



**Understanding the Political Economy of Corruption
at Local Level:
The Case of Indonesia**

A Working Paper

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**UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION AT LOCAL LEVEL:
THE CASE OF INDONESIA**

A WORKING PAPER

by

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This paper is a preliminary effort to response to the concern raised by practitioners, politicians, or academicians about seeking the right approach of corruption. Since the multi-pronged approach launched to handle corruption, there were increasing voices criticizing the relatively slowly outcome of such serious efforts. For the countries as complex as Indonesia, the situation became more appealing. Corruption, which previous mostly centralized in Jakarta, right now spread out to regional and local level. Ironically these phenomena concurrent with two main political economic processes namely transition to democracy and decentralization. Viewing it as an only institutional dysfunction neglect the reality of tug of war of power between political actors capturing the state, social activists striving for democracy, and the regime's maneuvering for survival. To deal with corruption, this paper suggests the necessity to start focusing on the selectivity of the context and viewing corruption as political economic phenomena. Consequently, the solution would be more political economy than administrative-managerial one.

To understand the political economy of corruption at local level, this paper will be divided into three sections. The first section is theoretical. The focus is on the discussion on multi-pronged compared to the dynamic-contexts approaches to corruption. The paper assesses the significance of each approach, in understanding corruption at sub-national level. The second section overviews some thrusts of the dynamic context approach to corruption taking the case of Indonesia as an inspiration. Viewing corruption at regional level in this way enables us to understand the variations and complexities of phenomena corruption. The third part summarizes lessons could be learned and on the same time assess the possible role could be taken by donors. The donors' roles include the support on both "state and societal crafting" with clear sensitivity on regional and local dynamic-contexts. This section will summarizes the analysis and discuss the inspiration for the future agenda for research and action. This paper also attaches a brief anatomy of 2004 corruption at local level in Indonesia. The focus is on the variation of actors-involved, the forms, and the extents of corruption in Indonesia.

I. FROM MULTI-PRONGED TO DYNAMIC-CONTEXT BASED APPROACHES TO CORRUPTION

Politicians, practitioners, or academicians have raised the concern about slowly outcome of the efforts of fighting of corruption. Sharp criticism raised by US Senator Richard Lugar regarding the overburdened multi-pronged approach to eradicate and prevent the practice of corruption.¹ Academicians also deliver their sharp criticisms on the indirect and possible over-extended activities of the donors in dealing with corruption issues.²

This turn is interesting to be understood since the multi-pronged approach has been believed in many places as “unquestionable truth.” This approach previously applauded suddenly faces sharp assessments. One of the questions is on the saliency and pervasiveness of corruption in several countries despite the significant global efforts and time already invested for it.

Before we can analyze the significance of the critics, this paper first analyzes some main features of the multi-pronged approach. This approach, according to Marquette, views corruption as:³

“...A symptom of underlying institutional dysfunction, and thus employs a proactive and holistic approach that attempts to help clients strengthen governance and public sector management, to improve economic policies and legal/judicial systems, and to develop and implement specific anticorruption measures. The Bank has made strengthening borrower capacity a priority through increased lending, enhanced country-level advisory service, and the inclusion of ‘good and clean governance’ as one of the central pillars of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)”

The range of activities covered by this multi-pronged approach is wide and holistic. It means that the activities involve all elements of development simultaneously and creates partnership with all actors. Marquette adds that: *“The CDF is intended to emphasize partnerships among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development actors.”*

For example, multi-pronged strategy suggests the need to deal with the following issues:

- Administrative and Civil Service Reform (pay and meritocracy, decentralization and community action);
- Economic and Policy Management (deregulation, tax simplification, macroeconomic stability; demonopolization);
- Financial Controls (financial management, audit, procurement);
- Legal-Judicial Reform (legal framework, judicial independence, judicial strengthening, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms);

¹ Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 July 2004: p.22

² Linn, J (2001) “The World Bank’s New Approach to Good Governance: Promises and Risks” *Transition Newsletter*, 12(2): 1-3. Marquette, H (2003) *Corruption, Politics and Development: The Role of the World Bank*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

³ Heather Marquettee, “Donors seek the right approach to corruption,” in *Local Governance Brief*, Spring 2004: p.6.

