OECD

# ECONOMICS NEWSLETTER

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
December *2006, Issue 6*

## Contents



To subscribe to the Newsletter, please send an email to economics.newsletter@oecd.org with your full contact details.

The Economics Newsletter is published by the Economics Department of the OECD.

Previous issues can be found at: www.oecd.org/eco/newsletter

*Editors*:
Vincent Koen & Romain Duval

*Editorial assistant*: Wendy Stokle

## Liberalisation and well-being

It is no secret that, over the years, liberalisation and economic reforms have become an increasing source of perplexity and anxiety across OECD countries. Public discussions have indeed reached a point where the focus is often almost exclusively about the cost of change.

Those worries may reflect a lack of confidence in the ability of public policies to adequately compensate the would-be losers from change. But the current mood may also signal diminished expectations about both reforms' ability to enhance growth and growth effectively translating into increased well-being.

It is this issue of the expected benefits from economic reforms, of the link between liberalisation and well-being, that the present newsletter tries to address, building on two recent OECD studies. The first one attempts to quantify the economic benefits stemming from a deep cut in anti-competitive product market regulation and barriers to international trade and investment OECD-wide. The second explores the link between GDP per capita and well-being.

Taken together, these two studies remind us that despite present doubts there is still a strong case for growth-enhancing reforms. Reducing competition–restraining regulations in the areas of product markets and FDI could, for instance, boost the level of GDP per capita in the EU15 and Japan by 2 to 4 percentage points of GDP, through a better allocation and use of resources. Such estimates would be even larger should the dynamic gains associated with stronger innovation and technical change be factored in.

There are also good reasons to believe that higher GDP per capita improves welfare. As our study on "Alternative measures of well-being" suggests, high GDP per capita acts as a powerful "facilitator". It is strongly correlated with self-sufficiency, health, equity and possibly even the ability to peacefully overcome political conflicts. GDP per capita is not an all-encompassing indicator, however, as it is, for instance, only loosely related to certain dimensions of welfare such as social cohesion. All in all, GDP per capita is not the alpha and omega for welfare measurement but still it is certainly the best available yardstick. And there is a strong presumption that in areas such as health, education and equity there are still many needs that could be met through higher GDP.

*Jean-Philippe Cotis*
*OECD Chief Economist*

# The costs of failing to reform, with a focus on Europe

**Reforms can entail transitional costs but postponing them has larger, if hard to quantify, costs. One way to estimate these opportunity costs is to assume that countries adopt "best practice" in the relevant policy areas and to compute the implied GDP gains. Results vary considerably depending on the scope of the exercise and the methodology used but overall it appears that the costs associated with the failure to reform are substantial, notably in the case of Europe.**

### *Convergence within the OECD club has stalled…*

Europe economic catch-up came to a halt during the 1980s and was followed by a period of relative decline starting in the early 1990s, like in Japan. On current policies, and because of faster ageing, the lag in terms of GDP per capita is set to worsen.

**Convergence interrupted**

Trend indices, based on 2000 PPPs and 2000 prices [1]




1. The trend is calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter set to 100) over a period which includes projections through 2010.

Source: OECD *Annual National Accounts.*

### *…partly owing to a reform deficit*

Zooming in on Europe, this trend is partly related to the fact that with only a few exceptions labour market reforms have tended to stall. In contrast, more substantial progress has been achieved in recent years with product market reform. Even so, there is room to go further on that front. Research by the OECD Economics Department sheds light on the potential gains that more open product market competition can deliver. An evaluation was indeed carried out of the macroeconomic benefits that would arise from a large reduction of the barriers still inhibiting trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and product market entry in the United States, the EU15 and other OECD countries. The results illustrate that, while Europe may face political hurdles in its drive to open product and services markets, the economic rationale for such liberalisation remains compelling.

### *Benchmarks*

In order to quantify potential benefits, the OECD countries having, in one sector or another, the most flexible regulatory framework were identified as benchmarks. Then, the assumption was made that every country would align itself on "best practice" so defined. The barriers that were relaxed in this thought experiment comprised:

Product market regulations (PMRs), including barriers associated with state control of companies and state involvement in business operations in the form of barriers to start-ups, administrative opacity, barriers to competition and so forth. Clearly, PMRs are more of a hindrance in Europe than across the Atlantic, especially inward-oriented ones. That said, some EU countries score better than the United States on some PMRs, witness Ireland and the United Kingdom in the case of barriers to entrepreneurship.

