with substantial humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Currently there is limited material available on peacebuilding but a draft country strategy (still restricted) is in preparation.	Not relevant until 2001. GCPP strategy now in place linking initiatives to the establishment of peace and stability

Consistency high in strategy terms – though many peacebuilding components not yet properly off the ground |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | The DFID Country strategy dated September 2000 makes no reference to peacebuilding. 10 project files examined in detail – no peacebuilding components identified, apart from demining. In the survey period there were substantial investments in development - strengthening government, health, social welfare, privatisation, capital markets. The 2002 Global Pool Strategy for the Balkans, which will cover BiH, is based around a Safety, Security and Justice for All programme. Planning period ended in late 2002. | BiH is included in the Balkans GCPP strategy – at a very early stage. The thrust is consistent with, and drawn directly from, *Safety, Security and Accessible Justice, 2002* |
| Cambodia | Projects focus on poverty reduction in the aftermath of war but not on peacebuilding. DFID Country Strategy Paper of March 2000 has no peacebuilding component. DFID has funded a reconciliation project and supported elections. 3 of the 5 projects included in the survey are demining. There are now questions about whether demining continues to be the best way forward. The UK is not involved in a World Bank led DDR programme. The UK programme is almost entirely with multilaterals. | Conflict and peacebuilding are almost off the UK strategy radar apart from modest grants by the FCO to e.g. a film or reconciliation (€37,000).

Consistency is good in so far as there is almost no peacebuilding aspiration at strategy or project portfolio levels. |
| DRC | There is no DFID Country Strategy Paper for DRC. DRC appears in the UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in sub-Saharan Africa (Africa CP Strategy). The UK has been involved recently in high-level peace initiatives through the UN and EU (undocumented) and grass roots peace initiatives some of which have been reviewed in the project summaries. The strategy paper acknowledges that peace for DRC requires regional action and that the UK has limited knowledge of, or influence with, some of the actors – CAR and Congo Brazzaville. | The UK is taking a multilateral approach to conflict in DRC, which is consistent with its stated approach. Strategy for DRC has evolved significantly in the past year. There is a new emphasis on engaging civil society in peacebuilding |

Country		
Mozambique	Mozambique is seen by the UK as a success story in peacebuilding. The DFID Country Strategy makes no reference to peacebuilding, or even to conflict other than noting the damage formerly done by the war. A list of projects was sent to DFID Mozambique in December 2002 requesting further information on peacebuilding content but no reply was received)	No conflict prevention or peacebuilding strategy in evidence besides long running demining assistance. Considerable support for improving governance, though not specifically peacebuilding related.
Rwanda	DFID Country Strategy Paper of September 1999 refers to resolution of disputes, building stability and national reconciliation. The Africa CPP strategy includes the key priority for the UK government to influence Ugandan and Rwandan governments directly to ensure that they engage constructively in peace processes in the region.	Strategy now tied into Africa CPP Great Lakes Strategy. The UK contribution to Rwanda has grown substantially over the past two years. The entire current £35 million DFID support to Rwanda is aimed at peacebuilding.
Sierra Leone	No official DFID country strategy but unpublished strategy documents from 1998 onwards set out a comprehensive peacebuilding approach based around governance, SSR, DDR, police reform, and law development. The UK has been the major donor, and in some sectors the only one. The UK continues to provide 80% plus of the personnel for most of International Military Advisory Training Team.	Consistency high, with evolving strategy well documented in files – but not publicly available.
Sri Lanka	The DFID Country Strategy Paper 1999, while acknowledging that an end to conflict was key to poverty reduction, has an entirely development/poverty reduction agenda and no initiatives on conflict. Following a Conflict Assessment and the advent of the Global CPP, a peace and reconciliation strategy has been developed by DFID (London, Bangkok and Reconciliation Adviser, Colombo), FCO and MoD, which now forms the Global Pool Strategy for Sri Lanka (restricted). The strategy emphasises influencing donors to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches, strengthening institutions to monitor and strengthen human rights, DDR, education with curriculum supporting social harmony, and assistance to IDPs.	Appears to be a significant shift from low consistency (solve conflict through traditional development programmes) to high consistency with GCPP strategy. However, projects covering major investment in education do not make links to the strategy or the role played by education in peacebuilding.

Sudan	UK strategy paper in draft. Until early 2002, the UK was engaged with humanitarian assistance, support to grass roots church-based reconciliation, return of abductees, and funding to the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Secretariat. A much fuller engagement in IGAD and funding to peace-related activities has followed Clare Short's visit in Jan 2002 and international pressure on parties. Papers include an unpublished Conflict Strategy 2000 (internal) updated in 2002, and a public Outline Approach paper (Nov 2002), prefiguring a peace agreement which covers: continued humanitarian assistance, monitoring the Nuba mountains ceasefire; supporting peace process (follow up to Machakos); and persuading others to get involved. After a peace agreement, the UK will support constitutional reform, recovery and stabilisation, return and reintegration, economic development and debt relief. The FCO has a small grants peacebuilding fund via the embassy in Khartoum and the Nairobi BHC. FCO houses a joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit.	During the study period, the UK held to its line that its development projects would not be sustainable while there was no peace agreement. There is now a UK strategy under the ACPP.

Also included in the Survey

Africa Regional	Initiatives involving activities in more than one country. Until 2002, there was no UK strategy for conflict-affected countries in Africa. In the Survey, activities have been included which cover the whole of Africa, Great Lakes region, East Africa, and the OAU.	The Causes of Conflict in SSA publication provides a broad overview of UK thinking. It has been followed-up by more detailed UK strategy for CP in Africa which is updated on a six monthly basis under the ACPP.
Non Country Specific	These are generally projects initiated by CHAD and often linked to thematic strategies – small arms, conflict assessment methods, business in conflict, development of methodologies, conflict related information initiatives etc.	SALW, SSR, work with the UN system and the EU all now have their own GCCP strategy papers.

4.   ORGANISATION AND COORDINATION IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

4.1   Conflict Prevention Pools

4.1.1   Developments since 2001

The CPPs are so called because the funds were established by a pooling of DFID, FCO and MoD budgets and expertise. The Treasury tops up both CPPs annually[52]. The Africa fund has been set at £50m (€75m) per year for the next 3 years and the Global fund at £60 million (€90m), £73 million (€110m) and £78 million (€118m). (The Global Pool is approximately £74 (€110) million in 2002/3 because of a £30m rebate from UNPROFOR).

The Pools fund Strategies agreed between ministries, each with a Strategy Manager. The Cabinet Office provides inter-ministerial coordination.[53] There is one overall UK Conflict Prevention Strategy for Africa and fourteen separate Strategies for the Global CPP.

The development of strategies for drawing on the Pools requires the integration of some or all of defence, development, foreign policy, law enforcement and, in theory, trade perspectives into the formulation of a comprehensive approach.

The DFID Secretary of State's report to the Chairs of UK Parliamentary Select Committees of May 2002 states that the CPPs have resulted in improved interdepartmental policy cooperation, better policy analysis and implementation, and a stronger UK contribution to international (conflict prevention) efforts.

The three ministries appear to have gone to considerable efforts to make the Conflict Prevention Fund mechanism work. The CPPs appear to be a genuinely novel way for the government to do business[54]. Most of those interviewed seemed to view the joint funds as an innovative and holistic approach, despite challenges in implementation. It has taken time for modalities to be sorted, strategies to be developed and for the process to 'shake down'. Tensions can arise over differences in priority – for example, the MoD focus on security will not always marry up with DFID's poverty focus. While sub-Saharan Africa is DFID's top priority for poverty reduction, it is not high on MoD's security agenda, for which bilateral defence assistance to eliminate instability in the former Warsaw Pact and former Yugoslavia is currently the key goal.

The criteria for selected strategy areas are:
- where there is a strong UK interest in preventing conflict or improving the international community's ability to tackle conflict
- where the UK could expect to have an impact
- where government departments participating in the pool have a common interest.

The Pools exist to fund activities that require joint strategy between the ministries. Conflict prevention activities that do not require this coordination are funded from outside the Pools – for example Humanitarian Mine Action. As a result, the Pool budgets are not a guide to the total UK funding to conflict reduction, prevention and peacebuilding and probably represent less then 50 per cent of the total UK spend on conflict prevention. 'Big ticket' items such as post-conflict reconstruction tend to be funded from outside the Pools.

Peacekeeping is also covered by the Conflict Prevention Pools but as a separate budget. The Pools contribute to the cost of the UK assessed and non-assessed contributions to support UN and other peace keeping and peace-enforcement operations. Peacekeeping costs are unpredictable and may have a knock-on effect on peacebuilding budgets. For example, the 2001 peacekeeping budget for Africa was set at £52 million but final expenditure was £79

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[52] What the Treasury refers to as 'headroom'.

[53] These are the Sub-committee on Conflict Prevention outside sub-Saharan Africa and the Sub-committee on Conflict Prevention in sub-Saharan Africa, both under the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy.

[54] The interministerial nature of the funds is said to have influenced the thinking of other governments (inc. the G8) on peace support.

million.

The CPP strategies are the subject of annual reviews. These provide some ongoing feedback in one to two pages per strategy on what has and has not worked in the previous year. Some of the 2001/2 reviews are very 'up-beat' about the positive progress made, for example on SALW. This annual review system would need to be greatly strengthened to make a full evaluation of the effectiveness of CPPs possible.

Discussions with officials across the three relevant Departments highlighted some implementation issues:
- While there is one UK strategy for conflict prevention in Africa, there is no one cohesive strategy for rest of the world. In response, regions are moving to develop regional strategies – hence DFID is to recruit a Senior Conflict Advisor for Asia.
- There appears to be considerable carry over of thematic priorities from the pre CPP era into the current strategies.
- Some strategies contain far more joined-up thinking than others, a key determining factor being the level of understanding and trust between strategy team members from the different ministries.
- Programmes are agreed for strategies for a two to three year period. Budgets for strategies were set year by year but can now be set for two years – even three years is a short time frame to see significant peacebuilding outcomes.
- There is an ongoing debate about whether fluctuations in peacekeeping budgets should impinge on the conflict prevention budgets.
- There is no computerised project management system or common database of financial allocations within strategies. Those funded by DFID appear in its PRISM system, otherwise information is held on individual, unrelated spreadsheets.

The Terms of Reference for an external evaluation of the operation of both CPPs have recently been drawn up and the contract awarded. The evaluation, to be completed by the end of 2003, could usefully examine the issues listed above.

4.1.2 Global Conflict Prevention Priorities

The Global 'Pool' is jointly managed by the three ministries and led by the FCO. The current Thematic and Geographic Strategies are:

Thematic[55]
- SSR – to reduce the risk of conflict by helping to bring security organisations, such as the police and armed forces, under democratic civilian control. By providing advice on up to date training methods, the strategy aims to reduce the potential for human rights abuses in the security sector.
- SALW – to facilitate the implementation of international agreements through practical control and reduction programmes, to strengthen international efforts to build consensus and agree standards on small arms proliferation and to conduct research and analysis.
- Strengthening the UN – to work with UN bodies to improve their global capacity and performance and to help improve the capacity of states to contribute effective troops to peacekeeping operations.
- OSCE and Council of Europe – to enhance the quality of OSCE mission personnel, to promote stable electoral processes and to enhance the OSCE capacity to promote the rule of law and order.

Geographic
- Afghanistan – to help post-Taliban Afghanistan achieve democratic and representational government in an environment free from the threat of conflict, with accountable security structures controlled by the centrally elected government.
- Balkans – to avert further wars by supporting security sector reform, improving

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[55] A strategy on EU Civilian Crisis Management has been discontinued.

- access to justice, strengthening democracy and inter-ethnic relations and fighting organised crime.
- Belize/Guatemala – to reduce the likelihood of future conflict by making a significant contribution to a settlement of the long-standing border dispute between the two countries.
- Central and Eastern Europe – to promote security sector reform and strengthen democratic institutions, to reduce tensions between national minorities and ethnic groups and to bolster the rule of law.
- Indonesia and East Timor – to tackle underlying factors that contribute to conflict, such as ethnic tensions and the lack of accountability in the security sector.
- Middle and Near East – to increase the chances of peace agreements being reached and implemented by involving non-traditional actors and promoting confidence-building measures between Palestinians and Israelis and to make countries more secure through security sector reform.
- Russia and the Former Soviet Union – some countries are at serious risk from instability, outbreaks of violence and civil unrest. The strategy aims to reduce the potential for renewed outbreaks of fighting by helping to develop civil society; to reduce ethnic, inter-communal, political and religious tensions; to reform and improve the accountability of the armed forces; and to reduce tensions over natural resources.
- South Asia – to contribute to the resolution of civil conflicts in the region and the prevention of international conflict by engaging with governments, the military and civil society. (This strategy has recently been broken down into three - India and Pakistan; Sri Lanka; Nepal).

4.1.3   Africa Conflict Prevention Priorities

The joint DFID/FCO/MoD Public Service Agreement 2003–2006 targets for sub-Saharan Africa states: 'By 2006, DFID, FCO and MoD, with others, will work to (i) resolve existing violent conflicts and prevent new conflicts in priority countries and regions including Sierra Leone, Great Lakes, Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria (Ivory Coast has recently been added to this list); (ii) address the national and regional causes of conflict by strengthening local conflict management including through security sector reform and improving peace support capacity; (iii) improve the international community's response to conflict by mobilising and supporting coherent bilateral and international action and tackling the economic and financial causes of conflict.'

The 2002–3 thematic focus of conflict prevention in Africa is on:
- reform of the security and justice sectors
- building African peacekeeping capacity
- constitutional and democratic development, including support to elections
- strengthening NGOs and other civil society institutions involved in peacebuilding and reconciliation
- research into peacebuilding
- media promoting peaceful solutions.

UK conflict prevention geographic priorities for Africa are as summarised above.

4.2   Conflict Assessment Methodology

DFID recognizes the need for improved links between conflict reduction and its country strategies.[56] A Conflict Assessment methodology has been developed over the past three years through field-testing and is now seen as a key tool in analysing the causes of conflict within DFID's ongoing country programmes. Conflict Assessments have been carried out in ten countries,[57] with the methodology being refined over time. DFID published *Conducting*

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[56] During the survey period, DFID country strategies were set out in Country Strategy Papers, now superseded by Country Assistance Strategies.
[57] Sri Lanka, Uganda, Nigeria, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Moldova, Kyrgyztan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan.

Conflict Assessments in January 2002. (The development of the conflict assessment methodology is included in the survey project summaries.)

In summary, the steps in the Conflict Assessment methodology are:
1. *Conflict Analysis*: analysis of the complex combination of structural factors underlying conflict (security, political, economic and social dimensions) and actors influencing and affected by conflict.
2. *Analysis of International Responses*: mapping the policies and responses of international actors on the political and aid front and the interaction between the two.
3. *Developing Strategies and Options*: e.g. working with FCO and MoD on joint approaches, working with belligerent parties to seek resolution and developing specific peacebuilding strategies and programmes that are more conflict sensitive.

Conflict assessments commissioned by regional departments have been specifically designed to address the issues raised by country offices and integrate the findings within country planning, including how to engage with other key agencies to better address each conflict. Conflicts differ in nature – their causes, duration, severity, and the phase during which the assessment is made. A recent DFID study on Poverty Reduction Strategies[58] states that appropriate responses to conflict will fall into two categories, depending on their character. Countries with ongoing widespread conflict require support for peace processes and continuing emergency relief, while those with only localised conflict or in transition from conflict can start on reconstruction and longer-term development. In some cases PRSPs may be explicitly part of the peacebuilding process.

It is reported that there are multiple donor conflict assessment tools, some of them stimulated by the work of DFID. There may well be scope for the harmonisation of these approaches within the Utstein group and more widely.

4.3   CHAD and Mainstreaming of Conflict

CHAD[59] has a complement of more than 40 staff, organised into:
- *Global Issues and Institutions* – deals with partnerships with international crisis and humanitarian organisations; UN Conflict Management System, European Relations, Refugees & Migration.
- *Humanitarian Programme* – deals with DFID's response to rapid onset crises. Humanitarian Response to disasters and prolonged emergencies: international humanitarian policy and systems, disaster reduction, mine action and civil-military relations
- *Conflict and Security Policy* – deals with the Global Conflict Pool (under FCO coordination), conflict policy, conflict assessment, security sector reform, small arms and light weapons, and arms export control.