- Public Oversight (parliamentary oversight, civil society and media, independent agencies/NGOs).⁴

This approach is based on the assumption that corruption is a “symptom of institutional dysfunction.” Viewing corruption in this way requires us to focus on institutional capacity building.⁵ The holistic approach is dealing with the entire institutional system instead of emphasis on selective areas, actors, or policies. The character of the solution offered by this approach tends to be administrative and managerial. Since the emphasis is on the entire institutional system, any effort of combating and preventing corruption as suggested by this approach would take quite a long time before any significant effect could be seen.

Table 1. Comparing Multi-pronged and Dynamic-context Based Approaches

Dimensions	Multi-pronged Approach	Dynamic-context Based Approach
Range	Holistic	Selective
Strategy	Simultaneous Multi-pronged	Stages
Focus	Institutional Capacity Building	Coalition and Agenda Building
Main issue	Administrative-Managerial	Political Economy
Timing	Long Time	Middle Range

Critics to this approach see the possible over-stretched agenda of effort to combat and prevent corruption. Instead of focusing on certain strategic agendas, the World Bank according to Marquette deals with almost all issues of social and economic development.⁶

Johannes Linn, as mentioned by Marquette, warned also the possibility of overstretching of World Bank activities due to its holistic approach to corruption:⁷

- First, by trying to address the roots of poor governance, the Bank may overload the reform agenda and overstretch both its own limited capacities and those of its counterparts.
- Second, even the most committed reformers might shy away from undertaking a huge mass of comprehensive and simultaneous reforms to regulatory institutions, fiscal relations, and the civil service, pension, education, health, and banking sectors.

⁴ Heather Marquette, “Donors seek the right approach to corruption,” in Local Governance Brief, Spring 2004: p.6.

⁵ Often used interchangeably with the terms “institutional reform” or “institution building” “capacity building” has been defined by Bank documents in both narrow and broad terms. Narrowly, it is “the provision of training and materials to build skills within organizations,” while broadly, it refers to “reforms of incentives and institutions as well as strengthening skills and resources.” Issues under the CDF matrix include good and clean government, the justice system, financial systems and social safety nets, and social programs.

⁶ Heather Marquette, “Donors seek the right approach to corruption,” in Local Governance Brief, Spring 2004: p.6.

⁷ Heather Marquette, “Donors seek the right approach to corruption,” in Local Governance Brief, Spring 2004: p.10

- Third, overloading the reform agenda can undermine the credibility of genuinely reform-minded governments. How much blame should these governments receive for the “slow” development of institutions that took decades to evolve in other countries.
- Fourth, can the Bank really transfer the highest standards of knowledge’s in so many areas, in many countries simultaneously?

Due to those limitations, several experts suggest for more focus and contextualize the strategy: Linn recommended for “greater selectivity, more flexibility in defining conditionality, and dividing work among bilateral partners, based on comparative advantage. However, there is no reason to believe that donors are in the position to do this any better than the Bank—with all its financial and human resources.”⁸

Furthermore, the generic solution such as institutional capacity building according to its critics as “Field of Dreams” approaches “build the institutions and good governance will come.”⁹ Instead, they suggest to take different strategy “starting with an analysis of each country’s particular context, not a specific list of policies...depending upon that country’s capacity, donors start out with particular social and political context and then look at what strategies would appropriate, coming up with completely new strategies if need be.”¹⁰ They believe this contextual approach of corruption signifies the beginning of a new phase in donor work on corruption.

This new approach would be conceptualized as indicates alternative such as dynamic-context based approaches.¹¹ The range of dimensions covered by this approach is selective. This means it deals with only few strategic elements of development at a time and creates partnership with the selected actors. In combating corruption, the dynamic context strategy suggests the need to deal with certain element of issues of Administrative and Civil Service Reform (pay and meritocracy, decentralization and community action); or Economic and Policy Management (deregulation, tax simplification, macroeconomic stability; demonopolization); or Financial Controls (financial management, audit, procurement); or Legal-Judicial Reform (legal framework, judicial independence, judicial strengthening, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); or Public Oversight (parliamentary oversight, civil society and media, independent agencies/NGOs).

This approach to corruption as aforementioned is based on the assumption that corruption is a “symptom of dynamic struggle of political economic struggle.” Viewing corruption in this way requires the focus of any effort of combating and preventing corruption through political economic approach.¹² This selective and contextual zed approach is dealing with part of the strategic institutional system with

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis and Frans L. Leeuw, “Fighting Governmental Corruption: The New World Bank Programme Evaluated,” *Journal of International Development* 16, 547-561 (2004).