Tariffs, including for agriculture. These are comparatively low on both sides of the Atlantic but they are more dispersed – and therefore more distortionary – in Europe.

Obstacles to FDI, particularly on foreign ownership, for example in the case of airlines. Barriers to FDI are if anything marginally lower in Europe but this partly reflects intra-EU freedom, except in the United Kingdom, where the regime is indiscriminately very open.

In all these areas, the OECD Economics Department has constructed a large number of structural policy indicators over the years. These have been used in panel data econometric analysis of the determinants of trade and FDI flows, employment and growth. Building upon this body of empirical evidence, the effects of dismantling barriers across OECD countries were estimated.

### *Caveats*

An important caveat, however is that this exercise quantified a deep rather than a broad cut in anti-competitive regulations, since it abstracted from most public interventions in agriculture, from all of the labour and financial market regulations, and from the distortions induced by welfare systems. Another caveat is that some of the indicators go back to the early 2000s, implying that if a lot has happened on the reform front since, the scope for gains from further reform may be overstated. In practice, however, this second caveat is in most cases a second-order one.

### *Methodologies*

Three alternative approaches were used to evaluate the gains from liberalisation: two empirical reduced-form econometric approaches and one more theoretical approach based on general equilibrium modelling.

The first approach was to explore how a reduction of domestic product market regulation and border barriers would affect trade and FDI flows, building on recent econometric work at the OECD, and then to estimate the impact of higher trade openness on economic efficiency and output. The useful rule of thumb here is that an increase in trade openness by 10 percentage points of GDP boosts the level of output by around 4%.

The second approach complements the first one and can be seen as a check. Here the focus is on productivity and output gains to be obtained by reducing domestic PMR. Past OECD research has shown that lower PMR stimulates competition, innovation and ultimately total factor productivity. Higher productivity in turn spurs additional investment. More concretely, this research has suggested that, in those sectors and countries where the regulatory framework is most rigid, aligning regulation on best, flexible, practice could increase output by some 10%.

The third approach, based on general equilibrium, is less empirical but allows for a more complete and transparent assessment of the overall impact of liberalisation, since it explicitly takes into account international feedback effects, which are key to evaluate cross-border spillovers.

### *The estimated gains are substantial...*

The results suggest that the potential benefits are substantial, with international trade receiving a major boost:

For the EU15 as a whole, GDP per capita would be boosted by 2¼ to 4¼ per cent, depending on the analytical approach used to estimate the gains. This is equivalent to up to a good two years of growth at trend.

For the United States, the estimates span a wider range, of a bit above 1% all the way to 4¾ per cent. The relatively high upper bound reflects that in this case the United States benefit from the assumed greater competition in a number of sizeable non-EU partner countries.

Outside the EU15 and the United States, the gains are substantial as well, reaching up to 4% for OECD-Pacific countries, and even higher in Poland or Switzerland for example.

**Impact of reforms on GDP per capita levels via trade using OECD panel data studies: EU15 and US**

| | Bilateral tariffs reduction | FDI reduction | Regulatory reforms | All policies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 0.3 | 0.7 | 3.1 | 4.1 |
| Belgium | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| Denmark | 0.3 | 0.6 | 3.0 | 3.9 |
| Finland | 0.4 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 3.8 |
| France | 0.4 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 4.7 |
| Germany | 0.5 | 0.5 | 3.2 | 4.2 |
| Greece | 0.2 | 0.8 | 3.9 | 4.9 |
| Ireland | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Italy | 0.4 | 0.5 | 3.4 | 4.3 |
| Netherlands | 0.2 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 |
| Portugal | 0.2 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 4.4 |
| Spain | 0.2 | 0.7 | 3.7 | 4.7 |
| Sweden | 0.4 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 3.8 |
| United Kingdom | 0.5 | 0.5 | 3.1 | 4.1 |
| **United States** | **1.3** | **0.7** | **2.6** | **4.7** |
| **EU 15** | **0.4** | **0.5** | **3.2** | **4.2** |

Product market deregulation rather than tariff lowering would provide the bulk of the economic gains. This is consistent with the fact that today the main obstacles to trade are not classical tariff and non-tariff barriers, which are in any case rather small, but domestic product market regulations themselves, especially in services.

