DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (DAC)

The DAC Guidelines
Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

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FOREWORD

OECD governments in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to expand and improve their efforts in situations of past, current, and potential violent conflict, often in countries where they have worked for many years. Painful experience shows that preventing violent conflict brings enormous benefit to human life, poverty reduction and growth.

The ground-breaking DAC guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21^st Century have guided work in this field for the last five years, primarily in the design and implementation of development co-operation for conflict prevention in post-conflict recovery. They reach beyond the role of development to activities and approaches that involve broader areas of international assistance to promote greater coherence and co-ordination. At that time, the DAC specified that these guidelines were "work in progress" and identified areas that should be further developed.

Knowledge and practice have evolved since then. Substantial progress has been made on some fronts over the last five years, while other challenges remain. Though the initial guidance is still highly relevant, a 2001 Supplement to that work, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, addresses some new challenges and changes in certain areas. It includes information on how to: mainstream conflict prevention in policy formulation; take account of the relationship between security and development; strengthen peace processes and build partnerships with state and civil society actors; work with business to promote growth and avoid fuelling violence; and enhance donor co-ordination and policy coherence.

Development Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior Officials responsible for development co-operation met at their annual High-Level Meeting in April 2001 and reaffirmed their commitment to conflict prevention as central for poverty reduction and sustainable development. Both sets of guidance were recognised as important for enhancing the role of development co-operation for conflict prevention and peace-building by the G8, at the Summit in Denver in 1997 and at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Rome in 2001.

This publication presents the full range of DAC guidance on conflict prevention in one volume. Part I, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, includes the 2001 Ministerial Statement and Supplement. Part II, Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21^st Century comprises the first Policy Statement and guidelines.

The extensive work to develop guidance on conflict prevention attests to the deepening interest in conflict-related development assistance. The DAC established a special Task Force to address this topic in 1995 which continues today as the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. This guidance can be used to help donors in their work with countries involved in conflict and with their own government counterparts in other ministries. It can also lend support to the international community as it strives to co-ordinate aid and assistance, and provide guidance to partners in developing country governments, civil society org anisations and business.

Acknowledgements

Part I: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001

This guidance is based on the work of the DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, chaired by Ambassador Marika Fahlén, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden), who also chaired a series of regional consultations on the DAC guidelines with partner countries. Bernard Wood made a substantial contribution in drafting this work and discussing it with Task Force Members. Francesca Cook, Paul Isenman, Massimo Tommasoli and Lisa Williams served as editors, ably assisted by Marcia Byström. Dylan Hendrickson, and Peter Uvin also provided valuable input. Since 2001, DAC work on conflict prevention has been pursued by a Network chaired by Minister Plenipotentiary Roberto Toscano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy). As Chairperson of the G8 Conflict Prevention Officials’ Meeting, he brought this guidance to the attention of the G8 Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Rome in July 2001.

Part II: Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21^st Century, 1997

In 1997, the DAC Task Force was chaired by James H. Michel, former DAC Chair, with Paul Sciarone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Netherlands), and Claudio Spinedi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy), leading its two working groups. Rémi Paris, Robert Scharf and Bernard Wood served as editors.

Table of contents

Note: Click on * to go to each specific section of this document.

Acronyms *

FORWARD *

PART I: Helping prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001 *

Ministerial Statement *

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY *

I. SOME BASIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES *

Recognise the potential — and the limits — of external influence *
Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good *
Be transparent and communicate intentions *
Widen and deepen dialogue *
Reinforce local capacities *
Recognise women as stakeholders and peacemakers *
Address implications of war-affected youth and children *
Act in timely and flexible ways, and think long term *
Use creative, incentive-driven approaches for constructive engagement *
Act on the costly lessons learned about the need for co-ordinated and coherent action and policy *

II. integrating a CONFLICT PREVENTION "LENS" *

Understanding conflict *
Conflict and risk analysis and assessment *

III.SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT *

Security as a vital base for development *
Governance and security *
Assessing security needs *
Increased policy coherence *
ODA eligibility of peace-related assistance *
Demobilisation and reintegration *
Reducing the means of violent conflict: landmines, and small and light weapons *

IV.SUPPORTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION and consultation *