¹² Often used interchangeably with the terms “institutional reform” or “institution building” “capacity building” has been defined by Bank documents in both narrow and broad terms. Narrowly, it is “the provision of training and materials to build skills within organizations,” while broadly, it refers to “reforms of incentives and institutions as well as strengthening skills and resources.” Issues under the CDF matrix include good and clean government, the justice system, financial systems and social safety nets, and social programs.

selective arena, actors, or policies. Since the emphasis is on the part of the strategic institutional system, the effort of combating and preventing corruption would take not too long time.

For providing the elaboration of the dynamic context approach to corruption, the following part will turn into the discussion of the view of corruption in Indonesia at local level. The perspective used is political economy.

II. DYNAMIC-CONTEXT BASED APPROACH AND LOCAL CORRUPTION


The dynamic-context based approach to corruption at local level is based on the assumption that corruption is basically a manifestation of political economic dysfunction. This phenomenon is an outcome of power struggle. Four kind different actors are identified to play dominant role in shaping the process.

The first group is the previous oligarchy, which has been, dominated political economic scene of Indonesia up to 1998. They were charged by several activities of serious corruption. These “big fish,” according to several analysts still exist and able to transforms themselves post 1998.¹³ Even-though their visibility has not been as pervasive as before, their existence still threatened the political and economic transition in Indonesia. Their possibility to capture the state to become again arena of patronage and corruption is very real. The second group is the new local politicians, which emerged and dominated the local political economic scene of Indonesia up post 1998. They were charged by several activities of corruption at local level. These “relatively small but abundant fish,” according to several analysts are the new threat to the processes of democratic transition and decentralization in Indonesia.¹⁴ Even-though their visibility has not been as pervasive as before, their existence still threatened the political and economic transition in Indonesia. Their possibility to capture the state at local level to become arena of patronage and corruption at local level is also very real. Using political economic concept, they represent the phenomena of free-rider. The third group is the social activists, which strived to bring awareness of the issues corruption. They stand up to the forefront of effort of eradicating and preventing of corruption. They struggle to defend the local public interests from the captured by the oligarchy or free riders. The last group is the new political actors at national level with their main rhetoric to eradicate and prevent corruption. Several “shocking therapy” has been planned and strategizing. How far they could transform their rhetoric into reality is still an open question.

¹³ Vedi R. Hadiz, “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives,” *Southeast Asia Research Centre, Working Papers Series, No. 47, May 2003*.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Graph 1. Dynamic-Context of Local Corruption: The Indonesian Cases 2003-2004



The political economic of corruption at local level in Indonesia is viewed as the tug of war between those for group of actors. Which groups dominated local political economic scene will determine the pervasiveness of corruption at local level. The effort of dealing with corruption is argued to depend on the effort to weaken or strengthen the political economic basis of those groups. In other word, the continuing democratization process would be the primary ingredient to eradicate and prevent corruption. The following section will analyze the features of each actors and their consequence on corruption at local level.

II.A. State Captured by Oligarchy

Several analysts have warned the threat of state captured by an “old oligarchy”. Hadiz summarizes the possible emergence of pre-1998 interests at both national and local level:

... The most notable aspect of this constellation is that predatory interests nurtured under the Soeharto regime’s formerly vast, centralized system of patronage – which extended from the Presidential palace in Jakarta down to the provinces, towns and villages—have largely survived and remain ascendant (Hadiz and Robison 2002). These have reconstituted themselves through new alliances, nationally and locally, and captured the institutions of Indonesia’s democracy to further their predatory objective. Through control over parliaments and political parties, and via business alliances and assorted instruments of political violence – a confusing array of paramilitary groups and crime/’youth’ organizations – they are establishing newly decentralized, mutually competing, and sometimes overlapping predatory networks of patronage (Hadiz 2000). (p.15)

The political transition since 1998 in Indonesia in much way have been succeeds in pluralizing and liberalizing formal political arena. However, the political economic constellation inherited from the Soeharto's era is relatively still intact. Hadiz argues that they consciously involved in the struggle for shaping the outcome of decentralization process where the local political elite's becoming more assertive:

In this specific case, powerful interests entrenched in Jakarta obviously have a vested interest in maintaining some control over local resources and authority over investment policy while attempting to balance this against aspirations for greater local autonomy. On the other hand, local elites (especially at the sub-provincial level) are fully intent on taking direct control over the same resources, typically citing the injustice of past practices that allowed Jakarta to exploit Indonesia's vast riches at the expense of locals. In the meantime, provincial-level authorities, stuck in the middle between Jakarta's penchant for control and the rising aspirations of sub-provincial officials, have resolutely struggled to ensure that they do not fall into the oblivion of political and administrative redundancy. (p.9)

There was new effort by the new Attorney General to open several big cases of corruption halted by the Supreme Court (SP3) in 2004. In the past the Supreme Court Judge could use SP3 letter to stop the investigation process. This action brought controversy regarding the influence of the oligarchy on the justice process. The new Indonesian Attorney General urges to start opening five of the SP3 cases. This kind of "shock therapy" is partially applauded. The reason of significant public hesitation is that they question the ability of new regime to face the interest of the oligarchy in such a short time (100 days).¹⁵ Even though the Indonesian Attorney General guarantee their preparation with new data and assessment of previous justice process discrepancies, most public raises their concern. They question the ability of the attorney general to deal with such "big fish." In the period of 2001-2004, there were 17 cases of SP3 cases, for example: BLBI (Syamsul Nursalim); Reboisasi Hutan (Prajogo Pangestu); Pipanisasi Jawa (Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana); Jakarta Outer Ring Road (Djoko Ramiadji).¹⁶

IIB. State Captured by Free-Rider

At local level, the existing of political constellation could capture the state. Sometimes, their interests are in contradictory to the main goals of democratization and decentralization process. Hadiz elaborates the process as:

There is little or no accounting for the fact that the persistence of weak institutions of governance may, for instance, benefit powerful predatory interests under certain conditions, or that the particular design of decentralization may reflect a particular constellation of power rather than some imagined objective common good. (p.7)

The "big bang" of political decentralization without followed by serious effort of implementing public accountability and reformed justice system brought the local political arena open to the captured of free-rider: ...decentralization is making possible the emergence of more localized networks of patronage that are relatively autonomous of central state authority, unlike during the Soeharto era. (p.15)

Often the struggle to shape the political economic arena, which is basically about the control of authority and economic resources, was put in the cultural jargon. The local political actors brought the issues of local pride, ethnic or regional identity to the front of public discourse at local arena. However,

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¹⁶ Suara Pembaruan, November 29, 2004.

most of time their demands subsumed under those discourse are political authority and economic resources.

There is variation among regions on their strategies dealing with the decentralization process in Indonesia. However as argued by Hadiz, the substance of implementation of decentralization is a matter of political economy calculation:

The stakes that are involved vary from region to region in the vast Indonesian archipelago: they may be relatively small in particularly natural resource-poor regions, but quite the opposite in natural resource-rich areas like the kabupaten of Kutai in Kalimantan. But even local officials presiding over relatively resource poor regions would want to ensure greater direct power over whatever is available locally rather than resign themselves to control by Jakarta. (p.13-14)

IIC. Societal Activisms

One of groups of actors rarely discussed in eradicating and preventing corruption is social activists. They are in the forefront in the battle against corruption in Indonesia before and after the 1998 transition. They have involved on the public awareness of the excessive corruption practice of corruption both at national and local level. They mobilize *grass-roots support and influence local governments*. They also participate in the investigation process, often involved in whistle blowing of the corruption case.

The decentralization process brought new momentum for social activism. Activists say that changes brought about by Indonesia's three-year-old decentralization programme, which shifts economic and political power away from Jakarta. They stated that judges are now less beholden to political interference from Jakarta. This enables them to be influenced by local activists. Regional autonomy has brought government closer to the electorate. Local lawyers say judges now face less political interference and a lot more scrutiny in delivering their verdicts.... On the same time, local autonomy is giving Indonesians a new sense of empowerment (easier to bring down the governor than the president).

To illustrate the role of social activists, we turn the discussion on the case of corruption in West Sumatra where Judge Bustami Nursyirwan *sentenced 43 members of the West Sumatra Legislative Council—almost entire parliament—to imprisonment on corruption charges on May 17, 2004* (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 2004: p.22.) The success in bringing this founding case was partly owed to the persistence of social activists in West Sumatra. The social activists involved in mobilizing the media and public after one whistle blower announced the possible discrepancy of the budget expenses. Then, they pressured the local court to investigate the discrepancies in the council's financial records. They participated actively in monitoring the pre-trial hearings. On the same time, they held press conferences frequently to keep the public inform about the outcome of court proceeding. The outcome of this case became a turning point for hundreds comparable cases throughout Indonesia.