### ... and if anything, understated

These estimates of the gains from liberalisation err on the prudent side. Indeed, only the “static” gains associated with greater international trade specialisation and better resource allocation are factored in. The “dynamic” gains from liberalisation, which stem from the fact that more open product markets stimulate research, innovation and technical progress, were not brought into the picture.

Furthermore, and against the backdrop of the Doha Round travails, it should be underlined that this analysis abstracts from any policy changes outside the OECD area: the gains from reforms for OECD and non-OECD countries alike would obviously be amplified if reforms were also implemented elsewhere.

### *Sectoral implications*

Although this work did not formally model the sectoral consequences of reforms, it provided ample evidence of anti-competitive regulatory settings and of relatively high levels of protection in a range of service sectors and in agriculture. This suggests that the output gains outlined above will require ambitious reforms in these sectors, but with a focus that differs across countries:

Competition-restraining regulations in most EU15 countries would have to be lowered significantly in domestic air, rail and road transportation, electricity and gas, and telecommunications. In the United States, reform efforts would have to concentrate on electricity and rail transportation.

**Distance from best practice in selected countries and sectors**
(as of 2003)

| | Electricity | Gas | Telecom | Airlines | Rail | Road |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | X | | | | X | |
| Japan | X | X | | XX | XX | |
| Germany | X | | | | XX | |
| France | XX | XX | X | XX | XX | X |
| Italy | | X | | XX | X | XX |
| United Kingdom | | | | | | |
| OECD | X | X | | XX | XX | X |

A blank space means that regulation is close to best practice. X and XX indicate the extent of the required efforts to move from current regulation levels towards best practice levels.

The required easing of restrictions on FDI in the United States would be largest in transportation services, while in the European Union it would be particularly extensive in electricity generation.

Reductions in EU tariffs would have to be concentrated in agriculture. In the United States, tariff reductions would imply relatively more adjustment to rates of protection on textiles, apparel and other manufactured goods.

**Further reading:**

OECD Economics Department Working Papers Nos. 432 “The benefits of liberalising product markets and reducing barriers to international trade and investment: The case of the United States and the European Union”, and 463 “The benefits of liberalising product markets and reducing barriers to international trade and investment in the OECD”.

## Assessing performance: is GDP per capita a sufficient statistic?

**As an indicator of performance and well-being, GDP per capita suffers from a number of limitations. However, looking at a range of alternative measures of well-being, it turns out that many of them are in fact fairly closely correlated to this traditional indicator. While some others are not, they come with their own serious drawbacks, including as concerns timeliness, measurability and cross-country comparability. In the end, GDP therefore appears to be the least imperfect indicator of well-being, even if it needs to be supplemented by others to nuance and qualify cross-country comparisons.**

***GDP per capita as an indicator has limitations***

As an indicator of well-being, GDP suffers from many shortcomings, even when adjusted for purchasing power parity. For example, it does not incorporate environmental degradation, the value of leisure or the welfare consequences of differences in income distribution. Using GDP per capita as the exclusive indicator of well-being may therefore be misleading. One way to overcome this difficulty is to consider lower levels of GDP per capita as a problem only inasmuch as they reflect policy deficiencies rather than differences in societal choices. Alternatively, or rather in addition, it is worth scrutinising other indicators of well- or ill-being, as was done in the 2006 issue of *Going for Growth*.

***Income and consumption-based indicators point the same way, and so does the valuation of leisure***

Moving beyond GDP and production, income and consumption-based indicators better capture living standards. As it turns out, they do not alter the picture provided by GDP indicators much. The same holds for indicators netting out capital depreciation. Going one step further, GDP and income per capita can be adjusted for leisure time. Again, this only marginally alters countries’ ranking.

**Net income and GDP**
Annual average per cent growth rate between 1994 and 2003




*Source:* OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Countries,* 2005.

### Taking leisure into account

Relative to the United States




*Source:* OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Countries, 2005* and OECD Productivity database.