The 26-strong CHAD Operations Team[60] is run by Crown Agents under sub-contract to DFID,

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[58] From 'National Poverty Reduction Strategies in Conflict-Affected Countries', DFID/Overseas Development Institute, 2002, Powerpoint presentation.
Countries still engaged in widespread conflict:
- Diplomatic/financial support to peace process & other peace building initiatives; continuation of emergency relief
- Starting a dialogue on poverty with key reformers in and outside of government & supporting elements who can exert pressure for change

Countries in localised conflict or in transition out of conflict:
- Post-conflict admin is going to need both short term priorities for reconstruction & a vision for longer term development. PRSP process should build on & facilitate this
- Donors should ensure that PRSP is coherent with other processes of political reform & peace building e.g. I-PRSP as possible national recovery strategy
- PRSP an opportunity for building the 'basics'.

[59] See also CHAD's Policy and Resource Plan 2001/2 in Appendix 4.
[60] CHAD Operations Team delivers a service to CHAD, including assessing disasters and crises, monitoring information on needs, making recommendations to CHAD's humanitarian programmes team on appropriate responses, and deploying staff to CHAD field offices in major crises to provide advice and information from the ground.

providing crisis response capabilities.

From 1997–2001, conflict related funding from DFID to the UN Secretariat, UN agencies, the EU and to other implementing partners was largely managed from within CHAD. Since then, the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Pools has brought a wider participation by ministries in the funding of conflict prevention. One implication is that CHAD advisors are now working closely with the FCO, as the manager of the Global CPP. DFID, through CHAD, has the management of the SALW and SSR strategies. The Afghanistan strategy is led by FCO, with CHAD heavily involved in implementation. CHAD also has management on behalf of FCO of the EU Civil Crisis Management Strategy and the UK Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Strategy.

There has been a shift to decentralise the management of conflict related programmes and to 'mainstream' conflict analysis into regional and country-based strategies and programmes. CHAD has passed responsibility for many of its conflict reduction projects to DFID geographic departments. More regional and country offices are taking the initiative in conflict related programming.[61]

4.4   Africa Conflict Team

In DFID London, the Africa and Great Lakes and Horn Department has recently set up the Africa Conflict Team (now with four posts), which coordinates the Africa Conflict Network, a forum for conflict issues for some 20 DFID advisors, desk and regional staff members from the Governance Department, CHAD, and from Africa. The Conflict Team maintains the Africa Conflict Network Intranet, which includes the Africa Conflict Network briefing paper series, a user-friendly summary of DFID's approach to conflict prevention.[62] The Africa Policy Department provides advisory inputs to the conflict team.

4.5   Defence Advisory Team

The Defence Advisory Team (DAT) is an interministerial team based at the Defence Academy of the UK. DAT provides a mobile team of 10-plus defence, military and governance advisers, which conducts defence management assessment and provides support programmes, including training, normally to military personnel. DFID has a governance advisor permanently seconded to DAT, while the team leader comes from the Directorate of Policy and Planning, MoD. Good governance and democratic accountability are the guiding principles in its SSR activities, including defence reviews, financial management and civil-military relations. The DAT is funded from the GCPP SSR Strategy.

4.6   Global Facilitation Network

A new initiative under the GCCP is the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform managed by a team of academics and practitioners at Cranfield University's Shrivenham campus as a resource for the UK Government as well as other global institutional, organisational, and government partners. It provides research on policy development and capacity building for global SSR initiatives[63].

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[61] DFID's international programme is managed from London, and from regional and country offices. Of the countries covered by the UK for the Utstein Survey, all are managed from London apart from Sri Lanka and Cambodia (from the regional office in Bangkok) and Mozambique from the DFID country office in Maputo.

[62] See http://insight/acn

[63] See also www.gfn-ssr.org

4.7 Conflict Prevention Budgets

Financing arrangements have changed significantly with the introduction of the two CPPs. It is, however, likely that conflict reduction activities will continue to be funded from a variety of sources. There has been uncertainty and some dispute within government over what can and cannot be funded from the Pools but a set of Eligibility Criteria was recently agreed by the three ministries (March 2003). One interviewee raised the question of 'backwash', where departments might cut budgets in one area in the expectation that in future the same activities could be funded from one of the Pools.

In DFID, peacebuilding activities have been funded from budgets held by CHAD, geographical departments and from the Civil Society Challenge Fund (formerly the Joint Funding Scheme), reserved for funding to non-government organisations. The FCO funds Human Rights projects from a separate budget unrelated to CPPs. Grants are normally between £10-£25,000 (€15-37,500) but can be more than £50,000 (€75,000). According to the FCO Human Rights Policy Department, these projects cover rule of law, prison reform, child rights, women's rights, freedom of information etc. but not peacebuilding or conflict prevention per se. (One FCO HR project was included in the survey database.)[64]

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[64] Because these projects are relatively small and only limited information was available, none of the FCO projects has been included in the Survey project summaries.

5. PARTNERSHIPS

The UK government is reliant on implementing partners for the delivery of its conflict reduction, including governments, armed forces, police and civil society actors, both in country, regional, multilateral and UK-based international agencies.

5.1   United Nations and International Agencies

Since 1997, the UK has come to regard the UN as an increasingly important partner. Strengthening key agencies within the UN system is seen by the UK government as a key to achieving its poverty reduction goals, and is one of the Global CPP strategies. This is part of a move to make the UK aid programme less bilateral.

DFID's main tool for managing its relationships with UN and other international agencies is the Institutional Strategy Paper (ISP). Over the past four years, 25 ISPs have been drawn up with multilateral agencies to provide them with core funding as part of an agreed institutional development plan. The ISP appears to provide an effective means for the UK to influence the direction and reform processes.[65] Current ISPs relevant to conflict prevention include OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR, and UNICEF, plus the ICRC and International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Societies.

The UK support to the UN is governed to a large extent by treaty obligations on contributions to the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets. Through ISPs and other less formal agreements the UK government aims to improve the efficiency and efficacy of the UN and help it fulfill the mandates for which the UK has voted in the UN Security Council or General Assembly, so that UK taxpayers' money reaches the intended beneficiaries and political and development objectives are met.

Partnerships critical to conflict prevention include:
- UNDP is a key partner for a number of conflict prevention related programmes, including humanitarian mine action and DDR. The UK is providing £37 million (€55m) in core funding and £5 million (€7.5m) in non-core funding to UNDP each year across all programmes[66]. According to CHAD, the UK is investing in the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery as part of a carefully designed, and monitored, strategy to strengthen UNDP.
- The UN Secretariat Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is an important partner, especially for the implementation of the Brahimi Report on International Peace Support Operations (2000). The UK set aside £1m per year for DPA[67].
- FCO has a programme with the European Council to increase the EU ability to help prevent conflict by enhancing early warning systems and improving co-operation with the UN.
- According to CHAD, the UK is working with the World Bank/IMF to integrate peacebuilding into longer-term development processes, particularly the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
- NATO is a key partner for FCO and MoD, especially in relation to 1) the Outreach programme, promoting peace in Central and Eastern Europe (particularly Russia) and the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia and 2) the Partnership for Peace programme which provides for military cooperation with NATO's 28 Partner nations outside NATO.

These partnerships, in line with the ISPs, are aimed at strengthening the means of delivery rather than funding specific projects.

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[65] While individual ISPs have been evaluated, there has been no overall evaluation of the ISP system. Tying well-thought-through institutional reforms to DFID funding should give DFID the opportunity to 'punch above its weight' in influencing the direction of institutional development in these agencies. An assessment of whether this is the case or not could prove valuable.

[66] According to a DFID Departmental report to the UK Parliament, 'UNDP has embarked on an ambitious and wide-ranging reform programme which seeks to sharpen the focus of UNDP's programmes, to improve the quality of its Resident Coordinators and to develop its results-based management system'.

[67] This contribution has been suspended pending a detailed proposal from DPA on the use of these funds.

5.2 Civil Society

The government recognises that civil society organisations, such as religious groups, traditional organisations and NGOs are often effective in promoting dialogue and reconciliation between parties in conflict. According to DFID's Governance Target Strategy Paper 2001, civil society groups can be effective in enhancing the participation of marginalized groups and acting as a balance to an intrusive state.

The larger NGOs are relatively sophisticated in their policy analysis and engage in a two-way policy influencing process with the UK government. UK NGOs can be grouped into conflict NGOs (e.g. International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Saferworld) and humanitarian relief and development NGOs (e.g. Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children). NGOs have access to the project funding from the Civil Society Challenge Fund and the larger agencies receive longer-term funding through Programme Partnership Agreements managed by the DFID Information and Civil Society Department.[68] FCO and DFID geographical desks also fund NGOs directly (including NGOs based outside the UK).

CHAD is currently pressing the main conflict NGOs to make stronger links between their conflict work and poverty, including making connections to the PSA/SDA targets and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is also in discussion with the major development NGOs on strengthening the links between conflict and their development programming. The NGOs themselves are conscious that they could be extracting more learning from their development experience in conflict areas and are taking initiatives to do so[69].

Interaction between UK civil society and government appears to be relatively open as compared with some other European countries, where, according to other Utstein researchers, NGOs see their humanitarian role as ideologically separate from that of government. As a result, there is less open debate.

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[68] How ICSD factors peacebuilding into these agreements has not been investigated.

[69] The idea of a workshop for an exchange of learning between NGOs on the links between development and conflict was floated but postponed till later in the year when the NGOs have completed a fuller analysis. Any future workshop will be managed by CHAD.

6. DISCUSSION

6.1 Missing Links to Peacebuilding

According to Chakrabarti,[70] DFID official statistics for 2001 show that only 3 per cent of expenditure was categorised as Conflict Handling (a DFID 'Policy Information Marker' used in classifying PRISM data). Many UK funded programmes cannot be attributed to peacebuilding, even if they were conceived as such at some stage in the planning process. As Chakrabarti also found, 'In most cases, such (development) efforts are being undertaken without any direct relation to conflict, thereby giving the impression that only a small proportion of development assistance is spent on conflict related activities'.[71] The same could be said for humanitarian projects, though as noted above, the recent reconstruction activity in Afghanistan is more explicitly related to peacebuilding.

During 1999/2000, DFID developed several Country Strategy Papers, including those for Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique. In setting the strategy context, these papers make reference to armed conflict as profoundly damaging to infrastructure and livelihoods and then move on directly to a development agenda, in particular how the Millennium Development Goals are to be met. The papers read as if the job of peacebuilding is either over or no longer relevant for the UK. Given that the conflict in Mozambique is a decade old, it is perhaps not surprising that peacebuilding is apparently low on the agenda but for Bosnia and Cambodia, this was unexpected.

The links between conflict prevention (including peacebuilding) strategies and projects does seem to have been tightened up significantly since the advent of the CPPs. However, with the high profile of the CPPs, it is easy to forget that many conflict related activities are not connected to the Pools (see below). It would be interesting to look back in two to three years time to see the extent to which the intended peacebuilding impacts of current development, humanitarian and recovery activities in conflict affected areas were articulated.

6.2 Conflict Prevention Pools

Since its establishment in 2001, the Conflict Prevention Pool mechanism requires a clearer articulation of conflict prevention strategies than before, at least for those areas covered by the Pools. At the same time, the Strategies are providing ongoing funding to legacy projects that would probably still be funded by their originating department if the Global Pools had not been established. From discussions with those involved with the Pools, the greatest benefit may be coming, at least at this stage, from government departments being obliged to strategise together, even where activities continue to be project managed by one department.

Interviews inside and outside government indicated that some implementing partners might feel shut out of the conflict policy dialogue, as officials have concentrated on the process of making the interministerial CPP dialogue and joint-strategising work. Some officials are aware of this. While some areas, such as SALW have brought NGOs into the strategy development process, there may be a need for closer working between the ministries to bring outside actors more fully into others. As noted above, the government needs to draw on the strengths of NGOs and other contractors for conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives, especially those aimed at community level. In DFID, closer collaboration between CHAD, the Africa Conflict Team and the Information and Civil Society Department is required to present a coherent view of what DFID is looking for from its partners working in conflict and peacebuilding.

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[70] Chakrabarti, *op cit*
[71] Chakrabarti, *op cit*

6.3   Conditions for Peace or Peacebuilding?

In general, the UK strategies seem to be aimed at creating the conditions in which peace, and hence development, can take root. The strategies reviewed in this paper are focused on creating a secure and stable environment for peace, and less on the making of peace. This may seem like a fine distinction but has implications for achieving the end goals of security and sustainable development. As a DFID Governance department document on post-conflict reconstruction reflected, 'Perhaps the UK government analysis is far better on creating the conditions in which peace can flourish than on building peace?' [72]

6.4   Evaluating Partnerships

The UK has placed considerable weight on the delivery of its conflict prevention objectives via a variety of institutional partners. The UK government's emphasis (especially in DFID) on making multilateralism work has led to a mutual dependence with the major partners for the delivery of conflict prevention objectives, including peacebuilding.

The relationship with these institutions is assessed through ISP reviews, Output to Purpose Reviews (OPRs) and other forms of evaluation. Individual partnerships are reviewed and the UK is now undertaking a review of the comparative effectiveness of its different institutions.

Given the level of investment in major institutions, especially the UN, this is clearly important. Much of the UK commitment to the UN system is not voluntary and is driven by treaty obligations. The UK does not have the latitude to simply switch, for example, to greater NGO funding as an alternative funding route. The UK view is that the UN has the mandate, the remit, the legitimacy, the legality and the international consent to continue to be a key player in crisis situations. While it has strengths and weaknesses, if it can be helped to perform better, this is likely to have an important impact.

However, whether investments in the UN are value for money compared with alternative partnerships is yet to be established. DFID's International Division has some work in hand on the comparative effectiveness of different international institutions. A possible question for further consideration is whether inefficiencies in the UN system are at a scale where other delivery mechanisms should be considered as alternatives to some of the non-mandatory aspects of UN funding.

6.5   Linking Strategy to Peacebuilding

It is clear that the links between various UK government conflict prevention strategies (whether predating, inside and outside Global Pool funding) have more or less well-articulated links to peacebuilding.

Figure 3 is based on the consultant's assessment of how well these links seem to have been made. It is offered simply as a way of stimulating debate about how to improve strategy development and express the linkages between strategy and activity – not as an assessment of how effective any one strategy might be in building peace.

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[72] From *Post Conflict Reconstruction: Key Issues in Governance*, Preliminary Discussion Paper, DFID Governance Department, April 2002

Figure 2 - Clarity of the Link between Peacebuilding and current UK main conflict reduction/prevention themes
(shown by the proximity of the topic box to peacebuilding)

APPENDIX 1 – GUIDELINES ON NATIONAL PAPER

From Project Manager, Oslo Peace Research Institute

(Provided by the project manager with a request that these should be taken into account in the preparation of the National paper rather than to be used as a fixed format)

The project/activities portfolio:

How important are projects in the donor's policies?
Checking against survey categories, are there evident patterns as to what is included and what is left out?
Are there changes with the passage of time (e.g. policy changes, more frequent use of peacebuilding concepts and terminology, shifts in the projects/activities)?

Statistical Overview

To the degree possible…

Consistency

Is there a general vertical consistency (donor policy on peace building>strategy to recipient country>overall portfolio>project selection)?
Is there horizontal consistency (with other donors, between agencies)?

Evaluations

Is project information stored in a way that facilitates retrieval (consistent categories) and presented in a way that facilitates evaluation (criteria, benchmarks, targets)?

Institutional relationships

How is coordination with other donor country government departments?
How many department/ministries are responsible for projects in the survey?
How are relationships with donor institutions with implementing agencies and project partners?