The regional dimensions of conflict *
Assistance for regional capacities *

V.PEACE PROCESSES, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION *

Supporting peace processes *
Supporting local capacities and initiatives *
Understanding gender issues in violent conflict and peace-building *
   Women as peacemakers *
Peace-building through democracy building *
Post-conflict justice and reconciliation *

VI. engaging IN PARTNERSHIPS for peace *

Partnership with states *
   In situations of weak governance *
   In situations of repressive or divisive governance *
Strengthening state capacity and governance *
Partnership with civil society *
Donor capacities and co-ordination for partnership *
Managing the risks and building trust *

VII. Working with Business *

Roles of business in conflict situations *
Business and development co-operation *
Orientations for development co-operation *
   Capacity building *
   Helping create an enabling environment *
   Creating space for dialogue *

VIII.COUNTERING NEGATIVE ECONOMIC FORCES *

Conclusion *

Boxes

Box 1: The "Three Thousand Houses" - Sri Lanka *
Box 2: Early warning and risk indicators *
Box 3: Impact assessments and prevention *
Box 4: Contrasting impacts on peace and conflict of two water projects in Sri Lanka *
Box 5: Security-related definitions *
Box 6: Eligibility of peace-related assistance as official development assistance *

Acronyms

PART I

Helping prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, 2001

Ministerial Statement on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners

Development Ministers, Aid Agency Heads and other Senior Officials responsible for Development Co-operation, endorsed this Ministerial Statement and the accompanying supplement to the 1997 DAC Guidelines at the High Level Meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in April 2001.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Violent conflict and its ruinous impact on people’s lives demands that the development co-operation community renew its commitment to peace and prevention. To prevent violent conflict, societies must build voluntary co-operation that results in peaceful co-existence among diverse communities within and between nations. Conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Development agencies now accept the need to work in and on conflicts rather than around them, and make peace-building the main focus when dealing with conflict situations. This is a significant step toward long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts. This Supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21^st Century (see full text in Part II) relates primarily to collective conflict – conflict among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

2. To work effectively toward peace, development agencies need to work alongside partners in developing countries before, during and after conflict. Promoting peace-building and conflict prevention require that donor agencies work with other relevant branches of their governments and other actors in the international community. With a "culture of prevention" and in-depth analysis, such as peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building, donors can work better together to achieve sustainable peace. Policies also need to be clear, coherent, comprehensive and co-ordinated in order to improve effectiveness in conflict prevention and management. Relevant policy areas involve trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defence, and development co-operation. Responding to this imperative, development agencies are accepting the risks of moving more deeply into this sensitive political terrain.

3. Economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability and regeneration are major goals of development co-operation that require structural stability. Structural stability embraces the mutually reinforcing goals of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by dynamic and representative political structures, including accountable security systems capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means. Experience and research point to some basic principles for preventing conflict that are enumerated in more detail in this Supplement to the 1997 DAC guidelines found in Part II. These principles call on the development community to:

Engaging long term and using a conflict prevention "lens"

4. "Moving upstream" to help prevent violent conflict at its source is a shared goal of the development co-operation community. Donors are learning to apply a conflict prevention "lens" to policies in many departments to make them coherent and comprehensive. The "lens" is a metaphor for looking at how conflict prevention can be incorporated into all arenas of policy, e.g. from development to trade, investment and foreign policy. This can also be referred to as building a culture of prevention. Concrete actions such as analysing and monitoring developments in conflict-prone situations are steps toward detecting and curbing conflict early on. Growing evidence suggests that early preventive action that works is far less costly than coming in later to stop violence and repair damage.^. Working with a human rights focus as part of a conflict prevention lens is important and helps minimise potential negative side effects of development co-operation and other external partners in conflict situations.

5. Donors recognise that all aid can influence conflict situations and create incentives or disincentives for peace. They are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peace-building both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues. To do so, they need to:

6. Setting up monitoring and evaluation (see DAC web site on Evaluation of Development Programmes) systems presents a challenge in these complex new areas of development co-operation. Sharing results, establishing benchmarks and evaluating lessons are vital to improving approaches and co-ordination.