### *But strong aversion to income inequality can change the picture*

In contrast, an extremely strong degree of aversion to income inequality can flatten out cross-country differences in well-being or even significantly affect country rankings.

### Factoring in aversion to inequality




*Source:* OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Countries, 2005* and OECD questionnaire on income distribution and poverty.

### *Social indicators*

There is also an obvious case for broadening the scope of the indicators to include social ones. This was done focusing on self-sufficiency, equity, health and social cohesion. Concretely, for self-sufficiency, indicators such as the proportion of people living in jobless households, or the average number of years of schooling were taken into account. The equity dimension was captured by indicators such as child poverty rates or gender wage gaps. For health, the potential number of years of life lost as a result of accidents or preventable diseases, as well as "healthy" life expectancy at birth were used. Social cohesion was proxied using indicators such as participation in community activities or suicide rates.

Simple correlations suggest that self-sufficiency, equity and health tend to be stronger in countries where GDP is high. In contrast, social cohesion indicators such as sui cide and victimisation rates seem uncorrelated to GDP.

### *Subjective measures of well-being*

A *tour d'horizon* of welfare indicators would be incomplete without subjective measures of well-being. The latter are not always well correlated with each other

### Correlation with social indicators




1. Where higher values of the indicators denote worse social outcomes (*e.g.* infant mortality, denoted with a *) correlations with per capita income are shown with the opposite sign.
2. Changes between the first half of the 1980s to around 2000.
*Source*: OECD *Society at a Glance* and Boarini *et al.* (2006).

nor with GDP per capita. Strikingly, survey results show most people in most OECD countries rating themselves as fairly to very happy, irrespective of income. There is only a weak tendency in richer countries to report higher life satisfaction. However, countries with the lowest happiness also have below-average GDP per capita. Also, subjective measures seem to be more informative about relative rather about absolute individual well-being. Overall, both hard and subjective indicators suggest that starting from already high GDP levels, additional growth yields diminishing returns in terms of improved well-being.

### *Externalities*

Going beyond the choice of indicators, the relation between well-being and GDP is also affected by the existence of growth externalities, be they negative or positive. A prominent example of the former pertains to the environment. But then, richer societies can and typically do spend more on the mitigation of environmental stress. Less obviously perhaps, GDP growth may also have positive political externalities: insofar as conflicting claims on resources are easier to solve in an expanding economy, growth may be conducive to pluralism and democracy.

### *GDP is imperfect but hard to beat*

All in all, social and subjective indicators clearly add valuable information to that conveyed by GDP. But many of them are narrow, capturing only one dimension of well-being. And all have practical drawbacks, including availability, measurement and cross-country comparability problems. Hence, in the end, the least imperfect and most timely summary statistic of well-being remains GDP, even if other dimensions of welfare should be borne in mind as well.

### Further reading:


OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 476, "Alternative measures of well-being", by Romina Boarini, Åsa Johansson and Marco Mira D'Ercole.

# Recent Working Papers

**OECD Economics Department Working Papers**

**www.oecd.org/eco/working_papers**

No. 467: Coping with the inevitable adjustment in the US current account P. Jarrett

No. 468: Getting the most out of public-sector decentralisation in Korea R. Jones, T. Yokoyama

No. 469: The labour market in Korea: Enhancing flexibility and raising participation R. Jones

No. 470: Sustaining high growth through innovation: reforming the R&D and education systems in Korea Y. Baek, R. Jones

No. 471: Fast-falling barriers and growing concentration: the emergence of a private economy in China S. Dougherty, R. Herd

No. 472: Product market reforms and employment in OECD countries G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta

No. 473: Product market competition and economic performance in France J. Høj, M. Wise

No. 474: Reforming federal fiscal relations in Austria A. Fuentes, E. Wurzel, A. Wörgötter

No. 475: Recent house price developments: the role of fundamentals N. Girouard, M. Kennedy, P. van den Noord, C. André

No. 476: Alternative measures of well-being R. Boarini, Å. Johansson, M. Mira D'Ercole

No. 477: Projecting OECD health and long-term care expenditures: What are the main drivers?