APPENDIX 2 - KEY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

Published Policy Papers
Public Service Agreement and Service Delivery Agreement, 2001-4 and 2003-6
The Causes of Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, DFID/FCO/MoD, October 2001
Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance, DFID, 2000
Conducting Conflict Assessments, Guidance Notes, DFID Jan 2002
Making Government Work for Poor People – Building State Capacity, DFID September 2001
Justice and Poverty Reduction, Safety Security and Access to Justice for All, DFID, 2000
Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, DFID/FCO/MoD, 2002
Small Arms and Light Weapons, A Policy Briefing, DFID/FCO/MoD, May 2002
Safety Security and Accessible Justice, Putting Policy Into Practice, DFID, July 2002
DFID Human Rights Target Strategy Paper, October 2000
DFID's Conflict Reduction Policy, 1999
UK Strategy for Conflict Prevention in sub-Saharan Africa 2002 (Restricted)
Poverty elimination and the empowerment of women, DFID, 2000

Other
FCO, 2001/02, *Policy on Africa, The UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa*
DFID Governance Department, April 2002, *Post Conflict Reconstruction: Key Issues in Governance*, Preliminary Discussion Paper
Poverty and the Security Sector, 1999
Background briefing: Humanitarian Mine Action, second progress report, Sept 2000
Smith, Alan, & Tony Vaux (Jan 2003), *Education, Conflict and International Development*,
November 2002 Consultation Document *From Better Livelihoods for Poor People: the Role of Land Policy*
The Challenge of Universal Primary Education, DFID, 2001
FCO Human Rights and Conflict Report 2002
Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa (draft), Africa Policy Department, 2003
Outline Approach for UK engagement in a Peaceful Sudan, 2003
Chakrabarti, Dr Indranil, DFID (2002), *Compiling Lessons about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*, Discussion Paper for the Evaluation Department

Ministerial speeches
Fatchett, Derek, FCO Minister of State (8 January 1998), 'Creating and Expanding Opportunities for Preventing Conflict',
Short, Clare, Secretary of State for International Development (2 November 1999), 'Conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding – from rhetoric to reality', , International Alert,
Short, Clare, (15 April 1999), 'Safety, Security and Accessible Justice',Royal Holloway College
Short, Clare, (3 May 2000), 'DFID promoting corporate initiatives to build peace and eliminate poverty',Lancaster House

APPENDIX 3 – SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWEES

- ❑ Anna Wilde, Assistant Governance Adviser, Governance Department, DFID
- ❑ Garth Glentworth, Senior Governance Adviser Governance Department, DFID
- ❑ Roy Trivedy, Africa Conflict Adviser, Africa Greater Horn and Lakes Department, DFID
- ❑ Melinda Simmons, Team Manager, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), DFID
- ❑ Simon Wood, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention Section, UN Department, FCO
- ❑ Tom Porteous, Conflict Management Advisor, FCO
- ❑ Paul Rimmer, Assistant Director, Overseas Secretariat, sub Saharan Africa and Asia Pacific, MoD
- ❑ David Murtagh, Deputy Director, Eastern Europe, MoD
- ❑ Lt Col Rupert Wieloch, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, MoD, Shrivenham
- ❑ Steven Nally, Information and Civil Society Department, DFID
- ❑ Bernard Harborne, Senior Conflict Adviser on Africa, DFID
- ❑ Rosie Bairwal, Conflict Programme Officer, Africa Greater Horn and Lakes Department, DFID
- ❑ Andy Willson, Programme Officer, Humanitarian Policy and Mines, CHAD, DFID
- ❑ Sarah Richards, Team Manager, CHAD, DFID
- ❑ Toby Sexton, Programme Officer, UN Conflict Prevention UNDP, CHAD, DFID
- ❑ Rod Evans, Senior Governance Advisor, Defence Advisory Team, Shrivenham
- ❑ Nigel Fuller, Head of Defence Advisory Team, MoD, Shrivenham
- ❑ Tim Randall, Programme Officer, Disaster Management Centre, Shrivenham
- ❑ Tim Lardner, Operations Manager, Cranfield Mine Action, Shrivenham
- ❑ Tim Whiting, Head of Section (covering Sudan), Africa Great Lakes and Horn Department
- ❑ Jo Moir, Sudan Programme Manager, FCO/DFID Sudan Unit
- ❑ Chris Athayde, Programme Manager Cambodia, DFID SE Asia
- ❑ Alan Holmes, Head of DFID Office, Sarajevo
- ❑ Malcolm Worboys, Deputy Programme Manager (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia), Central and South East Europe Department, DFID
- ❑ Simon Ray, former head of Central and South East Europe Department, DFID
- ❑ Laurie Lee, Afghanistan Programme Manager, Western Asia Department, DFID
- ❑ David Scott, Programme Manager, Sierra Leone, West Africa Department, DFID
- ❑ Charlie Whetham, Deputy Programme Manager, SSR and DDR Programmes, West Africa Department, DFID
- ❑ Matthew Lesslar, Programme Officer, West Africa Department, DFID
- ❑ Alistair Craib, consultant and evaluator for DFID CHAD on mine action
- ❑ Daniel Jarman, Programme Support Officer, Humanitarian Programmes, CHAD
- ❑ Clare Harkin, Senior Civil/Military Affairs Adviser, CHAD
- ❑ Robert Watt, Programme Manager (Small Arms), CHAD
- ❑ Debi Duncan, Senior Conflict Reduction Adviser, CHAD
- ❑ Maggie di Maio, Civil Society Challenge Fund Programme Officer, Information and Civil Society Department, DFID
- ❑ Martin Honeywell, Deputy Director, International Alert
- ❑ Paul Eavis, Director, Saferworld
- ❑ Richard Rumsey, Head of Programme Funding, World Vision (telecom)
- ❑ Ed Cairns, Policy Department and Maurice Herson, Humanitarian Department, Oxfam GB (telecom)
- ❑ Nick Branch, Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention Section, UN Department, FCO
- ❑ Michael Mosselmans, Head of CHAD, DFID

APPENDIX 4 – CHAD KEY OBJECTIVES 2001/2

CONFLICT REDUCTION OBJECTIVES	VITAL SUCCESS INDICATORS [LONGER TERM & SYSTEM - WIDE]	KEY INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS [SPECIFICALLY FOR CHAD IN 2001/02]
C1. Promoting social cohesiveness and inclusion.	⇒ Increased active Governments and groups in civil es and practices that reduce	C1.1 Further develop and pilot methodologies for conflict analysis and 'peace and conflict impact assessment' in DFID supported programmes and institutions. C1.2 Advise and assist Regional Departments to develop and operationalise country-level and regional conflict reduction strategies as integral part of their programmes. C1.3 Progress practical strategies and programmes on role of business, media, and women in peacebuilding.
C2. Improving the international machinery for dispute settlement and conflict prevention.	⇒ Increased coherence and ss of international efforts.	C2.1 Progress agreed programmes with UN Secretariat to help improve the UN system's capacity to anticipate, respond to, and mitigate conflict. C2.2 Encourage effective implementation of Brahimi's peacekeeping recommendations, alongside FCO and MoD. C2.3 Develop co-operation and capacity building programmes with selected regional organisations, especially in Africa in support of APED and Africa RDs. C2.4 Work alongside FCO in strengthening international mechanisms for developing and implementing better targeted sanctions. C2.5 Continue to promote sharper focus to role of DAC and G8 in relation to conflict management. C2.6 Encourage development of effective new crisis management mechanisms in the EC.
C3. Limiting the means of waging war.	⇒ Reduced inappropriate ure, and reduced proliferation, l arms and landmines.	C3.1 Preparation for, and successful 2001 UN Conference. C3.2 Progress global Small Arms Reduction Programme agreed with Saferworld, and develop stronger links with UNDDA and other international agencies. C3.3 Continue to develop understanding and programmes on economic and other incentives and disincentives in relation to Conflict. C3.4 Continue to advocate enhanced policy on arms export licensing, especially with EU partners, and UK legislation on arms brokering. C3.5 Initiate new 4-year cycle of the Humanitarian Mines Action Programme.
C4. Reforming the security sector	⇒ Reduced threats from armed cy and human rights	C4.1 Take forward programme with the Conflict, Security and Development Group at CDS, Kings College. C4.2 Advise and assist to develop and operationalise country-level and regional security sector reform strategies as integral part of their programmes (also in co-operation with Governance Dept).
C 5. Defending human rights in conflict situations.	⇒ Reduced incidents of Geneva Conventions, and efugees and Rights of the Child.	C5.1 Implement institutional partnership strategy with OHCHR. C5.2 Operationalise strategy on children and armed conflict. C5.3 Expand IHL provision through strategic partnership with ICRC, and others.
C6. Promoting post-conflict peacebuilding.	⇒ Increased support for l frameworks that invest in velopment after the cessation of	C6.1 Promote more specific engagement of IFIs and closer working between UN agencies and IFIs in post conflict transition and recovery situations. C6.2 Advise and assist regional departments on peacebuilding issues in relation to: Sierra Leone, Uganda, Caucasus, Sri Lanka, Great Lakes, Balkans, Nepal, Indonesia, Solomons, and elsewhere.

APPENDIX 5 - NATO TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

AGREED AND PUBLISHED IN THE NATO GLOSSARY - AAP-6(2003)

Conflict prevention

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. S*ee also peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* 14/10/2002

Peacebuilding

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations. S*ee also conflict prevention; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* 14/10/2002

Peacekeeping

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacemaking; peace support operation.* 14/10/2002

Peacemaking

A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peace support operation.* 14/10/2002

Peace support operation

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. S*ee also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking.* 14/10/2002

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS NATO AGREED AND PUBLISHED IN AJP 3.4.1 PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS BUT AWAITING PUBLICATION IN THE NATO GLOSSARY - AAP-6(2003)

Peace enforcement

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. Peacekeepers must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially. S*ee also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.*

JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY ON PEACEBUILDING

PART II

SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED

FROM UK GOVERNMENT FUNDED

PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS 1997–2001

Janey and Simon Lawry-White

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report forms part of the UK Government contribution to the joint Utstein countries' study on peacebuilding and has been prepared by PARC consultants working on contract to the DFID Evaluation Department. The synthesis draws on summaries of lessons learned from 57 UK-funded peacebuilding related projects covering the period 1997–2001.

Lessons learned have been assembled under three main headings – Project Design, Project Implementation and Sustainability.

Key lessons include:

- the need for a proper and regularly updated understanding of the origins and dynamics of individual conflicts, including a knowledge of the motivation of key protagonists

- working in conflict requires an understanding of, and sometimes engagement with, the international and local political and economic context and the indigenous social and cultural context

- the choice and capacity of partners is a key determinant in the success of peacebuilding initiatives

- the importance of networks and coalitions is increasingly recognised

- donors and other external agencies need to be far better coordinated at the policy level and in national and local implementation

- the limitations of managing peacebuilding initiatives from a distance

- the need for direct linkages between peacebuilding and development, including beneficiary participation

- the development of trust requires continued investment in relationship building over the medium to long term

- a long-term perspective is required for the healing of societies damaged by conflict

- the development of local ownership of peacebuilding initiatives is vital to their sustainability.

The quality of the source evaluative material is very variable and often insubstantial. DFID would gain a great deal more value from its funding of peacebuilding work by instigating a more rigorous approach to the evaluation of the results of peacebuilding initiatives.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report forms part of the UK Government contribution to the joint Utstein countries' study on peacebuilding and has been prepared by PARC consultants working on contract to the DFID Evaluation Department. Other components of the UK contribution include a paper on the UK Government approach to peacebuilding, together with an Addendum summarising the process of analysing project data from an initial database of UK-funded peacebuilding related activities. While the main UK paper draws largely on policy and strategy documents and interviews, this synthesis provides a summary of lessons learned from 57 UK-funded peacebuilding related projects as an input to the joint Utstein peacebuilding study being coordinated by theOslo Peace Research Institute (PRIO).

In all, lessons are drawn from 42 project summaries. Evaluations and reports vary considerably in quality and some had nothing to provide by way of lessons learned. Those projects that have been more fully assessed tend to be referred to more frequently. For the few pure research projects included here, the lessons learned would be better termed 'research findings' as they are not necessarily based on field realities but represent *a priori* principles deduced during the research.

The lessons included here are drawn directly from the observations included in internal and external project assessments, reviews and evaluations. The paper consists of an organised set of observations from project documents, grouped by theme. The current authors have used their judgement in selecting material that appears to be relevant and useful but the material remains 'raw' in that the findings from individual evaluations and reports have been taken at face value. The report does not necessarily provide a balanced picture of any one project, rather findings have been used to illustrate common themes.

The funding period for the study is 1997–2001. While much of the documentation was completed after 2001, findings included here refer to activities falling in the study period. Lessons learned have been assembled under three main headings – Project Design, Project Implementation and Sustainability.

2. PROJECT DESIGN

2.1 Developing a Theoretical Understanding of Conflict

A number of projects acknowledge the contribution that theories around conflict assessment, sensitivity and resolution can make to an improved understanding of the project-working context. Several incorporate the development or refinement of such theories into their programming. Theories have been developed around practical work to enhance understanding, and to provide tools for more effective programming. Agencies committed to this approach are also in favour of skills training to disseminate these theories.

The International Working Group in Sri Lanka[1] notes that the first year of the programme was based on assumptions regarding a level of understanding of conflict resolution approaches that proved unfounded. Only a small 'peace community' in Sri Lanka are *au fait* with this practice and methodology, and the understanding is not widespread in the NGO or political communities in Sri Lanka. There is a need for training in the practical application of conflict resolution to programming and to provide a theoretical background for those working at the national and political levels.

International Alert[2], reporting on its project to help NGOs by designing a conflict impact assessment, observed that there is frequently a lack of understanding among donors and implementing agencies of the true nature of conflict-sensitive development. Often it is seen as relevant only in the context of conventional peacebuilding activities, such as reconciliation initiatives or conflict resolution skills training. Such an understanding needs to be transformed into an appreciation that any traditional development activity (such as health or education) can be conflict-sensitive if planned and implemented using appropriate methodologies. If methodologies are to be fully effective there is a need for skills training and capacity building among both donors and implementing agencies, including governments.

The International Alert Business and Conflict Programme[3] found that practical results achieved in Azerbaijan demonstrated that new kinds of collaboration involving the private sector can help to create the conditions for peace and stability. However, the exact nature of this engagement remains, in many cases, undetermined and awaits the development of concrete tools and frameworks on risk and impact assessment and multistakeholder dialogue.

VOICE, Sri Lanka,[4] identifies three key themes in the learning expected from its project as a development of its peacebuilding approaches:

- How can we apply peacebuilding, conflict resolution and participatory civil society approaches in the context of a development organisation and development mission?

- How can we develop culturally appropriate methodologies to adapt peacebuilding, conflict resolution and participatory civil society techniques (largely developed outside Sri Lanka) to the Sri Lankan cultural and social environment?

- How can we apply peacebuilding, conflict resolution and participatory civil society techniques (largely developed in post-conflict contexts) in an active conflict environment?

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[1] International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – A peacebuilding measure in Sri Lanka/International Working Group on Sri Lanka
[2] Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) Tool Development (later changed to CIAS: Developing Practical Methodologies for NGOs) /International Alert/Non-specified country
[3] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[4] Vulnerable Groups Organised in Conflict Areas (VOICE)/Care International UK/Sri Lanka

2.2   Understanding the Peacebuilding Context

Several projects emphasise the importance of understanding the international and local project context for maximising project impact. This applies equally to projects working on theoretical approaches as to practical projects.

2.2.1   International context

INTRAC's Conflict Assessment Project[5] was designed to assist in developing policies and programmes that are sensitive to the dynamics of peace and conflict and which can contribute to the prevention, management and reduction of violent conflict. The project comes to the following conclusions:

On the nature of conflict

- Conflict does not represent a departure from the norm. It is embedded in society and cannot be separated from ongoing political and social processes. Human security or insecurity is the result of wider social, political and economic processes.

- Conflict has a positive dimension and is an essential part of the process of social and political change. Conflict management is, therefore, not about preventing conflict but supporting institutions that are able to manage conflict in an inclusive and non-violent way.

- Countries are especially vulnerable to violent conflict during periods of transition and system change.

- The interplay between three factors was found to be critical in predisposing a country to violent conflict: (i) structural tensions, (ii) capacities to manage conflict, (iii) opportunities to profit from violence. International policies often undercut one another and undermine the effectiveness of conflict prevention or conflict resolution interventions. The 'sticks and carrots' that might affect the calculations of conflict stakeholders have often not been applied in an intelligent and coordinated manner.

- Conflict confers benefits on certain groups and individuals, and the motives and responsibilities of those involved can usefully be explored. Where donors and agencies have focused on the coping strategies of victims rather than the perpetrators of violence, insights have been lost. A political economy approach can be used to understand the motivations of the 'winners', so as to better protect the rights of the 'losers'.

On the nature and influence of international involvement

- Case studies in Moldova, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that there is not always a smooth convergence between the values and objectives of foreign policy, trade and international aid. A critical challenge appears to be the development of greater complementarity within a range of policy instruments.

- Aid tends to be highly concentrated among a few major donors, which gives them substantial leverage in terms of steering overall aid policy.