Ensuring peace through security and development

7. Security, including "human security", is a critical foundation for sustainable development. This implies protection from systematic human rights abuses, physical threats, violence and extreme economic, social and environmental risks, and territorial and sovereignty threats. It is a primary pre-condition and goal for poor people to make lasting improvements in their lives. The DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, and consultations with the poor in all regions, have underlined how critical basic security is for them.

8. Poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other. The requirement for security in this context has to go beyond the classic requisites of defence from military attack and extend to the well-being and the protection of persons and property. Actors in international, national and local government and civil society have thus come together around a changing concept of security aimed at freeing people from pervasive threats to their lives, safety or rights. This is especially critical for the poor.

9. Helping developing countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security — in defence, police, judicial and penal systems — has become a high priority, including for external partners, even though there are risks involved. Security system reform should be treated as a normal part of work on good governance. Though this is a vital area for donors, not all development agencies are equally ready or have the mandate to engage in activities directly related to improving security systems. Development agencies are working together to define agreed uses of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in such activities.

10. Donor assistance can help improve the capacity of relevant civilian bodies in government to manage the security forces more effectively. Within developing countries, there is growing recognition of the need to use the same principles of good public sector management in the security sector as apply to all public sectors. These principles include transparency, accountability and informed debate and participation and are key to getting military expenditure and other security-related spending planned and implemented right. Reinforcing legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight of security forces, in particular the role of relevant parliamentary committees, is one such area for assistance.

Supporting regional co-operation

11. Even with the predominance of intra-state conflicts, there are cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts. Strategies for prevention, peacekeeping, and recovery can be regionally designed. Many national conflicts can only be dealt with effectively in their regional contexts, taking account of cross-border influences. Regional co-operation and integration — through economic, environmental and other measures — can contribute to peace-building, particularly around scarce common goods such as water. Donor support should focus on strengthening the capacity of relevant regional institutions.

12. Co-ordinated foreign policy actions are needed to support regional and sub-regional co-operation in combating drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism, and controlling illicit or irregular arms trade, as well as the flow of arms generally. Such co-ordinated action can also underpin peace negotiations and regional peacekeeping capabilities, help build regional networks for the protection of human rights, refugees, peace initiatives, and democratisation, and establish security reform processes. The business sector, including foreign investors, also has a role to play in regional co-operation.

13. While pursuing "regional solutions for regional problems" is a good principle, there are situations — like those in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes and central African regions and others — which call for a response by the whole international community to support regional actors.

Peace, justice and reconciliation

14. The international community, including donor agencies, can assist peace-building before violence erupts, support peace processes and opportunities, help societies grapple with the complexities of justice and reconciliation in the wake of violent conflict, and encourage fundamental principles of democracy. There are no easy formulas, but there are ways to support national solutions that respect basic international legal norms.

15. Once the peace is deemed won, donors tend to focus their support more on the state, away from civil society. This happens even when donors have channelled support exclusively to civil society during the conflict. But donor support to civil society peace-building initiatives should begin early and continue. Further efforts are required to include marginalised or weakened segments of society in peace processes and to recognise women’s abilities to manage survival and negotiate and implement peace at the local and informal levels. More can be done to involve women in national level peace negotiations.

16. A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation is to promote open and continuing communication as a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and to avoid relapses into violent conflict. Support for non-partisan and peace-building media is important here (see also Supporting the freedom of, and access to, information in Part II - the 1997 Guidelines).

17. To avoid the recurrence of conflict, long and short-term peace rely in part on:

18. In supporting peace processes donors, the international community and developing countries need to realise that the challenge of reintegration depends on jobs and growth, but can only be fully achieved with reconciliation.

Partnerships for peace

19. Peace-building hinges on trust and co-operation among groups and is reinforced by wider and deeper partnerships. A legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other. However, a crisis of legitimacy exists in many states, not only in "failed" or "failing" ones. Signs of this can be seen when the state takes on an oppressive and predatory role in relation to society, foments internal conflict and abrogates its core functions as "protector". Donor engagement with oppressive regimes can be problematic. At the same time complete withdrawal of donor involvement may have negative impacts and be read as a signal of external indifference. Normal partnerships are difficult or impossible to maintain in some conflict situations. But experience and realism now suggest that external partners, including multilateral institutions, can play key roles in encouraging partnership between government and civil society organisations, including with those who are excluded or in opposition. The extent and types of partnership must be gauged by the country situation.