Far Eastern Economic Review, for example, illustrates how this case lent momentum to corruption case in Indonesia:¹⁷

Investigations quickly accelerated in 14 other provinces, involving hundreds of local legislators. Across the country, from Aceh in the West to Papua provinces in the East, non-governmental organizations, lawyers, journalists, students, and others are banding together to hold their representatives responsible for looting public coffers...The Padang case has lent momentum to the more than 300 of the past years 690 corruption case that involved local parliamentarians, reaching 30 of Indonesia's 32 provinces.

¹⁷ Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 2004: p.22

In short, the decentralization process became a two-edged sword process that:¹⁸ “The decentralization programme, which began in 2001, is both a cause and a cure for the corruption scandals in local parliaments. In 1999, with separation a growing concern, new draft laws were rushed through shifting economic and political power to provinces and districts. In the rush, contradictions in the legislation left local parliament with wide powers to raise and spend their own money.”

IID. New Regime Agenda

The new directly elected president of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has announced that *governance* and anticorruption at the front and center of its development strategy.¹⁹ Free and fair elections, and now direct elections to the Presidency, mark a profound change from previous system of one party one family rule.

Fight against corruption has progressed in 3 major ways: Indonesia’s accountability framework is being radically redrawn, which in theory should lay a legal foundation to enable Indonesians to fight corruption, they should wish to do so; New anticorruption institutions have been created or are in the process of being created that are intended to provide fresh momentum; There have been efforts with varying degrees of energy to pursue legal cases against corrupt individuals.

Legal framework to fight corruption is being strengthened. New organizations have been established including Commission to Audit the Wealth of State Officials (KPKPN), Anticorruption Commission (KPK) and a special Anticorruption Court are planned. A new state Finance Law enhances budgetary accountability. The Supreme national Audit Agency (BPK) is freer to audit the state’s accounts and publicize its findings through Parliament.

As aforementioned the Indonesia’s Attorney General stated the government intention to open some of controversial cases, which had been “freeze” by the previous Supreme Court Judge to stop the investigation. The rhetoric to catch the big fish is also followed by the prosecution of abundant “small local fish” at local level.

However, some critics respond this rhetoric skeptically. There is little commitment for all segments of the new leadership and also little support from several regional and local actors. The answer lies in the current transition. Many of Indonesia’s leaders are conditioned by the corrupt past and set in their old ways; Political competition is less strong than it appears. Voters do not believe political parties’ claims that they will be less corrupt than their incumbents, since they lack policy credibility with voters the proportional representation system combined with the restrictions being placed on eligibility of political parties makes individual politicians heavily dependent on their party bosses for both political survival and success rather than on the support they enjoy from their constituents. They must therefore be responsive to party pressures to collect funds for elections.

¹⁸ Far Eastern Economic Review, July 22, 2004: p.22

¹⁹ *Why did Soeharto’s New Order succeed in delivering high levels of economic growth and substantial poverty reduction despite high levels of corruption? The regime was careful to ensure that the scale of corruption did not deter investment and economic activity; The success is overstated since it came at a high cost in terms of weak and corrupt institutions, severe public indebtedness through mismanagement of the financial sector, the rapid depletion of Indonesia’s natural resources, and a culture of favors corruption in business elite*

IV. INSIGHTS AND POSITIONING THE DONORS

The last part elaborates the insights could be derived from Indonesian case before we could give appropriate suggestion of positioning the donors. As aforementioned viewing corruption as merely institutional dysfunction neglect the reality of tug of war of power between political actors capturing the state, social activists striving for democracy, and the regime's maneuver to survive. To enable us viewing corruption in this way, the paper suggests the necessity to start focusing on the selectivity of the context and viewing corruption as political economic phenomena. Thus, the solution would be more political economy than administrative-managerial.