- The frameworks designed to coordinate and deliver aid are under-institutionalised and there is limited cooperation at the strategic level.

- The main development donors have tended to work 'around conflict', and have inadvertently exacerbated tensions or missed opportunities to mitigate or resolve violent conflicts.

- Donors need to understand that the political impacts of aid should be part of conflict analysis. Conflict is related to processes of enrichment as well as of impoverishment. Donors need to consider approaches that limit the opportunities for greed.

INTRAC's work challenges 'the more conflict sensitive bilateral donors' to influence the major multilateral donors and to encourage them to take conflict more seriously, recommending the development of improved coordination arrangements. These arrangements will enable the

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[5] Conflict Assessment/INTRAC/Non-specified country

international community to move towards joint diagnosis and joint prescriptions, incorporating addressing the external causes of conflict while supporting internal responses and solutions. To this end, the use of strategic conflict assessments (SCA) in Uganda, Sri Lanka, Moldova and Nepal have been successful in raising the awareness of other international donors on conflict-sensitive development, particularly in Sri Lanka, where DFID's funding support is relatively small compared with other donors, but is still influential. INTRAC considers SCA to be an effective advocacy tool where it has been used to date.

Contributing to the discussion on the importance of understanding the international context for peacebuilding work, International Alert[6] observes:

- A useful distinction may be made for the purposes of conflict impact assessments (CIAS) between *de jure* and *de facto* peace. The international community tends to focus on *de jure* peace, but local capacities to implement *de facto* peace lag behind, often not being sufficiently strong and professional to do so.

- Donors and implementers both generally work within country borders; NGOs tend to have a national focus, and donors are not often structured to accommodate cross-border funding. On the other hand, conflicts tend not to respect borders, and addressing development needs only on one side of a border can be counter-productive.

- There is a need to investigate ways in which current aid systems, including trade and development, impact on the structural causes of conflict by contributing to failure and political breakdown. A particular issue is the new conditionality on 'poor performing' countries adopted by a number of donors, whereby some conflict-prone countries fail to receive aid that might reduce the risk of conflict. There is a tendency among donors and implementers not to perceive, or respond to, the need for conflict sensitivity in areas of low level or threatened violence.

2.2.2 Local Context

Several projects highlight the imperative of a realistic and constantly updated understanding of the conflict for appropriate project design and in order to understand the real outcomes of the project. Understanding the local context is taken to include an up-to-date knowledge of the conflict, factors outside the project parameters that impact on the project's development and outcomes, and the cultural, social and political context within which the project is functioning.

INTRAC and IDPM[7] report that NGOs could improve their programming by developing strategic, longer term approaches consistent with local realities and adapted to the phase of the conflict. A lack of analysis of the wider and local dynamics of conflict makes it easier for aid to be manipulated in the politics and economics of war, and can lead to programmes exacerbating pre-existing tensions. Elsewhere, INTRAC[8] notes that donors who are attuned to local conditions and adapt their policies accordingly can contribute to timely and early intervention.

Save the Children's work in southern Sudan[9,10] repatriating women and children abducted by enemy forces has found that the degree to which returning children are put at risk depends on the prevailing circumstances at the time of repatriation, for example local food security, level of conflict in the home area, exposure to raiding and prospects for reintegration (which themselves will depend on the impact of extra mouths to feed, children to educate etc). The situation is made more complex by the enforced 'marriage' of abducted women to soldiers of rival groups. Where children have been born to these marriages, the return of abductees becomes extremely sensitive.

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[6] Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) Tool Development (later changed to CIAS: Developing Practical Methodologies for NGOs)/ International Alert/Non-specified country
[7] The Contribution of NGOs to Peacebuilding in Complex Political Emergencies/ INTRAC and the Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester/Non-specified country
[8] Conflict Assessment Project/ INTRAC/Non-specified country
[9] Reunification of abducted women and children in South Sudan/ Save the Children (UK) for Sudan and south Sudan (SCUK), SC – Sweden, UNICEF
[10] Reunification of Abducted Women and Children Awaiting Reunification/Resettlement/ SCUK/Sudan

The Quaker United Nations Office report, *The Lived Experiences of Female Child Soldiers*[11] concludes that the design of appropriate programmes for the demobilisation and reintegration into society of young female ex-combatants depends on an understanding of the social, economic and cultural factors behind their decision to join the conflict.

The impact of cultural context on project effectiveness is also noted by Cranfield Mine Action Course[12] evaluators. A major benefit of the course comes when the student returns home and is able to use their new skills. However, the ability of students to use their new skills can be limited by the culture of the country, government policy, or a superior's attitude. (Discussions with UNDP on how to minimise the negative effects of this were said to be ongoing.)

In the Sudan People to People Peace Process[13], the final project report notes that the use of culturally appropriate symbols and widely accepted practices give peace agreements more credibility in the eyes of local people. The traditional rituals used to bless the agreements such as the killing of a bull and making the people jump over it are important signs that people are familiar with and can identify with. People only use the modern practice of signing agreements because they have been asked to. Christian Aid's local partner, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), has also learned that each peace conference has its own peculiar dynamic. Where the parties to be reconciled come from the same cultural background, for example, the Dinka and Nuer, conflicts are easier to resolve, as there is a common framework for conflict management and resolution.

The Sierra Leone Security Sector Programme[14] recognises that new management practices need to be relevant to the culture of the receiving country. The latest Western thinking may not be culturally or institutionally appropriate to local systems or time scales.

2.2.3   Political and economic context

Project findings show conflict cannot be separated from politics, so an awareness of the political context is vital for peacebuilding projects. Reviews show how projects have been both positively and negatively affected by the connection between politics and conflict.

International Alert's project report on Conflict Assessment Impact (CIAS)[15] notes that developing theoretical models for this area of work is, by definition, political. It is important to make the assumptions and values behind CIAS work explicit, particularly in the definitions of such concepts as peace, conflict and peacebuilding. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment cannot be a substitute for political action. CIAS should, therefore, not be limited to development cooperation, but should include the full range of 'political' instruments; including arms export controls, trade tariff policies, and diplomatic measures.

Elsewhere, in their work on Conflict and Business,[16] International Alert note that awareness of and sensitivity to, the political context can promote democratic development as a serendipity of project work. Although the Government of Azerbaijan remained suspicious about any contact between foreign oil companies and the political opposition, it was important for democratic development that the opposition be engaged.

By definition, projects working directly with politicians require implementing agencies to have a good understanding of the political context. International Alert[17] notes that work involving the political establishment demands regular presence on the ground, continued nurturing of relationships and knowledge of day-to-day changes in the political context, and the capacity to respond quickly.

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[11] The Lived Experiences of Female Child Soldiers/ Quaker United Nations Office/Non-specified country
[12] Cranfield Management mine action Training/ Cranfield Mine Action (CMA), UNDP, UNOPS
[13] Strengthening the People to People Process in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid
[14] Security Sector Programme (SILSEP)/ FCO, Crown Agents, Ministry of Defence Advisory Team/ Sierra Leone
[15] CIAS/International Alert/Non specific country
[16] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert/Non specified country
[17] Strengthening Prospects for Peace by promoting a process of thinking on post conflict issues/International Alert/Sri Lanka

Lessons from the AMANI[18] Forum highlight the need to maintain a balance between different parties – between the sexes, between leading and less important politicians, and between local and national-level stakeholders. This was seen as one factor behind the success of the Great Lakes Parliamentary forum on Peace. In creating effective National Chapters, a branch has an increased chance of success if it is seen as being 'above party politics', rather than as the mouthpiece of those with particular interests.

The importance of understanding the political context extends to funders as well as project design and progress. Regarding DFID's support to the Organisation of African Unity's Conflict Management Centre (CMC)[19] it was found that the UK contribution was not just a matter of funding. The UK is a key player because of its capacity building role and the close working relationships between the CMC and successive British Military Liaison Officers in Addis Ababa. A decision by the UK to withdraw funding might see other donors following suit.

Projects concerned with national institutional development inevitably work in the political sphere. A review of the Sierra Leone Community Safety and Security Project[20] considers that future support to the development of policing in Sierra Leone cannot be separated from the need for improved pay and conditions, the government's action to tackle high level corruption, and wider reform of the justice system, which all impact on the effectiveness of the project. Another project in Sierra Leone[21] noted that endemic corruption is undermining sustainable development in all sectors, including security.

Elsewhere political opposition was found to have hindered projects or caused changes in their way of working. In North Kivu[22] (Democratic Republic of Congo) local authority obstruction and threats meant that NGO staff chose to promote a more generic cultural transformation that challenged corruption, torture, and human rights abuse rather than trying to address structural issues directly.

In the Southern Sudan[23], the return of abductees was hampered by local politics, insecurity and alternative priorities by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement among others.

2.2.4   Working within External Constraints

By definition, working in conflict areas means that external factors will have a significant effect on project outcomes, and expectations should be set with this in mind. The Output to Purpose Review[24] for the joint Oxfam/SCF Relief and Rehabilitation Project in Sri Lanka[25] notes that the programme outputs have a significant role but ultimately the warring parties are outside the control of the project and have the greatest impact on the situation. The evaluation of CAFOD's Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives in North Kivu[26] found that challenges to peacebuilding initiatives and project outcomes included war, poverty, illiteracy, the marginalisation of women, restricted access to quality schooling, and an extremely weak infrastructure, while the evaluation of UNDP's Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme in Rwanda[27] states that demobilisation is entangled in broader processes of economic recovery and political change. By contrast, external events can provide windows of opportunity, for example in Sierra Leone,[28] where a post-election 'honeymoon' period created a relatively peaceful and stable environment for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

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[18] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Africa Regional
[19] Support to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Conflict Management Centre (CMC)/Africa Regional
[20] Sierra Leone Community Safety and Security Project/MOD
[21] Security Sector Programme (SILSEP)/ FCO, Crown Agents, Ministry of Defence Advisory Team/ Sierra Leone
[22] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC
[23] Reunification of abducted women and children in South Sudan/ Save the Children (UK) for Sudan and south Sudan (SCUK), SC – Sweden, UNICEF
[24] The Output to Purpose Review is DFID's standard procedure for reviewing project results mid-term or ex-post
[25] Joint Oxfam/Save the Children Relief and Rehabilitation Project (RRP)/Sri Lanka
[26] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC
[27] Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme/ UNDP (other bilateral donors) - World Bank with bi-lateral donors/Rwanda
[28] Community Reintegration Programme/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone:

2.3   Setting Realistic Expectations

Project reviews highlight the need for realistic expectations. The AMANI Forum's[29] strength lies in its ability to intervene practically in smaller-scale conflict situations where it can play a decisive role, as for example with the Zanzibari refugee situation. Its influence on higher-level regional and international dimensions of conflict is limited because no sustainable resolution is achievable without the commitment of governments. At the beneficiary level, the World Bank criticised UNDP's project in Rwanda[30] for generating unrealistic expectations amongst ex-combatants through inadequate pre-demobilisation counselling.

2.4   Choice of Partners

The choice of partners can have a profound influence on the progress of the project and its ultimate success in terms of acceptability to beneficiaries, its reach, and sustainability.

- The evaluation of CAFOD and Christian Aid's Peace and Reconciliation project in North Kivu[31] noted the benefits of working through faith-based organisations and the strength of the project arising from their choice to work ecumenically. The churches play an important social role and by working through church partner agencies the project had access to people at all levels, while most NGOs restrict their activities to main cities. Working through the church to promote peace can promote unity through a message transcending religious, ethnic and other divides.

- In Sri Lanka, VOICE[32] choice of partners was recognised as having a significant impact on the project's success. Partners were carefully screened for their predisposition towards participatory methods and peacebuilding and reconciliation work.

- In the People to People Peace project in Sudan[33], Christian Aid noted the importance of NGOs (international and local) in providing services as a dividend for peace. Their participation in the peace process from an early stage makes them a part of the process and allows them to understand the needs of poor people.

The capacity of local NGOS (or lack of it) can impact on project effectiveness and therefore capacity building for these NGOs can be a worthwhile programme output in its own right. International Alert's project assessment of their Business and Conflict Programme[34] found that the extent to which local NGOs genuinely represent the needs of the Azeri society, and the legitimacy of NGOs in this regard, is questioned both by the Government and foreign companies. NGOs lack of capacity also means that they cannot enter into a dialogue with foreign companies on an equal footing.

On an international scale, partnerships can be crucial for successful outcomes. A review of Saferworld's Small Arms Programme[35] found that its success is based on its ability to engage in genuine partnerships with organisations affected by the proliferation of Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW). Interviewees stressed Saferworld's sensitivity to local issues and how local NGOs were helped to find their own agenda.

Unsuitable partners can have a negative effect on project outcomes and on possibilities for future funding. The International Trust Fund[36] working in Bosnia and Herzegovina admitted to

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[29] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Non specific country

[30] From World Bank Technical Annex (Mar 25, 2002) on the Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme/UNDP/Rwanda

[31] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC

[32] Vulnerable Groups Organised in Conflict Areas (VOICE)/ CARE International, Hewlett Foundation, US Institute for Peace/Sri Lanka

[33] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid

[34] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP):

[35] Small Arms Programme (under Global Conflict Pool Small Arms/Light Weapons Strategy)
Programme to Stem the Proliferation of Small Arms/Saferworld and partners/Non-specified country

[36] International Trust Fund of the Republic of Slovenia for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina/ International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ITF)

evaluators that they had made mistakes in allocating demining projects to those with vested interests. A review mission felt that unless the mine action system was radically reformed donors would be increasingly reluctant to fund it.

Elsewhere, the lack of partnerships was seen as a weakness. In Bosnia, the British Army's Return and Reconciliation Project[37] had a limited range and depth of relationships with NGOs, particularly local NGOs, which restricted the project's impact.

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[37] Return and Reconciliation Programme (RRP)/Bosnia/British Army

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

An analysis of project reports, reviews and evaluations throws up a host of examples of lessons in project implementation, many of which are not unique to peacebuilding.

3.1 Organisation and Management Issues

3.1.1 Prioritisation

The mid-term OPR for the CODEP Secretariat[38] noted that the working style of the organisation militated against meeting time goals. Despite strong commitment from staff and the executive committee, the committee took too long to make decisions, as Task Groups failed to meet due to the members' other commitments. Important assessment and focusing activities, although identified, did not take priority.

3.1.2 Managing from a Distance

International Alert had difficulty managing the AMANI Forum[39] from London. This was addressed by relocating the Programme Officer to Nairobi, which allowed better coordination and communication, allowing more time to be spent on substantive issues. In the Sierra Leone Security Sector[40] Programme, management from a distance caused a separation from the development of the wider governance environment in Sierra Leone and the application of common approaches to public sector reform.

3.1.3 Managerial Support

The evaluation for CAFOD's Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives project in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, noted that future projects require more clearly defined managerial support regular meetings and sharing of information, for improved project outcomes.

3.1.4 Meeting corporate commitments

A DFID/UNICEF visit report covering UNICEF's project on children affected by armed conflict noted that HQ staff need to be more proactive to ensure that corporate commitments are reflected in country-level programming and particularly the integration of child protection into humanitarian crises programming and more traditional UNICEF activities.

3.1.5 Blockages to conflict-sensitive development

International Alert noted blockages to the implementation of conflict-sensitive development at many levels, some internal to agencies (human resource capacity, lack of mandate, lack of guiding policies, shortage of relevant tools and resources) and some external (the lack of access to sufficiently flexible funding and restrictions imposed by government authorities).

3.1.6 Effective Networking

The external evaluation of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)[41] throws up learning points and dilemmas for international networks. IANSA's potential as an international advocacy network was said not to have been realised as yet, with the network not having taken any direct action to change the proliferation and misuse of SALW. The network needed a much more coherent strategy (though this might not be welcomed by southern NGOs trying to prevent IANSA becoming an organisation driven by the UN and government lobbying). The lack of ownership of IANSA by network members was seen to

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[38] Support to Conflict Development and Peace (CODEP) Secretariat (Phase 2)/Non-specified country
[39] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Non specific country
[40] Security Sector Programme (SILSEP)/ FCO, Crown Agents, Ministry of Defence Advisory Team/ Sierra Leone
[41] The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) regional and global network development programme/Non-specified country

derive from its ambivalent role as both a network and a donor, putting smaller NGOs into competition with each other over resources.

3.1.7   In-Country experience

International Alert's CIAS[42] project was considered innovative and relevant but its decision to 'test' the CIAS tools/methodologies in countries where it had no previous presence led to delays and initial suspicion from local NGOs. (The project was still found to have had a profound impact on International Alert's own CIAS methodologies).