20. For donors to enter into effective partnerships for conflict prevention with developing countries, a pivotal requirement is greater coherence and co-ordination among donors themselves. The recent pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership among development co-operation actors offers an important opportunity to address conflict issues and co-ordinate more effectively (e.g. Comprehensive Development Frameworks, country-produced poverty reduction strategies and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks).

21. It has become clearer that a constructive relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation entities requires shared objectives, common approaches to planning processes, and co-ordination mechanisms. In harmonising these efforts, donor and humanitarian assistance agencies entrusted with these responsibilities cannot escape the need to work together better through quite long transition periods.

Working with business

22. Another widening space for stronger partnerships is with business — local, national and international — to help maximise its positive economic and social contributions and to ensure against feeding into the negative dynamics of conflict. At times this involves dialogue between external partner governments and firms that are taking actions that worsen violent conflict.

23. Virtually all developing countries are now convinced they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate strong enough economic growth for sustainable development. Fostering private sector-led growth in jobs and incomes within a rights and rules-based approach is a basic long-term component of conflict prevention.

24. A widening community of business actors is already moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and pursuing a "triple bottom line" of profitability, social responsibility and good environmental practices. Enlightened economic self-interest of firms can lead them to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict. Donors should support these trends by taking steps such as raising awareness of conflict prevention issues in national and international business communities.

Countering negative economic forces

25. However, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, rent-seeking and corrupt resource deals that fuel and thrive on conflict. This can be done through G8 and UN embargoes such as those on conflict diamonds and be supported by other international instruments. Donors must take account of the political economy of violent conflict in which powerful groups and networks, using violent and non-violent means, develop a vested interest in their perpetuation, as well as the corrupt and ethnically biased economic practices that can help start them.

I. SOME BASIC GUIDING PRINCIPLES

26. The experiences of the development co-operation community, other external actors and developing countries provide the basis for the following principles for effective action in conflict situations.

Recognise the potential — and the limits — of external influence

27. Outside influences can shift balances and relationships between conflicting parties to some degree. These can be positive or negative. Coherent and comprehensive policy responses, involving diplomacy, security relations, finance and trade, and development co-operation are crucial. Addressing potential root causes of conflict with coherent responses early on is more likely to help prevent violent outcomes or ensure that outside influences are positive. As for all development co-operation, local ownership is vital and irreplaceable. Outside actors need to adopt a realistic modesty in their approaches and put priority on areas where co-operation can make the most difference with limited resources.

28. Development co-operation and other external actors must:

Ensure you do no harm, and do the maximum good (see also External assistance in conflict situations in Part II - the 1997 Guidelines)

29. All aid becomes part of the political dynamic and produces political results. The first principle for aid policy makers is to do no harm and to guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts. Since the cost of not acting is usually equally unacceptable, donors need proactive and innovative approaches in different conflict situations that strengthen incentives for peace for key actors, and help strengthen security for both people and countries. They need to work coherently with other external actors, such as their own ministries of foreign affairs or defence, international organisations, NGOs and entities responsible for humanitarian assistance and relief. In trying to help steer a society away from potential dangers towards positive directions, donors need to be open and flexible in their support to a variety of, sometimes evolving, options. As they do so, external actors have to recognise that, in conflict situations:

Be transparent and communicate intentions

30. Transparency and full communication with key actors in a developing country and among all external actors are essential to making the objectives of external actors clear. This makes actions and policies more likely to be sustainable and improves mutual trust and confidence on all sides. But there are difficult dilemmas to manage. In some conflicts, public transparency on approaches to peace-building entails risks for donors and other external partners as well as for national actors. But this does not preclude their responsibilities to be accountable, open and clear with each other. It should help avoid unco-ordinated and conflicting actions between them. This is important in relation to the perceptions of local protagonists and other actors. Basic ground rules will need to be tailored to particular conflicts.