No. 478: How to sustain growth in a resource based economy? The main concepts and their application to the Russian case R. Ahrend

### Reducing sickness absences in Sweden

One of Sweden's biggest economic problems is the high number of people absent from work due to sickness or disability. In the light of what other countries have done to reduce absenteeism, it appears that a mutual obligations approach to sickness insurance is advisable, placing greater responsibilities on the sick person, the employer and the social insurance office to get that person back to work as soon as possible.

***D. Rae (September 2005), "How to reduce sickness absences in Sweden: lessons from international experience ", No. 442***

### House prices and inflation in the euro area

The inflation measure used by the European Central Bank excludes housing costs borne by homeowners even though they make up more than a tenth of euro area household final consumption expenditure. Has this driven a wedge between the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) and the cost of living? A country-specific measure of the user cost of housing capital is constructed, taking into account property taxes but also the tax breaks enjoyed by homeowners on their mortgage repayments. The user cost measure is combined with the HICP to derive a "broad" inflation estimate. For the sake of comparison, an alternative estimate is put together using imputed rents. Owner-occupied housing costs do turn out to have an impact, but it varies noticeably with the method used to incorporate them into the price index.

***B. Cournède (October 2005) "House prices and inflation in the Euro Area", No. 450***

### Assessing the robustness of demographic projections in OECD countries

In order to assess the robustness of demographic projections to different assumptions on mortality, fertility and migration, a small-scale simulation model is built for 23 OECD countries, closely reproducing national projections under similar demographic assumptions. Up to 2020, projections are quite robust to alternative hypotheses. However, uncertainty about future longevity gains and fertility rates account for a large range of results for dependency ratios by 2050. A long-lasting surge in fertility may not be enough to fully offset the impact on dependency ratio of increases in longevity in line with past trends.

***F. Gonand (December 2005), "Assessing the robustness of demographic projections in OECD countries ", No. 464***

### Fiscal rules for sub-central governments: design and impact

Against a background of mounting demands for spending on services provided by sub-central governments, how can fiscal rules help ensure that pressure on resources is minimised and available resources are used efficiently? This paper gives a detailed picture of fiscal rules for sub-central governments in a number of OECD countries. It examines the rationales for fiscal rules, their potential impact, the factors making for effective implementation and the interactions between various types of rule. It then constructs synthetic sub-indicators to assess the extent to which sub-central government fiscal frameworks hinder or facilitate the achievement of fiscal objectives. It also proposes a composite indicator based on the combined impacts in the different fiscal policy areas.

***D. Sutherland, R. Price and I. Joumard (December 2005), "Fiscal rules for sub-central governments: design and impact", No. 465***

No. 479: Strengthening innovation in the Netherlands: making better use of knowledge creation in innovation activities D. Carey, E. Ernst, R. Oyomopito, J. Theisens

No. 480: The ageing challenge in Norway: ensuring a sustainable pension and welfare system B. Bellone, A. Bibbee

No. 481: Balancing health care quality and cost containment: the case of Norway A. Bibbee, F. Padrini

No. 482: Revised OECD methods for supply-side and medium-term assessment: a capital services approach P-O. Beffy, P. Ollivaud, P. Richardson, F. Sédillot

No. 483: Summary of a workshop on global convergence scenarios: structural and policy issues N. Vanston (rapporteur)

No. 484: Realising the oil supply potential of the CIS: the impact of institutions and policies R. Ahrend, W. Tompson

No. 485: Brazil's fiscal stance during 1995-2005: The effect of indebtedness on fiscal policy over the business cycle L. de Mello, D. Moccero

No. 486: Employment patterns in OECD countries: reassessing the role of policies and institutions A. Bassanini, R. Duval

No. 487: Maintaining Switzerland's top innovation capacity F. Jaumotte

No. 488: Are house prices nearing a peak? A probit analysis for 17 OECD countries P. van den Noord

No. 489: The Fiscal challenge in Portugal S. Guichard, W. Leibfritz

No. 490: Factors behind low long-term interest rates R. Ahrend, P. Catte, R. Price

## The labour market in Korea: Enhancing flexibility and raising participation

The Korean labour market suffers from increasing dualism and a need to encourage greater labour force participation. The rising proportion of non-regular workers lowers labour costs and enhances employment flexibility, but it negatively affects equity and efficiency over the long term. Relaxing employment protection for regular workers and increasing the coverage of the social safety net for non-regular ones would help limit the extent of dualism. Population ageing is projected to be exceptionally rapid in Korea, leading to a significant decline in the workforce by mid-century. Steps to boost the participation of women through family-friendly policies are a priority. It is also important to encourage employees to stay at firms beyond the age of 50. Making the wage system more dependent on productivity and less on seniority and implementing a company pension system in place of the retirement allowance would help.