3.1.8   Structures

The AMANI[43] project's strength and flexibility is seen to lie in its nationally-based regional structure, which allows the six Chapters to operate both separately and collectively within the AMANI Forum. This has strengthened the capacities of parliaments in the region at both intra- and inter-parliamentary levels. The National Chapters provide space for MPs to engage in analysis of conflict issues and to undertake peace activities at the national level. Through the National Chapters the Forum can acquire regional influence and credibility. AMANI's regional base enables it to send non-partisan delegations from the region to encourage dialogue or even mediate between the conflicting parties. The general lesson for practitioners and funders is to recognise that if this type of project is to take root it should focus in its early stages on establishing effective structures rather than implementing activities.

3.1.9   Funding mechanisms

In UNDP's support for elections in Cambodia[44] the lack of a fully costed master plan meant that donors could not see at a glance the cost of the elections, and what the funding gap was at any time. Funds were not sufficient to cover the National Election Commission's final budget request. Funding earmarked for post-electoral activities had been spent before the elections. UN administrative processes were seen to been unnecessarily complex. The process of setting-up the UN trust fund (for DFID contributions) was delayed by waiting for the UN Secretary General to formally agree that assistance could be given to Cambodia before UNDP and UNOPS took on their assigned programme roles. The EU Trust fund was more efficient and was set-up early enough to support the critical voter registration process. Jointly funded projects were seen as a better alternative to a UN Trust Fund.

International Alert's Business and Conflict Programme[45] was hampered by a lack of funding for the project because International Alert was slow to develop a fund raising strategy, including the potential to use DFID funding as a lever.

3.2   Peacebuilding and Poverty

3.2.1   Development Priorities

Many project reviews commented that peacebuilding and conflict reduction or resolution need to be embedded in other activities which beneficiaries and stakeholders also consider to be important, whatever the priorities of DFID or the lead agency. Several projects noted the close relationship between peacebuilding and building the rural development infrastructure. Peace must be seen to bring benefits (peace dividends) to gain beneficiary commitment. Specific examples include:

- INTRAC's work on Conflict Assessment[46] found that the elimination of poverty and achievement of the International Development Targets requires an understanding of

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[42] CIAS Tool Development/ International Alert/Non-specified country
[43] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Non specific country
[44] Support for the 1998 Elections in Cambodia/UNDP
[45] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[46] Conflict Assessment Project/ INTRAC/Non-specified country

    conflict processes and the links between sustainable livelihoods, conflict reduction and peacebuilding.

- In Rwanda, ACORD[47] noted that some business or other economic activity should be promoted as a central tenet of reintegration.

- Oxfam GB[48]'s experience in Sri Lanka found that direct peacebuilding initiatives lack credibility where they do not address the immediate concerns of communities. Community priorities focus on immediate concerns of livelihoods and access to services rather than violence in the community.

- An International Alert[49] internal project report notes that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without addressing the issue of unequal development. Therefore peacebuilding should be linked to women's political empowerment and economic development.

- Agrisystems[50] found that the social poverty and injustice that contributed to the initial conflict needed to be addressed to prevent a resurgence of violence. Priorities changed during the project term from establishing a confidence-building, high-visibility presence to reinforce the peace and the promise of external resources for rebuilding rural livelihoods, to longer term projects – education and training, enterprise development and micro-finance.

- In Cambodia[51], it was recognised that a narrow focus on demining land needs to be broadened to encompass other issues of rural development. The challenge is to integrate mine action more effectively into a broader institutional framework for rural development where the real needs can be rationally assessed.

3.2.2 Ex-Combatants and Poverty

The need to tackle wider issues of development was noted by several projects working on the demobilisation of ex-combatants, recognising that poverty is a primary factor encouraging enlistment of soldiers:

- The Quaker report on the experience of girl child soldiers[52] found that in general the girls who volunteered (as soldiers) felt their lives would be improved by joining. Living in poverty was an important factor in girls joining movements or being abducted. Some girls felt that their time in the forces had given them valuable skills and better opportunities than life outside the conflict would have. Some would have stayed in the forces were it not for the violent battles. For these girls to begin to reconstruct their lives there must be some level of mutual reconciliation with their families and their village or community. Demobilisation and reintegration programmes must begin to provide the girls with new experiences that will help to change their identities as soliders and begin to build their identities as children worthy of a new life. The girls see education/training as fundamental to their future after being soldiers.

- In Sierra Leone, Agrisystems[53] noted that, unless ex-combatants and their peers are able to find economic opportunities to use their new skills and modest assets, they will rapidly reach the conclusion that they have been 'reintegrated back into poverty'. Ex-combatants are highly mobile and are drawn towards places where there are significant employment/income generating opportunities. More sustainable reintegration may result from individuals or small groups of ex-combatants working in village locations where they are finally divorced from their previous command structures, and have to build new social relationships and adopt new behaviour patterns which enhance these. The conflict's legacy of social change should not be underestimated.

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[47] Development and Resettlement Programme, Rwanda/ACORD
[48] Joint Oxfam/Save the Children Relief and Rehabilitation Project (RRP)/Sri Lanka
[49] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/ International Alert (IA), INIFEM, Canadian Centre for Conflict Resolution, ACORD, Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCD)/Africa Regional
[50] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone
[51] UK contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reform/UNDP
[52] The Lived Experiences of Female Child Soldiers/ Quaker United Nations Office/Non-specified country
[53] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone

- In Rwanda, UNDP[54] noted that significant economic reintegration assistance is necessary and should be tailored to ex-combatants' socio-economic characteristics, capabilities and expectations. Disabled combatants require targeted medical and economic assistance as well as part of the demobilisation process.

3.2.3 Conflicting priorities

Where priorities or concerns of partners and beneficiaries are not in line with project aims, this needs to be recognised so appropriate action can be taken, for example:

- The Business and Conflict Programme[55] noted that beneficiary/partner agendas might not be in line with those of the project. Project managing agencies need to be alert to hidden agendas that might compromise the project objectives.

- In the Southern Sudan, UNICEF[56] noted that reunification of abducted women and children could be complicated both by their own circumstances, and by the political aspects of the conflict. The longer the period between abduction and the possibility of return and reunification, the more complicated it becomes for the people in these situations to make decisions about their futures. Not all abductees wish to return. The most obvious complex cases involve the children of a Dinka mother and Arab father. Resolving these cases is extremely sensitive.

- Also in Sudan[57], for the Government to be supportive and work towards the eradication of abduction they need to be sure that there is a positive outcome and that returnees are not supporting the rebel cause.

3.3 Project Flexibility

Given the fluid nature of conflicts and the changing needs of beneficiaries, projects need to be able to respond to constant change. A developing understanding of the situation may necessitate a change of focus. For example:

- International Alert's report on the development of a Conflict Assessment tool[58] noted that as the project progressed, the focus shifted from the production of a single output (the CIAS tool) to an emphasis on the *process* involved in developing CIAS methodologies for development NGOs, including in relation to their planning processes. The original 'one-tool-fits-all' approach could not be sustained in the light of the complex reality of NGOs in conflict prone environments.

- INTRAC[59] reported that micro-management by donors, narrow and short-term project approaches, and conservative funding that sticks to 'known' approaches inhibits the realisation of NGO potential and strengths.

- INTRAC's findings on Conflict Assessment[60] revealed that DFID's conflict assessment requires a high degree of flexibility and the designing of each individual TOR along the lines of: (i) the nature of the country and conflict assessed, (ii) the role DFID is playing in the country, (iii) the degree to which the country is donor dependent, (iv) the needs of the DFID country office, (v) the targeted audience, (vi) the required purpose, (vii) existing HMG policies towards (and interests in) the country, (viii) the quality of HMG contacts with political and civil society, and (ix) the policies of other major powers towards the country in question.

- In reports on the joint Oxfam/Save the Children Relief and Rehabilitation Project (RRP) in Sri Lanka, programmes evolved in response to changing situations and opportunities. Unexpected twists and turns in the progress of the conflict mean that projects had to be flexible to remain relevant. Oxfam moved further into conflict

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[54] Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme/UNDP/Rwanda
[55] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[56] Reunification of abducted women and children in South Sudan/SCUK and SC-Sweden, UNICEF
[57] Reunification of abducted women and children in South Sudan/SCUK and SC-Sweden, UNICEF
[58] CIAS Tool Development/ International Alert/Non-specified country
[59] The Contribution of NGOs to Peacebuilding in Complex Political Emergencies/INTRAC & Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester/Non-specified country
[60] Conflict Assessment/INTRAC/Non-specified country

- reduction and addressing violence against women, while SCUK reduced its emphasis on livelihoods and relief, while continuing to develop child-rights focused programmes.

- In Sri Lanka, International Alert's work with politicians on strengthening prospects for peace[61] found that the original focus on developing understanding between the conflict protagonists was modified when the Norwegian Track I facilitation efforts became operational. The 'safe spaces for dialogue' provided by the project could be used by protagonists to explore issues or blockages in the Track I discussions.

- The evaluation of the British Army's Return and Reconciliation Programme project in Bosnia[62] reported that funding was used flexibly and followed the patterns of minority return, for example in winterisation (permanent rehabilitation of houses). For this reason it was valued by the Office of the High Representative, and the Return and Reconstruction Task Force.

Some shifts in project emphasis were a result of poor planning or inadequate focus by the lead agency:

- The Demobilisation and Reintegration programme[63] in Rwanda had budget shortfalls (a budget of $39 million but with only $11.4 million committed) that affected how priorities could be set. The lack of funding caused programme imbalance with 72 per cent of the funding used for demobilisation payments (for political reasons) leaving little for reintegration support – only 13 per cent for education, training and micro-credit, (programme administration used 6 per cent). The programme in effect turned from a development programme into a programme for security sector reform, with resources going to the re-absorption of 15,000 ex-soldiers into the Rwandan Army.

- The Responding to Conflict (RTC) project[64] aimed to develop self-sustaining, practical conflict handling capacity among practitioners working on instability and tension worldwide. However, as the project developed, the focus changed to a concentration on the development of an international network of practitioners (ACTION), building the capacity of this group and supporting individual conflict transformation activities. The evaluation noted that in its desire to ensure that it was not imposing its own agenda, RTC effectively lost its voice, moving from a primarily training focus to the development of a network, a role in which RTC had little expertise.

3.4   Recognising the Impact of Key Players

Various project evaluations recognised the ability of certain key groups or players to affect project outcomes.

3.4.1   Engagement of Women

- In Sudan, Christian Aid[65] recognised the importance of the involvement of women in the peace processes. Women were seen to be able to undermine peace by inciting violence through traditional songs but also able to play a key role in promoting peace or preventing retaliation. (The project report does not specify which activities are used to how promote peace or prevent retaliation.)

- The pivotal role which women can play in peace making was also recognised in an International Alert[66] progress report, which noted that the involvement of women from refugee camps in Tanzania was key to peacebuilding initiatives involving the Diaspora.

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[61] Strengthening Prospects for Peace by promoting a process of thinking on post conflict issues/International Alert/Sri Lanka
[62] Return and Reconciliation Programme (RRP)/Bosnia/British Army
[63] Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme/UNDP/Rwanda
[64] Sustainable support for conflict transformation/Responding to Conflict/Non-specified country
[65] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid
[66] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/ International Alert (IA), INIFEM, Canadian Centre for Conflict Resolution, ACORD, Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCD)/Africa Regional

- The Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme[67] recognised the importance of developing women's ability to recognise peacebuilding work they have already been doing in their families and strengthening peacebuilding initiatives in their communities. Positive signs of this increasing confidence have been demonstrated through the inclusion of more women in political and peace processes.

3.4.2 Political Leaders

The level of engagement by senior figures was recognised as a key factor in project success:

- With reference to the Sudanese peace process, an internal discussion paper for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Sudan Secretariat[68] noted that the stalemate in the peace process illustrated the need for a high level political breakthrough, something beyond the capacity of the Secretariat to achieve alone.

- Also in the Sudan, Christian Aid[69] noted that reconciliation and visits between chiefs prevented potential conflict situations from escalating.

- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the evaluation of CAFOD's peace and reconciliation initiative in North Kivu[70] felt that the project would have been assisted by greater involvement of higher church authorities.

- With the AMANI[71] Forum for Peace, difficulties encountered during fact-finding missions highlighted the need for AMANI to maintain relationships strategically with influential government figures in order to obtain their support for the implementation of activities.

- Project reviews for the Community Safety project in Sierra Leone[72] observed that key reformers in the police could play a role in advocating wider reform.

3.5 Coordinated Working

Several assessments noted the value added by coalitions and co-ordinated ways of working with other agencies or governments to maximise each agency's contribution:

- The Kimberley Process agreement of March 2002 was seen as a significant breakthrough in the issue of conflict diamonds[73], achieved through the efforts of many governments and the diamond industry. Without the NGO input it would not have started and would never have concluded as well as it did. The creation of a broad NGO coalition was very important to this outcome.

- In Sri Lanka, ICRC's [74] ability to access conflict areas, maintain good contacts with both sides of the conflict, and its detailed knowledge of security issues made it well placed to assist NGOs in their taking the lead in provision of assistance.

- In Azerbaijan, the (Business and Conflict) project[75] developed contacts amongst the foreign oil companies, the embryonic NGO community, with the Government of Azerbaijan, and the local business sector, so bringing a range of perspectives to the table.

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[67] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/ International Alert (IA), INIFEM, Canadian Centre for Conflict Resolution, ACORD, Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCD)/Africa Regional
[68] Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – Sudan Secretariat
[69] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid
[70] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC
[71] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Non specific country
[72] Sierra Leone Community Safety and Security Project/MOD
[73] Human Security and the International Diamond Trade in Africa/Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) in Belgium, the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) in Sierra Leone, CARE Canada, Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto/Africa Regional
[74] ICRC Activities in Sri Lanka
[75] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country

3.6   Working with Levels of Society

Reviews indicate that peacebuilding needs to take place at various levels of society. So as to foster links or deflect potential differences between those involved at different levels of peacebuilding within a conflict, agencies need to be aware of the main players at each level, the different roles actors can play at different levels, and the relationship between the different processes in order. Examples include:

- Lessons learned from promoting peace among women of the Great Lakes[76] area, affirm that the sustainable resolution of conflict requires profound changes and reforms at all levels of society. This process takes time and is not amenable to 'quick fixes'.

- A report by the University of Manchester and INTRAC[77] found that NGOs can have an influence at the local level, helping communities retain their values, cohesion and resilience; supporting those who are trying to resist war; and helping protect recognised or potential 'leadership' for peace from the threats of conflict entrepreneurs. The influence of individual NGOs depends on individual, especially indigenous, leadership, its strategic linkages, a high level of creativity, and the ability to explore windows of opportunity.

- In Sierra Leone, recommendations for the SILSEP[78] programme included the appointment of a senior governance advisor in-country who could bring together, manage, advise and coordinate the SILSEP, police and law programmes, and also ensure linkages with the wider public sector reform programme and UN agencies development coordination role and associated projects – with the aims of developing civil oversight of the military and addressing people's distrust and fear of the armed forces.

- In North Kivu[79], interviewees quoted in the project evaluation stressed the benefits of greater inter-ethnic and inter-denominational tolerance, and wanted the programme intensified to reach many more people at all levels of society.

Players at different levels in society may have different agendas for peace, as noted by Christian Aid[80] in the Southern Sudan. The New Sudan Council of Churches has recognised the importance of prior preparation and liaison with local churches, civil authority, and community leaders to prevent political interference with the P2P (people-to-people) process, while in Sierra Leone, Agrisystems[81] reported that peace is threatened by disputes over land and home ownership between returning refugees and people who have settled in new areas because of war disruption. Agencies need to be aware of the impact of disputes at one level on those at others.

3.7   Building Trust

Projects dealing with changing attitudes to conflict are dependent on building high levels of trust between the key players.

- The success of the International Working Group (IWG) Sri Lanka[82] was considered to have been built on the project's forming initial shared agreements around International Humanitarian Law as a forerunner to warring parties signing Peace Agreements. IWG was able to construct a common agenda by creating an atmosphere of trust, confidentiality and respect for autonomy.