Widen and deepen dialogue

31. Encouraging and sustaining broad and inclusive dialogue — with demonstrated follow-through — is critical. It is one way that development co-operation and other external partners can address different interests and perceptions of contending groups in a conflict, listen to the marginalised and ensure that the wisdom and bridge-building potential of a wide range of possible "connectors", including Diasporas, are kept in the picture. This must be done carefully for several reasons. Dilemmas arise about how representative certain groups actually are, what risks are involved in deciding who and how to consult; and how to encourage constructive solidarity, especially in volatile situations. External partners can be facilitators, for example by providing acceptable space and platforms for dialogue. The media can play an active and positive role in informing populations and providing space for dialogue and exchange. Donors and international media can reinforce open debate by supporting accurate and responsible media coverage.

Reinforce local capacities

32. External actors — multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental — individually and collectively need to identify and support local capacities for preventing and resolving conflict issues and for finding innovative solutions, even in the most grave conflict or post-conflict situations. Resources provided should, however, be commensurate with absorption capabilities. Local capacities should be supplemented, reinforced or strengthened by external resources, not substituted or overwhelmed by them. Too many resources can detract from or undermine local efforts and create avoidable dependencies. Donors should give particular consideration to understanding and, where appropriate, supporting indigenous and customary peace-building capacities and other potential connectors, such as women’s organisations with the potential to play bridging roles. These can have a major impact on building solidarity and boosting local confidence and capacity.

 Recognise women as stakeholders and peacemakers

33. War is a "gendered" activity with a strong division of labour. Most fighters are men, most institutions involved are male-dominated, and definitions of masculinity and femininity are created and mobilised. Women become the bearers of the culture that their men are fighting to defend. They also hold economies together and keep communities functioning. This is why women are so often targeted in armed conflict – and become prey to the destruction of whole communities and cultural identities. Women respond to evolving and difficult environments and often find themselves making or partaking in decisions formerly made by males in their communities, devising coping strategies at different scales. These responsibilities need to be acknowledged in post-conflict rehabilitation and negotiations.

34. Although conflicts affect men, women, youth and children differently, all suffer during times of war. Yet, the long-term effects of traumatic experiences are marked by gender differences. Despite the increase in involvement of civilians, men are still more likely to be killed during and missing after war. Men and boys are more likely to be directly involved in fighting and perpetuating violence, forcibly or otherwise. Men and women can experience trauma, rape, harassment, beating and torture, arbitrary detention and sexual slavery and servitude. They are often singled out as targets for different types of violence based on their gender.

35. Women play complex and important roles as bridge-builders and peacemakers. These contributions to peace often go unrecognised, especially at the more formal levels. There is a clear need to make fuller use of the genuine potential of women’s groups, networks, and modes of operation in peace-building activities.

Address implications of war-affected youth and children (see also Box 15. Children as soldiers in Part II - the 1997 Guidelines)

36. Conflict can forever change a child’s aspirations and capabilities by subjecting him or her to horrific physical, psychological, sexual and societal violence, as noted in the Ministerial Statement from the International Conference on War-Affected Children, held in September 2000. Young people’s frustrations over both present prospects and future outlooks may lead them to destructive engagement in violence, and their energies may easily be lost to offers of lucrative benefits from dubious activities. Children and youth are directly targeted by armed conflict and constitute a large segment of refugees, but their rights and perspectives are not always included in relief efforts. Security and well-being of youth and children is part of the overall security environment and human rights system and ultimately an issue of governance. Many development co-operation programmes work intensively on activities on the special re-entry needs of children and youth. This includes children and youth as refugees and asylum seekers. Programmes for children and youth address issues such as psychosocial care, protection, family tracing and reunification, education, training and access to information, health and defence of children’s rights.

37. The significant advances that have been made in addressing the problem of war-affected children and youth in the international legal arena and security reform objectives can be mutually reinforcing. The proliferation of non-state security forces that are virtually immune to outside influence can only be effectively addressed in the context of efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts. Long-term solutions lie in a dual strategy of working at all levels to outlaw and end the recruitment of children in conflict, and addressing the lack of jobs and educational opportunities that can be such powerful "push" factors of economic necessity for the young people concerned.