To understand the political economy of corruption at local level, this paper will be divided into three sections. The first section is theoretical. The focus is on the similarities and differences between multi-pronged to dynamic contexts approaches to corruption. The paper also discusses the assessment of each approach, especially for understanding corruption at sub-national level. The second section discusses some main thrusts of the dynamic context approach to corruption. The focus is on the ramification and complexities of phenomena corruption as political economic phenomena. *“Contextual factors need to be taken into account. In future research, indicators need to be developed by which the relevance of national policies to curb corruption can be assessed. National anti-corruption programmes can be judged relevant if they have the potential to have an impact within a country's existing institutional and policy environment.”*

This third part discusses the role thus could be taken by donors. The paper focuses on their role on state and societal crafting with sensitivity and selectivity of regional contexts. Based of the above discussion, rather dealing with all dimension of the social problems in dealing with corruption, the donors should take more selective and strategic role. As aforementioned, there are four actions could be taken: Supporting Effort of Deterring State Captured by Oligarchy; Supporting Effort of Deterring State Captured by Free rider; Enhancing Social Activism; Supporting Effort of Regime Specific Agenda on Corruption.

In supporting the effort to minimize the state captured by oligarchy, the donors could facilitate for the exchange of experiences about creating corruption to be high cost practice with low benefits.²⁰ The case of ICAC from Hongkong could become an early warning system for the oligarchy to abuse the system. Learning from other experience can help deter the wrong doing. The experiences need to be also sensitive with the complexity and ramification of the context. In supporting the effort to minimize the state captured by free-rider, Pope's ideas are also appealing: create a program that guarantee the sufficient salary for the civil servants; examine administrative law and make sure sanctions; create a partnership between government and civil society.

In enhancing the social activism, the donors could help creating a relatively comprehensive anti-corruption law. This will create certainty about the lack of law loop-hole. The donor could also continue the diagnostic survey. Through this kind of survey, the donors could help identifying governmental activities those are vulnerable for corruption. In enhancing the regime commitment on eradicating corruption, the donors could create synergy of agenda with the leader with clear commitment to eradicate corruption and to open themselves to be researched. The donors could help creating networks those became support groups for keeping the commitment alive.

With those roles, the donors would be more sensitive and selective in their activities. Their understanding about the constellations and political economic dynamic shape local corruption in Indonesia (or other countries) enables them to create more feasible and useful programs. On the same time, this kind of understanding of corruption would more possibility to deal with corruption on the same time nurture the roots of other important processes such as democracy.


²⁰ This insights have been nicely proposed by Jeremy Pope from Transparency International.

ATTACHMENT

THE ANATOMY OF LOCAL CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA

This section maps the pattern of corruption at local level in Indonesia. The paper examines the main characteristics of local level corruption, actors involved, amounts, and any effort to control them. At least, the paper uses 67 local cases of corruption occurred during the period of 2000-2004. This part also assess the possible interlink ages of those cases with other forms of political economic problems. This situation adds more complexity to the phenomena of corruption at local level in Indonesia.



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
²¹ Based on ICW's report "2.7 Trillion Rupiah Corrupted: Notes on the first 8 Months of 2004 Corruption in Indonesia". www.antikorupsi.org.

Modus²²

Modus of Corruption January-April 2004 (Regions or Provinces)



²² Based on ICW's report "2.7 Trillion Rupiah Corrupted: Notes on the first 8 Months of 2004 Corruption in Indonesia". www.antikorupsi.org.



The Amount of corruption based on the regions January – August 2004²³

Regions	Amount of Corruptions in Dollars (January – April 2004)	Amount of Corruption in Dollars (May – August 2004)
NAD	115,060,150	5,840,000
Lampung	*	1,390,900
West Java	11,296,900	11,368,069
Central Java	149,750	6,188,454
East Java	2,659,700	14,387,109
DKI Jakarta	5,544,991	37,850,000
South Kalimantan	*	900,950
South Sumatra	210,000	3,081,500
West Sumatra	1,040,000	1,799,300
North Sumatra	100,000	145,000
NTB	*	1,163,800
NTT	914,000	255,177
Bangka-Belitung	*	150,000
West Kalimantan	4,700,000	480,000
East Kalimantan	*	22,612,600
Bengkulu	*	17,000
South Sulawesi	20,000	3,664,000
Central Kalimantan	*	200,000
Riau	*	9,423,622
North Sumatra	*	283,989
North Sulawesi	1,130,000	1,010,000
Maluku	*	1,727,000
Banten	*	1,366,000
North Maluku	*	7,445,455
Diy	*	300,000
Bali	*	11,200
Jambi	*	81,600
Southeast Sulawesi	1,500,000	655,000
Central Sulawesi	50,000	*

*Data are not available

²³ Based on ICW's report "2.7 Trillion Rupiah Corrupted: Notes on the first 8 Months of 2004 Corruption in Indonesia". www.antikorupsi.org.