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[76] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/ International Alert (IA), INIFEM, Canadian Centre for Conflict Resolution, ACORD, Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCD)/Africa Regional
[77] The Contribution of NGOs to Peacebuilding in Complex Political Emergencies/ Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, INTRAC/Non-specified country
[78] Security Sector Programme (SILSEP)/ FCO, Crown Agents, Ministry of Defence Advisory Team/Sierra Leone
[79] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC
[80] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid
[81] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone
[82] International Humanitarian Law (IHL) – A peacebuilding measure in Sri Lanka/ International Working Group on Sri Lanka (IWGSL)

- Saferworld[83] was seen to have bridged the gap between civil society and government in many countries, enhancing cooperation and contributing to greater effectiveness of projects.

- The Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme[84] recognised the need for space for dialogue and trust-building between women from Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. The fears and perceptions held by opposing sides are as significant as the facts of the conflict.

- The VOICE[85] project in Sri Lanka found that one of the most important lessons learned is that transparency is vital to reducing community tensions.

- International Alert[86], in developing its Conflict Assessment Tool, concluded that a field presence enabled it to develop trust and effective working relationships with other NGOs and donors.

3.8   Neutrality

As part of building trust and credibility, it is of critical importance for agencies and their partners to be perceived as neutral. This applies both to organisations and to individuals interacting directly with parties to the conflict:

- In the southern Sudan, Christian Aid[87] recognised that the role of New Sudan Council of Churches is crucial in the People to People process, as it is still the only organisation known throughout southern Sudan with a non-political remit.

- Again in the southern Sudan, one key to success in the Reunification of Abducted Women and Children Programme[88] is the free exchange and acceptance of credible information between the north and south. It is important for SCUK to continue to be seen as neutral and impartial providers of such information

- The external evaluation of UNDP's Small Arms and Demobilisation Unit[89] noted that its success is partly based on donors and national governments seeing UNDP as an independent and transparent agency.

- The Business and Conflict programme[90] noted that it is essential to select implementing partners who are seen as independent. The project might not have worked as a direct UK government initiative because it would have raised the suspicions of the Government of Azerbaijan.

- AMANI[91] is faced with the issues of objectivity and neutrality. After its visit to Southern Sudan (effectively organised by the rebel movement Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army) AMANI Kenya was invited by the Sudanese government to visit Khartoum. As a result, the southern Sudanese felt AMANI was betraying their cause.

- The BBC Great Lakes Lifeline Service[92] noted that almost everyone relies on BBC service for neutral news coverage, particularly for its reporting on politically sensitive issues. This neutrality was seen as contributing to the high regard in which the Lifeline service was held.

- The success of CAFOD's project on Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives in North Kivu, DRC, relied on each local project coordinator being seen as independent from religious, ethnic and political divisions.

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[83] Small Arms Programme (under Global Conflict Pool Small Arms/Light Weapons Strategy) Programme to Stem the Proliferation of Small Arms/Saferworld/Non-specified country
[84] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/International Alert/Africa Regional
[85] Vulnerable Groups Organised in Conflict Areas (VOICE)/Care International UK/Sri Lanka
[86] Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) Tool Development/International Alert/Non-specified country
[87] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid
[88] Reunification of abducted women and children in South Sudan/ Save the Children (UK) for Sudan and south Sudan (SCUK), SC – Sweden, UNICEF
[89] Small Arms Programme (under Global Conflict Pool Small Arms/Light Weapons Strategy) UNDP Emergency Response Division, Small Arms Programme / UNDP, International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)/Non-specified country
[90] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[91] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Africa Regional
[92] BBC Great Lakes Lifeline Service/Africa Regional

3.9   Equal Opportunity

Inherent in neutrality and trust is the need to be seen to provide opportunities to different players in the conflict:

- Agrisystems Ltd[93] noted that care must be taken to balance opportunities for socio-economic assistance both to ex-combatants and to those who did not take up arms, so as to be seen to be fair within a poor society.

- In Rwanda, the World Bank Mission[94] recommended that all ex-combatants should be treated equally by the programme, irrespective of previous military affiliation while special assistance should be provided to target groups with specific needs (disabled, female, child ex-combatants, HIV/AIDS sensitization, counselling etc)

- In Bosnia[95] it was found that where the promotion of a multi-ethnic workforce in projects is translated into ethnic quotas, rejection of applicants, or requests to 'find a minority' is not conducive to decreasing social tensions.

- In the same project in Bosnia, it was also noted that supporting only returnees could create social tension with local communities and local displaced persons.

3.10   Delivering Value for Money

Within the project reviews, discussion of value for money was largely confined to de-mining projects.

- In Cambodia, evaluators of HALO Trust's[96] work found a general agreement that the cost of demining needs to be brought down. (At current levels of activity service providers clear approximately 10 sq km per year at an overall cost of US $20 million per year). However, it is not always possible to choose between a mine action activity and a rural development activity. Individual agencies are coming under increasing pressure from funders to assess mine action against broader rural development objectives.

- The evaluation of HALO Trust's demining programme in Mozambique[97] states that the benefits from the demining should exceed the costs and should be the cheapest way of achieving a particular objective. Likewise, those demining tasks with the highest ratio of benefits to costs should be done earlier than those with lower ratios. The need for best value to be demonstrated brings in the need to look at alternative means of demining, such as training and using village deminers, though the HALO Trust[98] was opposed to this.

- For the Mine Action Centre, Afghanistan[99] (MACA), it was recommended that if MACA is going to use the cost to victims as a core component in the cost-benefit analysis argument for funding, then this needs to be tightened to relate cost of injuries from mines to other causes of death and injury. (For reference, UNFPA has highlighted the estimated 50 women a day – i.e. 1500/month – who die in childbirth in Afghanistan from easily preventable causes).

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[93] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone
[94] Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme/UNDP/Rwanda
[95] Return and Reconciliation Programme (RRP)/ British Army/Bosnia
[96] Halo Trust Humanitarian mine action/HALO Trust/Cambodia
[97] Demining in Mozambique/HALO Trust
[98] Halo Trust Humanitarian mine action/Halo Trust/Cambodia
[99] Demining Programme for Afghanistan/ UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

- An evaluation of the UK contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reform[100] recommended a more integrated approach to assessing value for money of demining activities incorporating information on other problems facing rural populations including illness, insecure land tenure, low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, and poor access to markets.

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[100] UK contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reform

4. SUSTAINABILITY

4.1   Long Term Perspective

Several reviews conclude that to work effectively in conflict-affected areas requires donors and implementing agencies to take a long-term approach. Tackling the causes of conflict requires looking at social infrastructure, the dynamics of power, social attitudes etc. that by definition will take some time to change. Relevant findings include:

- International Alert's Conflict Assessment project[101]: Transformation towards genuinely effective conflict-sensitivity can be a very long-term process, involving cultural as well as policy change.

- From the same project: Maintaining a long-term presence and obtaining material input from local partners are critical to effectiveness. Considerable time is involved in establishing relationships and trust with participating organisations and attempts to shortcut this will negatively affect outputs.

- ACORD[102] Rwanda: Genocide has not only damaged physical structures but also people's hearts and minds.

- The BBC Lifeline Service[103]: The longer-term focus on building trust with listeners and broadcasting in the local language has given the BBC the chance to start influencing local attitudes and knowledge to health, and socio-economic and family issues through a radio soap programme.

- Agrisystems Ltd[104] notes that following initial project activities designed to provide temporary socio-economic reintegration opportunities, the focus should shift and begin to address broader and longer-term issues around social reintegration and economic development, including the relationship between local level governance structures and returning populations and rural communities.

- Within the Business and Conflict[105] programme, International Alert notes that the roots of long-term conflict are often complex, numerous and inter-linked. Addressing the social, political, and economic dimensions of the conflict includes nurturing the development of institutional and collaborative mechanisms that work towards long-term stability.

Where agencies have made a longer term commitment to working in a particular conflict-affected area, this can give them a deeper understanding of the particular context in which they are working, and help with making projects more applicable and effective. In Sri Lanka, VOICE[106] has developed over a decade of on-the-ground experience. The Business and Conflict programme[107] has noted that the longer individual initiatives have to establish themselves, the greater the likelihood of sustainability. This has implications for donor financing.

Taking a long term perspective has implications for donors and implementing agencies, as illustrated by the evaluation of mine action in Cambodia[108], which concluded that mine action has been largely externally driven by donors with a desire for rapid results and without an integrated view of the political and socio-economic issues facing the Cambodian government. Donors need to move away from the view that they can have a large impact simply by providing funding. Donor reluctance to come to terms with many of the difficult questions surrounding institutional development as it affects demining has resulted in a focus on

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[101] CIAS Tool Development/ International Alert/Non-specified country
[102] Development and Resettlement Programme, Rwanda/ACORD
[103] BBC Great Lakes Lifeline Service/Africa Regional
[104] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone
[105] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[106] Vulnerable Groups Organised in Conflict Areas (VOICE)/Care International UK/Sri Lanka
[107] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert
[108] UK contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reform

extracting mines at the expense of attention to who benefited from cleared land. Donors have significant leverage to encourage the service providers to work in ways that are consistent with building national capacity, and recognise that progress in this area cannot be expected to proceed quicker than wider institutional reform in the rural development apparatus.

4.2   Local Ownership

The importance of building up indigenous capacity to promote sustainability in sectors funded by DFID is noted by several projects. While it may take longer to work through local institutions (at all levels), benefits in terms of a better understanding of the local situation, beneficiaries taking on project ownership, and in terms of sustainability of projects are all emphasised.

- INTRAC's and the IDPM[109] noted that NGOs and aid donors commonly let their action get ahead of their understanding. The gap between action and understanding could be narrowed by some relatively simple mechanisms such as listening to key stakeholders, planning expatriate staffing so as to minimise dramatic losses in institutional memory, and mounting annual 'scenario-building' workshops for groups of NGOs.

- The evaluation of CAFOD's project in North Kivu[110] reported that the imagination of interviewees' had been captured by the project that they saw having potential to reduce ethnic tensions. This is a positive for sustainability.

- The Output to Purpose Review of the MOD security sector project in Sierra Leone[111] concluded that all decisions should be discussed with the Sierra Leonean staff, so they can take ownership. It is important to work with local chains of command rather than bypassing them.

- In Sri Lanka, a review of the ICRC Humanitarian Relief project[112] recognised that although, for security reasons, the ICRC must continue to carry out much of its work through expatriate delegates, the development of indigenous capacity and support for the institutional development of Sri Lanka's legal and humanitarian sectors should be an important part of the programme.

- The interim report for the Publicity for National Dialogue Project[113] in the Democratic Republic of Congo notes that the project methodology has been to empower and support the Congolese media.

- The external evaluation of the UK's contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre[114] reform noted that 'indigenous capability' should not merely be seen as a mine/UXO clearance capability. Empowering national authorities to regulate, co-ordinate and sustain all mine action activities should be a key objective of international support.

- The Output to Purpose Review for the HALO Trust demining project in Mozambique[115] noted that the National Institute of Demining had not introduced the policies required to create the structure within which a new indigenous demining organisation can survive. The project aim to become self-sustaining in the planned timeframe was therefore unrealistic.

- In Christian Aid's[116] support to the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the final project report notes that the People to People meetings have been successful in empowering community leaders to address problems in their areas, so that the NSCC, as facilitators, are no longer initiating meetings, but responding to community initiatives or wider political events.

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[109] The Contribution of NGOs to Peacebuilding in Complex Political Emergencies/INTRAC & Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester/Non-specified country

[110] Peace and Reconciliation Initiatives, North Kivu/CAFOD/DRC

[111] Security Sector Programme (SILSEP)/ FCO, Crown Agents, Ministry of Defence Advisory Team/Sierra Leone

[112] ICRC Activities in Sri Lanka

[113] Publicity For National Dialogue/ Search for Common Ground/DRC

[114] UK contribution to Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reform

[115] Demining in Mozambique/HALO Trust

[116] Strengthening the People to People Process (P2P) in Southern Sudan/Christian Aid

- In order to promote community ownership of development or reintegration initiatives, which in turn helps to promote project sustainability, ACORD[117] in Rwanda and Agrisystems Ltd[118] in Sierra Leone note that, regardless of the type of activity, or the initial knowledge of the population, the beneficiaries must be involved at all stages of the programme to ensure community involvement. Community mobilisation and social development are crucial to leaving behind a sustainable, equitable legacy.

- International Alert's discussion of Conflict Impact Assessment Tools/Methodologies[119] for NGOs agrees that local ownership at all stages is vital. This must involve the participation of local actors from the beginning, including the host government however challenging that may be. Interviews with International Alert's local partners in the study revealed how important it was for the national NGOs to have their concerns taken seriously.

- INTRAC's Strategic Conflict Assessment[120] concluded that active participation of in-country staff appeared to be crucial to the successful use of SCA in northern Uganda as they can call on local expertise and knowledge and commit time and energy to ensure effective follow-up and implementation.

- A further potential benefit of using local resources is improving value for money. For example, a review of ICRC in Sri Lanka[121] found that it is more cost effective in the long-term to build the capacity of the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society in areas of tracing, dissemination, relief, first Aid, administration and policy development than to continue to rely on expatriate staffing.

- Within the Business and Conflict programme[122] in Azerbaijan, the Enterprise Development Committee (EDC) and the Oil Industry Forum (OIF) are developing their own sense of momentum, which means the role for International Alert can diminish as the project moves forward.

4.3   Communicating and Replicating Learning

The importance of communicating and replicating lessons learned between related projects is widely acknowledged in project reports.

- International Alert Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme[123] reported that unless women develop a common vision for peace they will never be able to make their voice heard. Sharing experiences of conflict and peacebuilding will strengthen women's practices in conflict resolution.

- The evaluation of the Cranfield Demining course[124] found that students learned from working and interacting with each other. This influenced the decision not to regionalise the course, but to run several follow-up courses in Cranfield, to enable participants from different parts of the world to attend and benefit from each other's knowledge.

- In the Southern Sudan, agencies involved in the reunification of abducted women and children[125] used information from the demobilisation of child soldiers, which is considered a major child protection issue in the minds of local authorities and other agencies, to provide an avenue to discuss other categories of separated children, their reunification and services.

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[117] Development and Resettlement Programme, Rwanda/ACORD
[118] Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)/Agrisystems Ltd/Sierra Leone
[119] International Alert: CIAS Tool Development/Non-specified country
[120] Conflict Assessment/INTRAC/Non-specified country
[121] ICRC Activities in Sri Lanka
[122] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[123] Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme (WPP)/ International Alert (IA), INIFEM, Canadian Centre for Conflict Resolution, ACORD, Interchurch Coordination Committee for Development Projects (ICCD)/Africa Regional
[124] Cranfield Management mine action Training/ Cranfield Mine Action (CMA), UNDP, UNOPS/Non-specified country
[125] Save the Children (UK) for Sudan and south Sudan (SCUK), SC – Sweden, UNICEF

- The lessons learned from the Business and Conflict[126] programme included a possible role for DFID as a focus for sharing lessons learned within the business sector. Foreign oil companies are becoming increasingly involved with broader sustainable development issues, including engagement on security and governance issues. Yet, oil companies are not well staffed with development specialists and there could be a role for DFID in disseminating best practice on a range of development issues within the private sector.

- Through a publication series and its website, the Accord[127] Programme aims reach out to an audience that is far wider than Western European and North American academics who already have access to voluminous materials on peace processes around the world. The evaluation found that it was the smaller NGOs that expressed greatest enthusiasm.

- The external evaluation of DFID's support to Rwanda civil society[128] concluded that DFID should continue to encourage sharing and debate between all donors to strengthen civil society, identify key issues to be raised with the government, and dialogue with key civil society organisations.

- SCUK's work with the demobilisation of child soldiers[129] in the DRC has contributed to the development of a model for the reintegration of child soldiers adapted to rural and conflict contexts, which SC(UK) and other NGOs can use in comparable situations. (In this model, demobilised children are considered under projects for the protection of vulnerable children rather than as a separate category).

- The AMANI[130] project report concludes that the concept of a regional parliamentary body with a specific focus on conflict and peace is something that may be replicable as part of a broader peacebuilding strategy in other conflict regions.

- The UNDP Small Arms and Demobilisation Unit[131] has realised that weapons destruction needs to be firmly embedded in policy development and coordination, capacity building and awareness raising. Regional programmes can address issues around harmonisation of legislation and experience in one country can be 'multiplied' and transferred to another.