38. With the 1989 adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2000 Optional Protocol to eliminate the use of child soldiers in armed conflict, political and legal awareness and commitment have strengthened to address the special problems of war-affected children and youth. The UN Security Council agreed that the impact of armed conflict on children constitutes a threat to long-term peace and stability. A Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2001 "A World Fit for Children" will review the first decade’s progress with the Convention and is expected to further focus the attention of the entire international community.

Act in timely and flexible ways, and think long term

39. Promoting peace is a dynamic process that requires long-term commitment. Sustainable peace is not something that can be produced rapidly or with a technical "quick fix." It is a process rather than a clear state that can be achieved once and for all. Long-term vision, therefor, should be maintained, even in short-term complex crises.

40. However, experience and analysis constantly point to a tension between the need to act quickly and flexibly in complex conflict situations, where matters can rapidly deteriorate and many lives can be lost, and the need to ensure that actions contribute to positive recovery in the long term. In order to be fully informed, it is important to learn as much as possible about potential vulnerabilities by: strengthening analytical capacity and information systems, using tools such as vulnerability and risk analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments, and scenario-building, and engaging in dialogue with other actors. This is true for all external actors. To illustrate the kind of balance required, an analogy can be drawn to the kinds of protocols for rapid response used in the best hospital emergency rooms. Drawing on vast experience, a number of urgent actions are prescribed based on identified symptoms, with an awareness of both the dangers of a mistaken action, and the requirements for longer-term recovery.

41. Humanitarian assistance by itself cannot bring about peace. It can only help people survive in the short run although it can provide space for further peace-building initiatives. The growing experience with unanticipated conflict situations shows the need to better calibrate relief with development aid and its long-term goals. Humanitarian relief and humanitarian assistance has too often been left to serve as the only response in complex emergencies and peace-building. There is a risk of a "suspension" of development-based approaches in relief efforts and of current development activities. For example, refugee camps rarely provide education even though children may remain there indefinitely. Humanitarian aid may become a substitute for coherent and explicit policymaking, and opportunities and needs to forge social capital and cohesion may be missed.

Use creative, incentive-driven approaches for constructive engagement

42. Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for violent conflict regardless of whether these effects are deliberate. How can incentives be managed to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to non-violent conflict resolution? Numerous alternative or complementary approaches for constructive influence are available for external actors, including donors, to try to mitigate conflict and reinforce peace-building. These include some of the following examples:

• Long-term, coherent and constructive engagement: This allows external actors (donors, governments, and others) to engage in policy dialogue and use a wide range of other incentives for peace. Long-term engagement can be misinterpreted and carries risks with it. For example, continued engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate or stop them. In some circumstances actions can appear to be impotent at least in the short run. Dilemmas arise on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit gross and systematic human rights abuses, target civilian populations and foster or wage war in neighbouring countries. This includes situations where legitimately elected governments are overthrown or governments maintain armed intervention in other states, unrelated to a clear case of self-defence as recognised by international law. But such risks are worth running in some cases. External actors must be clear, including with their own publics, about their assessments, concerns and goals.
• Negotiated benchmarks: Donors should seek to negotiate political benchmarks for improved governance in the context of their long-term commitment.
• Transparent and co-ordinated conditionalities: Where specific conditionality on aid flows is still to be applied, as part of a broader framework of incentives for peace, a more explicit policy should be articulated. It should be explained as clearly and transparently as possible to minimise misunderstanding. Broader experience with conditionality demonstrates that it rarely works unless linked to domestically-owned reforms. In conflict-related situations specifically, experience suggests that conditionality for aid needs to be:

Based on clear analysis and specified conditions.

Co-ordinated among donors to prevent donor shopping.

Used as a last resort rather than regularly employed.

Based on ethics of responsibility with provisions for transparency and accountability.

Monitored and evaluated clearly, and preferably jointly.

Part of a broader strategy of using incentives for peace.

Anchored in civil society, with a strong domestic base for the policy goal sought.

Exercised in compliance with humanitarian principles.

Consistently applied across cases.