***R. Jones (December 2005), "The labour market in Korea: Enhancing flexibility and raising participation", No. 469***

## Product market reforms and employment in OECD countries

The employment effects of product market reforms aimed at increasing competitive pressures and easing government controls are estimated in a sample of OECD countries over the past two decades. Account is taken of several labour market policies and institutions that are thought to influence equilibrium employment rates, and interactions between these policies and product market reforms are investigated. The potential complementarity of some labour and product market policies is also taken into account in the regressions. The results suggest that restrictive regulations have curbed employment rates significantly in countries where no product market reforms were implemented. These effects appear to have been magnified by the interaction of such regulations with labour market settings that provide a strong bargaining power to insiders, suggesting that rent sharing tends to depress employment. The implication is that significant employment gains can be obtained by deregulating product markets in overly regulated countries.

***G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (September 2005), "Product market reforms and employment in OECD countries", No. 472***

## Realising the CIS oil supply potential: impact of institutions and policies

The CIS region's oil sector potential is situated in the global context, and its country-specific structural features are analysed, notably the ways in which CIS oil industries have been organised and governed since 1991, as well as questions of transport infrastructure and export routes, which are especially critical for Central Asia's landlocked producers. The causes and likely consequences of the recent shift towards greater state ownership and control in Russia and Kazakhstan are assessed. These changes are shown to have increased the risk that the full hydrocarbon potential of the CIS may not be developed in a timely and economically efficient way.

***Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson (May 2006), "Realising the oil supply potential of the CIS: the impact of institutions and policies", No. 484.***

# Recent releases


Economics Department

[www.oecd.org/eco](www.oecd.org/eco)

*Postal address*
**2, rue André Pascal**
**75775 Paris Cedex 16**

*Visiting address*
**Tour Europe**
**33, place des Corolles**
**92049 Paris La Défense**

Fax : 01.44.30.63.76


All OECD publications are available from [www.oecdbookshop.org](www.oecdbookshop.org)

Or online via [www.SourceOECD.org](www.SourceOECD.org)







**OECD Economic Surveys (www.oecd.org/eco/country_surveys)**

This is the home page of ECO's country reports. Click and find Survey summaries. Recent ones are (including the topics analysed in depth):

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Luxembourg | - | Public finances, labour market, education, product market |
| Canada | - | Business environment, innovation, fiscal arrangements, labour market and social policy |
| Japan | - | Banking sector, fiscal consolidation, income inequality, innovation, integration in the world economy |
| Iceland | - | Monetary policy, fiscal management, financial system, education |
| Australia | - | Fiscal relations, infrastructure services, industrial relations, work incentives |
| Turkey | - | Informal sector, pensions, education, agriculture |
| Russia | - | Macroeconomic management, public administration reform, innovation, health care |
| Brazil | - | Macroeconomic consolidation, innovation, labour utilisation |

**Speeches and presentations (www.oecd.org/eco/speeches)**

- Economic growth and productivity, Nottingham, July 2006
- Interim press briefing on the economic outlook, Paris, September 2006
- Boosting incomes and jobs: The OECD strategy, New Delhi, September 2006
- The distortions of globalisation, Rimini, October 2006
- Comments on "Global economy and competitiveness", Milan, November 2006
- Press conference on the OECD Economic Outlook No. 80, Paris, November 2006
- The "Soaring Eagle": Poland's economic performance and challenges, Warsaw, November 2006

**Economic Studies (www.oecd.org/OecdEconomicStudies)**
**No. 41, 2005/2**

- Policies, institutions and fertility rates: a panel data analysis for OECD countries
- Are structural reforms the answer to global current account imbalances?
- A comparison of structural levels of productivity in the major industrialised countries
- Foreign affiliates in OECD economies: presence, performance and contribution to host countries' growth
- Sub-central government fiscal rules