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[126] Business and Conflict Programme/International Alert (IA), Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (PWBLF), Council for Economic Priorities (CEP)/Non-specified country
[127] Accord Programme/Non-specified country
[128] Rwanda Civil Society Support/DFID
[129] Demobilisation Child Soldiers/SCUK/DRC
[130] The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace (AMANI Forum)/International Alert/Non specific country
[131] Small Arms Programme/ UNDP Emergency Response Division/Non-specified country

5. CONCLUSIONS

The available body of evaluation and project reporting material on UK funded peacebuilding activities is sufficiently consistent to draw a number of key lessons that are significant for the future of policy and practice in peacebuilding.

These include:

- The need for a proper and regularly updated understanding of the origins and dynamics of individual conflicts, including a knowledge of the motivation of the protagonists.

- Working in conflict requires an understanding of, and sometimes engagement with, the international and local political, economic context and the indigenous social and cultural context.

- The choice and capacity of partners is a key determinant in the success of peacebuilding initiatives.

- The importance of networks and coalitions is increasingly recognised.

- Donors and other external agencies need to be far better coordinated at the policy level and in national and local implementation, with longer-term approaches.

- The limitations of managing peacebuilding initiatives from a distance.

- The need for direct linkages between peacebuilding and development, including beneficiary participation.

- The development of trust requires continued investment in relationship building over the medium to long term.

- A long-term perspective is required for the healing of societies damaged by conflict.

- The development of local ownership of peacebuilding initiatives is vital to their sustainability.

While it has been possible to extract at least one substantive point from more than half the project reviews available, the quality of the evaluative material is very variable and often insubstantial. DFID would gain a great deal more value from its funding to peacebuilding by instigating a more rigorous approach to the evaluation of the results of both individual initiatives and evaluations across peacebuilding themes, for example demobilisation, the role of women in peacebuilding, or community peacebuilding initiatives.

JOINT UTSTEIN STUDY ON PEACEBUILDING

PART III

SURVEY OF UK PEACEBUILDING

ACTIVITIES 1997–2001

Simon Lawry-White

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

This document forms an appendix to the main paper on the Review of UK Approach to Peacebuilding, prepared as part of the Utstein Peacebuilding Study. This paper focuses on the assembling of project data and project summaries as part of the Survey of UK-funded peacebuilding activities from 1997 to 2001[1]. It describes the process used to identify and analyse data, the selection of project for summarising, and a summary statistical analysis for activities in the nine survey target countries, namely Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, plus two additional categories for Africa Regional and Non Country Specific (NCS)[2]. The survey design as supplied by the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), is included as Appendix 1.

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[1] Except Afghanistan for which activities were reviewed from 2001 on.

[2] Only those NCS and Africa Regional that appeared to be peacebuilding were included in the database – some were found not be on closer inspection. Those in the 'Unclear' category have been removed.

2. INFORMATION ON PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES

2.1.   Database of Financial Allocations

A database[3] has been developed containing more than 1000 records of financial allocations made in the survey period for projects, programmes and budget support of all types in the target countries. The database was used to generate the statistics in Section 5. Almost all the records in the database are taken from the Department for International Development (DFID) records, plus a few from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)[4].

Each database record has been classified under four main headings – 'Security', 'Socio-economic', 'Political', and 'Reconciliation', as per the survey instructions. The consultant added an additional category of 'Humanitarian' because of the substantial expenditures on humanitarian relief that would otherwise have appeared simply as the remaining allowable category, 'Other'. Activities were then further categorised on the basis of their project title and purpose, with a column headed 'Direct Link to Peacebuilding?', and marked as either 'Clear', 'Possible', or 'Unclear'.

2.2.   Project Summaries

A total of 57 project summaries have been prepared. Summaries vary from one to six sides in length depending on the quality of documentation available. These have been submitted to PRIO for further analysis before the international conference on peacebuilding planned for November 2003 in Oslo. Within the four main survey headings, there are 18 sub-headings. Amongst the projects summaries, there is at least one example from all the sub-categories, apart from Socio-Economic categories 2.2 and 2.3, as no infrastructure projects were located that had an explicit peacebuilding intent.

The aim was to locate six to eight projects per country for review but for several countries it has not been possible to find this number of useable projects with peacebuilding intent. NCS was the only data set with a surplus. Table 1 below shows the numbers of projects included in the survey, by country. The main report summarises the conflict prevention strategy for each country, which in turn has influenced the numbers and types of projects selected.

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[3] An Excel spreadsheet.

[4] MOD stated that a special report would need to be requested to allow information on spending on individual defence diplomacy initiatives to be extracted and that there would be a preference not to release such material.

	'Country'	No. Summaries
1.	Afghanistan (2001 on)	2
2.	Africa Regional	7
3.	Bosnia	2
4.	Cambodia	5
5.	DRC	5
6.	Mozambique	1
7.	Non country specific	13
8.	Rwanda	6
9.	Sierra Leone	6
10.	Sri Lanka	6
11.	Sudan	4
	Total	57

Table 1 – Numbers of peacebuilding projects summarised, by country

2.3. Project Records

The key source of data for the database was the DFID Project Reporting Information System for Management (PRISM). This is a relatively sophisticated project data system that includes the ability to attach relevant documents to the basic project record. The key sources for the project summaries were the standard DFID project documentation – including: project proposals, logical frameworks, project header sheets, PRISM (especially for expenditure figures drawn from DFID's MIS system), Output to Purpose Reviews (OPRs), and Project Completions Reports (PCRs) – along with DFID or partner initiated evaluation reports and the progress, annual and final reports of implementing partners. The only document attached to almost all PRISM records is the Header Sheet. Project proposals were available online in perhaps 40 per cent of cases. PCRs are rarely attached or found on file, while OPRs were available for approximately 15 per cent of the projects summarised[5].

2.4. Locating Project Files

In general there has been no difficulty in obtaining DFID files. Records from the period 1998–2000 are held in archives and have to be ordered into the office from a warehouse. The volume of material varied considerably between projects, from as little as 20 sheets of paper to many as 10 files weighing several kilos[6]. The FCO and MOD do not have the same project management and information systems as DFID, making it more difficult to assemble data. FCO has an Internet accessible database of human rights projects, with narrative summary and financial allocations.

2.5. Financial Allocations

In the database and the project summaries, figures are entered in £ and €. In the summaries, these are converted at a January 2003 Sterling rate of 1.508 and rounded to the nearest thousand euros. Where multiple financial allocations have been made to the project, either for new phases or supplementary activities, these have been aggregated to one figure before converting them to €.

The FCO has provided the consultant with figures for the annual budgets for each Global Conflict Prevention Fund strategy. Records of individual allocations against strategies relevant to the survey have only been obtained for the Global CPP for Cambodia, Afghanistan and for the Small Arms Light

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[5] DFID procedures only require OPRs for projects with total allocations exceeding £1 million and PCRs for projects exceeding £500,000. OPRs are sometimes undertaken for smaller projects. PCRs sometimes seem not be completed even for qualifying projects.

[6] Difficulties with DFID file sources include: some departments cannot connect MIS numbers and file numbers. Some file numbers are not recorded in PRISM. Three files could not be located at all. Overall, problems have proven minor, have wasted some of the consultant's time but have not impeded the survey otherwise.

Weapons (SALW) strategy. FCO acknowledges that its information system for monitoring the Global CPP may need some improvement.

Individual allocations from the Global Pool strategies were not available and are therefore not included in the database, unless the activity is funded by DFID, in which case it appears in the PRISM system. Where possible, allocations reported by interviewees are included in the database. FCO has provided detailed information for the use the Human Rights Fund[7].

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[7] Summary data is available on projects from the Human Rights fund some of which are relevant to peacebuilding, for example: 1) Burundi: The Burundian transition: justice, reconciliation and reintegration. This three-part project will produce two radio series of 26 episodes and one regional training programme to help sustain the peace process in Burundi. Expenditure this financial year: £59,996. 2) Afghanistan. Promoting freedom of expression and civil society impact on media development in Afghanistan. This project aims to support peace building and reconciliation in the aftermath of the Afghan conflict through strengthening civil society, the media and promoting freedom of expression. Expenditure this financial year: £69,624

3. PROJECT SELECTION PROCESS

A key issue in the survey was how to select projects/programmes for inclusion in the survey. Correspondence with the project manager and discussion at the November researchers' meeting helped to clarify the requirements but the method is still open to some interpretation. The approach taken by the UK consultant is set out below.

3.1. Relevance

Projects were only to be included in the survey in cases where the project documentation explicitly refers to peacebuilding, or indicates peacebuilding intent through an activity associated with peacebuilding. Projects were first screened by looking for peacebuilding intent in the title and/or purpose statement, typically 25–40 words in all. Each allocation was marked as having either a 'Clear', 'Possible', or 'Unclear' link to peacebuilding. Keywords other than 'peacebuilding' were searched for including: peace, confidence measures, conflict reduction, conflict prevention, and reconciliation. Once identified, the title and purpose statement provided a reliable guide as to whether the activity had a clear peacebuilding intent, with more than 90 per cent of the activities initially selected for summarising found to have peacebuilding intent on closer inspection of the project files.

3.2. Main categories

The survey design groups peacebuilding activities under 4 main headings – Security, Socio-economic, Political and Reconciliation. In most cases, security and reconciliation activities can be readily linked to peacebuilding. Socio-economic activities tend to have no stated links to peacebuilding. Whatever the main category, if the Project Header Sheet had Conflict Reduction as a Policy Information Marker then the project could be included. Measures for 'recovery' or to 'improve stability', terms commonly used in UK documentation, might be included but not on the basis of these terms alone. Similarly, post-conflict reconstruction projects would not be included unless there was a clearly stated peacebuilding intent – which is generally not found.

3.3. Numbers by country

From the list of 'qualifying' projects a further selection is made. Originally, each Utstein partner was to choose 10 projects from each of eight countries, plus Afghanistan, making a total of 90 projects. In addition, the UK consultant identified two additional data sets, Africa Regional and NCS, making 11 sets of data to be filtered.

3.4. Representative Sample

It was made clear from the outset that the number of selected projects by category was not supposed to be statistically significant. Rather the sample is 'illustrative'. Nevertheless, the aim was to ensure that the sample represents each of the main categories according to its frequency of occurrence in each country. In the UK case, with so few directly peacebuilding projects to choose from, getting a representative spread was no longer relevant.

3.5. Scale

Projects with a total budget under £100,000 (€150,000) were generally not included, as they tend to be short-term, one-off, or supplementary exercises. A few allocations below this level have been included where either a) they cover a category not covered elsewhere, b) the UK is one of a number of donors to a substantial programme or c) there is evaluation material of particular interest.

3.6. Usability

For some countries, it would have been possible to include additional projects in the survey if the project files had contained any useable information on peacebuilding activities. That is, while there was peacebuilding intent, there were no useful findings recorded. The survey design allows for projects with no evaluative information to be included, as a way of showing the extent to which projects are or are not being evaluated. However, since these add little by way of substance, only two or three projects

with no useful reporting or evaluation material have been retained where no others were available for a country. The survey is therefore clearly biased towards projects with learning material.

3.7.   MIS Numbers

Some projects retain one management information system number for their duration, while others have a new one for each financial allocation, depending on departmental practice. Second or third phases may be given the same MIS code or new MIS numbers. Projects initiated by CHAD and later passed to the management of the geographic department, tend to have new MIS numbers assigned on transfer. This means that there is no direct correlation between the numbers of MIS codes and the true number of projects. In a few cases, such as the SALW programme included under NCS, a single financial allocation is shown for the whole programme, while the evaluation material covers four separate projects funded from the one programme.

4. QUALITY OF INFORMATION

4.1. Evaluative Information

The quality of evaluation material available varies considerably from project to project. The DFID Output to Purpose (OPR) review is the main tool for on-going evaluation of activities. OPRs have a fixed format for their report but seem to follow no fixed procedure for their production. An OPR can be derived from a few days deskwork, a field visit, or a full-blown evaluation by external consultants. The usefulness of the material varies accordingly. (No overall assessment of the quality of OPRs has been attempted). Where evaluations are missing, proposals for repeat financial allocations after 2001 have sometimes provided a review of activities pre 2001, as implementing partners assessed phase 1 progress as part of their phase 2 funding proposal.

Full evaluations of the peacebuilding impact of activities were available in less than 10 per cent of cases. From the viewpoint of evaluation of peacebuilding strategies, the documentation as a whole is of limited value. The few projects that have full evaluations may be worthy of further investigation to understand the reasons for success or failure.

It is not clear how well FCO and MOD initiatives can be evaluated as their filing systems have not been examined. The impression gained is that project documents are not structured with objectives and indicators laid out, at least not before the advent of the CPPs.

4.2. Survey Focus

Given the purpose of the Study, the survey's exclusive focus on activities with demonstrable peacebuilding intent is sound, as these are the activities likely to produce learning on peacebuilding. The drawback is that any unintended peacebuilding impacts of initiatives with no stated peacebuilding intent will not have been captured.

If projects do not include a peacebuilding objective, even though programme managers intended for them to have a peacebuilding purpose, OPRs, PCRs and evaluations are unlikely to assess their peacebuilding impact. Only if evaluation Terms of Reference included peacebuilding would it be considered, and even then there would be no monitoring or data collection systems to draw on for the assessment of peacebuilding impact.

4.3. Methodology and Learning Potential

The methodology for the survey (as opposed to the study) places reliance on PRIO for the analysis and synthesis of the information provided by the country consultants. There is a missing evaluative 'layer' in the country-based Survey phase because cross-project analysis, or comparison with overall strategy was not clearly built in. However, the main paper has provided a brief commentary at country level and made some assessment of the consistency of country strategy versus project portfolio.

5. STATISTICS

The database of activities in the target countries for the period 1997-2001 (Afghanistan from UK financial year 2001/2 to present) has been assembled into an MS Excel spreadsheet. There were several difficulties in interpreting financial data[8]. As a guide, the figures should be regarded as accurate to at best +/-10 per cent. Excel Pivot Tables were used to analyse the data, copies of which are included below the summary tables.

5.1. Summary Tables

The tables below show the summary of financial allocations by country, survey main category and those clearly linked to peacebuilding for the survey period. (All figures in Euros).

Table 2 - Total Funding, ranked by Country

	€
Mozambique	375,079,774
Afghanistan	237,188,190
Sierra Leone	233,538,343
Rwanda	217,004,980
Sudan	80,732,918
Cambodia	68,560,451
Non Specific Country	56,998,310
Sri Lanka	54,801,334
Bosnia	46,292,841
Congo, Dem Rep	30,043,518
Africa Regional	4,736,682
Total	1,404,977,343

Table 3 - Investments in Peacebuilding, ranked by Country

		€
Rwanda[9]		145,669,815
Sierra Leone		81,841,235
Non Specific Country		56,377,339
Afghanistan		20,453,596
Cambodia		16,152,731
Sri Lanka		12,662,233
Bosnia		6,184,283
Mozambique		5,897,244
Africa Regional		4,150,378
Sudan		1,298,418
Congo, Dem Rep		1,258,206
	Total	351,945,478

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[8] including: unapproved projects having expenditure against them, approved projects with no expenditure, different MIS codes for the same allocation. Where MIS codes have an approved allocation but no expenditure, the figures have not been included

[9] includes financial aid to Rwanda govt of €95,670 between 1997-2001 towards 'Promotion of Peace, reconciliation, and poverty reduction'. Budget support to other countries does not have such a clear connection to a peacebuilding, so the Rwanda figure appears at the head of the list

Table 4 - Total Allocations by 4 Main Categories, versus allocations to Peacebuilding

Category	Total 4 categories €	Clearly Peacebuilding	Per cent by value
Security	166,576,963	134,842,621	81%
Socio-Economic	991,610,394	173,651,469	18%
Political	100,527,052	34,410,794	34%
Reconciliation	10,198,196	9,040,594	89%
Total	1,268,912,606	351,945,478	28%

Table 5 - Percentage investment in Peacebuilding activities, by Country

Country	Total €	Clearly peacebuilding	Per cent by value
Afghanistan	232,827,588	20,453,596	9%
Africa Regional	4,736,682	4,150,378	88%
Bosnia	44,334,370	6,184,283	14%
Cambodia	67,317,083	16,152,731	24%
Congo, Dem Rep	17,972,246	1,258,206	7%
Mozambique	347,365,667	5,897,244	2%
Non Specific Country	56,952,894	56,377,339	99%
Rwanda	209,608,786	145,669,815	69%
Sierra Leone	212,171,355	81,841,235	39%
Sri Lanka	54,257,859	12,662,233	23%
Sudan	29,812,222	1,298,418	4%
Total	1,277,356,751	351,945,478	28%

(Figures for Africa Regional and NCS categories relate only to peacebuilding activities but show less than 100 per cent because some activities were re-classified as Possibly Peacebuilding on later inspection).
(Only peacebuilding activities from Africa Regional and NCS categories were included. They show less than 100per cent because some activities were reclassified as Possibly Peacebuilding on later inspection).