• Sanctions: Controversies over sanctions as an instrument to influence the course or prevention of conflict are based to some degree on their potentially adverse impact on social and economic welfare of people in the country in question. "Smart" sanctions that are clearly targeted against those individuals responsible for atrocities might minimise adverse social and humanitarian impact. These include, for example, freezing individual bank accounts, blocking entry visas, and other such personalised, tailor-made sanctions.

Act on the costly lessons learned about the need for  co-ordinated and coherent action and policy

43. Improving co-ordination between donors, and more broadly within the international community, is a major preoccupation of development co-operation and humanitarian assistance efforts. Equally important, there is growing recognition of the need for greater and better synchronised coherence between the actions of different ministries in OECD countries, other foreign policy actors and international institutions. Co-ordinating at the regional level and addressing issues from a regional perspective are essential. Recognition of the complementarity between mandates and responsibilities of different actors is key to better coherence. Experience since the 1997 guidelines (Part II, Chapter II, "Co-ordination within the International Community and In-Country") reveals improvements in co-ordination, and in some aspects of policy coherence, e.g. with respect to countering illegal resource flows that feed conflict.

44. However, international organisations, governments and individual ministries, and international non-governmental actors still rarely exercise the level of discipline and co-operation that responsible behaviour would dictate. The growing movement toward improved co-ordination in development co-operation in general needs to be re-doubled in conflict situations when strategic frameworks can be used to guide the activities of all agencies. Drawing on the sometimes disastrous experience documented in case studies and recognising the difficulties that often delay formal co-ordination arrangements, and in the absence of an agreed framework, donors and other external partners should consider how to have less formal and more flexible ground rules for actions and decision making in order to reduce the dangers of unco-ordinated actions.

II. integrating a CONFLICT PREVENTION "LENS"

Understanding conflict

45. To create a "culture of prevention" in development co-operation and foreign policy action, the international community needs to better analyse the causes and dynamics of conflict and peace in order to understand how their actions will affect the "structural stability" of a society or country. They need to be more aware of the political aspects of any activity and understand how its aims, design, and implementation may interact with the political and economic dynamics in that society, including their effect on poverty. In short, all actors need to apply a conflict prevention "lens" to policies and activities.

Donors need to be politically sensitive about how activities generate benefits or cause poverty, dislocations and inequities between different groups such as returnees and local populations. In Rwanda, many donors abandoned targeting for fear of being seen as partial to one side. In Afghanistan, they strengthened targeting to women, out of a concern for the need to counterbalance and contest exclusionary government policies. Others abandoned their aid in protest to those policies.

Donors are beginning to modify their project designs to adapt to or influence conflict dynamics, as DAC case studies have traced. Regardless of the specific sector, donors can try to design their activities to reinforce incentives to move toward a peaceful society, and minimise those for violence. Given the unique elements of conflict dynamics, developing one common set of universally valid responses is unlikely. But it is possible to work on universal techniques to aid judgements, such as conflict analysis, in order to design activities better targeted at conflict prevention and peace-building to promote structural stability in societies. It is important to:

To help understand and foresee the impact of development programmes in conflict-prone and divided societies, development co-operation activities can:

Conflict and risk analysis and assessment

46. Peace and conflict impact analysis, and risk and vulnerability assessments, should be mainstreamed to become as common as cost-benefit analysis. These tools can identify potential harm and constructive actions, improve coherence and provide different branches of all governments concerned with fresh insights and angles to contemplate further actions.

47. For these reasons, donors have been encouraged to continue efforts to develop improved conflict and risk analysis and impact assessments. Many bilateral and multilateral actors, and NGOs have already tested instruments and operational tools intended to assess conflict potentials. These may be categorised as peace and conflict impact assessments, strategic conflict analysis, conflict vulnerability analysis, and analysis of early warning response and preventive assistance measures. Many donors are sharing experiences on the use of these operational tools with a view to propagating good co-ordination and best practices amongst all external actors.

48.Such tools need to consider the social and political dynamics of conflict and include a focus on the specific impact of conflict on women, men, youth and children and their potential contributions to peace. There is rarely one, simple, universal formula. Furthermore, causes and grievances are replaced or transformed as conflict evolves. For example, "victims" may themselves become perpetrators of abuses over the course of a conflict, resulting in new long lasting grievances among other sections of the population. Analyses shou