5.2.   Pivot Tables

The raw data in the Excel spreadsheet was analysed into the following Pivot Tables from which the summaries above were drawn.

DFID INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY, 1997–2001 (except Afghanistan 2001 onwards)
£:€ rate 1.509

ALL FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS TO SELECTED COUNTRIES

Sum of Allocations (Euros)	Main Category						
Country	Security	Socio-Economic	Political	Reconciliation	Humanitarian	Other	Grand Total
Afghanistan	4,745,020	187,045,190	25,842,315		19,523,327	32,338	237,188,190
Africa Regional	1,563,481		2,398,070	775,131			4,736,682
Bosnia	1,908,766	33,370,619	9,046,268	8,717	239,824	1,718,647	46,292,841
Cambodia	16,377,634	48,751,040	1,690,439	497,970	603,826	639,541	68,560,451
Congo, Dem Rep	476,631	15,538,070	103,113	1,837,867	11,831,610	256,227	30,043,518
Mozambique	30,644,844	314,545,509	2,175,314		22,861,062	4,853,045	375,079,774
Non Specific Country	41,126,752	181,116	13,230,139	2,414,886		45,416	56,998,310
Rwanda	3,497,298	190,754,428	13,248,000	2,109,060	3,766,044	3,630,150	217,004,980
Sierra Leone	49,410,978	138,670,590	23,854,127	160,209	15,090,524	6,351,915	233,538,343
Sri Lanka	368,750	43,469,126	8,675,371	1,744,612		543,475	54,801,334
Sudan	1,350,244	19,284,705	263,897	544,681	58,222,859	1,066,533	80,732,918
Grand Total	151,470,399	991,610,394	100,527,052	10,093,134	132,139,077	19,137,287	1,404,977,343
Percent by Value	11%	71%	7%	1%	9%	1%	100%

Numbers of Allocations	Main Category						
Country	Security	Socio-Economic	Political	Reconciliation	Humanitarian	Other	Grand Total
Afghanistan	2	30	12		20	1	65
Africa Regional	8		12	4			24
Bosnia	7	44	15	1	1	7	75
Cambodia	25	58	4	1	2	8	98
Congo, Dem Rep	3	24	1	4	12	8	52
Mozambique	3	110	9		36	23	181
Non Specific Country	71	4	44	13		2	134
Rwanda	7	47	31	5	12	11	113
Sierra Leone	22	62	40	3	31	21	179
Sri Lanka	2	39	11	5		4	61
Sudan	1	22	4	2	74	8	111
Grand Total	151	440	183	38	188	93	1093
Per cent by number	13.82%	40.26%	16.74%	3.48%	17.20%	8.51%	

FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS IN FOUR MAIN CATEGORIES AND PEACEBUILDING LINK
(excludes Humanitarian and Other category)

Numbers of Allocations	Link to Peacebuilding?			
Country	Clear	Possible	Unclear	Grand Total
Afghanistan	5	12	29	46
Africa Regional	19	3	2	24
Bosnia	8	4	55	67
Cambodia	26	4	58	88
Congo, Dem Rep	6	1	26	33
Mozambique	1	2	119	122
Non Specific Country	129	3		132
Rwanda	16	13	61	90
Sierra Leone	42	14	71	127
Sri Lanka	10	8	39	57
Sudan	6	18	28	52
Grand Total	268	82	488	838
Per cent by numbers	32%	10%	58%	100%

Sum of Allocations (Euros)	Link to Peacebuilding?			
Country	Clear	Possible	Unclear	Grand Total
Afghanistan	20,453,596	178,021,803	34,352,189	232,827,588
Africa Regional	4,150,378	109,024	477,280	4,736,682
Bosnia	6,184,283	8,056,971	30,093,116	44,334,370
Cambodia	16,152,731	1,314,953	49,849,399	67,317,083
Congo, Dem Rep	1,258,206	290,575	16,423,466	17,972,246
Mozambique	5,897,244	499,819	340,968,604	347,365,667
Non Specific Country	56,377,339	575,555		56,952,894
Rwanda	145,669,815	6,548,562	57,390,409	209,608,786
Sierra Leone	81,841,235	11,453,275	118,876,844	212,171,355
Sri Lanka	12,662,233	13,477,274	28,118,351	54,257,859
Sudan	1,298,418	6,272,214	22,241,590	29,812,222
Grand Total	351,945,478	226,620,025	698,791,248	1,277,356,751
Per cent by Value	28%	18%	55%	100%

FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS BY FUNDING RANGE – FOUR MAIN CATEGORIES

By Number

Country	Under Euro 100k	Euro 100–500k	Euro 500k–1m	Euro 1–5m	Euro 5-10m	Euro 10m plus	Grand Total
Afghanistan		2	1	1		1	5
Africa Regional	5	11	2				18
Bosnia	4			2			6
Cambodia	1	13	4	5			23
Congo, Dem Rep	1	4	1				6
Mozambique					1		1
Non Specific Country	56	48	6	14	1		125
Rwanda	5	8		2		1	16
Sierra Leone	17	11	2	8		3	41
Sri Lanka	2	4		2	1		9
Sudan	2	4					6
Grand Total	93	105	16	34	3	5	256
Per cent by number	36%	41%	6%	13%	1%	2%	100%

By Value (Euros)

Country	Under Euro 100k	Euro 100–500k	Euro 500k–1m	Euro 1–5m	Euro 5-10m	Euro 10m plus	Grand Total
Afghanistan		323,083	513,513	4,527,000		15,090,000	20,453,596
Africa Regional	210,056	2,515,337	1,424,985				4,150,378
Bosnia	148,283			6,036,000			6,184,283
Cambodia	91,596	4,178,528	2,975,570	8,907,037			16,152,731
Congo, Dem Rep	16,564	626,517	615,124				1,258,206
Mozambique					5,897,244		5,897,244
Non Specific Country	2,304,050	10,481,188	4,190,644	30,905,787	8,495,670		56,377,339
Rwanda	239,759	1,940,467		3,152,589		140,337,000	145,669,815
Sierra Leone	572,407	2,854,171	1,608,979	24,209,623		52,596,055	81,841,235
Sri Lanka	142,362	1,255,488		5,982,883	5,281,500		12,662,233
Sudan	78,845	1,219,572					1,298,418
Grand Total	3,803,923	25,394,351	11,328,814	83,720,920	19,674,414	208,023,055	351,945,478
Per cent by Value	1%	7%	3%	24%	6%	59%	100%

PER CENT VALUE OF ALLOCATIONS – CLEARLY PEACEBUILDING ONLY BY COUNTRY AND MAIN CATEGORY

Country	Security	Socio-Economic	Political	Reconciliation
Afghanistan	100%	0%	2%	100%
Africa Regional	100%	—	76%	100%
Bosnia	86%	14%	0%	100%
Cambodia	91%	0%	44%	100%
Congo, Dem Rep	49%	0%	100%	50%
Mozambique	19%	0%	0%	—
Non Specific Country	99%	100%	100%	90%
Rwanda	61%	74%	7%	100%
Sierra Leone	96%	16%	48%	100%
Sri Lanka	87%	11%	66%	100%
Sudan	0%	3%	30%	100%

APPENDIX 1 SURVEY DESIGN

Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding

P R I O

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Institutt for fredsforskning

Survey:
Design and instructions

Dan Smith
27 September 2002

This note is to help guide the researchers in each of the four Utstein countries who will be conducting the survey of their country's recent experience in peacebuilding. Drawing on feedback at meetings in the Hague, London and Bonn this note replaces an earlier (21 August) draft.

Aims

The aim of the project is to help shape peacebuilding policies and activities by producing policy guidelines based on experience. The aim of the survey is to provide part of the empirical basis for assessing experience, the other part being provided by a sweep of the evaluation and policy literature and some other sources, reaching more widely than the four Utstein countries. The key questions for the project to answer are, what works, what does not work, what gets missed out?

Activity

Seventeen categories of peacebuilding programmes are used in the survey. About each programme that is covered in the survey, fourteen questions will be asked. For those projects that have been evaluated, the evaluation report should provide most if not all of what is needed.

Many of the 17 types of activity are also carried out under other headings than peacebuilding – democratisation, development, support to civil society, etc. Like the project as a whole, the survey operates with a concept of peacebuilding activities that reflects on the implementation of the same kinds of activities under other headings – peacebuilding uses a variety of tools from a range of different toolboxes. When these activities are part of peacebuilding rather than, say, development, it is not necessarily because the activity itself is different but because its context and purposes are specific to peacebuilding – the context of crisis and conflict and the purpose of making things as peaceful as possible.

The survey will look at activities rather than policies, and therefore primarily at projects (or groups of projects, see below). The survey is not comprehensive or representative in a scientific sense. It will provide an adequate empirical basis for sustainable generalisations, and thus needs to be broadly representative (or illustrative) of the range of peacebuilding activities carried out or financed by the Utstein countries.

Selection

The number of projects that could be studied is far greater than the number that needs to be. In undertaking the survey the first task is one of selection. A quick scan of project files and evaluation reports should permit researchers to sieve out the projects to include in the survey. The following categories should facilitate this exercise:

(a) Countries – see below
(b) Project titles
(c) Budgetary source
(d) Period (=context) – see below
(e) Stated objectives – NB: Projects often have several objectives, of which only one may be peacebuilding. Such projects are to be included in the survey.
(f) Implementing agency
(g) DAC codes / own codes
(h) Desks' own assessment

The period of activities to be covered in the survey is within the five years 1997-2001; activities that either start or finish or both in that period are included as well as those that run within the period and those that started before and continue after it.

Country selection has been agreed as follows:

Norway	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Guatemala	Angola
Germany	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Colombia	Guatemala	Kenya
Netherlands	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Guatemala	Kenya
UK	Bosnia-H	Sri Lanka	Cambodia	Mozambique	Afghanistan	Rwanda	Sudan	Sierra Leone	DRC

In the case of Afghanistan, the emphasis falls on looking at project plans worked out in the period since September 2001.

Once this first selection has been carried out, there are still likely to be too many projects for the time available for the survey. Further mechanisms of selection are the scale and the theme of the project, which can be understood in terms of a simple grid:

	Security	Socio-economic	Political	Reconciliation
<100,000				
100-500,000				
500-1,000,000				
>1,000,000				

The process of selection will be to list all projects in the four large categories – Security, Socio-economic, Political, Reconciliation – plus 'Other'. From those listed in the four large categories, identify those activities that are clearly part of peacebuilding will indicate where the emphasis of activities has fallen – in which category, at what scale, in what period within the 1997-2001 timeframe. This will permit researchers to characterise the overall approach of the donor towards each recipient.

Further selection, to arrive at a manageable number of projects to survey in each country, will be on the basis of:
- Those projects for which evaluations have been done;
- Discussions with desk officers etc;
- Inclusion of projects that are routine and projects that are innovative;
- Inclusion of projects at different phases in the conflict cycle;
- Arbitrary choice based on convenience.

If the Utstein donor funds programmes or groups of projects, as well as single projects, it will be important to include the programmes or groups in the survey.

Further guidelines
1. The survey is not interested in the detailed history of any project or programme. The survey covers actors, activities, objectives and identified results. *However*, in cases where objectives were modified along the way, the survey is interested.
2. The answers to the questions may range in length from one word (a country, if that is specific enough) to about 100 for questions 5-14. The language used is English.
3. Consistent liaison is the way to resolve many of the detailed issues that will arise as the material is confronted.
4. NGO projects that the donor government specifically approves are included; those that are independently carried out by an NGO with a multi-year framework grant (or independent funds) are left out.
5. It has been agreed that as well as carrying out the survey work and forwarding the results, the researchers will each write a paper based on the material they unearth in the course of the survey. The themes of these papers could vary according to what is most relevant and what has been brought out by the survey, but it could also be that the vertical consistency of policy from enunciation to implementation would be relevant for all the Utstein countries.
6. In the Dutch and German cases, it has been agreed that the researchers will write a brief paper outlining the policy of the government in peacebuilding activities.
7. For each recipient country, the researchers will briefly characterise the Utstein donor's approach – how much spent, evolution of spending pattern, which broad categories.

Survey categories

1. SECURITY
    1.1.   Humanitarian Mine Action   Mine clearance to restore civilian access/use and mine-awareness programmes
    1.2.   DD&R   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of combatants
    1.3.   DD&R Children   Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes for child soldiers
    1.4.   Security Sector Reform   Retraining in the police, military services, prison services etc, with emphasis on professional efficiency and ethics, including respect for human rights
    1.5.   SSR: Small Arms   Specific measures within Security Sector Reform to restrict availability of small arms in the country or the region

2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC
    2.1.   Reconstruction   Aid for physical reconstruction of buildings and structures, electrical supply and other utilities, roads, and for addressing war-related environmental damage
    2.2.   Infrastructure   Investment in the future: Economic support for improving the economic infrastructure (communications, roads, water, sewage systems, electricity) and for training in issues relevant to the functioning of a modern economy
    2.3.   Investment in Health & Education   Economic support for improving health service provision and for improving access to and quality of basic education
    2.4.   Repatriation & return   Support for the repatriation of refugees and return of IDPs, including to regain access to property, restoration of land rights and distribution of land

3. POLITICAL
    3.1.   Democratisation   Support for democratic institutions (political parties, independent media, NGO sector), and activities in the fields of education & culture that have a democratic theme or intention
    3.2.   Good governance   Promotion of ethics, efficiency, transparency & accountability in government; Rule of law, justice system, legal reform
    3.3.   Institution building   Training programmes in government and NGO sector and among political parties
    3.4.   Human Rights   Promotion of awareness of international standards and of monitoring and reporting of abuses

4. RECONCILIATION
    4.1.   Dialogue (a) Leadership   Dialogue opportunities between leaders of actually antagonistic groups
    4.2.   Dialogue (b) Grass roots   Dialogue opportunities between members of antagonistic groups
    4.3.   Bridge-building in society   Other activities (in media, education curricula, cultural activities) to erode barriers in highly divided societies
    4.4.   Truth & Reconciliation   Commissions – and /or other means – of enquiry into recent and violent past, using knowledge as basis for reconciliation

We can also retain an eighteenth box for 'other' – i.e., activities that do not fall under one or more of the headings listed above.

Survey questions

About each activity, the survey will seek the following information:-

1.	Technical information	(a) Project/programme name
		(b) Location
2.	Category/ies	Which of the survey's 17 categories does the activity come under
3.	Dates:	The start and end dates or planned duration of the activities
4.	Budget:	(a) Total
		(b) Donor's contribution
5.	Other donors	
6.	Project partners	Who were the project partners:
		(a) Outside beneficiary country?
		(b) In beneficiary country?
7.	Summary aim:	The objective of the programme
8.	Strategic perspective:	The project's role (if stated) in an overall strategy towards the conflict problems of the country/region
9.	Cross-cutting themes	What cross-cutting themes are addressed in the statement of aims/strategy?
10.	Evaluation:	Has there been an evaluation of the programme or of major components of it? If so, was the evaluation internal or external? (Specify documents)
11.	Impact assessment:	Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation) assess the impact of the programme for the beneficiaries and on the society as a whole; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?
12.	Financial assessment:	Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation) ask whether the programme gave 'value for money'; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?
13.	Organisational assessment	Did the evaluation (if any) or the project design and reporting (if no evaluation) assess organisational efficiency in the programme; if so, what means and what criteria were used, and what was the result?
14.	Overall conclusion:	What was the overall conclusion of the evaluation (if any) or the project reports (if no evaluation) about the project's worth? What (if any) was the project's perceived contribution to peacebuilding? What (if any) lessons were identified?

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting sustainable development and reducing poverty. The central focus of the Government's policy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers on International Development, is a commitment to the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. These seek to:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development

DFID's assistance is concentrated in the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, but also contributes to poverty reduction and sustainable development in middle-income countries, including those in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

DFID works in partnership with governments committed to the Millennium Development Goals, with civil society, the private sector and the research community. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the World Bank, United Nations agencies, and the European Commission.

DFID has headquarters in London and East Kilbride, offices in many developing countries, and staff based in British embassies and high commissions around the world.

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